Risk Assessment of Propulsion Systems for LNG Carriers
Senichi Sasaki *
1. INTRODUCTION
Infiltration of heat from external air sources and ship motions
causes a portion of the cargo carried by low-temperature
liquefied gas carriers (LNG carriers) to be converted into boil
off gas (BOG). As this gas can be used to power their boilers,
steam turbines have thus become the most common propulsion
system used on LNG carriers. In recent years, however, studies
have been carried out on a variety of other propulsion systems,
including oi!-flred diesel main engines with reliquefaction units,
electric propulsion systems with dual fuel diesel generators,
and dual fuel diesel main engines. Some of these propulsion
systems are already being used on actual ships.
As with general merchant ships. classification society rules do
not include special redundancy requirements for the main
engine and propeller shafting systems of LNG carriers. If the
components are determined to be reliable, then a single main
engine is adequate. As a general requirement, a ship is only
expected to be able to maintain a navigable speed (7 knots or
half the speed required by the rules for fully-loaded condition)
in the event of a single-point failure.
However, despite the lack of special rule requirements, due to
the special characteristics of LNG carriers, including:
Regular sailings demanded as part of the LNG supply
chain
Requirements for main engine standby at terminals,
main engine redundancy is considered to be a general
requirement for LNG projects. Due to this, redundancy is
generally required for LNG carrier propulsion systems,
excluding that equipment which is considered to be highly
reliable. (shaft, reduction gear, etc.)
Redundancy has always been established empirically. For
example, the high and low pressure turbines on steam turbine
driven ships can be operated independently of each other.
Further, installing two diesel main engines and two propulsion
motors for electric propulsion systems has become common
practice. In this way, equipment and machinery redundancy
was ensured merely by installing two of each piece of
machinery. Until now, there have been no real cases where the
level of redundancy was analyzed theoretically.
Redundancy is required not only for propulsion systems, but
* Research Institute, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK)
ClassNK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2009
also for BOG treatment systems as well. When BOG treatment
systems break down. BOG will be inevitably emitted to the
atmosphere. In order to deal with such situations, IGC Code
requires that a duplicate BOG system be maintained. For steam
turbine driven ships, the main boiler can also perform BOG
treatment. The surplus steam generated by combustion in the
main boiler is treated by the dump condenser, and the surplus
heat quantity is released into sea water. Dual fuel diesel engines,
reliquefaction units, and gas combustion units may be used as
BOG treatment systems in place of the boiler. Of these,
however. IGC code only requires redundancy for reliquefaction
units, and there are no requirements for the other systems.
This report compiles the results from an investigation of the
redundancy requirements for propulsion and BOG treatment
system using risk assessment as ajudgnient tool.
2. Systems to be assessed for risk
The basic configurations of the four kinds of propulsion
system (including BOG treatment system) to be assessed for
risk are shown in Fig. I.
Conventional steam turbine propulsion system:
This system consists of one low pressure turbine, one
high pressure turbine, and two main boilers. With regard
to generators, two generators driven by steam turbine and
one generator driven by diesel engine were considered.
Oil-fired diesel engine propulsion system:
This is a system that consists usually of two oil-fired
diesel main engines. With regard to generators, a system
with three generators driven by diesel engine was
examined. Reliquefaction unit are generally used as the
BOG treatment system tr this propulsion type.
(e) Electric propulsion system using DFD generator
engine:
This is an example of a typical system using DFD engine.
Four generators driven by DFD engine and two motors
for propulsion are provided. Although this may use either
a reliquefaction unit, a gas combustion unit (GCU), or an
auxiliary boiler as its BOG treatment system, use of a
single gas combustion unit was examined in this case.
(d) DFD propulsion engine system:
63
This system theoretically uses a DFD engine for engines and three generators driven by diesel engine.
propulsion, however, this type of system has not yet been Similar to (e), one gas combustion unit is taken as the
developed. This system consists of two DFD main BOG treatment system.

