G.R. Nos.

86883-85 January 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY
LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE, accused.

SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER BENDAÑO, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless foreign religious
minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of his
executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a
popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was
gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up
pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts
swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for
their outrageous feat, the gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is
indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was one of
the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.2

In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted in the
capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest
and still remain at large.

Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed against those
responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from
the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato.6

After trial, the court a quo held —

WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander
Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
treachery, hereby sentences each of them to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00;
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum
of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for every day the case was set for
trial; moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.

Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of the
 Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to
which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of P19,000.00 representing the value of the
motorcycle and to pay the costs.

Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia
alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less
than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, and minimum,
to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
complainant Rufino Robles the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as
court appearance fee for every day of trial and to pay proportionately the costs.

The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order of
their respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.7

From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger
Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as
well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently,
the decision as against them already became final.

Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero
brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La
Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the
Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a
cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate,
Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having
links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the
complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are
simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that
should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.8

At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a placard
on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found
on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2)
hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close
to the eatery.9

Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with
assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the
vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was
included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any
qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of
"Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were
hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he
was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however
managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to
surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then
Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face and accused him
of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11

Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from
his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his
head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of
Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the
center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the
motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12

Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto
mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me,
Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali
dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was
the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body
three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr.
Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified
onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms
who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 13

In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and
Roger Bedaño contend that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if
properly appreciated, would tend to establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended
victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and,
that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their
proximity at the time to Edilberto.

But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.

On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting
palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger
Bedaño alleges that he was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that
morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in La
Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.

Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed to
the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their
fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to where
the crime took place at Km. 125.

It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but
that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 14

Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at the
crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places where accused-appellants
were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the
defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that no
physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by
jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where
he allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we
ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely two (2)
hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19

In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that they
were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the Manero
brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. The
witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon,
appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali
was brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that appellants were at
the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the alibi of
appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence
of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all doubts that they were not
privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore removed. There was direct
proof to link them to the conspiracy.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the
offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of
purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24

The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as
evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus —

The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified
with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades
in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985
morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where
Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified
members of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they
all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen
again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles.
They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left
when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They
followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when
Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26

From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent
bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted
murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a
fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They
surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that
the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of
the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in
concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-
appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common
intent to commit the criminal acts.

While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias
whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the
murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators expressly agreed. As witness Manuel
Bantolo explained 28 —

Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were there
other persons who were to be liquidated?

A There were some others.

Q Who were they?

A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that paper
then they will (sic) kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian and if they
could not kill the persons they like to kill they will (sic) make Reynaldo
Deocades as their sample.

That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian priest in the
event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29 —

Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?

A All of them in the group.

Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan to
kill Fr. Peter?

A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him
ahead."

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?

A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.

Q Rudy Lines.

A He also said "yes".

Q What do you mean "yes"?

A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about Efren Pleñago?

A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".

Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to that suggestion that should
they fail to kill Fr. Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided he is an
Italian and if not, they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades an example?
 A He also agreed laughing.

Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the
act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30

The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical Institute of
Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the
deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his family, or that he disinherited any member thereof,
when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same
congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to the
natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to moral
damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments
as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person
has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages may be
awarded.

Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be lawfully
entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never
presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they take the witness
stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should be
satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded
there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali
was attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary
damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the
complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.

With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount is increased
to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to the lawful heirs, not the
PIME as the trial court ruled.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to
the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00; however, the award of moral
damages is deleted.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 132330. November 28, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 JOSE

