.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29.

he vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
vs. the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city
of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women
married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went
to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared,
MALCOLM, J.:
and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through
minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the
stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent
paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a
away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit
application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the
a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were
Philippine Islands?
illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared
might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts
for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons,
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have
had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in
Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody
the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without
the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax,
three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz,
court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum)
the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the
attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the
order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such
December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of
the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final
decision.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous
endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and
can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that
the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of
eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they
the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of
could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first
formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies
regulation, compels any person to change his residence. of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such
in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a situation as that now before us.
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even
the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or provides:
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a
mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to
citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile,
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a
to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than
official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by
the head of any citizen.
regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five
be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound
by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued
the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.)
indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
"The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case,
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416,
"that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual
motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
at liberty.
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
Islands.
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the
chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce
they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus.
It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in
its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to
grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction
a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be
made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of
First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is
a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it
was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the
other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two
original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case
involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a
denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When
the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the
jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of
such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising
the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which
began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take
a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus
be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early
date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme
Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor
child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in
another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was
notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers,
with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the
opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of
the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have
taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of
Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries
and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed
for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will
have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the
petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered
that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the
life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the
proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their
notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as
to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute.
Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights
which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this
writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor.
It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who
serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court
relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force
of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be
resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the
ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are
only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the
power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of
affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the
power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo.,
117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by
the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave
defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return
stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him
to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was
impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal,
the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That
writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in
chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to
bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can
be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by
reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the
issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce
the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ
without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the
question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what
was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is
not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there
has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child
in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305.
See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.
S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of
Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his
return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in
the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District
of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were
then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that
Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due
course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been
lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the
term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See
also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two
orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found
that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far
as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram
of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-
hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought
before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings
that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in
Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to
the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women,
at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found
in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their
own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude
a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do
everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only
accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words,
the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made
by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was
because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their
wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined
in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are
to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of
literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial
compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular
individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance
with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the
city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent
Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a
certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt
of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five
a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of
In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.) Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this encroachment.
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case
through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city
fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as
the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses,
the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who
ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the
steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of
Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to
facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and
without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP
03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the
principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
In its Comment or Opposition 6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said
to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow
plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition 7 dated June 29, 2016, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea
bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2
of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.]
9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making
power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial
conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment
of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense.
Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea
bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of
dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December
2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an
otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent
for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible
basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving,
whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the
admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus
not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given
the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of
illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 9 dated
July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being
procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have
been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition
for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to
sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and
(3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the
case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored
that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under
proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties'
arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or
its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when
issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. 12 We have
acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached
"epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously
harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the
hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. 14 At the
same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug
problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the
protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who,
because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused
and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our
country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its
part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued
presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition,
technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive
pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural
rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules
of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the
same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power
and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its
independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their
vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with
legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of
the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the
bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation;
it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do
so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled:
"It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter
is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of
the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however,
may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section
5(5), Article VIII provides:
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further
elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of
its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been
priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the
1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent
power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's
rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [
s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that
the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be
shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of
powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to
delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the
Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with
the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence
of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the
present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government
has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other
branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v.
Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from
issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure,
to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To
reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since
July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which
stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the
court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged
which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or
information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the
1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense
was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required
during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118
of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea
bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to
be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted
below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for
in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes
a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not
diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a
rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power,
and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one
context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what
is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the
context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice
and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive
right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the
given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking through then
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar
of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended
party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar,
the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and
the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable
period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the
accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the
criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused
by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing
criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either
with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were
no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public
prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of
public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually
operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases
have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce
the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability
of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may
have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more
difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime.
The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof,
the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case
does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at
any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for
employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create
anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties
and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose
his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run,
it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the
entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the
judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation
of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the
power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in
the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency
of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment
of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts 47 that the rules on plea
bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of
its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is
reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more
promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively
attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that
the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752
[1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of
enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to
continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the
time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may
be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources.
The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and
the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered,
plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed,
economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal
of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing
leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be
to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering
occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel,
to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need
not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea
of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal
actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver
one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute.
The reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions
are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case,
prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to
allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot
accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these
decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision
whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than
that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the
point when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining
during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount
to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing
or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act
in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted
a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon
which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change
of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to
preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and
unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY,
JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are
both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout,
58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from
their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID
Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of
the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the
country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a
pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty
two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls
engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the
child prostitutes.
