Cardozo School of Law

Heavy Law/Light Law: Walter Benjamin, Friedrich Nietzsche, Robert Bork, Duncan Kennedy
Author(s): Joseph Jenkins
Source: Law and Literature, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 2005), pp. 249-268
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Cardozo School of Law
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 Heavy Law/Light Law
WALTER BENJAMIN, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,

ROBERT BORK, DUNCAN KENNEDY

JosephJenkins*

Thisarticlesuggeststhatlaw be thoughtof as a conflictedintergenerational bequest.Even themost

fair-sounding statement of law masks someone's that
desirousplea they be remembered. Theburden
of thisforebear'sdesire,its will tofoundfollowersin its own image, can be lightenedby sensitivity
to theforms throughwhichhistorymay be writtenand read.

Heavy law/light law is a critical perspective that emphasizes the inter-

generationalaspectof law,its qualityof bequeathingsomethingfromone gen-
erationto the next.A constitutionis sucha bequest.So, too, is theruleof a par-
ent, the statementof a teacher,andeven a poem foundin a library.Affect and
ambivalenceattachto these legacies. The child and the studentare reader/
recipientsof law,as is the attorneywho interpretsthe constitution.While the
writtennessof constitutionsand poems distinguishesthem from teachers'
ramblingsand most parentalrules, even oral laws (and stories) involve a
speaker'swill to leave a markon futuregenerations.
This structureof desireis elaboratedat lengthin JacquesDerrida'sLa carte
postale:that which repeats,to some extent in all speakers,is the impulse to
thinkthe self as individualfounderof followers.'The continuingexistenceof
thisstructureimpugnsall seeminglyrationalpoliticalenunciations;all of these
arenow likelyto involve a kindof hidden,desirous,conflictof intereston the
partof the enunciator.This is a conflictalso elaboratedby JacquesLacan(in

Law &Literature,Vol.17, Issue 2, pp. 249-268. IssN 1535-685x,electronic IssN 1541-2601.

? 2005 by The Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. All rights reserved. Please direct all
requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California
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249
Law & Literature * Volume 1 7, Number 2

terms of the "obscenefather").2The politicalleader,the family father,the

school teacher,in fact anyonewho uses words or signs to provokeeffects in
others-all are suspect when they seek to asserttheir wills over followers.
The challengebecomes, in the shadowof these suspicions,to suggest guide-
lines for a politicalpracticethatdoes not fall into quietism.
Heavy law/light law is a provisionalaxis of critiquethat respondsto this
challenge.Humaninteractionsare here viewed as givings and receivingsof
law.A speech-actis the giving of law;being affectedby it is a receivingof law.
Emotion,gestures,practices,andso forthcanconstituteall or partof law giv-
ing acts.Effectsof thesetransactionsincludeneuroses.A law giving actis defi-
ned as "heavy"to the extentit is involved with the tendencyof a speakerto
think of him/herself as founderof one or more followers. To the extent it
avoidsthis, it is "light."
Fromthis criticalperspective,the potentialpoliticalactoris a readerof his-
tory in the broadestsense. The mannerin which s/he reads makes all the
difference.WalterBenjamin'swritings warn of the "catastrophic"dangers
of reading history as an unbrokenline. Such readings, according to Ben-
jamin,producecertainimplicationsthroughtheirform alone. By choosing--
among infinitepossibilities-only certainfacts or events, and by arranging
these in accordancewith a local articulatorylogic of cause and effect, the
suggestion of a certaininevitabilitycan be given to almost any status quo.
The status quo becomes the end of the story in the mind of the reader.At
worst the impressioncan be given that all that has come before was a single
uninterruptedchainof eventsdedicatedto a positiveprogression(the flower-
ing of a root origin) predestinedto achievethe glory of the rulingclass.Such
a readerof history,even if s/he meanswell, is incapableof a light-lawgesture
towardthe outsider.With missionaryzeal,s/he will try to "teach"the "disad-
vantaged"strangerthe "true"meaningof "progress"and "civilization."Per-
haps one day s/he will lose patience and slap the student who learns too
slowly.
An alternativeway of readingavoidspre-supposinga linearform for his-
tory. Emphasisis given to the fracture,the break, suspension,ellipsis. This
makesthe historian'sjob muchharderbecauseeverythingbecomes relevant,
especiallythose things thatwere discarded(or concealed)in the catastrophic
historian'sattemptto hammerchosen items into a coherentnarrativewith a
beginning, middle, and end. Giorgio Agamben, a particularlycompelling
readerof Benjamin,goes so far as to describethe breadthof the historian's

250
 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

responsibility(i.e., the responsibilityof all those who take seriously their

participationin politics)in the followingimpossible-to-meetterms:

Thereis a force,anoperation of theforgottenthatcannotbe measured interms

of consciousmemory,norcanit be accumulated asknowledge; ratherits insis-
tencedetermines therangeof everyknowing.Thatwhichthelostdemandsis
nottoberecorded andcommemorated, butratherto remaininusandwithusas
for
forgotten-anduniquely this,unforgettable.
... [T]hetraditionof theunforgettable is nota tradition-it is ratherthat
whichcounter-signs everytradition witha markof infamyorgloryand,some-
times,of bothtogether.
... [Whatis needed]is thecapacityto remainfaithfulto thatwhich--even
incessantly forgotten-mustremainunforgettable, insistson remaining in some
way with us, to be still-for us-in some way possible. respondto this
To
exigency is the sole historicalresponsibility I wouldfeelmyselfto assume
that
unconditionally.3

Agamben's"forgotten"is the limit case of the almostforgotten,the insigni-

ficantfroma certaininsider'sperspective.The significanceof these "insignifi-
cant"items,to historyreaders(law-receivers)like BenjaminandAgamben,is
importantlyrelatedto theseitems'potentialto subvertthe insider'sjustificatory
narrativeline.
Butit is not enoughto say,"Let'sgive theseitemssignificance."They must
be communicatedthroughform, knowingly or not. Benjamin'sconcern for
the politicalrelevanceof form is apparentthroughouthis writings.The prac-
ticetheremadeevidentinvolvesa certainkindof meditation overwhatBen-
jamincalls"ideaconstellations." Thisis anunhurried practice,rhythmicand
repetitive,through which thereader/writer considerspossiblemeaningcon-
nectionsamongcitations/events (includingseemingly ones)sepa-
insignificant
ratedbyspaceandtime.Throughtheprocessof suchmeditations (includingthe
continuingcollectionof citationsto whichthereader/writer respondsunder
idea
differingcircumstances) constellations, which are alwaysprovisional,
change.Themovement of theseideasspeaksnotonlytothehistoricalmoments
referenced in thecitations,butalsoto themomentthatincludesthereader/
writer.The reader/writer as is his/herthinking.The
herselfis provisional,
recognition thatthoughts(including cannotpossiblyhave
ideaconstellations)
importance, or evenrelevance,beyonda certainlimitednumberof moments
lends dignity to, or at least a dignifiedacceptanceof, passing.Benjamincon-
veys this, at one point, throughan explanationof the "dialecticalimage":

