G.R. No.
172299 April 22, 2008 In denying the motion, the RTC held that:
ALFREDO TAGLE, petitioner,
vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the
HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch
82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alfredo Tagle
(petitioner Alfredo) stemmed from the following Resolutions promulgated by the Court of Appeals: (1) the
6 September 2005 Resolution1 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Alfredo, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing the 4 April 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82,
City of Malolos, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. P-71-20042; (2) the 16 February 2006 Resolution3 denying
petitioner Alfredo’s Motion for Reconsideration; and (3) the 11 April 2006 Resolution4 denying petitioner
Alfredo’s Second Motion for Reconsideration.5
Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 4 April 2005 Order6 of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-71-2004, which
denied petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. He prays that this Court certify "for review
with prayer for preliminary injunction to stop the writ of possession [of] the property located at Concepcion
Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-143715 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan [subject property] and after due hearing, let judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of the Honorable Regional Trial Court Branch 82, [City of Malolos,
Bulacan,] and the Court of Appeals as the law requires with costs."7
According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was constituted as a
Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. He and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle
(Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property to respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI)
whether before or after the subject property was constituted as their Family Home. It was Josefino Tagle
(Josefino), who was not the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI.
Josefino was religiously paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half
thereof. Josefino, however, passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume Josefino’s
outstanding mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner Alfredo was already paying Josefino’s mortgage
obligation in installments, respondent E-PCI still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property. 8
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly registered in the name
of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner
Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses Josefino and Emma Tagle with respondent E-PCI.
Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property upon default in payment by spouses
Josefino and Emma, and upon the expiration of the period of redemption, caused the consolidation and
transfer of the title to the subject property in its name. Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC
a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject property, which was docketed as LRC Case No.
P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the ground that the
subject property is a Family Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 9
On 4 April 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Stop Writ of Possession is hereby DENIED.
In the case at bar, the mortgage transaction happened on May 9, 1997 (Exhibit D), after the effectivity of
the Family Code.
With Article 155 in application, it is crystal clear that this instant case does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code, as the case stemmed from the mortgage transaction entered
into between the [herein respondent E-PCI] and [herein petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia] dating
back in (sic) 1997. This fact will militate against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion
embodied in said article. Hence, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by [petitioner Tagle and
his spouse Arsenia].10
Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its foregoing
order. However, it was likewise denied by the RTC in another Order11 dated 21 June 2005.
Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo12 elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari [and
Prohibition] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing
and seeking the nullification and the setting aside of the denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession.
In a Resolution dated 6 September 2005, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the petition, stating thus:
The instant petition is not accompanied by (i) the order denying petitioner’s motion to exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage; and (ii) a relevant and pertinent document, i.e., motion to exempt from foreclosure
of mortgage (Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED outright.13
In due time, petitioner Alfredo moved for the reconsideration of the afore-quoted Resolution.
On 16 February 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s motion
for reconsideration, decreeing that:
Petitioner [Alfredo] seeks reconsideration of Our resolution dated September 6, 2005 dismissing the petition
for not being accompanied by the order dated April 4, 2005 (denying his motion to exempt from foreclosure
mortgage) and motion to exempt from foreclosure of mortgage. Instead of the aforesaid order and motion,
however, petitioner submitted certified true copies of the order dated June 21, 2005 (which was already
attached to the petition) and motion to stop writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.14
Undaunted still, petitioner Alfredo once more filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s 16
February 2006 Resolution.
On 11 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the last of its Resolutions, denying, as expected,
petitioner Alfredo’s Second Motion for Reconsideration, stated in full below:
For consideration is petitioner’s [Alfredo’s] motion for reconsideration of Our February 16, 2006 resolution
denying its (sic) motion for reconsideration of Our resolution dated September 6, 2005 dismissing the
petition.
Appellant has not cured the formal defects of the petition noted in Our resolution dated September 6, 2005.
And, more importantly, a second motion for reconsideration of a final order is not allowed (Sec. 5, Rule 37,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Obando vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 673).
WHEREFORE, the subject motion for reconsideration is DENIED.15
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner Alfredo filed the instant petition designating it in both the caption and the body as one for
"certiorari" under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. He anchors the present petition on the sole issue
of "whether or not the subject property subject of the mortgage being a family home is exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage."16 He argues:
That from the records of the mortgage, the same was not constituted before or after the constitution of the
family home by the petitioner and as such the Honorable Court of Appeals has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the proceedings complained of.17
He thus prays for this Court to issue a preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ of
possession of the subject property, and after due hearing, render a judgment annulling or modifying the
proceedings before the RTC and the Court of Appeals, with costs.18
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI counters that the petition at bar must be dismissed on the following
grounds:
First, petitioner Alfredo’s "Petition for Certiorari" with this Court failed to comply with the technical
requirements of the Rules of Court19 for petitions for certiorari in that (a) the present petition was filed out
of time considering that the 60-day period within which to file the same was reckoned from receipt of the
11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s second Motion for Reconsideration, instead of the
16 February 2006 Resolution denying his first Motion for Reconsideration;20 (b) petitioner Alfredo did not
allege in the present petition that the Court of Appeals "acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"21 when it dismissed his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to attach thereto certified true copies of the 4 April 2005 RTC
Order denying his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession, as well as the very motion subject of the assailed
order; (c) the present petition lacks the proper verification and is considered an unsigned pleading which
produces no effect whatsoever;22 and (d) the present petition requested for the issuance of an injunction
without stating the grounds therefor.23
Second, petitioner Alfredo’s second Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Court of Appeals is
prohibited by law,24 as a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is clearly
disallowed by Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
And third, granting arguendo that the petition at bar was properly filed by petitioner Alfredo with this Court,
the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure
of petitioner Alfredo to submit the required documents.25
Respondent E-PCI then concludes that "the present Petition for Certiorari was filed not to question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals but as a vain hope of appealing the Order dated April 4, 2005 issued by
the Regional Trial Court x x x."26
In reply to the foregoing counter-arguments, petitioner Alfredo contends:
1. That Rule 52 Sec. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is not applicable to the present case because what is
applicable is a Second Motion for Reconsideration in the Supreme Court;
2. That the 60 day period within which petitioner [Alfredo] may file subject Petition for Certiorari has been
reckoned from April 11, 2006 denying the petitioner’s [Alfredo’s] Second Motion for Reconsideration and
the Rules of Court does not distinguished (sic) whether the denial is first or second;
xxxx
4. That the issue of whether or not the mortgage was executed before or after the constitution of the Family
Home is a necessary question in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; and
5. That the verification based on personal knowledge is proper because the Rules of Court did not distinguish
whether the facts is based on personal knowledge or an (sic) authentic records;27
For its substantive as well as procedural infirmities, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Given the above-stated arguments raised by both parties, the threshold question that must be initially
resolved is whether or not the present Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006.
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.28
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.29
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.30
The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority31 or want of
legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with
reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.32 "Excess of jurisdiction"
occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority;33 or results when an act,
though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general
power in respect of it are wanting.34 While that of "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.35
In the present case, there is no question that the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 is already a disposition on the merits.
Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the Resolutions dated 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006 denying
reconsideration thereof, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of CA-G.R.
SP No. 90461 by the appellate court, and which, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, are appealable
to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed
to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
the original case.36
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders.37 They were not interlocutory because the proceedings were
terminated; and left nothing more to be done by the appellate court. There were no remaining issues to be
resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo then
was to file before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and not a special civil action for certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for certiorari is
wanting, that is, there must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari from the
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a petition for certiorari.
Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved
party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.38 In this case, appeal was
not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.39 Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to show
circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available to him a petition for
certiorari in lieu of making an appeal.
Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason why the issue raised in his petition for certiorari could
not have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari. He simply argued that the appellate court gravely
abuse its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90461 and not finding that the subject property covered by the Writ of Possession was a Family
Home, hence, exempt from execution or forced sale. He did not give a single explanation as to why the
errors committed by the Court of Appeals cannot possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.40 Time and again this Court has
reminded members of the bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal41 where the latter remedy is available; especially if such loss or lapse was
occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.42
To be sure, once again, we take this opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(an appeal by certiorari) and a Petition for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original action for Certiorari),
under Rules 45 and 65, respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation,43 summarizes the distinctions between these two remedies, to wit:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
‘When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari.’
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the
law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake
of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review.
Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and
supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while
a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted
in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to
the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes
the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for
review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial
of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the
period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such
motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal
by certiorari, already a sufficient justification for dismissing the instant petition. But even if his present
petition is given due course, we still find it bereft of merit.
When the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, it did so on the
ground that petitioner Alfredo failed to attach certified true copies of the following: (1) the 4 April 2005
Order of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-71-2004 denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of
Possession; and (2) petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession submitted to the RTC. Suitably,
therefore, the proper issue which petitioner Alfredo should raise before this Court in his instant Petition for
Certiorari should be whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to attach thereto the pertinent documents.
In dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, the appellate court relied on Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation
to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 1 of Rule 6544 reads:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied.)
And Sec. 3 of Rule 4645 provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent
with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner and shall be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant
or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly-
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his
duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied
by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The afore-quoted provisions are plain and unmistakable. Failure to comply with the requirement that the
petition be accompanied by a duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or
ruling being challenged is sufficient ground for the dismissal of said petition. Consequently, it cannot be
said that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for non-compliance with Sec. 1, Rule 65,
in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice,46 this Court has, before,47 treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari;48 (2) when errors of judgment are averred; 49 and (3) when there
is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.50
But these exceptions are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial
or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. x x x.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of petitioner Alfredo in CA-G.R. SP No.
90461 by virtue of a Resolution dated 6 September 2005. Petitioner Alfredo’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the dismissal of his petition was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 16 February 2006.
Petitioner Alfredo thus had 15 days from receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
within which to file a petition for review. The reckoning date from which the 15-day period to appeal shall
be computed is the date of receipt by petitioner Alfredo of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, and not of its 11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s second motion for
reconsideration, since the second paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is explicit that
a second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed. And since a second motion for reconsideration is
not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner Alfredo made a critical mistake in waiting for the Court of Appeals to resolve his second motion
for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.
Another elementary rule of procedure is that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional. For this reason, petitioner Alfredo’s failure to file this petition within
