Cards To Cut Organized

PROLIF BAD:
Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars.

Sobek et al 09 – Professor of Political Science @ Louisiana State
University [David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster (Professor of International
Studies and Political Science @ Virginia Military Institute) & Samuel
B. Robison (Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science @ Louisiana State
University) “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation
on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001,” Prepared for presentation at the 2009
Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22,
pg. http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p362138_index.html]
They will escalate to great power nuclear wars

Below 08 – Wing Commander for the Royal Air Force [TIM D. Q. BELOW
(Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London),
“OPTIONS FOR US NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: EXEMPLARY LEADERSHIP OR
EXTRAORDINARY LUNACY?,” A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION
REQUIREMENTS, AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, JUNE
2008]
The end result is nuclear winter that destroys the vast majority of
the world’s population
Toon et al 07 – Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @
University of Colorado [Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock (Professor of
Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco
(Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ UCLA, Charles Bardeen
(Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of
Colorado), Luke Oman (Professor of of Earth and Planetary Sciences @
Johns Hopkins University), Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Professor of
Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), “NUCLEAR WAR:
Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science, 2 March
2007, Vol. 315. no. 5816, pp. 1224 – 1225]
New proliferators will be uniquely destabilizing – guarantees

conflict escalation.
Cimbala, 2008
[Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, “Anticipatory Attacks:
Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27, InformaWorld]
If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption … marginalization of major interstate warfare.
Fast global prolif is inevitable without US arsenal cuts.

Cirincione, 2007
[Joe, Ploughshares President, Former Center for American Progress and Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation
program Directors, Former House Armed Services Committee member, Georgetown University Foreign Service
Professor, CFR member, nonproliferation expert, Bomb Scare, p. 105-8]
The longest-term, but most severe, … the brink of annihiliation for the first time in some twenty years.
Prolif leads to nuclear terrorism—multiple groups are pursuing weapons.
Perry & Schlesinger, 2009
[William J., Chairman, United States Institute of Peace, James R., Vice-Chair, “America’s
Strategic Posture,” http://www.usip.org/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf]
The second important new challenge is nuclear … is dangerously close to a “tipping point.”
The plan reverses perceptions of US nuclear hypocrisy – key to RevCon and the NPT.
Acheson, 2008
[Ray, project associate of Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom, editor of the News in Review, a daily newsletter published during NPT PrepComs and Review
Conferences, and is associate editor of the Arms Control Reporter, “The Challenges of Non-proliferation: Preparing
for the NPT Review Conference,” http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121:the-
challenges-of-non-proliferation-preparing-for-the-npt-review-conference&catid=62:dt2008summer&Itemid=2, 7-6]
The tension between nuclear- and non-nuclear-… spoken of by the Swiss ambassador evaporates permanently.
Strong NPT preventsrunaway global proliferation.

Dunn, 2009 – Senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) [Lewis A. Dunn (Former
assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and ambassador for the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in the Reagan administration), “THE NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,”
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009]
Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage … there is compliance with NPT obligations. Pg. 149-151
SOLVENCY:
us must abandon nukes/ although us cut weapons they're more powerful=us nuke
primacy/
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61931/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-
podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-l/nuclear-exchange-does-washington-really-have-or-?
page=4
Weapons reductions send an immediate global signal that halts proliferation.
Cirincione 11-6-09 [Joseph, “The impact of nuclear posture on non-proliferation,”
http://www.ploughshares.org/news-analysis/blog/impact-nuclear-posture-non-proliferation]
The nuclear posture and strategic decisions …by new states and by terrorist groups.
Anything short of total disarmament fails

Muller 08 [Harald Muller is director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor
of international relations at Frankfurt University, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent
World, The Washington Quarterly 31.2, Project Muse]
Taking complete nuclear disarmament as a serious and … national security of any party involved in the
process.
A2 SECURITY K
Security Kritik Answers

There is no link between discursive framing and global politics – only we have empirical proof.
Minnesota and Monasch U, 1998
(Richard and Christian “Dangerous Liasons?..” European Journal of IR)
Ironically, the end of the Cold War … from disciplinary critique to substantive analysis.
Accept all ontologies. These questions are unresolvable.

Arnd-Caddigan and Puzzuto ‘6 (Margaret, Assistant Prof. Soc. – East Carolina U. , and Richard, Associate Prof.
Soc. – ECU, Qualitative Social Work, “Truth in Our Time”, 5:4, Sage)
From the authors’ perspective, the …none of these quadrants have a ‘God’s eye’ perspective.
Existence is a prerequisite to value

Wapner ‘3 (Paul, Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of
“nature””, Winter, 50:1, Proquest)
All attempts to listen to nature are social… their fundamental moral commitment.
Stability isn’t about perfection. Trying to achieve social peace is about preventing violent anarchy.
Elshtain ‘3 (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics – U. Chicago, “Just War Against Terror: The Burden of
American Power in a Violent World”, p. 48-49)
Many, myself included, believe that … we are likely to call for a new government.
Predictions are feasible. They can be made logically from empirical evidence.
Chernoff ‘9 (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism
as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage)
For these and other reasons, many social theorists …should be evident from the foregoing discussion.
Enemies are real

Elshtain ‘2 (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Politics Ethics – U. Chicago, and Chair in Foundations of American
Freedom – Georgetown U., Common Knowledge, “LUTHER’S LAMB: When and How to Fight a Just War”, 8:2,
Highwire)
One sign that the American president …but unfortunately they do occur.
Securitization key to heg.

Kelstrup, Writer and editor for Sage Publications, 2004 [Morten, “Globalisation and Societal
Insecurity”,Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg.115]
This strategy is, it seems, … 'war on terror' is part of such a strategy.
Security Kritik Answers
Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance --– the perm solves best
Gibson-Graham ’96 (J.K., Feminist Economists – The End of Capitalism)
One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce … visible as a denial of diversity and change.
The impact is extinction, the refusal to engage in traditional politics is an abdication of social responsibility that
makes social crises inevitable
Boggs ‘97 (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, “The great retreat: Decline of the public
sphere in late
twentieth-century America”, December, Volume 26, Number 6,
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf)
The decline of the public sphere in late…had vanished from civil society. 75
And, they don’t fiat a global shift—this means other countries will act capitalist and resource wars/no value to life is
inevitable. The economic crisis means capitalist super powers will be stronger
Mead 2/4 - Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter Russell, The New
Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger”, 2/4)
But, in many other countries where capitalism…is almost as long as the list of financial crises.
Cap solves war

Griswold, 05 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at Cato, “Peace on earth? Try free trade among
men”, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)
As one little-noticed headline on an …financial assets, and human capital.
POLITICS
Plan popular with religious groups
http://www.zero-nukes.org/Disarmament_Scenarios_Case_Against_Nukes_Moral.html
turkey does not support nukes in the region
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=58412
fears of withdrawal of nukes are conceptual / removal of nukes drains capital
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher
nato supports withdrawal of weapons/ removal of weapons=insecurity=prolif for defense
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/22/nato-states-us-nuclear-arms-europe
turkey supports withdrawal (start treaty proves)
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6945527.html
http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-calls-for-mideast-free-of-nuclear-weapons-1.274139
turkey supports withdrawal
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/06/turkish_parliament_debates_us_.php
obama supports disarment
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html
Japan Proliferation Answers
Scrapping missile defense should have triggered the link.

David, Former US Assistant Defens Secretary for WMD, and Kirkpatrick, Former WSJ Deputy Editor, 9/17/2009
[Jack, Melanie, "A New Nuclear-Arms Race,"
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574419173653298610.html?mod=googlenews_wsj]
Call it a shot heard round … affords are plainly diminished.
Weakening of US nuclear umbrella won’t cause Japanse prolif --- no sustained political support and costs
overwhelm benefits.
Llewelyn Hughes, Spring 2007. Doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security 31.4, Project Muse.
Nevertheless, a hollowing out of the … bilateral alliance with the United States.
US LEADERSHIP KEY
Failure to take a leadership role in non-prolif makes prolif, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war inevitable.
Russo, 2006
[Gregory, Osgood Center for International Studies, “The U.S. and the Proliferation Situation: An Opinion,” 8-8,
http://www.osgoodcenter.org/Russo_Paper.pdf]
If I have taken anything away from … group, becomes terrifyingly real.
Second, GLOBAL NORMS – US action creates a norm that prevents prolif. AND – that is an independent internal
link to preventing conflicts from escalating
Graham and Kampelman, 08 Ambassador, involved in the negotiation and/or review process of every major
international arms control agreement in which the United States participated between 1970 and 1997 and
Ambassador to the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe from 1980 to 1984
(Thomas and Max, Nuclear Weapons: A n Existential Threat to Humanity, CTBTO Spectrum 1, September 2008,)
Sixty-three years ago last month, .....United Nations to live up to its potential.
ADVANTAGE TWO – SOFT POWER

Obama improved the US image – but it isn’t translating into soft power – action on nuclear issues key.
Ghitis, 2009 independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor
(Frida, World Citizen: Obama Must Parlay Soft Power Gains into Real Results, april 9)
When viewed through a wide .... to score more solid results.
CTBT ratification is the NUMBER ONE sign that we respect the international community, are committed to
multilateralism, and revamps soft power.
Joseph, 2009 senior Democratic foreign policy staffer in the United States Senate (Jofi, Renew the Drive for CTBT
Ratification, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Issue 2 April 2009 , pages 79 - 90
First, a pledge to work toward CTBT .... U.S. commitment to disarmament.
Nuclear issues are the best way to change the perception of US leadership – it shores up our soft power – that’s key
to solving a litany of issues
Stanley, 2007 PhD in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown
University
(Elizabeth A, , “International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy,” independent research project for the Advanced
Concepts Group at Sandia National Laboratories, Feb,)
Seen in light of this .... and incredibly difficult to model.
Soft power & perception is key to effective leadership – builds alliances, checks counter-balancing, maintains
domestic support – multilateral co-op is the best internal link to solving terrorism
Jervis, 2009 professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural
Perspective, World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009
To say that the system is .... that its leadership is benign.
Commitment to multilateralism is vital to prevent counter-balancing and overstretch – which destroy US leadership
Grygiel, 2006 George H. W. Bush Chair in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University (Jakub “Imperial
Allies” Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 (ScienceDirect)
But the fact that the .... to the detriment of American interests.
US decline won’t be peaceful – it’ll explode into global chaos & WMD conflicts – mending our image is vital.
Brzezinski, 2005 National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns
Hopkins University [Zbigniew “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership” (p. 2-4)]
History is a record of change, .... a more secure international environment.
That causes extinction.

Nye, 1990
[Joseph, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Bound to Lead,” p.17]
Perceptions of change in the relative… history as we know it may end.
Finally, hegemonic decline triggers nuclear wars around the globe.