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Law & Literature * Volume 1 7, Number 2

It is notthatwhatis pastcastsitslighton whatis present,orwhatis presentits

lightonwhatispast;rather,imageis thatwhereinwhathasbeencomestogether
in a flashwiththenowto forma constellation. Inotherwords:imageis dialec-
Forwhiletherelationof thepresentto thepastis purelytem-
ticsata standstill.
poral,the relationof what-has-been to thenow is dialectical:
not temporalin
naturebutfigural[bildlich].Only dialectical are
images genuinelyhistorical-
thatis,notarchaic-images.Theimagethatis read-which is to say,theimage
inthenowof itsrecognizability-bears to thehighestdegreetheimprintof the
perilous critical
moment on which allreadingis founded.4

The formalelements5relevantto Benjamin'spracticeare not strictlylim-

ited to those he tracedon pages. The "form"he gave to his practicemode-
collecting citations,contemplating,writing and re-writing-made possible
the formal qualitiesreadablefrom the pages he left behind. These pages, in
the Passagen-Werknotebookson Parisin the nineteenthcentury,revealun-
finishedlists of citationsgrouped(and re-grouped)undercategoriesof less-
than-obviousconnectednessandpoliticalsignificance,suchas Fashion;Dream
House, Museums,Spa;and Idleness(KonvoluteB, L, m).' The pages reveala
formal quality that is fragmented,disjunctive,provisional,suspended;and
they have generateda tremendousamountof scholarlywork. Such writing
departsfrom linearnarrativeform, but nonethelessprovidesindicationsthat
may assistthe readerin makingsenseof the fragments.Benjamin,in a passage
often cited, remarksthatthe best kind of book would containcitationsonly,
with none of the author'sown wordsadded.7This is not to say thatthe author,
even of suchan exceptionalbook, would haveabsentedhim/herself entirely.
There would stillbe a certainsubjectiveelement,a certainform-imposingvi-
olenceperpetratedthroughthe choiceandjuxtapositionof the fragments.But
Benjamin'spracticeis sensitive to that violence; active participationby the
readeris encouraged,almost as a means of his/her defense. Sensitivity to
the violence of the word is evidencedas well in Benjamin'sruminationson
language:acts of judging, and the abstractionsthat facilitatethem, are for
Benjamincomplicitwith the fall of man.8
Benjamin'spracticehasinspiredthisarticle'sparticularregardfor lightness
of law. Benjaminpassesdown to his readersa self-effacingmode of practice,
ratherthan a set of judgments,prescriptions,and proscriptions.The reader
(law-receiver)of Benjamin,to the extent s/he engages in a similarpractice
mode, does so out of an active,positiveregardfor thatmode, ratherthanas an
effectof coercion.The dignityinheringin thispracticemode foregoesa striv-

252
 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

ing for individualsignificance-as putativefounderof cominggenerations-

in favorof takinga passingpartin the movementof ideas.While the practice
of perfectlylight law giving remainsimpossible(therewill alwaysbe at leasta
traceof violence in the word, and even in the attractivepracticemodel), such
a practicemode can be considereda limit towardwhich the law-giver may
aspire.

LIGHT-LAW PRACTICE AMONG HEAVY-LAW

NEIGHBORS: THE UNLIKELY PROBLEM OF
THE QUIETIST DESPOT

Light-lawpracticemaybe criticizedas quietist.In a worldof oppressivepoli-

tics andmaterialdeprivations,sucha practicemay seeman aestheticistescape.
In responseto thesecriticisms,it is usefulto considerthe affinitiesof light-law
giving with Nietzscheanethics. The latterhave raised,for some, concernsof
a fardifferentkind:thatthose personsinfluencedby the "will-to-power"idea
may taketoo muchinto theirown hands.This sectionreads,froma light-law
perspective,the "SecondEssay"of FriederichNietzsche's OntheGenealogyof
Morals,' and considersqualitiessharedbetween Nietzscheanethics and Ben-
jaminianpractice.Whatthese have in common recommendslight-lawgiving
and answersthe concernsjustdescribed.
Nietzsche and Benjaminshare the view that history should be read as a
fracturedfield. This is what is at stake,for example,in section 12 of the "Sec-
ond Essay." Nietzsche rebukes contemporarysciences for foregrounding
actionsof "adaptation"[Anpassung] by individualmembers-which he views
as a backgroundphenomenon[Aktiviti'tiweiten Ranges;activityof secondary
importance]-while these same sciences shrinkfrom recognizingan extra-
individualwill-to-powerthatpertainsto life in general[das WesendesLebens...
sein Wille(urMacht].To foregroundadaptationis, in effect,to focus on a nar-
rative line, that is, on individuallinear articulations(stories) of cause and
effect.The protagonist,oftenin a kindof Bildungsroman, encountersobstacles
and "from them learns and grows." Adaptingto these obstacleseventually
makes him "who he is." But from the beginning the aim has remainedthe
same:to grow toward"successful"adulthood.The lack of definitionof what
success is enablesthe illusion that the protagonist'saim ("success,"or some
similarterm,usuallywith moralconnotations)is the reasonfor which he has

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come into existence. This illusion resembles Nietzsche's "hand as made for
grasping," a striking image of a mistaken view:

No matterhow well one has understood the usefulnessof any physiological

organ (or, for that matter,legal institution,social custom, political practice,
artisticor religiousform), one has learntnothingaboutits originin the process.
I maintainthis view regardlessof the discomfortand displeasureit might cause
to older ears-since from time immemorialit had been believed thatin under-
standingthe ascertainableaims and use of a thing, a form, an institution,one
also understoodwhy it had come into existence-thus the eye was understood
as madefor seeing, the handas madefor grasping.'i

Nietzsche's idea of der Wille urMacht is aperspective:one that foregrounds

the forces that fracture the linear narrative of adaptation just described.
Despite the tyrannical images the term may conjure for some, Nietzsche's will
to power is politically aligned with the outsider threatened by catastrophic his-
toriography: the narrative line that focuses on a certain chosen individual (or
in-group) while sweeping "insignificant" items, including outsiders, under
the carpet. Note in the following how Nietzsche substitutes aforegrounding of
"causes that do not themselves necessarily stand in relation to one another"
for his contemporaries' emphasis on cause and effect relationships, without at
all denying that cause-effect transactions (adaptations) do occur. Causes-not-
in-relation are the fractures in the narrative line, and their foregrounding is
precisely the other of individual self-centeredness.

