LEGAL PERIODS

Armigos v CA

COPY RECEIVED on JUNE 8, 1977

NOTICE OF APPEAL JUNE 9, 1977
SUBMITTED REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTION on JUNE 24, 1977
LC – PERFECTED APPEAL ONLY ON JUNE 24, 1977
PETITIONER CLAIMS: Received 4 pm on June 8, 1977 and submitted all requirements on June 24 1977 *dapat deadline 4pm pa

1. Private Respondent Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against petitioner Armigos with the Mun Court of Digos Davao del Sur for collection
of damages and attorney;s fees.
2. After trial, judgment IFO of Mata.
3. A copy of decision was received by Armigos on June 8, 1977 and the following day on June 9, 1977 Notice of appeal, he completed
other requirements for perfection of appeal including the filing of an appeal bond and payment of the appellate court docket fee.
4. However when the case was elevated to the CFI, for consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period, then dismissed the appeal.
5. PETITIONER: that from June 8. 1977, when he received the copy of decision to June 24, 1977 when he perfected his appeal, only 15 days
had elapsed so that the decision of the CFI dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond RP is erroneous.
6. He contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commenced from the hour he received the copy (4 pm June 8, 1977),
so that the first of the 15 day period is on 4pm of June 9, 1977, and the last day should be on 4 pm of June 24, 1977 and not June 23,
1977.
7. ISSUE: W/N petitioner perfected his appeal within the reglementary period – NO
a. Court considered day as synonymous with date, consequently the 15th day shall be 15 days after appeal regardless of the time it
was submitted.
b. Rule in Art. 13 of CC “in computing the period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included” is similar but not
identical to Section 4 of Code of CP which provided “Unless otherwise specially rovided, the time within which an act is required
by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday
it shall be excluded”, as well as the old Rule 28 of the ROC which stated the prescribed or allowed by the ROC by order of court
or by statute the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of timebeggins to run is not to be included,.
 c. Human memory is frail, human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person, there is
no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by the
party.
d. Period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
e. May find meaning in HC cases where mandatory 48 hours.
f. Absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. Petitioner
failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

NAMARCO v Tecson

NAMARCO 10 years
November 14, 1955 decision (Price Stabilization v Tecson)
November 21, 1955 received decision (ordering Tecson to pay)
December 21, 1965 – revival of judgment versus Tecson
Tecson raised LOJ and prescription (less than 10k; 10 years na CCP art 13) – That December 21, 1965 should be December 19, 1965 because of
two leap years (1960, 1964)
Denied, raised to CA by NAMARCO, CA certified to SC due to QOL
ON December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint on the same court as successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation against the same defendant 10 years ago

1. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over subject matte and prescription of
action
2. Court issued order of dismissal with regard to Article 13 of the CC
3. NAMERCO appealed to CA. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366
days. Case reached its conclusion with the appellant’s theory with regards to the Article 13 of the CC.
4. ISSUE: W?N the term year used in Article 13 of the CC is limited to 365 days (and whether the action had already prescribed) –
Prescribed –limited to 365 days only
a. 1144(3) of CC action upon judgment be brought within 10 years
b. Term year in Article 13 of the CC is limited to 365 days
 c. It is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy of the RAC, this may be done through
alegislative process and not by judicial decree
d. Prior to approval of CC of Spai, SC thereof held that whn law spoke of months it meant natural month or solar month in absence
of express provision to contrary. Spanish SC held then that Art 7 of CC that whenever months are referred to in law, it shall be
understood to ebe of 30 days and not the natural or solar calendar months unless designated by name in which case they shall
be computed by RAC sec 13.
e. In the language of this court in People v del Rosario, with the approval of CC of PH we have reverted to the provisions of the
Spanish CC in accordance with which a month is to be considrerd as a regular 30 day month and not the solar or civil month. And
in ours we explicitly stated that years are of three hundred sixty five days.
f. Although some justices inclined to think the legis is not realistic for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice,
theory of plaintiff cannot be upheld without ignoring or nullifying Art 13 of CC.