Kagan, 2007 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert “End of Dreams, Return
of History” Policy Review (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)]
This is a good thing, and it should .... will provide an easier path.
WARMING IMPACT: (ADV IF CUT INTERNAL LINK)
And, Nonprolif credibility is key to revitalize multinational enrichment

Goodby, 8 [James E., research fellow at the Hoover Institution and nonresident senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution. He has taught at Stanford, Georgetown, Syracuse, and at Carnegie Mellon, where
he is a distinguished service professor emeritus. His career spanned 35 years in the U.S. Foreign Service
and included several assignments dealing with nuclear issues including the START treaty, what became
the Helsinki Accords, and five ambassadorial rank appointments including ambassador to Finland., 9/4,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle”, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/op-eds/internationalizing-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle]
The rising demand for energy, especially in Asia, has made it all but inevitable that …the treaty regime
still has after years of erosion will be gone for good.
Multinational fuel processing makes nuclear energy globally affordable and reduces the risk of global
warming
Rislove 07 - JD @ University of Wisconsin & Ph.D. in Physics @ University of New Mexico [DANIEL C.
RISLOVE, “Global Warming v. Non-proliferation: The Time Has Come for Nations to Reassert Their Right
to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy,” Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2007, VOL 24; NUMB 4, pages
1069-1098]
Establishment of multinational fuel processing programs modeled after the European experiment …risks
of diversion of this technology into weapons programs.
Multinational Fuel cycle is the only solution to climate change and energy shortages
Eerkens 08 - Research Professor @ Nuclear Science and Engineering Institute, University of Missouri
[Jeff W. Eerkens (MS degree in Nuclear Engineering and a PhD in Engineering Science from the
University of California at Berkeley.), “Nuclear and Coal: The Energy 'Dream Team' for Years to Come,”
Seeking Alpha, December 14, 2008, Pg. http://seekingalpha.com/user/319497/comments]
Green nuclear power is the only practical solution to simultaneously (1) avoid dependence on foreign …
short-sightedness and follies of prior administrations.
Warming causes extinction

Tickell, 8-11-2008
(Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. …
human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.
Energy scarcity causes extinction

HEINBERG, Senior Fellow of Post Carbon Institute, 2004 Richard, Book Excerpt: Powerdown: Options
and Actions for a Port-Carbon World, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/2291’
Last One Standing – The path of competition for remaining …Recent US administrations have enunciated
a policy of nuclear first-strike.
A2 IMPACT DEFENSE ON NUCLEAR WAR:
Even a small nuclear war causes extinction

Reville 2-4-2010
William, associate professor of biochemistry and public awareness of science officer at UCC, “Nuclear
winter weather forecast”
The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/sciencetoday/2010/0204/1224263727687.html
Contention One- Nuclear War Termination
Conventional wars are inevitable- conflict will push the U.S. to the brink of nuclear use now.
Wilson, 2006 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, “Rationale for a study of
City Annihilations,” http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city_annihilation/]
One of the … and rationality.
The U.S. will use nukes to terminate these conflicts- there’s a high likelihood of nuclear use in wartime.
Kultgen, 1999 [John, Ph.D., University of Chicago, “In the Valley of the Shadow: Reflections on the
Morality of Nuclear Deterrence,” p. 224]
The accumulation of …use nuclear weapons.
Err on the side of caution- crises distort rational thinking and encourage nuclear miscalculation.
Wilson, 2006 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, “Rationale for a study of
City Annihilations,” http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city_annihilation/]
The rationality/risk argument … to maximize rewards.

Nuclear war termination escalates to extinction- even limited nuclear use collapses deterrence.
Kultgen, 1999 [John, Ph.D., University of Chicago, “In the Valley of the Shadow: Reflections on the
Morality of Nuclear Deterrence,” p. 226]
The problem of controlling…international politics as played.

Even the threat of war termination sparks miscalculation and encourages other states to use nuclear
weapons in conventional conflicts.
Kimball, 2005 [Daryl G., director of the Arms Control Association, “Goading China: Of Madmen and
Nukes,” November 4, http://www.counterpunch.org/kimball11042005.html]
Since the beginning of …U.S. nuclear forces.
No offense- war termination fails- even a single bomb sparks massive retaliation because countries
become convinced they are going to be exterminated.
Wilson, 2008 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, “The Myth Of Nuclear
Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November]
One of the striking things … Yet they rarely succeed.
A2 TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR ZERO=NUKE WAR
ITS INEVITABLE
No Transtion Wars - Ikenberry 8 (John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
University “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.” Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2008, Vol.
87, Issue 1)
THE MOST important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a
remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of
gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the
United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising
power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully,
no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a
historical process. The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to
facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive
purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its
peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc
Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu
of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to
promote the country's development of global power status ." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than
outside of, the Western order.
A2 NON-PROLIF CAUSES A SHIFT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Even if used, bioweapons won’t spread or cause epidemics
Easterbrook 03
(Gregg Easterbrook, Senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!”
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set)
3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in
popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The
reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan,
in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out
of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but
no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US
government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked
around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was
discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning
mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known
pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it
didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug
introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health,
excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill
bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some
novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent
(two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly
troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up
nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no
superplague has ever come close to wiping out
humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

Too difficult to acquire and deploy bioweapons
Burton Stewart, 08
(Fred and Scott, Stratfor Intelligence, “Busting the Anthrax Myth”, July 30,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/busting_anthrax_myth)
We must admit to being among those who do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that posed by a nuclear strike.
To be fair, it must be noted that we also do not see strikes using chemical or radiological weapons rising to the threshold of a true
weapon of mass destruction either. The successful detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city would be far more devastating
than any of these other forms of attack. In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons,
we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a bio logical weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a
large strike using conventional explosives — such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004
train bombings in Madrid that killed 191. We do not disagree with Runge’s statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated
an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence that al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However,
there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biological
weapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. Misconceptions About Biological Weapons There are
many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to
deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties. While it is certainly true that there are many different
types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far few er actors who can actually isolate
virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose a
significant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to
obtain, more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highly
skilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment. Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin and botulinum
toxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then
convert it into a weaponized form — a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponization
hurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively take
large quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended targets. During the past several decades in the era
of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves to
highlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and are
constantly seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily
obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly portrayed, militant groups would have used
them far more frequently than they have. Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works,
they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the
rise and fall of the use of chlorine in militant attacks in Iraq. Anthrax As noted by Runge, the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus
anthracis is readily available in nature and can be deadly if inhaled, if ingested or if it comes into contact with a person’s skin. What
constitutes a deadly dose of inhalation anthrax has not been precisely quantified, but is estimated to be somewhere between 8,000 and
50,000 spores. One gram of weaponized anthrax, such as that contained in the letters mailed to U.S. Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick
Leahy in October 2001, can contain up to one trillion spores — enough to cause somewhere between 20 and 100 million deaths .
The letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy reportedly contained about one gram each for a total estimated quantity of two grams of anthrax
spores: enough to have theoretically killed between 40 and 200 million people. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the current
population of the United States is 304.7 million. In a worst-case scenario, the letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy theoretically contained
enough anthrax spores to kill nearly two-thirds of the U.S. population. Yet, in spite of their incredibly deadly potential, those letters
(along with an estimated five other anthrax letters mailed in a prior wave to media outlets such as the New York Post and the major
television networks) killed only five people; another 22 victims were infected by the spores but recovered after receiving medical
treatment. This difference between the theoretical number of fatal victims — hundreds of millions — and the actual number of victims
— five — highlights the challenges in effectively distributing even a highly virulent and weaponized strain of an organism to a large
number of potential victims. To summarize: obtaining a biological agent is fairly simple. Isolating a virulent strain and then weaponizing
that strain is somewhat more difficult. But the key to biological warfare — effectively distributing a weaponized agent to the intended
target — is the really difficult part of the process. Anyone planning a biological attack against a large target such as a city needs to
be concerned about a host of factors such as dilution, wind velocity and direction, particle size and weight, the susceptibility of
the disease to u ltra v iolet light, heat, dryness or even rain. Small-scale localized attacks such as the 2001 anthrax letters or the 1984
salmonella attack undertaken by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh cult are far easier to commit.
Nukes kill 20 times more people from the explosion alone.

Mendelsohn, 2006 (Jack, adjunct professor at George Washington University and American University,
was a member of the U.S SALT I and START II delegations and is the former deputy director of the Arms
Control Association, “Delegitimizing Nuclear weapons,” Issues in Science & Technoloy, 22:3, March)
The devastating efforts of nuclear weapons as compared with CWs and BWs are indicated in a comparative
lethality risk model developed by the now-defunct congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
The release of 300 kilograms of sarin nerve gas would create a .22-square-kilometer lethal area and cause 60
to 200 deaths. The release of 30 kilograms of anthrax spores would create a 10-square-kilometer lethal area
and cause 30,000 to 100,000 deaths. But the explosion of a hydrogen bomb with a 1-megaton yield would
create a 190-square-kilometer lethal area and cause 570,000 to 1,900,000 deaths.
A2 PROLIF WILL BE SLOW
Proliferation in practice can never be safe enough to justify the magnified risks
Luke Wilcock, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Efficacy of Deterrence,” Interstate Online,
Issue 50, Spring 1997, http://users.aber.ac.uk/scty34/50/prolif.htm, accessed 8/3/02
The picture painted by proliferation pessimists in this case is one of doom and gloom and it is difficult not to appreciate and mirror
their concern. There are, however, glimmers of optimism. Ted Greenwood argues that “[a]s the United States and the [old] Soviet
Union have found, when other nuclear powers are involved in a dispute, or might become so, the spectre of nuclear conflagration
usually encourages caution.” (ftntl2) Waltz is in agreement with this and the idea that by complicating calculations, nuclear
weapons proliferation actually strengthens deterrence. The possibility of mis-perceptions mentioned above, or rather the uncertainty
that mis-perceptions might or might not result, arguably encourages states to take even greater care than they perhaps might have
previously. Additionally, presuming that every state will indeed be responsive to deterrence, new nuclear states who have
traditionally been at the mercy of the tyranny of its larger neighbours might be able to assume a more equable existence. (ftntl3) At
first sight, both sides of the debate seem to have a convincing case. Both pessimists and optimists draw on past examples to support
their arguments, showing just what could happen and what has not happened. Where should the emphasis lie? Examples have been
given where it is thought rational deterrence theory will not operate, yet at the same time various reasons seem to exist directing one
to believe that it does, and will, and that the wider benefits of nuclear proliferation will indeed result. The tendency towards
There is
stalemate, however, is undermined by the failure of optimists to absolutely rule out the dangers for the future.
no guarantee, for example, that every potential nuclear weapons possessor would recognise
the constraints that, in any sane world, nuclear weapons inevitably impose. This shifts the
unpredictability of the future and the very
argument in favour of the pessimistic approach. The
nature of nuclear weapons makes optimism about the advantages of nuclear weapons
proliferation look increasingly misplaced. So while it may be possible to advocate
proliferation from a theoretical standpoint it would be madness to advance such theory
in practice.
Emerging nuclear states will adopt launch on warning postures—causing accidental war.
Busch 4 – Associate Professor Govt. @ Christopher Newport U, Nathan, No End in Sight, p 8-9
Optimists and pessimists also agree NWSs must avoid weapon deployments that could lead to inadvertent launches. These include
deployments that re¬quire rapid response or policies that call for launch-on-warning (LOW), which requires a state to fire its nuclear
weapons after an attack is detected but before the incoming nuclear weapons have reached their targets. For ex¬ample, Kenneth Waltz
argues that "survival of forces must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms."" Thus, Waltz acknowledges
that if NWSs do in fact tend to develop rapid-response capabilities and policies of LOW, then the risks of
inadvertent use would be quite high, since these doctrines greatly reduce the time that leaders have to decide
whether to launch their nuclear weapons. But optimists argue that emerging NWSs will not develop these capabilities and use-
doctrines because they will be able to ensure survivability by dispersing and concealing their nuclear weapons." Instead, optimists argue,
emerging NWSs will adopt force doctrines that call for "riding out" a first strike, then engaging in a delayed retaliation. As a number of
pessimists have pointed out, however, a doctrine of ride out and delayed retaliation increases a state's vulnerability to
decapitation (where those authorized to order a retaliation are killed or the communica¬tion networks
necessary for disseminating a launch command are severely disrupted or destroyed) and to counterforce
strikes (where large numbers of the state's nuclear forces are destroyed), both of which significantly reduce
the state's retaliatory capability. Pessimists have therefore argued that emerging NWSs will not be satisfied
with such doctrines, and will instead develop rapid-response capabilities and even adopt policies that allow
for LOW.7
Wide spread of tech makes fast breakout prolif possible.