The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29
February 1988 stated:
ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.
RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his
room.
In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988
read in part:
Noted:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having
been in his care and live-in for quite sometime.
On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for
being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
(Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia:
Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable
aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health
and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners
for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced trial against petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond
alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous
detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who
certified that petitioners were healthy.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent
denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were
healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID
detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to
the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going.
On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that
he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally
released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he
voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III
allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However,
it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was
filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.
On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the
Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was
presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with
any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the
existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with
valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the
activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association
with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and
detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a
pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a
pedophile.
We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably
defended by the Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's
Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable
cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to
the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious
man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667
[1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may
be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has
committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after
close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of
the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago,
L-27360, February 28, 1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987
ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal
Procedure).
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its
inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against
them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued
against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently
being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons,
therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the
law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543).
"were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas
corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with
John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined
as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis
p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred
sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665)
[Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the
Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the
declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be
considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20,
1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance
with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary
and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of
deportation proceeding would be defeated.
Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and
1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions
essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are
administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal
action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32),
it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions
upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos,
33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler
vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155).
It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient
information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs.
Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench
vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the
strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed;
only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination.
(U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay
evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to
explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp.,
437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that
"the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for
purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts
with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935
Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of
Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause
why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced
against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step
preliminary to their possible deportation.
Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of
Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional.
The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated
the condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner
nugatory to the detriment of the State.
The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives
authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds
required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.
... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for
his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng
Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend
to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs.
Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board (G. R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo
vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935
Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may
be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of
to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against
the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly
provides: WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby
denied.
Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power
residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said SO ORDERED.
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except
upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have
the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf,
and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also

challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to
bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said
provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on
the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary
(Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA
442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu
Chun Hai et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest
(Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good [G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004]
and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil.
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks to nullify the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, executed by respondent Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of respondent
Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
The facts may be summarized as follows:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under
Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand
Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said enabling law read:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by
existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be
allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x
x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that
are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement.
TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE
Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and conditions
established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-
five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges
and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football,
lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction
of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the
integrity and fairness of the games.
On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll.
Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its
President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations
by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards
and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that
the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that
PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He
contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could
not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment
on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international
network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling
contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869
which provides:
Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of
chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines. x x x
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of
the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of
P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and authority to operate and
maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports
gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.[1] He contends that internet gambling could not have been included
within the commonly accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other
recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-
space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance
authorized by law.
The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:
 I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D.
NO. 1869 TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED
RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS
OF ITS RIGHT TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS
AND OTHER AMUSEMENT PLACES UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED
AUTHORITY TO SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN THE
INTERNET.
The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal
question: Does PAGCORs legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity,
SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate Internet gambling? Otherwise put,
does Presidential Decree No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its
franchise to SAGE by authorizing the latter to operate Internet gambling?
Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle a number
of important procedural matters raised by the respondents.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that
petitioner has no legal standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen or
as a member of the Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-in-
interest entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does
not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to impugn the validity of
PAGCORs grant of authority to SAGE.
Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or House of
Representative to maintain a suit and assail the constitutionality or validity of laws,
acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities
are not without precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly
challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government there
must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs
his rights and prerogatives as legislator.[2] However in a number of cases,[3] we
clarified that where a case involves an issue of utmost importance, or one of
overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside
procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition. Considering that the
instant petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public
interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.
Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
these remedies should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in
exercising its legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to
operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasi-
judicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses or authority to operate be
construed as a purely ministerial act. According to them, in the event that this Court
takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed for failure of
petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.
Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation where an almost identical factual setting
obtained. Petitioners therein filed a petition for injunction directly before the Court
which sought to enjoin respondent from operating the jai-alai games by itself or in
joint venture with another corporate entity allegedly in violation of law and the
Constitution. Respondents contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to take
original cognizance of a petition for injunction because it was not one of the actions
specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondents likewise took exception to the alleged failure of petitioners to observe
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In brushing aside the apparent procedural lapse,
we held that x x x this Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[4]
In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar
seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before this
Court, the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with the authority
to operate on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that averments in the
complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of
the action.[5] Although the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent PAGCOR, what it primarily seeks to accomplish is to prevent the
enforcement of the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming. Thus, the action may properly be characterized as one
for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65, which incidentally, is another remedy
resorted to by petitioner.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show
always be eschewed.[6] that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing,[10] the Court
clarified that since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may
Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the substance of
not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the
the action.
jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. legislative franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally operate
It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but on-line Internet gambling.
should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the
Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming
government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that
executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the
manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of SO ORDERED.
conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered
and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always
defined in clear and unequivocal language.[7]
After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the
contending positions of the parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits
of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.
