LATEST CASES DECIDED BY JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO

1. Asiatrust Devt Bank vs CIR, GR 205130/201680-81 Apr 19, 2017

TAX
- An application for tax abatement is deemed approved only upon the issuance of a
termination letter by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

- Section 4 of RR No. 15-06 provides:

“SECTION 4. Who May Avail. – Any person/taxpayer, natural or juridical, may settle thru
this abatement program any delinquent account or assessment which has been released
as of June 30, 2006, by paying an amount equal to One Hundred Percent (100%) of the
Basic Tax assessed with the Accredited Agent Bank (AAB) of the Revenue District Office
(RDO)/Large Taxpayers Service (LTS)/Large Taxpayers District Office (LTDO) that has
jurisdiction over the taxpayer. In the absence of an AAB, payment may be made with the
Revenue Collection Officer/Deputized Treasurer of the RDO that has jurisdiction over the
taxpayer. After payment of the basic tax, the assessment for penalties/surcharge and
interest shall be cancelled by the concerned BIR Office following existing rules and
procedures. Thereafter, the docket of the case shall be forwarded to the Office of the
Commissioner, thru the Deputy Commissioner for Operations Group, for issuance of
Termination Letter.”

- The presentation of the termination letter is essential as it proves that the taxpayer’s
application for tax abatement has been approved. Thus, without a termination letter, a
tax assessment cannot be considered closed and terminated.

- Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a letter issued by RDO Nacar. These documents,
however, do not prove that Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement has been
approved. If at all, these documents only prove Asiatrust’s payment of basic taxes, which
is not a ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated.

REMEDIAL
- An appeal to the CTA En Banc must be preceded by the filing of a timely motion for
reconsideration or new trial with the CTA Division.

- The same is true in the case of an amended decision. Section 3, Rule 14 of the same
rules defines an amended decision as “[a]ny action modifying or reversing a decision of
the Court en banc or in Division.” As explained in CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[65] an amended decision is a different
decision, and thus, is a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration.

- In this case, the CIR’s failure to move for a reconsideration of the Amended Decision of
the CTA Division is a ground for the dismissal of its Petition for Review before the CTA En
Banc. Thus, the CTA En Banc did not err in denying the CIR’s appeal on procedural
grounds.
2. Bankard, Inc. Vs. Luz P. Alarte; G.R. No. 202573; April 19, 2017
REMEDIAL
- Preponderance of evidence greater weight of the credible evidence

- Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales
contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business
establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the
credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between
the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.

- This is to say that while the Court believes that petitioner’s claim may be well-founded,
it is not enough as to allow judgment in its favor on the basis of extant evidence. It must
prove the validity of its claim; this it may do by amending its Complaint and adducing
additional evidence of respondent’s credit history and proving the loan transactions
between them. After all, credit card arrangements are simple loan arrangements
between the card issuer and the card holder.

3. Herma Shipyard, Inc. and Mr. Herminio Esguerra Vs. Danilo Oliveros, et al.; G.R. No.
208936; April 17, 2017
REMEDIAL
- It is settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. Nevertheless, in view of the opposing views of the tribunals
below, this Court shall take cognizance of and resolve the factual issues involved in this
case.

LABOR

- Who are project-based employees? Employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee

- The principal test in determining whether particular employees were engaged as

project-based employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether they
were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of
which was specified at, and made known to them, at the time of their engagement.
Elements:
a. knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties;
b. without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employees; and
c. any other circumstances vitiating their consent.
 - Performance by project-based employees of tasks necessary and desirable to the usual
business operation of the employer will not automatically result in their regularization.
2 distinguishable types of activities;
a. a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or
usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and
identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company.; and
b. particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation.

- Repeated rehiring of project employees to different projects does not ipso facto make
them regular employees.
Stated otherwise, the rule that employees initially hired on a temporary basis may
become permanent employees by reason of their length of service is not applicable to
project-based employees. Our ruling in Villa v. National Labor Relations
Commission[124] is instructive on the matter, viz.:
“Thus, the fact that petitioners worked for NSC under different project
employment contracts for several years cannot be made a basis to consider them as
regular employees, for they remain project employees regardless of the number of
projects in which they have worked. Length of service is not the controlling
determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee. In the case of
Mercado Sr. v. NLRC, this court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of
Article 280, providing that an employee who has served for at least one year, shall
be considered a regular employee, relates only to casual employees and not to
project employees.”

- Indeed, if we consider the nature of Herma Shipyard’s business, it is clear that Herma
Shipyard only hires workers when it has existing contracts for shipbuilding and repair. It
is not engaged in the business of building vessels for sale which would require it to
continuously construct vessels for its inventory and consequently hire a number of
permanent employees.

- What is important is that the respondents were apprised at the time of their
engagement that their employment is coterminous with the specific project and that
should their employment be extended by virtue of paragraph 10 the purpose of the
extension is only to complete the same specific project, and not to keep them employed
even after the completion thereof.