BINDING EFFECT

Barretto Gonzales v Gonzales 1933

Married in Manila in 1919 until 1926 they voluntarily separated (4 children born)
Mutually agree 500 pesos support
Husband left for Nevada and secured absolute divorce
Returned to PH 1928 and had another marriage
Wife brought action to CFI for confirm and ratify the decree of divorce; pay alimony; dissolve community
ARTICLE 9 OCC (on binding on status) and ARTICLE 11 OCC (Prohibitive laws)
Defendant ABSOLVED

1. Plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of PH, married and lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926, after which they
voluntary separated and not lived as man and wife. They had 4 minor children together.
2. After negotiations, both agreed to allow Manuela Barreto for her and her children’s support of P500 monthly to be increased in cases f
necessityand illness and that the title of certain properties be put in her name.
3. Shortly after agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant) went to Reno Nevada and secure an absolute divorce on ground of desertion
(Nov 28, 1927). On same date he had another marriage with another Filipinoncitizen and had 3 children with her.
 4. When Gonzales left PH he reduced the amount of support and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
5. Gonzales came back to PH and shortly after, Barreto brought ax at the CFI Manila requesting to confirm and ratify the decree of divorce
issued by Courts of Nevada and invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced and deliver to the guardian ad litem the
equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate.
They also prayed that the marriage be declared dissolved and order Gonzales to pay Barreto 500 pesos per month and counsel fees of
5000 and all expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons.
6. Guardians of children also filed as intervenors in the case.
7. After hearing, the CFI Manila granted judgment in favor of plaintiff but reduced AF to 3k.
8. Hence SC
9. Issue: W/N Foreign divorce relating to citizens of the PI will be recognized in this jurisdiction except it be for a cause, and under
conditions for which the courts of PI would grant divorce? NO
a. Securing jurisdiction of the courts to recog and approve divorce in Reno cannot be done accoding to PP in PH.
b. Art 9 and 11 of CC and Divorce law of PH does not allow such to be done the effect of foreign divorce in the PH – that litigants
cannot compel courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the PH to be affected by
decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which our gov believes is contrary to PO and good morals.
c. Art 9 thereof : laws relating to family rights and duties… and Art 11: prohibitive laws.

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Still a citizen daw during divorce

1. 27 YO Vicenta Escano who belong toa prominent Fil Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feb 24, 1948 with Pastor Tanchavez a 32
YO Engr and ex army officer before Catholic Chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.
2. Marriage was culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered.
3. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match maker and go between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a
San Carlos student where she and Vicenta are studying.
4. But stopped, iba na suitor ni vicenta, but reconciled
5. Scandal daw ang clandestine marriage
6. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/marriage in a church as suggested by Vicent’s parents.
7. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s father, he disagreed for a new marriage.
8. Vicenta continued living with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
9. Subsequently, Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the US and filed a
complaint for divorce against pastor which was later approved and issued by Nevada.
10. She then sought for annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.
11. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran (American) in Nevada and has begotten children. She then acquired citizenship.
12. Petitioner Pastor filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her
husband.
13. SC
14. Issue: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding in PH – NO
a. Divorce although successfully obtained in another country cannot be applied in PH since PP.
b. Principle well established in PRIL that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene PP.
c. At time of divorce, Escano was still a Filipino hence was subject of PH law under Art 15. PH law then now in force does not admit
absolute divorce but only legal sep.
d. For PH courts to recognize foreign divorce, would be a patent violation of policy of State esp with Art 17 3rd par of NCC.
e. To recognize would give a rise to scandalous discrimination IFO wealthy citizens.
f. On parents – claim not supported by evidence
g. 25 k MD and AF
h. Ruling:
i. That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
ii. That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
iii. That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
iv. That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Van Dorn v Romillo and Richard Upton (Alice Reyes Van Dorn v Hon Manuel Romillo and Richard Upton) 1985

Married in 1972, divorced in 1982. Alice Reyes remarried in 1983 to Theodore Van Dorn
The Galleon Shop in Ermita

1. Married in HK Upton is US in 1972. After a divorce was granted by US court bet Alice Reyes Van Dorn and American Husband, American
filed a CC in TC in PH alleging that her business was conjugal prop Two children din.
2. Pet remarried in Nevada to Van Dorn.
3. He prayed that she render an accounting and that plaintiff be granted right to manage the Business
4. ISSUE: W/N divorce is valid – YES hence no personality
a. There can be no question as to validity of Nevada Divorce. The decree is binding on respondent as an American
b. Owing to nationality principle, only PH nationals are covered by PP against divorce.
c. However Aliens may obtain divorces abroad and recognized in PH provided it is valid accdg to their national law. The divroce is
likewise valid as to petitioner.
d. AS such pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner hence has no standing to sue as husband of the
petitioner over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before his own country;s court from asserting the right
to exercise control over conjugal assets.