Roberts 99 – member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia,
and a member of the editorial board of The Nonproliferation Review. Brad, “VIEWPOINT:
PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT LESSONS”,
Nonproliferation Review, fall, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/robert64.pdf
But there is an historical inevitability to the latency phenomenon. Beneath

the patterns of conventional and unconventional
weapons proliferation is a much more substantial pattern of technology diffusion. Reflecting the
globalization of the industrial revolution, this diffusion has been greatly accelerated by the emergence over the
last couple of decades of a transnational economy in which technologies, materials, capital, and expertise
flow rapidly across international borders, typically from firm to firm rather than from state to state . Many of
these technologies and materials are dual-use in nature, meaning they have both civil and military applications. In
fact, the number of civil technologies with military applications appears to be growing ever larger and includes today, for example,
biotechnology, commercial observation satellites, and the Internet. Also increasingly available internationally are so-called enabling
technologies that facilitate the production, integration, and use of weaponry.3 In short, more and more countries are
acquiring the ability to produce strategic military capabilities. This potential to create long-reach weapons
with the ability to inflict mass casualties could supply these countries with great political leverage in time of
war and crisis. These latent capabilities are strategic hedges. One of the least measurable indices of
proliferation, but also one of the most important, is the degree to which states consciously develop those
hedges so that they are in a position to compete successfully if they enter a disintegrating international
environment that calls for rapid break-out.
nuke war good/bad

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50769/michael-mandelbaum/lessons-of-the-next-nuclear-war?
page=6
all nukes are nukes (still dangerous even if unarmed)/
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60426/john-deutch/a-nuclear-posture-for-today?page=3
the risk that weapons are stolen o/w the risk of detterence/ a2 removing weapons destroys allied
credibility/ a2 weapons key to negotiation with russia/ a2 turkey wants them there
http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/bombs-away-removing-tactical-nukes-europe
A2 TERRORISM IMPACT DEFENSE
a2 nuclear theft exagerated / facilities not well armed
www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond01b.html
Nuclear Terrorism is likely, causes nuclear retaliation, and triggers a new arms race—consensus of
experts
Rhodes 12-14-09
Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former
visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the
Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. “Reducing the
nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-
the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety
The response was very different among nuclear and national security…had nothing to do with those
attacks in the name of sending a message.
TNW’s make the risk of nuclear terrorism very high- theft and no locks
Bin and Zhiwei 3
(“The contribution of arms control to fighting nuclear terrorism)
tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are short-range … attractive terrorist objective
risk of terrorist acquisition of weapons
http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf
2AC Consult Japan

3. Consultation now
US Fed News 09 (US State Department Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
“JAPANESE LOWER HOUSE ELECTION RESULTS”, 9-1, L/N)
We congratulate Japan on this historic election and … of the issues confronting this generation of Japanese and
American leaders.
7. Massive delay to the counterplan & it doesn’t solve the net benefit
Tastumi 9-3 [Yuki Tastumi, 9/3/09 Yuki Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Henry L.
Stimson Center
New Government in Japan—implication for US-Japan relations http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=858]
Over the next six to twelve months, … of new cooperation in that key relationship.
Collapse of heg causes rearm

Kagan 98 assistant professor of military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point
(Frederick, “THE ARMED FORCES WE DESERVE”, The Weekly Standard, June 1, p 27)
In three regions -- Europe, the Middle East,…we should seek assiduously to prevent.
The CP is unconstitutional
Gellner 83 (Charles, Senior Specialist Foreign Affairs – Congressional Research Service, “Who should
control US nuclear weapons in Britain?” 5-18, L/N)
That, however, could pose serious constitutional…Officials of other governments do not.
That outweighs – constitutional questions are a priori

Levinson 00 (Daryl, Associate Prof. – UVA Law School, University of Chicago Law Review, “Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs” Spring, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev.
345 L/N)
Extending a majority rule analysis of … constitutional rights were never violated.
Also means you don’t solve cause the plan gets struck down.
Knox 07 (John, Prof. Law – Wake Forest U., American Journal of International Law, “INTERNATIONAL
DECISIONS: NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY. 464 F.3d 1. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, August 29,
2006”, April, 101 A.J.I.L. 471, L/N)
The D.C. Circuit's confusion over the nature … implies that this instruction is unconstitutional.
2AC CMR
2. CMR low now
Feaver 10-21 [Peter, “Obama’s military problem is getting worse,” Foreign Policy,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/21/obamas_military_problem_is_getting_worse]
President Obama is presiding over a slow-motion …to the electorate to judge him, not the military.
Or B. it’s resilient
De Luce 10-29 [Dan, writer for Tehran Times, “Like past presidents, Obama faces tension with his
generals,” http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=205967]
As he contemplates dire warnings from his … obligation is to carry that out to the best of our ability.”
3. Leaks killing civil military relations

Feaver 9/21/09 – Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke
University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), and former special advisor on the
National Security Council Staff – ‘Foreign Policy: Woodward discloses troops needed”
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583
Here is the crucial bit: "... But Obama's deliberative pace — …. more clearly spelled out. This is significant
and serious.
B. Leaks outweigh any debate caused by the aff
The Telegraph 10/5/2009 (“Barack Obama furious at General Stanley McChrystal speech on
Afghanistan,”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6259582/Barack-Obama-
furious-at-General-Stanley-McChrystal-speech-on-Afghanistan.html#article)
Bruce Ackerman, an expert on constitutional law at … McChrystal once since his appointment in June.
5. No link – no pro-nuclear bureaucrats

Murdock, CSIS Senior Advisor, March 2008 [Clark, "The Department of Defense and the
Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century,” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080305-murdock-
nuclearmission.pdf]
In the March/April 2006 Foreign Affairs, Keir A…. indicator of current strategic priorities.
A2 consult nato
3. Consultation now
Kellerhals 2009 (Marle David, Staff, Washington File, State Department Documents and Publications,
“NATO Agrees to Resume High-Level Ties with Russia; Enhancing Afghanistan security mission
continues to challenge NATO”, 3-5, L/N)
Vice President Biden travels to Brussels …. next steps in re-engagement with Russia.
6. Relations are resilient

Sperling and Webber 2009 (James, Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Akron, and Mark, Prof. Int’l Pol. – U.
Loughborough, International Affairs, “NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul”, 85:3, April, Wiley Interscience)
This view of a NATO apparently …. stood alongside the ‘core function of collective defence’.12
8. NATO process means delays and waters down the plan.

Collins 2002 (Brian, Lt. Col. – US Air Force and Faculty – National War College, Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs, “Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO”, Summer/Fall, CAIO)
Why the United States Didn't Turn to NATO. …. over the conduct of the combat operations.
DETERRENCE:
nukes are immoral/nuclear detterence is immoral / weapons cost alot of money (econ add-on)/ congress would say
no
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/11/03_wickersham_disarmament_now.php#related
A2 WALTZ/DETERRENCE https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?
krieger
Deterrence is irrelevant – an accident is the most probable risk of war – that’s the Barash and Sandberg
evidence– bolt out of the blue or conventional escalation are no longer threats to global security – nuclear
weapons are outdated in the post Cold War world and the US needs to transform its deterrence doctrine
in order to cope. More ev
DFI International 01 [“Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence of State and Non-State Adversaries: Potential
Approaches and Prospects for Success,” A Study for The Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced
Systems and Concepts Office, FINAL REPORT, October 2001, pg. handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA459871]
Nuclear weapons are broadly accepted as …about their employment, unlike nuclear weapons.
The plan reverses the trend by altering investment decisions and

military doctrines. Conventional deterrene will be privledged
Miller 02 - Director of the International Security Program @ Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
[Steven E. Miller, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of
No-First-Use,” Pugwash Meeting no. 279, London, UK, 15-17 November
2002, pg. http://www.pugwash.org/ reports/nw/miller.htm]
NFU forces the Global Strike Command to adopt conventional strike posture
The Stanley Foundation 08 [“US Nuclear Weapons Doctrine: Can We Adopt
No First Use?” Policy Dialogue Brief, April 4, 2008]
This prevents inevitable low-level friction from becoming great power wars
Grant 09 – Research Analyst @ Lexington Institute w/ emphasis on joint
doctrine, air power, aerospace defense [Dr. Rebecca Grant (PhD in
International Relations from the London School of Economics and Former
lecturer at Air University and Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell
Air Force Base), “Global Deterrence: The Role of F-22,” Lexington
Institute, February 2009]
And, Conventional deterrence prevents shifts in the local balance of

power from triggering global wars.
Gerson & Whiteneck 09 – Research analysts @ Center for Naval Analyses,
a federally funded research center, where he focuses on deterrence,
nuclear strategy, counterproliferation, and arms control [Michael
Gerson (M.A. in International Relations from the University of
Chicago) & Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterrence and Influence: The Navy's
Role in Preventing War,” CNA Analysis and Solutions, March 2009]
These coming regional disputes can only be addressed with conventional

deterrence. Our ev is comparative
Lichtenstein 02 – Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army [WENDY L.
LICHTENSTEIN, “CONVENTIONAL MILITARY DETERRENCE - ITS RISE TO
DOMINANCE AND ITS FUTURE,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research
Project, 28 February 2002]
Failure to upgrade conventionals is the worse-case scenario for global

security.
Horowitz & Shalmon 09 - Professor of Political Science @ University of
Pennsylvania & Senior Analyst @ Lincoln Group, LLC. [Michael C.
Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military
Strategy,” Orbis, Spring 2009]
Nukes aren’t credible – and nuclear threat aren’t credible
Gerson 9/29 – senior fellow at CFR, was at Heritage Foundation
(Michael, 2009, "Rethinking US Nuclear Posture"
http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/0929_transcript_nuclear_ posture.pdf)
us doesn't need nukes for dettterrence/ turkey nukes can't be used for detterence because they're not
armed (dual purpose)/ nukes key to us security and preventing prolif/ nukes don't influence terrorism
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60426/john-deutch/a-nuclear-posture-for-today
Nuclear deterrence
US nuclear deterrence is in terminal decline

Monroe 09 [Vice Admiral Robert, national security consultant, former director of the Defense Nuclear
Agency, director of Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, partner and senior counselor for
Bechtel (management firm), serves on boards for the DOD, Dept of State, DOE, NASA, and other
organizations, Air & Space Power Journal, Fall, V23 I3, p.19-29, Ebsco]
America faces a critical decision point in history. The ... nonprolifera tion, which caused the test bans and
moratoria.
And, collapse in umbrella credibility is inevitable

