Professional Documents
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The law relating to bail is founded on the Constitution generally and the Criminal
Procedure Act1 in particular. Bail may be defined as an agreement between the
accused (and his sureties as the case may be) and the court that the accused will pay a
certain sum of money fixed by the court, should he fail to appear to attend his trial on
a certain date2. A bond on the other hand is the sum of money which the person to be
released (or his surety) binds himself to pay, if he fails to appear or attend his trial on
the agreed date. Where a person gives an undertaking to appear at a police station or a
court without binding himself to forfeit any sum of money in default of such
appearance he is said to have entered a recognisance. The guiding provisions
regarding bail are to be found in sub-section one of section 148 of the Criminal
Procedure Act which states:
1
See sections 148-163 of the Criminal Procedure Act generally.
2
Brown, D. (1970) Criminal Procedure in Uganda and Kenya, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2nd Ed.
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was arrested, no formal charge has been laid against him he must be set free unless
the police officer in question reasonably believes that the offence suspected to have
been committed is a serious one. (See section 64 (1) (c) CPA).
Where a person was arrested without warrant and a formal charge has been laid
against him while under the custody of the police; but there is insufficient evidence on
which to proceed with the charge and thus further inquiries must be carried out or the
offence does not appear to be a serious one; a police officer in charge of a police
station may, upon that person executing a bond, with or without sureties, to appear
before a court if so required, release him on police bail. (See section 64 (2) CPA).
When a person is admitted to bail by a police officer, no bail money is paid to such
police officer, in stead the person may be required to execute a bond with or without
sureties, to appear before such police officer at a date to be determined by such police
officer. To this effect section 31 (4) of the Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act
provides:
“Notwithstanding any other written law for the time being in force relating to
the grant of bail by police officers, no fee or duty shall be chargeable upon bail
bonds in criminal cases, recognisances to prosecute or to give evidence, or
recognisances for personal appearance or otherwise issued or taken by a police
officer”.
2
o undertaking in writing to observe specified
requirements as to his conduct while released on bail,
o getting another person acceptable to the police to
acknowledge in writing, that he is acquainted with him
and regards him as a responsible person who is likely to
appear in court to answer the charge;
o the accused himself or another person acceptable to the
police, entering into an agreement, with or without
security, to forfeit a specified sum of money in the
event he fails to appear in court to answer the charge;
o the accused himself or another person acceptable to the
police, depositing with the police, a specified sum of
money to be forfeited in the event he fails to appear in
court to answer the charge.
3
Admission to bail by a court is also subject to the provisions of section 148 of the
Criminal Procedure Act which lays down circumstances under which an accused
person may not be admitted to bail by a court of law.
There are five stages in the hearing and determination of an application for bail. The
first is the submission of the application for bail to the court by the accused person,
his advocate or a relative. The second stage is for the court to ask the Prosecuting
Attorney whether he has any objection to the grant of bail or whether there are any
legal impediments to he grant of bail; for instance whether in the instant case bail is
proscribed under section 148 (4) – (5) CPA. If the Prosecuting Attorney objects to
bail on the basis of certain allegations, such allegations must be satisfactorily
substantiated. The Prosecuting Attorney may do this by filing an affidavit or adducing
evidence in some other way; depending on what the court considers to be most
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convenient. While an affidavit may strengthen the Prosecution’s arguments against
the grant of bail; the fact that there is an affidavit will not automatically lead the court
to refuse the application for bail. The court has to exercise its discretion and arrive at
its decision judicially. Makame, J. (as he then was) had occasion to point out the
value to be attached to affidavits in an application for bail in the case of Shabel v. R
(1976) LRT 4, when he stated3:
“For my part, I do not propose to canonise affidavits, which are intended to
facilitate the administration of justice and not hamper it. Mr. Mwakabuta’s
affidavit may not be a model of elegance and precision but it adequately
informs and it is upon the court to weigh up the information and decide. There
is no magic in affidavits, and one can of course lie fluently even on oath in the
witness box in court. It is in the last analysis good sense and judicial
experience which the court must employ in exercising its discretion as to
whether or not to release on bail.”
The third stage is the decision of the court. The granting or refusing to grant bail by
courts of law in respect of bailable offences is a matter in the discretion of the Judge
or magistrate. Since this is a judicial discretion it must be exercised judicially. Long
ago Lord Mansfield defined “judicial discretion” thus:
“It means sound discretion guided by Law. It must be governed by rule, not by
humour. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular”.
(See R v. Wilkes, 4 Burr 2527).
In bail applications, therefore, a magistrate must exercise judicial discretion in
arriving at his decision on the competing claims, namely, the individual’s right to his
freedom and the need to protect the interests of Society within the legal, social,
economic and political environment of that Society. The need to balance the
competing claims is premised on the constitutional principle that bail is a right and not
a privilege. In Tito Douglas Lyimo v R., (1979) LRT No. 55, Mwesiumo J (as he then
was) observed thus:
“Bail is a right rather than a privilege unless the court is convinced that to
grant it will defeat the ends of justice as a failure of the accused to appeaser
before the court to stand his trial or that by granting it the accused would
tamper with the investigations or with exhibits which are to be tendered before
the court at the time of trial”
3
Cited as: Saidi Gurhal Shabel and 3 Others v. R., (1976) LRT 4.
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is satisfied that the accused person would so interfere or has already started to
interfere, the application for bail should be refused. However an allegation as
to such interference or possible interference must be satisfactorily proved by
the Prosecuting Attorney. In Bhagwanji Kakubhai’s case (supra) Wilson Ag.
CJ said “ There should be a definite allegation of tampering or attempted
tampering… supported by proved or admitted facts showing reasonable cause
for the belief that such interference with the course of justice was likely to
occur if the accused is released”.
¾ Whether the applicant will abscond.
¾ Whether the applicant is likely to commit other offences while on bail.
¾ Whether release of the applicant will adversely affect peace and good order.
This is in accordance with the test in all bail applications which we saw above:
“whether the grant of bail would be detrimental to the interests of justice and
good order and the keeping of public peace”. In Abdul Nassor v. R., I TLR (R)
144; where the accused was charged with offences of assault and the
prosecution resisted an application for bail, on the ground iter alia that if
released on bail there would be unrest or further breach of the peace among
Somalis and Baluchis in the Nzega area where the offence was alleged to have
been committed; the High Court granted the application for bail, stating that it
thought law enforcement authorities would cope with such a situation if it
arose. Nevertheless the High Court took heed of the allegation, for one of the
conditions it attached to the bail was that the accused should remain in Tabora
and its immediate environs (some seventy five miles from Nzega) until it
became necessary for him to go to Nzega to take his trial.
¾ Whether the offence is a serious one. It is logical that the more serious the
offence the greater the punishment it attracts, and the greater will be the
accused person’s temptation to flee and to evade justice.
¾ Whether the sureties are reliable. In essence bailis the delivery of a party
accused of a crime into the hands of his sureties. As such, the accused person
is accounted by law to be in the custody of his sureties, who bind themselves
on the pain of forfeiting their bonds, to produce the accused before the court
on an appointed day. It is therefore logical that the sureties should satisfy the
court that they are reliable members of the society and are able to ensure that
the accused will be there to take his trial. The court must therefore enquire into
the reliability and substantiality of the proposed sureties. A known criminal or
a person who is himself facing a criminal charge would definitely not be a
reliable surety.
¾ Whether the applicant has a known and reliable domicile.
¾ How long has the applicant been in custody? The nature of the evidence in
support of the charge. In a situation where the application for bail is made
when the hearing is already under way the court is perfectly entitled to take
into account the strength of the evidence so far received. If the evidence
suggests that there is a strong case against the applicant, and the offence is one
of those that attract a custodial sentence, it would be wise for the court to
refuse to grant the application.
¾ The age of the applicant. In appropriate cases the age of the applicant may be
taken into account. It is felt that, as far as possible, young children ought not to
be kept in custody where their character is likely to be soiled by rubbing
shoulders with hard-core criminals. In most cases it is neither in the interests
of such children nor those of Society to remand them in custody.
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If the court decides to grant the application for bail then the matter goes to the forth
stage that is the decision of the court as to the conditions to impose on the grant of
bail. In relation to the conditions to impose the court may be guided by the provisions
of section 148 (6) – (7) CPA; for instance: surrender of passport, restriction to
movement, periodic reporting to a police station, abstention from visiting specified
localities or premises etc. In any case the court may impose any other condition which
in the court’s opinion appears proper and just and will ensure the appearance of the
accused person for the trial of his case.(See section 148 (7) (c) CPA). The fifth and
final stage is the requirement of the accused to execute a bond with or without sureties
as the court may determine in accordance with the circumstances of the case.