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera (1989)

Imelda Pilapil and Erich Geiling married 1979

1980 child
1986 Divorce in Germany by Geiling
FILING OF ADULTERY CASES

1. Petitioner Filipina Imelda Pilapil and respondent German Erich Geiling got married in Germany and lived in Manila,
2. After 3 ½ years of discordant cohabitation, respondent filed for divorce in Germany, while petitioner filed for legal sep in PH.
3. After 5 months after issuance of divorce decree n Germany, respondent filed 2 cases of adultery against petitioner alleging she had
affairs with different men (William Chia and Jesus Chua) during the subsistence of their marriage. Petitioner filed for C and P assailing
jurisdiction of LC to try and decide because adultery is a private offense.
 4. Arraignment not guilty. Filed Certiorari and Prohib with TRO
5. ISSUE: W/N divorce decree may be recognized in PH hence depriving respondent of legal standing YES
a. The fact that respondent obtained valid divorce in his country is admitted.
b. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the PH insofar asprivate rep is concerned in view of nationality principle.
c. Respondent being no longer the husband had no legal standing to commence adultery case under imposture that he was the
offemded spouse at time he filed suit.

HUMAN RELATIONS

People v Ritter

1. On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room.
2. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario and afterwards inserted a foreign object (like a vicks inhaler – anti nasal inhaler) to the
vagina of Rosario.
3. The next morning Ritter gave Jessie 200 and Rosario 300.
4. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter insterted an object. Sometime the following day, Rosadio said that the object has already been removed
from her vagina.
5. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara (while scavenging garbage) saw Rosario with a bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined
to Olangopo City Gen Hospital. An Ob-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her using forceps but failed because it was deeply
embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis.
6. She told the attending physicians that a Negro inserted the object to her Vagina 3 months ago.
7. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide.
8. ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable? NO
a. Prosec failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened (so not rape). And that Rosario
prostituted herself even at the tender age. What was presented was baptismal certificate which is hearsay if uncorroborated.
b. As evidence she received 300 from Ritter the following morning.
c. A doctor/speciailist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which
caused her death.
d. As evidence, Rosario herself said to Jessie the ff day that the object has been removed already.
 e. She also told the doctor that a negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago.
f. Ritter was a caucasioan. Ritter was also acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide.
g. However it does not exempt him from the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It does not
necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the crim action.
h. Ritter was deported
i. The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code).
As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the
responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual
exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case,
we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
j. And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by
pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on
statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of
rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to
enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street
children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to
do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them.
Something must be done about it.

Ardiente v Sps Pastorfide

1. Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold conveyed and transferred all their rights and interests
in the Emily Homes Housing (CDO City) unit to the former.
2. It has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente.
3. On Mar 12 1999, Ma Theresa’s water supply was disconnected without notice.
4. She complained to CDO Water district and she found out that the account has become delinquent. She paid the three months due and
wrote a letter through her counsel to the CDO water district why her water was cut without notice.
5. General Manager of CDOWD Gaspar Gonzalez explained that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection.
6. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente CDOWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa.
7. RTC IFO Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights.
a. In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department
of defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due
date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
b. They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the present
ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should
have requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not
have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers.
She should have been very careful.
8. CA aff
9. SC ISSUE – are the def liable for damages? YES
a. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under section 19 of CC was violated. It provides that every person must..
b. A right although it is legal for being recognized by law, as such may nevertheless become the source of illegality (Globe v CA),
when it is exercised ina manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to
another.
i. It is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to
enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
ii. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection
of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that
her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses' name.
iii. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after
submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
 obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD
undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water
supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
c. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for damages caused to another.
d. Here petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of water supply without notice of such intetntion.
e. CDOWD and Gonzalez are also liable for disconnecting without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting
supply when the respondent already paid the delinquent account.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