15 days from receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his first Motion
for Reconsideration, rendered the same final and executory, and deprived us of jurisdiction to entertain an
appeal thereof.
The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify
the same. Try as we might, however, we fail to find the existence of such exceptional circumstances in this
case, and neither did petitioner Alfredo endeavour to prove the existence of any. In fact, there is total lack
of effort on petitioner Alfredo’s part to at least explain his inability to comply with the clear requisites of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Worth noting is the observation of respondent E-PCI that, essentially, petitioner Alfredo is using the present
Petition for Certiorari, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the 4 April 2005 Order of the RTC, and not
to assail the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. This he cannot validly do for it is an apparent
disregard of the proper exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court. We cannot overlook the ruling of the
Court of Appeals and proceed right away to a review of the RTC order, absent any error of judgment or
jurisdiction committed by the former.
All told, a perusal of the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals fail to illustrate any reversible
error, much less, a showing of any iota of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court, to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in the case at bar. Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our
disquisition above, without need of further delving deeper into the facts and issues raised by petitioner
Alfredo in this Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction, we hereby dismiss the instant
petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as his failure to sufficiently
show that the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16 February 2006 and 11 April
2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner
Alfredo Tagle.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment in absentia
and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 4, 2007
Resolution4 and the September 4, 2007 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R. No. 144332 and promulgated on
June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 705, otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s counsel informed the trial court that
petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC,
however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled.11 The
dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela
Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum period
to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum period. Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest
against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the
factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. On the basis of the
evidence on record, accused Efren S. Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against
him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence of the accused Ila and Lloren,
duly assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete records
of this case be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court in a Resolution
dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied by this Court
in its March 28, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s September 8,
1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006
Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation25 of the September 8,
1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari28 with
the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in its September 4, 2007
Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the charge against him passed
the requisite conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner was valid despite
the absence of the petitioner and regardless of petitioner’s intention to be present at the promulgation of the
Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted petitioner
Almuete in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars further proceedings and that to do so
would constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-promulgation is in order, the denial
being based on an inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative Order No. 16-93).32
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly convicted by the RTC because his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial and
hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck containing the lumber.34 Thus, he
contends that his earlier acquittal by the CA was proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed
without violating the principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment against him since it was made
in his absence.37 He insists that he had a valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the judgment
as he was suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and thus, was advised to
rest.38 He also claims that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for Repromulgation was not proper.39 Hence, a
repromulgation of the judgment should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40
Respondent’s Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues and arguments raised by petitioner
may no longer be entertained as these have been addressed in People v. Court of Appeals,41 which is already
the "law of the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed
under Section 643 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s
Motion for Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioner’s right has prescribed,46 as the same
should have been filed within 15 days from the time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8,
1998 Decision instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction, respondent recommends that the penalty
be modified by reducing the same to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY SUPREME COURT OR COURT
OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in criminal cases after their
judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
attention is invited to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases, differs from that
prescribed for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the
signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the
parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The
Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in relation to section 17 of Rule 120
(now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter,
the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that "the certified
copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53,
not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment against
him," it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that
accused or his attorney had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended,
of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51)," and that the duty of the court of first instance in
respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the
court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for "promulgation" of the judgment
of the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized
surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict was
already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance
from the station of the court. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the
convict is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment
order so that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison
facility for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall
immediately order the bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter
issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the
execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for
promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in
criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion
for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of
Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision
must likewise fail as this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this
Court has explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because petitioner’s absence was
unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision
despite the absence of petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained finality. In fact, an Entry of
Judgment was made by this Court on February 15, 2005.
Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by the CA as it was made with
grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed
because "the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and
discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari
instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused, respondents herein, guilty of the crime
charged based on the evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and 305 of the Revised Penal
Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of the promulgation
of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the
right to appeal, by writ of error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal
of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners
could question the findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as
the penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or
unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the
respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits.
They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay and based on mere
inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It
behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its
conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly
insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of the crime
charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its
authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of
the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of
error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity.
If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise
the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void.
The lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In this case, the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law,
it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent
Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court’s decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision has long prescribed.
Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to an appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the penalty imposed
by the RTC in its September 8, 1998 Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case is an offshoot of
G.R. No. 144332 which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty,
be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article 310 which
is two degrees higher than those specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty
prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation
or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these
circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that which is
prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods57 should be imposed in its maximum period58
plus an additional one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000 pesos in excess of ₱22,000.00 or three more
years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed
by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest court of the land, rendered it."60
However, this Court has suspended the application of this rule based on certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of
the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s
findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of
imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law.
Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere
between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice
demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its
own Rules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x
Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice."62
Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s "primordial and most important duty
is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed notwithstanding the finality of
the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel Barro (Joel) were charged
with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice
of appeal. Joel failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial court’s Decision insofar as
Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In the Court’s Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal
filed by Benigno and Florin was found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards Joel, the
penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the range"66 of the penalty prescribed for the offense.
Consequently, the Court modified the penalty imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already
become final and executory. The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty
for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight years which
is within the medium period (6 years 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The
trial court erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the
range of said penalty. The records show that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed
on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty
imposed on the accused can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason
being that, said penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power
of the Court to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa. While the trial was pending,
petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during the promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent.
Two years later, or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s
Decision. The same was denied for having been filed out of time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA which was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before this Court. In its
Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that petitioner’s trial in absentia was proper; that she was
not denied due process; and that the denial by the trial court of her motion for reconsideration was proper
as the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. However, the Court noted that the penalty imposed
by the trial court (which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as maximum) on petitioner was erroneous.
As computed by the Court, considering that the amount defrauded is only ₱68,700.00, the proper minimum
imposable penalty should only be within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of prision correccional in its
minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium period"69 while the proper
maximum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8 months and 21 days and 12
years of prision mayor in its maximum period."70 Hence, notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s
Decision, the Court modified the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also modified the penalty imposed on the
petitioner notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision based on the observation that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range prescribed by law. The Court
ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of the trial court that must be
rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional one day on the
maximum period of arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of
said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month and one day to six months. Adding one
day to the maximum penalty will place it within the range of prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years, four months and one day of
prision correccional is also incorrect as it is outside the range of the penalty imposable in this case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed
by law as it is within the Court’s duty and inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be
in accordance with the law and nothing else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to
the petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying the penalty imposed, it is not
reopening the case; neither is it saying that there was error in judgment. In the same manner, in this case,
we are not reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:
x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to Gatward, the penalty inflicted by
the court a quo was a nullity because it was never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties
which consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms and
unknown in penal law. Without intending to sound sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the
indivisible penalties of public censure, or perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in their
minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting a penalty higher or lower than
the one imposable under the law but with both penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid
punishments. An erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment. But a judgment which ordains
a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the
roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of the penalty and
does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final
and executory.1âwphi1
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case was reopened in order that a
higher penalty may be imposed on him. There is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is
being affirmed but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law,
pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not been changed since what was
decreed by the trial court and is now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an elemental form which is non-existent
in and not authorized by law. Just as the penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused,
neither has it been increased so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the imposition upon him of the corrected
duration, inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence
with an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal
protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the nullification,
not only of the judgment and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served.
Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial and corrective measures interposed by
this opinion protect him against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period
of imprisonment.74

Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor General prayed for the modification
of the imposable penalty.75

Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the favorable
modification of the penalty should likewise apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to appeal.77

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the September 4, 2007 Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons stated
above, the September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The
accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164153 June 13, 2011
JOHN ANTHONY B. ESPIRITU, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact for Westmont Investment
Corporation, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Golden Era Holdings, Inc., and
Exchange Equity Corporation, Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL N. TANKIANSEE and JUANITA U. TAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted
by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Where a party’s
petition for certiorari and subsequent appeal seek to achieve one and the same purpose, there is forum
shopping which is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the certiorari petition.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s February 27,
2004 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76518 which affirmed the February 4,2 February 17,3 and February
26,4 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 02-103160, and the
June 22, 2004 Resolution5 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On March 25, 2002, John Anthony B. Espiritu, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Westmont Investment
Corporation, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Golden Era Holdings, Inc., and Exchange
Equity Corporation (Espiritu Group) and Tony Tan Caktiong and William Tan Untiong (Tan Group) filed
a Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management and Control6 with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against United Overseas Bank Limited, United Overseas Bank Philippines, Manta
Ray Holdings, Inc., Wee Cho Chaw, Wee Ee Cheong, Samuel Poon Hon Thang, Ong Sea Eng, Chua Ten
Hui, Wang Lian Khee and Marianne Malate-Guerrero (UOBP Group). The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-103160 and raffled to Branch 46.
On June 27, 2002, Manuel N. Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan, joined by Farmix Fertilizer Corp., and
Pearlbank Securities, Inc. (intervenors), filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-In-Intervention.7
On July 26, 2002, the UOBP Group filed their Answer Ad Cautelam with Counterclaim against intervenors,
and Cross-claim against the Espiritu and Tan Groups.
On September 16, 2002, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed their Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Answer to the
cross-claim of the UOBP Group.
On October 4, 2002, the intervenors filed a Motion for Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents
against the UOBP Group.
On October 14, 2002, the intervenors filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of John
Anthony B. Espiritu, Tony Tan Caktiong and Chua Teng Hui. A similar notice was sent to Wee Cho Yaw.
All the aforementioned parties opposed the taking of their depositions via separate Motions for Protective
Order and/or Objection to Resort to Discoveries on the ground that resort to discovery procedure was already
time-barred.
In an Order dated October 29, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for production of documents and notice
to take depositions because, as modes of discovery, the same were filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.
Subsequently, the intervenors filed a Motion for Clarification. On November 25, 2002, the trial court
reversed its previous ruling and granted the intervenors’ motion for production of documents and notice to
take depositions. Thereafter, the Espiritu, Tan and UOBP Groups sought reconsideration of this order.
However, on December 18, 2002, the trial court denied the same and maintained that resort to discovery is
permissible under the premises.
Following suit, the Espiritu and Tan Groups attempted to resort to discovery procedure. On January 31,
2003, they filed a Notice to Take Depositions Upon Oral Examination of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita
U. Tan.8
Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
On February 4, 2003, the trial court issued the first questioned order which, among others, disallowed the
taking of the depositions of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan.9 It held that the taking of the subject
depositions is time-barred. Meanwhile, in view of the November 25 and December 18, 2002 Orders of the
trial court allowing the deposition-taking of John Anthony B. Espiritu and Tony Tan Caktiong, on February
7, 2003, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed a Motion for the Issuance of Protective Orders.10 On February
17, 2003, the trial court issued the second questioned order which denied the said motion.11 Upon motion,
on February 26, 2003, the trial court issued the third questioned order which modified the February 17, 2003
Order by canceling the deposition of John Anthony B. Espiritu until further notice and resetting the
deposition of Tony Tan Caktiong to a later date.12
On April 14, 2003, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed a petition for certiorari13 before the Court of Appeals
challenging the validity of the February 4, 17, and 26, 2003 Orders for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for
certiorari. It ruled that the Espiritu and Tan Groups failed to adduce evidence to establish that they filed the
notice of deposition within the period provided under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
on Intra-Corporate Controversies. Moreover, the failure of a party to avail himself of modes of discovery
does not operate to deprive him of the right to present his case because evidentiary matters may be presented
before the court through pleadings and testimonies of the parties.
From this adverse decision, only the Espiritu Group (petitioners) appealed to this Court.
Meanwhile, while this case was pending resolution before the appellate court or on February 2, 2004, the
trial court rendered a Decision14 in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From this judgment,
petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of appeal.15 This case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 and is pending resolution before the appellate court. For its part,
petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Notice Of Appeal16 and
a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.17 On December 15, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring
the Court of Appeals to elevate the complete records of CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 to this Court.
Issues
1. Whether the disallowance of the deposition-taking of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan (Tankiansee
Group) is contrary to the mandate of liberality in the availment and interpretation of the Rules on
Discovery.18
2. Whether petitioners were deprived due process when they were denied resort to the modes of discovery.19
3. Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.20
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend that, in disallowing the deposition of Manuel N. Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan, the trial
court violated the liberality in the availment and interpretation of the Rules on Discovery. Moreover, the
trial court failed to consider that the allowance of the deposition would not prejudice any party because, at
the time the notices of deposition were served, no party had yet actually availed himself of and/or conducted
any discovery proceeding. They emphasize that the testimonies of the intended deponents are crucial to
establish their just claims in the main case.
Petitioners further argue that the Tankiansee Group was allowed to avail itself of the modes of discovery
despite the fact that the latter filed their pleadings beyond the period allowed under the Interim Rules
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. They claim that the trial court erroneously counted the 15-day
period. In truth, both petitioners and the Tankiansee Group availed themselves of the modes of discovery
beyond the 15-day period. In effect, the trial court denied petitioners the very same right it granted the
Tankiansee Group.
Petitioners also note that after the submission of the respective pre-trial briefs in the main case, the trial
court rendered judgment without conducting hearings. Hence, they were denied the right to fully present
their case because they were unable to make use of the testimonies of the intended deponents. Petitioners
plead that it is not yet too late to rectify this injustice by allowing the subject depositions because the
aforesaid summary judgment has been challenged in the meantime in various proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents claim that petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. On February 2, 2004, the trial court
rendered a summary judgment in the main case, i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160. Petitioners, except petitioner
Westmont Investment Corporation, thereafter filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner Westmont Investment
Corporation chose to file an ex abundanti ad cautelam notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. All three cases seek to annul the February 2, 2004 Decision of the trial court.
According to respondents, the present recourse has the same objective, that is, to reopen the trial court’s
February 2, 2004 Decision which is pending review before the Court of Appeals. Considering that
petitioners have a commonality of interest, the splitting of the causes of action on the same cause is
tantamount to forum shopping.
Moreover, respondents argue that the notices of deposition filed by petitioners are time-barred. Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies provides that a party can only avail
himself of any of the modes of discovery not later than 15 days from the joinder of issues. According to the
respondents, the joinder of issues occurred on September 29, 2002 after the lapse of the period for the filing
of the last responsive pleading of the parties to this case. However, petitioners filed their notices of
deposition only on January 31, 2003. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying their resort to modes of
discovery.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners’ appeal before the Court of Appeals is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and the certiorari
petition, subject matter of this case, constitutes forum shopping.
As stated earlier, while this case was pending review before the Court of Appeals or on February 2, 2004,
the trial court rendered a Decision in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From this judgment,
petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of appeal. This case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 and is now pending resolution before the appellate court. For its part,
petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Notice Of Appeal and a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
With these developments, the instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners’ appeal before the
appellate court is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and (2) the certiorari petition, subject matter of this
case, constitutes forum shopping. This is in consonance with our ruling in Ley Construction & Development
Corporation v. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation.21
In Ley Construction & Development Corporation, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against respondent. Subsequently, petitioner served notices to take the depositions of several
individuals. Initially, the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioner to take the subject depositions.
However, it later issued another order canceling all the depositions set for hearing in order not to delay the
prompt disposition of the case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
questioning the trial court’s order canceling the deposition-taking which allegedly deprived it of its due
process right to discovery. While this certiorari petition was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court issued a resolution in the main case which dismissed the complaint for specific performance and
damages. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the certiorari petition. On appeal to this Court by
petitioner from the dismissal of its certiorari petition, we ruled that –
Second, the Petition for Certiorari was superseded by the filing, before the Court of Appeals, of a subsequent
appeal docketed as CA-GR CV No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the two Orders. In this light,
there was no more reason for the CA to resolve the Petition for Certiorari.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only when
"there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the availability
of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. As the Court
has held, these two remedies are "mutually exclusive."
In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate remedy
because it assails not only the Resolution but also the two Orders.
It has been held that "what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies." The Court is satisfied that the denial of
the Petition for Certiorari by the Court of Appeals will not result in a failure of justice, for petitioner’s rights
are adequately and, in fact, more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
Third, petitioner’s submission that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect is in fact an
admission that the two actions are one and the same. Thus, in arguing that the reversal of the two
interlocutory Orders "would likely result in the setting aside of the dismissal of petitioner’s amended
complaint," petitioner effectively contends that its Petition for Certiorari, like the appeal, seeks to set aside
the Resolution and the two Orders.
Such argument unwittingly discloses a recourse to forum shopping, which has been held as "the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition." Clearly, by its own submission, petitioner seeks to accomplish
the same thing in its Petition for Certiorari and in its appeal: both assail the two interlocutory Orders and
both seek to set aside the RTC Resolution.
Hence, even assuming that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect because it would lead to the
reversal of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint, it would still be denied on the ground of forum
shopping.22
In the same vein, petitioners’ certiorari petition, questioning the three interlocutory orders which denied
their resort to discovery procedure, has been superseded by the filing of their subsequent appeal before the
Court of Appeals (i.e., CA-G.R. CV No. 83161). As explained above, a certiorari petition may only be
availed of if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."23
We find that petitioners’ appeal from the February 2, 2004 Decision of the trial court in the main case is the
appropriate and adequate remedy in this case as it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory orders and the
decision in the main case.
Moreover, petitioners’ appeal and certiorari petition effectively seek to annul the February 2, 2004 Decision
of the trial court. In their pending appeal before the appellate court, petitioners argued, among others, that
they were unduly deprived of their right to avail of modes of discovery, specifically, the deposition taking
subject matter of this case.24 This is one of their arguments in their appeal which prays for the annulment
of the February 2, 2004 Decision on due process grounds.25 On the other hand, petitioners argued in their
certiorari petition that the disallowance of the taking of the subject depositions deprived them of the
opportunity to bring to fore crucial evidence determinative of this case. According to petitioners, this
brought about the erroneous February 2, 2004 Decision issued by the trial court.26 In fine, the appeal and
certiorari petition raise similar arguments and effectively seek to achieve the same purpose of annulling the