BANGCADO[1] and PO3 CESAR BANISA, accused-appellants.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
 SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO and PO3 CESAR BANISA appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City convicting them of two (2) counts of murder and two
(2) counts of frustrated murder, imposing upon them the corresponding prison terms, and
to pay damages plus costs.[2]
The facts: On 27 June 1993, at around 8:30 in the evening, Pacson Cogasi, Julio
Clemente, Leandro Adawan and Richard Lino were at the Skyview Restaurant,
Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, drinking and listening to folksongs. Moments later, a
group of five (5) arrived and sat one table away from Pacson Cogasi and his
friends. Among the newcomers was a thin person wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket,
later identified as SPO1 Jose Bangcado, and a heavier one wearing a t-shirt
and maong pants, later identified as PO3 Cesar Banisa.The rest of their group were not
identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio City were conducting Operation
Kapkap at the Skyview Restaurant. They however exempted the table of PO3 Cesar
Banisa as they knew him to be a fellow policeman.
At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his friends left the restaurant to go
home. They were residents of La Trinidad, Benguet. As they went behind the restaurant
where their Ford Fierra was parked, they noticed SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar
Banisa following them. Cogasi and his group recognized Bangcado and Banisa to be
customers at Skyview Restaurant. Bangcado and Banisa approached them. First, Banisa
asked Richard Lino for a light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked the group if they were
willing to be frisked. Since the two (2) police officers were armed with handguns and
smelled of liquor, the group agreed to be frisked. As Leandro Adawan stepped aside to
urinate, Bangcado slapped him and then asked the group where they came from.Their
answer was, from Besao, Mt. Province, except Clemente who said that he came from
Balili, La Trinidad. Bangcado, with Banisa standing guard behind him with a drawn gun,
ordered Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to form a line against the Ford Fierra facing
him in that order.Adawan was only one meter away from Bangcado.Lino and Cogasi were
about 1-1/2 meters away, while Clemente, four (4) meters away. Without any warning,
Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick succession at the four (4) persons lined up
against the Ford Fierra. Cogasi saw Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi then felt he was
hit on the left side of his neck and he also fell down. He managed however to crawl away
and run to the Hilltop where he was able to ask for help before falling unconscious.
Cogasi woke up to find himself confined at the Baguio General Hospital together with
Clemente.There Cogasi learned that Lino and Adawan died from gunshot wounds in their
heads. Cogasi himself suffered a gunshot wound at the neck, at the junction of his left
jaw near the ear, while Clemente received two (2) gunshot wounds on his right shoulder
with one (1) of the bullets being lodged just below his right eye.
After their release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a complaint with the
NBI in Baguio City. On 8 July 1993, four (4) civilian males were presented to Cogasi for
identification by the NBI, but he told them that the suspects were not among those
present. Clemente did not participate in the identification process because of his eye
injury.
 In the morning of 10 July 1993 Bangcado and Banisa reported for their regular rank
inspection at the La Trinidad Police Station. The policemen were told to remain in
formation after the inspection.Cogasi went around the formation four (4) or five (5) times
before pointing to Bangcado and then to Banisa. Clemente also went around the
formation but despite going around longer than Cogasi, Clemente was unable to identify
anybody.Clemente started to point to James Tagle but withdrew his identification of him
when some people then present laughed and shouted "Hoy!" and "Sabali!" meaning
"Wrong!" or "Different!" Accused-appellants insist that Clemente could not have made a
reliable identification of them at the NBI and La Trinidad line ups, nor even in open court,
because his eye injury blurred his vision.
The rule is that positive identification of witnesses prevails over the simple denial of
the accused. It cannot be doubted that Clemente and Cogasi had a good view of the faces
of the accused. From the testimonies of various witnesses, including PO3 Jimmy Baybay,
one of the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap, the Skyview Restaurant was
well-lighted. Banisa himself testified that although the lighting may be "somewhat dim,"
he could still recognize a person from a distance of four (4) meters. [3] This is relevant
considering that the two (2) groups were seated only one (1) table apart. Thus, Cogasi
and his friends were able to recognize their assailants as the persons who came out from
the Skyview Restaurant.
The crime scene was illuminated by two (2) streetlights and the lights coming from
the nearby Garden Inn and various sari-sari stores. The fact that the policemen who
responded to the report of the incident had to use a flashlight in their investigation did not
prove that the area was so dark as to preclude the identification of the persons
involved. For one thing, the policemen had to be careful not to overlook any piece of
evidence, such as a spent bullet. For another, SPO4 Antonio Naungayan of PNP Baguio
City, who was part of the investigating team, testified on cross-examination that even if
the area was not brightly lighted, one could still recognize people.[4]According to Clemente,
he was only four (4) meters away from his attackers when they fired upon him and his
friends. Cogasi was only 1-1/2 meters away while Adawan and Lino, who died on the spot,
were each only about a meter away.
It cannot be doubted that Cogasi and Clemente had enough time to take a good look
at their assailants faces who conversed with their victims, ordered them to fall in line,
frisked them one by one, and asked them questions before shooting them. When
Bangcado and Banisa leaned over to frisk Cogasi and his friends, their faces must have
only been inches away from their victims; and when they ordered their victims to line up
against the vehicle, they stood only a few meters away.
Although Clemente admitted to be suffering from blurred vision, Cogasis positive
identification of appellants could be sufficient to establish their identities. Indeed, there is
no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated except,
of course, when expressly mandated. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, in
determining the credibility of witnesses and the value of each piece of evidence.In fact,
the testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, [5] and
must be given full faith and credence when no reason to falsely testify is shown. [6]
 Assuming arguendo that Clemente was unable to identify accused-appellants during
the line-up in La Trinidad as his right eye was still bandaged from his injuries, he was able
to make a positive identification in open court. Neither is it material now that Clemente
made some attempts to point to policeman James Tagle for it seems clear that he
withdrew his identification. Besides, Clemente admitted candidly that he could not identify
anyone in the line-up since his right eye was still covered with a bandage and was still
suffering from blurred vision.
Further, the defense failed to shake Cogasis certainty, either when he declared that
he recognized accused-appellants as being those who were earlier in the Skyview
Restaurant, or when he pointed to them in the line-up at La Trinidad. The fact that he took
some five (5) minutes and had to go around the line-up four (4) or five (5) times did not
detract from his credibility.Rather, it is to his credit that he took time to look closely into
the faces of more than twenty-four (24) or so similarly garbed men to make sure that he
did not make a mistake in identifying his assailants.
Neither should the defense attempt to mislead the Court by pointing out that Cogasi
was not able to identify Bangcado during the NBI line-up since it is clear that that line-up
did not include accused-appellants. Instead, it was composed of four (4) civilians, none
of whom he had ever seen before.Since these four (4) had no connection with the crime,
there was no reason for Cogasi to implicate any of them in the murder.
The defense also points out that the policemen who conducted Operation
Kapkap indicated in their joint affidavit that they only saw Banisa present inside the
Skyview Restaurant, along with three (3) unidentified companions. According to the
defense, this only proves that Bangcado was not there since the policemen personally
knew Bangcado and thus should have included him in their joint affidavit.
However, the theory of the trial court that the reason why they did not see Bangcado
with Banisa was because he went to the washroom or elsewhere deserves
credence. Considering that the Skyview Restaurant had some thirty (30) to fifty (50)
customers that night; that the four (4) policemen were busy going around the tables
conducting Operation KapKap; that they did not approach the table of Banisa to frisk him
and his companions because they recognized him as a policeman, then it is evident that
their attention was elsewhere, and that they did not bother to inquire whether Banisa had
other fellow officers with him. Further, the policemen testified that they were in the
restaurant for only a few minutes.
Further, PO Delfin Balan-eg, one of the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap,
testified that he saw Bangcado and Banisa drinking beer inside the restaurant. The
defense tried to destroy his credibility by establishing that he and the two (2) victims as
well as the two (2) complaining witnesses were related. However, it must be stressed,
that relationship, much less bias, cannot be established by the fact that two (2) persons
live in different barangays that form part of the same town.
The defense insist that neither could Cogasis testimony be given any weight since
his testimony in open court contradicted his sworn affidavit executed immediately after
the incident before the investigating officer. While he testified that he saw the accused
emerge from the Skyview Restaurant, in his affidavit, he swore that their attackers actually
alighted from a red -colored car. The theory of the defense is that if the gunmen alighted
from a red or maroon colored car immediately before the shooting, then they could not
have come from the Skyview Restaurant, and vice versa.
An affidavit taken ex parte is judicially considered to be almost incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the incident.[7] Further, an
examination of Cogasis sworn statement shows, however, that there was actually no
contradiction. His testimony was as follows: "x x x I noticed a maroon car x x x I noticed
also two persons who were immediately following us went (sic) near the parked maroon
car and one of them opened the door at the drivers side but immediately closed it." [8] Quite
obviously, the two (2) persons who emerged from the Skyview Restaurant intended to
board the parked car but changed their minds and, instead, followed Cogasi and his
friends to the Ford Fierra that was parked.
The accused-appellants raise the defense of alibi which is inherently weak. To
prosper, alibi must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not
have been physically present at the crime scene at the time of the incident.[9] The alibis of
the accused clearly show upon examination that this could not have been so.
Bangcado testified that he stayed at home because he served his tour of duty from
12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. the previous day. Thus, on the day of the incident, he was at
home where he slept, read the newspapers, watched television and played with his one-
year-and-seven-month old daughter. After dinner, he took a nap until his mother-in-law
woke him up before 11:00 p.m. so he could report to the police station before 12:00
midnight. As police officer assigned to patrol his area of responsibility, his job was to ride
in the police vehicle going around La Trinidad.[10] This was confirmed by Bangcado's
mother-in-law Angela Gondales when she testified for the accused.
Yet, Bangcado himself told the court that Central Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, where
his mother-in-laws house stood, was only five (5) kilometers away from Skyview
Restaurant and could be negotiated in thirty (30) minutes using a motor vehicle. [11] The
fact that La Trinidad was only thirty (30) minutes away from Baguio City was corroborated
by Banisa himself.[12] And Bangcados house is near a national highway where jeepneys
pass by on their way to Baguio City, which means, it was not impossible for Bangcado to
have left the house earlier than 11:00 p.m. and be in Baguio City at the time of the incident.
The defense failed to establish with credible evidence that SPO1 Jose Bangcado was
on duty from 11:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:30 the following morning. SPO4 Lilia
Pascual, Records Custodian of the PNP at La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that there was
no record of the attendance of PNP officers from June to December 1993. SPO4 Carlos
Layagan, Bangcados Patrol Section Supervisor, testified that on that day, Bangcado was
present for his regular tour of duty from 12:00 o'clock midnight to 8:00 o'clock the following
morning and conducted routine patrol by mobile,[13] but the incident occurred at around
9:00 o'clock in the evening according to the police who responded when the crime was
reported to them. Thus, Bangcado had plenty of time to do what he did and still go on his
tour of duty. More damaging was the admission of Layagan in his cross-examination that
before 12:00 o'clock midnight of 27 June 1993 he was not in the company of SPO1 Jose
Bangcado.[14]
The alibi of PO3 Cesar Banisa was even more incredible. He admitted being at the
Skyview Restaurant when Cogasi and his friends were there, but claimed that he left with
his brother to eat mami and siopao at the Baguio First Hotel, which is only about a
hundred (100) to a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from Skyview Restaurant and
could be reached in five (5) minutes of walking.[15] He explained however that"this bold
admission x x x placing him within the vicinity of the crime scene shows his clear
conscience. For, if he was involved in the crime, he would naturally put himself in other
places."[16] His testimony was corroborated by Abelardo Lucas who testified that he, along
with Arsenio Palileng and Raymund Banisa, accused-appellants brother, was with Banisa
that night.
While flight of an accused is competent evidence to establish prima facie his guilt,
there is no law or principle that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of
innocence. Much like the defense of alibi, non-flight cannot prevail against the weight of
positive identification of the accused.[17] It is more credible to believe that Banisa had no
choice but to tell the truth regarding his presence at the Skyview Restaurant because four
(4) policemen who knew him well saw him there while they were conducting Operation
Kapkap.
PO3 Banisa further claims that his group stayed at the Baguio First Hotel Restaurant
for only ten (10) minutes and then went down the road to the jeepney station where they
boarded a jeepney at 9:00 o'clock in the evening bound for La Trinidad and got home
