ChinaBrief 2009

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Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 1
January 12, 2009 07:26 AM Age: 1 yrs
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Africa, China and the Asia-Pacific, Economics
By: Wenran Jiang
Since achieving independence five decades ago The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been ravaged by a
dictatorship, war and political strife. Although large in territory and rich in mineral and other precious raw materials, the
DRC is a failed state that has been seemingly incapable of maintaining any semblance of stability. With the lowest
ranking per capita GDP, life expectancy, literacy rate and a host of other human development indicators, it suffers from
rampant corruption on a level of pandemic proportions [1]. Despite an election in 2006 and the deployment of the largest
UN peacekeeping mission in history (18,000 troops), war looms in Congo¶s Eastern region as clashes between rebel
forces and the central government have already displaced up to a million people (All Africa, November 10, 2008). At the
same time, large-scale mining contracts and other economic activities have flowed into the DRC in recent years owing
to the global boom in demand for raw materials. China²a relatively new comer in this new scramble²has committed
to $9 billion for investment in the DRC last year, thus becoming one of the most influential pla yers in the Congolese
economy almost overnight.
Changing Domestic Priorities and China-DRC Relations
China¶s relations with the DRC after its independence in 1960 have been bumpy at best. While Beijing established
revolutionary ³brother-in-arms´ relations with many other new African states immediately after their colonial occupiers
departed, China-DRC diplomatic relations were interrupted twice, and finally stabilized under President Mobutu Sese
Seko in 1972. After Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu in 1997, bilateral ties continued to improve, and the past decade
saw impressive growth in bilateral trade.
China has strategically shifted away from actively supporting radical ideologies around the world in the 1960s and
1970s and moved toward becoming a major economic investor that proclaims neutrality in political matters. Reinventing
itself as the world¶s manufacturing power house has resulted in rapid growth of China¶s demand for energy, minerals
and other resources. As indicated in the Tralac bilateral trade volume figures, Chinese imports from the DRC more than
quadrupled from 2004 to 2007 [2]. Despite the DRC's dismal business environment, China¶s huge appetite for copper,
cobalt, other minerals and the vast potential of the DRC to provide these metals have driven a range of large, medium
and small Chinese companies and banking institutions into the heart of the largest country in Africa. These companies
have built some impressive landmark buildings such as the National Parliament, the People¶s Palace, and the country¶s
largest outdoor venue, Stade des Martyrs (The Martyrs¶ Stadium). China¶s Huawei Technologies Corporation Ltd. has
been laying and upgrading the Congolese telecommunications and Internet infrastructure. China has also provided
training for students through other aid programs as a part of its overall African engagement strategy [3].
A Chinese "Marshall Plan" or Infrastructure for Resources?
Yet the aforementioned projects are dwarfed by the massive $9 billion dollar, multi-year multi-project deal that the two
countries signed in 2008. Negotiations began in the fall of 2007 for the amount of $5 billion, and another $3.5 billion
were added to the deal later. Under the terms of the deal, the Export-Import Bank of China pledged a $9 billion loan and
finance to build and upgrade the DRC¶s road (4,000 km) and rail system (3,200 km) for transportation routes that
connect its extractive industries, and to develop and rehabilitate the country¶s strategic mining sector in return for copper
and cobalt concessions (Reuters, April 22, 2008). In return, China will gain rights to extract 6.8 million tons of copper
and 420,000 tons of cobalt (proven deposit)²and the operations are expected to begin in 2013 [4].
The DRC National Assembly approved the agreement in May 2008. After some adjustment on the Chinese side, three
major Chinese companies, China Railway Group, Sinohydro Corporation and Metallurgical Group Corporation, controls
a total of 68 percent of the new joint venture Sicomines, with the rest of the shares held by Gécamines and the DRC
government [5]. By May 2008, 150 Chinese engineers and technical personnel were already in the DRC working on the
new joint venture (Northern Miner, May 19, 2008).
The scope of this infrastructure in exchange for resources agreement is unprecedented in many ways. The promised
investment is more than three times that of the DRC government¶s annual budget ($2.7 billion for 2007). The Chinese
Ambassador to the DRC hailed the deal as only the beginning of China¶s active promotion of its relations with the DRC.
But Congo¶s Infrastructure Minister Pierre Lumbi praised it as a ³vast Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of our
country¶s basic infrastructure.´ Other than long distance road and rail construction, the package also includes two hydro-
electric dams and the rehabilitation of two airports [6]. If fully disbursed, this will be the single largest Chinese
investment in Africa. No other countries or international financial institutions have come close to initiating such a
massive project in such a short period of time.
Many see the influx of Chinese capital as hope that the DRC can finally move forward with some desperately needed
infrastructure development. President Joseph Kabila stated that ³for the first time in our history, the Congolese people
can see that their nickel and copper is being used to good effect.´ Yet critics have lashed out at the arrangement as a
sellout of DRC¶s natural resources. They argue that the entire arrangement is a ruse intended to veil the Kinshasa¶s
corrupt regime¶s scheme to grab money at the expense of ordinary Congolese. Others have argued that the deal is bad
for Congo due to the huge profits for China. Yet others claim that the Chinese investment will further fuel the armed
conflicts raging in the most resource wealthy parts of the country.
It is difficult to arrive at a precise estimate on the mineral profits for China's initial investment. Estimates have ranged
from $14 billion to $80 billion (Mining Weekly, September 28, 2008). But wit h the recession hitting many major
developed economies, metal prices have declined sharply in recent months. For instance, copper price has dropped from
$9,000 per ton at its peak to the current price of just over $3,000 [7]. Based on various calculations, Chinese profits will
have to be adjusted to the market situation.
It is also hard to imagine, with such large fortune at stake, that Beijing would want to see the DRC destabilized. If
anything, it is in China¶s fundamental interests to build a more secure environment for its long-term presence. That may
explain the specific clause in the agreement which specifies that native Congolese workers will compose 80 percent of
the work force on all projects.
The Lubumbashi Copper Boom and Bust
It is too early to make definitive conclusions about the $9 billion mega deal as many Chinese copper extractors and
smelters in the Southeast province of Katanga have clearly gone through a business cycle of prosperity and decline.
When the worldwide demand for copper and cobalt increased, especially from China, many Chinese enterprises, ranging
from large to small, went to the mining city of Lubumbashi to set up extraction smelting operations. While the large
firms were securely financed and planned to lay the foundations for a long term relationship, many medium and small
sized companies, with limited financial flexibility, went to Congo in the hopes of making a quick buck [8]. But after the
Congolese government placed a ban on raw ore exports in 2007, these small businesses became mainly involved in
processing and trading and found that, even in the midst of the copper rush, earning a quick profit was far from easy.
Unlike well-established Western companies with integrated mining and processing operations, many new Chinese firms
were set up for smelting only. They depended heavily on raw materials collected from individual manual miners and
once the furnace was up and running many of them found that they did not have enough supplies. The more experienced
Western firms, on the other hand, could secure supply for the furnaces from their own large-scale mechanized mining
operations.
When the Katanga provincial governments implemented new regulations, demanding that the processor of minerals
must supply the raw materials from their own mines, many small Chinese smelting plants were forced to stop their
operations due to a lack of resources and increasing cost. While some simply diversified into trading activities for large
firms, others were stuck with their investment in land, plant and other equipment [9].
Contrary to popular perception that the all-powerful central government is behind all the advances of Chinese
enterprises, almost none of the medium-sized and small Chinese companies receive any kind of governmental
assistance. There is not even a Chinese consulate in Lubumbahi [10]. A provincial government minister told the author
that there were very few cultural exchange activities between China and the Katanga province, something quite in
contradiction to the assumption that China is facilitating its commercial interests through a variety of cultural and socio-
political initiatives.
The continuous decline in metal prices has resulted in over 300,000 workers losing their jobs in the mines and factories
around Lubumbashi. The renewed fighting and turmoil in the East has also adversely affected the security situation in
the resource rich province. In the latest development, more than 10 people, including one Chinese citizen, were killed in
Lubumbashi. The government security forces are stretched thin and skyrocketing unemployment is making the city more
difficult to manage (Agence France-Presse, December 26, 2008).
Another ³Great Game´ by the Great Powers?
Despite the deteriorating business operating environment, many Chinese and international businesses continue to expand
in the DRC. ³There is still money to be made,´ as the CEO of a Chinese medium mining firm told the author last fall.
However, the situation has grown increasingly bleaker due to the country¶s shaky stability and falling commodity prices.
The long-term outlook for China¶s role in the DRC is not clear (the same can be said for China's overall strategy toward
Africa). Even if Beijing¶s $9 billion infrastructure for resources project is fully implemented, China will still remain a
newcomer in the Western dominated mining sector of the DRC. For example, the 6.8 million ton copper deposit
concession to the Chinese side is only about two-thirds the amount controlled by a single American firm, Freeport²
operator of Congo¶s huge Tenke Fungurume mine [11]. Yet there are indications that the United States and other
Western countries are concerned about Chinese intentions in the DRC in particular and in Africa in general. There is
also an emerging debate on whether the on-going war in North Kivu province is the result of the growing rivalry
between the United States and China in the DRC [12]. In a country that has 10 percent of the world¶s copper and one-
third of its cobalt reserves, 75 percent of Congolese live below the poverty line. It remains to be seen whether Chinese
investment actually improves the lives of ordinary Congolese or whether it merely serves to intensify the competition
among the great powers for the control of the world¶s natural resources and adds to the misery of the local population.
Notes
1. UNICEF, Statistics on Democratic Republic of the Congo, available at

www.unicef.org/infobycountry/drcongo_statistics.html.
2. Gilbert Malemba N¶Sakila, ³The Chinese Presence in Lubumbashi, DRC,´ The China Monitor, Issue 24, October
2008, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, p. 7.
3. ³Millicom Awards Major Network Contract to Huawei,´ News from Huawei¶s corporation website, April 13, 2008,
available at
www.huawei.com/africa/en/catalog.do.
4. Hannah Edinger and Johanna Jansson, ³China¶s µAngola Model´ comes to the DRC,´ The China Monitor, Issue 24,
October 2008, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University; Alfred Cang, ³China Railway to Fund $2.9 Billion
Congo Mining Project,´ Reuters, April 22, 2008, Dow Jones Factiva.
5. ³DRC: Loan Tensions,´ Economist Intelligence Unit ± Country Monitor, August 18, 2008, Dow Jones Factiva.
6. Timothy Armitage, ³DRC Outlines US$9.25 Billion Deal with China,´ Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 13, 2008,
Dow Jones Factiva.
7. The author¶s own calculation based on data available at ca.advfn.com.
8. This section is based on the author¶s field research and interviews in Lubumbashi and surrounding areas, September
7-12, 2008.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Calculation based on ³Mutual Convenience,´ The Economist, March 13, 2008.
12. F William Engdahl, ³China¶s US$9bn Hostage in the Congo War,´ Asia Times Online, December 2, 2008.
Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank Stellenbosch University¶s Centre for Chinese Studies, Johanna
Jansson, and Simin Yu for providing field trip support and research assistance.
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Category: China Brief, China and the Asia-Pacific, Military/Security, Africa, Foreign Policy, Featured
By: Mingjiang Li
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has deployed two warships and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden and the
waters off the coast of Somalia on an "anti-piracy mission." To many observers of Chinese foreign policy, this decision
appears to break from Beijing¶s consistent position of maintaining a low profile international policy and marks a
departure from its strenuous effort to downplay²and to a large extent conceal²the growth of its military power in the
past decade. One may wonder whether the naval expedition to Africa represents a watershed in China¶s security policy.
Another question is how the Gulf of Aden operation will change China¶s policy and behavior in maritime affairs in East
Asia. The regional order in East Asia is predominantly shaped by the policies and strategies of various actors in
maritime affairs in the region, namely the United States, and China will want to feature itself prominently in the
evolution of the region's maritime regime.
China¶s participation in maritime cooperation in East Asia has been fairly active and pragmatic. On the one hand,
Beijing has actively participated in various concrete programs concerning maritime affairs. On the other hand, China has
unequivocally rejected any grand scheme or proposal regarding maritime cooperation in the region. In light of these
observations, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that the Gulf of Aden mission is likely to foster more Chinese activism
in maritime non-traditional security cooperation in East Asia but China is not prepared to strive for any notable
leadership role or join any grand scheme in this regard.
A Mixture of Confidence and Caution
Overall, China¶s handling of the Gulf of Aden mission has been quite sophisticated and skillful. This is reflective of
growing Chinese confidence that stems from a multiplicity of sources, including more or less stable relations with other
major powers (in particular the United States and Japan), and strengthened naval capability. Furthermore, China¶s
decision to embark on the mission signals the policy-makers¶ growing awareness of the necessity of using military
means for the protection of Chinese commercial interests on the seas. The practical consideration of taking advantage of
the opportunity to gain naval battle experience also played a big role in the decision.
Political and military confidence notwithstanding, it is also notable that China acted with considerable caution before the
official decision was made public, which reflects China¶s concern that such naval action might be interpreted by other
powers, especially regional states, as a harbinger of Chinese assertiveness. The caution is demonstrated in China¶s probe
for international responses before the official announcement of the decision and the high-profile public relations
campaigns that accompanied it. The Chinese strategic community first made the proposal in the Chinese media to test
how other parties would respond. Then Chinese diplomats to the United Nations followed up with a statement that China
was considering the possibility of using its naval force to strike down piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Having sensed a
relatively calm reaction from other states and even encouraging signals from the United States, Beijing officially made
the announcement and followed up with high-profile public relations campaigns. Spokesmen at the Foreign Ministry and
Defense Ministry and prominent Chinese analysts strenuously attempted to justify China¶s decision on the ground of
international law (the UN Security Council resolutions in particular), China being victims of the Somalian pirates,
China¶s commercial interests, international maritime security, and the operations of other countries. A notable point that
China constantly emphasized was that the naval action signifies China¶s intention and behavior to be a responsible
power. All these aimed at forestalling any negative international opinion on China¶s naval expedition to the region.
China¶s Growing Activism in Maritime Affairs in East Asia
Many maritime affairs concern a nation-state¶s sovereign claims in territory and resources and the role of its military or
quasi-military in dealing with these issues.
In the past decade or so, the PLA has made notable progress in engaging the militaries of many other countries. This
growing military openness and international communications, especially between the PLA Navy and the naval forces of
other countries, have had a positive impact on China¶s maritime cooperation.