February 2, 2004 Decision which petitioners perceive to be in gross error. Thus, as in Ley Construction &
Development Corporation, the certiorari petition must perforce be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 27, 2004 Decision and June 22, 2004 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76518 are AFFIRMED.

The records of CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 are RETURNED to the Court of Appeals which is ORDERED to
resolve the aforesaid case with reasonable dispatch.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011
Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action1
and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario
and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by
the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA in its
assailed Decision are as follows:
The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in
Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry
of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land
by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its
possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof.
In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of
said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its
possession and occupancy of said land.5
On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint
contains, among others, the following significant allegations:
3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City
and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the
Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex
"A".
4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.
xxxx
7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual
or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.
8. But [plaintiffs’] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs
made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.
xxxx
10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to fail and
refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject
premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently,
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the
owners thereof.7
Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:
3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect that the
defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using
the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant
corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two
long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4
of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the
matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors
hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general
welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere
in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its avowed aims
and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a beautiful
auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation "shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from
any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease" (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2"
hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;
xxxx
5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth
being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement,
photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2" and made integral parts hereof, entered
into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of
the subject property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;
xxxx
8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant refused
to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the
allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are
neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant;
xxxx
As and by way of –
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:
12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.
The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having
acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly,
the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property
covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil
Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of
the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "3"), the
plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas.
Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the
City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant
foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal
right to have possession of the subject property;9
After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on October
20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show
that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for
"Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529" docketed
as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Subsequently, on
October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondent’s Motion. In the said Order,
the MTCC held that:
The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of the City of
Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between the
plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased
by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the
possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by
it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease
according to its terms and pursuant to law.
The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to the
present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981
executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.
Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist;
rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the
said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did
merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.
When the parties’ pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have
been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting a
trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination,
either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule
35, Rules of Court.
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the
plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d]
it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make
representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s]
have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.
Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.
xxxx
Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and possession of the
subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements
with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition
of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.
That the defendant’s possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the
defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired
said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant
foundation’s occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyer’s immediate
possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of
the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to be
untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-
spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the
plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9, 2004 affirming the
MTCC Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision13 dated
April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated
November 15, 2005.
Issues
Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in
interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,
II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute judicial admissions.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without
their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property, developed
the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to
make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondent’s
possession of subject property is only by tolerance.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x
"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the
introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with."17 Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions
of the plaintiff and binding upon him."18 "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader."19
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject property
without their consent and authority and that respondent’s use of the land was without any contractual or
legal basis.
Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.
In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that "what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought."
complaint is one for forcible entry – that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who
has entered without right."34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners
alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception.35
Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in
petitioners’ Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the
proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for
unlawful detainer.
Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from
the time of dispossession.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject
vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit: property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time
of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means respondent.
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said order
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior of dismissal.
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated
in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.
termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.23
SO ORDERED.
"The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ shall include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom."24 "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right."25

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."26 The employment of force, in this
case, can be deduced from petitioners’ allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the
subject property without their consent and authority.1avvphi1

"‘Stealth,’ on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain
entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"27 while strategy connotes the
employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.28 The CA found that
based on the petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, "respondent’s entry on the land of the petitioners
was by stealth x x x."29 However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing
in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the
petitioners as shown by petitioners’ allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind
the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff’s nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now
the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who
transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their
property."30 To this Court’s mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not
for unlawful detainer.