Donato v Luna

1. An information for bigamy against Leonilo Donato was filed with the Lower Court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of Paz
Abayan.
2. Before the arraignment, Paz filed with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping a year earlier.
3. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner’s consent to marriage.
4. Prior to solemnization of second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5
years, proven by a joint affidavit executed by the, for which reason the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Art 76
CC.
5. Donato continued to live with Paz until Nov. 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married.
6. ISSUE W/N a crim case for bigamy pending before the LC be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before
the juvenile and domestic relations court on ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question – NO
a. Donato cant apply rule on Prejudicial question since a case of annulment of marriage can only be considered as prejudicial to
the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of
 duress, violence, and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
b. There being no prejudicial question shown, the lower court denial is sustained.

Landicho v Relova (judge)

1. Petitioner was charged before CFI of Batangas with the offense of Bigamy. It was alleged that petitioner was lawfully married to Elvira
Makatangay,with such marriage not legally dissolved. He then obtained marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
2. Ac action before CFI Batangas likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage null and
void because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly
bigamous character.
3. Petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third party complaint, against the third party defendant (Elvira Makatangay the first spouse),
praying that his marriage with her be declared null and void on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of Peace of Makati, Rizal.
4. Issue: W/N the CC filed is a prejudicial question – NO
a. Where the first wife filed a crim action for bigamy against husband and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of
the marriage on account of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a CC for annulment of marriage against the first
wife the CC are not prejudicial questions in te determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second
marriage is not in issue.
b. The mere fact that there are actions to annul marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
prejudicial questions are automatically raised in civil actions to warrant the suspension of the crim case.
i. In order for the case of annulment be considered as prejudicial to bigamy case, it must be shown that the petitioner’s
consent to such marriage must be one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his
act in second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
c. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At time petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
i. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on ground of force, threats and
intimidation.
ii. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in Civil Action, filed a third party complaint against first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be N and V on ground of FTI.
d. Assuming first marriage was null and void, that fact would not be material to outcome of crim case.
 i. Parties to marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of a competed court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void. And so
long as no declaration, presumption is that marriage exists.
e. Therefore he who contracts a second marriage before the JDN of first marriage, assumes risk for bigamy.

CIVIL PERSONALITY

COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

Roe v Wade

1. Petitioner Roe, a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These
laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother
2. Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor facing crim prosec for violating state abortion laws; and the Does, a married
couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconsti. Defendant
was district atty Wade
3. A three judge district court panel tried the cases together and held that both Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented
justiciable controversies and that declaratory relief was warranted. However the court ruled that injunctive relief was not warranted and
that the Does’ complaint was not justiciable.
4. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The DC held that Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs.
5. The Does lost however because the DC ruled that the injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
6. Does appealed directly to the SC of the US and Wade cross-appealed the DC judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford
7. ISSUES:
a. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions except those required on medical advice to save the life of the mother violate
consti?
b. Does the DP protect right to privacy inc right to obtain abortion
c. Are there any circ where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion
d. Did the fact that Roe’s pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was decided render lawsuit moot
e. Was DC correct in denying injunctive relief?
 8. SC
a. YES State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life saving procedures on the mother’s behalf and do not take
into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other interests are unconsti for violating DP
b. YES the DC protects right to privacy inc woman’s right to terminated her pregnancy against state action
c. YES though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy. It has legit interests in protecting
both the pregnant woman;s health and the potentiality of human life at various stages of pregnancy
d. NO the natural termination of Roe’s pregnancy did not render her suit moot
e. YES DC was correct in denying injunctive reliev
f. The court held that in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left ot the judgment of the pregnant
woman;s doctor.
g. In regard to second trim, states may promote their interests in the mother’s health by regulating abortion procedures related to
the health of the mother.
h. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even
prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
i. The SC held that litigation involving pregnancy which is capable of repetition is an exception that an actual controversy must
exist
j. Court held that while 28 USC 1253 does not auth a party seeking only declaratory relief and the arguments on the issues of both
injunctive and declaratoy relief are necessarily identical.
k. The Does complaint seeking injunctibe relief was based on contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too
speculative to present an actual case.