Main boue
I
Dump Condenser
=
Reduction Gear

BOG Compressor BOG

T
e-jf
H. P. Turbine

L. P. Tu bine
D/ E Cargo Tank

(a) Steam turbine propulsion system

DE

(b) Oil-fired diesel engine propulsion system with re-liquefaction unit

GCU I'll'
Reti luction Gear
D/ E

Propulsion
O/E BOG Compressor
Motor

. D/E

Cargo Tank
DJE

(e) Electric propulsion system using DFD generator engines

GCU

H. P. BOG Compressor
O/E
2-stroke
Main Engine
DE

2-stroke
Main Engine Cargo Tank

(d) DFD propulsion engine system

- Steam Electric '4- Boil-off Gas

Figure 1 Subject propulsion system for risk assessment

Fuel Oil

CIassNK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2909

3. Risk assessment 3.2 Risk and availability
The redundancy of machinery and equipment is determined Risk is defined as failure rate x consequence of failure.
after completing the three steps below. Generally in examinations of machinery systems. the
STEP I: Using reliability analysis. find the failure rate consequence of failure can be classified into the categories
and the mean time to repair the entire system. shown in Table I. However, fiar the purpose of the present
STEP 2: Using the failure rate and mean time to repair, research, for instance, the consequence of a failure in the
find the risk and availability. propulsion system is identified and analyzed as "loss of self-
STEP 3: Using the risk and availability as judgment propelling ability". Accordingly, risk is simply expressed as
indices, determine the redundancy of the failure rate.
equipment.
Table I Classification of tile consequence of failure
Category* Explanation
3.1 Reliability analysis Total loss of system, loss of life or
Using reliability software developed by Relex Software Co., Catastrophic serious human injuries remaimng
the failure rate and mean time to repair of the entire system as after effects
Major damage to system resulting
were determined by Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The top events Severe in loss of self- propelling ability or
were fixed first in FTA, the basic events (failure of equipment) serious human inuries
Damage to system making reduced
up to the top event were developed, and failure rate (or mean speed operation inevitable or
Significant
time between failures) and mean time to repair were assigned hunlan Injuries
to each basic event so that the failure rate of the top event could Minor damage to system that does
Minor not lead to failure of normal
be determined. For instance, Fig. 2 shows an example of an navigation and no human injuries
analysis of the steam turbine propulsion system. Here, the top Note: Classification according to 1MO FSA Guidelines
event is "loss of self- propelling ability" while the intermediate In addition to risk, availability is also one of the indices for
events are 'propeller shafting system failure", "turbine failure", judgment in the present research. The availability of equipment
"power failure", "S/TI failure" and "DIE failure". "Propeller A is given by the failure rate A (cases/hour) and the repair rate
shafting system failure" is comprised of two basic events u (cases/hour) as in the equations below.
namely "propeller failure" and "shaft failure". By inputting the A=i/(2+p) (1)
failLire rate and the mean time to repair for these basic events, 2=l/MTBF (2)
the final failure rate and mean time to repair can be obtained u=l/MTBR (3)
for when the system reaches "loss of self-propelling ability" Here, MTBF: Mean time between failures (hours/cases)
level of failure. MTTR: Mean time to repair (hours/cases)

Fault Tree
Loss of self-propelling
ability
Propeller failure
.....J Propeller shaft (OR
j
system failure Shaft failure
Red. Gear failure
HP turbine failure
Turbine failure AND
H LP turbine failure

S/Ti failure

Power outage AND S/T2 failure

DIE failure

Figure 2 Analysis example of a steam turbine propulsion system (Partial)

65
ClassNK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2009
3.3 Estimation of failure rate and consist of the BOG treatment system and the power supply
Data such as failure rate assigned to basic events has been units required for powering these systems.
obtained from the Ship Reliability Investigation Committee
database (SRIC database) of the National Maritime Research Table 3 BOG treatment system to be assessed
System to be assessed Generator
institute. However, reliability data does not exist for equipment
(a) Main boilers x 2 (conventional ST s 2. DE s I
with few failures or equipment with practically no operating system)
records. Data for equipment with few failures was estimated by (b) Re-liquefaction unit DE x 3
(e) Gas combustion unit (gas burner x 2) DFD x 4
the classifying frequency of failures. Further, practically no
(c) Gas combustion unit (gas burner x 1) DFD x 4
operating records exist for machinery like DFD engines. For (d) Gas combustion im it (gas burner s 2) DE x 3
such machinery, the failure rate distribution of oil-fired diesel Note: DE: Oil-fired diesel engine: DFD: Dual fuel diesel engine: ST:
engines was determined, and the mean value of parts with high Steam turbine

failure rates was found. That is, the DFD engine was treated as The system in (e)' of Table 3 is the case of the system of (e)
an engine with comparatively high failure rate and the failure having one gas burner, and is installed to study the redundancy
rate was estimated. of gas burner.