"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab
initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject
property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows
that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’
G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012
RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner,
vs.
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 dated 08
January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution2 dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein
petitioner.
The Factual Antecedents
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on
the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City
covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with
technical descriptions as follows:
1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in
the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand
seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.
2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon,
situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty
thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of
Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz,
father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the
latter being relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from
his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's
father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration
of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied Lot
No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the
plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being
his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as
owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising
their rights of ownership thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that
the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No.
11711.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion
of said decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC, by
instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth Division
dismissed his appeal.4 It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed
properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner
was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both
documents were notarized shortly after their execution.5 The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed
at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,6 resulted in the issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed
with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.7
Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real
property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance
by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in
the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the appellate court
concluded that respondents’ possession of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner –
petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of ownership.8
The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to respondents as early as
1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust
respondents from the subject properties.9 The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered
owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to the unregistered
Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the
inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents’
unregistered deed.10 In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents’ possession was "not ...
anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the
complaint for ejectment must fail."11 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch
XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal ownership of
petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right to possession.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT
TO POSSESSION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.13
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the parties has the
right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-
12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
properties?
The Court's Ruling
We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature of an
ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the
issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful
detainer case.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an
ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has
not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court."14 In ejectment
proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises,
possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.15
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and
binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.16
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties as owners,
having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971.
Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners
and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership,
contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under
the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner
and consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which
necessarily includes possession.17 Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject
properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the
appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature
of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open
and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,18 which has facts and legal issues identical to those of the
instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed
property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property claimed
ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two
parties had the better right to possess the subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to possession
of the disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the
facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens
Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims.
The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this country
because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and
until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law,
the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the
Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes
of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was
guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of
petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 19
The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel20 and in
Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,21 wherein we consistently held the age-old rule "that
the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."22
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case
against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in
continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by
mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents
from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.
Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,23 which reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible
entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts
resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property
is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by mere tolerance of
petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person’s
withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the
expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or
implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally
lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts
of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject properties was
by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established
when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful – a requisite for a valid cause of action in
an unlawful detainer case.
In Canlas v. Tubil,24 we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful
detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face
to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last
demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant
the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have
consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since
their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly
dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the disputed
properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he
acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the
issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand,
continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action
to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action
to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of
respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals 25 :
(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired
a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the
operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land,
his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens system
cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis
supplied.]
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead of the
Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner’s father to respondents
cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction.
We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980
registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of
fraud" 26 on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title
of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.1âwphi1
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.27
Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.28 It is a well-established doctrine that the
title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.29 Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be
decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on
petitioner's title is proscribed.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in relation
to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's
Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot
resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.1âwphi1 The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag
City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner – are AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169594 July 20, 2011
BIENVENIDO BARRIENTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO RAPAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April 29, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68482, and the Resolution2 dated September 1, 2005
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:
On April 15, 1988, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square meter parcel of land located at No. 2
Misamis St., Luzviminda Village, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, from one Antonio Natavio via a
notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The said parcel of land was said to be a portion of the estate
of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4136.
Thereafter, respondent constructed a semi-concrete house on the lot and took actual possession of the
property by himself and through his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.
Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed petitioner Bienvenido Barrientos and his family to stay on the subject
property as caretakers on the condition that petitioner shall vacate the premises when respondent would
need the property. However, when respondent demanded petitioner to vacate the subject property, the last
of which was made on July 14, 1997, petitioner refused to leave the lot. The parties later underwent barangay
conciliations, but to no avail.
Thus, on April 13, 1998, respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 19889.
On February 21, 2000, after submission of the parties' respective position papers, the trial court rendered a
Decision3 in favor of the respondent, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff entitled to
the prayer sought and hereby orders defendant to:
1. vacate and all persons claiming under him that house structure located at No. 2 Misamis Street,
Luzviminda Village, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City;
2. pay plaintiff the sum of ₱3,000.00 per month, as compensation for the use of said house structure
beginning July 14, 1997 until he vacated the place; and
3. pay plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fee plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the Decision of the MeTC and resolved in favor of
petitioner, reasoning that respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in question.5
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.
The court finds no basis to award any counterclaim.6
Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the CA assigning the following errors committed by the RTC,
to wit:
1. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the petitioner has not shown any prior
lawful possession of the property in question.
2. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the respondent and his family who were
merely invited to live in the house out of Christian charity and human compassion, has possessory rights
over the same lot and house.
3. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in injecting the issue of ownership over the lot.
4. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the petitioner has propositioned himself as
an awardee-grantee of the property in question.7
On April 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision8 reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating
the decision of the MeTC, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the extant Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 92-Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered REINSTATING the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 39-
Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.9
In ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA touched upon the issue of ownership since both claimed
ownership over the disputed property. The CA found that both parties presented weak evidence of
ownership. Hence, the CA determined who between the parties was first in possession and concluded that
respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,10 but it was denied in the Resolution11 dated September
1, 2005.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
WHETHER THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE INITIALLY RESOLVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION.
II
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE A TRANSFER OF
POSSESSORY RIGHT CAN PREVAIL OVER THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AND
THE LATTER'S ACTUAL POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY.12
Petitioner maintains that he has a better right over the subject property as against the respondent. Petitioner
insists that even assuming arguendo that the subject property was registered in the name of the Rapal family
and occupied by him as caretaker, this only bolsters his claim that he has been in actual occupation of the
property. Moreover, petitioner contends that since respondent's claim of ownership was derived from a void
title, he did not have a better right to possess the property as opposed to by the petitioner who actually
occupied the same.
Petitioner points out that he was even awarded a Certificate of Project Qualification by the Office of the
President through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. Petitioner argues that since
the property in controversy is a government property, it is the government through the National Government
Center (NGC) that can award the same to qualified beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 9207, or the
National Government Center Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003, which it in fact did when he was
given a Certificate of Project Qualification.
On his part, respondent argues that the CA did not commit any reversible error by ruling in his favor,
considering that the CA initially looked into the issue of ownership only for the purpose of determining who
between the parties has a better right to possess the subject property. In addition, petitioner failed to
substantiate that he has a better right to possess the subject property.
The petition is without merit.
xxxx
But considering Our preceeding (sic) findings and the fact that the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification
Form submitted by the respondent himself bears no indication that it was tampered, We are inclined to
believe the version maintained by the petitioner. The mark "CARETAKER" purports what it explicitly
states; that is, Bienvenido C. Barrientos was only a caretaker of the subject lot.

Ejectment cases – forcible entry and unlawful detainer – are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
party's title to the property is questionable.13 In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same
in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.14
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent were claiming ownership over the subject property. Hence,
the CA correctly touched upon the issue of ownership only to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the subject property.
True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and respondent presented weak evidence of ownership.
Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over the subject property on the strength of a notarized
Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. The subject land, however, was said
to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136, which this Court has declared null and void in the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals15 as such, respondent could not derive any right therefrom.
Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a better right to possess the property on
the fact the he is in actual possession of the property and that he was awarded a Certificate of Project
Qualification by the Office of the President through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council. However, although petitioner claimed ownership over the subject lot, he failed to adduce sufficient
evidence therefor, or even sufficient reason on the manner by which he acquired ownership.
Consequently, and taking into consideration the great number of affidavits and evidence in favor of the
petitioner, We find that the petitioner was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.16
Thus, based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be deduced that petitioner's occupation of
the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the
lot as a caretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact in his Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form.
Moreover, all other supporting evidence, such as the Census Survey Certificate17 and construction material
receipts,18 bolster the fact that respondent was in prior possession of the property before petitioner entered
the same by mere tolerance of the respondent.
Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, since
petitioner's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against them.19
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are
designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public
order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on
questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
April 29, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 1, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68482, are AFFIRMED.

Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but just and proper for the CA to have reminded the courts a SO ORDERED.
quo to have settled the case by restricting their resolution to the basic issue of possession.

From the various evidence submitted by the respondent, it can be clearly inferred that respondent is entitled
to the possession of the subject lot. As aptly found by the CA:

To recall, in its (sic) Answer, respondent (defendant herein) alleged:

4. That defendant also DENIES the allegations in paragraphs 6 and 7 of complaint, the truth of the matter
being that defendant is the exclusive occupant of said lot since 1989 and that he built thereon a residential
house from his own resources as a consequence of which he has been registered as the qualified beneficiary
of the property as is (sic) indicated in the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form issued by the
National Government Center – Housing Project on August 18, 1997, copy attached as ANNEX "C" hereof.
(Answer, p. 2; Records, p. 167) (Emphasis supplied)

Going over Annex "C" (records, p. 24) or the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form which bears
TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1, Our attention was caught by the words "CARETAKER" written on the top of the
entry BIENVENIDO/GLORIA BARRIENTOS.

We also find, appended to petitioner's Reply to Answer with Special Defense and Counterclaim (records p.
50), a Census Survey Certificate that bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1 with a notation "Registered to Rapal
family."
G.R. No. 194880 June 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both represented
by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs.
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which
ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are registered
co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City,
and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition
is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294
square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by
petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.2 Petitioners are
being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked
with the administration and disposal of government assets.3 Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which
had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,4 petitioners leased the four
parcels of land, including the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc.,
(TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the
Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of
the four parcels of land.6
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar
through several sublease agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements commenced
on different dates, all of them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether
set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s main lease contract with petitioners, but
subject to renewal at the option of respondent:8
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable] months commencing
on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.9
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed "to return or surrender
the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract
or any renewal or extension thereof."10
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting of several
commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces
on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine
Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed
by TRCFI.13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to
exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate
and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same
desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had already been sent
to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.16 It further explained that the proposal of respondent
for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments
be accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of
any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC – through Atty.
Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel – notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to
renew the contract of lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores
likewise notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The Republic reasoned
that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to
the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed
respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with
respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject
property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property
to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property
within thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,25 but
failed to vacate and remained on the property.26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15
days.27 When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued to
occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair rental value of
the subject property and petitioners’ lost income – a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to
vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements.28 Using the
market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was ₱
10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of ₱ 630,123,700 from 01
January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to
vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after proper proceedings,
judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons, natural
and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with
the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages
in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (₱ 630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the
subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the
subject property, together with its improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the
plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of petitioners in the
Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between
them.31 In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more properly an accion
publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the petitioners’
supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed respondent
Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’ Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its Answer35 to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule
65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss.37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and
reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari
against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the
certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an exception
to the general rule on summary proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was
subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded,
and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari Petition, the
RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for
lack of jurisdiction.43 The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case
was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December
2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful
detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
I Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of Appeals57 to justify a certiorari
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues that merit
preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have
availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the
Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by petitioners to
the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action
without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless,
the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved.47 This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to
wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review
under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal
is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.50 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to
entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit.
At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more
specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition
against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a
question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the
instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for the RTC to
have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure
expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed
RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order
issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough,
and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.53 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the
RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC
not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the
merits.
review by the RTC owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar
and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure – conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-
Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built
a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to
file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer
in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed
three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of
his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in
January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a
duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the
landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since
a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC,
however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the
Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not
prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no
other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable
by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the
Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section
36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary
procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief is
made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault
or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed
may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC,
or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the
RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of
MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx 58 (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case,
the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall
have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In
response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory
order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was
upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for
certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived
of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an interlocutory
order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the ‘sorry
spectacle’ of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often
as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress."
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for
certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of
which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" in the
procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances,
the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of
cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section
36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.
In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely
to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances
in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.59
(Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are not
comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the
present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari
may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, the
subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an
interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation
of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the
instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case
before a summary judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify
respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial
of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should
have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari
Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited.
The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage
of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would constrain this
Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the
benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be
regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition
against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be
inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court
and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition – whether the Complaint filed by
petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion
publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year
requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the unlawful
withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners
argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February 2009 of the
Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately
taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the
main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC.