4. People of the Philippines Vs. Tirso Sibbu; G.R. No. 214757; March 29, 2017
CRIMINAL
- Treachery is present “when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

- In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident,
Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the
impending attack. In addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in
the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed. They
 also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. Appellant, in particular,
wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his
family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety
or to defend themselves. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant’s
attack was treacherous.

- The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the
triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this
circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually
entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim
was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without

- The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in

this case. Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the
shooting incident. There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over
appellant’s face but to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in
the same barangay and are familiar with each other

- For crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an
ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death
penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs
the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages. For
the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances
present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil
indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00.

5. Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Sps. Esteban and Cresencia Chu; G.R. No. 192345; March
29, 2017
REMEDIAL
- Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised as this Court is
not a trier of facts; it is not our function to re-examine and weigh anew the evidence of
the parties.
Exceptions;
a. as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and
b. when the findings of fact are conflicting

- We held that although the determination of just compensation is fundamentally a

judicial function vested in the RTC, the judge must still exercise his discretion within the
bounds of law.
“He may not disregard the procedure laid down therein because unless an
administrative order is declared invalid courts have no option but to apply it. Otherwise,
the judge runs the risk of violating the agrarian reform law should he choose not to use
the formula laid down by the DAR for the determination of just compensation”
 CIVIL

- Although the LBP maintained that it stringently applied the pertinent law and its
relevant implementing rules in arriving at its computation, it failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the truthfulness or correctness of its assertions.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, we held that “in determining just
compensation, LBP must substantiate its valuation.”

- The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining just
compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market
value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time
of taking, not its potential uses.

- For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking,
or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property,
such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e.,
(a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
(d) the owner’s sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations,
(f) the assessment made by government assessors,
(g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

- When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from
the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall
be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

6. People of the Philippines Vs. Myra Gayoso y Arguelles; G.R. No. 206590; March 27, 2017
CRIMINAL
- In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial
importance must be given to “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused

- Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined “as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. The determination of the existence of probable cause is
 concerned only with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged.
- The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements:
1. the identities of the buyer and the seller,
2. the object and consideration of the sale; and
3. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
- The offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following elements:
1. the accused is in possession of an item or an object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug
2. such possession is not authorized by law; and
3. the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug
In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that these
offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.

- The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed
- Four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be established:
1. seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
2. the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
3. the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and
4. the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

- The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done
“(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation.”

- In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items
with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While PO2
Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,[28] no
evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of
appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None of
the police officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore a complete absence
of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.

- While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a
case of warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers secured a search
warrant prior to their operation.

- It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality
however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed “is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
 confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of
custody could not be established at all.

- Section 21(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.

- Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the shabu in view of the broken
linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot arise.”

7. Martin Villamor y Tayson, and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan Vs. People of the Philippines; G.R.
No. 200396; March 22, 2017
CRIMINAL
- The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra’s compound without
a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar.
Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the
petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

- “Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and
seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree.”
REMEDIAL
- In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely
“(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”

- The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering
the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted
that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called
“papelitos;” yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he
readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.
 - The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be
raised before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the
legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this
case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the
arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest.

-The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose.[1] A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with
the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or
search warrant. While there are instances where arrests and searches may be made without
a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.

8. Nicolas S. Matudan Vs. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan; G.R. No.
203284; November 14, 2016
CIVIL
- The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals taught us that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

- Thus, the incapacity “must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.

- Psychological incapacity,’ as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family

Code, should refer to no less than a mental– not merely physical – incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

- We’ cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the
petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards.
- It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run
contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
 which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts.

- In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive
guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.

(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the
marriage,

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

9. Sps. Romeo Pajares and Ida T. Pajares Vs. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning,
represented by Archemedes G. Solis; G.R. No. 212690; February 20, 2017
CIVIL/REMEDIAL
- Breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific performance or rescission of
contract. It may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant to
Art. 1170 of the Civil Code. In the specific performance and rescission of contract cases,
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction belongs to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the case for damages, however, the court that has
jurisdiction depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.
 - Specific performance is ”[t]he remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract in
the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon.
[It is t]he actual accomplishment of a contract by a party bound to fulfill it.

- Rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, is a
remedy available to the obligee when the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent
upon him.[26] It is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party who violates the
reciprocity between them. Rescission may also refer to a remedy granted by law to the
contracting parties and sometimes even to third persons in order to secure reparation of
damages caused them by a valid contract, by means of restoration of things to their
condition in which they were prior to the celebration of the contract.

- A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained in the penal
clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary estimation.