3.4 Propulsion systems to be assessed 4. Results of assessment

To study redundancy of machinery or equipment constituting 4.1 Redundancy of propulsion system
the propulsion system, risk assessment was carried out Table 4 and Fig. 3 show the calculated results of Table 2.
considering the top event of FTA as 'loss of self-propelling
Tab le 4 RedLindancy of propulsion system
ability". Table 2 shows the system to be assessed.
X (cases!
Systems to be assessed A
1000 hrs)
Table 2 Propulsion system to be assessed
(a) Steam turbine system 0.751 0.9982
Generator (conventional system)
System to be assessed Main engine
engine (b) Oil-fired diesel propelling 0.551 0.9987
(a) Steam turbine LP x 1, HP x 1, ST s 2, machinery sysleni (DE x 2)
system boiler x 2 DE s 1 (b)' Same as above (DE x 1) 1.139 0.9974
(conventional
(e) Electric propulsion system using 0.463 0.9991
system) DFD generator
(h) Oil-fired diesel DE s 2 DE s 3 (propulsion motor x 2)
propulsion
(e)' Same as above 0.483 0.9991
machinery system
(propulsion motor x I)
(b)' Same as above DE s I DE s 3
(d) DFD propulsion machinery (1.463 0.9991
(e) Electric propulsion Propulsion DFD s 4 system (DFD s 2)
system using DFD motor x 2
generator (d) Same as above (DFD s 1) 3.000 0.9945
(e)' Same as above Propulsion DFD s 4
motor s I The following were the findings with regards to redundancy
(d) DFD propulsion DFD x 2 DE x 3 of the propulsion system obtained from the calculated results:
machinery system
(d) Same as above DFD s I DE s 3 The basic systems (b), (e) and (d) have smaller failure
Note: DE: Oil-fired diesel engine: DFD: Dual fuel diesel engine: ST rates, higher availability, and more adequate redundanc'.
Steam turbine compared to the conventional steam turbine propulsion
(b)', (c). (d)' in Table 2 indicate systems with one each of system (a).

oil-fired diesel main engine, propulsion motor and DFD main
engine respectively. By performing risk assessments of such
systems, the redundancy of engines and propulsion motors can
be studied.
3.5 BOG treatment system to be assessed
Even in case of(c)' having one propulsion motor in the
system in (e), the difference in failure rate and
availability in the two systems was not large; this leads to
the judgment that one propulsion motor may be used.
In the systems (b)' and (d)' having one oil-fired diesel
propulsion engine and one DFD propulsion engine, the

To study the redundancy of the equipment constituting the failure rate was clearly higher and the availability lower
than the system in (a). From this, it can be concluded that
reliquefaction unit and gas combustion unit, risk assessment
multiple engines are necessary to obtain a system with
was carried out taking the top event of FTA as "BOG emission
reliability equivalent to or greater than then system in (a'i.
to atmosphere. Table 3 shows the systems to be assessed. The
systems to be assessed are part of the basic system of Fig. 1,

66 CIassNK TECHN ICAL BULLETIN 2009

4.2 Redundancy of BOG treatment system From the calculated results, the following were the Ondings
The results of the calculation are shown in Table 5. Although related to redundancy of the BOG treatment system:
the failure rate was estimated in the analysis of the The systems (b) that included reliquefaction unit and the
reliquefaction unit and the gas combustion unit, the repair time systems (c) and (d) that included gas combustion unit,
could not be estimated, therefore, assessment of the entire were judged to have lower failure rate, more adequate
system was made only by failure rate (or risk). redundancy than the conventional steam turbine
propulsion system (a).
Table 5 Failure rate of BOG treatment system Even in the system (c) consisting of the system (e)
X (cases! having one gas burner, the difference in failure rate
Systems to be assessed
1000 hrs)
(a) Steam turbine system 0.588 compared to (e) was small; this suggested that one gas
(conventional system) burner may be used.
(b) Oil-fired diesel propelling machinery 0.350
system + reliquefaction unit
(e) Electric propulsion system using DFD 0.320
generator + gas combustion unit
(burner x 2)
(e)' Sanie as above 0.330
(burner x I
(d) DFD propulsion machinery system + 0.320
gas combustion unit (burner x 2)

[1/h r] NO
DFD main engine < 1

102
Oil-fired diesel main engine x i
io
io Steam turbine Recommended
a)
(t
t) 1
Oil-fired diesel main engine x 2

(a 10.6 DFO main engine 2

u-

io-? Electric propulsion

10.8
(a) (b) (c) (d)

Consequence of la) Minor I (b) Siqnificant (d) Catastrophic

failure
(i) Risk of propulsion system

Acceptable Elec. propulsion

Oil-fired diesel main
motor DFD M/E
Steam engine
twin / single twin I single
turbine twin I single

twi n single twi n

(ii) Availability of propulsion system

Figure 3 Risk and availability of propulsion system

CIassNK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2009 67

Deift University of Technology
Ship Hydromechanics laboratory
Library
Mekelweg 2 26282 CD Deft
Phone: +31 (0)15 2786873
E-mail: p.w.deheer@tudeIft.nJ