Gaffney 10 [Frank J Jr., President of the Center for Security Policy – 1-25 “Stopping START,” Canada
Free Press, 25 January. [Online] http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/19352]
One of those exceptions, we are constantly reminded, was Ronald ... and effective as we can make them
Advantage : Conventional Deterrence

Disarm locks in American conventional superiority – solidifies alliances to deter regional aggressors
Lind 09 [Michael, ed of the New American Contract and the New America Foundation, “How I learned to
stop worrying and live with the bomb,” Salon, 10-13,
salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/10/13/nuclear_weapons/index.html]
President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize has been justified ... renouncing the use of mass-casualty nuclear
weapons not only in first strikes but also in retaliation.)
Disarm allows greater conflict escalation flexibility and is a more credible threat. Even if there’s no
reciprocation, it independently boosts US military R&D
Dujarric 3-4-10 [Robert Dujarric runs the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University,
Japan Campus, “The Obama bid to rid the world of nuclear weapons boosts US security -- minus the
threat of Armageddon, Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0304/The-Obama-bid-to-rid-the-world-of-nuclear-
weapons-boosts-US-security-minus-the-threat-of-Armageddon]
As tensions over Iran and North Korea’s programs ... strengthen US military capabilities and deterrence.
This is the MOST IMPORTANT factor for deterrence

Horowitz and Shalmon 09 - Professor of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania & Senior Analyst
@ Lincoln Group, LLC. [Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American
Military Strategy,” Orbis, Spring 2009]
Hedging will be the optimal strategy for the U.S. … military power not only for this generation, but also for
the next, as well.
And, it would establish overwhelming American air dominance – key to power projection
Scoblic 09 [J. Peter Scoblic, J. Peter Scoblic is executive editor of the New Republic, “The hawkish case
for nuclear disarmament,” 8-16, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/16/opinion/oe-scoblic16]
Last week, peace activists around the world commemorated ... we face, but our own nuclear arsenal
cannot protect us from an attack.
Hegemony prevents nuclear wars around the globe.

Kagan 07 [Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams,
Return of History” Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary … American influence and global involvement
will provide an easier path.
Plan is necessary to resolve status quo weapon ambiguity that makes deterrence impossible
Kristensen 07 – Project Director for the Nuclear Information Project @ Federation of American Scientists
[Hans M. Kristensen (Former Special Advisor to the Danish Defence Commission and Former Senior
Researcher @Nautilus Institute), “U.S. STRATEGIC WAR PLANNING AFTER 9/11,” Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007]
The New Triad has been sold on the presumption that it … if the target includes both soft and deeply
buried hardened time-urgent targets.
And, conventional trident missiles make a world of disarm stable and boots the credibility of our deterrent
Brito and Intriligator 3-1-10 [Dagobert L, is the Peterkin Professor of Political Economy and Baker Institute
Scholar at Rice University; Michael D., is Professor of Economics at UCLA where he is also Professor of
Political Science, Professor of Public Policy in the School of Public Affairs, and Co-Director of the Jacob
Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences. He is also a Senior
Fellow of the Milken Institute, Conventional Trident Modification Program: Creating the Possibility of
Global Zero for Nuclear Weapons, huffingtonpost.com/dagobert-l-brito/conventional-trident-
modi_b_480660.html]
Global Zero has the support of the Obama Administration … weapons to a rogue state, it also makes
possible the stability of Global Zero in the future.
nuke prolif threatens us security/ nuke protection key to stop nuke prolif (allies) (orphans)/
detterence=prolif
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50769/michael-mandelbaum/lessons-of-the-next-nuclear-war
nuclear detterrent is bad/ nukes in turkey is what keeps them from proliferating/ conservatives like
nukes presence
http://cosmopolitanreview.com/articles/56-2010-spring-vol-2-no1/201-a-step-closer-to-a-world-without-
nuclear-weapons
weapons not used for detterrence/ a2 allied prolif/ a2 key to alliances
http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance
Positive Peace 2AC
Arguing that reps and language determines reality is reductionist and simplistic
Rodwell, 05 (Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching U.S. Foreign Policy, 49th parallel,
Spring, “Trendy but empty: A Response to Richard Jackson”,
http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)
However, having said that, the problem is … are at best a footnote in our understanding .
Turn—masking
Meisner, 95 [professor of environmental studies at York University, 1995 (Mark, “Resourcist Language:
The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature”, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our
Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)
Changing the language we use to …language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.
Turn - their argument assumes a static conception of language that locks in a particular meaning. You
should vote affirmative to embrace our use of language to change the way that it has constructed reality
in the past
Anna Kurtz and Christopher Oscarson, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference
on College, Composition and Communication, 2003 ("BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate,"
ProQuest)
However, Butler also argues that … for learning in which everyone feels safe.
Framework - we get to weigh our aff – the K moots out the entire 1AC and is unpredictable. They kill
education by destroying clash and making debate one sided.
No link – we agree that war is irrelevant – accidents and terror are the only scenarios for war
Structural violence is an obscure metaphor. Its use cannot lead to positive changes because it conflates
distinct and generally unrelated problems of violence and poverty.
Boulding ’77 (Kenneth, Faculty – U. Colorado Boulder, Former Pres. American Economic Association,
Society for General Systems Research, and American Association for the Advancement of Science,
Journal of Peace Research, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung”, 14:1, JSTOR)
Finally, we come to the great … a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.
Perm – do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt
The Permutation is critical. Trying to claim moral authority ghettoizes peace research into academia. The
best option is to combine the policy of the plan with insights brought out by the K.
Byrd ’87 (Peter, Lecturer in Politics/Continuing Education – U. Warwick, Cambridge Journal of Education,
“Peace Studies: A Case for Careful Development”, 17:1, p. 36-37)
Peace studies may place an even broader … claim a monopoly of concern or of insight.
*Condos a voter --- kills education by encouraging argument under-development – cross-applications and
unpredictability kills 2ac strategy --- dispo solves their offense.
Structural violence death tolls are inflated. They are meaninglessly attributed and the models are
guaranteed to produce high death counts.
Maley ’88 (William, Prof. and Founding Dir. Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy – Australian National
University, The Australian Outlook, “Peace Studies: A Conceptual and Practical Critique”, 42:1, p. 29-30)
Various authors have sought to operationalise … all their various dimensions for many years.
Social injustice isn’t the root of war. We don’t need positive peace for negative peace.
Mushkat ’94 (Marian, Fellow – World Academy of Art and Science, International Problems, “Peace
Research in the Post Cold War Era”, 33:12, p. 39)
It goes without saying that there is … answers to the problems of war and peace.
Positive peace is a justification for intervention and war.

Maley ’88 (William, Prof. and Founding Dir. Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy – Australian National
University, The Australian Outlook, “Peace Studies: A Conceptual and Practical Critique”, 42:1, p. 30)
The deployment of a notion of positive … in justification of Italian Fascism."
Interventionism risks global war

Valenzuela ‘3 (Manuel, Freelance author and social critic, “Perpetual War, Perpetual Terror”, 12-16,
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5382.htm)
Today, the U.S. is responsible for 40% … the world’s perception and treatment of us today.
Structural violence prevents tyranny and annihilation.

Research in the Post Cold War Era”, 33:12, p. 42-43)
Many claim that the use of … the national liberation movements as wel1.26
Case outweighs – prefer our specific impact scenarios compared to nebulous theory that is empirically
denied for decades
*Alt vagueness is a voter – it moots the 2ac by shifting the alt in the block, aff can never generate offense
skewing strategy. Specific options key to education
Alt fails -We have empirical evidence. Policymakers dismiss overly broad peace formulations.
Research in the Post Cold War Era”, 33:12, p. 38-39)
The peace-related knowledge produced … German economist H.G. Nutzinger - "empty boxes.15
2ac – NPR CP
1. Perm do CP—it solves we would just do the plan after the NPR—it’s justified because the CP includes an element
of future fiat, which is bad because it creates false net benefits makes it impossible to be aff -- also plan doesn’t
have to be mandatory—should proves not mandatory
Atlas Collaboration, 99, “Use of shall, should, may can,”
http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html
shall
'shall' describes something … so much the better.
2. No solvency – Pentagon opposes the plan – will block NPR changes

Rosenbaum, 09 (Ron, Slate, “Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama's Dream of Zero?,” 8/21,
http://www.slate.com/id/2225817/pagenum/all/)
Meanwhile, there are further … derailing the commander in chief's goals.
Empirically proven—doesn’t result in the aff

Cirincionne, 09 (Joe, “The 'Nuclear Posture Landmine' : An Interview With Joe Cirincione,” 8/16,
http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/8/16/767100/-The-Nuclear-Posture-Landmine-:-An-Interview-
With-Joe-Cirincione)
Well, the way that …way the President wanted it to.
perm do the plan as an NSD—solves your offense
A2 ALLIED PROLIF
Allies trust us --- they defer to any changes in our arsenal as long as we express political commitment to
their defense.
David S. Yost, July 2004. Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in international relations at
the University of Southern California (1979). “The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies,”
International Affairs 80.4, Ebsco.
Perhaps partly because of improved relations with Russia, … the size of the force and its specific
characteristics.
NFU negotiations increase alliance cred

Sagan 09 – Professor of Political Science @ Stanford University [Scott D. Sagan (Co-Director of
Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.), “The Case for No First Use,” Survival | vol.
51 no. 3 | June–July 2009 | pp. 163–182]
Concerns about extended deterrence have thus often been … from changes in declaratory policy. Pg.
168-169
No link – aff doesn’t cause a loss of credibility in our deterrent – security guarantees mean that the US is
still bound to protect allies
Weakening the umbrella doesn’t actually cause prolif --- its all cold warrior hype --- multiple other factors
are more important in the decision to go nuclear.
Hans M. Kristensen, 7/2/2009. Project Director for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of
American Scientists. “Japan, TLAM/N, and Extended Deterrence,” Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php?pfstyle=wp.
These reports, authored by agencies … the role of nuclear weapons as alpha omega.
--prolif makes the impact inevitable—we control terminal impact unqiuness—they’ll do it covertly to
counter other protential threats—that’s Krieger
--modeling solves—other countries follow our nuclear areseanl models and all ban first use—this
decreases regional tensions which are the impetus for developing weapons in the first place—that’s
hanso----Allies oppose aggressive nuclear posture.
Advantage : War
The existence of US nuclear weapons makes their use inevitable – first is commitment traps
Wirtz 05 [James J., “Disarmament, Deterrence, and Denial,” Naval Postgraduate School, Comparative
Strategy, 24.5, Dec]
Second, these divergent policy perspectives often emerge ... and only increases the risk of nuclear war.
Second is cyber terrorism

