G.R. No.

189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV
No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if
the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of
nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein
petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due
to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that
petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this
Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the
same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that
at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in
its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it
was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-
CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and
existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC
in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties
acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular,
Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no
marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable
marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction,
while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
(5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the
Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first
wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was
deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second
marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and
Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity
is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be
protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability
and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very
shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive.
For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was
in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing
rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed
that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of
Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we
find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, G.R. No. 179620

Petitioner YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., - versus - Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
REYES, JJ. COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,

BRANCH 254, and Promulgated:

LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,

Respondent. August 26, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming
in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong
remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.[3]
Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel
Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that
time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they
got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father.
This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.
Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this
was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar
closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.[9]
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.[10] Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.[12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with
Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).[13] She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such incapacity is marked by
antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital
relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
memorandum[15] released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or
secondary hospital.[16] Leonidas family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence.[17] In
other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary
discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who
reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.[18] Manuel pointed out that Leonida
found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.[19]
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further
misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.[20]
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuels house during his weekly trips
to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True,
they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident
occurred. On that particular date,[22] he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time,
except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was
presented.

RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendants share thereon in favor of the same parties
children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment
in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books
of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in
support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this
jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality
has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55,
par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and
forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in
haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower courts jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute
community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.

CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005)
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate
court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a
mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.[28]

Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE
OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]

Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the
party from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through
no fault of petitioner.[32] However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure,
in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some
cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to
sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his
alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner
Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this
Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that under the
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for
review.[40]
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal.
xxx
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial
defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate
grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari
instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not
hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating petitioners CA petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it
is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure
that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the
ends of justice.[46]
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio,
repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuels appeal. True it is that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest
of justice so require.[47]
The negligence of Manuels counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioners former counsel led to the
loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty,
which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set
aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their
defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyers mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by
perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in
court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more
conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of ones action.[50]
The client was likewise spared from counsels negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.[51] and
Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its
rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of
incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case
under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings,
infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish
psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to
demonstrate were Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to
prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue
of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there
is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the
totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN,
pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard
but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people
but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be
effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendants denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one
thing is certain even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling
victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed
sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent
that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes
stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional
rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward
infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the
time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also,
it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with
Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,[58] such as concealment of
homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be
proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances[61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per
se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations[62] of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed
out that in Article 46, they are talking only of concealment, while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal
separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for
clarity, they add the phrase existing at the time of the marriage at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.[64]
Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of
the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.[65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her
that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course
of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in
the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in
our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.[68] In
Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said
the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this
Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily
to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were
married. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best,
and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioners homosexuality per se and not its
concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[70] The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.[71] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both
spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court
forfeited Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of
Manuels share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,

Petitioner, - versus - ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 167746

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27
October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first
five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in
a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage
under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite
the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the
same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage
contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy
vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the
substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and
respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence
of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry
to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November
1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by
counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city
or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.[30] An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.[31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that
the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer
scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to
the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the
Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no
claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed
during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.

COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and they
accepted it your honor.

COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number
7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.[35]
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer
or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All
the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ISIDRO ABLAZA,

Petitioner,

-versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 158298

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD,* and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the
regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.[1] The case was docketed as
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being
issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that
his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved
to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the
marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,[4] however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the
same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition
was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not
prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands
to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE;
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out
of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the
time the marriage is contracted.[6] As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment
of the governing law.[7] To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited
under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed
by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.[8]
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March
15, 2003.[10]
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior
to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the
law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v.
Bayadog,[12] the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to
their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.[13]
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to
bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,[14] the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest.[15] Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action.[16] Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[17]
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to
be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the
petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate.[18] Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was
the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial
right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos surviving wife,[19] stood to be benefited or
prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code
required a marriage license for their validity;[20] hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on
whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is
not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[21]
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G.
Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the
property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial
right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering that Section 11,[22] Rule 3, Rules of
Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made on motion of any party
or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as
parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate)
at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the
estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the
second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without
such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL
knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their
union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]"11 She eventually discovered that
Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the
National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987.13 "After much prodding by their friends and
relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994."14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina
Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm
the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible
criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour.19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as evidence a Certification28 from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He
argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his
first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they
had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to
petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not
categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For
more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when
this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

I Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the municipality where they were
married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice.
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code
of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first
marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could
be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN
dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that
Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The
marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage.44This "should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff
presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting
parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the
possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy
involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the
Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case,
and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a
doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was
issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due
to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan
Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the
parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered
into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that
despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage
exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is no evidence to show that the number series of that
license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital
documents. This would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes
sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion
that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion
that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as
well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched
conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal
cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee
to issue a document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that
discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy.
Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56
The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes
useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the
first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a]
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4,
1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of
bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged.

III Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a
minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are
considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously
computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin
III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business
owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following
real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions
for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to
Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties
he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency
of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which
the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of
her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4
September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court,
Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from
the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the
case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for
Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties
with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the
lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena,
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family
Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared
NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480,
and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628,
194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B.
Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the
words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution
from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these
five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However,
the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to
his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant
to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of
the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City
and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied
the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting
the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception
of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However,
despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved
before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring
Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals
ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to
Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the
absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of
bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the
trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27,
2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and
to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in
not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled
hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding
the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present
her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision
should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her
lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of
Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because
the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and,
at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and
that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of
Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified
that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that
the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin
and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission
for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and
testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally.
This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218
while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and
Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the
rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is
required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not
under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by
a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties
to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the
property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or
both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella
to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision,
showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the
call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for
decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not
enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of
bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy.
Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the
belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible
account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined
and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived
together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered
their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In
advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of
Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of
a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage.
But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their
marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be
denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the
previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is
valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse
married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of
the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its
findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree
with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the
range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22
Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of
six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos
on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the
marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no
legal impediment to the marriage.31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano,
Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from
her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met
Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the
two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an
affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract
marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1)
marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between
spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the
crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal
act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of
positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for
having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite
marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and
Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30,
2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity
of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar.
Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
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xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the
municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage
ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the
venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or
documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the
afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before
dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and
void for want of the most essential requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence,
null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and
of no legal effect;

x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which
attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent
with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is no evidence to prove
petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was
solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties
submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1,
1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the
application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of
marriage.

SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of
the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents
and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued
for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

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1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to petitioner's evidence which
established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the
CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations
as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by
petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with
these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
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(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code
governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
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ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing
more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer
before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain
such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the
former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cari�o v. Yee Cari�o.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no
record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage
of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that
the required marriage license had been secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she
who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22
issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and
license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was
conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of
the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject
marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification
issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not
exist in the said office despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a
certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such
document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification,
the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cari�o v. Yee Cari�o,27 this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her
deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
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Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's
and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way
out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.

x------------------x

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,

Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 175581

G.R. No. 179474

Present:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,

Acting Chairperson,

TINGA,*

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO,** and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could
get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him
the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does
not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid.
It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this
Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency.
This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just
but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister
all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the
action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code
did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February,
1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose
filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that
the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require
that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November
2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must
be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void
from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying
Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No.
175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

I RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that
one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order
to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.
For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez
v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that
the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with;
and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification
of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and
that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article
76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties
shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact
arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive
on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage
license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since
all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement
of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when
we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of
marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the
parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53]
To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of
the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for
it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated
the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-
year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring
the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004
which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister
of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry
of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo
Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the
civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract,
the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in
church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another
marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and
reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until
their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some
time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during
this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the
United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to
him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil
Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20,
1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him
a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No.
2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and
September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in
October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her,
asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When
they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry.
Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to
support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her
family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil
wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone
prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant
further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She
learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN,
11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over
her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called
"intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird
sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and
then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a
habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be
studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage.
Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew
up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their
own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh.
"13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be
fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was
shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan,
and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales
at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry
No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a
copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and
held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore
just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil
registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather,
because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is
defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a
marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was
purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void
ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime
is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the
present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden
of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before
the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of
Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the
earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that
a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No.
2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all
effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly
dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or
that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you
those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of
the Local Civil Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to license no.
2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the
same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books?
Which is which now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold
the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official
act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true
in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves.
It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio –
Always presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution
dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
LOLITA D. ENRICO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 173614