Geluz v CA (1961)

Woman who voluntarily procured abortion, can husband recover?

1. Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar Lazo (resp), came to know Antonio Geluz (pet and phys) through her aunt Paula Yambot.
2. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married.
3. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz.
4. She had her pregnancy aborted again on Oct 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
 5. After two years on Feb 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter
Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street
6. Oscar aat this time was in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have an idea nor
given his consent on the abortion
7. ISSUE: W/N husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion coud recover damages from the physician who caused the same
– NO
a. SC believes that the minimum award fixed at 3k for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality which TC and CA predicated
b. Both TC and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of MD evidently bc Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of
Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.
c. Instead of filing an admin or crim case, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages by
suing Geluz for 50k and 3 k for atty fees.
d. The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an
unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases
collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
e. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art.
2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
i. But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

Quimiging v Icao

1. Carmen Quimiging (pet) and Felix Icao (def) were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close confidential relations.
 2. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant.
3. Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff sued for support at 120 a month, damages and AF.
4. Complaint was dismissed by the LC in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack of COA
5. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse she gave birth to a baby girl but court ruled that no
amendment was allowed since the original complaint averred no COA
6. ISSUE: WN Plaintiff has right to claim damages – YES
a. SC held that a conceive child although yet unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to
it (Art 40 CC).
b. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Art 742.
c. LC theory on Art 291 of CC declaring that support is an obligation parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn violates art 40 aforementioned
d. Another reason for reversal is that Icao, being a married man, forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights, thus entitled to claim compensation

De Jesus v Syquia

1. Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 Years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente
Mendoza.
2. Cesar Syquia (def) 23 Years and unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barbershop.
3. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relaiotionship As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born.
4. In the early months of pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor and he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is
his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake.
5. Defendant ask his friend Dr Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila
6. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a house in Camarines Street Manila where they lived for a year. When Antonia
showed signs of a second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
 7. It should be noted that during christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the
name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
8. ISSUES:
a. W/N the note to the Padre in connection with other letters acknowledges paternity
b. W/N the uninterrupted possession of status of a natural child justified by the conduct of father himself and that as a
consequencethe defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledgethe said Ismael loanco
9. HELD
a. Letter written by Syquia to Rev father serves as an admission of paternity and the other letters are suff to connect admission
with the child carried by Antonia. Mere requirement is that writing shall be indubitable.
b. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in continuous possession of the status of a natural child, and the period
here is long enough to reveal the father;s resolution to admit status
c. SC agree with TC in refusing to provide damages to Antonia for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law.
d. Furthermore there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the def to recognize a second baby Pacita
Loanco.
e. Finally SC found no necessity to modify judgment as to amount of maintenance allowed to Ismale Loanco in the amount of 50
per month. They pointed out that it is the TC who has that juris.

Limjoco v Intestate Estate of Pio Fragrante

1. Pedro Fragrante (fil) at time of death applied for a certificate of PC to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal.
2. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the propose service.
3. The PSC issued a CPC to Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Admin.
4. Pet claims that granting of said CPC is contravention of law
5. ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragrante may be extended an artificial judicial personality? YES
a. The estate of Fragrante could be extended an artificial judicial personality bc under the CC, estate of a dead person could be
considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties.
b. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical admin includes those rightsinvolving the pending application for PC.
 c. SC is of opinion tjat for purposes of prosec of said case of PSC to its final conclusion, personality and citizenship of Fragrante
must be deemed extended within meaning of PSA.