Evans et al 09 [Gareth, Chancellor of Australian Nat’l U, former Cabinet Minister of Atty General,
Resources and Energy, Transport and Communications, and Foreign Minister, negotiated at the Canberra
Commission and the Chem Weapons Convention; Yoriko Kawaguchi; Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Alexi
Arbatov (Russia), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa), Francois
Heisbourg (France), Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Brajesh Mishra (India), Klaus Naumann (Germany),
William Perry (US), Wang Yingfan (China), Shirley Williams (U.K.), Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia),
Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico), Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, December 09,
Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,
http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/cover.html]
4.20 Cyber attacks. Producing and detonating radiological or … be assumed that such attempts will never
be successful in the future.
Third, accidents
Granoff 10 [Jonathan, president of the Global Security Institute, senior advisor to the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Committee on Arms Control and National Security, co-chair of the ABA Blue Ribbon
Task Force on Nuclear Non- proliferation, and senior advisor to the Nobel Peace Laureate Summit, “The
Process of Zero,” World Policy Journal, Winter 09/10]
History never stands still. The existence of nuclear weapons amplifies … heightens the frightening
prospect of the possible use of nuclear weapons.
Fourth, weapon ambiguity

Shull 05 [Major in the United States Air Force, Todd C. Shull (M.S. @ University of North Dakota),
“CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: VALUABLE MILITARY OPTION OR THREAT TO
GLOBAL STABILITY?” Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Arts in Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005]
For terrestrially-based concepts, the single … presence of enduring launch-on-warning postures.
These risks compound every year – making extinction inevitable in the long run
Harrell 09 [Eben, writer for Time, 2-20-09, The Nuclear Risk: How Long Will Our Luck Hold?
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html#ixzz0dt55cGcXhttp://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html]There There are hundreds of these and similar land-based ... to ask
after this latest nervy episode: is it worth it?
Plan makes wars less destructive Sagan 09 [Scott D. Sagan, a Fellow of the American Academy since
2008, is Professor of Political Science and Codirector of the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University. He is Codirector of the American Academy's Initiative on the Global
Nuclear Future, Daedalus. Boston: Fall 2009. Vol. 138, Iss. 4; pg. 157, 13 pgs]
Some are pessimistic about the prospects for … the consequences of individual failures of wisdom and
prudence.
Advantage : Iran
Iran will get nuclear ballistic missiles in a year – multiple intelligence sources agree
Kimery 3-4-10 [Anthony L., award-wining editor and journalist who has covered national and global
security, intelligence and defense issues for two decades, “Iran Close to Having Nukes, DOD Official Tells
Oil Execs” http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/12389/149/]
Intelligence collected by Western spy agencies strongly indicates ... fears that Iran may be secretly
working on developing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.
A new wave of sanctions is coming – they will fail without international cooperation
Solomon and Lyons 3-4-10 [Jay and John are writers for the WSJ, “New Hurdle to Iran Sanctions,”
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541304575099972132770104.html?
mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLETopStories]
The Obama administration, still struggling to win China's ... sanctions regime, whether endorsed by the
U.N. or not.
A strong diplomatic push is necessary to get others on board

Richter 2-25-10 [Paul, LA Times, Unity lacking for U.N. sanctions against Iran,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/25/world/la-fg-iran-sanctions26-2010feb26]
Reporting from Washington — As many as four countries … agreed Daniel Brumberg, a specialist on the
Muslim world at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Specifically, the nuclear double standard must be resolved

Makinda 2-12-10 [Professor of Politics and International Studies @ Murdoch University – 02/12, Sam,
“West applying double standards,” Business Daily Africa, 12 February
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion%20&%20Analysis/-/539548/860118/-/sujnm6z/-/]
The continuing diplomatic row over Iran’s … advancing international peace and security if it is done in
isolation.
Eliminating the nuclear double standard boosts negotiation credibility

Schell 07 [Jonathan Schell, the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute, “The Old and New
Shapes of Nuclear Danger,” The Nation, December 24, 2007, p. 11-18]
There are important differences, of course. The new … presented more quickly, for a critical moment of
decision has already arrived.
Effective sanctions force Iranian concessions and spur regime change – lobbying by the US is key
Gerecht and Dubowitz 2-23-10 [Reuel Marc was former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is a senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Mark, “The case for gasoline sanctions on
Iran,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703315004575073682694222948.html]
Are gasoline sanctions against Iran a bad idea? President Barack … commerce with the United States or
diminishing trade with Iran.
This stops their nuclear program and avoids an Israeli strike

Kagan 1-27-10 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, How
Obama can reverse Iran's dangerous course, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012602122.html]
Imagine an Iran whose educated, inventive and highly ... to reverse their strategic and ideological
debacle. But he cannot wait too long.
Israel will attack by the end of the year

Zenko 3-4-10 [Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prevention, A Predictable Catastrophe,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21585/predictable_catastrophe.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication
%2Fby_type%2Fop_ed]
To analyze the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran in … Israeli strike might be the foreseeable
catastrophe of 2010.
The US would get drawn in

Phillips 1-15-10 [Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage Foundation [James
Phillips, “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.,” Backgrounder
#2361, January 15, 2010, pg. http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg2361.cfm]
The Iranian regime's drive for nuclear weapons, rapid ... Israel's right to take action in self-defense
against Iran's growing threat;
Extinction
Morgan 09 [Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea (Dennis
Ray Morgan, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction
of the human race”, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect]
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the ... a savage toll upon the environment and
fragile ecosphere as well.
Iran prolif causes global nuclear war - multiple scenarios

Rubin 09 [Barry, director of Global Research in Int'l Affairs, Center in Israel and editor of the Middle East
Review of International Affairs]
If and when Iran gets nuclear weapons it would set off ... avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons in the first
place.
Nuclear Iran collapses US-China relations, US leadership in East Asia and causes aggression against
Taiwan
Zambelis ‘7 (Chris, Associate – Helios Global (International Political Risk Analysis), China Brief 7:23, “The
Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations”, 12-13,
http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373858)
The United States also shares many of the concerns ... architecture aimed at containing China in East
Asia.
US alliance structure in East Asia prevents regional instability and warNye ’95 (Joseph, Prof. IR –
Harvard, Foreign Affairs, “The case for deep engagement”, 74:4, July, Proquest)
Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, ... alliances and friendships. That is what
we propose to do.
East Asian instability leads to World War II IKnight Ridder ’00 (Jonathon S. Landay, “Top administration
officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, 3-11, L/N)
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea ... security mechanism in place. There are
elements for potential disaster."
Anything short of total disarmament fails

Muller 08 [Harald Muller is director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor
of international relations at Frankfurt University, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent
World, The Washington Quarterly 31.2, Project Muse]
Taking complete nuclear disarmament as a serious and … national security of any party involved in the
process.
Prez key
Obama is in a battle with it over the direction of US nuke policy. The next month is key
van der Linden 1/10/10 - Contributing Editor @ Daily Kos [Page van der Linden (Former research assistant in a
physical inorganic research laboratory in the University of New Mexico Chemistry Department), " US National
Security Policy And Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on the Nuclear ... ", Daily Kos (blog), pg.
http://www.dailykos.com/ storyonly/2010/1/10/823593/- US-National-Security-Policy- And-Nuclear-
Weapons:- Perspectives-on-the-Nuclear- Posture-Review]
What has also currently been addressed by ... structure?" not "why do we have it?"
He will blink first. Establishing a new nuclear agenda is less important than compromising
Westen 09 - Professor of Psychology and Psychiatry @ Emory University [Drew Westen, “Leadership, Obama
Style,” Huffington Post, Posted: November 2, 2009 11:38 AM, pg. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ drew-
westen/leadership-obama- style_b_342269.html]
Genuine leadership means setting ... is well on his way to the thirty yard line.
His credibility is at risk. Obama needs to run roughshod over adversaries to prove that he is a fighter
Harrison 09 - Banking and finance specialist at the economic consultancy Global Macro Advisors. [Edward
Harrison (Former diplomat in the foreign service.), "Obama: knowing when to be an asshole,” Credit
Writedowns, on 18 August 2009 at 6:16 am, pg. http://www.creditwritedowns. com/2009/08/obama-knowing-
when-to-be-an-asshole.html.
So, from a purely Machiavellian perspective, Obama ... fight will become a true liability for the President.
The world is watching the nuke debate. He has to knock resisters inline to sustain his credibility
Butfoy 09 - Senior lecturer in international relations @ Monash University. [Andy Butfoy, “Obama versus the
Pentagon,” Inside Story, 25 September 2009, pg. http://inside.org.au/obama- versus-the-pentagon/]
The most interesting area of potential change... Iraq and Afghanistan. •
That issue is key to international perceptions

Nye 09 – Professor and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. [Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (PhD in
political science from Harvard. Former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Former chair
of the National Intelligence Council. Former deputy assistant secretary of state for security assistance, science and
technology.), "Obama's Nuclear Agenda"Op-Ed, __Daily News Egypt__, October 13, 2009, pg.
http://belfercenter.ksg. harvard.edu/publication/19633/ obamas_nuclear_agenda.html]
How successful Obama is in ...taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.
Indecision signals weakness and leads belligerence from our adversaries. The process is more important
than the decision
Bolton 09 - Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [John R. Bolton (Former U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations) “The danger of Obama's dithering,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2009, pg.
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18]
Weakness in American foreign policy ...direction of the next 39, we still have a long way to fall.
Obama’s indecisiveness is the key internal link

Bolton 09 - Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [John R. Bolton (Former U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations) “Bolton on Obama's Afghanistan Decision: 'This Is Like a Slow-Motion Trainwreck',”
Fox News, Friday, November 13, 2009, Pg. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,574349,00.html]
JOHN BOLTON, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N.: Right. Well, this is like a slow-motion ...
he's got a problem making hard decisions.
And, weak Obama risks global wars. One test of resolve will open the floodgates
Hanson 09 – Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover Institution, Stanford
University [Dr. Victor Davis Hanson, “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis
Hanson,” Interview with the Oregon Patriots, Resistnet.com, December 7, 2009 at 3:52pm, pg.
http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disaster-obama/showLastReply.]
BC: Are we currently sending a message ... tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.
There are multiple scenarios

Peters 08 – Former Foreign Area Officer, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. [Ralph
Peters (Retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel. Currently is a reporter who fouses on politics in
troubled countries), “AMERICA THE WEAK: US RISKS TURMOIL UNDER PREZ O,” Last Updated: 4:51
AM, New York Post, October 20, 2008, pg.
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_GS5vnNwCO6UjfBPf3uobyM.]
IF Sen. Barack Obama is elected president, ...allowed to do what he wants.
Israel risks nuclear winter

Morgan 09 - Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea (Dennis
Ray Morgan, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction
of the human race”, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, ... and fragile ecosphere as well.
Russia risks World War III

Hellman 08 – professor of electrical engineering @ Stanford University. A renowned mathematician who
has worked for over 25 years during nuclear war risk assessment [Martin Hellman, “Soaring, cryptography
and nuclear weapons,” Asia Times, Oct 23, 2008, pg.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/JJ23Aa01.html]
A similar situation exists with ... ignoring the warning signs.
Obama must enact a policy change to control the nuclear bureaucracy. Presidential declaration is a
prerequisite
Cirincione 09 – Nuclear non-proliferation expert & President of the Ploughshares Fund [Joseph Cirincione
(Former Director of nonproliferation and international policy programs @ Center for American Progress
and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) “Interview with Global Zero signatory, Joe
Cirincione on Daily Kos,” Global Zero, Sunday, August 16, 2009, Pg.
http://www.globalzero.org/en/interview-global-zero-signatory-joe-cirincione-daily-kos]
Unfortunately, it's still not being treated ... outcome unless it is predetermined
“Sole purpose” creates a psychological shift that thwarts political opposition to the president’s agenda
Evans 09 – President of the International Crisis Group & Former Foreign Minister of Japan [Gareth Evans
(Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and
Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne) “Getting to
Zero: An Interview With International Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Commission Co-Chair
Gareth Evans,” Interviewed by Miles A. Pomper and Peter Crail, Arms Control Today » April 2009, pg.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_4/Evans]
As far as a doctrinal shift, it ...should in turn engender in others.
The bureaucracy will push for “usability” as long as it is an option. An immediate restriction is key
Kimball 09 – Executive Director of the Arms Control Association [Daryl Kimball (Former executive director
of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers), “Reality Check: The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings in
Pictures,” Arms Control Association, August 2009, pg.
http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/realitycheck.]
To back up his words with ... most terrible killing machines.
A direct order is key.