after twenty-five (25) to thirty-five (35) minutes. Yet he also testified that the boarding
station for jeepneys bound for La Trinidad was only across the road from Skyview
Restaurant.
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa could have accosted their victims,
gone back to Skyview Restaurant and joined their companions who may have thought
that they (Bangcado and Banisa) just went to the comfort room or stepped out for some
fresh air. Abelardo Lucas himself testified that while they were at the Skyview Restaurant
his companions would frequently stand up and leave, purportedly to go to the restroom.
The defense bewails the fact that nothing seemed to have been done to the deformed
slug found near the body of the deceased Richard Lino, nor to the other slug extracted
from Clemente, and that no ballistics examination was conducted to determine from what
caliber they were fired and if the gun used was the same. Investigators did not even cause
the surrender of accused-appellants firearms for examination and comparison. Neither
were accused-appellants required to undergo a paraffin test.
Nonetheless, a ballistics examination is not indispensable, and even if another
weapon was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still the accused cannot excape
criminal liability therefor as he was already positively identified. [18] Because credible
witnesses had already demonstrated accused-appellants' culpability, there was no need
to present further evidence linking them to the crime. There is no requirement of a certain
quantum of evidence before one may be justly convicted of an offense except when
specifically required by law. The only requisite then is that the guilt of the accused is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.[19]
Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot the victims and/or the
complaining witnesses. However, even the absence of a known motive, the time-honored
rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of
the culprit.[20]Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the
participation of the accused therein are definitely shown,[21] particularly when we consider
how nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed
serious offense for no reason at all.[22]
The defense also tried, but failed, to establish that Cogasi and Clemente knew
beforehand that Bangcado and Banisa were policemen as they all lived and worked
together in the same neighborhood. This allegation is not sufficient to prove that the
witnesses for the prosecution had any ill motive to testify against accused-
appellants. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in
the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[23]
The defense also assails the conclusion reached by the trial court that the accused
were guilty because they remained silent when they were pinpointed by Cogasi during
the police line-up. The trial court asked, "Is it not that 'Qui tacen concentire videtur,'
meaning, 'Silence means consent'?"[24]
Although the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence
and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act
or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him, [25] courts
should be cautious in interpreting silence against the accused. Further, the facts do not
support the conclusion that the accused remained silent. Both Bangcado and Banisa
gave their individual reactions during the line-up but police discipline kept them from
breaking rank.[26] As police officers, they are bound by the strict discipline of their
profession, as well as an awareness of their rights to remain silent and to avail of the
services of counsel. These rights are not diminished by the fact that they are policemen.
However, the trial court ruled, and correctly so, that at the time of the police line-up,
accused-appellants were not yet under the custody of the police agencies. Their rights
had not yet been restricted or curtailed. The right to counsel attaches from the moment
the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the accused.
From the testimony of the victims as well as from the physical evidence, it seems that
SPO1 Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa merely stood behind him with
his gun drawn. In his testimony, Cogasi narrated how the shooting occured -
Q: You testified that the thin one who called himself Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at
Leandro Adawan, what type of gun is (sic) that x x x x
A: It was black and short.
 Q: What about the fat man at that time, was identified as Cesar Banisa, what was he doing at
that time?
A: He was also standing beside him and was holding his gun.
Q: Would you illustrate to this Court how Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at Leandro Adawan?
A: Witness stretch[ed] both his arms and clasped his hands together with the forefinger
extended in front of him.
Q: After you saw Jose Bangcado point a gun at Leandro Adawan, what else transpired, Mr.
Witness?
A: He suddenly fired his gun.
Q: To whom Mr. Witness did he fire his gun?
A: He fired his gun to the four of us.
Q: After firing his gun what else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A: I just felt that I fell down.
Q: Why did you fall down?
A: Because I was shot.[27]
On cross-examination, Cogasi affirmed his sworn statement taken by the
investigating officer immediately after the incident wherein he referred to only one (1)
gunman who did the shooting. He further testified that he heard four (4) successive shots
when the gunman started shooting, then heard more shots only after he had succeeded
in running away.
On his part, Clemente attested in his sworn statement that "the man in jacket then
ordered us to line up. After we have formed a line, he started shooting at us starting from
the left. He shot first Leandro, then Richard and followed by Pacson.After hearing the
shots and seeing my companions fall, I turned my back and held my nape with my two (2)
hands and started to run but I got hit and fell. I got up and tried to run but I fell down
again."[28]
On the other hand, during his direct examination Clemente testified -
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, when these two (2) persons followed you and your companions, what
did you observe from them that time?
A: They have (sic) guns, sir.
Q: What kind of guns do (sic) they have?
A: Short and black, sir.
Q: And were they holding their guns?
A: They were holding their guns, sir x x x x
Q: After you were made to fall in line, what happened next?
A: He pointed a gun, sir.
Q: Who pointed the gun to whom?
 A: The thin man pointed his gun at Leandro Adawan, sir.
Q: What else transpired after that?
A: They fired their guns at us, sir.
Q: Who shot at who (sic)?
A: The two (2) of them, sir, because there were two of them.[29]
On cross examination, Clemente testified -
Q: So, you said on that date you were frisked and then later on lined-up and when you heard
successive shots, you fell down?
A: When I heard the three (3) successive shots, I saw one pointing the gun again at me, so, I
turned around and prepared to run, but I was hit, sir. When I turned my back and started
to run, I was hit, sir.
Q: So, because you turned your back, you did not really see who actually shot you?
A: I saw the thin one point the gun at me and both were armed with guns, sir x x x x
Q: So, you want to tell the court that it was the thin one who shot you because he was
holding the gun that way, is that correct?
A: I do not know because both of them have (sic) guns, sir. But I saw the thin one pointing a
gun at me, sir.[30]
Thus, as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that both witnesses were positive
only as far as Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that they only concluded that
Banisa participated in the shooting because he was also holding a gun. The failure of the
surviving victims to assert with confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises reasonable
doubt as to whether he participated in the shooting.
Accused-appellants deny the existence of treachery, nighttime and abuse of public
position to aggravate the commission of the crimes. It is settled that qualifying
circumstances cannot be presumed but must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, as conclusively as the killing itself.[31] The defense alleges that there is no
evidence that accused-appellants made some preparation to kill the victim in such a
manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself. For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.[32] In this case, treachery was not present. In a long
line of cases, the Court held that "the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." [33]
To ensure that he was not in any risk, accused-appellant Bangcado frisked and
searched Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to see if they were concealing any
weapons. After making sure that the victims were unarmed, Bangcado directed the
victims to form a line against the Ford Fierra to separate the victims from each other and
so that the latter could not rush to their friends defense.Because Bangcado and Banisa
were holding handguns, Cogasi and his friends did as they were told and were caught
unaware when they were shot. In fact, Adawan and Lino died of gunshot wounds in the
head, while Cogasi and Clemente only sustained head wounds that did not prove fatal.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal
responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is
individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own
acts.[34] Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault
on the victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated
Bangcados act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any
reason or purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed
prior to the killings.
For public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public
official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in
realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying
his position, then there is no abuse of public position.[35] Hence, that aggravating
circumstance cannot be appreciated here. While it may seem that accused-appellants
intended to assert their authority as policemen and encourage in the victims minds the
belief that they were part of Operation KapKap when they frisked the victims, both Cogasi
and Clemente testified that they never told the investigating officers that their assailants
might be policemen. In fact, because the assailants were not in uniform, they believed the
latter to be civilians.
The defense claims that the injuries of the surviving victims were not serious enough
to classify the attack under the frustrated stage, therefore, they committed only attempted
homicide. However, the doctors who attended to the surviving victims testified that had
they not treated Cogasi and Clemente's injuries the latter would have suffered from
infection which could result in their death. It is clear that only timely medical attention
saved both victims from imminent death.
Accused-appellants deny that there was an offer to compromise when their relatives
visited Miguel Adawan, the 81-year old father of Leandro Adawan. The old Adawan in
tears testified that he came to know of the accused Bangcado and Banisa through their
relatives when the latter came to his house in Besao, Mt. Province. Although the incident
occurred on 27 June 1993, the first visit was sometime in April 1995 when Magdalena
Mabiasan, the mother of Jose Banisa came "for a possible settlement of the
case."[36] Again, sometime in August or September 1996, Bangcados wife and parents,
along with Banisas mother Magdalena, visited him at Pico, La Trinidad. [37]
The defense claims that the only reason the relatives of accused-appellant went to
visit and talk to Miguel Adawan was to prevent him from avenging his sons death on the
families of accused-appellant, in keeping with the tradition of the Igorot indigenous
people. Therefore, this cannot be interpreted as an implied admission of guilt. Moreover,
Sec. 27 of Rule 130[38]contemplates an offer of compromise from the accused
himself. There is no showing that the visits were made with the knowledge or upon the
instructions of accused-appellants. Thus, even if the purpose of the visit was to negotiate
a settlement, accused-appellants had nothing to do with it, since they were neither
participants nor initiators.[39]
 The trial court believed in the testimony of Adawan, compared to that of the relatives
of accused-appellants who could be biased, partial and, of course, hoping to save the two
(2) accused from the serious predicament they were in.[40] It posited this question:
But why is it that during the first time that they approached the 77-year old man
Adawan in Besao, Mountain Province, they were already assured that the family of the
deceased Adawan would not take revenge and for the last three years, nothing happened
to the families of the accused, still they again went to the residence of Miguel Adawan at
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. This would only show that they tried to amicably settle the
cases, but they were rebuffed.[41]
But an offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an
admission of the party himself.[42] Although the Court has held in some cases that an
attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of
guilt,[43] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied
admission of guilt, the accused should be present or at least had authorized the
compromise.
In People v. Macatana[44] it was held: "No implied admission can be drawn from the
efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the courts, primarily because appellant did not
take part in any of the negotiations. The efforts to settle the case x x x in accordance with
the established Muslim practices, customs and traditions were initiated by acknowledged
leaders x x x in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the
tribes."[45]
The general rule is that claims for actual damages should be supported by actual
receipts.However, it is undisputed that the victims are members of the indigenous
community and were buried according to their customs and traditions.The relatives of the
victims attested that they incurred expenses for the caao, the traditional gathering of
Igorots. The Court is not unaware that the informal market system still governs the
economic transactions of indigenous communities. Thus, receipts and other documents
do not play a large role in their daily commercial transactions. In this case, wherein it is
clearly established that the claimants were indeed members of indigenous communities,
then the court should allow reasonable claims for expenses incurred in relation to
traditional burial practices.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Leandro Adawan. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary
evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
does not preclude recovery of the damages.[46] Testimonial evidence is sufficient to
establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the
damages for the loss of earning capacity.[47] Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of
earning capacity of a deceased victim, the Court can consider the nature of its occupation,
his educational attainment and the state of his health at the time of his death. [48]The
testimony of Adawans father sufficiently established the basis for making such an
award. It was shown that Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death
in 1993 and earned P4,000.00 a month as a mechanic.
 Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by
this Court in several cases,[49] the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:

Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x Gross annual income living
expenses (50% of gross annual income)

where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of deceased [37 years])

x = 2/3 x (80 - 37) x [(P4000.00 x 12) - (P4000.00 x 12)50%]

x = 2/3 x 43 x [P48,000.00 - P24,000.00]

x = [2/3 x 43] x P24,000.00

x = 28.67 x P24,000.00

x = P688,080.00

Since Leandro Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death, his
life expectancy was 28.67 years. Considering that his average monthly income
was P4,000.00, his gross annual income would be P48,000.00. Using the above formula,
the victims unearned income would thus be P688,080.00.
On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award damages for Richard Lino loss
of earning capacity because the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence on this
matter.
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence)
is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the
aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary
damages may be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be
awarded only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance
with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime
is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts
thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.[50]
Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is mandatory
upon the finding of the fact of murder. Moral damages, vis-a-viscompensatory damages
or civil indemnity, are different from each other and should thus be awarded
separately.[51] Thus, as explained in People v. Victor,[52] the indemnity authorized by our
criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by
the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other established actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as
moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.[53]
 In People v. Victor the Court increased the civil indemnity for rape committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. The Court held
that "This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court
over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[54] It is submitted that the heirs of
victims of murder, which is also a heinous crime, should not receive less than what victims
of rape receive as civil indemnity. If the civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the
accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense, all the
more reason should the same minimum amount be imposed on those convicted of murder,
as more often than not the victims who are killed leave behind grieving families who are
depended upon them for support. Thus, indemnity of P75,000.00 should therefore be
reckoned for each count of murder committed by accused-appellant SPO1 Jose
Bangcado.
Since the crime was committed on 27 June 1993, the penalty for murder prescribed
by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by RA 7659, which took
effect only on 31 December 1993, should be applied in imposing the penalty for frustrated
murder, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death.
The penalty for frustrated murder is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by the
Penal Code for the consummated offense, hence, the imposable penalty for frustrated
murder should be prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporalmedium. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance present in the commission of the offense, the penalty to be imposed for the
frustrated murder shall be taken from the range of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayormedium or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
as minimum, to the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal or
twelve (12) years five (5) months and eleven (11) days to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days as maximum. Hence, an indeterminate prison term of eight
(8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum to
fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum may be considered reasonable for the frustrated murder under the facts of this
case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo in Crim. Cases Nos. 11619-R to
11622-R imposing reclusion perpetua for the two (2) counts of murder and the
indeterminate prison term of prision mayorin its medium period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period for two (2) counts of frustrated murder on both accused-appellants
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 11619-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found
GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery, and
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Richard
Lino P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P59,300.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00
as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 11620-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found
GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Leandro
Adawan P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P93,100.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. 11621-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found
GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying
circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayormedium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum, for the
frustrated murder of the victim Julio Clemente, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and to pay the costs; and,
4. In Crim. Case No. 11622-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found
GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying
circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of of eight (8) years two
(2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayormedium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum, for the
frustrated murder of Pacson Cogasi, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs.
There being no finding of conspiracy with accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado,
PO3 Cesar Banisa is ACQUITTED of all the charges against him and, consequently, is
ordered released from custody in connection with herein cases, unless he is held for other
lawful causes.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129304. September 27, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AVA MA. VICTORIA