Under the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act where the value of the
property involved exceeds ten million shillings; jurisdiction to consider an application
for bail is vested in the High Court. (See section 29 (4) (d) Economic and Organised
Crimes Control Act).
¾ Non-bailable offences
In terms of Section 148 (5) CPA a person charged with the following offences may
not be granted bail by a police officer or a court. The offences falling in that category
are:
• murder, treason, armed robbery, or defilement,
• illicit trafficking in drugs against the Drugs and Prevention of Illicit
Traffic in Drugs Act,
• an offence involving heroin, cocaine, prepared opium, opium poppy
(papaver setigerum), poppy straw, coca plant, coca leaves, cannabis
sativa or cannabis resin (Indian hemp), methaqualone (mandrax), catha
edulis (khat) or any other narcotic drug or psychotropic substance,
where the value of such drugs has been certified by the Commissioner
for National Co-ordination of Drugs Control Commission, as
exceeding ten million shillings,
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¾ Restrictions on Bailable Offences
Section 148 (4) and (5) (b) – (e) CPA provides that bail may not be granted by a
police officer or a court under the following circumstances, that is:
• if the Director of Public Prosecutions, certifies in writing that it is likely that
the safety or interests of the Republic would thereby be prejudiced; (See
section 148 (4) CPA.
• if it appears that the accused person has previously been sentenced to
imprisonment for a term exceeding three years, (See section 148 (5) (b) CPA)
• if it appears that the accused person has previously been granted bail by a
court and failed to comply with the conditions of the bail or absconded; (See
section 148 (5) (c) CPA). It may be noted in analysis of this provision that
failure to comply with conditions of bail will, as a matter of logic, include
commission of an offence while on bail.
• if it appears to the court that it is necessary that the accused person be kept in
custody for his own protection or safety; (See section 148 (5) (d) CPA),
• if the offence with which the person is charged involves actual money or
property whose value exceeds ten million shillings unless that person deposits
cash or other property equivalent to half the amount or value of actual money
or property involved and the rest is secured by execution of a bond: (See
section 148 (5) (e) CPA. The condition of depositing cash does not apply to
police bail since in terms of section 31(4) of the Police Force and Auxiliary
Services Act, no fee is chargeable on police bail.
• if the act or acts constituting the offence with which a person is charged
consists of a serious assault causing grievous harm on or a threat of violence
to another person or of having, or possessing a firearm or an explosive. This
provision was added to the CPA by virtue of an amendment introduced by
Act No. 12 of 1987. Offences which easily come to mind as non-bailable by
virtue of these provisions are robbery, causing grievous bodily harm and
attempted murder. Robbery, for instance, is defined under our Penal Code as
stealing with the actual use of violence or threat of violence to any person (or
property) at or immediately before or immediately after such stealing, which
actual violence or threat of it is for the purpose of obtaining or retaining the
thing stolen or for preventing or overcoming resistance to its being stolen or
retained. Now, since the statutory restriction speaks of ‘an act or acts
constituting the offence …consists of a serious assault causing grievous harm
or threat of violence’ to another person, it follows that the offence of robbery
will generally be non-bailable where the violence causes grievous bodily
harm.
¾ Mandatory Conditions
Section 148 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act lays down the following mandatory
conditions, that is:
o surrender by the accused person to the police of his passport or any
other travel document; and
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o restriction of the movement of the accused to the area of the town,
village or other area of his residence.
¾ Discretionary Conditions
Section 148 (7) CPA provides that the court may also impose any one or more of the
following conditions which appear to the court to be likely to result in the appearance
of the accused for the trial or resumption of the trial at the time and place required or
as may be necessary in the interests of justice or for the prevention of crime, namely–
o requiring the accused to report at specified intervals to a police
station or other authority within the area of his residence; or
o requiring the accused to abstain from visiting a particular
locality or premises, or associating with certain specified
persons, or
o any other condition which the court may deem proper and just
to impose in addition to the preceding conditions.
When a person is admitted to bail pending appeal the Court shall order that the
execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the hearing
of his appeal. (See section 368 (1) (b) CPA).
The following rules laid down by the Criminal Procedure Act must be borne in mind
where appeals generally are concerned:
• a person if aggrieved may appeal to the High Court against any finding,
sentence or order made or passed by a subordinate court in its ordinary
jurisdiction, (See section 359 CPA).
• Where the sentence, finding or order appealed against was made by a
subordinate Court in exercise of extended jurisdiction powers in terms of
section 173 CPA, the appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal, (See section 359
and 175 CPA),
• an appeal to the High Court may be on a matter of fact as well as on a matter
of law, (See section 359 (2) CPA),
• no appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded
guilty and has been convicted on such plea by a subordinate court except as to
the extent or legality of the sentence, (See section 360 (1) CPA),
• leave to appeal shall have to be obtained from the High Court in cases in
which a subordinate court has passed a sentence of a fine not exceeding one
thousand shillings only, or of corporal punishment only imposed on a person
under sixteen years of age, or a sentence of imprisonment in default of the
payment of a fine, (See section 360 (2) CPA,
• notice of intention to appeal must be given to the subordinate Court within ten
days from the date of the finding, sentence or order and, in the case of a
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sentence of corporal punishment only, within three days of the date of such
sentence; (See section 361 (a) CPA)
• the petition of appeal must be lodged in the High Court within forty-five days
from the date of the finding, sentence or order, ( See section 361 (b) CPA),
(provided the computation of such period shall exclude the time that was
required to obtain a copy of the judgement or order appealed against. Further,
the High court may, for good cause, admit an appeal out of time).
• the Director of Public Prosecutions must give notice of his intention to
appeal to the subordinate court within thirty days of the acquittal, finding,
sentence or order against which he wishes to appeal, (See section 379 (a)
CPA)
• the Director of Public Prosecutions must lodge his petition of appeal within
forty-five days from the date of such acquittal, finding, sentence or order,
(See section 379 (b) CPA).
Considerations regarding bail pending appeal differ from those relating to bail
pending trial4 some of which we saw earlier. The grant of bail pending appeal
primarily depends upon the cogency of the grounds of appeal although ultimately the
court will have to exercise its discretion in examining the relevant facts of the
particular case. Various factors may be taken into account however the following
three are cardinal; namely:
9 whether leave to appeal has been granted,
9 whether there is a strong likelihood of the success of the appeal,
9 where there is a risk that the sentence will have been served by the
time the appeal is heard.
The general rule laid down in Habib Kara Vesta (1934) 1 EACA 191 is that bail
should only be granted in special circumstances pending appeal. This rule has been
faithfully followed. However it was observed in Musozi (1936 – 51) 6 ULR 161, that
in circumstances where the sentence imposed is short and it would likely have been
served or a substantial part of it, by the time the appeal is heard and decided,
consideration should be in favour of grant of bail pending appeal. In rejoinder to this,
Trevelyan J, in Somo v. R., (1972) E.A. 476 warns as follows:
“It seems to me that where these applications are considered it must never be
forgotten that the presumption is that when the applicant was convicted , he
was properly convicted…. That is why where he is undergoing a custodial
sentence, he must demonstrate… that there are exceptional or unusual
circumstances in the case”.
Admission to bail pending appeal does not appear to be taken lightly by the courts.
Even in circumstances of a short sentence passed by a subordinate Court, likely to
outrun the decision on the appeal, the Uganda Court of Appeal in Shah v. R5., rather
than grant bail pending appeal, suggested that steps should be taken to see that the
hearing of the appeal; is expedient. The court stressed further that bail pending appeal
should be granted only in exceptional circumstances.
The most fundamental ground for consideration in bail pending appeal is whether
the appeal has an overwhelming chance of success, and where this is shown then
there is no justification for depriving the applicant of his freedom. This rule was laid
4
See the judgement of Sheridan J, in Masran v. R. (1960) EA 321
5
1976 Court of Appeal (UR) of 13 August 1976.
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down in Lamba v. R., (1958) EA 3376 as the test in applications for bail pending
appeal. In Motichand v R., (1972) EA 399, Muli J (as he then was) who was
disinclined to adopt the test in its full rigidity, granted bail pending appeal on the
ground that the appeal had a probable chance of success. In refusing to follow the
decision in Lamba, Muli J, noted that if the test in Lamba was to apply it would
virtually mean that in all applications for bail, the overwhelming probability of
success of the appeal must be conclusively demonstrated. In doing so, it would be
tantamount to constituting the court hearing the application for bail, a Court of
Appeal.