Smith 09 [Barron Young Smith, "These Are The President's Weapons" The New Republic, September 22,
2009 | 2:13 pm
Pg. http://www.tnr.com/print/blog/the-plank/these-are-the-presidents-weapons]
Yet none of that obscures the ... ask anyone for permission.
Only a presidential directive ensures Obama will fight the plan

Howell 05 - Professor of government @ Harvard University [William G. Howell, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief
Overview,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume: 35. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number:
417+Questia]
Having issued a directive, presidents ... goals throughout the federal bureaucracy.
MODELING INTERNAL LINK
Britian models our nuclear policy

Norton-Taylor, 5 [Richard, Guardian's security affairs editor, 10/5, Guardian, “As the US lowers the
nuclear threshold, debate is stifled”,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/oct/05/foreignpolicy.freedomofinformation]
The circumstances in which the most powerful country ... has already decided, in private with
Washington.
Cutting British Trident solves nuclear war
Murphy, 9 [Joe, Political Editor, Cut in Trident submarine fleet ‘would ease tensions’, London Evening
Standard, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23747523-gordon-browns-plan-to-scale-back-
trident.do;jsessionid=86812A6DFCD2E2B234CB16AD35692670]
Foreign Secretary David Miliband today said a ...and was clearly timed to cheer up Labour activists before
next week's party conference.
That access Russia, China, and Iran

Rogers et al, 6 [Paul Rogers, Bradford School of Peace Studies, John Ainslie, Scottish CND, Bob
Aldridge, Pacific Life Research Center, Frank Barnaby, Oxford Research Group, Paul Ingram, British
American Security Information Council, Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, Robert
Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, Andy Oppenheimer,
Nuclear Weapons Consultant, Milan Rai, Justice Not Vengeance, Greenpeace, “Why Britain Should Stop
Deploying Trident”, March, http://www.plrc.org/docs/GP_UK_Trident_Briefing_Paper.pdf]
Even if the UK never intended to use Trident aggressively, its ... gives China a strong incentive to
upgrade its nuclear arsenal.
NUKE ENERGY DA ANSWERS

Non-unique – their card
Squassoni 2009
“enthusiasm for nuclear energy” “still in operation”
Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons decreases the DOE nuclear weapons budget
Ling 2009
“obama particularly highlighted the” “New Mexico, California, Nevada, Tennessee and Idaho”
Nuclaer weapons funding trades-off with funding for nuke power – cuts from the NNSA budget will be
funneled into nuclear energy programs
Munger 2009
“I’d been trying unsuccessfully” “because that is the $64”
2AC WEAPONITIS--
IR predictions are feasible and effects

Chernoff 2005 “The power of international theory: reforging the link to foreign policy making through
scientific enquiry,” 157-9
“in the social sciences the” … “international stability from each scenario”
Root cause isn’t offense—we can still solve something—no root causes –violence is proximately caused
Curtler 1997 “rediscovering values: coming to terms with postnmodernism” 164-5
“at the same time, we” “problems with postmodernism, however.”
Structural violence is down

Russettt et al 2006 International studies quartlerly, 50:3, “the declining risk of death in battle,”
“the correlates of war (COW)” “the end of the cold war”
Arms control creates momentum for peace
Knopf 1997 “Coalitions and political movements: the lessons of the nuclear freeze,” 157-8
“The anti-nuclear weapons movement” … “the end of the cold war”
Arms can create a war risk by justifying internvention which their authors concede
Mayer 1992 “review: avoiding nuclear war” 12:1 JSTOR
“the nuclear seduction, a” … “movement as they claim”
The alt fails
Robinowitch 1971
“stoning of America” bulletin of the atomic scientists 27:9
“this appeared to many” … “ real and important improvement”
We solve fem
ONLY THROUGH A DECONSTRUCTION OF FOUNDATION THIS LANGUAGE RESTS UPON CAN AN

ALTERNATE DEPICTION OF REALITY BE CREATED THAT WOULD INCORPORATE INDIVIDUALS
INTO THE DISUCSSION AND THUS DISPLACE THE DOMINATE MILITARIZED MASCULINE VOICE
THAT DE CONTEXTUALIZES THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE STATUS QUO. Cohn 1990 [Carol, Director of
the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, “‘Clean Bombs’ and Clean Language,” Women,
Militarism, & War. Elshtain, Tobias. 1990 pg 50-51] However, I have been arguing throughout
this...conversations with each other will invent those futures.
BY UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS THAT OUR CURRENT GENDERED LENS HAS ON OUR
VIEWING AND DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONRY OPENS SPACE FOR A FEMINIZED LENS
THAT HELPS DECONSTRUCT OTHER FORMS OF PATRIARCHAL OPPRESSION Peterson and
Runyan 99 [V. Spike and Anne, professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of
women’s studies at Wright State University, Global Gender Issues, 2nd edition, 1999. p. 14-15) Gender
issues surface now because...transforming other oppressive hierarchies at work in the world.
IGNORANCE OF GENDER MAKES THEIR METHODOLOGY SUSPECT- ONLY BY INVESTIGATING

HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED CAN WE DEVELOP A BASIS FOR ACTION AND AVOID ERROR
REPLICATION Peterson and Runyan, professor of political science at the University of Arizona and
professor of women’s studies at Wright State University, 1999 (V. Spike and Anne, Global Gender Issues,
2nd edition, p. 1-3) Whenever we study a topic, we....outdated maps are inadequate, and potentially
disastrous, guides.
Courts CP 2AC:
Perm shields
Katherine Perine, 2008 [6/12, Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling, CQ
Politics, online]
Thursday’s decision, from a . . . made me do it.’”
No solvency – Only the President can alter Counterforce

FAS, 2009 [April 8, New Report Recommends Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament]
This report argues that . . . be reevaluated and loosened.
No Solvency – Presidential action key to prevent cooption
FAS, 2009 [April 8, New Report Recommends Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament]
The president will need . . . directive might look.
The RRW program would cause US-Russian nuclear war

UCS, 2007 [“New Nuclear Weapons: Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW),” May, online]
The RRW program would . . . based on false information.
Having Obama issue an Anti-Nuclear PDD brings his Administration in line – Solving RRW
Ron Rosenbaum, 2009 [August 21, Slate, “Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama’s Dream of Zero? How
serious is the president about nuclear disarmament?, online]
He has yet to mobilize . . .is a dream denied.
ILAW ADV
nukes in turkey violate NPT (nuclear non prolif treaty) ILAW?
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/nato.htm
nukes violate ilaw (adv)
http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/140/international-law-and-nuclear-weapons-does-the-continued-
development-of-advanced-nuclear-weapons-violate-international-law
nukes EVERYTHING
http://www.nuclearweaponslaw.com/Syllabus_Fordham_Law_2007.htm
nukes violate ilaw
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1997/05/00_illegality-nato.htm
nukes violate ilaw
http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/15/1/65
International Law is inevitable but US engagement is critical to its effectiveness

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2
and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding
Security-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf
The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a
global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors,
and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of
accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still
continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges
of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and
required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions
of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States
are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential
U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear
infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has
dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter
into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S.
interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a
matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or
withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to
its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.
Effective international law solves every impact, includes warming, human rights and
nuclear war
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2
and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding
Security-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf
The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a
global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-
state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations,
nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the
course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument
employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly
embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words,
they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use
of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able
to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty .
However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear
infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has
dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties
expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state
like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this
as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to
its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.
1AC – International Law (13/18)
Scenario One – Environment
Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss.

Glennon, Board of Editors, American Journal of International Law, 90 [Michael, Board of Editors @
American Journal of Intl Law, Jan., 84 A.J.I.L. 1]
It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to protect
endangered species. Customary norms are created by state practice "followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." 250 Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even states that are not parties to the
instruments promulgating them, 251 wildlife protection norms also have become binding on nonparties as customary
law. Closely related to this process of norm creation by practice is that of norm creation by convention: customary norms are
created by international agreements "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." 252 Several such [*31] agreements are directed at wildlife protection, 253 and CITES is one of them. It is
intended for adherence by states generally 254 and is accepted by the 103 states that have become parties. In addition, some
nonparties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements so as to trade with parties. 255 CITES is not "rejected by a
significant number of states"; 256 only the United Arab Emirates has withdrawn from the agreement. In such circumstances, the
International Court of Justice has observed, international agreements constitute state practice and represent law for nonparties. 257
Moreover, customary norms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 258 Because CITES
requires domestic implementation by parties to it, 259 and because the overall level of compliance seems quite high, 260 the general
principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of
customary law. 261 Even apart from the CITES requirements, states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to
be the clear exception rather than the rule. 262 That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this obligation 263 is
suggested by the firm support given endangered species [*32] protection by the UN General Assembly and various international
conferences. 264
Extinction
Diner 94 (Diner, David N. B.S. Recipient. Ohio State University. J.D. Recipient. College of Law. Ohio State University. LL.M. The Judge
Advocate General’s School. United States Army. Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps. United States Army. “The Army and the Endangered
Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994. Lexis-Nexis.)
No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death --
extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a
singleminded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race.
n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and
new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life,
humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the
ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [*171] species the world needs to
support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food,
species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in
maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals
also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3.
Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72
Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans
draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday
desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern
shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense.
Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a
closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the
number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically.
n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current
mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by
reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications.
Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These
ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a
stress. . . .[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple,
unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions,
humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of
ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are
relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction,
with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new
extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be
edging closer to the abyss.
Scenario Two – Leadership
Multiple factors make unipolarity unsustainable