In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when PAGCOR entered into
a joint venture agreement with two other entities in the operation and management
of jai alai games, the Court,[8] in an En Banc Resolution dated 24 August 2001,
partially granted the motions for clarification filed by respondents therein insofar as
it prayed that PAGCOR has a valid franchise, but only by itself (i.e. not in association
with any other person or entity), to operate, maintain and/or manage the game of
jai-alai.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the
former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations
and Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the
privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCORs franchise to operate a
gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right
and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its
activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise
and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of
the State is presumed to exist for the common good. Hence, the special privileges
and franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of
its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how these
privileges had been employed, and whether they have been abused. [9]
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of
Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A,
CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic
phrase, of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but
without a specification as to the term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks
to set aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV,
dated September 8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge and granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein
private respondents and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as well as his
resolution of October 19, 1976 2 denying the motions for reconsideration filed by
the parties therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein
private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M.
Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act No.
4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the
arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional
nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to
quash was subsequently reduced to writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975,
the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On September 2,
1975, private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an
undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on October 20,1975,
the motion for reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the
Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from
proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32
of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private
respondents was related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch
transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further proceedings and where
it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976,
the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20,
1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum
in answer to the amended petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged
decision holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional
but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts,
and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for
preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
of the lower court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion thereof
which sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent
judge denied both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19,
1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following
questions of law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act
No. 4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the
constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the
adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or
coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall
in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor
more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine
ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law
has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While
a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be
qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress
intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of
the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and
that the absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes
that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously
asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure
is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the
constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms
of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental
rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that
the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes
a cruel and unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the
Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and should be rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is
not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a
barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Based on the principle,
our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay,
2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People
vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our Supreme Court in the first of the
cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity
in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in
America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur.,
p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am.
Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within
the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional
prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the
proportion between the penalty and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs.
Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was
imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in
view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this
reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the
light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not
spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation
as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty...
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to
declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact
that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or
unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as
obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due
time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down
a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal
provision in question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of
the court as if the lattter were the legislative department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the
courts to determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory
construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is contended that
the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with
the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also
submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix
the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall
be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to
the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing
persons convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by
the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a
law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing
laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously
overlooked is his own reference to penalties "between designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle
that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of
powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if
they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of
due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private
persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest
delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative
authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said
courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it
must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length
of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons
convicted of a crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that
since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the
court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of
which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-
an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix
the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such
that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests
in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as
the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of
constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section
34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32
thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of
imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and
academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the
so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be
equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine,
whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and
independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is
likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in
Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine
into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a
fine when imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter
penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is
subordinate to the other. 24

2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. 25

With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of

Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of
said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than
P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly
exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against private respondents
was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not
more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal
courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for
trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21, 1939
JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with
the investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal,
which was scheduled to take place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally
determined by this court. The respondent was required to answer, but the petition
for preliminary injunction was denied.
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of
the petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery,
extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law
profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the
President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible
coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the
answer of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the
same day. The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office on
February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal
with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939,
the respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against
him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas as special investigator
to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner
that the formal investigation would be commenced on February 17, 1939, at 9 a.
m., but due to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set
definitely for March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction
referred to in the beginning of this opinion.
The petitioner contends in his petition:
(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend and
much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the petitioner and
decide also by himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend municipal
elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction
of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government;
(2) That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office
and in preferring by himself charges against him and in designating a
special investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A are null and
void for the following reasons:
(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner, has
exercised control over local governments when that power has been taken away
from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution for the to abrogate and
the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has been interpreted
to include the power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power
to destroy;
(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of
supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must
be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law
governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in
section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary
of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that
power under existing law, in accordance with section 2188 of the Administrative
Code, as amended, as the latter provision govern the procedure to be followed in
suspending and punishing elective local officials while section 79 (C) of the
Administrative Code is the general law which must yield to the special law;
(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an arbitrary power
by converting himself into a complainant and at the same time judge of the charges
he has preferred against the petitioner;
(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not based on
any sworn statement of any private person or citizen of this government when
section 2188 of the Administrative Code requires the complaint against elective
municipal officials to be under oath in order to merit consideration by the
authorities.