China has made notable progress in participating in joint search and rescue exercises on the seas with a wide range of
countries in recent years. China and India held their first naval joint search and rescue operation in 2003 in the East
China Sea. The military exchanges between the two powers have been gradually increasing ever since, leading to the
second joint search and rescue exercise in the Indian Ocean in December 2005 (Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan [Outlook
News Weekly], May 10, 2004). In July 2005, China, South Korea, and Japan held a joint search and rescue exercise in
China¶s offshore area. In September and November 2006, Chinese and American navies conducted two search and
rescue exercise in the U.S. West coast and in the South China Sea respectively [1]. This was the result of 8 years of
maritime security consultations between the two countries and a major breakthrough in the past 20 years (Outlook News
Weekly, November 27, 2006). China participated in the first ARF maritime-security shore exercise hosted by Singapore
in January 2007. In March 2007, two Chinese missile frigates, together with the naval forces from Bangladesh, France,
Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States participated in the four-day sea phase of
³Peace-07´ exercises in the Arabian Sea. In May 2007, a PLAN missile frigate took part in the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS) exercise that also involves Australia and the United States. Although China joined this forum over
twenty years ago as one of its founding members, this was the first time it was involved in a live exercise [2]. Joint
search and rescue operations were also conducted with Australia and New Zealand in October 2007.
These joint search and rescue operations offered experience to the PLAN, and gradually changed the Chinese military
decision makers¶ mindset leading to the political and military confidence shown in the decision of the Gulf of Aden
mission. Moreover, the naval exchanges with external powers and regional states have been quite significant in
facilitating China¶s participation in various programs of maritime cooperation in East Asia.
China is no longer an outsider in East Asian maritime cooperation, particularly in some of the concrete projects, such as
joint oceanic research, environmental protection, and many sea-based non-traditional security issues. In Northeast Asia,
China helped North Korea train personnel and provided various equipments to the North Korean Navy. The two
countries also engaged in a few research projects in the Yellow Sea (Zhongguo Haiyang Bao [China Ocean Newspaper],
December 12, 2006). China and South Korea signed a MOU on joint oceanic research in 1994 and set up a joint research
centre on marine science the next year. The two sides have been collaborating quite closely on a wide range of issues
ever since (e.g. management of offshore areas, marine environmental protection and information exchange). China and
Japan, in the past years, also cooperated in studies of oceanic currents. Japan provided equipment and trained Chinese
personnel (China Ocean Newspaper, December 12, 2006). At the trilateral level among China, Japan, and South Korea,
starting from 1999, the three countries launched a ministerial level meeting on environment and various concrete
proposals on sandstorms and marine environmental protection have been carried out. In 2004, the authorities monitoring
earthquake in the three countries agreed to share seismic information and technology. The immigration authorities of the
three countries have also held workshops on countering terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking in Northeast
Asia.
In Southeast Asia, China has agreed to various legal frameworks that would facilitate closer maritime cooperation with
its neighboring states in the region, either bilaterally or multilaterally. These documents include the 2000 China-ASEAN
action plan on countering drug trafficking, the 2002 China-ASEAN joint declaration on cooperation in non-traditional
security issues, and the 2004 China-ASEAN MOU on non-traditional security cooperation. Bilaterally, China has
attempted to strengthen maritime cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. With
Vietnam, discussion and cooperation were conducted through the joint marine experts group. Major areas of cooperation
included forecast of waves in the South China Sea, offshore environmental protection, exchange of information, and
coastal area management capacity building. China and Thailand are negotiating a formal agreement to further
institutionalize and deepen their cooperation in maritime affairs (China Ocean Newspaper, October 7, 2008). During a
visit to Southeast Asia by the former director of China¶s State Oceanic Administration Wang Shuguang in 2004, China
reached agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia on cooperation in a variety of maritime issues (e.g.
marine environmental protection, oceanic resources management, and oceanic science and surveys). Various concrete
projects have been or are being carried out. During Wang¶s visit, he even proposed that maritime ministers of countries
surrounding the South China Sea meet regularly (China Ocean Newspaper, December 24, 2004). China claims that it
intends to further engage ASEAN countries in disaster reduction and relief, seminars on oceanic studies, and eco-
monitoring training programs in the South China Sea area (China Ocean Newspaper, December 12, 2006).
At the broader international level, China has been participating in the UNEP¶s Global Meeting of Regional Seas, the
Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, the East Asian
Seas Action Plan, and the Northwest Pacific Action Plan. In the Northwest Pacific Action Plan, for instance, in
December 2007, China joined the relief work of an oil spilling incident off the coast of South Korea under the
emergency response mechanism of the plan and, in September 2008, China and South Korea held a joint emergency
exercise in dealing with search and rescue and oil spilling in the sea (Zhongguo Shui Yun Bao [China Water Transport
Newspaper], September 3, 2008). China joined the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) in 2004, four years after
its inception. The forum attempts to provide a platform for international coast guard leaders to interact regularly and also
initiated at-sea combined exercises that began in 2005. China now actively participates in its six areas of cooperation:
anti-drug trafficking, joint actions, counter-illegal immigration, maritime security, information exchange, and law
enforcement on the sea. In 2006, China even hosted the seventh experts¶ meeting of the NPCGF (Renmin Gong¶an Bao
[People¶s Public Security Newspaper], March 31, 2006). China¶s participation in the NPCGF is particularly significant
since it provides a valuable forum for China and the US to communicate and exchange views on various maritime issues
[3]. Two Chinese ports, Shanghai and Shenzhen, are now officially part of the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI)
(Xinhua News Agency, June 24, 2005).
All these new policy moves and behaviors reflect a slightly changed mindset among Chinese decision makers. Some
Chinese analysts believe that cooperation with other militaries, including the U.S. military, on various non-traditional
security issues is an inevitable trend as China further integrates itself into the international society. Military exchanges
with other countries are also important as the Chinese military may have to be more frequently involved in protecting
China¶s overseas interests and evacuating Chinese nationals in emergent foreign conflict areas. Exchanges with foreign
militaries, especially the U.S. military now would lay a good foundation for cooperation and avoidance of
misunderstanding when such cases arise (Outlook News Weekly, November 27, 2006).
China¶s Concerns for Grand Schemes
The growing activism in the past decade or so noted above was largely a reflection of the significant improvement in
China¶s international relations in the region. Despite active participation in maritime cooperation in recent years,
China¶s role in this regard is likely to be restrained by the military and strategic environment in East Asia, China¶s own
concerns of sovereign territorial claims, Chinese posture on military transparency, and of course the policies of other
states in maritime affairs.
The strategic reality in East Asia is still that the U.S. serves as the hegemonic stabilizer. Many East Asian states look to
the U.S. for security purposes and attempt to maintain American participation in regional military and maritime affairs.
It is still difficult to imagine East Asia developing institutionalized maritime cooperation without U.S. participation. In
this sense, China¶s role and participation in East Asian maritime cooperation will have to be influenced by the U.S.
factor and Sino-U.S. military relations. To a lesser extent, the lack of strategic trust among major powers in the East
Asian Seas region is also a restraining factor for China¶s more active participation in maritime cooperation. This is so
because many projects in maritime cooperation will have to depend on the naval forces directly or indirectly.
The lack of strategic trust affecting China¶s attitude in maritime cooperation is evident in China¶s view of the U.S.
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). China supports the objectives of the PS I, but argues that the PSI includes the
possibility of taking interdiction measures on the sea beyond the permission of existing international laws. That is why
China decided not to participate in the PSI. In addition, China urges participating countries to seriously consider the
Chinese point and act with caution in the implementation of the PSI (Xinhua News Agency, September 1, 2008).
Chinese analysts believe that the PSI, initiated and dominated by the US, is a fairly aggressive and coercive collective
mechanism, a by-product of Bush¶s ³preemptive strategy,´ and deeply embedded in American unilateralism [4].
Another case is China¶s response to the U.S. proposal for a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP or Thousand-Ship
Navy). Washington hopes that China can join this grand scheme to deal with all sorts of maritime problems at the global
level [5]. The U.S. has twice requested China to participate in the plan and did so again after China made public its
decision to dispatch its fleet to the African waters. Chinese military analysts, however, still have profound skepticism of
the U.S. proposal. Many of them believe that the plan actually indicates US intention to set up a global naval regime to
continue to dominate maritime affairs at the global level [6]. Others even fear that it is part of U.S. strategy to
strategically constrain China and Russia [7].
Future Prospect for China¶s Role in East Asian Maritime Cooperation
Overall, China¶s maritime policy has been in a state of dynamic transition. Its policy shifted from distrust and non-
participation in regional maritime programs throughout much of the 1990s, to active participation and growing
integration over the past few years. Now the Gulf of Aden operation has demonstrated Chinese capability and
confidence. With the milestone decision of the African expedition and China¶s first large medical ship in service, it is
quite likely that China may seek to play a more important role in maritime non-traditional security issues, for instance
disaster relief, anti-piracy in the South China Sea, and the safety of sea lines of communication in East Asia.
There are quite a number of propitious conditions for China¶s growing role in maritime affairs in the region. First of all,
China has already been fully participating in all sorts of maritime programs in East Asia seas, has gained the necessary
experience in dealing with various maritime challenges, and is better informed of the policies and expectations of other
states. Second, in the mainstream strategic thinking in China, proactive engagement with regional states is still viewed as
a proper strategy for consolidating China¶s strategic foothold in the region and shaping regional international relations
conducive to China¶s domestic economic programs. Third, the overall maritime order in East Asia is stable and other
regional states seem to respond positively to China¶s engagement policy. This is best illustrated in the cases of China-
Japan in-principle agreement (reached in June 2008) on the joint oil and gas exploration and extraction in the East China
Sea and the China-Vietnam joint statement (announced on October 25, 2008) regarding their willingness to jointly
explore parts of the South China Sea. However, such joint development projects are notoriously fickle, as demonstrated
by the recent spat between China and Japan over China¶s exploration of the Tianwaitian gas field (China Daily, January
5). Still, the overall positive atmosphere provides some hope that China and its maritime neighbors may eventually
manage to find some mutually acceptable solutions to their disputes.
In East Asia, China still has territorial disputes with many of its maritime neighbors and, in addition to scrutiny by
external powers, other Asian states keep a close watch over China¶s activities in regional maritime affairs. The Gulf of
Aden, on the other hand, is a much less sensitive region for China and thus serves as a perfect testing ground for the
Chinese Navy. It is still premature to expect China to strive for any leadership role in maritime affairs closer to home.
Notes
1. Luo Yuan, ³Zhong mei junshi guanxi feng xiang he fang´ [Where is the Sino-US Military Relationship Headed],
Heping yu Fazhan [Peace and Development], issue 2, 2008, pp. 9-14.
2. Eric McVadon, ³China and the United States on the High Seas,´ China Security, Vol. 3 No. 4 Autumn 2007, pp. 3 ±
28.
3. Eric McVadon, op. cit.
4. Gu Guoliang, ³Meiguo µfang kuosan anquan changyi¶ pingxi´ [An analysis of American ³Proliferation Security
Initiative´], Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies], no. 3, 2004, pp. 30-44.
5. Eric McVadon, op. cit.
6. Du Chaoping, ³Meiguo µqian jian haijun´ jihua yu zhongguo de xuanze,´ [U.S. ³Thousand-Ship Navy´ Plan and
Chinese Choices], Jian Zai Wuqi [Shipborne Weapons], December 2007, pp. 23-28.
7. Media interview with Li Jie, a PLAN analyst, available at
www.cnr.cn/military/djt/200712/t20071228_504666766.html , accessed November 4, 2008.
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Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Home
Page
By: Willy Lam
The year 2009 is set to become a watershed in the People¶s Liberation Army¶s (PLA) development into a force capable
of long-distance, multi-pronged power projection. This is despite the perception that owing to the global recession, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership under President Hu Jintao is preoccupied with its multi-billion dollar effort
to resuscitate the economy and generate jobs. Even as three ultra-modern naval vessels (two destroyers and a supply
ship) are steaming around the Gulf of Aden on an "anti-piracy mission," the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has
indirectly admitted that the country is building aircraft carriers. Various PLA officers have waxed eloquent on the
imperative of enhancing the forces¶ ³combat-readiness´²and their ability to win high-tech warfare. Moreover, a
gargantuan military parade is being planned for October 1, when Beijing will mark the 60th anniversary of the founding
of the People¶s Republic of China (Yangtze Evening Post [Nanjing], January 4).
Less than a month after President Hu celebrated with big fanfare the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping¶s reform and
open door policy, the Hu leadership seems to have jettisoned two key Deng dogmas. Firstly, the late patriarch said in the
early 1990s that China must ³keep a low profile and never take the lead´ in foreign and national-security issues. Deng,
who presided over the demobilization of a million soldiers through the 1980s, also told the party's top brass that frugality
must be observed because army-building must sub-serve the overall national goal of economic construction. Yet, since
the Beijing Olympics last August, China¶s military establishment seems to have been unreservedly showing off its hard-
power projection capabilities. This is despite the fact that flaunting the country¶s military muscle in the apparent pursuit
of national glory could stoke the ³China threat´ theory. Given the PLA¶s propensity for acquiring big-ticket, state-of-
the-art hardware, the armed forces will likely enjoy double-digit annual budget boosts in the foreseeable future.
First came the Shenzhen astronauts¶ ultra-ambitious moon mission, including a 15-minute ³space walk´ accomplished in
late September 2008. While the naval expedition to waters off Somalia was billed as China¶s contribution to the global
effort against piracy, it seems clear that the top brass is also using the mission to test the long-distance capability of
China¶s inchoate blue-water navy. According to military expert Qing Yan, the sortie into the Gulf of Aden could become
³a major milestone in China¶s attainment of blue-water navy capacities.´ Qing said that the trip would help China¶s best
naval vessels adapt themselves to the climate, magnetic fields and geopolitics of faraway waters. It could also be a trial
run for China¶s future aircraft carrier battle group in terms of logistics, information gathering, IT warfare, and so forth
(Ming Pao [Hong Kong], December 26, 2008; Nanfang Weekly [Guangzhou], December 25, 2008). Indeed, while
revealing details about the naval maneuver, MND spokesman Huang Xueping indirectly admitted that China was putting
together its first aircraft carrier. ³An aircraft carrier is a symbol of a nation¶s comprehensive strength,´ he said. ³It also
meets the basic requirements of a nation¶s navy.´ PLA experts have since reported that naval shipbuilders are
constructing at least two flattops for possible deployment after 2015 (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo], December 31, 2008;
Ming Pao, January 1).
There are also signs that Beijing is making subtle revisions of the so-called ³peaceful rise´ theory, which was advanced
by the Hu Jintao leadership in 2003 to reassure Asia-Pacific nations that the emerging quasi-superpower would not pose
a threat to its neighbors. Official military analysts are now saying that to attain a global status commensurate with
China¶s comprehensive strength, the PLA should not only seek sophisticated weapons but also be constantly primed for
warfare to defend China¶s core interests. According to General Zhang Zhaoyin, the PLA must abandon the outdated
doctrine of ³building a peace-oriented army at a time of peace.´ Writing in the official Liberation Army Daily, General
Zhang pointed out that ³preparing for battle, fighting wars, and winning wars have always been the fundamental tasks of
the army.´ ³The PLA must never deviate from the doctrine of µbeing assiduous in preparing for warfare, and seeking to
win wars¶,´ added Zhang, who is the deputy commander of a Group Army in the Chengdu Military Region. According
to Zhang, ³Army construction must revolve around the core of raising our ability to win wars.´ (Liberation Army Daily,
December 2, 2008)
At the same time, well-known military commentator Jin Yinan posited the theory that ³China can not emerge in the
midst of nightingale songs and swallow dances,´ a reference to the placid pleasures of peacetime. Jin, a Professor of
International Relations at National Defense University, indicated that China had to ³hack out a path through thorns and
thistles´ in its search for greatness. ³When a country and a people have reached a critical moment, the armed forces
often play the role of pivot and mainstay [in ensuring that national goals are met],´ Jin noted. ³Even in peace time,
soldiers need to be ever-ready for battles, so that they can throw themselves into action at any time.´ Referring to
China¶s domestic and international goals in the 21st century, Jin pointed out that PLA personnel should ³acquit
themselves of the responsibility of history and become the vanguard of the Chinese race´ (Liberation Army Daily,
December 31, 2008). In another controversial article, Liberation Army Daily commentator Huang Kunlun raised the
notion of ³the boundaries of national interests.´ Huang argued that China¶s national interests had gone beyond its land,
sea and air territories to include areas such as the vast oceans traversed by Chinese freighters as well as outer space.