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated: September 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary
Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They
argued that Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any
legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or
on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10]
dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11]
that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain
and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or
the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the
action to declare the marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the
[respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an
Order[14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail
a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.[16]
Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that
the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The
Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their
marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to
reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the
lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would
be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the
parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered
into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage
will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to
a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which
shall be applicable.[17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the
ground that no new matter was raised therein.[19]
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs
enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct
recourse to this Court.[20] Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence
of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has
the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby
the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two
marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the
facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit
in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the
opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED
without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present: - versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO, known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and

DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ. SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated: CARLOS II,

Respondents. December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases
commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot
159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076)
SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con
la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con
la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the
parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo.
The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The
parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third
and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He
also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such
certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended
that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo
II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the
trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In
the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was
made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of
collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the
Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by
TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul
a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount
to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the
matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The
fact, however, that appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for
a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved
the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the
formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed
by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement
as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts
rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said
appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely
purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minors total forfeiture
of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.[8]

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied
the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19
(now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.
So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the
trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the
State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of
the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The
rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can
decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with
the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.[22]
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.[32]
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a
personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven
to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does
not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the
RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of
the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II.
This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was
adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined
to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For
the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty
provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money
must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity
or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to
DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married
on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition
in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would
be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal,
i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22
in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x
x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25
The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the
same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country,
the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose
of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they
are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or
the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there
is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of
the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as
a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support
pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not
an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain
to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf
and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on
May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has
no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and
factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda)
did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be
counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995
a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14
which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their
evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial
court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it
from hearing the case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the
appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was
indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is
not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen.
Tamano as void ab initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as
void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The
court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into
during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce
obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the
RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry
her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to
question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was
given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari
with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that
the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the
legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it
debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in
violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the
proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the
RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was
prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of
her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the
period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction
and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603
were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there
was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the
time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was
rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer
and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively
participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended
the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion
to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the
motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the
course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the
instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial
court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before
the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does
not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the
trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after the CA
rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her
evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer
and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the
prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to
have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and
executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss
and not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on
the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties
are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently
complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be
no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the
public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed
or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their
execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right
acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect
of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted
under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits
to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if
the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming
that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity,
therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s
interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the
Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the
proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in
which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one
of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother
had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which
include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent
Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA,

Petitioners,
- versus -

THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR,
CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 181174

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

December 4, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married[1] on January 4, 1978.
The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef[2] and Janelle Ann[3] on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo[4] on
June 4, 1980.

Pablo died[5] on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent
minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's
birth certificate[6] from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL

TITULAR

Date of Birth: 01 January 1996

Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular

Father: Pablito S. Braza

Date Received at the

Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997

Annotation: "Late Registration"

Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"

Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy[7] of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her
co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition[8] to correct the entries
in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and
3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order[9] of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order[10] of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
 Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in
the civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,[11] Lee v. Court of Appeals[12] and Republic v. Kho,[13] they contend that even substantial errors, such as
those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.[14]

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the
trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code[15] charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled
or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.[16]

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records[17] and that the rest of the prayers are merely
incidental thereto.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and
impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171[18] of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the
death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the
Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts
were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their
records of birth but to establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners
mother and the substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed
as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they
were illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the
changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature,
upheld the lower courts grant of the petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 13, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in
a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged
in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit;
and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that
they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere
belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the
last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to
show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the
basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region,
Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant
and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.[9] Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions
of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never
be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.[10] Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage can be
the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments
on the petition.[13]
In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to
prove paternity and filiation.[15]

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the
OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.[20]

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite
the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.[22]

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.[25]
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name
for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can
prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]

The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own
admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and
F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger
and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.