The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence,
reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration of the right to hold possession may – by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one
year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.60 Unless
otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in
the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.61
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,62 the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an unlawful
detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over
which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within one year
from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following
elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination
of the latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s
enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the Complaint for ejectment.63
"On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should
be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one
of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana."64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for unlawful
detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its sublease
agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on
31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued
occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners
made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the
fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period should
be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted
from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to
vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. "Such
one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real
property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful."66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.67 In
Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the
one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint – filed on 25 February 1997 – from the latest demand
letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property located at K-J
Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment
identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C without paying
any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because their possession is not de
facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had
elapsed from respondent’s demand given on "July 3, 1995" when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who
are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer
is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor
has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the one year
reglementary period.69 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003), respondent
Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal
of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was
allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners – petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvar’s
possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful
occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is "necessarily bound
by an implied promise" that it "will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them."70 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should
have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which
to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the
MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008, which could
have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be
deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its
occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave
respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance.
Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must
be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original
demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit,
considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.71 If the subsequent
demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence
an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.72 However, respondent failed to raise in any of
the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is
now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or
reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the
present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.

The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the expiration
of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners
from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court.
Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a decade has passed without any resolution
of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of
expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant
Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of
the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime
property of the government located in the country’s business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by
petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the Privatization
Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil
Case No. 98708.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012
FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO,
LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA,
BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA
CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE
ESCASINAS, GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA, EDUARDO
EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA, NILA LEBATO,
ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR.,
FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE,
CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, VILLAR,
JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision1
dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of Appeals’ decision
reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 257, and of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77, by dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s
complaint for ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo,
Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo
Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa,
Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera, Eduardo Evardone,
Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon
Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo Pacate,
Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos, Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, John
Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioner’s cause of action was not for unlawful
detainer but for recovery of possession. The appellate court affirmed this decision in its resolution of August
22, 2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters, located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased the property to the petitioner.
Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period upon mutual agreement
of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby
transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be
responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood
however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be
recovered from the occupants.5 (Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the petitioner demanded
in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly rental of
P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment
case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then brought the
dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to File Action on March
1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint, incorporating the proceedings before the
barangay before the summons and copies of the complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject
property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected
their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed to vacate the property
without legal justification. He prayed that the court order the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to
pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999 until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay
him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of the land long
before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua
Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The respondents also presented a Deed of Assignment,14
dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual
and moral damages for the filing of a baseless and malicious suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were submitted, the MeTC
resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 of January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the
respondents had no right to possess the land and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance.
It further noted that the respondents could no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already
been settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title
before the RTC, Branch 260, of Parañaque City, which ruled that the registered owner’s title was genuine
and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction over the case because of the
respondents’ assertion of ownership of the property. On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents
to vacate the premises and to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month
from the date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the
costs of suit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that no legal basis exists for the
petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by tolerance, "where the possession of the defendants was illegal
at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be no tolerance."16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision17 on October 8, 2003,
reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right
to file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land by mere tolerance and their possession
became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that
the complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or within one year after the unlawful deprivation
took place. It cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its
ruling that a case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that the
respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance
not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance entailed
permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that
the respondents unlawfully entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was
not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents’ allegation that they had been
in possession of the land before the petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having
been in possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an
ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the only issue to be
resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the
other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of
lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch
257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended
complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution23
of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises before us the following issues:
I matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON
RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT
WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS TO
AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be
filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as
his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, the defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate
the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the
unlawful withholding of possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these
allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or
the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in support of his unlawful
detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and registered
in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.
xxxx
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected
their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff referred the
premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to vacate the
premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the requirements for unlawful detainer.
In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was
permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the start and
was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s
subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful
even before the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the
unlawful withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the
alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents occupied the premises by
mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however,
shows when the respondents entered the property or who had granted them permission to enter. Without
these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s definition and characterizes
"tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness
or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material
injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "they are
acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits
others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from
a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired
by prescription." Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the
possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part
of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces
itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must have been present at the
beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer
as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s possession was merely
tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject property was unlawful
from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when a complaint is silent
regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v.
Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant immediately occupied the subject property after its
sale to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation
of the premises was by mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they
did not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of
the property by the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the property was unlawful
at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later
sought to be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation of the premises has not been proven,
the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment
case should have been for forcible entry — an action that had already prescribed, however, when the
Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is
reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack of knowledge of the
defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant of permission, but
proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the
unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally wanting as to when and under what circumstances
xxx the alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical possession of the
premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up to the present. For sure, the petitioners
merely derived their alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their having been in possession of the property at
one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the
owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint which fails to
positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a
case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start of
possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit
it to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior
court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,
then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in
the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number
of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior
court — upon plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land.
Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the respondents of possession over a
property that they have held for at least eight years before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a summary
proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations or
evidence to support it.
There was no change in the
respondents’ theory during
the appeal that would amount
to a deprivation of the petitioner’s
right to due process.
The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC the fact that their
occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the
property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true owner of the property in question; (3)
the petitioner’s lease contract was not legally enforceable; (4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-
interest; (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical possession of the property; and (6) the
respondents’ right of possession was based on the "Deed of Assignment of Real Property" executed by
Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on appeal before the RTC. They argue that this
constitutes a change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered
by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally
the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to
present evidence in connection with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and
fair play.39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not applicable to the present
case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the essential
requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land,
it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required to properly allege and
prove when the respondents entered the property and that it was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any
other persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it
was not the respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the case but the petitioner’s contradictory statements
in his amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always questioned
the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents negated
the possibility of their possession of the property under the petitioner and his lessor’s tolerance when the
respondents alleged to have occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired the property in 1991.
They said as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed property, as when he became
an owner of the 1,919 square meters property described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already been
occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already
occupants/possessors of the property from where they are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed
LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession
and that the same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the
court to restore possession regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO
CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical possession of the property where
DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA
SING got his fake title to the property.42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their possession was based on the
Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they
considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their transactions on the property, and could
not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the respondents before the RTC,
the petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At
best, he belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum44 before this Court that his lessor had tolerated
the respondents’ occupancy of the lot, without addressing the respondents’ allegation that they had occupied
the lot in 1970, before the petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property in 1991, and without
providing any other details. His pleadings continued to insist on the existence of tolerance without providing
the factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway
deprived the petitioner of due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the case based on the
issue of tolerance.
The Court cannot treat an ejectment
case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no
other ends than to comply with technicalities.45
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful,
speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking
and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession
de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise,
the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force
and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining
rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve
the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should
remain in possession pending the decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be
highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.1âwphi1 Therefore, where a person
supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the
party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to
place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts
would then decide in summary proceedings cases which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown
trials. Because these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle complicated issues requiring extensive
proof, they would no longer be expeditious and would no longer serve the purpose for which they were
created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided
cases, and the utter lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision dated March 14, 2005
and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80116.
SO ORDERED.

The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it
as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable and their differences
constitute far more than mere technicalities.