³Our armed forces need to defend not only µterritorial boundaries¶, but also the µboundaries of national interests¶,´
Huang wrote. ³We need to safeguard not only national-security interests but also interests relating to [future] national
development´ he added (Liberation Army Daily, December 4, 2008). This novel concept would vastly increase the
³legitimate´ areas where the PLA can operate.
What does one make of this pugilistic rhetoric? These belligerent remarks may solely represent the ³hawkish wing´ of
the national-security establishment, particularly given the apparent fear among generals that the military budget could be
cut in times of economic difficulties. Yet, in view of the long-established tradition that PLA officers will not talk about
policy issues without authorization from the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is headed by President Hu, it
seems clear that opinions about bolstering the PLA¶s combat-readiness represent the thinking of the very top.
While touring the Shenyang Military Region in mid-December, Hu Jintao, acting in his capacity as CMC Chairman,
asked officers and soldiers to prepare themselves for impending ³military struggles.´ ³New and complicated changes
have taken place globally, and our domestic task regarding reform, development and stability has become difficult,´ Hu
told the military personnel. ³The new situation and responsibilities have made even higher demands on army
construction and on the forces¶ preparation for µmilitary struggle¶.´ Apart from traditional goals such as defending
national boundaries and safeguarding territorial integrity, Hu asked the PLA to get ready for ³non-war related combat
missions´ and to ³comprehensively raise its ability to tackle different types of threat to [national and social] security.´
President Hu ended his tour by asking the officers to ³make enthusiastic contribution to maintaining the stable and
relatively speedy development of the economy, as well as upholding social harmony and stability´ (Xinhua News
Agency, December 16, 2008; People¶s Daily, December 17, 2008).
In a New Year talk to senior officers of the People¶s Armed Police (PAP), which is also under the direct control of the
CMC, President Hu called upon them to ³boost their ability for tasks such as handling emergency [mass] incidents and
combating terrorism.´ Moreover, the commander-in-chief commended the PAP¶s role in ³safeguarding national security
and unity, and maintaining social harmony and stability´ (Xinhua News Agency, January 4). Hu¶s highly positive
assessment of the PLA and PAP would seem to buttress arguments by the top brass that in light of their invaluable
contribution to safeguarding socio-political stability²a prerequisite for not only economic development but also the
perpetuation of the CCP¶s ruling party status²the armed forces are justified in continuing to enjoy a disproportionately
large share of national resources. Last year, the PLA was awarded a budget of $57.23 billion, a whopping 17.6 percent
over that of 2007; moreover, most Western analysts think the armed forces¶ actual expenditure is up to three times the
official budget.
To be sure, the Hu-led Politburo has pulled out all the stops to reinforce the perception of the party¶s ³absolute control
over the gun.´ At year-end, President Hu laid down five ³core values´ for officers and soldiers: ³be loyal to the party,
love the people, serve the country, be ready to sacrifice yourself, and value honor.´ He also instructed that officers and
soldiers must augment their ³ideological and political construction´ to ensure that PLA personnel would not deviate
from their serve-the-people credo (Xinhua News Agency, December 30, 2008). Yet, there is no questioning the fact that
the foremost priority of the party-and-state apparatus is to indefinitely prolong the CCP¶s mandate of heaven through
snuffing out dissent and other challenges to its monopoly on power. In his speech marking the 30th anniversary of the
reform era, Hu reiterated that ³stability is our overriding task, because nothing can be accomplished without stability.´
With reference to maintaining the party¶s ruling party status, the supremo also warned that ³What we possessed in the
past doesn¶t necessarily belong to us now; what we possess now may not be ours forever´ (People¶s Daily, December
19, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, December 18, 2008). Hu¶s amazing statement has been interpreted as a frank
admission that in light of the severe economic downturn and the rise in ³mass incidents´ such as riots and disturbances,
the party¶s political dominance is under unprecedented threat. As the CCP becomes more and more dependent on the
armed forces to uphold its supremacy, it may have no choice but to grant the generals not only generous budget boosts
but also a bigger say in national-security policy-making.
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Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Martin Andrew
Z-9G Attack Helicopter
A profound transformation is taking place in Chinese battlefield aerospace, the People¶s Liberation Army¶s (PLAs)
xinxihua zhanchang (informationalized battlefield) program is assisting its armed forces in attaining information
domination on the battlefield. As part of this program, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are
undergoing a complete reorganization and expansion within the PLA. Previously, battlefield reconnaissance was
conducted by the People¶s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), using fighter aircraft modified for reconnaissance.
Cameras used in these missions produced excellent imagery but could not aid the PLA in battle because it took too much
time to process and be of any operational value. This has now changed with the PLA's new capabilities of operating
helicopters with thermal imaging systems and UAV¶s providing real time data to battlefield commanders.
Advances in the development of Chinese unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)
enhance the military's strategic posture and capabilities. Long range patrolling of China¶s high altitude borders regions
in Xinjiang, and to a lesser extent in Tibet, is carried out by border guard patrols in specially designed cross country
vehicles pressurized to cope with the lack of oxygen at these heights. UAVs will enable more effective surveillance and
patrolling of these borders, at considerably less cost in manpower and equipment, enabling the border guards to focus
more on their tasks and quickly move to an area where the UAV has picked up illegal border crossings. The PLA has
invested heavily in ISR and command and control systems and the introduction of the latest UAVs will enable them to
see µover the hill¶ without having to expose soldiers or aircraft. Military operations in urban environments and counter-
insurgency operations will also be enhanced as UGVs will be able to search buildings for improvised explosive devices
as well as for the insurgents.
Battlefield Aerospace Aviation Units
Battlefield aerospace aviation units in the PLA are divided into manned (helicopters) and UAVs. UAVs were primarily
used as targets for air defense systems but from the mid-1990s small UAVs started to be employed for battlefield
reconnaissance and recently for civilian tasks such as surveying disaster areas. Recently, China started examining the
possibility of using UAVs for combat missions. The provision of battlefield helicopters at present is split between the
Army Aviation units in the PLA and the PLAAF, which are both expanding and modernizing. The PLA is in the
process of acquiring its first dedicated attack helicopter, the Chinese developed WZ-10, and the PLAAF is acquiring
more modernized Russian Mi-17 helicopters to be built in China [1]. Furthermore, the new WZ-15/EC175 medium
helicopter is being built in a 50/50 partnership between the Chinese firm ACIC II and Eurocopter [2], which will
supplant and subsequently replace the Z-9 model currently in service. Battlefield UAVs have been used by selected PLA
units, primarily special forces, since the mid-1990s for reconnaissance but their wider use is expected with new designs
coming into service.
Ground reconnaissance elements units have been upgraded throughout the new brigade structures down to the company
level and equipped to provide near real time exploitation of their ISR. New scout and reconnaissance vehicles have been
introduced and the PLA is looking at unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for future use in reconnaissance and other
roles.
Army Aviation Capabilities
The most common army aviation helicopter is the Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Company Z-9G/W, which is the
Eurocopter AS 365N Dauphin II produced under license, and is the most modern helicopter used by the PLA Aviation
battalions. Variants of the Z-9W include dedicated liaison, reconnaissance, utility, anti-tank, command and control and
utility variants; with the anti-tank and reconnaissance variants equipped with a nose mounted thermal imaging seeker.
The People¶s Armed Police (PAP) also uses a variant of the Z-9 (Beijing Qianlong News Online, April 11, 2005). It
has two pylons that can carry a maximum of either eight Hong Jian-8 anti-tank guided missiles, four Tian Yan 90, two
cannon pods or two rocket pods [3]. They are vulnerable to even small arms fire as they lack redundant systems and
armor. For counter-terrorist and riot control as well as locating and general police duties, the Z-9 can be equipped with a
fixed side facing high intensity white light and dual loud speakers on the left side pylon [4]. The introduction of thermal
imaging seekers on Z-9 helicopters has provided PLA commanders with real time ISR assets opening up the battlefield
at night and with the ability to locate camouflaged positions from stand off distances during the day.
After the 9-11 attacks on the United States the PLA¶s first Army Airborne Regiment was sent to Xinjiang ostensibly to
combat Uyghur separatists. The unit was initially equipped with approximately 30 Chinese built Z-9 helicopters (World
Journal, October 23, 2001) and its missions were to develop tactics and doctrine for helo-borne operations including
night time combat search and rescue, as well as conducting counter terrorist and insurgency missions (Zhuongguo
Guofang Bao Online [China National Defense News, 12 December 2004; 4 May 2005). The unit's mission profile is
similar to a U.S. Army Ranger battalion combined with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne).
The airborne regiment has PLAAF Mi-17 transport helicopters available to provide greater troop lift and fire support.
These are equipped with navigation radar and up-rated engines with an auxiliary power unit to ensure reliable starting at
altitudes up to 4,000 meters (m) [5]. It is difficult to establish whether the unit is still in Xinjiang, but 16 Z -9G and 16
Mi-17 helicopters that were self-deployed to Russia for the August 2007 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
exercise µPeace Mission 2007¶ came from Xinjiang (Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 27, 2007).
Helicopter Fire Support and ISR
A long standing requirement for a helicopter to provide survivable all weather aerial fire support for both escorting
transport helicopters and close air support will be met by the Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation (CAIC) WZ-10
attack helicopter. This is China¶s first indigenous attack helicopter and is the lynchpin of the PLA Army Aviation¶s
modernization plans. Besides anti-armor, the WZ-10 will provide escort, armed reconnaissance, and force protection
missions, the latter against enemy attack and reconnaissance helicopters and UAVs. The WZ-10 will give operations
staff real-time long range battlefield imagery from its advanced all-weather avionics and targeting systems via data links
that can be expected to be part of the avionics system.
The WZ-10 is in the size and weight range of the Italian A129 Mangusta with many design features copied directly from
it, including the cockpit. The prototype used two Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6C-6TC engines rated at 1,531
horsepower (hp), which equates to 1,142 kilowatts, power the WZ-10. These are subject to the post-Tiananmen embargo
so will be replaced before the WZ-10 goes into service. These give it a top speed of 280 kilometers per hour (km/hr), a
cruising speed of 230 km/hr and a maximum range of 800 km.
The cockpit design has been taken directly from the A129 Mangusta fire control system, using helmet mounted display
systems a field of view of 260 degrees horizontally and from minus 34 to plus 56 degrees at right angles to the cockpit.
The design reduces its infrared signature and the navigation system incorporates GPS/GLOSNASS updates. The sensor
system includes a nose mounted electro-optical laser designator/range finder and a thermal imaging seeker. The systems
integration of the navigation, electronic warfare and fire control system will be a challenge for China¶s aviation industry.
The armament comprises a 30mm cannon under the nose similar to the AH-64 Apache, and on its two stub wings it can
carry a total of eight Tian Yan 90 air-to-air missiles, or eight Hong Jian-10 anti-tank missiles, or rocket and gun pods. It
incorporates electronic warfare suite includes a radar warning receiver and a chaff/flare dispenser.
Transport
The PLAAF uses the Russian Mi-17 transport helicopter, the export designation of the Mi-8MTV-2 helicopter, which
incorporates a chin-mounted radar enabling bad weather operations and six sponsons for armament. In PLA service the
armament includes six 57 mm UB-32 rocket pods containing a total of 192 55 mm rockets providing transport
helicopters a measure of fire support/defence suppression [6]. During the ill-fated Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the
Mi-8 was severely underpowered at high altitudes. Due to the problems of flying in mountains at high altitudes,
resupply helicopters could only fly between five and ten hours. Often they did not land but dropped the cargo from an
altitude of between 5 and 30m at a speed ranging between 20 and 70 km/hr. The maximum payload never exceeded
400 kg [7].
The Mi-17 in PLAAF service has two 1,900 hp turbine engines compared to the Mi-8¶s engines rated at 1,700 hp. The
Mi-17 helicopter also carries an auxiliary power plant, which feeds the air starters to the engines ensuring reliable
starting of the main engines up to 4,000 m depending on the engine type. Despite the extra power the Mi-8MT/Mi-
17MT can only carry six to eight combat laden soldiers dropping to only four or five at 3,000 to 4,000 m [8]. A Russian
air assault soldier can carry anywhere from 35 to 40 kg of extra equipment on top of his weapon and uniform [9]. The
company says that it can lift 24 combat equipped soldiers at lower altitudes [10]. By comparison, Australian Defense
Force CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters deployed in Afghanistan can carry 30 passengers and five tons of cargo
[11].
Interestingly no helicopters in the PLA¶s service have been seen mounting any type of door gun to provide suppressive
fire when the helicopters land during an assault. Providing a machine gun with mount, ammunition and dedicated gunner
to provide suppressive fire at high altitudes would severely restrict the amount of personnel or cargo that a Z-9 or Mi-17
helicopter could carry. The poor performance of helicopters at high altitudes is why the CH-47D Chinook has become
the primary helicopter for delivery of cargo and personnel by air in Afghanistan.
Unmanned Air Vehicles
Chinese industry has developed a wide range of UAVs in recent years used by the PLA²small UAVs have been used
by special forces since the mid-1990s (People's Daily Online, June 19, 2002). Typical UAVs are the W-50 that
reportedly has the ability to loiter over four hours depending on the payload and an operational range of over 100 km;
and the Z-3 helicopter UAV, which weighs 130 kg with its 30k payload and incorporates GPS navigation for pre-
planned reconnaissance missions [12]. In the recent Sichuan Earthquake at least one Chinese-developed small UAV
was deployed to survey the damage [13]. Of pusher configuration with twin booms connecting a µV¶ shaped rear fin it
was 2.1 m long, had a wingspan of 2.6 m and weighed 20 kg. It can travel at 110km/hr, reach an altitude of 3,500 m and
has GPS assisted guidance.