CARIQUEZ y CRUZ, and LEEZEL FRANCO y SAMSON, accused-
appellants.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of 19 March 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 110410 convicting accused-appellants Ava Ma. Victoria
Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter AVA) and Leezel Franco y Samson (hereafter LEEZEL) of the crime
of parricide and homicide, respectively.
 In an Information[2] dated 30 May 1996, AVA and LEEZEL were initially charged with
serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.[3] However, on 31 May
1996 the victim, Mariel Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter ETHEL) died. On 30 August 1996 the
information was amended to charge AVA and LEEZEL with the crime of parricide. The Amended
Information[4] reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, accuses AVA MA. VICTORIA
CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ and LEEZEL FRANCO Y SAMSON of the crime of Parricide defined
and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5 of R.A. 7659
committed in the manner herein narrated as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of May 1996, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AVA MA. VICTORIA Y CARIQUEZ,
being then the mother of a 2 1/2 years old child, MARIEL CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ, conspiring and
confederating together with Leezel Franco Y Samson, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, beat and maul said MARIEL
CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ in the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds which directly caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Lilia Gojul, Michelle Torrente, Theresa
Castillo, Dr. Antonio Vertido, Dr. Jose Joey Bienvenida, SPO3 Adonis Bacarra, Dr. Arsenio
Pascual, and Benilda Almario. Lilia Gojul is AVAs sister. The relevant and material facts
established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellees Brief, as follows:

Mariel Cariquez y Cruz, fondly called Ethel, was two and a-half years old when she and her
mother, Ava Cariquez, moved in sometime in January 1996 to No. 116 Royal Townhomes, San
Rafael Mandaluyong City. Avas sister, Lilia C. Gojul moved in with them (TSN, October 16,
1996, pp. 5-6, 32). She slept with the little girl in one of the two bedrooms on the house
(TSN, Ibid., p. 12). Ava had a housemaid named Elizabeth Patao, who also watched over Mariel
or Ethel (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 6,8). At the time, Ava had a live-in partner, Leezel Franco
(TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 5-6, 49). He was not the father of Ethel, however (TSN, ibid., p.
51).

Avas household was not at all peaceful because almost everyday, Ava and Leezel
quarreled, nagbubugbugan (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 9, 11; October 29, 1996, pp. 29, 40-
41). Ava an Leezel were then taking or using drugs (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 39).

In the middle of March 1996, Lilia Gojul left Avas household and went to live in her home at
Urduja Village, Novaliches, Quezon City (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 6).

In the meantime, the little girl caught the attention of their neighbors as she was cute and
friendly. While the neighbors became fond of Ethel, they however found Ava and Leezel aloof
snobbish (October 29, 1996, pp. 9, 30, 21).
On April 14, 1996, Lilia visited Ava and her niece at the Royal townhomes but she was shocked
to see Ethels appearance; her hair was shaven, her face was full of contusions, her neck had
faded cigarette burns while her arms and legs had traces of pinching and maltreatment. She also
had marks of black-eye on both eyes. Lilia also noticed Ethels knees with contusions due to
prolonged kneeling.(TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 12, 13). When Lilia asked the little girl to
identify who inflicted the injuries on her body, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel (TSN,
October 16, 1996, p. 14).Lilia confronted Ava about her and Leezels treatment of Ethel (Ibid., p.
13).

Neighbors were hearing the little girl crying everyday, morning, noon, evening, and even at 1:00
oclock or 2:00 oclock in the morning (TSN, October 29, 1996, p. 8, 29-30). Sometime in April,
Michelle Torrente, an occupant of Unit 114, was aghast to see her shaven, with bruises all over
her body and wounds in her arms and legs (TSN, ibid., pp. 10,130. Ethel also had cigarette burns,
and when Michelle asked what happened, Ethel replied: pinaso po ako. When Michelle further
asked who burned her and caused her bruises, Ethel said, Papa ko po,referring to Leezel Franco
(TSN, ibid., pp. 11-13).

The little girls shaven head and bruises were also noticed by Theresa Castill, an occupant of unit
115, adjacent to Avas residence. When she asked Ethels yaya why this was done to the little girl,
the yaya answered, parusa (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 150).

The next time that Lilia visited Ava and her daughter was on May 12, 1996. At the time, Avas
housemaid has already left the household. On that occasion, Lilia observed that Ethel was sickly
and had even more contusions than the last time she saw her in April. Out of pity for the little
girl, Lilia tried to persuade Ava that she take custody of Ethel (TSN, October 16, 1996, p.
15). Ava agreed to her suggestion and wrote a note where she passed on to Lilia Gojul the
guardianship of Ethel Cariquez (TSN, ibid., pp. 16, 19; Exhibit A). However, on May 14, 1996,
Lilia had to leave Avas household without bringing Ethel with her (TSN, October 16, 1996, p.
21). Ethel cried silently when Lilia left (TSN, ibid., pp. 22, 36). Lilia heard nothing from them
after that.

On May 27, 1996, around 3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Ethel was brought in an
ambulance from the Mandaluyong Medical Center to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital at
Greenhills, San Juan (TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 8; 29). At the time, she was unconscious
and was assisted by an ambu bag, unable to breathe on her own. Her body was limp and she had
prominent bruises on the forehead and the right cheek (TSN, ibid.,pp. 8, 16).

Dr. Jose Joey Bienvenida attended to her and in the course of taking her medical history, he
interviewed the mother, Ava Cariquez. Ava at first told the doctor that it was her brother, the
patients uncle, who mauled the child and inflicted upon her serious injuries. Ava later changed
her story, saying that the little girl actually fell from the stairs (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-10, 25-27).

A CT-scan was taken of the child and the results showed a combination of chronic and acute
subdural hematoma on the left frontotemporoparietal (front side and apex) convexity of the
brain.
Massive edema and musk effect in the left cerebral hemisphere and right fronte-parietal lobe
were noted. A fracture was also noted on the left frontal bone (TSN, ibid., p. 11). Blood clot was
found in almost the entire cerebral hemisphere. He also found soft tissue injuries, i.e., hematoma
and abrasions, in other parts of the body (TSN, ibid., p. 42). Dr. Bienvenida noted that the injury
on the head was a confluent injury, which means that it was sustained on different dates
(TSN, ibid., p. 40); one portion of the injury was resolving hematoma which was at least two (2)
years old, while the more acute injury was sustained within 24 hours from his examination
(TSN, ibid., p. 41). Ethel was thereafter confined at the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital,
attached to a respirator (TSN, ibid., p. 16). She was classified as a brain-dead patient (Ibid., p.
18).

Ethels condition however grew worse and she eventually died on May 31, 1996 at about 10:20 in
the morning. After her death, the life support system was removed (TSN, ibid., p. 18; Exhibit
E). The cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest secondary to multiple organ system failure,
severe massive crania-cerebral trauma (TSN, ibid., p. 23; Exhibit C-2).

Dr. Antonio Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy on the little girls body
(TSN, November 7, 1996, p. 4). The doctor made the following significant findings: fracture
linear, right middle cranial fosse; abrasion, right forehead; contusion, right leg; contusion-
abrasion left face; hematoma, forehead right and hematoma, scalp, right fronto-parietal (Exhibit
D). In his autopsy report, Dr. Vertido concluded that the cause of death was Traumatic Head
Injury, Severe (Exhibit D-2).[5]

AVA and LEEZEL were the witnesses presented by the defense.