Section 373 of the CPA provides that a revision may be initiated in principally three
ways, namely: one by the High Court suo motu calling for a record of a subordinate
court, two by a subordinate court reporting and submitting a record to the High Court
for orders and three the record of a subordinate court coming to the knowledge of the
High Court in some other way. It is possibly the latter which appears to leave it open
for an accused person to petition the High Court for revision.
Further section 373 of the CPA grants wide powers to the High Court in the exercise
of its powers of revision which are very similar to the powers of the High Court in its
appellate jurisdiction. Among those granted, is the power of the High Court to grant
bail pending revision which is specified in paragraph (a) of sub-section one of section
373 CPA. Briefly this paragraph states that where, the record being reviewed shows
that the accused person was convicted by the subordinate court, the High Court may
exercise any of the powers conferred on it as a court of appeal by sections 366, 368
and 369 CPA. Section 368 CPA empowers the High Court to suspend the sentence
imposed by the subordinate court and admit the accused person to bail pending
(mutatis mutandis) revision.
6
Raghbin Singh Lamba v R (1958) EA 337.
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Where the confirming court is any other court (not the High Court) sub-section six of
section 172 CPA grants such confirming court the discretion to release the person
sentenced to imprisonment on bail pending an order from the High Court in exercise
of its powers under section 385 CPA.
In wrapping up on the question of bail let us recall the cardinal point that bail
ultimately secures the temporary release of an accused person. There are about
six situational settings under which the accused person may be temporarily released:
• While in the custody of a police officer following an arrest but before being
taken to court. He may be admitted to police bail by executing a bond. See
sections 64 – 69 CPA read together with sections 148 – 160 CPA. No money
may be paid when an accused person is released on police bail. See section 31
(4) of the Police force and Auxiliary Services Act, Cap 322.
• When the accused person is charged before a court but the case against him
cannot proceed for justifiable reasons. In such a situation he may be released
on bail pending the trial of his case. See sections 148 – 162 CPA.
• When the case has already been tried and concluded and the accused person
found guilty and convicted but he wishes to challenge the conviction by way
of an appeal. In this case he may be released on bail pending appeal in
terms of section 368 CPA.
• If after he has been convicted and sentenced by a subordinate court, the High
Court calls the record of the subordinate court for purposes of revision in
terms of section 372 CPA. He may be released on bail pending the revision
of his case. See section 373 CPA.
• When he has been found guilty by the High Court, but the Judge reserves
certain questions for reference to a full bench of two or more judges, the
decision of which may affect the outcome of he trial in terms of section 318
(1) CPA. In such a case he may be released on bail pending the outcome of
the reference to a full bench. See section 318 (2) CPA.
• After being convicted and sentenced by a subordinate court in cases which
require confirmation by a superior court and while awaiting such
confirmation. He may be released on bail pending confirmation in terms of
section 172 of the CPA.
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o or is notified in writing by any surety for the person admitted to bail that the
surety believes that that person is likely to break the condition that he will
appear at the time and place required and for that reason the surety wishes to
be relieved of his obligation as surety,
o police officer may arrest without warrant such person who has been admitted
to bail,
o and produce him before the court which granted such bail or preferably the
court before which he is required for resumption of the trial.
o and before such court a person who is arrested on reasonable suspicion of
planning to abscond or breach the conditions attached to his bail may not be
considered for further bail in the same case. As such his bail is for all intents
and purposes effectively cancelled. (See section 158 CPA).
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¾ On Finalisation of the Case
When the case against the accused person in respect of which the bond was executed
is finalised the bonds are automatically discharged. If a sum of money was deposited
as cash bail that sum of money is refundable.
Judicial wisdom and best practice however teach that; though in logic the jumping of
bail by the accused person may be said to be prima facie proof of the failure of the
surety to ensure his appearance in court on the appointed day; the forfeiture of the
bond should not be automatic. The surety should be given a reasonable opportunity
to explain to the court what he is prepared to do to trace the accused person and he
should be given reasonable time to do so. Georges C.J. warned and pointed out in the
case of R. v. Daleyusuf (1967) HCD No. 244:
“It is preferable that bonds should not forfeited too quickly, if the accused fails
to appear. It is usually best to adjourn the proceedings to allow the surety
some time to find the accused if he thinks he can succeed, and the fact that the
accused is later produced can be taken into account in deciding whether there
should be forfeiture”.
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