- Concomitantly, what respondent primarily seeks in its Complaint is to recover aforesaid

liquidated damages (which it termed as “incidental and consequential damages”)
premised on the alleged breach of contract committed by the petitioners when they
unilaterally ceased business operations. Breach of contract may also be the cause of
action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code. It
provides:
“Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof; are liable for damages. (Emphasis supplied)”

- In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by the total
amount of damages claimed.

- In the instant case, the plaintiff’s complaint is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged breach of contract. The complaint sought the award of P200,000.00 as incidental
and consequential damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as legal expenses; the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount of P20,000.00 as cost of the suit, or
for the total amount of P280,000.00 as damages.

Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, the action
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total
amount of demand in the complaint is only P280,000.00, which is less than the
jurisdictional amount of the RTCs. Hence, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over the
instant case.

10. William G. Campos, Jr. Vs. Atty. Alexander C. Estebal; A.C. No. 10443; August 8, 2016
LEGAL ETHICS
- Obviously, the complainants failed to get the US visa There was even no attempt on the
part of the respondent to submit the application form for US Visa before the US
 Embassy. Respondent failed to attach any record that will show that he made an!
attempt to submit the same either individually or collectively.

- What is clear is that the amount individually paid by the complainants went to the
pocket of the respondent. It is not even clear if it is for the payment of his attorney’s
fees or for the payment of the application for the US visa, as above stated, an applicant
has to spend only P6,157.00. Thus, by mere mathematical computation, the amount of
P200,000.00 contract with complainant William Campos is excessive. If it is for the
payment of attorney’s fees, the same is also considered excessive and unreasonable.

- Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized;

(1) when there is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees

(2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the fees stipulated are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by the Court
(3) when the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal defects of
execution
(4) when the lawyer for justifiable cause was not able to finish the case for its conclusion
(5) when the lawyer and the client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees and
(6) when the client dismissed his client before the termination of the case or the latter
withdrew therefrom for valid reason

- Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client,

CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 2Q-01 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees.

- Respondent violated Canon 15 for the reason that he was not candid enough to tell the
complainants their chance[s] of getting [a] US visa.

- He also violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 because he did not account [for] the money he
received from the complainants. It is not clear to the complainants how much is trip
amount due to the respondent.

- Lastly, it appears that the attorney’s fees that he collected from the complainants are
excessive and unreasonable. Considering the degree of work and number of hours spent
 - In Nery v. Sampana,[12] the Court declared that:
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also
owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the
Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
“x x x A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.[13]

11. Spouses Mauricio M. Tabino and Leonila Dela Cruz-Tabino Vs. Lazaro M. Tabino; G.R. No.
196219; July 30, 2014
REMEDIAL
- Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to
vacate the premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and
2005-939 – respondent’s claim of possession and his right to recover the premises is
seriously placed in issue. If the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to
proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise
where the existing structures thereon would have to be demolished. If petitioners’
position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it
would mean that respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject
lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the ejectment case; and an
injustice would have occurred as a consequence of the demolition of petitioners’
residence and other permanent improvements on the disputed lots.

- In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme Court held that, “Under the Public Land
Act, the Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary ultimately have the
authority to dispose of and manage public lands. And while the DENR’s jurisdiction over
public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of
possession, the DENR’s decision would prevail with regard to the respective rights of
public land claimants. Regular courts would have no jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of the award of the public land.”

- The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial

system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.

- In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,[31] this Court made the following pronouncement:
“Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a
pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag, we
ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity.
We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of
 their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.
Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a
stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of
enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.[32]”
- More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag[35] dictates, thus –
“As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere
filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the
property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be
suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the
demolition of petitioners’ house would result from the enforcement of the
municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.[36]”

- In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot in good conscience
order the petitioners to vacate the premises at this point. The better alternative would
be to await the outcome of these Protests, before any action is taken in the ejectment
case.

12. Asian Institute of Management Vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association;
G.R. No. 207971; January 23, 2017
LABOR
- Article 212(m) of the Labor Code defines managerial employees as:

‘ART. 212. Definitions. – x x x

‘Managerial employee‘ is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay

down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any
of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book.’

- In further opining that a managerial employee is one whose ‘authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment‘, a
description which fits now a supervisory employee under Section 1(t), Rule I, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

- In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto, Tomas,[30] this Court declared that “[i]n case
of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s
certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.”

- On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can be said that petitioner was
correct in filing a petition tor cancellation of respondent’s certificate of registration.
Petitioner’s sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
registration – that its members are managerial employees and for this reason, its
 registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute vio1ation of Article 245 of the
Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join any labor
organization – is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation
for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial employees.

- The resolution of this issue cannot be pre-empted; until it is determined with finality in
G.R. No. 197089, the petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of registration
on the grounds alleged by petitioner cannot be resolved. As a matter of courtesy and in
order to avoid conflicting decisions, We must await the resolution of the petition in G.R.
No. 197089.

