Ople v Torres

239 SCRA 141 (1998).

FACTS:
Petitioner Ople prays that for the invalidation of Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on the ground that it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and
the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
On April 8, 1997, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining its
implementation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the establishment of a national computerized identification
reference system requires a legislative act.

RULING:
Yes. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must
be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing
the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of
power and cannot be allowed.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

249 SCRA 630 (1995)

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one
title rule.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Section 26(1), Article 6 - one subject,
one title rule.
NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were
exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included.
PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the
removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was only made after
the meeting of the Conference Committee which was not expressed in the
title of RA 7166

RULING:
No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to
expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power
of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public
utility when the common good so requires.
One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members
and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not
know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they
might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its
existence.
 Pesigan vs. Angeles
G.R. No. 642279
April 30, 1984

FACTS:
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in
an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos
and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas as the
destination.
The carabaos were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the
town’s police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial
veterinarian, in spite of the permit and certificates to transport. Doctor Miranda,
thereafter, distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud
Camarines Norte – where said carabaos were confiscated, and to a farmer from
Vinzons municipal nursery.
Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case filed by the Pesigans
against Zenarosa and Miranda, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The cause of confiscation was based on Executive Order No. 628-A.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order 626-A is effective prior to its publication
in the Official Gazette.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is a penal regulation
published more than two months after the confiscation of the cattle or in
June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. It should therefore not be enforced
against the petitioners.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and fairness dictate that the public must
be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the NCC also includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties.
 Lagcao vs Labra
G. R. No. 155746
October 13, 2004

FACTS:
The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the
mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition
of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and Ursula Lagcao.
In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of
which is the lot 1029. In 1965, petitioners purchased said lot on installment
but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of Cebu. The latter
tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners.
RTC and CA ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and
a TCT was issued in their favor. When they tried to take possession of the
land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus, they instituted
ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed
by RTC. However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of
the demolition since the city was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. This was granted. During the suspension the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot
1029). Ord. No. 1843 likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the
payment of subject land; this was approved by the Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cebu City Ordinance No. 1843 is valid.

RULING:
No. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain
well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive
requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus
established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance.
 Salas vs Jarencio
G.R. No. 29788
August 30,1970

FACTS:
The City of Manila had a Torrens Title over a 7,490-square-meter lot. The
municipal Board of Manila requested the President of the Philippines to have
the lot declared as patrimonial property of the City so that it could be sold by
the City to the actual occupants of the lot. In 1964, Congress enacted
Republic Act 4118 whereby the lot was made disposable or alienable land of
the State (not of the City), and its disposal was given to a national government
entity, the Land Tenure Administration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 4118 is valid

RULING:
Yes. There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its
own funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State IN TRUST for
the benefit of the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and
therefore the STATE can lawfully dispose of the lot. Thus, Republic Act 4118 is
valid and constitutional and this is so even if the City of Manila will receive NO
COMPENSATION from the State.

Tanada v Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (1986)

FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity
for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to
publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of
general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The
publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in
the official gazette.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING:
Yes. The court held that all statute including those of local application shall
be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not
have to be made in the official gazette.

Philippine Veterans Bank employees Union vs. Vega

G.R. No. 105364
June 28, 2001

FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the
rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official
Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor
tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening
the bank.
In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the
PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge
Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that
RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication
in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval.
Aquino signed it into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became
effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its
effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it
took effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the
petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after
15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise
provided”.