In November 2008 at the Seventh China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai a mockup of the
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation¶s new CH3 technology demonstrator attack UAV was displayed
(People's Daily Online, November 3, 2008). It has a tail-less canard design with the flaps mounted on the tips of its rear
double delta wings. The engine and triple blade propeller is mounted in the rear of fuselage like the MQ-1C Warrior
developed by the United States and appears similar in size although it incorporates a chisel nose instead of the bulbous
nose, which contains a radar in the MQ-1C. The CH3 utilizes a blended fuselage and incorporates a stabilized targeting
turret under the forward fuselage similar to the AN/AAS-52 Multi-spectral Targeting System on the MQ-1C. There is a
large pylon under each rear wing, which on the mockup, mounted a missile similar is size and shape to the AGM-65
Maverick.
Also on display was a reconnaissance UAV, similar is size to the Israeli Aerospace Industries¶ Scout [14]. Employing
skids instead of wheels, implying it is catapult launched, it is most likely employed to locate targets for artillery units.
Mechanized and armored units have not been neglected as the PLA has type certified an armored tracked launcher,
based on the ZSD 89 armored command vehicle, using a modified low profile turret from the WZ731. This incorporates
flat transmitter panels on the turret roof, with a compressed gas catapult for a small UAV mounted on top [15].
Battlefield Unmanned Ground Vehicles [16]
The PLA is also looking at unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for use on the battlefield and for high risk missions like
explosive ordnance disposal and clearing buildings. The two vehicles that appear most suitable for the ISR role are the
ASENDRO and the CHRYSOR. UGV¶s not being manned are especially vulnerable to terrain obstacles and light anti-
tank weapons and anti-materiel (military equipment) rifles.
The ASENDRO is a small UAV being 600mm long with a chassis height of 400 mm high and weighing 45 kg. There
are both wheeled and tracked versions, with the tracked version able to travel at 10 km/hr, climb a 400 slope and cross
over a 200 mm high obstacle. The vehicle is capable of carrying mast mounted cameras and a rotating arm on the
forward half of the chassis. It uses a 24/27 volt circuit and operates up to four hours. The ASENDRO Scout, a
dedicated reconnaissance version, carries an 18 x camera operating in the 7 to 14 micron bandwidth and having an
operating angle of 500 x 350.
The CHRYSOR is a large amphibious UGV, which looks similar to the British Argocat 8 x 8 logistics vehicle. It is 2.92
m long, 1.64 m wide and has a chassis height of 1.92 m. It weighs 950kg and its 31 hp (22.79 kW) gives it a maximum
road speed of 45 km/hr and a speed in water of 4 km/hr. It can operate up to 12 hours and it has a payload of 680 kg on
ground which drops to 300 kg if it needs to cross water. It can climb a 370 slope, a 1m trench and climb over a 0.4 m
obstacle. It carries ten fixed cameras on the chassis for movement and can carry a multifunction mast depending on the
mission. The prototype vehicle can be driven if necessary and some of the versions envisaged keep the optional drivers
position [17]. Two versions mooted for the ISR role are as a communications repeater in remote areas, which would be
extremely useful in high altitudes and as a reconnaissance vehicle in counter±terrorist and urban warfare. This version
carries three banks of five high intensity lights to illuminate an area.
To exploit all these new sources of information, and to prevent information overload, the new brigades and battalions
contain their own intelligence net that shares battlefield information. A dedicated reconnaissance officer is located at the
brigade headquarters to ensure no duplication of assets or missions (PLA Daily Online, September 16, 2008). The
battalion reconnaissance teams have man portable battlefield radar and night observation equipment coupled with a data
link offering the commander a real time picture of the battlefield from the soldiers view as well as from the sky (PLA
Daily Online, November 19, 2008).
Conclusion
The drive for information dominance on the battlefield has seen the PLA modernize its ISR assets. Chinese industry
has, and is, developing a range of battlefield UAVs that the PLA is now deploying. Helicopters have been equipped
with the ability to operate at night, which denies enemies night-time sanctuary. The introduction of armed UAVs and a
new dedicated attack helicopter will enable the PLA to conduct high tempo 24 hour operations. Their ability to assist in
disaster relief has already been established, freeing helicopters to perform medical evacuation and supply missions.
UGVs are just coming into service and as they are further developed the PLA will find new ways to utilize them.
Besides reconnaissance over minefields and booby trapped terrain, they can be used to search for earthquake victims as
well as for ordnance disposal.
Notes
1. Sichuan Lantian Helicopter Co. Ltd, 3 January 2009, www.lthsc.com accessed 3 January 2009.
2. 'Eurocopter Creates a New Helicopter in a Cooperative Venture with China', Eurocopter website,
http//:eads.net/1024/en/pressdb/archive/2005/2005/2005012_ec_175.html, 5 December 2005, accessed 3 January 2009.
3. 'Da zaozong hezhao zhangxinglui hangbudui', (Building an All-Round Army Aviation Force) Xiandai junshizao
(CONMILIT), 2/2004, Number 325, pp. 10 & 11.
4. 'Zhongguo luhang zhijiu wuzhuang zhishengji', (Chinese Joint Low Flying Hostage Rescue Military Helicopter)
poster inserted in Bingqi Zhishi, 10A/2008, Number 254.
5. Lavrentiev, A.P. The International Workhorse - the Mi-17, located on the Kazan Helicopter Production Association
website: www.kcn.ru/tat_en/economics/profiles/k/kvz/lavrent.html, accessed 26 February 2003.
6. Dolgov, S. 'On a Wing and a Prayer', in Roshchin, S; Reznichenko, S & Saoylyuk, S. 'War Doesn't Sleep',
ArmeyskiySbornik, October 2000, p. 59;
7. Grau, L.W & Gress, Michael A. (eds). The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost: the Russian
General Staff, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 2002, p. 287.
8. Grau, L.W. The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Foreign Military Studies
office, Fort Leavenworth, 2005, p. 101.
9. Ibid., p. 97.
10. 'Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip ± Multi-Mission helicopter', Army Technology, www.army-
technology.com/projects/mi8t/specs.html accessed 10 November 2008
11. Walters, Patrick. Hard-working Chinooks the pack horse of the frontline' in 'Special Report on Defence¶, Weekend
Australian, 29 & 30 November 2008, p. 3.
12. Wu Xiaochun, 'NRIST Keeps Forging Ahead ± Part II', Military Training & Simulation News, Volume 5, Issue 6,
November 2003, pp. 54 & 55.
13. "Hua ying" aoxiang kangzhen jiuzai', (³Golden Eagle´ Seismic defense soaring and helping people in a disaster)
Bingqi Zhishi (Ordinance Knowledge), 7/2008, Number 249, pp. 20 & 21.
14. Ibid.; 'Older UAVs', Israeli Aerospace Industries Ltd website, 4 January 2008, www.iai.co.il/Default.aspx, accessed
4 January 2009.
15. 'Xinxihua zhanchang shangde zhuangjia 'qianliyan'," Zhongguo WZ731 xingludai shi tongyong zhuangjia zhencha
che', (Informationalized Battlefield Increasing with the Armored ³Thousand li eye´ Chinese Type WZ731 Tracked
Multi-Purpose Armored Scout Vehicle) Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang (Tank and Armored Vehicle), 7/2008, Number 269,
pp. 12 ± 15.
16. 'Jiqi xiongdi zongdongyuan', (Motorized Big and Small Versions Gathered and Mobilized) Bingqi Zhishi, (Ordnance
Knowledge) 8A/2008, Number 250, pp. 22 ± 25.
17. 'Youren "wuren zhijing´ Zhongguo Bingqi 218 chang tuichu xinxing dimian wuren pingtai', (As if Manned
³Unmanned Condition´ Chinese Ordnance Factory 218 has Pushed Development of New Model Ground Unmanned
Platforms) Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang (Tank and Armored Vehicle), 8/2008, Number 270, pp. 5 ± 7.
$'
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Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Russia
By: Stephen Blank
Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (L) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (R)
The Russo-Chinese relationship is a multi-dimensional one. Thus progress in each aspect of those ties is uneven. For
instance, Russia has consistently failed to satisfy China¶s demands for energy, which Russia regards as being
excessively one-sided insofar as the apportionment of benefits is concerned. China has long demanded that it pay below
market prices and Russia has largely resisted yielding to that demand. On the other hand, the issue of arms sales
seemingly is an area where Russia has successfully sold many weapons to China and gained valuable revenues while
China gains weapons and technologies plus know-how in designing them. Nevertheless, a closer examination of recent
developments in Russian arms sales to China suggests trends parallel those in the energy sector: Russia is failing to meet
Chinese demands. Just as Moscow now seeks Chinese loans for its energy companies and investments in Russian Asia,
its arms sales to China is falling victim to its angst at the United States and its arms producers¶ need for cash even as it
builds up a formidable military force that it knows one day could be deployed against it.
From 1990-2007 Russia sold China $25 billion of weapons. Nonetheless there were many production problems albeit
largely unreported ones (Interfax-AVN, December 12, 2008). For example, the three-way contract with Uzbekistan and
Russia to build Il-76 military transports and Il-78 tankers was effectively annulled by Tashkent. So while Russia
fulfilled its contractual obligation to make the engines, nobody made the airframes (Interfax-AVN, December 12,
2008). In other cases 200 Su-27SK fighter jets were to be made under license but only 105 were completed
³whereupon China unilaterally terminated the conract.´ Those sales fell precipitously to just $700 milliion of new
contracts in 2007 (Interfax-AVN, December 12, 2008; FBIS SOV, December 12, 2008; Vedomosti, December 10, 2008;
FBIS SOV, December 10, 2008). This prospect caused considerable alarm in Russia¶s defense industrial complex,
especially in the current economic crisis. China, having bought many weapons platforms, now does not need them but
rather seeks the technologies associated with them, the right to joint development and production, and Russian state of
the art weapons (Interfax-AVN June 27, 2007; Interfax, December 12, 2008; FBIS SOV, December 12, 2008). Indeed,
China had already begun to reverse engineer these Russian weapons and proudce them by itself thereby infringng upon
Russia¶s intellectual property and causing the prospect of millions of dollars in losses.
Consequently there is currently not one single large-scale defense contract with China as in the past. Worse yet,
apparently Russian officials are unable to decide what systems should be sold to China. The revelations of defective
weapon sales to India and Algeria coupled with Russia¶s habit of abruptly raising prices for its products and then
demanding payment lest the production line shut down raises question of its overall rellaibility as an arms seller²not
just to China. Yet beyond this ³there is currently no effective communication channel or mechanism to deal with the
problems, not even at the top leadership levels´ [1]. Indeed, there had been no meetings of the full bilateral militry
commission since 2005.
Therefore this issue became a serious concern for Moscow, especially as it still held back from selling Beijing the most
sophisticated and latest technology like what it sells to India. At the same time there also appears to be signs of a
subterranean disquiet about the rapid growth of Chinese power (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 30, 2008; FBIS SOV,
January 31, 2008; The Weekly Standard, February 5, 2008). Although some analysts argue that Russia is unafraid of
Chinese military power, that is not the case with regard to Chinese nuclear and missile policies since Beijing's expanding
arsenal clearly has triggered Moscow's disquiet which, however, it dare not publicize [2]. But since Russian defense
exports depend on sales to China, especially under conditions of growing tension with the West and now the global
economic crisis, and nobdoy else will export weapons to China, it was always likely that some compromise weighted
toward Beijing would ensue. During Prime Minister Wen Jiabao¶s visit to Russia in October 2008, Moscow
announced that arms sales will continue through 2015 without problems, a trend that both sides welcome (Interfax,
October 24, 2008).
In December 2008 Russian Defense Minsiter Anatoly Sedyukov led a delegation to Beijing and the first meeting of the
bilateral Military Commission since 2005. Those meetings reviewed the entire inventory of arms sales and apparently
led both sides to agree in the field of high technologies on both sides, step up cooperation to a higher qualitiatively new
level (i.e. newer Russian models and weapons, and jointly develop high-tech products). Although no new contracts
were signed at those meetings, negotiations are already underway on many new contracts (ITAR-TASS, December 12,
2008; FBIS SOV, December 12, 2008; ITAR-TASS, December 13, 2008; FBIS SOV, December 13, 2008;
Kommersant, December 12, 2008). Reportedly Russia will expand bilateral military cooperation and defense and
security cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework so that both sides will play a bigger role
in Eurasia¶s security agenda (Xinhua News Agency, December 10, 2008).
Specifically, China will continue producing Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets under license, and will cooperate with Russia
across the spectrum of Sukhoi aircraft, including the SU-33 and multi-role Su-35 fighter, i.e. Russia¶s newest models,
project 677E submarines and elements of China¶s aircraft carrier program, e.g. carrier-based aircraft on the Su-33.
China could also be interested in obtaining the TU-22M3 missile armed naval aircraft with new heavy anti-ship
intermediate range missiles, project 971 and 949a multi-role nuclear powered submarines, and the MiG-31 Interceptor.
In 2010 China will also receive the Il-76 military transports and Il-78 tanker which were contracted for but encountered
production difficulties (RIA Novosti, December 12, 2008; Interfax-AVN Online, December 12, 2008; FBIS SOV,
December 12, 2008).
Thus it appears that Russian angst with the United States, Moscow's need for support against America, and desire to
show Washington that it has other international options, plus the distress that arms manufacturers have felt due to
decreased sales, and the looming economic crisis have led Moscow to sell China most²if not all²of what it wanted in
the way of access to high-tech and new weapons from Russia which will now aid it to challenge the U.S. Navy, Taiwan,
other Asian players, and develop enhanced capabilities for power projection. Meanwhile it remains unclear if Russia
has really resolved the intellectual property issue of Chinese copying of Russian systems (FBIS SOV, December 12,
2008). The catch for Russia is overcoming its own production bottlenecks that apparently obstructed previous programs¶
full reailzation in order to actualize the arms sellers and producers¶ revenues (ITAR-TASS, December 12, 2008; FBIS
SOV, December 12, 2008). But now Russia has had to deny that it will supply China with nuclear submarines because
of the invitable foreign disquiet that reports of these agrements generated abroad (ITAR-TASS, December 15, 2008;
FBIS SOV, December 15, 2008). Nonetheless Russia will now actively support the further growth of Chinese military
power even though it acknowledges that this power represents a threat to its own interests.
In this respect arms sales parallells energy developments. Russia¶s inability to execute its contracts due to poor
economic governance and policy, coupled with its belligerent stance toward the West may allow it to insist on its
sovereign independence, but actually its policy amounts to little more than 'splendid isolation'. Russia appears
increasingly compelled to yield to China whether it be on energy, missile defenses, or arms sales even as its defense
policies acknowledge, in practice if not word, a rising Chinese threat [3]. Ultimately Russia is riding the dragon but can
it alight in time before it bites?
Notes
1. Jeff Chen, ³Russia-India, Russia-China Military Cooperation Running Into Difficulties,´ Toronto, Kanwa Intelligence
Review Internet, in English, March 30-April 13, 2008, FBIS SOV, April 5, 2008.
2. Stephen Blank, ³Russia¶s Security Dilemmas in Asia,´ Forthcoming in Pacific Focus argues for mounting concern
about nuclear and missile programs.
3. Stephen Blank, ´The Russo-Chinese Energy Follies,´ Jamestown China Brief VIII, No. 23, December 8, 2008;
Stephen Blank, ´Russia¶s Strategic Dilemmas in Asia,´ Pacific Focus, XXIII, NO. 3, December, 2008, pp. 271-293;
Stephen Blank, ³Strategic Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific Theater: A New Nuclear Arms Race,?´ Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, XX, NO. 1, Spring, 2008, pp. 27-46.
[The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.]
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Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Economics, Africa, China and the Asia-Pacific, Featured
By: Jeffrey Herbst, Greg Mills
The commodity price decline has revealed to the Africans something of the nature of their friends. During the
commodity price boom, China invested massively in Africa seeking to lock up as many raw materials as possible. Some
in academia spoke confidently of China having a fifty or one hundred year strategy toward Africa. In practice, Chinese
entrepreneurs have been the first to leave when the market turned since the global decline in commodity prices
accelerated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. For instance, according to interviews the authors
conducted in Congo, more than 60 Chinese mining companies have left the mineral rich Katanga the last two months, as
cobalt and copper prices have tanked. Over 100 small Chinese operators are reported to have left Zambian mines for the
same reason.
A similar retreat may be occurring at the strategic level. In 2007, it was announced that China would lend the Congo $5
billion to modernize its infrastructure and mining sector. Under a draft accord, Beijing earmarked the funds for major
road and rail construction projects and for rehabilitation of Congo's mining sector, while the repayment terms proposed
included mining concessions and toll revenue deals to be given to Chinese companies. In simple terms it meant 13
million tons of copper for $5 billion²or (even at today¶s depressed prices) $40 billion for twenty-times less [1]. The
China-Congo deal, however, has gone very quiet as the copper price has plummeted. The market²not grand strategy²
is the main Chinese motivation in Africa.
Africa and China
African countries have, on average, grown by five percent or more over the last few years. This remarkable turnaround
from the low rates of growth of the previous 20 years has given some hope that many of the world¶s poorest countries
can finally start on the road to development and poverty alleviation. The growth resurgence in Africa has been due to
the many difficult economic reforms that many countries have undertaken, including liberalizing the exchange rate and
reducing inefficient state enterprises. Yet, growth in Africa has also been fuelled by the large increases in commodity
prices over the last few years as most countries are dependent on the export of a few raw materials.
Africa is a new continental market for lesser-priced Chinese exports, while it is a major source of raw materials. China¶s
trade with Africa has dramatically increased from $11 billion in 2000 to $73 billion in 2007 [2]. As the price of
commodities rose, China rapidly became the most assertive investor nation in Africa. By the start of 2008, over 800
Chinese state-owned enterprises were active on the continent, with Chinese firms investing more than $6 billion in
Africa in 900 projects²notably in the natural resource sector [3].
Until recently, it appeared that Africa¶s dependence on commodity export would not be an obstacle to growth In the
middle of 2008, as oil surged past $140 per barrel, there were confident predictions of a commodity ³supercycle´ based
on sustainable increases in demand from India and China that would keep not only petroleum but every other
commodity at record high prices. In fact, commodities have crashed. Oil is now below $50 per barrel and other
commodities have succumbed to the downward pressure. The benchmark copper price has fallen 65 percent since July
and cobalt is now at approximately $16/lb down from $52 in March (Mining Weekly, December 16, 2008).
The sharp drop in commodity prices has many implications for Africa²and by extension its relations with China. First,
growth is going to be massively slashed. Indeed, the price declines have been so sudden and so brutal that many African
leaders, who believed that they were doing what the west recommended, suddenly find their economies to again be in
tatters. For instance, in Zambia, a combination of bad political leadership, a failure to reinvest, and falling prices had
seen copper production fall by the early 1990s to less than one-third of its 720,000 ton 1960s peak [4]. In 1991, the
Zambians finally voted out the old party that had presided over decline and instituted a controversial program of
privatization. Riding on the commodity boom, Zambia has enjoyed a five-year boom, with production rising to 600,000
tons [5]. Now, Zambian mines are closing as many are unable to produce at the current cost and unemployment is
growing rapidly. The value of the local currency, the Kwacha, fell by three-quarters in just 45 days from the start of
November 2008. It may not end here. As Zambia¶s Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane said: ³I suspect there will
be further knock-on effects, particularly among the sub-contractors to the mines.´
However, it is questionable whether Zambia, like others, even made full use of the boom. In response to the high prices
Zambia introduced a µwindfall tax¶, the result being that some mines were forced to pay tax before they made any profit.
The outcome: All new investments stopped, including those that would have given old mines a new lease, which may
have mitigated the impact of the current price downturn. The windfall tax rates meant that as copper prices rose above
$3 per pound triggering the tax, so the profitability of operations decreased. Unusually it became in companies¶ financial
interests to see prices decline to avoid such taxation.
A similar if more desperate story is underway in the neighboring Congo. Under former president Mobutu Sese Seko¶s
misrule, by the mid-1990s the annual per capita income of Congolese was, at $120, two-thirds less than before
independence. The commodity boom helped Congo and at least Katanga province, where much of the mining is located,
experience an uptick. However, Katanga is now in freefall as many of the mines are closing and may well take the rest
of Congo with it. Indeed, the upsurge of violence in Eastern Congo may be due in part to the fact that rebels fighting the
Congolese government are aware of the commodity price decline and are deliberately picking a fight against a
government that they know has grown weaker.
While the Africans are understandably bitter about the sharp price decline in their export prices that seemingly began
with the overbuilding of houses in Boca Raton, Florida, they are not without blame. The commodity boom produced
something akin to the proverbial seven fat years for some African countries but there was very little effort to diversify
production while the going was relatively good. In particular, the very old story of underinvestment in agriculture was
repeated as Africans listened to those analysts who said that commodity prices would stay high forever. Now they are
stuck with low prices for their exports and little else.
In the DRC, like Zambia, opportunistic policy and recalcitrant bureaucracy has not helped. In response to high prices the
Congolese government initiated a µrevisitation process¶ early in 2007, questioning the tenure of all mines and forcing
companies to reapply for licenses. Such uncertainty made raising capital more difficult. As a result, big long-term
mining projects are now at risk. Indeed, such greed may have ensured the DRC has largely missed out on the metal price
bubble.
The effects of such avarice have been exacerbated by the nature of the DRC¶s bureaucracy. This is one hangover from
former president Mobutu Sese Seko¶s 35 years in office when everyone was left to fend for themselves, using their
office to frustrate progress until paid. As one mining executive observed, ³until the international community can
somehow pay for salaries of the bureaucrats, I don¶t believe things will change much.´
No doubt some African countries have benefited on balance from the commodity downturn, as food and fuel prices have
fallen. Most African countries are, after all, net energy and food importers. Yet, the sudden price decline has proven
again that African countries are not immune to the effects of the international financial crisis and that they must redouble
efforts to reduce their dependence on raw material exports.
Despite the price declines, Africans in southern Africa that the authors speak to remain committed to competing in the
international economy and driving their countries forward through better policies. Interestingly, government officials
and businessmen in Africa never mention foreign aid as a particularly important driver for growth, despite the lavish
attention that western media gives to actors, musicians, and others who continue to promote Africans as helpless victims
who need ever-greater handouts. Today¶s leaders in Africa know, especially in light of the commodity decline, that they
have made mistakes but they also know that they will determine the fate of their countries. To do so, they will need a
recipe of sound bureaucracy, and consistent policies attractive to investors. China, African leaders know, will be an
important and growing presence in Africa. Yet, the price decline, and the subsequent Chinese response, will probably
cause African leaders to recalibrate their perspective on what they can expect from Beijing in the years to come.
Notes
1. Authors¶ discussion with Zambian and DRC-based mining executive on 21 December 2008 in Johannesburg.
2. Authors¶ interview on 9 November 2008 in Beijing.
3. See Sudha Ramachandran, µIndia pushes people power in Africa¶, Asia Times, 13 July 2007 sourced at
www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IG13Df03.html
4. Authors¶ interviews in December 2008 in Zambia.
5. Authors¶ interview with Zambian Finance Minister on 15 December 2008 in Lusaka.
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Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Foreign Policy, Domestic/Social, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Willy Lam
Even as the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) is projecting hard power across the four corners of the earth, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) is mapping out a multi-pronged strategy to publicize globally the apparent viability of the
³China model.´ The administration of President Hu Jintao is spending around Renminbi (RMB) 45 billion ö$6.58
billion to boost what party insiders call ³overseas propaganda´ (waixuan gongzuo). Prominent state media including
CCTV and Xinhua News Agency will vastly enhance programs and news feed in different languages for Western and
Asian audiences, and an English news channel modeled upon Al Jazeera is set to let the world get the Chinese take on
issues and events ranging from politics and finance to culture and religion.
Reports by the Hong Kong and Western media last week said that CCTV, Xinhua, and the CCP mouthpiece People¶s
Daily could each receive up to RMB 15 billion ($2.19 billion) for ambitious schemes geared toward enhancing China¶s
international influence. CCTV, which opened French and Spanish channels before last summer¶s Beijing Olympics, is
expected to offer services in Russian and Arabic later this year. Xinhua, which has news bureaus in dozens of major
cities around the globe, is reportedly planning to establish a 24-hour English news channel to compete with CNN and
BBC. In the run-up to the Olympics, Chinese media²and nationalist Chinese youth²had vehemently denounced CNN
and other Western news organizations for distorting the ³true picture´ of Chinese policies regarding sensitive areas such
as Tibet and human rights. The Global Times, which is an offshoot of People¶s Daily, is readying an English edition in
the near future. This would become China¶s third English-language newspaper (Reuters, January 13; South China
Morning Post [Hong Kong], January 12; AFP, January 14).
As with major efforts in other arenas, this aggressive projection of soft power is initiated by a marathon of speeches by
CCP senior cadres. Earlier this month, CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun told officials
attending a national conference on propaganda and ideology that they must ³vigorously sing the praises of the
achievements of the CCP, socialism, the reform policy, and [the glories of] the great motherland.´ Li called for
³assiduous efforts to augment the soft power of Chinese culture, and to further elevate our national image.´ Wang Chen,
who heads the party¶s overseas propaganda division, added that media and cultural units should beef up their ³capacity
to broadcast, to positively influence international public opinion and to establish a good image for our nation.´ ³We
must strive to set up a top-line global media arm that covers the entire world and which is multi-lingual, enjoys a large
viewership, has a large volume of information and is strongly influential,´ Wang indicated (People¶s Daily, January 6;
Xinhua News Agency, January 9; AFP, January 14).
Plans to extend the global reach of Chinese norms²and the Chinese model of development²complements PLA
gambits such as sending naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden and building aircraft carriers and other state-of-the-art
hardware (China Brief, January 12). This µGreat Leap Outward¶ of Chinese soft power may also be an effort to exploit
the precipitous drop in the esteem of American-style, laissez-faire capitalism in the wake of the financial tsunami. While
the Chinese economy has also been hurt particularly due to a shrinkage of exports to the United States and the European
Union, the Hu leadership is convinced that the sorry state of the American model has thrown into sharp relief the
superiority of the Chinese way of doing things. According to a recent commentary by the Xinhua News Agency, the
results of 30 years of Chinese reform have amounted to ³the realization of innovation and creativity on a gargantuan
scale « nothing less than an epic poem about expeditious development.´ ³Not only ordinary people but the media and
academia in China and abroad have paid close attention to µthe China miracle¶ or µthe China model¶,´ proclaimed the
party mouthpiece (Xinhua News Agency, December 28, 2008).
Similar sentiments are being echoed by Beijing¶s big-name scholars. For Peking University political scientist Yu
Keping, the China model has ³enriched our knowledge about the laws and paths toward social development and
promoted the multi-pronged development of human civilization in the age of globalization.´ Yu, who sometimes advises
President Hu on political issues, said that the Chinese approach carried a special significance for developing countries
because ³both the µEast Asian model¶ and the µLatin American model¶ have lost their effectiveness in recent years.´
According to Central Party School Professor Zhao Yao, the China model is worth maximum exposure because ³it has
saved the world socialist movement.´ ³Through the reform and open door policy of China, new vistas have been opened
up for socialism,´ Zhao noted (Beijing Daily, November 18, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, December 28, 2008).
There is little question that particularly since most private and semi-governmental international news and cultural
organizations are downsizing due to harsh economic realities, China¶s multi-billion RMB propaganda putsch will catch
eyeballs galore. Whether the worldwide audience will buy the product is another question. A just-released survey by the
Chinese Academy of Sciences points out that based on data up to 2005, the influence of Chinese culture is ranked
seventh in the world, behind that of the United States, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Spain (Xinhua News Agency,
January 18)²and CCP cadres and experts seem convinced that Chinese soft power will mushroom in the wake of the
proliferation of publicity materials. According to Dong Manyuan, a senior researcher at the China Institute of
International Studies (a Chinese Foreign Ministry think-tank) Chinese soft power is different from²and potentially
more appealing than²Western brands because the former exults a wholesome sense of ³peace and harmony.´
³Characteristics of Chinese soft power include respect for heterogeneity of world [cultures], openness and tolerance,
friendliness and inclusiveness « respect for politeness and benevolence´ (Xinhua News Agency, January 18; Outlook
Weekly [Beijing], December 8, 2008).
However, detractors of the ³China model,´ including the Chinese approach to overseas propaganda, have cited instances
where Chinese leaders²and censors²have failed to demonstrate openness, tolerance or inclusiveness. In a speech late
last year summarizing the achievement of 30 years of reform, which underpins the apparent virility of the country¶s
economy and culture, President Hu took an uncompromising stance while underscoring the imperative of cleaving to
Marxist orthodoxy. The supremo vowed that the CCP would uphold the ³Four Cardinal Principles´ of stern party control
and ³democratic proletarian dictatorship.´ Hu said that the CCP would do whatever it takes to ³boost its ability to guard
against changes [to a non-socialist system] and to withstand risks´ such as socio-political instability. And he delivered a
stern warning to liberal cadres who favor a faster pace of political reform as well as the adoption of ³universal values´
such as elections and rule of law. Hu warned that the leadership ³will never take the deviant path of changing the flag
and standard [of the party]´ (People¶s Daily, December 19, 2008). Hu¶s harsh rhetoric would seem to be at odds with the
image of a benevolent, harmonious and tolerant China that the party¶s legions of publicists are so keen to project.
In an article on the difficulties facing the global marketing of Chinese values and culture, Tsinghua University media
scholar Li Xiguang noted that ³the soft power of a country manifests itself in whether it has the power to define and
interpret µuniversal values¶ such as democracy, freedom and human rights.´ Li pointed out that in order to enhance the
attractiveness of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', ³we must let the whole world hear the stories that Chinese
citizens have to tell about their democracy, liberty, human rights and rule of law´ (People¶s Daily net, January 5). The
problem, of course, is that intellectuals bold enough to air their views on democracy and political reform have been
harassed if not incarcerated by the authorities. This is true of the dozens of well-known writers and professors who
earlier this month signed a manifesto called Charter 08, which asked the CCP leadership to do nothing more than letting
Chinese enjoy civil rights enshrined in United Nations covenants (China Brief, December 19, 2008).