Butall aims,all uses aremerelysignsindicatingthata will to powerhasmastered

something less powerful than itself and impressedthe meaning of a function
upon it in accordancewith its own interests.So the entirehistory of a "thing,"
anorgan,a custommaytakethe formof anextendedchainof signs,of ever-new
interpretationsand manipulations,whose causesdo not themselvesnecessarily
standin relationto one another,but merelyfollow andreplaceone anotherarbi-
trarilyandaccordingto circumstance.The "development"of a thing,a custom,
an organdoes not in the leastresembleaprogressus towardsa goal, andeven less
the logicalandshortestprogressus,the mosteconomicalin termsof expenditureof
force and cost. Rather,this developmentassumesthe form of successionof the
moreor less far-reaching,moreor less independentprocessesof over-powering
thataffectit-including also in each case the resistancemarshaledagainstthese
processes,thechangesof formattemptedwitha view to defenceandreaction,and
the resultsof thesesuccessfulcounteractions.Theformisfluid, butthe "meaning"
evenmoreso ..."

254
 Jenkins * Heavy LawlLight Law

This idea of fluidmeaningmay be troublingto those historianswho seek

fixedfoundations.It is more comfortingto believe thatcertainimportantdoc-
uments,suchas the U.S. Constitution,containdefinitivemeanings.Underthis
view, subsequentinterpretationsconstitutethe "progress"or "flowering"of
the originalmeaning,the fulfillingof a potentialthatwas alwaysthere from
the start;false interpretationsmay usurp,but originalmeaning"willre-arise,
duringbettertimes."l2The originaldocumentcan thusbe laudedfor produc-
ing the stability(andprosperity)enjoyedby its followers.
This view is extremelyproblematic.Unlikethe "fluid"meaningelaborated
by Nietzsche, this view implies a pre-establishedteleology that shares the
dangerous-to-outsidersformalqualitiesof the linearnarrative:it focuses on
an individual"thing"to the exclusionof all others.Otherwiseput,it readshis-
tory as a closed form, ratherthana fracturedfield, and therebyperpetratesa
violence of exclusion (an exclusion from consideration)with respect to all
perspectives,all notionsoutsidethatform.
Even wherethe perspectiveinvolvedis widely admired,as is the U.S. Con-
stitution, the readingof it as the origin of a closed field of meaning is dan-
gerous. This kind of linear narrativization-the image of the protagonist
(originalconstitutionalmeaning,the spiritof the foundingfathersanthropo-
morphizedinto a hero) "re-arising"in all his originalintegrityfollowing his
travails-is precisely the kind of rhetoricalenchantmentthat can blind the
inattentivereaderto the precariousposition of those excluded:for example,
those who do not happento agree with the meaningbelieved by some to be
"original."
There is also a certainviolence wroughtin obtainingconsensuson "origi-
nal"meaning.It is wroughteven on those who arebroughtinto thatconsen-
sus, as can be read not only from this "SecondEssay" (appearingin 1887),
but from writingsas distantin time as Nietzsche's "On Truthand Lie in an
Extra-MoralSense"(1873):

Westilldo notknowwheretheurgefortruth[e.g.,"original" meaning]comes

from;forasyetwe haveheardonlyof theobligationimposedby societythatit
shouldexist:to be truthfulmeansusingthecustomarymetaphors-inmoral
terms:theobligationto lie accordingto fixedconvention,to lie herd-likein a
styleobligatoryforall."3

It is unquestionablypossibleto takereadingandwritingseriously,as of course

Nietzsche did, without viewing a particulartext received from history as

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Law & Literature * Volume 17, Number 2

"authoritative." While it may be practicalanduseful to enactlaws aimingfor

conformancewith a previouslywrittenconstitution,this is preciselythe type
of Aktivitiit weitenRanges(activityof secondaryimportance)thatNietzsche
arguesshouldnot be foregrounded.Suchlegalenactmentsinvolvecause-and-
effect relationshipsthat produce subjects'adaptations(effect) to laws pro-
nouncedandenforced(cause).The event morecrucialto keepin focus occurs
when causesthat are not directlyrelatedclash-for example,when a certain
contingent,fracturedfieldof reader/law-receivers,who have takenseriously
the importanceof readinghistory in the ways discussedabove throughBen-
jaminand Agamben,decide that currentcodificationsof justiceare not ade-
quate.Despite the greaterfrequencyof usefulcause-and-effectadaptationsto
law, awarenessof the clash of causes-not-directly-related provides crucial
protectionagainsttyranny.
Sections 19 and 20 of the "SecondEssay"are particularlyrelevantto this
discussion.HereNietzschediscussesthe relationshipof thepresentgeneration
At the openingof section 19, he argues
to those who camebefore [ Vorfahren].
that the "privatelegal relationshipbetween debtor and creditor"has been
interpretedinto relationshipswith Vorfahren.
Earlier,in the closing passageof
section 8, Nietzsche has describedthe debtor-creditorrelationshipin these
less thanflatteringterms:

Buyingandselling,togetherwiththepsychologywhichaccompanies them,are
olderthaneventhebeginningsof anysocialformof organization andassocia-
tion.It wasfromthemostrudimentary formof personallawthatthebudding
senseof exchange,contract,debt,law,obligation,andcompensation firsttrans-
lateditselfintothecrudestandearliestsocialcomplexes(intheirrelationship to
similarcomplexes),alongwiththehabitof comparing, andcalculating
measuring,
power in to
relationship power.The eye was now adjustedto thisperspective:
andwiththatclumsyconsistency whichispeculiar to thethinkingof mankind in
earliertimes,a thinkingwhichis slow to get underway,but whichonce in
motioncontinuesrelentlesslyinthesamedirection, onesoonarrivesatthegreat
generalization:'Everythinghasitsprice;everythingcanbepaidoff'--the earli-
est and most naive canon of moraljustice [naivstenMoral-Kanonder Gerech-
tigkeit],the beginningof all "neighborliness,"
all "fairness"[Billigkeit],
all
all
"goodwill," "objectivity" on earth. at
Justice[Gerechtigkeit]theearliest
stage
of itsdevelopment is thegoodwillthatprevailsamongthoseof roughlyequal
power[unterungefalrGleichmiichtigen] to cometo termswithone another,to
"come to anunderstanding"oncemorethrougha settlement-andtoforcethose