In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion
publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful
detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics:

On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the
negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one
year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right
to the physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better
right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial
court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]

The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An
ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession
de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine
actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue
of possession, and is therefore inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
RULE 57
Preliminary Attachment
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a
plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or
damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from
law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about
to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a
corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a
willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or
fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part
thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being
found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought, or in the performance thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his
property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication. (1a)
Section 2. Issuance and contents of order. — An order of attachment
may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the
court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the
property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt
from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless
such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount
equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated
by the applicant, exclusive of costs. Several writs may be issued at the same
time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions. (2a)
Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. — An order of attachment shall
be granted only when it appears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some
other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action
exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in section 1 hereof, that there
is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action,
and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the
possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which
the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond
required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the court
before the order issues. (3a)
Section 4. Condition of applicant's bond. — The party applying for the
order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount
fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned
that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto. (4a)
Section 5. Manner of attaching property. — The sheriff enforcing the writ
shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment
and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of
the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may
be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a
deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond
executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court
in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached,
exclusive of costs. No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under
section 2 hereof shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
the application for attachment the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order
and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines.
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not
apply where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a non-resident of the
Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem. (5a)
Section 6. Sheriff's return. — After enforcing the writ, the sheriff must
likewise without delay make a return thereon to the court from which the writ
issued, with a full statement of his proceedings under the writ and a complete
inventory of the property attached, together with any counter-bond given by
the party against whom attachment is issued, and serve copies thereof on the
applicant. (6a)
Section 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof.
— Real and personal property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the
writ in the following manner:
(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, or any interest therein,
standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of the province in the name
of the party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon
such records, or belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued and
held by any other person, or standing on the records of the registry of deeds
in the name of any other person, by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of
the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice
that it is attached, or that such real property and any interest therein held by
or standing in the name of such other person are attached, and by leaving a
copy of such order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property,
if any, or with such other person or his agent if found within the province.
Where the property has been brought under the operation of either the Land
Registration Act or the Property Registration Decree, the notice shall contain a
reference to the number of the certificate of title, the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered, and the registered owner
or owners thereof.
The registrar of deeds must index attachments filed under this section in the
names of the applicant, the adverse party, or the person by whom the property
is held or in whose name it stands in the records. If the attachment is not
claimed on the entire area of the land covered by the certificate of title, a
description sufficiently accurate for the identification of the land or interest to
be affected shall be included in the registration of such attachment;
(b) Personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely
keeping it in his custody, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
(c) Stocks or shares, or an interest in stocks or shares, of any corporation
or company, by leaving with the president or managing agent thereof, a copy
of the writ, and a notice stating that the stock or interest of the party against
whom the attachment is issued is attached in pursuance of such writ;
(d) Debts and credits, including bank deposits, financial interest, royalties,
commissions and other personal property not capable of manual delivery, by
leaving with the person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under
his control, such credits or other personal property, or with his agent, a copy
of the writ, and notice that the debts owing by him to the party against whom
attachment is issued, and the credits and other personal property in his
possession, or under his control, belonging to said party, are attached in
pursuance of such writ;
(e) The interest of the party against whom attachment is issued in
property belonging to the estate of the decedent, whether as heir, legatee, or
devisee, by serving the executor or administrator or other personal
representative of the decedent with a copy of the writ and notice that said
interest is attached. A copy of said writ of attachment and of said notice shall
also be filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which said estate is being
settled and served upon the heir, legatee or devisee concerned.
If the property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a copy of the writ of
attachment shall be filed with the proper court or quasi-judicial agency, and
notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property. (7a)
Section 8. Effect of attachment of debts, credits and all other similar
personal property. — All persons having in their possession or under their
control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party
against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to him, at the time of
service upon them of the copy of the writ of attachment and notice as provided
in the last preceding section, shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of
such credits, debts or other similar personal property, until the attachment is
discharged, or any judgment recovered by him is satisfied, unless such
property is delivered or transferred, or such debts are paid, to the clerk, sheriff,
or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment. (8a)
Section 9. Effect of attachment of interests in property belonging to the
estate of a decedent. — The attachment of the interest of an heir, legatee, or
devisee in the property belonging to the estate of a decedent shall not impair
the powers of the executor, administrator, or other personal representative of
the decedent over such property for the purpose of administration. Such
personal representative, however, shall report the attachment to the court
when any petition for distribution is filed, and in the order made upon such
petition, distribution may be awarded to such heir, legatee or devisee, but the
property attached shall be ordered delivered to the sheriff making the levy,
subject to the claim of such heir, legatee, or devisee, or any person claiming
under him. (9a)
Section 10. Examination of party whose property is attached and persons
indebted to him or controlling his property; delivery of property to sheriff. —
Any person owing debts to the party whose property is attached or having in
his possession or under his control any credit or other personal property
belonging to such party, may be required to attend before the court in which
the action is pending, or before a commissioner appointed by the court, and
be examined on oath respecting the same. The party whose property is
attached may also be required to attend for the purpose of giving information
respecting his property, and may be examined on oath. The court may, after
such examination, order personal property capable of manual delivery
belonging to him, in the possession of the person so required to attend before
the court, to be delivered to the clerk of the court or sheriff on such terms as
may be just, having reference to any lien thereon or claim against the same, to
await the judgment in the action. (10a)
Section 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment
and before entry of judgment. — Whenever it shall be made to appear to the
court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to both parties,
that the property attached is perishable, or that the interests of all the parties
to the action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may order such
property to be sold at public auction in such manner as it may direct, and the
proceeds of such sale to be deposited in court to abide the judgment in the
action. (11a)
Section 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. — After
a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party whose property has been
attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge
of the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The court shall, after
due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant
makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party
with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal
to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But if
the attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property,
the counter-bond shall be equal to the value of that property as determined
by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure
the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the
action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be served on the attaching party.
Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this
section, the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be
delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to
the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid
standing in place of the property so released. Should such counter-bond for
any reason be found to be or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the
same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for
a new order of attachment. (12a)
Section 13. Discharge of attachment on other grounds. — The party
whose property has been ordered attached may file a motion with the court in
which he action is pending, before or after levy or even after the release of the
attached property, for an order to set aside or discharge the attachment on
the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or
that the bond is insufficient. If the attachment is excessive, the discharge shall
be limited to the excess. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the
movant but not otherwise, the attaching party may oppose the motion by
counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the
attachment was made. After due notice and hearing, the court shall order the
setting aside or the corresponding discharge of the attachment if it appears
that it was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is
insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive, and the defect is not cured
forthwith. (13a)
Section 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If the
property attached is claimed by any person other than the party against whom
attachment had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit
of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has
possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching
party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment,
unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not
less than the value of the property levied upon. In case of disagreement as to
such value, the same shall be decided by the court issuing the writ of
attachment. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property
may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of such
property to any such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the attaching party from
claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not
be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the
attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. (14a)
Section 15. Satisfaction of judgment out of property attached, return of
sheriff. — If judgment be recovered by the attaching party and execution issue
thereon, the sheriff may cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the property
attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose in the following manner:
(a) By paying to the judgment obligee the proceeds of all sales of
perishable or other property sold in pursuance of the order of the court, or so
much as shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment;
(b) If any balance remains due, by selling so much of the property, real or
personal, as may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for that purpose
remain in the sheriff's hands, or in those the clerk of the court;
(c) By collecting from all persons having in their possession credits
belonging to the judgment obligor, or owing debts to the latter at the time of
the attachment of such credits or debts, the amount of such credits and debts
as determined by the court in the action, and stated in the judgment, and
paying the proceeds of such collection over to the judgment obligee.
The sheriff shall forthwith make a return in writing to the court of his
proceedings under this section and furnish the parties with copies thereof.
(15a)
Section 16. Balance due collected upon an execution; excess delivered to
judgment obligor. — If after realizing upon all the property attached, including
the proceeds of any debts or credits collected, and applying the proceeds to
the satisfaction of the judgment less the expenses of proceedings upon the
judgment any balance shall remain due, the sheriff must proceed to collect
such balance as upon ordinary execution. Whenever the judgment shall have
been paid, the sheriff, upon reasonable demand, must return to the judgment
obligor the attached property remaining in his hands, and any proceeds of the
sale of the property attached not applied to the judgment. (16a)
Section 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond. — When the judgment has
become executory, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant
to the provisions of this Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall
become charged on such counter-bond and bound to pay the judgment
obligee upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount
may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary
hearing in the same action. (17a)
Section 18. Disposition of money deposited. — Where the party against
whom attachment had been issued has deposited money instead of giving
counter-bond, it shall be applied under the direction of the court to the
satisfaction of any judgment rendered in favor of the attaching party, and after
satisfying the judgment the balance shall be refunded to the depositor or his
assignee. If the judgment is in favor of the party against whom attachment was
issued, the whole sum deposited must be refunded to him or his assignee.
(18a)
Section 19. Disposition of attached property where judgment is for party
against whom attachment was issued. — If judgment be rendered against the
attaching party, all the proceeds of sales and money collected or received by
the sheriff, under the order of attachment, and all property attached remaining
in any such officer's hands, shall be delivered to the party against whom
attachment was issued, and the order of attachment discharged. (19a)

Section 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or

excessive attachment. — An application for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal
is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties setting forth the facts showing his
right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded
only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main
case.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom
the attachment was issued he must claim damages sustained during the
pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with
notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial
court.

Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the
attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the damages
awarded to him from any property of the attaching party not exempt from
execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail
to fully satisfy the award. (20a)
RULE 58
Preliminary Injunction
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. (1a)
Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary
injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is
pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in
the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof. (2a)
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts
either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (3a)
Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. — A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts
entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court the applicant files with the court where
the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant
will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the
requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. (4a)
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case,
if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the
presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the
requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be
acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall
be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which
the records shall be transmitted immediately.
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.
— No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown
by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said
party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter
is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding
judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case
is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining order
granted is too great, it may be modified. (6a)
Section 7. Service of copies of bonds; effect of disapproval of same. —
The party filing a bond in accordance with the provisions of this Rule shall
forthwith serve a copy of such bond on the other party, who may except to the
sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. If the applicant's
bond is found to be insufficient in amount, or if the surety or sureties thereon
fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved
after justification is not filed forthwith the injunction shall be dissolved. If the
bond of the adverse party is found to be insufficient in amount, or the surety
or sureties thereon fail to justify a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient
sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the injunction shall
be granted or restored, as the case may be. (8a)

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not
resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed,
automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not
extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court
shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which
it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary
restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party
or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme
Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders. (5a)
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. —
At the trial, the amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the
bond of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under
the same procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (9a)
Section 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action
it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance
of the act or acts of confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. (10a)

Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of,

injunction or restraining order. — The application for injunction or restraining
order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or
restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other
grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be
opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or if
granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or
continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to
the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for
such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed
by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages which the applicant may
suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If
RULE 59
Receivership
Section 1. Appointment of receiver. — Upon a verified application, one
or more receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be
appointed by the court where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals
or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and such other proof as
the court may require, that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver
has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action or
proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed,
or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to administer and preserve
it;
(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of
a mortgage that the property is in danger of being wasted or dissipated or
materially injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the
mortgage debt, or that the parties have so stipulated in the contract of
mortgage;
(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of an
appeal, or to dispose of it according to the judgment, or to aid execution when
the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses
to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the
judgment into effect;
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver
is the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or
disposing of the property in litigation.
During the pendency of an appeal, the appellate court may allow an
application for the appointment of a receiver to be filed in and decided by the
court of origin and the receiver appointed to be subject to the control of said
court. (1a)
Section 2. Bond on appointment of receiver. — Before issuing the order
appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond
executed to the party against whom the application is presented, in an amount
to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party all
damages he may sustain by reason of the appointment of such receiver in case
the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause;
and the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require
an additional bond as further security for such damages. (3a)
Section 3. Denial of application or discharge of receiver. — The
application may be denied, or the receiver discharged, when the adverse party
files a bond executed to the applicant, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
to the effect that such party will pay the applicant all damages he may suffer
by reason of the acts, omissions, or other matters specified in the application
as ground for such appointment. The receiver may also be discharged if it is
shown that his appointment was obtained without sufficient cause. (4a)
Section 4. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before entering upon his duties,
the receiver shall be sworn to perform them faithfully, and shall file a bond,
executed to such person and in such sum as the court may direct, to the effect
that he will faithfully discharge his duties in the action or proceeding and obey
the orders of the court. (5a)
Section 5. Service of copies of bonds; effect of disapproval of same. —
The person filing a bond in accordance with the provisions of this Rule shall
forthwith serve a copy thereof on each interested party, who may except to its
sufficiency or of the surety or sureties thereon. If either the applicant's or the
receiver's bond is found to be insufficient in amount, or if the surety or sureties
thereon fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties
approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the application shall be
denied or the receiver discharged, as the case may be. If the bond of the
adverse party is found to be insufficient in amount or the surety or sureties
thereon fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties
approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the receiver shall be
appointed or re-appointed, as the case may be. (6a)
Section 6. General powers of receiver. — Subject to the control of the
court in which the action or proceeding is pending a receiver shall have the
power to bring and defend, in such capacity, actions in his own name; to take
and keep possession of the property in controversy; to receive rents; to collect
debts due to himself as receiver or to the fund, property, estate, person, or
corporation of which he is the receiver; to compound for and compromise the
same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and
other property that shall remain among the persons legally entitled to receive
the same; and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court
may authorize. However, funds in the hands of a receiver may be invested only
by order of the court upon the written consent of all the parties to the action.
(7a)

No action may be filed by or against a receiver without leave of the court which
appointed him. (n)

Section 7. Liability for refusal or neglect to deliver property to receiver.

— A person who refuses or neglects, upon reasonable demand, to deliver to
the receiver all the property, money, books, deeds, notes, bills, documents and
papers within his power or control, subject of or involved in the action or
proceeding, or in case of disagreement, as determined and ordered by the
court, may be punished for contempt and shall be liable to the receiver for the
money or the value of the property and other things so refused or neglected
to be surrendered, together with all damages that may have been sustained
by the party or parties entitled thereto as a consequence of such refusal or
neglect. (n)

Section 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver. —

Whenever the court, motu proprio or on motion of either party, shall determine
that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists, it shall, after due notice to all
interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the
delivery of the funds and other property in his possession to the person
adjudged to be entitled to receive them and order the discharge of the receiver
from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such reasonable
compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs
against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires. (8a)

Section 9. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. — The amount,

if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the
same procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (9a)
RULE 60
Replevin
Section 1. Application. — A party praying for the recovery of possession
of personal property may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
before answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such property to him, in
the manner hereinafter provided. (1a)
Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must show by his own
affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging
the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief ;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double
the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the
return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for
the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the
applicant in the action. (2a)
Section 3. Order. — Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the
bond, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin,
describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and
requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody. (3a)
Section 4. Duty of the sheriff. — Upon receiving such order, the sheriff
must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the
application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be
in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody.
If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the
sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the
building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his
possession. After the sheriff has take possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its
delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary
expenses for taking and keeping the same. (4a)
Section 5. Return of property. — If the adverse party objects to the
sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he
cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so
object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant,
require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending
a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated
in the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such
delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum, to him as may be
recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on
the applicant. (5a)
Section 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. — If within five (5) days after
the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the
adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's
bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of
the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does
not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the
applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the
sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (6a)
Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If the
property taken is claimed by any person other than the party against whom
the writ of replevin had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an
affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds therefor, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has
possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the sheriff
shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin or deliver it to the
applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall file
a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum
not less than the value of the property under replevin as provided in section 2
hereof. In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall determine the
same. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping, of the property may be
enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.

The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of such
property, to any such third-party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from claiming
damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious
claim, in the same or a separate action.

When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required,
and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall
be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of
the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. (7a)

Section 8. Return of papers. — The sheriff must file the order, with his
proceedings indorsed, thereon, with the court within ten (10) days after taking
the property mentioned therein. (8a)

Section 9. Judgment. — After trial of the issues the court shall determine
who has the right of possession to and the value of the property and shall
render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled
to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such
damages as either party may prove, with costs. (9a)

Section 10. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. — The amount,

if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the
same procedure as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (10a)
RULE 61
Support Pendente Lite
Section 1. Application. — At the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the
grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in
support thereof. (1a)
Section 2. Comment. — A copy of the application and all supporting
documents shall be served upon the adverse party, who shall have five (5) days
to comment thereon unless a different period is fixed by the court upon his
motion. The comment shall be verified and shall be accompanied by affidavits,
depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof. (2a, 3a)
Section 3. Hearing. — After the comment is filed, or after the expiration
of the period for its filing, the application shall be set for hearing not more
than three (3) days thereafter. The facts in issue shall be proved in the same
manner as is provided for evidence on motions. (4a)
Section 4. Order. — The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent
facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require, having
the regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances
as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application
is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or
such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the
necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party,
and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application
is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible. (5a)
right of reimbursement against the person ordered to provide such support.
(h)
Section 6. Support in criminal cases. — In criminal actions where the civil
liability includes support for the offspring as a consequence of the crime and
the civil aspect thereof has not been waived, reserved and instituted prior to
its filing, the accused may be ordered to provide support pendente lite to the
child born to the offended party allegedly because of the crime. The
application therefor may be filed successively by the offended party, her
parents, grandparents or guardian and the State in the corresponding criminal
case during its pendency, in accordance with the procedure established under
this Rule. (n)
Section 7. Restitution. — When the judgment or final order of the court
finds that the person who has been providing support pendente lite is not
liable therefor, it shall order the recipient thereof to return to the former the
amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment,
without prejudice to the right of the recipient to obtain reimbursement in a
separate action from the person legally obliged to give the support. Should
the recipient fail to reimburse said amounts, the person who provided the
same may likewise seek reimbursement thereof in a separate action from the
person legally obliged to give such support. (n)

Section 5. Enforcement of order. — If the adverse party fails to comply

with an order granting support pendente lite, the court shall, motu proprio or
upon motion; issue an order of execution against him, without prejudice to his
liability for contempt. (6a)

When the person ordered to give support pendente lite refuses or fails to do
so, any third person who furnished that support to the applicant may, after due
notice and hearing in the same case obtain a writ of execution to enforce his