According to AVA, during their breakfast at about 7:30 a.m. on 27 May 1996, she talked with
LEEZEL about their up-coming concert on 1 June 1996 at Subic. Then, she went out of the house
to make a telephone call. When she left the house, her daughter ETHEL was eating while LEEZEL
was playing the guitar. When she returned she saw ETHEL playing with the food. She told ETHEL
to hurry up as she was going with her to the office, but ETHEL stubbornly looked at her and
continued to play with her food. She again told ETHEL to hurry up and finish her food. ETHEL
still said No. To her repeated order to do so, ETHEL also repeatedly said, No. AVA then got a
plastic belt and hit ETHEL with it on the buttocks a number of times, which made ETHEL
cry.Since ETHEL continued to be hard-headed, AVA held her on the shoulder. ETHEL struggled
and slipped from AVAs hold, got out of balance, and fell ETHEL hit the sofa and when she
bounced back her head hit the edge of the cemented stairs. AVA got shocked and noticed LEEZEL
stop playing his guitar and shout: Ava yoong anak mo. AVA then held ETHEL and gave her
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Seeing ETHELs serious condition, LEEZEL suggested to AVA to
bring ETHEL to the hospital, which they did, at first to the Mandaluyong City Hospital and because
the hospital cannot provide the best medical care, to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where
she was brought to and confined at the hospitals Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Early on the morning
of 28 May 1996, AVA went to the Mandaluyong Police Station to get her car and to find out the
reason why her car was impounded. She was not able to get the car.Instead, she was detained at
about 8:00 p.m. of 28 May 1996. AVA came to know that the police found drugs in her car, for
which reason she was detained.[6] Three (3) days after her detention, Lilia Gojul, her sister, went
to jail and asked her to sign some papers and asked her permission to take off the respirator of
ETHEL in the hospital. She did not give her permission.[7]
 On cross-examination, AVA declared that the cigarette burns on ETHELs body were caused
by sprinkling oil while their maid was cooking; LEEZEL had nothing to do with any of the childs
bruises or injuries; when Lilia Gojul, her sister visited her in jail, the former told her that she should
point to LEEZEL as the one responsible for ETHELs death, otherwise, she will do something to
her; and that she has no personal relation with LEEZEL. However, in her affidavit,[8] dated 1 June
1996, and in her reply-affidavit,[9] AVA pointed to LEEZEL as the one responsible for ETHELs
injuries, stating that when she returned home after making a phone call from outside the house,
she found LEEZEL hit ETHEL with the buckle of a belt at the back and front of her head. She
tried to stop him but he pushed her. As LEEZEL continued to hit ETHEL with the belt, what she
did was to get the antenna of the TV and hit LEEZEL with it at his hand causing him to release
the same. She then got hold of ETHEL but because LEEZEL pushed her she fell to the floor with
her daughter. This was repeated several times. When she noticed ETHEL was having difficulty in
breathing, she ran to the comfort room in order to give ETHEL a shower to revive her, at the same
time applying mouth to mouth resuscitation to her. She went out of the bathroom to bring ETHEL
to the hospital.[10]
In her reply-affidavit AVA declared that when she returned home after making a telephone
call, she found LEEZEL hit ETHEL with a buckle of his belt. That was not the first time that she
saw him hit ETHEL; he used to hit her whenever he is high on drugs and ETHEL was noisy
playing. On those occasions LEEZEL used to hit AVA and they end up fighting because AVA
always tried to protect ETHEL from harm.
AVA tried to diminish the value of these admissions in her affidavit and reply-affidavit by
testifying that she did not read them before signing and she signed under a state of shock.[11]
LEEZEL offered two versions for his defense.In his counter-affidavit[12] of 11 June 1996, he
declared that during breakfast in the morning of 27 May 1996, he and AVA talked about the band
and their concert in Subic. Thereafter, AVA told him that she was going to make a phone call
outside of the house. Before leaving, she ordered ETHEL to hurry up with her food because she
was to go with AVA to the latters office. However, when AVA returned, ETHEL had not finished
eating. AVA hit ETHEL very hard, whipped her with a belt, held her by the arms and pushed her,
sending ETHEL to hit the corner of the sofa and then to bounce, causing her head to hit the end of
the cemented stairs and to fall to the floor. ETHEL was on the verge of death. AVA was
shocked. Seeing this, LEEZEL picked up ETHEL and brought her to the comfort room where he
poured water on her.Thereafter, he and AVA brought ETHEL to the hospital.[13]
But, in his testimony in court LEEZEL declared that his statement in his counter-affidavit that
AVA pushed ETHEL, causing the latter to fall and to hit the cemented stairs was only narrated to
him by AVA and that he never witnessed the incident.[14] He further declared that he had nothing
to do with ETHELs injuries and the testimony of Lilia Gojul is not true.Lilia had an ulterior motive
against him because on one occasion he prevented Catherine, Lilias daughter from entering AVAs
house and because of that, Lilia, her husband and her sons Caesar and Julius kicked him and hit
him with a chair. Finally, LEEZEL claimed that he had no idea as to what happened to ETHEL;
all that he saw was the child lying on the floor, and he then helped AVA bring the child to the
hospital. In the hospital, he was asked by the police to go with them to the Complaints and
Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong City Police, where he stayed for more than four
hours. Since the police conducted no formal investigation on him, he left for home.[15]
 In its decision[16] of 19 March 1997, the trial court found AVA and LEEZEL guilty of parricide
and homicide, respectively. It decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez y Cruz
and Leezel Franco y Samson guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Parricide and homicide respectively and considering the mitigating circumstance that they did
not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and there being no aggravating
circumstances on record, imposes upon-

a) Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

b) Leezel Franco the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayora
minimum to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one () day of reclusion temporal as
maximum;
c) To pay the costs.
Any detention service rendered by the accused should be credited in their favor computed
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
AVA and LEEZEL appealed to us from the decision.
In their Appellants Brief, AVA and LEEZEL interpose this lone assignment of error:

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED WITHOUT

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION.

In support thereof, they argue that the prosecutions principal witness Lilia Gojul, as well as
the other witnesses never saw how ETHEL sustained the injuries inflicted upon her; Lilia never
testified that during her stay in AVAs house the child was the object of their quarrel; the
prosecutions evidence is purely hearsay, conjectural and fails to show any conspiracy that they
maltreated and caused ETHELs death; her death was purely accidental; only circumstantial
evidence is on record against them and there was no evil motive on their part to kill ETHEL.
They characterized the report of ETHEL to Lilia Gojul as to the formers shaven head and
injuries as hearsay and cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule because it was not
made on an impending death or with the thought of an impending death and was related to Lilia
many days before the incident.
LEEZEL further asserts that only AVA was formally charged, hence, there is no case against
him.
The trial court convicted AVA and LEEZEL on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.Circumstancial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following requisites are
present, namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived from are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[17] The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken
chain of events so as to lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the
accused.[18] In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7)
circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to account and relied upon as bases for its
finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL, to wit:
 1. In 14 April 1996, prosecution principal witness, Lilia Gujol, saw Ethel shaven, with many
constusions on her face, black eyes, cigarette burns on her arms and neck, and several marks
of maltretament on her legs and both knees as well as traces of pinching all over her
body. When asked who caused her those injuries, the 2 year old girl pointed to her own mother,
Ava, and her mothers live in partner, Leezel Franco;
2. When Lilia next saw Ethel on 12 May 1996, Ethel had even graver injuries and was
sickly.Again, Ethel pointed to appellants Ava and Leezel as the ones who caused her the
injuries.
3. Michelle Torrente, a resident of the unit adjacent to the townhouse unit occupied by Ava
Cariquez, Leezel Franco and Ethel Cariquez, testified that she used to hear Ethel crying
between 1:00 to 2:00 in the morning.She further testified that one day she saw Ethel with
bruises and cigarettes burns and when asked what happened to her, Ethel replied, pinaso po
ako; Ethel pointed to her Papa Leezel as the one who did it to her.
4. Theresa Castillo, another occupant of an adjacent unit, also testified that she often saw Ethel
bruised and crying and sometime in April, saw her head shaven. When she asked the yaya why
Ethels hair was shaved, the yayaanswered parusa.
5. Dr. Jose Bienvenida, the doctor who attended to Ethel at the Cardinal Santos Memoraial
Hospital, opined that the injuries found on the head of Ethel were inflicted on different dates.
6. Dr. Bienvenida further testified that in the course of taking the medical history of the child, he
interviewed the mother, Ava Cariquez, who gave conflicting accounts as to how the child got
injuries: while the mother initially said that her daughter was mauled by her uncle (AVAs
brother), she later changed her story by claiming that the child fell from the stairs.
7. Dr. Vertido testified that the cause of death was traumatic Head Injury, Severe
Aside from the foregoing circumstantial evidence, the trial court also took into account AVAs
affidavit (Exhibit R), reply-affidavit (Exhibit S), and LEEZELs counter-affidavit (Exhibit T), as
well as the circumstances of the apprehension of the two by authorities for illegal possession of
shabu and AVAs judicial admission that ETHEL slipped form her hold, fell and her head hit the
cemented floor.
We are fully convinced from the evidence on record of the culpability of AVA and LEEZEL
for ETHELs maltreatment. The testimony of Lilia Gojul, Michelle Torrente and Theresa Castillo
ineluctably show that AVA and LEEZEL tormented ETHEL. Where ETHEL dwelt was not a
home; it was not even a house. It was hell. AVA and LEEZEL considered ETHEL not as a child
with human dignity and an object of love as children should be, but an unwanted object against
whom they could vent everything from frustrations to anger and hate. What Lilia saw on ETHEL
was truly shocking -- an innocent child with shaven hair; with a face full of contusions; a neck
with faded cigarettes burns; arms and legs with traces of pinching and maltreatment; black-eyed
eyes; and contused knees due to prolonged kneeling.[19] When Lilia asked the little girl to identify
who inflicted the injuries on her body, ETHEL tearfully pointed to AVA and LEEZEL.[20] Lilia
confronted AVA about her and LEEZELs maltreatment of the child.[21]
In April 1996 Michelle Torrente was aghast to see ETHELs head shaven, with bruises all over
her body and wounds in her arms and legs,[22]as well as cigarette burns. When she asked what
happened, ETHEL replied: pinaso po ako.When she further asked her who burned her and caused
her bruises, ETHEL said, Papa ko po, referring to LEEZEL.[23]
 Theresa Castillo also noticed ETHELs shaven head and body bruises. When she asked
ETHELs yaya why this was done to the child, the yaya answered, parusa.[24]
The declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they observed on ETHEL were not
hearsay. They saw her and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the
answer of ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL
could not be confronted on that, yet it was part of the res gestae and, therefore, an exception to the
hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.