256
 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

who areless powerfulto agreea settlementamong themselves[sichmiteinander

"-und, in Bejug auf
abqufnden,sichdurcheinenAusgleichwieder?u "verst'dndigen
diese
wenigerMidchtige, untersich(u einem u
Ausgleich jwingen].'4

Nietzsche here attributes to "crude" and "clumsy" habits the kind of thinking
limited to a buy-sell, creditor-debtor mentality, a thinking limited to "the habit
of comparing, measuring, and calculating power in relationship to power." Such
thinking, along with its forcing of those less powerful to conform with it, re-
mains within the second-order realm of cause-effect adaptationdescribed above.
This is also the kind of thinking that goes with the idea of a debt to the
founding fathers. When he later writes that the "private legal relationship
between debtor and creditor" has been interpreted into relationships with Vor-
fahren, Nietzsche makes reference to an interpretation based on the crude and
clumsy habits of thinking he has described in section 8:

"generation"or "genera-
Here the convictionprevailsthatthe race [GescAlecht;
tions"]'5only exists by virtue of nur
[durchaus durch;perhaps"endure(s)only
through"] the sacrificeand achievements those
of the forefathers[Vorfahren;
who camebefore(ungendered)]-and thatone is obligedto repaythemthrough
sacrificeand achievements:a debtis recognized that gnaws incessantly [man
erkenntsomiteineSchuldan, die dadurchnochbestdndiganwiichst;recognitionof
debt/guilt, steadilygrowing]by virtueof the factthatthese forefathers[Ahnen;
ancestors(ungendered)],in theircontinuedexistence [Fort-existence; forward-
as
existence] powerfulspirits, never cease to grant the race new advantagesand
advancesin strength.
According to this kind of logic, thefear of the forefather[Furchtvordem
Ahnherrn; dreadbeforeancestors]andof his power,the consciousnessof indebt-
ednesstowardshim necessarilyincreasesin exactproportionas the powerof the
race[MachtdesGeschlechts; powerof the generations]itself increases,as the race
[Geschlecht]itself becomesever-more victorious,independent,respected,feared.
And not somehow the otherway around![Nichtetwaumgekehrt.]'6

The "Second Essay," read in its entirety, exhorts the reader to turn their think-
ing around; this turning around has much in common with Benjamin's
emphasis on the readerof history (the law-receiver, the generation that fol-
lows) and with his warning against "catastrophic" narrative (narrative fixed
tightly to an imagined founding moment). Nietzsche proceeds to link fear/
debt/guilt toward the Vorfa/r (forebear) to fear/debt/guilt toward any god
(including the Christian God). Then the link is made: Vorfa/r-god-fixed-

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Law & Literature * Volume 1 7, Number 2

ideal-of-any-kind.In the finalsection, the narratorpassesthe baton to einem

"Zukiinftigeren"--ayounger,more "futurish"type-thus performinga will-
ingness thathe himself disappearinto silence.This is a passinginto the fluidity
of meaningthatNietzschehas arguedthroughout:

The justice[Gerechtigkeit] whichbeganwith:"Everything can be paidoff,

everything must be paidoff," ends with a look theotherway thosewhoare
as
unableto pay areallowedto runfree-it endsas everygood thingon earth
ends,by canceling itselfout[sichselbstaufjebendj.Thisself-cancellation
of jus-
tice:thebeautifulnameit goesby is wellenoughknown-grace[Gnade]; need-
lessto say,it remainstheprerogative of themostpowerfulman,evenbetterhis
domainbeyondthe law [... Gnade;sie bleibt,wiesic yvonselbstversteht,das Vor-
rechtdesMdchtigsten,bessernoch,seinjenseits desRechts].17

Note that the individualized"mostpowerfulman"is entirelythe productof

Smith'stranslation.In the Germanthere is grace understandingitself as the
before-the-lawor beyond-the-lawof the mightiest.•"The territoryis lawless;
thereis no authorityhere to dictatewhat is right and what is wrong. But nei-
therdoes therereignan arbitraryrelativismbasedon individualinterest.The
legal commentator/critic,banishedto this insecureterrainoutside the law,
mustreadandwritehistorywith impossiblebreadthandimpossiblesensitivity
to form-and take a position, makea decision, even though s/he could not
possiblybe ready."
Sucha critic(law-receiver)lightensthe law passeddown to her/him by the
way s/he reads it and writes. This is both an active practiceand an active
model of practice.The growth of such a practicemode amongwidergroups
of people, fracturingmeaningin disagreementamong themselves,can con-
ceivably facilitatechangeby mass movementaffectinglegislation-and can
perhapstherebydeter more violent confrontationsbetween hardenedposi-
tions. The commonalternativeto this mode of practiceis for some individual
or in-groupto takeit upon themselvesto represent the interestsof others.Rep-
resentation,too, is a closed form thatat leastto some extentmust sweep those
others' interestsunder the carpet,regardlessof the representative's"good"
intent. That which might seem unpatrioticto some ("not enough respectfor
authoritieslike the Constitution")might in fact preservedemocraticinstitu-
tions by lighteningthem. Lightlaw is malleablewhile heavy law mustbe bro-
ken. Farfroma frighteningfigureof suddenviolentoutburst,the Nietzschean
Ubermensch (a typeof humanbeing beyondthatof today) could be (butby no

258
 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

meanswill certainlybe) a memberof an open, fracturedgroup of light-law

reader/writersthat has become so prevalentthat its memberscan be called
typicalof humanity.That indeedwould be a stateof grace.

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A CASE

STUDY IN LIGHT-LAW THINKING

Controversiessurroundingjudicialreview may benefitfrom light-lawthink-

ing. If, for example,one assumes,along with JusticeRobertBork,thata U.S.
court's authorityto invalidatea legislative act derives solely from the U.S.
Constitution,then such a courtwould be obligatedto enforcea duly adopted
statute,no matterhow discriminatorythe statutemay seem, unlessthe court
"candemonstratein reasonedopinionsthat it has ... a valid theory,derived
fromthe Constitution,of the respectivespheresof majorityandminorityfree-
dom."20 ForBork,the framersprovidedonly in specificinstancesexceptionsto
the generalprincipleof majority(legislative)rule. Unless a courtcanpoint to
one of these exceptions,to invalidatea statuteis merelyto imposethe court's
"ownvaluechoices"(I 5) over those of the majority(reflectedin legislation).
Bork'spositionis a readingof legal historyin the "catastrophic" form of a
straight-line narrative.Authority for action derives solely from referenceto
a single document adopted in a moment past. No possibility of ruptureis
admittedbetween the foundingdocumentand Bork'sreadingof it. He fore-
goes reviewof the impossiblywide fieldof historicaltextsrelevantto the issue
thathas broughtlitigantsto court(say,the rightof a womanto have an abor-
tion even where a legislatureordersher not to do so). No medicalevidence
would be permitted,no sociological researchas to what becomes of unwed
mothersandtheirchildren.(Bringthese studiesto the legislature,Borkwould
recommend.)This is more thana "foregrounding"of local cause-effectartic-
ulations(where the Constitutionis seen as the cause;the judge's opinion as
directeffect);it is a completedisregardof everythingelse. And, to the extenta
criticwould takeissue with this exclusivefocus, Borkimplies-and none too
subtly-that such a criticis a traitor:

[A]courtthatmakesratherthanimplements with
valuechoicescannotbesquared
thepresuppositions
of a democratic The
society. manwho understands
theissues
andnevertheless
insistsupontherightnessof theWarrenCourt'sperformance

259
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oughtalso,if he is candid,to admitthathe is prepared to sacrificedemocratic

process to his own moral views. He claimsfor the SupremeCourtan institu-
tionalizedroleasperpetrator of limitedcoupsd'etat.... Themanwhoprefers
resultsto processeshasno reasonto saythattheCourtis morelegitimatethan
anyotherinstitution. If theCourtwillnotlisten,whynotarguethecaseto some
othergroup,saytheJointChiefsof Staff,a bodywithratherbettermeansfor
implementing itsdecisions?2'

For Bork,legitimacycan only derivefromadherenceto conditionsset in a

foundingmoment.Any deviationis a kind of treason.This is much like the
"crudeandclumsyhabitsof thinking"describedby Nietzsche:the conviction
thatour successesare indebtedto our ancestors;and thefear that our advan-
tages may be revokedif we displeasetheirpowerfulspirits.It may be, rather,
thatcertainreadersof the Constitution,in the morethantwo centuriessinceits
adoption,have engaged in "moreor less far-reaching,more or less indepen-
dent processesof over-poweringwhich affect it [affectthe Constitution]."22
And it may be that legitimacy-grantingauthority,which Bork feels resides
solely in the Constitution,in fact residespartlyin (better:in factis a rhetorical
effectfacilitatedat leastpartlyby) these reader/interpreters.
This is not to say thatthe separationof powers,obedienceto the ruleof law,
should be disposed of lightly. To the contrary,the responsibilityfor taking
such a dangerousplunge would be enormous.But politicaleffect can be had
nonetheless,withoutthe extremestepof declaringrevolution.The ruleof law
canbe saidto remainintact,on a questionof Constitutionalinterpretation,by
citing John Marshallor BenjaminCardozo,for example-or Earl Warren
himself. Where this is done, creditfor any authorityeffectsproducedmustbe
sharedwithMarshallor Cardojoor Warrenby the FoundingFathers'spirits.
And for those who may be shocked that authority here is reduced to a
mere rhetoricaleffect,it shouldbe noted that Borkhimself foundit necessary
to appeal to "popularunderstanding"of the SupremeCourt's role. Bork's
concern is that "the Supreme Court's power to governrests upon popular
acceptanceof" Bork's"principled"model, which he opposes to "thevalue-
choosing role of the WarrenCourt."23 But Bork must admit (despite his
unease)24 that what is at stake in the Court's "powerto govern" is nothing
more thanconvincingothersthat it is legitimate,and therebypersuadingthem
to obey.
DuncanKennedy,in A Critiqueof Adjudication, exploresthe consequences
of a particularU.S.legal historyin whichjudges'decisionsaresaidto be based

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on a principled"application"of rules provided from elsewhere(by federal

and state constitutions,legislative and regulatoryenactments,and binding
precedents),while in fact thereis much room for judgesto maneuver.25 The
particularity of U.S. to
legal history, according Kennedy, is that judicial
supremacyfollowing Marbury v. Madison has placed enormous stakes in the
hands of judges. The ability to deploy these stakesdependsupon use of an
argumentwith formalisticcharacteristics(i.e., the argumentthat the court is
merely "applyingin a principledmanner"rulesimposedfrom elsewhere,and
is notitself actingin the mannerof a legislature).Becauseeachof the two prin-
cipal U.S. ideologicalgroupings("conservatism"and "liberalism")has found
itself, at one momentor another,in controlof the U.S. SupremeCourtwhile
the other group holds a legislativemajority,each has had occasion both to
makethe formalisticargumentand to engage in what Kennedycalls "internal
critique"of it. For example,in the late nineteenthcentury,legislativeenact-
ments of labor and agrarianreforms were struck down by a conservative
Court in the name of owners' constitutionallyprotected"propertyrights."
Confrontingthis, the liberal-backed"legalrealist"movementchallengedthe
deductivereasoning(thepurportedlyconstrainedapplicationof a ruleimposed
from elsewhere) of each conservativelegal opinion as it was issued. And
becauseit was often compellinglyarguedthata particularchainof deductive
reasoning,employedin a legal opinion,in fact didnotconstrainthe judgeto a
particularresult,the practiceof supplementingdeductivereasoningwithpol-
icy arguments(a conflatedrealmbetween solid judicial"application"of law
and prohibited"judiciallegislation")becamemorewidespread.
DuncanKennedydescribesall of thisas the spreadof a kindof "virus"that
would eventuallysap faith,at leastin a significantpartof U.S. legal academia,
in the determinacyof legal reasoning.Thetablesturnedsubstantially,accord-
ing to Kennedy'shistory,followingWorldWarII. Now activistliberalCourts
were forcedto defendagainstargumentsvery similarto those they had them-
selves deployedbefore the war. In the 1930s, a conservativeCourt had been
strikingdown New Deal legislationon behalf of "propertyrights,"andliberal
criticshadbeen decryingthisas "judiciallegislation."Now, postwar"internal
critique"(of purportedlyconstraineddeductionfromimposedrules)became
a conservativeratherthan a liberalweapon, while liberalsdid their best to
"reaffirm... the possibilityof judicialneutralityand the distinctionbetween
law and politics."26Arguments now tended to focus on the question of
whethera rightcouldbe "absolute"and,if not, on the balancingof rights.Still