Moreover, even though state media are all guns blazing in expanding their coverage and broadcasts overseas, the
Department of Propaganda and other departments have tightened their grip on Chinese publications and websites that
have apparently run afoul of the censors. A just-released Human Rights Watch World Report pointed out that at least 26
Chinese journalists remain in prison. ³The Chinese government continues to strictly control journalists, and sanctions
individuals and print and online media which fail to comply with extremely restrictive but unpredictably enforced laws
and regulations,´ the report said [1]. Since late last year, seven departments including the Public Security Ministry and
the State Council Information Office have closed down more than 726 websites that are said to be pornographic. Yet
famous blogger Wang Junxiu said that the crackdown could be more about taming the Chinese internet than eradicating
smut. Wang, a Charter 08 signatory, indicated that authorities wanted to ³tighten up [the media] in response to all the
sensitive dates in 2009´ such as the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre (Reuters, January 5; AFP,
January 16).
Doubts have also been raised by Chinese intellectuals about the quality²and integrity²of state media including CCTV.
Earlier this month, 22 writers and lawyers started a Net-based movement asking Chinese nationwide to stop watching
the station. The campaign, entitled ³Say no to CCTV, say no to brainwashing,´ accused its news programs of ³focusing
only on bright side´ while reporting on domestic affairs, and doing the opposite about events in foreign nations. The
petitioners also faulted the network for running too many historical dramas whose message was that citizens should
profess undying loyalty to the emperor. So far, neither CCTV nor other Chinese media have reported on this
unprecedented challenge to the CCP media establishment. When asked by Hong Kong reporters to comment on the
issue, a CCTV spokesman said only that his organization and its programs were ³well-liked by the great majority of
Chinese´ (BBC news, January 13; Ming Pao [Hong Kong] January 14; CableTV News [Hong Kong], January 14).
Unless these and other questions about censorship and brainwashing are answered satisfactorily, however, China¶s state
media, no matter how well-endowed financially, can hardly win a global following, let alone help Beijing develop soft
power that is commensurate with that of a quasi-superpower.
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February 5, 2009 08:16 AM Age: 1 yrs
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page, Featured
By: Cheng-yi Lin
Beijing published the 2008 edition of "China¶s National Defense" (hereafter White Paper) on the cusp of U.S. President
Barack Obama's historic inauguration on January 20th. The past three editions (2002, 2004, and 2006) of the White
Paper were all published in the final month of every other year, but this time Beijing purposely delayed its release for
almost three weeks. An incident wherein Beijing exhibited similar behavior was in July 1998 when it released the 1998
edition of the White Paper on the same day that ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
(ARF), a landmark security dialogue among mainly Southeast Asian states, were meeting in the Philippines. The
meeting coincidentally called upon its members to have more transparency in their defense planning. On both occasions,
it is clear that Beijing deliberately choose the timing of the release to indicate its intention to accept the common practice
of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Asia-Pacific and project an image of a responsible stakeholder.
Although the White Paper argues that China ³is still confronted with long-term, complicated, and diverse security threats
and challenges,´ leaders in Beijing believe that ³China¶s security situation has improved steadily´ [1]. The White Paper
mentions that ³China¶s overall national strength has increased substantially, its people¶s living standards have kept
improving, the society remains stable and unified, and the capability for upholding national security has been further
enhanced´ [2]. Most importantly, the White Paper reveals that Beijing¶s threat perception in the Taiwan Strait has been
greatly reduced. The White Paper, however, explicitly said that China¶s military capabilities will continue to grow even
as the Taiwan issue thaws, verifying that a Chinese national security strategy looking beyond Taiwan is taking shape.
What is Said and Not Said in the 2008 Defense White Paper
Beijing harps that the new White Paper provides previously unreleased information and reflects new changes to the
previous editions. For instance, the current edition includes developments in the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) Army,
Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Force organized by separate chapters rather than grouped into the same
chapter like previous editions (Defense News, January 26). Some notable developments in each branch of the Chinese
armed forces highlighted by the White Paper include: acquiring capabilities of high mobility with three-dimensional
assault in the Army; integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations in the Navy; integrated air-land
capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations in the Air Force; and surface-to-surface missile equipment
system comprising both nuclear and conventional missiles with different ranges in the Second Artillery Corps.
Most importantly, the White Paper describes when and how China plans to use its nuclear weapons. The White Paper
outlines three different operational scenarios (i.e., under peacetime, nuclear crisis and nuclear attack) for nuclear
escalation. The nuclear missile force of China¶s Second Artillery Corps will go into a state of alert when facing a nuclear
crisis to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. Beijing¶s leader will then use nuclear missiles to
launch a counterattack against the enemy when it comes under a nuclear attack. The conventional missile force of the
Second Artillery Force is responsible for conducting medium and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and
operational targets of the enemy [3].
While building a modern military, China continues to skip doing certain things in the process of mechanization (i.e.
enhancing hardware and acquiring more advanced operational platforms) and strives to achieve leapfrog development in
key areas. Therefore, it adopts a policy of composite development of mechanization and informationization (i.e.
digitalization of weaponry, information system network, and integration of battle elements, particularly applicable to
military command, control, and communication). The PLA is also transforming a strategy from winning a local war with
the condition of high-technology to winning a war under the condition of informationization. By 2020, the PLA will
accomplish the goal of mechanization and make major progress in informationization (China Brief, November 24, 2008)
[4].
Even though PLA experts have known the geographical locations of the three fleet commands, the 2008 White Paper
was the first to explicitly identify Qingtao as the site for the North Sea Fleet, Ningbo for the East Sea Fleet and Zhejiang
for South Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, the White Paper, as usual, did not provide any details on the new Chinese destroyers,
frigates, submarines and warplanes that have made the PLA Navy more capable in projecting its power in the region.
Reports on the building of aircraft carriers were also not confirmed in the White Paper [5].
The White Paper fails to address concerns over Chinese missile deployments targeting Taiwan and U.S. forces stationed
on bases surrounding Taiwan. Moreover, Beijing avoided the chance of explaining its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in
January 2007, which remains a major sticking point in Sino-U.S. political-military relations, as well as the decline of a
port visit by the USS Kitty Hawk to Hong Kong in November 2007. To soothe U.S. security concerns, the White Paper
did, however, acknowledge that China and Russia jointly submitted in February 2008, a draft Treaty to the Conference
on Disarmament on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects [6].
Beijing cautions in the White Paper that China is facing ³the superiority of the developed countries in economy, science
and technology, as well as military affairs.´ More importantly, China ³also faces strategic maneuvers and containment
from the outside´ [7]. While not pointing a finger at the United States, it is indirectly condemning the United States as
its major adversary. China publicly warns the United States for its arms sales to Taiwan and claims that this will cause
³serious harm to Sino-U.S. relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits´ [8]. Beijing suspended its
military exchanges program with the United States in response to the $6.5 billion arms sales package that the Bush
administration sanctioned in October 2008, but with the new Obama administration, the resumption of military
relationship is expected to take place soon.
In addition to the United States, Beijing lists separatist forces such as those supporting ³Taiwan independence,´ ³East
Turkistan independence´ and "Tibet independence" as threats to China¶s ³unity and security.´ The White Paper claims
that Beijing has succeeded in thwarting ³Taiwan independence´ from seeking ³de jure Taiwan independence,´ therefore,
the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn [9]. Beijing believes that cross-Strait
relations have improved because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) have resumed
negotiations on the basis of the ³1992 Consensus.´ The White Paper, however, did not reflect the policy articulated by
Chinese President Hu Jintao on December 31, 2008, concerning cross-Strait discussion of military CBMs between
Taiwan and China through increased military contacts and exchanges.
In the White Paper, China indicated that it has formulated a military strategic guideline of active defense for the 21st
Century. This active defense guideline include four components: winning local wars in conditions of
informationization; emphasizing the prevention and deterrence of crises and wars; enhancing the capabilities to counter
various security threats; and setting up a logistical mechanism of military mobilization and civilian-based economy,
science, technology, information and transportation mobilization [10]. In different chapters of the White Paper, the PLA
like the United States, is focused on the new task of its armed forces in handling the challenges of military operations
other than war (MOOTW) in areas such as counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency response, peacekeeping,
emergency rescue and disaster relief [11]. The PLA Navy is also committed to developing a capability of countering
non-traditional security threats in distant waters, which explains Beijing's decision to dispatch a mini-fleet to the Gulf of
Aden in the Arabian Sea for protecting its national surface ships from piracy.
The White Paper disclosed the trend in defense budget increases throughout the past three decades. For example, the
average annual increase of defense expenditures in the 1978-1987 was 3.5 percent, 14.5 percent in 1988-1997, and 15.9
percent in 1998-2007. Arguably, the increase reflects its rapid economic growth but also exhibits its need to meet ³the
requirements of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs).´ From 2006 to 2008, the PLA's defense expenditure grew
even more significantly. The defense expenditure was RMB 297.938 billion (about $38 billion) in 2006 and RMB
355.491 billion (about $45 billion) in 2007, up 20.4 percent and 19.3 percent respectively over the previous year [12]. In
a longer time span, Chinese defense spending has risen sharply²from about RMB 16.7 billion ($2.4 billion) in 1978 to
about RMB 417.7 billion (about $60 billion) in fiscal year 2008, roughly a 25 -fold increase. The official figure,
however, is much lower than the estimations by different Western defense-related organizations. For example, the White
Paper claims that China¶s defense expenditure budget in 2007 was around 1.38 percent of China¶s GDP, but the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) calculates that the real figure might be around 2.1 percent of
GDP [13].
Overseas Concerns
In the 2006 White Paper, Beijing¶s leaders was more concerned over the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under
former President Chen Shui-bian for pushing a pro-independence agenda, such as the name rectification campaign and
constitutional reform. Then, Beijing warned that political developments in Taiwan remained a challenge that ³must not
be neglected,´ and that the ³struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for µTaiwan independence¶´ poses a
³grave threat to China¶s sovereignty and territorial integrity´ (China Brief, January 24, 2007) [14]. As demonstrated in
President Hu Jintao¶s end-of-year "six-point proposal" toward Taiwan, Beijing is far more confident now about the
prospect of eventual unification than it was during the past eight years. The new political climate after the 2008
Taiwan¶s presidential election greatly altered Beijing¶s threat perceptions in the Taiwan Strait.
Although Taiwan¶s defense ministry shunned away from making a public statement on the 2008 White Paper, experts in
Taiwan argue that there is little new information revealed in the White Paper. While Beijing continues to warn the
United States over its arms sales to Taiwan, the Obama administration has no urgent need to consider providing Taiwan
with new weapons after the Bush administration announced $6.5 billion in arms sales to the island. The Ma Ying-jeou
government, restrained by the economic downturn and pressure to preserve the political gains from cross-Strait
rapprochement, might find less economic and political imperatives to request more advanced U.S. defense hardware
including the F16C/D and diesel submarines. Taiwan has long had proposed CBMs with the Chinese military, such as
making defense information more transparent, limiting military deployments, establishing communication channels, and
setting up verification measures. Although the 2008 White Paper fails publicly to endorse the future direction of cross-
Strait CBMs, it is likely that think tanks in Beijing and Taipei will have more opportunities to talk on issues to ³stabilize
cross-Straits relations and ease concerns about military security´ (Xinhua News Agency, December 31, 2008).
Speculation in the Chinese media continues that Beijing might consider removing or freezing the numbers of its surface-
to-surface missiles targeting at the island. The new scenario, however, could pose a security dilemma for the Ma Ying-
jeou government and the Obama administration, because Beijing will fully take advantage of this dramatic gesture to
weaken justifications of future U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation.
Two days after the publication of the White Paper, President Ma spoke to Taiwan¶s military and urged them to combine
hard with soft power to safeguard the island¶s security. Ma argued that through military readiness, Taiwan could deter a
war in the Taiwan Strait. Ma also proclaimed that ³resolute defense and effective deterrence´ is always the goal of
Taiwan¶s defense [15]. Nevertheless, both Ma Ying-jeou and Barack Obama will face one chilling reality²that the
military balance in the Taiwan Strait is tilting in favor of the PLA.
Compared to Taiwan¶s low-keyed response to the White Paper, the Japanese media have been much more vocal. In an
editorial of the Asahi Shimbun it expressed disappointment because the White Paper ³said nothing about China¶s
reported plans to build new nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers´ and its
³silence about these projects has only increased international unease.´ The editorial furthers its critique by commenting
that ³the report didn¶t refer to any review of China¶s military capabilities in response to the improvement in relations
with Taiwan´ (Asahi Shimbun, January 23).
In the White Paper, Beijing toned down the pronouncement of its security concerns over Japan¶s military modernization
compared to its 2006 edition. Japan, however, is particularly concerned that the PLA is building a blue water navy that
will pose a security challenge in the overlapping territorial claims over the disputed islands in the East China Sea (Japan
Times, January 23).
Taiwanese and Japanese concerns are not exceptions. In a Senate Armed Service Committee testimony on January 27,
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified the threats of Chinese military buildup by stating that ³the areas of
greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-
ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles.´ Gates believes that ³modernization in these areas could threaten
America¶s primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific´ [16]. The United States, however, stated
that it has ³the capability in place to deal with any Chinese threat for some time to come´ (Washington Times, January
27).
Conclusion
Even with further reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait, China has decidedly maintained its rapid pace in building a
high-tech and digital armed force with the ability to counter conventional and nuclear threat or to handle complex issues
related to human security. Beijing has shown that its defense planning is already beyond Taiwan¶s capability and could
potentially challenge Japan and the United States in the Western Pacific. Undeniably, Beijing has made progress with
each different edition of the White Paper since 1998, but it still conceals a great deal of defense information that shrouds
its intent. Japan as well as the United States, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, are not reassured by Beijing¶s latest Defense
White Paper. By keeping its strategic planning from being completely transparent, it could strengthen China¶s
psychological defense vis-à-vis its potential adversaries. Partial revelation of China¶s defense information to meet the
minimum standard of CBMs, while playing up the role of a responsible stakeholder, appears to be the strategy and intent
behind the publication of China¶s 2008 National Defense White Paper.
Notes
1. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, ³China's National Defense in 2008,´
January 20, 2009, chapter 1, cited in www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm.
2. Ibid.
3. ³China's National Defense in 2008,´ Chapter 7.
8. Ibid.
11. ³China's National Defense in 2008,´ Chapters 2 and 3.
13. Petter Stålenheim, Catalina Perdomo and Elisabeth Sköns, ³Military Expenditure,´ in SIPRI 2008 Yearbook:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, cited in yearbook2008.sipri.org/05.
December 2006, Beijing Review, No. 2 (January 11, 2007), Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 11, 2007), p. 3.
15. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), News Releases, January 22, 2009.
16. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Submitted Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009,
cited in armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/January/Gates%2001-27-09.pdf.