There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae.(1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[25] In this case the startling
occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them
spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the
infliction of the injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no
uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event from
the making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to
the incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. These acts are covered by and
punished under R.A. No. 7610, under which they were originally prosecuted.However, the then
Information was amended to charge them with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code. The evidence on the prior incidents cannot legally justify a conviction for the physical
injuries inflicted before 27 May 1996.
The issue then that must be resolved is who was or were responsible for the act on 27 May
1996, which caused or resulted in the death of ETHEL? On this the prosecution failed to offer any
direct evidence. The circumstantial evidence the trial court appreciated related to acts or events
which happened before 27 May 1996.
Yet, these prior acts are inseparable from that which happened on 27 May 1996. The latter
was the coup de grace. Fortunately, for the prosecution, AVA offered two versions. The first was
that she offered at the witness stand in open court, i.e., ETHELs death was due to an accident. The
second was narrated in her affidavit (Exhibit R) and reply-affidavit (Exhibit S), where she pointed
to LEEZEL as the culprit.We cannot allow her to disown her affidavit and reply-affidavit as the
explanation given for that is very flimsy and incredible, and clearly concocted to exculpate
LEEZEL and at the same to absolve herself under a claim of accident. Her affidavit and reply-
affidavit were prepared at her instance long before she took the witness stand. In a manner of
speaking they were given voluntarily and spontaneously long before the prospect of a court trial
became imminent and the dismissal of the cases against her was her goal. That she told the truth
in her affidavit and reply-affidavit cannot escape the verdict of rational minds.
AVAs story of accident cannot, likewise, work in her favor.
 Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. In order
that accident may exempt an accused from criminal liability, it must be shown that the accused
was performing a lawful act with due care; the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and
there must be no fault or intent to cause the injury on the part of the accused.[26]
The defense of accident shifted to AVA the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon
them to prove that they were exempt from criminal liability. It is at once evident from the story
foisted to the trial court by AVA while she was on the witness stand that the requisites
of accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven. On the contrary, the totality of her
story proved beyond reasonable doubt that ETHEL was maltreated and pushed hard driving her
head to the cemented stairs and causing the injuries which were the proximate cause of her death.
We agree with the trial courts appreciation of conspiracy against AVA and LEEZEL. The rule
is well settled that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable
for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.[27] Proof of conspiracy need not be direct but
may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances.[28] If it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object each doing a part so
that their acts, though apparently independent were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of
formal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved.[29] The facts and circumstances proven in this
case unerringly lead us to a conclusion that AVA and LEEZEL conspired to maltreat, injure, inflict
pain, torture ETHEL and they were united in that purpose and intention. The totality of their evil
deeds demonstrated beyond doubt their resolve to pursue with persistence their common objective,
which eventually resulted in the death of ETHEL. As amply demonstrated by the evidence,
ETHELs injuries, particularly that on the head, in addition to those on the body, were sustained
not only on the date of the fateful incident but on dates before the day of the incident. Thus, Dr.
Bienvenida testified that: he noted that the injury on the head was a confluent injury, which means
that it was sustained on different dates;[30] one portion of the injury was resolving hematoma which
was at least two (2) days old, while the more acute injury was sustained within 24 hours from his
examination.[31] Likewise, the result of the CT-Scan which was taken on the child showed a
combination of chronic and acute subdural hematoma on the left fronto-temporoparietal (front side
and apex) convexity of the brain.Massive edema and musk effect in the left cerebral hemisphere
and right fronto-parietal lobe were noted. A fracture was also noted on the left frontal bone. Blood
clot was found in almost the entire cerebral hemisphere. Also found were soft tissue
injuries, i.e., hematoma and abrasions, in other parts of the body.[32] In the autopsy conducted by
Dr. Vertido of the NBI, the doctor concluded as the cause of Ethels death: Traumatic Head Injury.[33]
Indisputably, AVA committed the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering that no modifying circumstances were proven, then pursuant to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, the lesser of the penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed
by the trial court on AVA.LEEZEL was correctly held liable for the crime of homicide only as he
was a stranger to the victim, ETHEL. Previous to its amendment by R.A. 7610, the penalty for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, was reclusion temporal. As amended by
R.A. 7610, the penalty for homicide in cases where the victim is a child below twelve (12) years
of age is reclusion perpetua. The second paragraph of Section 10 of Article VI of R.A. 7610
provides, as follows:
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248,
249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical
injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the penalty of reclusion perpetuashould be imposed upon LEEZEL. His claim that
he was not charged in the amended information is absolutely wanting in basis. He was, although
for parricide, but, he could legally be convicted of homicide, which is necessarily included in that
charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated 19 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 110410 finding accused-appellant Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez
y Cruz and Leezel Franco y Samson guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Parricide and Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 246 and Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively, and imposing, with respect to appellant Ava Cariquez, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED, but MODIFIED as to the penalty for Leezel Franco
y Samson and as so modified, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The decision is further MODIFIED by directing accused-appellants Ava Cariquez and
Leezel Franco y Samson to pay jointly and severally the heirs of ETHEL Cariquez, except accused-
appellant Ava Cariquez, the death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 125539. July 27, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN,

JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr. were charged before Branch 25 of
the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of
robbery.* The Amended Information dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2)
accused,conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and
intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in the dwelling
of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1)
adjustable wrench, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1)
travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10.00) pesos, with a total value of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and
Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED
(P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended
parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or on the
occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim
Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of
more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the other victims Corazon
Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance
for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 92-93, II Record.)