“x x x if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the

judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in1he first suit. x x x Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of
issues.[31] (Citation omitted)”

13. Julieta B. Sta. Ana Vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.; G.R. No. 208459; February 15, 2017
REMEDIAL
- As a rule, a petition under Rule 45 covers only questions of law as the tactual findings of
the CA are final and binding upon the Court However, this rule allows certain exceptions
including a situation where the CA manifestly overlooked undisputed relevant facts,
which if properly considered would support a different conclusion,[33] as in this case, In
particular, the uniform finding of the LA, NLRC, and CA that Sta. Ana was validly
dismissed is unjustified because salient facts were overlooked, which, if properly
considered, will prove the absence of just cause in dismissing her from work.

LABOR

- In this regard, to legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust, the
employer must establish that;
a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property;
b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established
facts; and,
c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.
In fine, there must be actual breach of duty on the part of the employee to justify his or
her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

- It is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, and not
simulated; it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct, and must not be arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.[44] While proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required; loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable
ground for one to believe that the employee committed the infraction, and the latters
participation makes him or her totally unworthy of the trust demanded by the position.

- An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two separate reliefs: full backwages and
reinstatement. In such case where reinstatement is no longer an option, payment of
 separation pay is justified. The Court considers “considerable time,” which includes the
lapse of eight years or more (from the filing of the complaint up to the resolution of the
case) to support the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Considering that
about eight years had passed from the time that Sta. Ana filed her complaint on
February 25, 2009 then, her reinstatement is an impractical option. Thus, instead of
reinstatement, the Court grants her separation pay of one month for every year of
service. As regards backwages, she is entitled to receive full backwages, which include
allowances and other benefits due her or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
time her compensation was withheld up to the finality of this Decision.
CIVIL
- The grant of moral damages is allowed where the employer acted in bad faith or in such
a manner oppressive to labor

14. People of the Philippines Vs. Dr. David A. Sobrepeña, Sr., et al.; G.R. No. 204063;
December 5, 2016
REMEDIAL
- Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

- Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal action.

- Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what
is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a
matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge.[9] The judge is under legal
obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties

- In People v. Plaza, the Court defined a summary hearing and expounded the court’s
discretionary power to grant bail to an accused.

“A summary hearing is defined as ‘such brief and speedy method of

receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail.’

On such hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
 nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted.

- From a perspective of the CA Decision, the issue therein resolved is not so much on the
bail application but already on the merits of the case. The matters dealt therein involved
the evaluation of evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of the CA to resolve in a
Petition for Certiorari. The findings and assessment of the trial court during the bail
hearing were only a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence
for the limited purpose of determining whether respondents are entitled to be released
on bail during the pendency of the trial.

- We would like to stress that “a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment

15. Sps. Desiderio and Teresa Domingo Vs. Sps. Emmanuel and Tita Manzano, et al.; G.R. No.
201883; November 16, 2016
CIVIL
- This ponente has had the occasion to rule that in a contract to sell, payment of the price
is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting
rescission but rather just an event that prevents the prospective buyer from compelling
the prospective seller to convey title. In other words, the non-fulfillment of the
condition of full payment renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and
effect.

- And it is precisely for the above reason that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot apply.
Since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same ineffective and
without force and effect, then there is no sale to speak of. Even petitioners’ posture that
their annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. 160752 is equivalent to registration or
claim of ownership necessarily fails, on account of the fact that there was never a sale in
their favor – and without a sale in their favor, they could not register or claim ownership
of the subject property. Thus, as between the parties to the instant case, there could be
no double sale which would justify the application of Article 1544. Petitioners failed to
pay the purchase price in full, while Aquino did, and thereafter she was able to register
her purchase and obtain a new certificate of title in her name. As far as this Court is
concerned, there is only one sale – and that is, the one in Aquino’s favor. “Since there is
only one valid sale, the rule on double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not
apply.

- ‘In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying
such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and
the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is
no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after
registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the latter, of
course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.’
 ‘Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere
consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:

a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price;

b) Determinate subject matter; and

c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.

Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale
because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller
explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the
prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the property
subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present
purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees
or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when the
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words, the full payment
of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which
prevents the obligation to sell from arising and, thus, ownership is retained by the
prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.’

The Court found that the Pacsons could have consigned the amount to be paid to the
Pacsons , which would have produced the effect of payment and fulfilled the suspensive
condition in a contract to sell, hence obligating the prospective seller to transfer the title
to the prospective buyers. The Pacsons, however, failed to do so

- ‘Evidently, before the remedy of specific perfomance may be availed of, there must be a
breach of the contract.

- This is not, however, to say that appellees are deprived of remedies. As found in the
Nabus case, appellees are entitled to the reimbursement of the sums they have paid, if
only to prevent the defendants’ unjust enrichment. Appellees are also entitled to
nominal damages against the defendants Manzanos and Estabillo