Petitioner prays this Honorable Court:
(a) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent restraining him,
his agents, attorneys and all persons acting by virtue of his authority from further
proceeding against the petitioner until this case is finally determined by this court;
(b) To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without
authority or jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner from the office of mayor of
Makati and to order his immediate reinstatement in office;
(c) To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against the
petitioner and to investigate those charges for the grant him that power the
respondent would be acting as prosecutor and judge of the case of his own
creation.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his answer:
1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code
expressly empowers the respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department" and in connection therewith to "designate an official
or person who shall conduct such investigation"; (Par. 4.)
2. That although section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by the
petitioner, empowers the provincial governor to `receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office', said section does not
preclude the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the power
vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must be read in relation
with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932; (Par. 4
[b].)
3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question
the power or jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the
administrative charges against him but merely contended that the filing of said
charges was not in accordance with law for the reason that they did not bear the
oaths of the complainants; (Par. 5.)
4. That the authority of a department head order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person under his department necessarily carries with it by
implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the investigation, such as by suspending the officer
under investigation to prevent coercion of witnesses; and that, furthermore, the
suspension from office of the herein petitioner by the respondent was authorized
by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of the Administrative
Code to remove officials from office; (Par. 7.)
5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the
granting of the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; (Par. 8.)
6. That it is a well-settled rule "that courts of equity have no power to restrain
public officers by injunction from performing any official act which they are by law
required to perform, or acts which are not in excess of the authority and discretion
reposed in them." (Par. 9)
The issues presented in this case may be reduced to an inquiry into the legal
authority of the Secretary of the Interior (a) to order an investigation, by a special
investigation appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity
brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province
of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of the said
mayor pending the investigation of the charges.
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to
the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said
bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau of office under his department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall
conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon,
witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take
testimony relevant to the investigation.
The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision
over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but
this section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which
grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political
subdivisions." In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed that
"Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not
without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon
a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the
present case.
We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to
order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special
investigator for that purpose.
As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the
suspension of the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the
charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of
a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which
provides that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing
a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity
of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges
against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days." The fact, however,
that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the
Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is
necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a
similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral
argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner
from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended,
Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President
could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a
legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and
to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were
to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, parenthetically, an
instance where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the power to suspend a
municipal official is not exclusive. Upon the other hand, it may be argued with some
degree of plausibility that, if the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove
concluded, empowered to investigate the charges against the petitioner and to
appoint a special investigator for that purpose, preventive suspension may be a
means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is a point,
however, which, for the reason hereinafter indicated, we do not have to decide.
The Solicitor-General argues that section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the
Reorganization Law of 1932, by providing, "the provisions of the existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding," that "whenever a specific power, authority, duty,
function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the
same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or
revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service",
should be interpreted to concede to the Secretary of the Interior the power to
suspend a mayor of a municipality. The argument is so generally sweeping that,
unless distinctions are made, the effect would be the complete abrogation at will of
the powers of provincial and municipal officials even in corporate affairs of local
governments. Under the theory suggested by the Solicitor-General, the Secretary of
the Interior could, as observed by able counsel for the petitioner, enter into a
contract and sign a deed of conveyance of real property in behalf of a municipality
against the opposition of the mayor thereof who is the local official authorized by
law to do so (sec. 2196, Revised Administrative Code), or in behalf of a province in
lieu of the provincial governor thereof (sec 2068, Ibid.), and otherwise exercise
powers of corporate character mentioned in sections 2067 and 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code and which are lodged in the corresponding provincial and
municipal officials. And if the power of suspension of the Secretary of the Interior is
to be justified on the plea that the pretended power is governmental and not
corporate, the result would be more disastrous. Then and thereunder, the Secretary
of the Interior, in lieu of the mayor of the municipality, could directly veto municipal
ordinances and resolutions under section 2229 of the Revised Administrative Code;
he could, without any formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and himself make
appointments to all non-elective positions in the municipal service, under section
2199 of the Revised Administrative Code; he could, instead of the provincial
governor, fill a temporary vacancy in any municipal office under subsection (a),
section 2188, as amended, of the said Code; he-could even directly appoint
lieutenants of barrios and wrest the authority given by section 2218 of the Revised
Administrative Code to a municipal councilor. Instances may be multiplied but it is
unnecessary to go any further. Prudence, then, dictates that we should hesitate to
accept the suggestion urged upon us by the Solicitor-General, especially where we
find the path indicated by him neither illuminated by the light of our own
experience nor cemented by the virtuality of legal principles but is, on the contrary,
dimmed by the recognition however limited in our own Constitution of the right of
local self-government and by the actual operation and enforcement of the laws
governing provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other political subdivisions.
It is not any question of wisdom of legislation but the existence of any such
destructive authority in the law invoked by the Government that we are called upon
to pass and determine here.