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February 4, 2009 02:41 PM Age: 1 yrs
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Elite
By: Russell Hsiao
Chen Xiaogong, deputy commander of the People¶s Liberation Army Air Force
The top-brass of the Chinese leadership started the Lunar New Year on a sprint. The year of the ox, which began on
January 26 in the Gregorian calendar, was marked by fervent planning for Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao¶s trip to the
World Economic Forum in Switzerland. On January 30, a little over a week after his inauguration, President Barack
Obama was on the phone with Chinese President Hu Jintao reassuring Beijing's concerns over U.S. Secretary Treasury
Timothy Geithner's remarks on the Chinese currency as well as the two countries' trade imbalances. According to a
Xinhua report, President Obama described the relationship as "the most important bilateral relations for both sides"
(Xinhua News Agency, January 31). Meanwhile, China's "2008 National Defense White Paper" was quietly slipped
under the doorstep of the White House on the day of the inauguration. According to military experts, the White Paper
continues to conceal important details about China's military modernization, which has been the source of tension with
its neighbors and the United States (China Brief, March 14, 2008). The White Paper, nonetheless, provides a systematic
window to recalibrate U.S. perceptions toward the attitudes and outlook of China's top military planners (see Cheng-yi
Lin's article in this issue). All announced in close tandem with the release of the 2008 White Paper, the Beijing
leadership also elevated the ranks of a number of officers to key executive posts in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Armed Forces and regional command (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], January 21). This move may signal the coming of age
for the next generation of PLA leaders and illustrates a new direction that the PLA is taking in conducting military-to-
military relations as the United States and China enter a new chapter in their bilateral relations.
According to multiple sources in the Chinese media, the most notable appointment is that of Deputy Chief of the
General Staff for intelligence Lieutenant General Chen Xiaogong to the post of deputy commander of the People¶s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) under the command of General Xu Qiliang. Chen is a well known "princeling"²
familiar to U.S. Sinologists²and is the son of the former People's Republic of China (PRC) Ambassador to Japan and
the United Nations, Chen Chu. Chen Xiaogong, 60 years old, has a long career in military intelligence, and served as a
defense attaché at the PRC Embassy in Washington from 2001-2003, prior to his most recent appointment he served as
the deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the Central Committee and General Staff Department's Second
Department (Ming Pao, January 21). Chen's elevation as the deputy commander of the PLAAF marks the first time in 40
years that a high-ranking army officer was made a high-ranking air force officer. Chen's illustrious career in Chinese
intelligence has earned him the nickname "Little Li Kenong," after the Chinese colonel general who was the director of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Investigation Department (Xilu.com, January 20).
Among other personnel changes verified by various Chinese sources, the central committee approved the appointment of
Major General Xue Guojiang as deputy commander of the Chinese People¶s Armed Police (PAP), Xue is replacing
retiring Lieutenant General Chen Chuankuo; the 54th Group Army (in Jinan Military District) Commander, Song
Puxuan, is replacing Rear Admiral Xu Chengyun as the deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region under
Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi; Second Artillery 54 Base (in Luoyang) Political-Commissar Guo Junbo was promoted
to deputy political-commissar of the Second Artillery Corps under the directive of General Peng Xiaofeng (Ming Pao,
January 21); and Major General Ren Haiquan, the head of education at National Defense University became its vice
president (Ta Kung Pao, January 28).
Major General Ruan Zhibo, auditor-general of the PLA Audit Bureau, the internal financial audit organization that is
subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC) but managed by the General Logistics Department, was made
the deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region, which includes the Tibet military district, under Commander
Lieutenant General Li Shiming. The appointment of Major General Ruan, 58 years old, marks the first time that an
officer in the audit bureau was selected to serve in a leadership position of a major military region (Nanfang Daily,
January 31).
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Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Cynthia Watson
Over the past decade, western militaries and governments have struggled with growing pressures to engage in and
balance their responsibilities in ³nation-building,´ ³peacekeeping operations´ and other various non-combat tasks. At
the same time, the Chinese People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) has been taking on an increasing number of such missions,
described in the 2008 Defense White Paper as ³Military Operations Other Than War´ (MOOTWA). For China, so-
called ´nation-building´ operations can include peacekeeping, anti-piracy efforts, environmental disasters and societal
unrest, while the PLA missions can also include traditional warfighting under informatized conditions. The MOOTWA
efforts serve as evidence of Beijing¶s increasing use of its armed forces as an instrument of statecraft, to achieve
fundamental national security objectives and to enhance a deeper Chinese presence around the world. This enhanced
role for its military helps the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership return China to a leading position in the
international community.
As the People's Republic of China (PRC) prepares for the sixtieth anniversary of its founding in October 2009, the
armed forces are receiving increased guidance regarding their responsibilities and missions. The CCP has established
two primary purposes for engaging in MOOTWA. First, China¶s civilian leadership is focused on governing the
complex, challenging, and changing environment at home. Second is a determination by the CCP to increase the PLA's
³meaningful´, active role in the world, and to increase international respect for the nation as a global leader
commensurate with its historic role as the ³Middle Kingdom.´ Employing its military in non-traditional missions will
demonstrate China¶s increasing status as a global power, while also increasing the scope of the PLA's portfolio of non-
traditional military capabilities. These accomplishments also serve to solidify the CCP¶s political authority over the
nation. This paper will explore several instances where the PLA has been assigned to non-traditional military missions,
and the effects of those efforts on the CCP and on China.
Missions and Capabilities: Evolving China
The PLA¶s priority mission remains the preservation of "national integrity," and it intends to do so both by preventing
³splittist´ efforts in Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet, and responding to threats to domestic stability. Yet The PLA continues
to receive non-traditional tasks from its civilian command. These operations have to-date been aimed at specific
missions²such as protecting shipping in the North Arabian Sea²while raising the PLA's (and by extension, the PRC's)
profile in the global community.
Twenty years ago, PLA's limited capabilities would have made today¶s deployments abroad difficult to accomplish. In
particular, the PLA Navy (PLAN) was a smaller, much less capable force, while the military¶s ground component
focused almost entirely on traditional continental threats [1]. Modernization of its forces was significantly enhanced by
dramatically increased budget allocations to the military during this time period, especially since the civilian government
directed the PLA to remove itself from the civilian commercial sector of the economy in 1998.
The PLA has since sought to redefine its role and increase its viability as an instrument of international statecraft,
supported by central government revenues and resulting from a strategic paradigm designed by Beijing. This apparent
shift in national strategic priorities was reflected in annual double-digit increases in the PLA¶s budget and in its dramatic
modernization. Hence, Beijing now has a viable military instrument for accomplishing the goals incumbent on a major
world power.
Peacekeeping Deployments: Increasing Participation
The PRC has been reluctant to participate in peacekeeping actions since its founding; it preferred to maintain a position
of extreme non-interference in other nations, a policy exemplified in the ³Five Principles of Mutual Co-Existence´
memorably stated by Premier Zhou Enlai at Bandung in 1955. This position developed primarily in response to China¶s
experience during the so-called ³Hundred Years of Humiliation,´ a concept still active in Chinese security policy
formulation, used to describe the period from approximately 1840 to 1949, when²in Mao Zedong¶s term²China was
'exploited' and 'attacked by imperialists.'
Exceptions to this general policy did occur in the last decade of the twentieth century, as China dispatched peacekeeping
forces to Liberia (1993), the Sinai (1989), and Kampuchea (1991-92) under a United Nations (UN) aegis, but these
deployments were few in number and limited in scope of effort, not exceeding five hundred men [2]. Many nations,
including the United States, have long urged China to participate more actively in international peacekeeping missions
when called for by the UN. China¶s position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has historically (and
will continue to) lend strength to those requests, especially in the post-Cold War era with the increase in number of
missions. Beijing seems to have responded, if not directly to the international community, by relaxing rigid rules of
non-interference.
During the past decade, China has taken [unprecedented] steps toward deploying military units to international
observing, policing and engineering operations. The PLA has been involved in peacekeeping operations around the
world, with notable assignments to sub-Saharan Africa, where its presence in Sudan and Liberia reinforced its increase
in investment and political involvement in the region. Typically described as ³soft power,´ these engagements are more
appropriately understood as a renewed appreciation in Beijing for the political uses of non-traditional military missions.
An indication of China¶s changing attitude was the establishment of a peacekeeping institute near Beijing in 2004.
Chinese peacekeepers have also been active in recent years (since 2004) in Haiti, where Ministry of Public Security
forces were deployed to try to suppress domestic unrest and to aid the establishment of a stable civilian government.
Chinese security forces²military and police units²were also assigned to Bosnia following the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords, East Timor following its separation from Indonesia (2000), as well as Congo (2003) and Kosovo (2004) [3].
The absence of Chinese involvement in Iraq signaled Beijing¶s disapproval of and apprehension about the U.S.-led
military action in that country since 2003.
Anti-Piracy Efforts: A New Role Abroad
Piracy has been a longstanding problem in the South China Sea, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
and the Andaman Sea. The threat posed by piracy flared from 2001 to 2003, and prompted littoral states like Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia to collaborate on joint anti-piracy patrols and other extraordinary measures. Significant
international support, particularly from the United States, Japan and Australia were evident in this campaign, but
China¶s absence from the efforts was noticeable. The piracy problems in Southeast Asia have since been minimized as a
result of these efforts (and in all likelihood, the improved economic conditions), but have become endemic in other areas
including the Indian Ocean, the coast of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, and in particular, the North Arabian Sea.
Strong evidence of Beijing¶s apparent shift in the focus of armed forces¶ missions can be found in the recent
announcement that 2008 PLAN units were assigned to join the counter-piracy efforts undertaken by several nations in
the troubled North Arabian Sea. This MOOTW mission has not, however, superseded the PLAN¶s more traditional
emphasis on protecting the PRC sovereignty²especially with respect to preventing Taiwan's de jure independence²but
this high-profile mission is a testament that MOOTW has risen in importance in the PLAN's operational portfolio.
The PLAN¶s ability to participate in such a long-range mission²approximately 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from China²
is evidence of the impressive modernization that its force has undergone over the past generation. This is true in terms
of the ships¶ individual capabilities, the logistic support available, and the maturation of Chinese naval strategic thinking
that has supported long-range deployment. Three ships²two guided missile destroyers and a supporting oiler/logistics
ship²began the counter-piracy mission in the North Arabian sea in January 2009 and by the end of that month had
completed 15 self-described ³missions´ that include safely escorting merchant ships through the waters threatened by
area pirates (Xinhua News Agency, January 20). These nascent efforts demonstrate the marked expansion of Chinese
participation in international peacekeeping activities, which may be a sign of Beijing¶s willingness to act as the
³responsible stakeholder´ urged on by U.S. policymakers. Employing the PLAN in this MOOTW mission marks a new
level of military and diplomatic sophistication in Chinese foreign policy.
The armed forces have also participated in addressing various natural disasters that have struck China in the past couple
of years. The military has been extensively engaged in assisting the civilian sector throughout the PRC¶s history but its
role has achieved new prominence with the expanded presence of technology projects throughout the nation. The
military was fully mobilized in 1998 to assist with ameliorating the effects of the drastic flooding that struck both the
Yellow and Yangtze Rivers during that summer.
The CCP also employed PLA resources to combat the epidemic of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak that occurred in late 2002 and the first half of 2003. Here again, the military's infrastructure offered strong
organizational support and the resources necessary to institute an effective quarantine of infected populations across the
country that served an important role in preventing the further spread of the disease. The PLA would certainly be called
upon to serve a similar role in the event of an Avian Flu pandemic
Similar assistance was called for during the 2007 flooding along China¶s southeastern coast, where the vast areas
affected required the manpower and equipment available that only China¶s large military can provide. Additionally, the
PLA was able to assist in controlling the public unrest and distress that accompanies such disasters.
The massive snowfall that paralyzed much of China in January through February of 2008 demanded that the PLA
provide the forces²manpower and equipment²necessary to meet a non-traditional military mission in the civilian
sector. The unprecedented snowfall struck during the Lunar New Year holiday, and prevented millions of people from
traveling on their only annual visit home; further, it occurred at a time when Beijing was beginning to invest heavily in
improving the country¶s markedly inadequate rail and road transportation networks, investments that still have not taken
full effect.
Hence, the CCP grew increasingly concerned about the people¶s mounting frustration and the potential chaos of having
millions of stranded travelers see their opportunity for an annual visit home thwarted. The PLA mobilized
approximately 224,000 troops and more than one million militia personnel to deal with the effects of the inclement
weather [4]. The military scored major accomplishments enhancing transportation opportunities, rescuing stranded
travelers from train and bus stations, and perhaps most importantly, demonstrating to China¶s citizens its willingness and
ability to help avert further disaster and to prevent the societal chaos so feared by both the government and people of the
nation.
An even more poignant demonstration of the evolving PLA role followed the disastrous earthquake that struck Sichuan
Province in May 2008. The physical damage that resulted was so severe that the PLA and its subsidiary militia and
People¶s Armed Police (PAP) forces faced major difficulties simply reaching the affected area, and then faced mammoth
tasks shifting through the damaged buildings and succoring millions of affected civilians. This initial rescue phase was
extensive and complex, requiring a relatively disciplined military force.
Despite extensive offers from the international community, including the United States, Beijing rejected most foreign
assistance, believing that the PLA was capable of dealing with the effects of the disaster. These efforts took several
weeks and included extensive PLA participation in clearing damaged property and reconstructing the affected areas.
This year, the PLA has already been called upon to assist in combating growing drought conditions in Jiangsu, Henan,
and other north central provinces [5]. The military will be providing engineering expertise and labor forces as part of an
effort to redirect water from the Yellow River into crucial agricultural areas starved of water. The PLA offers the nation
the engineering expertise needed for immediate action to ease a serious and deteriorating situation.
The Olympics as MOOTW

During the summer of 2008, the PLA played a massive role in the maintenance of the CCP¶s choke-hold on China¶s
dissidents during the run-up to and conduct of the Olympics in Beijing. This may be categorized as a non-traditional
military mission in much of the world, but is a long assigned task of China¶s military forces. The PLA did, however,
play an important role in ensuring a problem-free, secure international event. The games did take place with the
precision and outward peace that the CCP needed to provide proof that China had returned to its self-declared status as
the world¶s "Middle Kingdom."
China¶s 2008 Defense White Paper
Publication of this iteration of the biannual defense white paper provided Beijing with the opportunity to reemphasize
the PLA¶s role in non-traditional military activities, underlining the military¶s dedication to ³the People.´ The white
paper makes direct reference to several MOOTW missions, including responses to natural disasters and emergency
relief, as outlined in the 2005 Regulations on the Participation of the People¶s Liberation Army in Emergency Rescue
and Disaster Relief, noting that in 2007 and 2008 the PLA and the PAP had deployed more than 600,000 troops and
similar numbers of vehicles, while more than a million militia and reserve personnel had been called to active duty to
cope with 130 crises [6].