Haass 8 Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations (Bottom of Form The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S.
Dominance, Foreign Affairs, May/June)
But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The
first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to
productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The
result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy.
To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has
failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them .
U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S.
consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more
than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up
the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of
wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and
gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized
for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States'
fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007.
Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward
pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor
regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also
contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice --
militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about
"imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in
the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective
mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from
Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new
burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or
of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the
volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured
goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two
fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a
result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities
of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers),
terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system
to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and
investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier
than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. NONPOLAR DISORDER The
increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the
world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote
collective responses to .
regional and global challenges One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. Herding dozens is harder than
herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of
threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers
that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the
U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move
away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result
of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able
to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of
technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran
alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear
technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.
Unilateralism causes international and domestic backlash, terrorism, and mass
proliferation resulting in isolationism
Ikenberry 2 G. John Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown, October ("America's Imperial Ambition – Foreign
Affairs) p. lexis
Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy, however. Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from
the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will usher in a more hostile international system, making it
far harder to achieve American interests. The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its
ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more
acceptable to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new
thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed
in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness
to use unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term . An American policy that leaves the
United States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass destruction will lead to a
diminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation regime. The Bush
administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering,
monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority
and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along -- when it
is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a
preemptive or preventive military intervention will go well; it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led
and military-focused interventionism. America's well-meaning imperial strategy could undermine the principled multilateral
agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success of nonproliferation goals. The specific
doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other
countries from doing the same. Does the United States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or even China or Russia? After all, it
would not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the
evidence is in, or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the
United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and quite paradoxically , overwhelming
American conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to
accelerate programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of
the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand strategy. Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate
WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After
the military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required,
as are long-term strategies that bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of
assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a new
regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed by outside military intervention must also be calmed. This is the "long tail" of burdens and
commitments that comes with every major military action. When these costs and obligations are added to America's imperial military
role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over the long haul -- the classic problem of
imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a growing and increasingly
productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost.
Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if the
initial decisions about military intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal
grand strategies suddenly become relevant again. A third problem with an imperial grand strategy is that it cannot generate
the cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fight
on terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from European and Asian countries in intelligence, law
enforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of
amicable working relations with major states around the world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization,
environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges. But
it is impossible to expect would-be partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue
business as usual in all other domains. The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withhold
cooperation in day-to-day relations with the United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the European response to the recent
American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific trade issues,
but it is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. The United States may be a unipolar military power, but economic and
political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restraining
American military policy, but they can make the United States pay a price in other areas. Finally, the neoimperial grand strategy poses a
wider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-
encirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it
risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules. The
proponents of the new grand strategy have assumed that the United States can single-handedly deploy military power abroad and not
suffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of leadership. But
history shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power. Charles V, Louis XIV,
Napoleon, and the leaders of post-Bismarck Germany sought to expand their imperial domains and impose a coercive order on others.
Their imperial orders were all brought down when other countries decided they were not prepared to live in a world dominated by an
overweening coercive state. America's imperial goals and modus operandi are much more limited and benign than were those of age-old
emperors. But a hard-line imperial grand strategy runs the risk that history will repeat itself.
Proliferation causes nuclear war –it uniquely increases the risk and magnitude of conflicts.
Sokolski 9 (Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and serves on the US congressional Commission on
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, “Avoiding a nuclear crowd,” Policy Review, June/July)
AT A MINIMUM, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II,
there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers' strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world
and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance
tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing
small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system (NATO) that includes two
European nuclear powers (France and the UK). NATO is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has
retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or
nuclearweapon- armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making
them "strategic partners" (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), "non-NATO allies" (e.g., Israel and
Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea,
which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our
European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security
relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as
important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what
this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming
analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no
power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number
of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states
or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington
could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such
threatening or unstable nuclear states.^^ Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each
of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted
above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all
actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear
deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and
nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state's military would
place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that
are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military
states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance
munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between
states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad
provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in
Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in
the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with "strategic" consequences (arms
races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world "every quarrel or difference of
opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today."^^ In short, we may soon see a future
that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.
Nuclear War
Kagan 7 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert “End of Dreams, Return of History” Policy Review
(http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous
administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional
predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now,
increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and
continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.
Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the
Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and
though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for
practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to
the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among
Nationalism in all its forms is back,
these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.
if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American
predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance.
Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the
other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through
diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and
destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess
nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more
catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability.
For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly
allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United
States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval
dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in
World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also
on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that
great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany.
Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to
check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe
greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today
exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place.
But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the
distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were
Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have
a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment
liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers.
Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and
Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory.
Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including
the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws
from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the
. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States
region. That is certainly the view of most of China’s neighbors
as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an
ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene
— even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an
even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist
theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and
the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia
are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some
call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving
Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable
circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would
lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely
that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some
see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired
with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on
the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among
powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening
dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The
alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of
American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their
It is doubtful that any American
interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum .
administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further
toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return
things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back
in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era
of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult
as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction
of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
U.S. credibility in international is key to leadership – it stabilized US power, reduces
backlash against unilateralism and increases overall credibility
Krisch 3 [Nico. Senior Fellow @ the Center for International Studies @ NYU Law. Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy – edited by Malone
and Khong. Pp. 62-63]
However, when international instruments reflect U.S. policy preferences vis-à-vis other states – as they often do (eg., in the area of arms
control) – careful analysis is needed on whether unilateral action can render similar results or whatever even the short-term interests of
the United States demand adherence to the treaty. Even the United States itself recognizes the value of legal regulation of international
relations, as the description of its attempts to create and enforce law by unilateral means has shown. It is not ready to renounce law as an
instrument, because law stabilizes expectations and reduces the costs of later negotiation and of the enforcement of certain policies.
Thus, the question is whether it is in the U.S. interest to accept the more egalitarian process of international law instead of using
unilateral, hierarchal legal instruments. Although it is impossible to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the general value of
international law in this chapter, I shall outline at least some arguments in favor of such an acceptance. First, a stronger use of
international law could help stabilize the current predominant positions of the United States. If the United
States now concludes that treaties with other states that reflect its superior negotiating power (even if not to the
degree the United States would wish), U.S. preferences can shape international relations in a longer perspective, as
change in international law is slower and more difficult than political change . It is worthwhile noting that past great
powers similarly influenced the international legal order to such a degree that it is possible to divide the history of international law into
epochs dominated by these powers – epochs that have left many traces in contemporary law. Second, even if the U.S. power continues to
increase and this argument therefore appears to be less appealing, the United States can gain from stronger reliance on
international law because the law can help legitimize its current exercise of power. Unilateralism in
international politics is always regarded suspiciously by other states, and it is quite probable that perceptions of
“imperialism” or “bully hegemony” will lead to stronger reactions by other states in the long run. Already now, some states show greater
unity. Although it remains to be seen whether in the Case of Russia and China this greater unity is only symbolic, other instances, such
as the strong stance of the like-minded states in the ICC, indicate a more substantive regrouping in the face of U.S. predominance.
Similarly, the accelerated integration of the EU can be regarded as caused in part by the desire to counterbalance the United States. IF
the United States were able to channel its power into the more egalitarian process of international law, it
could gain much more legitimacy for its exercise of power and significantly reduce the short and long term
costs of its policies. This has been recognized in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001,
and the U.S. president not only sought to build an international ad hoc coalition but also taken steps to bolster the international legal
regime against terrorism, in particular by transmitting conventions against terrorism to the Senate in order to proceed with ratification.
Multilateralism is certainly valued more highly by U.S. administration since the attacks, but reluctance still prevails in many areas, as
enduring U.S. opposition to the ICC and to the additional protocol to the BWC shows. Third, it is highly questionable whether the
United States will in fact be able to pursue its strategy of subjecting international law in the future. In the past, it might have been
possible to exert significant influence on the content of international agreements and then not subscribe to them. Repeating this in the
future is likely to be more difficult – as the United States discovered in the case of the ICC statute after a certain point. As one observer
to the ICC negotiations notes: Increasingly, the other delegations felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the Untied States; they
believed that the United States would never be satisfied with the concessions it got and ultimately would never sign the treaty for
completely unrelated domestic political reasons. Similarly, the use of reservations in order to secure a privileged position has become
increasingly difficult as other states become wary of this strategy and seek to foreclose the possibility of reservations to new treaties
entirely, as in the ICC statute and the Ottawa Convention. And discontent with U.S. behavior might backfire in unexpected
circumstances – as with the loss of the seat in the Commission for Human Rights, or the suit brought and vigorously defended by
Germany in the LaGrand case. In general, these effects are likely to undermine the U.S. capacity for leadership which
to a large degree is based on reputation, credibility, and persuasiveness – not only on brute power . Moreover, as
the United States discovered in its failure to achieve desired goals in the climate change and the landmine negotiations, leadership can be
barred by too great a difference in opinion between the leader and those to be led. Compromise may thus be necessary to maintain the
momentum to lead. The United States may be forced to choose between engagement, leadership, and control, on the one hand, and free-
riding, isolation, and a loss of influence on the other.
CONSULT NATO
nato would say no/ discussing removal of weapons with allies key to relations
http://en.trend.az/regions/world/usa/1653851.html
nato would say yes
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/02/20
nato would say no
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/22/AR2010042201714.html
A2 REARM
a2 rearm
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons.pdf
A2 TURKEY PROLIF
First off extend Bell 09, the first card in the 1AC. Not only do TNW’s lack any strategic value, but if you
look into the warrants it says “no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik”
(Incirlik is the base housing the B-61 TNW’s). This is public data which means no one, even Iran, will
consider this a deterrent. The bombs can’t even be used in their defense.
Also, extend my Ingram 09 inherency evidence your disad is inevitable. TNW’s will be inevitably
removed in the future, but if we wait too long the costs will raise and we will lose the clarity of our
purpose which in turn closes the doors for an alliance and cooperation which is key in the fight for
Nuclear Zero.
On to the line-by-line.
Even if we pull out our nuclear weapons, it seems Turkey is too heavily rooted in non-proliferation
efforts to start making nuclear arms of their own according to his NTI 09 evidence. Turkey wouldn’t
think about starting a nuclear weapons program after taking such a strong non-proliferation posture or
they would risk their credibility with all non-proliferation alliances.
The Disarm Counterplan
“Text: The United States federal government should completely disarm itself of all nuclear weapons,
other than B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. We’ll clarify.”
The CP doesn’t solve ANY of the 1AC advantages, if you refer back to the 1AC all my internal links to
proliferation and nuclear war are specific to the B-61 TNW’s stationed in Turkey and the Russia
advantage as stated in cross-x of the 1AC is best solved by Turkey. Russia won’t care about the other
nuclear weapons because you’re leaving a stockpile right in their front yard! Turkey TNW’s is the most
immediate threat to Russia and as stated before trying to get Russia to disarm before we do in Turkey is
like saying “Put down your nukes even though we have 80 of them just down the street”. Russia won’t
cooperate without the plans passage so the plan has a huge solvency deficit over this CP. Besides, the CP
happens after the plan passes. In case you missed the Nuclear Zero part.
Also the CP advocates disarming nuclear weapons not elimination. Disarmed nukes can be rearmed,
making the proliferation impacts underlined in the 1AC inevitable post the CP.
The TNW Counterplan
“Text: President Obama should issue an Executive Order to substantially reduce military presence by
eliminating all U.S. B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy.
We’ll clarify.”
This CP also has a huge solvency deficit. It can’t claim either of the advantages of the 1AC, just refer to
my rant above on the last CP. Also my second Bell 09 card assumes that out of the 5 TNW holding
countries Turkey is the key piece to the disarmament puzzle because of its geographical region and it
houses almost half of the TNW’s split between the 5 alone. Turkey is the only country that would send a
message not only by encouraging Russia to eliminate their weapons, but the strengthen the NPT
conference which is key in the non-proliferation effort.
The Consult Counterplan
“Text: The United States federal government should enter into binding consultation with Japan and
propose that President Obama ought to issue an Executive Order to substantially reduce military
presence by eliminating all U.S. B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. The United States federal
government will allow minor modifications and implement the result of the consultation. We’ll clarify.”
First off there is a solvency deficit because there is no guarantee Japan says yes, so the CP is already
shaky. Also the CP doesn’t solve the proliferation advantage extend my Van 9 evidence that “Removing
U.S. TNW’s from Turkey UNILATERALLY would motivate countries like Russia to make large efforts in
clearing their own arsenals and strengthens the NPT/ Review causing a spillover” The key word
unilaterally I’m not sure if I made that large enough in the 1AC. As you can see, not a single one of these
CP’s solve the entirety of the case.
Onto the line-by-line
The Bergsten et al. 01 evidence that says consult is key to the alliance says that the kind of consultation
that is key is “both economic and security issues”. If there is a single economic or security issue that we
haven’t consulted Japan on in the last nine years either A. the net benefit is non-unique or B. It won’t
matter if we don’t consult because they will just not care like the last nine years. Don’t give them the net
benefit, it’s ridiculous because the entire scenario depends on this card.
AND
US assurance solves, no consultations on nuclear policies so far because Japan doesn’t want to be
involved in our nuclear strategies so the CP wouldn’t pass
Satoh ‘9 [Yukio - the japan institute of international affairs. “are the requirements for extended
deterrence changing?” Monday, april 6, 2009 carnegie international nonproliferation
CONFERENCE http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1299]
Strategically, Japan’s adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon
the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, or more specifically, the credibility of the United States’
commitment to provide deterrence for Japan. In coping with conceivable nuclear threats, the
Japanese government has hitherto expressed no more than sheer and total dependence upon the
American deterrence. The present Defense Programs Outlines, which was adopted by the cabinet in
2004, for example, takes the position that “to protect its territory and people against the threat of
nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent”. This position has been
maintained ever since the first Defense Program Outlines was adopted in 1976. Unlike the case of
NATO, however, there have been no official consultations between Washington and Tokyo on how
American extended deterrence should function , nor even any mechanism put in place for such
consultations. This is largely, in my eyes, due to Japan’s reluctance to date to be involved in
American nuclear strategy.
This card is especially hot, there’s no way Japan would even want to consult on the plan so there’s no
risk of the net benefit.
AND
Strengthened US-Japan cooperation freaks out China – causes miscalc and instability over Taiwan and
it expands their nuclear arsenal which is the opposite of what the CP tries to do
Park and Lee‘8 [ John – Dir. Of the Korea Working Group at the US Institute of Peace, and Dong Sun –
Asst Prof of IR at Korea University. “North Korea,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security
in 21st Century Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p. 288]
While these measures are designed primarily for self-defense, they are raising significant concerns in
Beijing, which regards them as potentially detrimental to its security interests. China suspects that the
strengthened cooperation between Washington and Tokyo might be an attempt to contain its growing
power and influence, and that the two allies' development of a missile defense might be aimed at
undermining China's nuclear deterrent (Friedberg 2005). Chinese officials are particularly concerned that
the joint missile defense system might be extended to include Taiwan, neutralizing their coercive
capabilities and facilitating the island's formal independence ( China's National Defense 2006; Cody
2006). IfJapan (which occupied parts of Chinese territory between 1931 and 1945) ac- quired any
offensive capability, Beijing also would suspect that Japan aggressively intended to expand its influence
at China's expense in order to dominate East Asia (Blanchard 2006). A Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman strongly criticized high-level Japanese politicians' consideration of a preemptive strike as
"extremely irresponsible" ( Yonhap News 2006a). In response to the increasing military capabilities of
its potential adversaries, China will likely expand its own nuclear arsenal to maintain an effective
deterrent against the United States (and Japan) and augment its missile and submarine capabilities to
restrain Taiwan. The United States and Japan might, in turn, interpret these Chinese moves as an
aggressive attempt at blackmail aimed at subjugating Taiwan—and therefore take countermeasures,
such as an increase of their missile defense capabilities. More- over, Taiwan may also strengthen its own
military capabilities—for example, by acquiring ballistic missiles and missile defense systems—to offset
China's aug- mented offensive capability. These reactions could further reinforce China's suspi- cions
about the two allies' intention and strengthen its effort to expand its military power. In the midst of this
arms buildup, mutual suspicion and tension would further grow, and the region would become
unstable.
Courts (301)
1. Multiple conditional worlds that include a K are a voter –