PNB vs Court of Appeals

41 SCAD 349, 222 SCRA 134 (1993)

FACTS:
Two parcels of land under the common names of the respondent Epifanio
dela Cruz, his brother and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine
National Bank. The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the by three promissory
notes. The first two was not paid by the respondent. The third is disputed by the
respondent who claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961; however, in the
bank records, the note was really executed on June 30, 1958.PNB presented
under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged lots. The lots were
sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder. A Final Deed of Sale and
a Certificate of Sale was executed in favor of the petitioner. The final Deed of
Sale was registered in Registry of Property. Inasmuch as the respondent did not
buy back the lots from PNB, PNB sold on the same in a "Deed of Conditional
Sale". The Notices of Sale of foreclosed properties were published on March 28,
April 11 and April 12, 1969 in a newspaper. Respondent brought a complaint for
the reconveyance of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully
foreclosed. The petitioner states on the other hand that the extrajudicial
foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale were all valid. The
CFI rendered its Decision; the complaint against the petitioner was dismissed.
Unsatisfied with the judgment, respondent interposed an appeal that the lower
court erred in holding that there was a valid compliance in regard to the required
publication under Sec. 3 of Act. 3135.Respondent court reversed the judgment
appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed
pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership. Hence,
the petition with SC for certiorari and intervention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the required publication of The Notices of Sale on the
foreclosed properties under Sec. 3 of Act 3135 was complied.

RULING:
No. The first date falls on a Friday while the second and third dates are on a
Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the
notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks". Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal
requirement. The Supreme Court held that: The rule is that statutory provisions
governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the
notice and render the sale at least voidable

Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Labor

Relations Commission
G.R. No. 58011
July 20,1982

FACTS:
The records show that private respondents have a manning contract for
period of one (1) year with petitioner in representation of its principal Kyoei
Tanker Co. Ltd. Three months after the commencement of their employment,
the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and benefits while their
vessel was in route to a port in Australia controlled by the International
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)where the ITF could detain the vessel
unless it paid its seamen the ITF rates. The agent of the owner of the vessel
agreed to pay a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly
afterwards, the seamen were repatriated and their contracts were terminated.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen
Ship-ping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of
contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private
respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the
seamen breached their employment contracts when they demanded and received
from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal
of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were ordered suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision
of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the
ground that the termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid
cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent NLRC had no more jurisdiction to entertain
private respondents’ appeal.

RULING:
Yes. Considering that copy of said decision was received by them on July 9,
1980 and they filed their memorandum of appeal only on July 23, 1980 or
fourteen (14) days later, whereas under article 223 of the Labor Code which
governs appeals from the National Seamen’s Board to the National Labor
Relations Commission per Article 20(b) of the Code provides that such appeals
must be made within ten (10) days.
In this connection, it is contended in the comment of private respondents
that petitioner has overlooked that under Section 7, Rule XIII, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the ten-day period specified in Article
223 refers to working days and that this Court has already upheld such
construction and manner of computation in Fabula v. NLRC, G.R. No. 54247,
December 19, 1980. Now, computing the number of working days from July 9
to July 23, 1980, We find that there were exactly ten (10) days, hence, if We
adhere to Fabula, the appeal in question must be held to have been made on
time.
Article 223 of the Labor Code literally provides thus:
"Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiters or compulsory
arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both of the parties within ten (10) days from receipt of such awards, orders, or
decisions. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and(d) If serious errors in the findings
of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to
the Appellant.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor
Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon the
erring parties the implementing rules may not provide that the said period should
be computed on the basis of working days. This, indeed, is a legal issue not
brought up nor passed upon squarely in Fabula, and petitioner prays that this
Court rule on the point once and for all.
After mature and careful deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that
the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 contemplates calendar
days and not working days. We are persuaded to this conclusion, if only because
We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded
that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long periods for
any acts to be done by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by
management than by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and
management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the
employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what
with well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts
and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter
either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino

G.R. No. 28841
June 24, 1983
FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City
Court an information for slight physical injuries allegedly committed by the
petitioner-appellant on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho Ching. The
petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that
the information having been filed on the 61st day following the commission of
the offense, the sixty days’ prescriptive period had lapsed. The City Court of
Quezon City denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a
Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading
falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding business day, the
action had not prescribed. After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the
City Court, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Rizal. CFI of Rizal dismissed the
petition. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this
appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which
interrupts the prescription of an offense.

RULING:
No. The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of
time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before
a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not
apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who
committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such
offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day
to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period
cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically
set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the
last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Footnote: Section 1 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Pretermission
of holiday- where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted
by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business
day. Section 1, Rule 28 of the former Rules of Court provided: How to compute
time-In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or
a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day
which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday.