MACTAN-CEBU v.
BENJAMIN TUDTUD the amounts they received as just compensation may
The National Airports Corporation (NAC) filed a complaint
for expropriation in order to expand the Cebu Lahug
Airport. It sought to acquire, by negotiated sale or
expropriation, several lots adjoining the then existing
airport which included the parcels of land owned by the
predecessors-in- interest of respondents Benjamin
Tudtud et al. NAC assured the owners that they would
reacquire the land if it is no longer needed by the airport.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the
expropriation. No structures related to the operation of
the Cebu Lahug Airport were constructed on the land
expropriated. Respondent Lydia Adlawan (Lydia), acting
as attorney-in-fact of the original owners, sent a letter to
the general manager of the petitioner Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA), the new owner
of the lot and demanded to repurchase the lot at the
same price paid at the time of the taking, without
interest. Lydia filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City for reconveyance and damages
against the MCIAA. The RTC of Cebu rendered judgment
in favor of Tudtud et al. MCIAA appealed to the Court of
Appeals but it affirmed the RTC decision. MCIAA then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether Tudtud et al. are entitled for the re-
conveyance of the land expropriated
HELD: Tudtud et al.’s witness respondent Justiniano Borga
declared that the original owners did not oppose the
expropriation of the lot upon the assurance of the NAC
that they would reacquire it if it is no longer needed by
the airport. The rights and duties between the MCIAA and
Tudtud et al are governed by Article 1190 of the Civil Code
which provides: When the conditions have for their
purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the
parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall
return to each other what they have received. In case of
the loss, deterioration, or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid
down in the preceding article [Article 1189] shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return. While the
MCIAA is obliged to re-convey Lot No. 988 to Tudtud et
al., they must return to the MCIAA what they received as
just compensation for the expropriation of Lot No. 988,
plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in
this case runs from the time the MCIAA complies with its
obligation to the respondents. Tudtud et al., must
likewise pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may
have incurred in sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary
value of its services in managing it to the extent that
Tudtud et al., were benefited thereby. Following Article
1187 of the Civil Code, the MCIAA may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from Lot No. 988,
and Tudtud et al., need not account for the interests that
have earned in the meantime.
Buce v. CA
Petitioner Anita Buce leased a 56 square meter of land
located at Quirino Avenue, Pandacan, Manila. The lease
was for a period of 15 years to commence on June 1, 1979
and subject to renewal for another 10 years, under the
same terms and conditions. Respondent Jose Tiongco,
demanded a gradual increase in the rent for Php 1,000 on
1991. On December 1991, respondent wrote petitioner
informing the increase of rent pursuant to the Rent
Control Law, effective on January 1992. However,
petitioner tendered checks dated October 1991 to
January 1993 for only Php 400 payable to respondent as
administrator which the latter refused to accept.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance
which the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Appellate
court reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the period of lease is to renew the
contract be given to the lessor.
RULING: Yes. In the given case of contract of lease, it is
given to the lessor. As a general rule under Article 1196 of
the Civil Code, the period of the lease contract is deemed
to have been set for the benefit of both parties. Renewal
of the contract may be had only upon their mutual
agreement or at the will of both of them. In the given
case, “this lease shall be for a period of fifteen years
effective June 1, 1979, subject to renewal for another ten
(10) years, under the same terms and conditions” does
not mean an autmoctic extension of the contract. The fact
that the lessee was allowed to introduce improvements
on the property is not indicative of the intention of the
lessors to automatically extend the contract. However, in
the given case, Tionco were not amenable to a renewal,
they cannot be compelled to execute a new contract
when the old contract terminated on 1 June 1994. It is the
owner-lessors prerogative to terminate the lease at its
expiration. The fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be
made to depend exclusively upon the free and
uncontrolled choice of the lessee and completely
depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality
does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality
exists between the lessor and the lessee since the life of
the contract would be dictated solely by the lessee.
LAFARGE CEMENT. vs CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP
A Letter of Intent (LOI) was executed, whereby petitioner
– on behalf of its affiliates and other qualified entities –
agreed to purchase the cement business of respondent
CCC. Both parties entered into a Sales and Purchase
Agreement (SPA). Petitioners were well aware that
respondent had a case pending with the SC, entitled APT
vs CA and CCC. In anticipation of the liability that SC might
adjudge against CCC, the parties, under SPA, allegedly
agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the
contract price. Petitioners allegedly refused to apply the
sum to the payment to APT despite the finality of the SC’s
decision in favor of APT. Fearful that nonpayment to APT
would result to foreclosure, CCC filed before the RTC a
“Complaint with Application for Preliminary Attachment”
against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners denied
the allegations in the complaint. They prayed by way of
compulsory counterclaim against CCC, its president (Lim),
and its corporate secretary (Mariano). Petitioners’
counterclaim for damages were the results of
respondents’ (Lim and Mariano) act of filing the
Complaint and securing the Writ of Attachment in bad
faith. They characterized their claim for damages against
CCC, Lim and Mariano as “joint and solidary”.
ISSUE: Whether the liability of the respondents is joint or
solidary.
HELD: The liability is solidary. Obligations may be
classified as either joint or solidary. “Joint” or “jointly” or
“conjoint” means mancum or mancomunada or pro rata
obligation. On the other hand, “solidary” obligation may
be used interchangeably with “joint and several” or
“several”. The petitioners’ usage of the term “joint and
solidary” is confusing. Notwithstanding the ambiguity in
petitioners’ counterclaims, respondents’ liability, if
proven, is solidary. This finds basis in Art 1207 of CC,
which provides that obligations are generally considered
joint, except when otherwise expressly stated or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Obligations arising from tort are, by nature, always
solidary.
INCHAUSTI VS. YULO
Facts: This suit is brought for the recovery of a certain sum
of money, the balance of a current account opened by the
firm of Inchausti & Company with Teodor Yulo and after
his death continued by Gregorio Yulo as principal
representative of his children. On Aug.12, 1909, Gregorio
Yulo, in representation of his 3 siblings, executed a
notarial instrument, ratifying all the contents of the prior
document of Jan.26, 1908, severally and joint
acknowledged their indebtedness for P253,445.42, 10 %
per annum, 5 installments. Plaintiff brought an action
againsta Gregorio for the payment of the said balance
due. But on May 12, 1911, 3 siblings executed another
instrument in recognition of the debt, reduced to
P225,000, interest reduced to 6% per annum,
installments increased to 8.
Held: The contract of May 12, 1911 does not constitute a
novation of the former one of Aug.12, 1909, with respect
to the other debtors who executed this contract. First, “in
order that an obligation may be extinguished by another
which substitutes it, it is necessary that it should be so
expressly declared or that the old and the new be
incompatible in all points(art. 1292). It is always necessary
to state that it is the intentionof the contracting parties to
extinguish the former obligation by the new one.” The
obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new
instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing only
the term of payment and adding other obligations not
incompatible with the old one.
The obligation being solidary, the remission of any part of
the debt made by a creditor in favor of one or more of the
solidary debtors necessarily benefits the others, and
therefore there can be no doubt that, in accordance with
the provision of Art. 1215, 1222, the defendant has the
right to enjoy the benefits of the partial remission. At
present judgment can be rendered only as to P112,500.
IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. VS. DAVID
Felicisimo V. Reyers and his wife Emilia T. David, herein
defendant-appellant, executed 2 indemnity agreements
in favor of appellee The Imperial Insurance Inc, jointly and
severally to assure indemnification of the latter of
whatever liability it may incur in connection with its
posting the security bonds to lift the attachments in 2 civil
cases instituted for the amount of P60, 000 and P40,000,
for the benefit of Felicisimo V. Reyes.
The spouses jointly and severally, executed another
indemnity agreement in favor of appellee to assure
indemnification of the latter under a homestead bond for
the sum of P7, 500.00 it had executed jointly and severally
with them in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines. Felicisimo later died and Special Proceedings
entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Felicisimo V. Reyes,” commenced. His wife qualified and
took her oath of office as the administratix of the said
intestate estate.
Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the two Civil Cases
against the spouses. Appellee made demands on Emilia
David to pay the amounts of P60,000 and P40,000 under
the surety bonds and arrears in premiums thereon. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the appellant on the
ground the plaintiff’s cause of action, if there be any, have
been barred for its failure to file its claims against the
estate of the deceased Felicisimo V. Reyes in due time.
She contends that appellee’s claim should have been
presented according to Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court and its failure to do so operates to bar its claim
forever. After trial, the court rendered judgment against
the herein appellant Emilia T. David.
ISSUE: Can the creditor choose to proceed against the
surviving solidary debtor instead of bringing an action in
accordance with Rule 86 (sec. 5) of the Revised Rules of
Court?

RULING:
Yes. Under the law and well-settled jurisprudence, when
the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his
action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in
solidum. In the case at bar, appellant signed a joint and
several obligation with her husband in favor of herein
appellee; as a consequence, the latter may demand from
either of them the whole obligation. As distinguished
from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is
entitled only for a proportionate part of the debt and the
creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the
credit, in a solidary obligation the creditor may enforce
the entire obligation against one of the debtors.
Moreover, in the case of Philippine International Surety
vs. Gonzales, “Where the obligation assumed by several
persons is joint and several, each of the debtors is
answerable for the whole obligation with the right to seek
contribution from his co-debtors.”

Article 1216 of the Civil Code also states that, “The

creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The
demand made against one of them shall not be an
obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed
against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
collected.” There is nothing improper, as held in Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co. vs. Villarama, in the creditor’s filing
of an action against the surviving solidary debtor alone,
instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of
the deceased debtor wherein his claim would be filed.