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Law & Literature * Volume 1 7, Number 2

later,followingtheturbulence of theI96os,a hostof new"rights" claimspro-

liferated: "rights" based on the"identities"
of that
groups alignedthemselves
accordingto commonexperiences of oppression.
As a resultof theseandotherevents,accordingto Kennedy, theideaof a
"right"asan"absolute" wasputseriouslyintoquestion.No longer,forsome
in legalacademia,couldthe "right"be viewedas an untouchable, objective
"fact,"as an ontologicalcategoryaboveandbeyondthe mere(disputable,
subjective) valuejudgmentthata certaininterestdeservespriorityoverother
intereststhatmaybeopposedto it. Ineffect,lossof faithinlegalreasoning had
migrated over to a similar
lossof faithin as
"rights" anabsolute.
Alreadyit canbe seenthatKennedy's readingof U.S.legalhistorylightens
the law thatBorktriedto handdown.In the contextof Kennedy'shistory,
Bork'srhetoricof airtight"principle"-lacedwithsteelyaccusation against
any who woulddarere-openthe questionof minorityrights(supposedly
answeredconclusively by theFoundingFatherstwocenturiesago,atleastfor
anyoneLoyal to his Country...)-is butanotherin a longseriesof formalist
arguments deployed(or decried,dependingon thecircumstances) forideo-
logicalpurposes.
Thisis notto saythatKennedyhasgonefarenough.Thelight-lawreader
canneverreachher aim:to readhistorywith impossiblebreadthandwith
impossiblesensitivityto form.Nonetheless,Kennedy'sworkis extremely
light.It is a historynotof concretediscoveries, butof rhetoricaleffects,emo-
tionaloccurrences, whichtendto becomemorewidelyexperienced atcertain
moments.Forinstance,

Onewaytolookatthehistory of American is intermsof shifts

legalthought
overtimeinthelevelof abstraction
atwhichit hasseemedplausiblethatlegal
conceptshavethe to
power generate
"operative" validsubrules.
deductively
BeforetheCivilWar,nondeductiveargument waswidelydeployed to resolve
that
questions got resolved after
deductively thatwar,andwere then againput
intothedomainof policybythesociological andrealists.27
jurisprudes
Farfroma sensethatourancestorshaveshownus the way,the impression
givenhereis one of vicissitudes,
ideasin interplaywithcircumstances,
with
outcomesneverquitecertain.
Kennedyfurtherbroadenshis historyby particularizing U.S.experience
againstBritishand continentalEuropeanperspectives.He claims,for exam-
ple, thatFrenchand Italiancivil law systemsdid not determinestakesthrough

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 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

adjudicationto the extent that U.S. practicedid.28Probablybecause of this,

the "internalcritique"did not developin Europeto the extentthatit did in the
United States.According to Kennedy,the "attitudetowardabstractions"of
Europeanlawyers (a kind of "overestimatingof the power of deduction")
remainsdifferentfromthatof theirU.S. counterparts.Even the Europeancul-
turalfigureof the judgedoes not matchthatof the UnitedStates.By contrast,
the U.S.figureis one forwhomthe "dutyof interpretivefidelityandexperience
of constraint"requiresa kindof heroicfortitude:

The [U.S.]Judgeis a mythicfigurein partbecausethis[theJudge'sdutyand

experience] is understoodto be a struggle,muchlikea religiousor monastic
struggle,to renouncewhatis naturalandalsocorruptandbanalin humancon-
duct,to depersonalizehim-(orher)self....
Someof theJudge'smythicrolemodelsareGod,thegoodFatherof a large
family,theKing,andSolomon.His (or her)moremundanecomradesarethe
clergyperson, thepoliceofficer,thedoctor,thetherapist,andeventheairline
pilot. Describingthe Judgein gender-neutral languagedistortsthe figure,
becauseheis oneof themultiplearchetypes of virtuousmalepower,definedby
semioticcontrast withtheMother,theSybil,theNurse,theVirginSacrifice, and
otherimagesof femalevirtueandpower.
Wewillnotbe ableto figureoutthepoliticalconsequences in
of constraint
adjudication unlesswe acknowledge its rolein thissymboliccomplex.29

For Kennedy,the U.S.judge'slegitimacy(as well as the authorityof her opin-

ions) derivesfrom a matrixmuch broaderthan the FoundingFathers'docu-
ment. Muchto the contrary,it could be said that thefigure of the Founding
Fathersderives its legitimacy from its contingentplace in an ever-changing
culturalmatrix.A complexof images,issuingfromloci thatseemnear(the air-
line pilot) andfar (the King), touchon humanpsychesin mannersinflectedby
particularcircumstances.
One of Kennedy's more concrete assertionsis that U.S. intelligentsias
(more thantheirEuropeancounterparts)have the power to deploy stakes(in
litigation and the precedents deriving therefrom) in ways not requiring
assemblageof majorities.The disavowalof this power (the illusion that the
judge is neutrally"applying"majority-backedlegislativeenactments)makes
it all the more difficultto challenge.Avoidingpublicscrutiny,the disavowed
power (even of the "liberal"intelligentsia)protectsnot so much minorities
oppressedas it protects itself-the privilegedminority with access to legal

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Law & Literature * Volume 17, Number 2

education(or with capitalenough to pay lawyers'fees). The game is farfrom

over when the legislativebill becomes law, and the dominatorsof this late-
gameplayingfield(respectedlitigationexpertsandtheirclients)havea (lucra-
tive) interestin this way of doing things-a way thatsomehowdistancesthe
popularvote fromits effects.
Kennedylinksthis disavowalto othersfoundthroughoutU.S. culture:dis-
avowalof the politicalin theworkplace,in personalrelationships,in justabout
every humaninteraction.The judge's denialof personalresponsibility(like
Bork's,discussedabove) rehearsesitself in U.S. cultureat large. Particularly
for professionalsworkingin largeinstitutions,Kennedyfindsa kindof implicit
loyaltytest,"3an ostracizingof those who stray from the requiredpostureof
"badfaith":

Inbadfaith,onehonorsboththeideathatthediscourseof decisionis a neutral

one[mereexecutionof theorganization's statedmission,whichtheactoriscon-
bound
tractually to within
further], which thepartiesaresearchingfora right
answer,andtheideathatwe allknowthatthereis anelementof manipulability
to thatsamediscourse.Stayingin bad faithis trickywork.Youpushyour
agendathroughthe discourse,neverindicatingthe slightestdoubtaboutits
necessitarianpresuppositions, while honoringthe implicitrulesaboutwhat
wouldbe goingtoo far.
[strayingoutsidethebad-faithconvention]
Politicizing is disloyalalmostby
definition.First,it endangerstheorganization's to
ability performits mission.
Second,it endangerseveryone'sinvestment in institutional life, includingthe
investment inaparticular setof "private"patterns of interaction andtheinvest-
mentin theprestigeof theinstitution in theworldit serves."