Dumlao v Quality Plastics

1. Judgment for civil case was rendered ordering defendants Solivernt, Oriam Laurencio, Sumalbag, and Darang to pay solidarily Quality
Plastics the sum of 3,667.03 plus legal rate or elseo Quality Plastics is hereby allowed to foreclose the bond.
2. Def failed to pay amount before the limit given.
3. Oria’s land was levied upon and sold by sheriff at a public auction
4. Apparently Oria died long before the decision. QP was not aware of the death. Summons and copies of complaint was personally served
by sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed
5. Dionisio Fausta et al all surnamed Dumlaou and all testatementary heirs in Orias will sued QP for annulment of judgment. Dionisio also
sued as admin.
6. ISSUE: W/N judgment against ORia and Execution against his land be annulled for lack of juridical capacity - YES
a. QP upon receiving summons just learned that Oria was already deda. The DUmlaos agreed in stip that QP was unaware of death
and acted in GF in joining Oria as defendant
b. However no juris was acquired over Oria thus judgment against him was a patent nullity. LC judgment was void over Oria. He
had no more civil personality and his jurid capacity was lost through death
c. The fact that Dumalo had capacity to sue QP does not follow that they are entitled to claim AF against corpo

Eugenio v Velez

1. Vitaliana Vargas’ borthers and sisters unaware of formers death filed a pet for HC before RTC Misamis Or alleging that she was forcible
taken from residence by petitioner Tomas Eugenio in his residence in Jasaan, Misamis Or.
2. Court issued Writ but pet refused on ground that a corpse cannot be subject to HC
3. Vitaliana, 25 died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio;s residence.
4. Court ordered body be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the LOJ of court
5. ISSUE: W/N Pet can claim custody? YES
 a. The Court held that the custody of dead body was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section
1103 of RAC – Persons charged with duty of burial nearest kin
b. Albeit petitioner claims he is a spouse under Art 294 of CC, but PH law does not recognize common law marriages as such in this
case b/c:
c. In addition it requires that a man and woman living to gether must not be incapacitated to contract marriage – here petitioner
has subsisting marriage with another woman

Joaquin v Navarro

1. During the battle of liberation of Manila, the ff sought refuge on the ground floor of German club building:
a. Joaquin Navarro Sr (70)
b. Angela Joaquin (67)
c. Daughter Pilar (32-33)
d. Daughter Concepcion (23-25)
e. Son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30)
f. And Wife of Jr Adela Conde (--)
2. The building was set on fire and Japs started shooting the daughters who fell
3. Sr decided to leave the building, his wife didn’t wat to leave so he left with his son Jr, and Jrs wife and Neighbor Francisco Lopez
4. As they came out, Jr was hit and fell on the ground ad rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets.
5. German club collapsed trapping many people presumably inc Angela, Joaquin Sr, Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter
where they hid for 3 days
6. On their way to St. Theresa Academy they met Japanese patrols Sr and Adela were hit and killed
7. TC ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled otherwise
8. ISSUE: W/N Son/mother died first (if son died first, petitioner would reap succession, if mother died first, respondent Antonio son of Jr
by first marriage would inherit) JR
a. Based on story of Francisco Lopez, Jr died first before his mother did.
b. This presumption was based on speculation not evidence
c. Gauge by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which CC are to be decided, this inference should prevail
d. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or inferential
Smith Bell v Natividad

1. Smith Bell is a corpo organized and existing under the laws of PH but majority of SH are british
2. When Smith Bell applied for a Cert of Ph Registry of the vessel owned by it, the Collector refused to issue the certificate giving as is
reason that all SH of SB were not citizens of US or PH
3. ISSUE: W/N gov can deny the registry of vessel to corporations having alien SH YES
a. The gov can deny the registry since it is within the purview of PP
b. However SC acknowledge that the corpo having alien SH is still entitled to protection afforded by DP of law and EP of laws of
consti

Barlin v Ramirez

1. Def Ramirez having been appointed by plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church
2. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors .
3. His successor havingbeen then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for delivery to himf the church convent and
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money and other property of the church
4. Def by written docu refused to make delivery stating that the town of Lagonoy in conjunction with the parish priest of thereof has seen
fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Island and to join the Filipino Church, the head of which is
at Manila.
5. Plaintiff brought this action against defendat alleging in his amended complaint that the roamn catholic church was the owner of the
church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
posessions therof and defendant render accounting
6. CFI ruled IFO plaintiff
7. SC
o It is suggested that the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in PI. This suggestion made with
reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed when
Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch and when idols were still worshipped in the Temple of Mecca – does not require
serious consideration