skews 2AC strategy by creating multiple worlds. Worse than
multiple counterplans because answers to the K can’t be
leveraged as offense to the other counterplan. Not reciprocal
because we can’t go for contradictory frameworks or
advantages as DAs to the status quo. Leads to run-and-gun
no risk offense for the negative that distracts from topic
education. Two conditional worlds of either CP or K solves
flexibility.
2. Perm --- do the CP --- we never specified an agent --- if

any part of the USFG should do the plan that’s a reason to
vote aff.
3. No test case specification is a voting issue – undermines a

key area of ground for offense. Means the CP is a perversion
of normal means.
4. Perm do both- solves 100% of the net benefit because it

still has the Court incorporate Ilaw
5. Agent counterplans bad- steals the entirety of the 1AC-

particularly true in the context of an artificially competitive
net benefit- it forces the aff to generate offense to something
external- makes it impossible to be aff
6. Congress would overrule

Brickman 07 [Brickman, Danette. "Congressional Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decisions:
Understanding the Introduction of Legislation to Override", Southern Political Science Association, Jan
03, 2007, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p143265_index.html]
Congress’s policy-making realm is sometimes challenged by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Court
renders a decision reflecting a policy which conflicts with congressional preferences . At times this conflict
proceeds to a battle over national policy, culminating in Congress overriding the Court’s decision. While
research on successful congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions has added to our
understanding of Court-Congress interaction, missing from the discourse is an examination of initial congressional reaction, the
introduction of legislation in opposition to Supreme Court decisions. Using a unified dynamic approach which incorporates changing congressional preferences and
context this research examines the circumstances under which Congress introduces legislation to override Supreme Court decisions. The results revel that the
absolute distance between congressional preferences and the Court’s policy statement, together with
various decision and saliency factors increase the probability that Congress will introduce legislation to
overturn Supreme Court decisions.
7. CPs without a solvency advocate are a voting issue ---

a. Predictability --- lack of solvency advocate means the
policy is not grounded in the literature --- makes it
impossible to research aff answers.
b. Education --- encourages contrived CPs that don’t have
actual literature --- causes shallow and uneducational
debates.
8. No solvency for ilaw- no reason ruling on the plan changes
all of the military deference
A2 EUROPE CP
Klaus Naumann, 5/19/2010, “A Farewell to Nuclear Arms” Project Syndicate,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/naumann3/English
But the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Europe is by no means the first step
towards nuclear disarmament. To suggest it as an opening move could damage European
security and jeopardize transatlantic cohesion, so the message has to be “no” to unilateral
withdrawal, but “yes” to including these weapons in future arms-control negotiations. Withdrawal
of these weapons would not mean the end of nuclear deterrence for Europe, as deterrence will
remain necessary until the last nuclear weapon is dismantled. But the sole purpose of retaining
some degree of deterrence will be to deter the use of nuclear weapons.
Europe perhaps benefited more than any other part of the world from nuclear deterrence,
because it helped to preserve peace during the Cold War and prevented nuclear proliferation.
But the time has now come to join Presidents Obama and Medvedev in bringing about
disarmament. Indeed, without the US and Russian examples, the world would see more, not
fewer, nuclear-weapon states.
NOW IS KEY
NOW IS KEY – GLOBAL MOMENTUM ENSURES SUCCESS
GLOBAL ZERO, 2009, “The Beginning”, An organization impacted with Global Nuclear
Posture, http://www.globalzero.org/en/2009-review
We partnered with Avaaz.org at key global decision-making moments. When President Obama gave his historic speech in Prague and called on other
nations to join him in working towards a nuclear-free world, Avaaz members in France sent 23,000 emails to President Sarkozy urging him to
participate in multi-lateral negotiations for global zero. In July, before the Obama/Medvedev Summit ,
over 100,000 people from
every country in the world signed the Global Zero declaration in just three days. This kind of
growth can only be achieved if all of us take a minute to tell our friends and family about Global Zero. If you haven't done so, please use our simple tool
to invite your friends and family to join our cause .
In 2009, the Global Zero movement grew exponentially among
around the world. There are now more than 50 Global Zero Campus Chapters in
students from
10 countries. Global Zero leaders have spoken at universities worldwide, including on a panel at the
London School of Economics, which featured Her Majesty Queen Noor and Ambassador Richard Burt before a sold-out audience of over 400.

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PROLIF BAD:

Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars.

They will escalate to great power nuclear wars

New proliferators will be uniquely destabilizing – guarantees

Fast global prolif is inevitable without US arsenal cuts.

Strong NPT preventsrunaway global proliferation.

Anything short of total disarmament fails

Security Kritik Answers

Accept all ontologies. These questions are unresolvable.

Existence is a prerequisite to value

Enemies are real

Securitization key to heg.

Security Kritik Answers

Cap solves war

Plan popular with religious groups

turkey does not support nukes in the region

fears of withdrawal of nukes are conceptual / removal of nukes drains capital

nato supports withdrawal of weapons/ removal of weapons=insecurity=prolif for defense

turkey supports withdrawal (start treaty proves)

turkey supports withdrawal

obama supports disarment

Scrapping missile defense should have triggered the link.

ADVANTAGE TWO – SOFT POWER

That causes extinction.

Finally, hegemonic decline triggers nuclear wars around the globe.

WARMING IMPACT: (ADV IF CUT INTERNAL LINK)

And, Nonprolif credibility is key to revitalize multinational enrichment

Warming causes extinction

Energy scarcity causes extinction

A2 IMPACT DEFENSE ON NUCLEAR WAR:

Even a small nuclear war causes extinction

Contention One- Nuclear War Termination

One of the … and rationality.

The rationality/risk argument … to maximize rewards.

The problem of controlling…international politics as played.

A2 TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR ZERO=NUKE WAR

A2 NON-PROLIF CAUSES A SHIFT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Nukes kill 20 times more people from the explosion alone.

A2 PROLIF WILL BE SLOW

Wide spread of tech makes fast breakout prolif possible.

But there is an historical inevitability to the latency phenomenon. Beneath

nuke war good/bad

all nukes are nukes (still dangerous even if unarmed)/

A2 TERRORISM IMPACT DEFENSE

a2 nuclear theft exagerated / facilities not well armed

risk of terrorist acquisition of weapons

2AC Consult Japan

Collapse of heg causes rearm

That outweighs – constitutional questions are a priori

3. Leaks killing civil military relations

5. No link – no pro-nuclear bureaucrats

6. Relations are resilient

8. NATO process means delays and waters down the plan.

The plan reverses the trend by altering investment decisions and

And, Conventional deterrence prevents shifts in the local balance of

These coming regional disputes can only be addressed with conventional

Failure to upgrade conventionals is the worse-case scenario for global

US nuclear deterrence is in terminal decline

And, collapse in umbrella credibility is inevitable

Advantage : Conventional Deterrence

This is the MOST IMPORTANT factor for deterrence

Hegemony prevents nuclear wars around the globe.

weapons not used for detterrence/ a2 allied prolif/ a2 key to alliances