Consequently,it is not just legal expertsthat have an interestin maintaining

thebad-faith(disavowed)statusquo.The entireupper-middleclassis "encour-
aged"(disciplined)not to utterthe forbiddentruth.Kennedyin effect(although
not in these terms) describesa fetish structurethat runs throughoutUnited
Statesprofessionalclasses.That which is disavowed,embracedas both being
and not being (in this case, discourse viewed as necessitarianand also as
manipulable),requiresa fetishobjectto distractattention,andrequiresa great
deal of psychicenergy to hold the structurein place. Perhapsthe readerhim-
self may have experienceda certaingrinding, a certainnervous insistence,
with whicha U.S. professionalseeksto assuresomeonethathe is right,thathe
is moral,thathe has nothingto be ashamedof.

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 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

Kennedyprovidesbotha certainbreadthof historyanda certainsensitivity

to form.The culturalsymptomjustdescribedis especiallyworthyof note.
Whatdisappoints, however,is the "conclusion" reachedby Kennedy: a rec-
ommendation thathisprofessionalreaders(thisis theonlygrouphe appears
to addressdirectly)remainessentiallypassive.He wouldhavethemseemto
remainwithintheboundsof theirorganizations' badfaithdiscourses. In this
way, thereader canmaintain his/herplace in thehierarchy.The adviceis:feel
the"shame" of participating
inour"indecent" society,butwaitforthemoment
whenyou cando somethingaboutit.32Unfortunately, Kennedyseemsto be
grantingthatrisksto one'scareerin theprofessional hierarchyaretoo big a
sacrifice
to be asked.Kennedy's "liveto fightanotherday"--evenif it is sup-
posedly"inthemodeof W.E.B.Du Bois'sdoubledconsciousness of peopleof
color"-may leavetheoppressed waitinga longtimeforthosewhoclaimto
represent them.33
A light-lawsensitivity to formwouldtakenoteof thistext'sstancevis-4-vis
representation.Does it assume that"theoppressed," on behalfof whomit
claimsto act,aresomewhereotherthanat theplaceof writing?If so, it is a
dangerous formalquality.Onewayof thinkingof the"reading of historywith
impossible breadth" is to considerreadingbodies(ailing,needy,perhapscon-
tagious) as well as printeddocuments(a formatthatpermitsa comfortable
perusal,physicallydistancedfromany ills described).Querywhetherthere
wouldseemto be plentyof time-to "waitfor the rightmoment"-if one
read one's documentswith those ailing, neglectedbodies in the room.
Kennedy's adviceis allthemoredismaying becausethecouragei beingworked
up here(the reason one is for
waiting one's "moment") is notto riskGestapo
torture,butonlyto sayto one'sbossintheoffice,withsomesmallconviction,
thatthepolicys/he is implementing willhaveimpactsonpeoplethats/he has
probablyneverconsidered.
Kennedy's bookrevealsheresymptomsof a writerwhohasthoughtabout
"theoppressed" in the abstract,butnevermadethe crucialnextstepto put
himselfamongthem.In lightof this,the suddenappearance of W.E.B.Du
Bois'snamein thelastparagraph of a 376-pagebook(Du Boishasnotbeen
mentioned beforethis;norhastherebeenanyattemptto experience thecon-
sciousness of peopleof color)caribereadasakindof unconscious excuse.The
realworkoccursin comingto termswithsuchrepressedinstances; andthe
impossibletaskof the light-lawreaderis to encouragesuchworkat the level of
community.

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Law & Literature * Volume 1 7, Number 2

Coming to termswith repressedinstancesis a kindof sensitivityto form.34

It convergeswith the thinking,suggestedin this piece, of law as bequeathing
somethingfrom generationto generation.Coming to termswith something
repressedinvolvesuncoveringfantasiesof origin.These fantasiesarethe cru-
cial beginnings35that subtendpersonalimaginations,both of constitutionby
law (law-receiving)andachievementof autonomy(law giving). When a pro-
fessionaldisavowshis/her own responsibilityfor a missionthats/he helpsto
execute,it is to believe a certainstory of law handeddown (imposed),derived
froma certainorigin.In orderto impactsuchsymptomsof disavowal,the fan-
tasy mustbe traversed,shown up as an idiosyncraticcontingencyresponsible
in largepartfor one's view of "therealworld."This traversalis traumatic; it
cannotbe otherwise.Not only is it a revisitingof the traumacoveredover by
the fantasyof origin, the traversalputs in questionan entireworld view and
the very idea (imagination)of the subject.
Tamperingwith these fantasies is an exercise well beyond theoretical
understanding.The researchercannot remove himself from the place of
trauma.Only afterseveraliterations(traversalof fantasy,heightenedexperi-
ence of trauma,formationof replacementfantasy,its traversal,etc.) could
some sense be had, not only of the contingency of origin fantasies,but of the
movementfrom fantasyto fantasy.Perhapsit is this movementthatshouldbe
called "law."If this is so, then its experienceis as close as one might come to
autonomy:autonomynot as self-containment(heavy),but as passing(light).36

* Manythanksto RichardWeisberg,whosedialoguewith me on Nietzschestimulatedthis writing.

Thanksalsoto SamuelWeberandKennethReinhard forcommentson earlierdrafts.
I. Thephenomenon readby Derridais anoscillationof thisfoundingwillwiththeFreudian deathdrive.
Thesedrivesintensifythefoundingwillandaddto thechallengesaddressed inthisarticle.JacquesDer-
rida,La cartepostale:de Socratea Freudet au-dela (Paris:Flammarion,1980).
2. The term "obscene father"seems to have been coined by Slavoj Zizek in several early moments of his
influentialelaborationsof Lacanianpsychoanalysis. For a fairly detailed explication, see Slavoj Zizek,
For TheyKnowNot What TheyDo: Enjoymentas a Political Factor,2nd ed. (New York:Verso, 2001),
134-37(first edition publishedin 1991).
3. Giorgio Agamben,II tempocheresta(Torino:BollatiBoringhieri,2001), 43-44. Translationby the author.
4. Citation N3,I from Benjamin'sPassagen-Werknotebooks. Translationsare from WalterBenjamin, The
ArcadesProject,Rolf Tiedemann, ed., Howard Eilandand Kevin McLaughlin,trans. (Cambridge:Har-
vard University Press, 1999), 462-63-
5. Note that the word "form" itself, to the extent it is used herein to describe reading/writing strategies
alternativeto linear narrativeform, is a bit too heavy. The word tends to connote a certainclosedness,
whichispreciselytheproblematicaspectof linearnarrativethatreadingsof historyas afracturedfieldmay
avoid. With referenceto these readingstrategies,use hereinof the word "form"is for convenience only.