In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the
President of the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner,
and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action
taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner should be
sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of
the Interior by the President of the Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in
this argument than in the suggested generalization of section 37 of Act No. 4007.
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which,
by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by
the President. There are certain constitutional power and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount
of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any
other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of
the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). Upon the other hand, doubt
is entertained by some members of the court whether the statement made by the
Secretary to the President in the latter's behalf and by his authority that the
President had no objection to the suspension of the petitioner could be accepted as
an affirmative exercise of the power of suspension in this case, or that the verbal
approval by the President of the suspension alleged in a pleading presented in this
case by the Solicitor-General could be considered as a sufficient ratification in law.
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the board proposition, albeit not suggested, that under
the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1,
section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122
U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167: 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839],
16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed.,
691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed.,
915: Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of
the principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the
assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any
member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts.
The implications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against
the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of government established under our Constitution, in the
light of certain well-known principles and practices that go with the system, should
offer the necessary explanation. With reference to the Executive Department of the
government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible
without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principles that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and,
in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the
President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of
the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must
be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President
is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of
course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any
way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to
certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of
valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the
Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a
department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints
him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries.
It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of
administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no
less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of
Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are the
necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there
is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system
unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any
subtle process of judicial interpretation or constitution.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and
Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants,
being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of
April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to
register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in
spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the
information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have
not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has
a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has
a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month
and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused
were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service,
does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.1ªvvphïl.nët
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war
does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This
is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is
a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to
defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without
violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against
his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253
Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due
process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or
employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual
existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last
analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of
need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance
Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying
with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No.
1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to
the appellants. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR")
is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit
public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice,
the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their
receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by
petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's
Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along
North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters'
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31
July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-
Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to
therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent
business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the
sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if
already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the
courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground
that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of
the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss
should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life
and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by
respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we
also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST
from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused
from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also
resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that
any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The
participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following
varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public
officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage
in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and
social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not
granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are
part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can
be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and
in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to
look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may
have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law.
Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very
the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely
"Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes: what we want to defend here.

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined
most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972.
Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and
to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-
Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and
other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic
law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to
independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They
the proper courts and authorities.
were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and,
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission
therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings
of Jurists.
cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the
ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define
the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
would now like to safeguard.
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are
curtailed.
really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission
Those are the rights that we envision here?
can be most effective.
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every
single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill
we draw the line?
of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would
like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human
rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they
had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is
that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by
the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances;
5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much
as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning
when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer
to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the
concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention
which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of
1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other
convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be
wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather
than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee,
before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the
Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the
purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the
sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without
prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and
political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom
from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public
trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and
collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect
the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are
not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer
linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-
called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I
was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant
and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights
of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee
to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I
cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few
lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused
and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture,
salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons
who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and
big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially
for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get
it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if
we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for
debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the
right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights
of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and
(6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not
likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have
thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within
its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to
cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the
like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay
for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No.
90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final
resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of
an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate
its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-
1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"

mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in
a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of
the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other [G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]
purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies
with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate
the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de
Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services
was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by
petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against
in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article
136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. [1] Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June
10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondents services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in
replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. [2] After
August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover
150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the
purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26,
1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in
the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July
8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch
supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum
dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting
married women for employment.[4]
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she
was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all
along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living
allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private
respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation
of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of
her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of
petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement
of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered,
the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by
petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was
apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled
that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was
modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for
three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be
condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter,
including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment
with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by
respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action
assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well
as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be
regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that
injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the
inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in
the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and
standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as
falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded
with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and
exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women
in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II[8] on the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women
in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article
XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution)
pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of
Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with
more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory
to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW).[11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727[12] which explicitly
prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 [13] which
bans the mail-order-bride practice for a fee and the export of female labor to
countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic
Act No. 7192,[14] also known as the Women in Development and Nation Building Act,
which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into
contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning
in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322[15] increasing the maternity benefits
granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877[16] which outlaws and
punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training
environment; and Republic Act No. 8042,[17] or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where
their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family
Code,[18] womens rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and
expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found
in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds
of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with
facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their
health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a
nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be
considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand,
recognizes a womans right against discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the
issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an
individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence,
the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such
employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the
company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions
encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working
methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-
off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. [19] As put in a
case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business
judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the
test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the
reminder, in the words of the latter, that youre fully aware that the company is not
accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to
you.[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor,
private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was
not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of
that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you
that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.)[22] Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made
to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only
by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be
solidarily liable with the corporation.[23]
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from
PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved
to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by
the employee and not on the employers caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
 In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private
respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact,
does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty
hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her
dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against
marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This
improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private
respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should
be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent
defied its policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an
act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a
trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T says it
gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead
of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does
not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled
with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on
the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to
conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was
the cause of private respondents secretive conduct now complained of. It is
then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent
that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to
dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly,
private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit
some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she
was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on
the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds.That the labor arbiter would
thus consider petitioners submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere
afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent
deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same
was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or
grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory
note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a
peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time
of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she
was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as
a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be
effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the
plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of
tenure.[27] On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as
she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and
business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation
to the business or trade of the employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.[30] However, as she had undeniably
committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion
of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by
respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such
act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to
its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally
justified.Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time
her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be
reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months
suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of
that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as
follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148,[31] better known as the Women and Child Labor Law,
which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act
to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which
on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently
regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then
Philippine Islands. Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employees. The State shall
in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x x x.
flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from
the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate
in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination from
women. Thus: employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable
standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis
has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or regulation
much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason
with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article
of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence
136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations
of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the
and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their
occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been
pecularities of their chosen profession.
adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking
knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13,
the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of
1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child
marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social
Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor
institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances,
unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a
respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods
momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended
of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not
paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the
based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated
same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover,
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1,
respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their
1974.
lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary
Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore
occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment
abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards
of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text
that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate
and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment
cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum
of women.
standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants,
but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The
standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining
the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. & Industrial Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said
case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of
the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated
the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married
women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the
with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets common good.[40] It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts
married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of discriminatory of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the
chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women public.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage
simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
and the Constitution. foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer
laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized
as a sex-plus discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and
other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against
on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination petitioner.
laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women,
but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United SO ORDERED.
States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination
against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex.[35]
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful.[36] Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must
remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or
BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not
on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the
workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one
case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was
regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of
the flight attendants.[37]
5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of
the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against EN BANC
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. G.R. No. 143855
her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR.,
and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M.
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY,
policy.[39] Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law FRANKLIN BAUTISTA,
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the CARPIO,
relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, CARPIO MORALES,
 VELASCO, JR.,* wholly owned by Filipino
NACHURA,* citizens.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but For the first two years of
- versus - BRION,* less than R.A. 8762s effectivity,
PERALTA, US$7,500,000.00 foreign ownership is
BERSAMIN, allowed up to 60%. After
DEL CASTILLO, the two-year period,
ABAD, 100% foreign equity shall
VILLARAMA, JR., be allowed.
PEREZ, Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by
MENDOZA,* and foreigners. Foreign
SERENO,** JJ. investments for
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. establishing a store in
(Executive Secretary), HON. MAR Categories B and C shall
ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and not be less than the
Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA equivalent in Philippine
(Secretary of National Economic Pesos of US$830,000.00.
and Development Authority), Category D US$250,000.00 per store May be wholly owned by
GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA of foreign enterprises foreigners.
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and specializing in high-end or
HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, luxury products
Securities and Exchange
Commission),
Respondents. Promulgated:
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their
September 21, 2010 citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business
with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and
determine the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T.
has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong,
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Sergio Apostol,Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime
Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero
The Facts and the Case Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762
(R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly on the following grounds:
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories: First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control
Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization
US$2,500,000.00 citizens and corporations
and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies.
Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the
retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business,
would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino
retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more
unemployment.
Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly
imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release
of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote
monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary
Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe
Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot
invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the
disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of
Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners
of course claim that, as members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors
in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law
violates the rights of those vendors.
Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not specify how the new law
violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of
the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens.
The Issues Presented
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge
the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Courts Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law
must have a standing to do so.[1] Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a
party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly,
standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will
suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. [2] To put it another way, he
must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the law he complains of.[3]
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the public interest so requires or the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[6]
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
which read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of
the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and
Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of
the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing.Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987
Constitution lays down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to
adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.[8]
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires
the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or
interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside
world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
[9]
competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.[10] The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between
protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments
instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed
such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of
course an exercise of the police power of the State. A persons right to property,
whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without
due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or
R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition
assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to substantive
due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise
of police power.[11] The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail
trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act,
lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos
right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to
engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the
entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court
has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional
mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would
eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not
mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed
to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be
allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives,
door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has
prejudiced and can prejudice the local small and medium enterprises since its
implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No
costs. SO ORDERED.