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were
charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with
deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working
together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with
firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band, entered the
dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against,
and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1)
Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand
Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the
occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their
companions who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana
Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar and Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 90-91, II Record.)

 Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty to
both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the
accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them,
they are hereby sentenced as follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and
Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10)
years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4)
months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of
P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo
Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his medication and
hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.,
Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of
the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 80, Rollo.)

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the
positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son
Reynaldo and the latters half sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an
unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They
were positively identified by the following witnesses: Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by
Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who
was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by
Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as a former barangay-mate for along time, as well as
by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo.The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated
and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long
period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage
of accused-appellants.Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who
were not shown to have any ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate accused-appellants,
prevails over the latters defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise
appreciated against accused-appellants (pp. 78-79, Rollo).
The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their individual briefs are summarized as
follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes
charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact
that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-
appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86,
146, 204, Rollo).
The prosecutions version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman,
Corazon Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar,
is summarized in the Solicitor Generals consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister
Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their
house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by
his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN,
Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons.Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to
let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.).Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with
his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11,
ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his
flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo
Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16,
ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the
hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June
30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon
Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to
make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the
latters aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The other man stayed put and
while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give
him money.After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked
the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of
Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total
value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00)
cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sisters house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July
21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunts house which is just twenty
(20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the
house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunts name and ask that the door
be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6)
persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body
and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other companions of appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with knives, a bolo, and a gun
also went in and restrained Josephine Belisarios cousins, namely Rogelia, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy,
and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June
29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face
down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant
Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisarios aunt and the mother of her
cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: Money, money. It is money we want.
Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p.
16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990). Then, appellants and their companions
seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three
thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of ladys rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3)
one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed
with a butchers knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did
as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly
removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant
Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the formers neck and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the
house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the
companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and brought
her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun,
threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life,
was left with no choice but to obey the mans orders. There, she was raped for the second time by
this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant
Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with
his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered appellant
Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon
not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her
over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a
gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he
undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.).Then, this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought
Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money.When she told him that
they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a
Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside the house again
where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then
brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this
position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. She refused
to obey appellant Alex Mijaques order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her
downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought
back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant
Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress
her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex
Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them
saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man demanded money from her
but she was not able to give him money. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her
with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength
finally gave out. He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her,
the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room
where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN,
June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate.While laying face down on the floor of the living room,
she was pulled by the heir by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood
up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a
double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie
down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13) years old, obeyed
appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed. Then,
appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who
was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed
knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He fondled her
breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her,
appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was returned inside the house,
the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in beating
the latter (pp. 4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier
after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of
them (p. 19, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first
aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-
20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14,
1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hack wound, mid forearm, area
ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit
A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent more
than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN,
December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was
raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine
Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the
ground. Josephine Belisario vagina admits two (2) fingers. Further, hematoma was noted in the
hymen at nine oclock and three oclock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at nine,
eleven, and three oclock positions.These are indications that a foreign object, which could be a
human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN,
September 3, 1986).

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr.
Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid).Her
vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one
centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were
likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three oclock positions (p. 3, TSN, November
10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the vagina of
Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the
face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head
and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) cm. lacerated wound on
the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised
wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right
forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below the waistline, her
vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and
four oclock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a 1 centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum
which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration
at six oclock position and a hematoma also at six oclock position were noted on her hymen
(Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their
witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The
denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows:
Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang,
whom he described as the landlord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to
reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand
that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo
Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).
 In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution
witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized the person who called [her]
brother Reynaldo, said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother,
and that she only recognized the callers voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-
appellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque
Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p.
3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the
perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower
court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points
out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown
persons. No rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders
were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise
takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not
report any rape.
According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred
to in the record as Mandurriao) received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set
was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as
the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of
arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo).Meanwhile, the
robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo.The arresting officers
of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save
themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial
investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery.Consequently, three days after his confinement,
a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed
against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.
Nestor Ras
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Ras, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr.
Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into
mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses declarations as regards his identification are
confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor
about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that Nothing happened to them (p.
210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the
alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented
their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents,
wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the
incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the
plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the
plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).
 For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the
farm where he was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In
July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for
investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell,
he was not identified.Instead, the policemen pointed to him and said, That is Alex Mijaque who
raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a case against you. Moreover, he testified that
he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13).Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor
of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latters alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a
drinking spree from 6 oclock in the evening to 12 oclock midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque
was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep
the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).
Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique
(particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As
corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11,
1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao,
Antique from 3 oclock to 5 oclock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items
in a sack (tsn, March 4, 1994, p. 4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturings and are compelled to affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally
uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses
but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses credibility,
particularly the ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to
a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was
not able to prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they
were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario
and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-
328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless
they really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining
witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman
failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984,
Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the
Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and
that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no
report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillars report did not mention that she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA
384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Alimans sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he
clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to
mention accused-appellant Mijaques name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not
know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn
statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he found out that the name of
his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned unknown
persons in his report does not affect Reynaldos categorical and positive identification of accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the
matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p.
19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting
the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident
(tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254
SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of
rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses,
as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a
kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down,
thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that
although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because
the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2)
the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to
identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight
of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency
in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so
when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279
SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight
in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181
[1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused,
it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given
weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present
at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA
314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709
[1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718
[1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124
[1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr.243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557
[1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo.The
overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and
twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is
merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in
Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away
therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting
witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was
given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis Mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places
where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was
not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 oclock or 7:30
o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984.More importantly and damming yet is the positive
identification of their presence thereat by the victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and
the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully
consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from
the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them,
as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims homes. He who goes to anothers
house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of
Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-
324). We further affirm the trial courts finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other
companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home
(tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4)
persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p. 10, June 30,
1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of
robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the
victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a
bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p.
10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).
With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaques defense that they were arrested
without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]).As correctly
pointed out in the Peoples consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed
prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal
Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime
charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting
wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three
accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the
victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the household of
Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-
appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunts house and the other culprits followed
suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a
hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims,
Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted
acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It
cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements
of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-
appellants adduced at the trial

...direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The
existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy
of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA
146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486)...

(People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the

straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the
time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art.
294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence,
the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive
capital punishment at its discretion, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Simply
stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp.
507-508).
Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the
Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitutions abolition of the death
penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the
death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the
decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already
taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime
in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised
Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress future
restoration thereof for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. At the time of such
ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been
imposed. Considering that the provision provides that [a]ny death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, it is clear that the framers intended said provision to have a
retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed
yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed
is automatically without need for any executive action commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue:When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and
was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that
any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer
would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men.The idea that an individual may be compelled
to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 [1919]). Before us is a
heinous crime indeed where People were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced
sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and
hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the
ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on
and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil.
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient.
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and
benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [p]enal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
 A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state
(Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the
Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital
crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a
criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when
sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried
out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs.
Santos, 56 Phil 483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty
benefits herein accused-appellants.Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will
not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by
Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508,
citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227,
citing I Record, p. 747-748).
There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to
insists that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued
existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a
particular matter.However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a
right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264,
citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil
372 [1946]).Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive
operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing
rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty
accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken
away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction
is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen
under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there
is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376,
correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal
property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for
medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to
order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs.
Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the
legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like
considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present
amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00. this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over
the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape
(considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to
the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the
victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise
awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269
SCRA 293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and
severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-
appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering
that the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of
the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the
amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00
representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00
representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar
family representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305
are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for
each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages,
for which amounts all three accused-appellants are jointly and severally liable.
SO ORDERED.