266
 Jenkins * Heavy Law/Light Law

Repetition of more cumbersome terms such as "strategies to avoid form by fracturing"is thereby
avoided.
6. See Benjamin,supranote 4.
7. The claim is implied by Benjamin'sstatementof methodology at Konvolute N Ia, 8 in his Passagen-
Werk.Id., at 460.
8. See, for example, WalterBenjamin,"On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,"in Reflec-
tions:Essays, Aphorisms,AutobiographicalWritings,Peter Demetz, ed., Edmund Jephcott,trans., 314-
32 (New York: Schocken Books, 1978); and the closing pages of his The Originof GermanTragic
Drama, John Osborne, trans. (London: Verso, 1985).
9. FriedrichNietzsche, "Second Essay,"in On the Genealogyof Morals,Douglas Smith, trans. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996). Smith's translation has been used throughout this article, unless
otherwise noted.
io. Id., section 12, p. 58.
II. Id. (emphasisadded).
12. Richard Weisberg, "Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution," 20 GeorgiaLaw
Review939-94 (1986), at 975.
13. FriedrichNietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-MoralSense," in The PortableNietqsche,Walter
Kaufmann,trans.(New York:Viking, 1954),47. The perspectivetakenin thatessay-of world history
as taking place in a remote and insignificantcorner of the universe-is another strong indication that
Nietzsche did not imagine der Wille urMacht as an attributecontained within the human individual.
Nietzsche also writes:
There is nothing in natureso despicableor insignificantthat it cannot immediatelybe blown up
like a bag by a slight breath of this power of knowledge; and just as every porter wants an
admirer,the proudest humanbeing, the philosopher,thinks thathe sees the eyes of the universe
telescopically focused from all sides on his actions and thoughts. (42-43)
14. Nietysche'sWerke.ErsteAbteilung.Band VII. Zur GenealogiederMoral (Leipzig: Alfred KrbnerVerlag,
1910), 361 (emphasisin the original).
15. Even the misconceptionsthat Nietzsche is a racistare relatedto a failure to read Nietzsche's emphasis
on that whichfactures form. Smith here translatesGeschlechtas race, in a context where Nietzsche has
which
just made use, a few lines above, of the unusualcompound substantiveGeschlechtsgenossenschaft,
Smith has translatedas race-community.Ratherthan choosing the closed term Rasse (race), Nietzsche
has chosen a term thatpertainsto a semanticgroup that includes sex and generation.A stronger trans-
lation of Nietzsche's text, one thataccountsfor its emphasison disruptionof forms and its celebrationof
the humancapacityto overpower conventional form-including the conventional form which groups
people into fixed categories such as race-would render Geschlechtsgenossenschaft as something like
"the earliestgenerationsto live in community,"with the shortenedterm Geschlechtrenderedas "gener-
ation" or "generations."
16. Nietzsche, Genealogy,supranote 9 at section 19.
17. Id., at section io (italic emphasisin the original, underscoreemphasisadded).
18. Of course the word menschappearsin Nietzsche's text (as in DieserMenschderZukunfi,in the closing
passages of the essay, id., at section 24). But English translations,by making choices in numerous
instanceslike the choice made by Smith here, tend to give the impressionthat the encounterof causes-
not-in-relation,as describedin Nietzsche's Germantext, refers insteadto forces each containedwithin
an individual human being. This is inappropriate,as argued throughout this article. Expressionslike
DieserMenschderZukunftshould be readas referringto a futuretypeof person ratherthana single indi-
vidual who will alone be founderof the future.
19. Texts relevant to this insecure terrain include, to name a few, Walter Benjamin's"Critiqueof Vio-
lence," in Benjamin,Reflections,supranote 8 at 277-300; JacquesDerrida's "Forceof Law: The 'Mys-
tical Foundationof Authority',"in Deconstruction andthePossibilityof Justice, Drucilla Cornell, Michel

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Law & Literature * Volume 17, Number 2

Rosenfeld,andDavidGrayCarlson,eds.,3-67 (New York:Routledge,1992);SamuelWeber's"Zur

SprachederGewalt"(unpublished); andGiorgioAgamben'sHomoSacer.Sovereign PowerandBare
Life,Daniel trans.
Heller-Roazen, Stanford
(Stanford: UniversityPress,1998).
20. RobertBork,"Neutral PrinciplesandSomeFirstAmendment Problems" [1971],inModernConstitu-
tionalTheory: 4thed.,JohnH. GarveyandT. Alexander
A Reader, Aleinikoff,eds.,113-20 (St.Paul:
WestGroup,1999),114-15.
21. Id.,ati I6-1I7.
22. Nietzsche,asquotedsupraatnoteii.
23. Bork,supranote2oat y15 (emphasis added).
24. Bork,id.,twoparagraphs later:"Ido notmeanto resttheargument entirelyuponthepopularunder-
standingof theCourt'sfunction.Evenif societygenerallyshouldultimately
perceivewhattheCourtis
in factdoing..."
25. Duncan Kennedy, A Critiqueof Adjudication:Fin de siecle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1997).
26. Id.,at 324.
27. Id.,at 107.
28. Id.,at76. Undercivillaw,theinterpretation of a statutebyonecourtis notbindingasprecedent to sub-
sequentcourts.The statuteis saidto be the sole sourceof authority, regardless(in theory)of prior
courts'holdings.
29. Id.,at 3-4.
30. Borkechoeshereagain("value-choosing" courtsasdisloyal),asdoestheNietzscheof "OnTruthand
Lie"(citedaboveatnote13).
31. Kennedy, supranote25 at 371.
32. Id.,at 375.
33. Id.,at 376,thebook'sfinalparagraph. Kennedylabelshimselfas havinglongpursueda "left/mpm
[modern/post-modern] projectin thecontext of American criticallegalstudies(cls)."Id.,at 8. "The
goalsof theleftprojectareto changetheexistingsystemof socialhierarchy, includingitsclass,racial,
andgenderdimensions, in thedirectionof greaterequalityandgreaterparticipation in publicandpri-
vate government.The analysisincludesa critiqueof the injusticeand oppressiveness of current
arrangements." Id.,at6.
34. Thisis a broadened notionof "form,"whichconsidersencounters amongpsychesandtexts.
35. One could beginby thinking of theseas narrativebeginnings example,theexaggerated
(for property
accumulator whoinsistshe is moral,takingsolacethathis "rights" derivefromsomevagueideaof a
pre-historic "Lockean stateof nature").However,originfantasiescaninflectthinking(inciteneurotic
symptoms) in much more indirectways.
36. Forfurthertreatment of lawas movementthroughorigins,see JosephJenkins,"Inheritance Lawas
Constellation in Lieuof Redress:A DetourthroughExceptional Terrain,"24 Cardogo LawReview
1043-66(2oo3).

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