MARIO J. MENDEZONA ,et al,petitioners, versus
the evidence could not have been
JULIO H. OZAMIZ,et al, respondents
February 6, 2002
Facts:
A suit was instituted on September 25, 1991 by the
petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita
M. Mendezona as initial plaintiff and in
the amendedcomplaint filed on October 7, 1991,
herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona
joined as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the
petitioners as plaintiff therein allegedthat petitioner
spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M.
Mendezona petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona
and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land each
in Lahug, Cebu city with similar areas 3462, 3466
and 3468 square meters covered and described in
TCT Nos 116834, 116835 and 116836. The
petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership
over their respective properties from a deed
of AbsoluteSale executed in their favor by Carmen
Ozamiz and in consideration of P 1,040,000. It
appears than on January 15, 1991, the respondents
instituted the petition for guardianship with RTC
Oroquieta, City alleging that Carmen Ozamiz had
become disoriented and could not recognize most of
her friends and could no longer take care of her
properties by reason pf weak mind and
absentmindedness. As guardiansRoberto J.
Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August
6, 1991 with the guardianship court their Inventories
and Accounts including the 10,369 square meters
Lahug property. Said Lahug property covered by
deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed
by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of petitioners. In their
Answer, respondents opposed the claim of
ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the
titles issued to the petitioners are defective and
illegal and the ownership of said properties was
acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as
the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate
and unconscionable. Respondents
further alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen
Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession
of her mental faculties; and that her properties
having been placed in administration, she was
in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.
On September 23, 1992, the
Trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners.
On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed
its decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated
April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the
petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was
actually paid.
HELD:
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL upon the ground of
newly discovered evidence is properly granted only
where there is concurrence of the following
requisites:
1. the evidence had been discovered after trial;
2.
discovered and produced during trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
and
3. the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative, or impeaching
and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably alter the result.
All 3 requisites must characterize the evidence
sought to be introduced at the new trial.
SC finds that the requirement of reasonable
diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As
early as the pre-trial of the case, the name Judge
Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness
for the defendants, herein respondents. That the
respondent chose not to present his is not an indicia
per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a
civil case is free to choose who to present as his
witness. Neither can Judge Durias' testimony in
another case be considered as newly discovered
evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge
Durias' which were existing before and during the
trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at
the trial The testimony of Judge Durias has been in
existence waiting only to be elicited from him by
questioning.
Factual findings of the appellate court are generally
conclusive on the SC which is not a trier of facts. It is
not the function of the SC to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again. However, this rule is not
without exception. If there is a showing that the
appellate court's findings of facts complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse
of discretion, the SC must discard such erroneous
findings of facts. SC finds that the exception applies
in the case at bench.
Simulation is defined as :the declaration of a
fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the
parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of
deception, the appearances of a juridical act which
does not exist or is different from that which was
really executed. The requisites of simulation are:
1. an outward declaration of will different from
the will of the parties;
2. the false appearance must have been
intended by mutual agreement; and
3. the purpose is to deceive third persons.
None of these were clearly shown to exist in
the case at bar.
Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the
appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be
inferred from the mere non-production of the checks.
It was not the burden of the petitioners to prove so. It
is significant to note that the deed of absolute sale is
a notarized document duly acknowledged before a
notary public. As such, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face.
CHUA VS PEOPLE GR 196853 dated July 13,
2015
TOPIC: Newly discovered evidence
FACTS:
Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-
time friends and neighbors. On different dates from
1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PS
Bank checks of varying amounts to See. However,
See claimed that when he deposited the checks,
they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds
or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to
make good the checks. Hence, See filed a
Complaint for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22
(BP 22).
The prosecution filed a Motion to Re-open
Presentation of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion
to Allow Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal
Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003, intending
to introduce the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 as a newly discovered evidence, stating that
“despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x
x x, the same was not located until sometime in
February 2002, when I was having our old
house/office cleaned and ready to be rented out;”
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 qualifies as a newly discovered evidence.
RULING:
NO. The demand letter dated November 30, 1993
deserves no weight and credence not only because
it does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence
within the purview of law but also because of its
doubtful character.
The question of whether evidence is newly
discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e.,
when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive
one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of
due diligence has relevance. We have held that in
order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new
trial, what is essential is not so much the time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor
the time when it first came to the knowledge of the
party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial
but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due
diligence, and whether the movant has exercised
due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has
been observed that the phrase is often equated with
"reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and a good
faith component. The movant for a new trial must not
only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in
support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in
good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that
the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to
obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him.
"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly
discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment."
In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a
newly discovered evidence within the purview of the
law. Per See's statements in his affidavit, the said
evidence was already known to him at the time he
filed his complaint against Chua. It was also
apparently available considering that it was just kept
in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised
reasonable diligence, he could have promptly
located the said demand letter and presented it
during trial. However, the circumstances suggest
otherwise.
Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at
the time he filed the complaint, the same was not
mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint,
which per See's own allegations, was also not
actually received by Chua. In addition, the
prosecution failed to present the original copy of the
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial.
Clearly on the basis of the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot
possibly establish the existence of the second
element of the offense. Indeed, the surrounding
circumstances and the doubtful character of the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 make it
susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction
was a mere afterthought - a belated attempt to fill in
a missing component necessary for the existence of
the second element of BP 22.
PADILLA-RUMBAUA VS. RUMBAUA
G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
TOPIC: New Trial; Pleadings and Practice;
Attorneys;
FACTS:
The present petition traces its roots to the
petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage against the respondent before the RTC.
The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage.

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. The
Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. In its ruling, the CA observed
that the psychiatric report did not mention the cause
of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality
disorder;” and failed to explain why petitioner came
to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity
was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family
Code requires the incapacity to be psychological,
although its manifestations may be physical. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to
perform. Hence, the petition to SC.
The petitioner maintains that vacating the
lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case
to the RTC for further reception of evidence are
procedurally permissible. She argues that the
inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the
fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago,
and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC
would allow her to cure the evidentiary
insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while
mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be
liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of
justice.
ISSUE: Whether the case should be
remanded back to the RTC;
HELD:
NO. A remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new
trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage.
Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside a
judgment or final order already rendered and to
grant a new trial within the period for taking an
appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be
filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence that could not have
been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by
reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have
probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the
aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial, and that would probably alter
the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the
inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former
counsel as basis for a remand. She did not,
however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC
granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not
been negligent in handling the case. Granting
arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new
trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. The negligence that the petitioner
apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation, 503 SCRA 704 (2006),
where we explained: Blunders and mistakes in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground
for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid
reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could
be employed to allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced or learned. This will put a premium on
the willful and intentional commission of errors by
counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the
event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.
G.R. No. 192914
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2dated November 20, 2009
and the. Resolution3 dated June 17, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-
MIN which affirmed with modification the
Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00 convicting
Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting
to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the
Comments5 of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and from the assailed decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north
along Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on
board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda
Toor, their three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and
househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left
and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a
speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and
coming from Malaybalay headed south towards
Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the
right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by
swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the
road and applying the brakes, but he was moving
too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-
up. The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and
immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of
lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the
Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital in Valencia City,
Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open
fracture of the humerus of the right arm and
displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal
femur of the right lower extremity which required two
surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of
the accident and was unable to return to her job as
the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about
P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00 for
Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area
swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor,
Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular bone
of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr.
sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area
of his right eye which required suturing. The damage
sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00.
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City
Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner
with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in
an Amended Information which was filed with Branch
10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City. The information
reads:
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning
at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City, Province
of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, in negligent, careless, imprudent manner and
without precaution to prevent accident [to] life and
property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color
white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by
PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as
a result hit and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle,
Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266
driven and owned by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR.,
and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor,
Jr., 3 years old and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan,
17 years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-up
was damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00 and
spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and Rosalinda Toor,
Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan
sustained the following injuries to wit:
MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right
shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus
right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced,
subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
victim in such amount that they are entitled to under
the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in
relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN
RELATION TO THE FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations
omitted)
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the
petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the Information in this case. 7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation
of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his
employment and transferred residence. His
whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was
not presented as a witness by his new counsel.8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in
absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the
accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged,
he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an
indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One
[1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum as minimum and
to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision
Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant
the amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as
moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty
Thousand [P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses
incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of
Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle
Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand
[P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in
the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4,
2006, which included an order for the arrest of the
petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new
trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of
law or irregularities have been committed during trial
that are allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights.
He claimed that he was not able to present evidence
during trial because he was not notified of the
schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the
case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.)
purportedly left the country.11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor
opposed the motion for new trial filed by the
petitioner.12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was
denied by the lower court pronouncing that notices
have been duly served the parties and that the
reason given by the petitioner was self-serving.13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner
filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006
by registered mail to the CA, on both questions of
facts and laws.14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty imposed, the dispositive portion thereof
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the
petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court
AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April
2006 Decision of the [RTC] of Malaybalay City,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the
evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points
to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the
records further reveals that the pictures taken after
the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all
coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which are in whole consistent and
believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner
that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly
biased and hearsay testimonies which do not
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
addition, there was no existing evidence to show that
there was an improper motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses.16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to
move for a new trial as baseless.17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty
is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods that is –
imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by
reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it
been intentional, would have constituted a less
grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article
365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the CA, in its
Resolution19 dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for
review before this Court, praying that the applicable
law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross
misappreciation of facts committed by the court a
quo and by the CA be given a second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO
ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE
APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in denying the
petitioner’s motion for new trial or to re-open the
same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities,
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner,
have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on
Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The Court shall
grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced
at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis
ours)
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes
that there was an error of law or irregularities
committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in
absentia and deemed that he had waived his right to
present evidence resulting to denial of due process,
a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and
rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already
been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had
already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there
was already an initial presentation of evidence for
the defense when his whereabouts became
unknown.
The petitioner’s claims that he had not testified
because he did not know the schedule of the
hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had
already been terminated with the departure of Toor,
Sr., do not merit our consideration.21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.22 It is established
that notices have been served to the counsel of the
petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear
on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the
petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in
violation of the constitutional right to due process are
doomed to fail.23
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such
opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14,
1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of
which was duly sent to the addresses on record of
petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they
failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they
later alleged that they were not notified of said
setting. Petitioner’s counsel never notified the court
of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a
wrong address from the very beginning, eventually
jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly,
therefore, petitioner and her counsel were given all
the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now
complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s right to
due process when it was by their own fault that they
lost the opportunity to present evidence.25 (Citation
omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly
had previous notice of the criminal case filed against
him and was given the opportunity to present
evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not in
any way deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he
forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by
not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings.26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the
case was already terminated resulting to his failure
to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has
ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with
his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the
case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about
the status and progress of the case from time to time
and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back,
relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also its
responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a
system for the receipt of mail intended for
them.27 (Citations omitted)
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the
petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in
which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance
of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of
concern towards the incident, and the people who
suffered from it. While there was no showing in the
case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was
grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the
notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to
blame but the petitioner himself in not exercising
diligence in informing his counsel of his
whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the
OSG that there is neither rule nor law which
specifically requires the trial court to ascertain
whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently
communicated with his client.28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge
Principe,29 the Court held that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless,
there is no reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its
favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence
and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the
right to due process cannot elicit this Court’s
approval or even sympathy. It is petitioner’s duty, as
a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. x x x.30 (Citations
omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner
anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument
still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it."31 The Court
agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a
new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence
which was available during trial but was not
presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the
course of the trial against [the petitioner’s]
substantive rights do not exist."32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote
efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence
thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed
only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity
and substantial justice, which is not present here.
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.34 (Citations omitted and italics in the
original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to
waive the procedural rules in order to grant the
motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no
legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial.
The Court believes that the petitioner was given the
opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this
opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough
to ask about the status of the criminal case against
him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of
the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – x x x.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that
the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that
it be without malice; (4) that material damage results
from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place.35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence
have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and claims that their
testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr.
is the real culprit when he turned left without looking
for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules
resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly
appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented
in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were
the witnesses’ narrations of the accident credible
and worthy of belief, their accounts were also
consistent and tallied on all significant and
substantial points.36 These witnesses’ testimonies
are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the
accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings
in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven
by Toor, Sr., together with his family and a
househelper as his passengers, was turning left
along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle
position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner.
He noted skid marks made by the bus and explained
that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able to
do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could
not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because
there was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to the
right instead and applied breaks to avoid the
accident. The investigator clearly testified that, on
the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to
the error of the bus driver who was driving too fast,
as evinced by the distance from the skid marks
towards the axle.37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.’s pick-up
turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and
a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The
truck was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was
running fast and overtaking the big truck from the
right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and
pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the
impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw
that the four passengers of the pick-up were
unconscious.38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving
towards the center of Aglayan on board her
employer’s pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus
overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their
vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of
the pick-up and hit her head on the ground.39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-
up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5
bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right
side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and
all his passengers.40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses
conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was
moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which
was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when
the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he
applied the brakes but because he was moving fast,
the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of significance and influence.
This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the
conduct of the witnesses."41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to
deviate from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not
biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the
witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed
a traffic violation and thus, he should be the one
blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without
merit.1âwphi1
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5
bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the
right shoulder of the road and overtook another
south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the
intersection, obviously to give way to another vehicle
about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for
him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front
and traveling in the same direction had already
slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which
was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public
market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it
was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his
speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to
allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead,
he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to
swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake
the truck, entering the intersection and directly
smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to
observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting
injury or damage to other persons and things, the
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the
Super 5 bus.42

In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:

Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates

all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the
right side of the road or highway. When overtaking
another, it should be made only if the highway is
clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle.
Overtaking while approaching a curve in the
highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not
allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when
overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a
high degree of care and diligence to avoid
collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to
it that vehicles coming from the opposite
direction are not taken unaware by his presence
on the side of the road upon which they have the
right to pass.44 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)

Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not

noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law
provides that the one overtaking on the road has the
obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction
know his presence and not the other way around as
the petitioner suggests.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,

the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the
Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN
are AFFIRMED.