China¶s 2008 Defense White Paper also refers to the importance of the PLA in ³participating in and supporting national
construction´ to highlight the ³building of a new countryside,´ while also engaging in vital scientific, technical, cultural,
health, and educational work. These tasks include constructing schools and hospitals, as well as assisting civilian
authorities in campaigns to reduce poverty and strengthen the sinews of civilian societal cohesion.
Conclusion
The PLA has demonstrably increased its capabilities to execute non-traditional military missions as a core element in the
dramatic modernization it has undertaken during the past decade. While this modernization still aims primarily at
improving traditional military capabilities, the military¶s ability to participate productively in MOOTW missions²and
hence further to strengthen CCP rule in China²has undoubtedly increased, as well.
The civilian government, which seems more confident than in previous years of an eventual, peaceful resolution of
Taiwan¶s status, will certainly continue to employ the PLA in non-traditional military roles. The CCP¶s determination
to remain in power while raising China¶s position in the international community will include both traditional and non-
traditional reliance on the PLA as the ³party¶s army.´
[The author thanks LTC (ret.) Dennis Blasko and Dr. Bud Cole for comments on prior drafts. The views presented here
are purely personal and do no represent those of any U.S. Government Agency.]
Notes
1. Conversation with Dr. B.D. Cole, author of pending second edition, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2010 publication).
2. Bates Gill and James Reilly, ³Sovereignty, Intervention, and peacekeeping:the view from Beijing´, Survival, 42:3
(autumn 2000): 41-59, www.csis.org/media/csisi/press/00fallgill_reilly.pdf
3. Yin He, ³The Peacekeeping Dragon is on safari´, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JB08Ad01.html, 8 February 2008,
and Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, ³China¶s expanding peacekeeping role´, SIPRI Update, January 2009
4. Information Office of the State Council of the People¶s Republic of China, China¶s National Defense in 2008
(Beijing, January 2009): 55
5. ³China¶s armed forces join battle against devastating drought´, www.chinaview.cn, 9 February 2009
6. 2008 White Paper: 55.
7. Information Office of the State Council of the People¶s Republic of China, China¶s National Defense in 2008
(Beijing, January 2009): 55.
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Category: China Brief, China and the Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy, Military/Security
By: Ian Storey
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
From February 18 to 19, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Indonesia as part of an 8-day voyage through
Asia. Prior to her trip, Clinton stated that Washington was committed to a stronger relationship with Indonesia, a country
she described as ³one of Asia¶s most dynamic nations´ and one that shares democratic values with the United States. A
week earlier in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 113 personnel from the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia:
TNI) participated in Asia¶s largest annual multilateral military exercise²Cobra Gold²alongside forces from the United
States, Thailand, Japan and Singapore. Though Indonesia¶s contribution was small, its participation reflects how quickly
U.S.-Indonesian military ties have advanced since they were normalized in 2005. In contrast, Sino-Indonesian military-
security ties, which were initiated in the same year, have failed to gain momentum.
China and Indonesia forged a close but brief ideological relationship from 1963 to 1965 when Beijing and Jakarta
challenged the international status quo. This relationship was brought to a sudden end in October 1965 when the TNI,
led by General (and later President) Suharto, seized power in the wake of an abortive coup carried out by the Indonesian
Communist Party. President Suharto blamed Beijing for instigating the coup and proceeded to suspend relations with
China in 1967. Twenty-three years later bilateral ties were normalized, but it was not until after the fall of Suharto in
1998 and the withdrawal of the TNI from Indonesian politics that the two countries could turn a new page in their
relationship. Increasing trade and investment ties became the focus of Sino-Indonesian relations post-1998, with China
showing particular interest in gaining access to Indonesia¶s oil and gas reserves.
The Sino-Indonesian Strategic Partnership
In 2004, newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono endeavored to craft a more comprehensive relationship
with the PRC in recognition of China¶s growing centrality in the Asia-Pacific region; economics was still front and
center, but the Yudhoyono government sought to expand the political, cultural and military-security aspects of the
relationship. The foundation for a broader and deeper relationship was laid in April 2005 when the two countries issued
a joint declaration on ³Building a Strategic Partnership.´ Among 28 key measures to strengthen bilateral ties, the
declaration enjoined Indonesia and China to promote greater cooperation in the defense and military spheres,
specifically developing each other¶s defense industries, establishing a defense consultation mechanism, and increasing
cooperation between their law enforcement and intelligent agencies in the fight against transnational security threats [1].
For Indonesia, the most important aspect of the budding military-security relationship with China was defense industry
collaboration. Jakarta seeks to develop an advanced domestic arms industry so it can modernize the TNI¶s antiquated
equipment without having to spend vast amounts of money on foreign weapons systems. Moreover, a more proficient
indigenous defense industry would immunize Indonesia against international sanctions. During the 1990s Jakarta learned
the painful reality of being overly dependent on one country for its defense needs when the United States, its primary
military partner, imposed a series of weapons and training embargoes on Indonesia in response to human rights
violations perpetrated by the TNI in East Timor and Papua. Cognizant of this fact, China was keen to position itself as
an alternative arms vendor to Indonesia; in 2007, China¶s Ambassador to Indonesia, Lan Lijun, declared that Beijing
stood ready to supply arms to the TNI ³without any political strings´ (Jakarta Post, April 19, 2007).
In the aftermath of the ³strategic partnership´ declaration, the two countries moved to improve defense relations. In July
2005, Indonesia and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defense technology cooperation during
Yudhoyono¶s visit to Beijing. Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono indicated that the MOU would result in
future cooperation on the development of short and medium range missiles thus providing the country with a cheaper
alternative to jet fighters. During Yudhoyono¶s visit, agreement was also reached for Indonesia to purchase YJ-82/C-802
anti-ship missiles (ASMs) for $11 million, the first major purchase of Chinese manufactured weapons by Jakarta since
the mid-1960s. There was talk of further arms acquisitions from the PRC, including jet fighters such as the Shenyang J-
8.
In accordance with the 2005 declaration, annual Indonesia-China Defense Security Consultation Talks were inaugurated
in 2006 to provide a forum to discuss regional and international developments, defense technology cooperation, military
educational exchanges, and proposed joint military exercises. In another sign of warming defense ties, in March 2007
two PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyers visited Indonesia, the first such visit in over 12 years. At the second meeting of the
Defense Security Consultation Talks a month later, a draft agreement on defense cooperation was signed. This
agreement was formalized at a meeting of the two countries¶ defense ministers in Beijing in November 2007. Details of
that agreement were not made public, but Sudarsono informed the press that it covered defense technology cooperation,
exchange of military students, and the possibility of further arms sales to Indonesia. Sudarsono was quick to point out,
however, that the agreement should not be misconstrued as a defense treaty (Antara, November 8, 2007).
Following Sudarsono¶s trip to Beijing, Chinese Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan paid a five-day visit to
Jakarta in January 2008. The two sides reportedly agreed to cooperate in the joint production of military transport
vehicles and aircraft, to be conducted by the two countries¶ state-owned defense industries, with financing to be agreed
upon at a later date. Agreement was also reached on setting-up a TNI-PLA cooperation committee with a view to
arrange joint military and training exercises (Antara, January 16, 2008).
Lack of Follow Through
Despite the various declarations, MOUs, and joint agreements since 2005, there has been very little follow through in
Sino-Indonesian defense and security cooperation. No contractual production agreements have been signed thus far, with
Beijing apparently reluctant to invest in Indonesia¶s state owned defense industry. No further weapons purchases have
taken place since 2005, and in July 2008 Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto announced that the TNI
had no further plans to buy Chinese C-802 ASMs (Antara, July 15, 2008).
Sino-Indonesian military exchanges have also been limited. In the period from 2007-2008, China offered 21 kinds of
education and training courses for 23 TNI officers (Antara, January 9, 2008). In October 2008 four Indonesian Air Force
pilots underwent a week of Sukhoi jet fighter simulation training in China. Unlike Thailand and China, no joint military
training or exercises have been conducted by the TNI and PLA (China Brief, July 3, 2008).
Several factors can be advanced to explain the slow pace of development of Sino-Indonesian military-defense ties. First,
Indonesia¶s initial approach to China regarding enhanced military links took place at a time when the U.S. arms and
training embargoes were still in force; Jakarta may have tried to use the ³China card´ as a means to pressure Washington
into expediting the resumption of U.S.-Indonesian military ties. While the possibility of closer defense links between
Indonesia and China may well have been a factor in U.S. decision-making to normalize defense ties with Jakarta, it was
certainly not a major one and was far outweighed by progress achieved by the Yudhoyono government in reforming the
military, as well as Indonesia¶s critical role in the fight against transnational terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. It was
mainly for these two reasons that by the end of 2005, Washington had lifted nearly all military sanctions against
Indonesia.
Second, Chinese weapons systems have a poor reputation in terms of quality, durability, and after-sales service, and
Jakarta has thus looked to more reliable defense vendors, Russia being the main beneficiary. In 2003, Indonesia
purchased four Sukhoi multirole jet fighters and in late 2006 Moscow agreed to extend Jakarta a $1 billion export credit
line for the purchase of further weapons platforms, including six more Sukhoi fighters, M-17 transport helicopters,
armored personnel carriers, and two ultra quiet diesel electric Kilo-class submarines, with an option to acquire eight
additional submarines by 2020 (Antara, December 3, 2006). Indonesia has since taken delivery of the Sukhoi jets and six
helicopters, though the purchase of the submarines seems to have been delayed until after 2010 (Antara, July 28, 2008;
Kompas, August 18, 2008). In addition to the Russian kit, Indonesia has also purchased four corvettes from the
Netherlands and 17 amphibious tanks from the Ukraine (Antara, July 28, 2008; Kompas, August 18, 2008; Antara, Ma y
9, 2007; Media Indonesia Online, August 26, 2008). Unlike Russia, China has not offered Jakarta credit facilities and
Indonesia¶s defense expenditure is shrinking. Regarding joint weapons production, Indonesia has kept its options open,
and has explored defense industry collaboration with India, Pakistan, Brazil, the Czech Republic and South Korea.
A third possible reason for the lack of progress is lingering distrust within the TNI toward the PLA and China¶s long-
term intentions in Southeast Asia. Although Indonesia no longer identifies the PRC as a security threat, the military
continues to monitor Chinese moves in the South China Sea (where the two countries have overlapping maritime
boundary claims near Indonesia¶s gas-rich Natuna Islands) and the TNI has called on China to be more transparent about
its defense modernization program (Antara, March 12, 2008).
China, Indonesia, and Maritime Security
The 2005 Strategic Partnership declaration also included a commitment to increase maritime security cooperation. By
2005 Chinese strategic analysts had become increasingly concerned at the strategic vulnerability posed by the passage of
70-80 percent of the country¶s energy supplies through the Strait of Malacca, a concern which the Chinese official media
dubbed China¶s ³Malacca Dilemma´ (China Brief, April 12, 2006). As means to exert greater influence in the
management of the Strait, China offered to provide the littoral states²Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in 2005²
with capacity building support to improve safety and security in the strategically vital maritime chokepoint.
Yet similar to Sino-Indonesia military-security defense ties, China has failed to turn rhetoric into action. In 2007 Beijing
donated 10 computers to Indonesia¶s Maritime Security Coordinating Agency (Bakorkamla) and offered slots to
Indonesia navy personnel for training courses in China. Capacity-building assistance from China has, however, been
dwarfed by that of the United States and Japan. Since 2006, the United States has provided Indonesia with $47.1 million
in funding for the installation of five coastal surveillance radars along the Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait (seven
more are sighted in the Makassar Strait and Celebes Sea) [2]. This funding has been made available through the U.S.
National Defense Authorization Act, of which Section 1206 is designed to assist foreign countries in their efforts to
improve maritime security and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. has also funded the transfer of 30 25-foot patrol
boats to the Indonesian marine police, while the U.S. Navy conducts annual capacity building training with its
Indonesian counterpart through Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and Southeast Asia
Counterterrorism Training (SEACAT).
Japan has been providing capacity building support to Indonesia since the 1960s, and in 2007 announced a $300 million
aid package to Bakorkamla (Antara, September 19, 2007). In the past, most Japanese funding has been utilized to
provide safety for navigation equipment in the Strait. In 2006 China announced that it too was willing to provide
funding for safety projects in the Strait, including the replacement of navigational aids²mainly lighthouses²destroyed
by the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that when the Indonesian
government presented China with a cost estimate to replace those navigational aids, Beijing baulked and has been
reluctant to allocate funding ever since.
Over the past decade China¶s political and economic gains in Southeast Asia have been undeniable. And while its
military-security links with the countries of the region are growing, this aspect of Sino-ASEAN relations remains the
least developed, particularly in maritime Southeast Asia. The failure of Sino-Indonesian military-security ties to gain
traction since 2005 is a prime example of how much catching up China has to do with Indonesia¶s traditional defense
partners.
[The author would like to express his thanks to John McBeth for his helpful insights.]
Notes
1. Full text of Chinese-Indonesian joint declaration on strategic partnership´, FBIS, April 26, 2005.
2. Nina M. Serafino, ³Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department
of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces´, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, 15 May 2008, ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf.
Y
3 % $ $4& *# +'

Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, China and the Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy
By: Willy Lam
Chinese President Hu Jintao (L) and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (R)
Beijing has unleashed an unprecedented diplomatic blitz while the new Obama administration battles doubts about its
stimulus packages to salvage the struggling American economy. For the first time, both Chinese State President Hu
Jintao and Vice-President Xi Jinping were on trips abroad earlier this month²the former to Saudi Arabia and Africa,
and the latter to Latin America. It was also the first time that two Politburo members, Xi and Vice-Premier Hui Liangyu,
were simultaneously wooing countries in the U.S. backyard. While Xi¶s road show included Venezuela, China¶s
ideological ally, and major trading partners Brazil and Mexico, Hui's itinerary included Argentina and Ecuador (Agence-
France Presse [AFP], February 15; Chinaview.cn, February 9).
Chinese diplomats and scholars have not given the United States a single mention while briefing the media on the
diplomatic juggernaut that seems geared toward consolidating the country¶s quasi-superpower status. Yet it is apparent
that the trips, which followed hot upon Premier Wen Jiabao¶s high-profile visit to Europe, were timed to take advantage
of the geopolitical vacuum created by a United States that is bogged down by massive domestic woes. According to
foreign affairs expert Chen Xiangyang, the multi-pronged foreign policy initiative would enable China to ³seize the high
vantage point [in handling] the future world order.´ Chen, a scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, added that Beijing wanted to ³show its hand early´ in the chessboard of international relations. ³We want to
send out China¶s voice, maintain China¶s image, and extend China¶s interests,´ he said (Outlook Weekly [Beijing],
February 9).
Take President Hu's tour of Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius, for example. Some foreign analysts are puzzled by
the fact that all four are neither big, powerful countries nor heavyweight producers of oil and other important minerals.
Yet according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the main point of the presidential tour was precisely to demonstrate
China¶s embrace of big and small states alike. As Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun noted, China¶s interest in Africa
was not ³confined to energy and resources.´ In an effort to reassure beneficiaries of Chinese aid that the economic
doldrums would not affect the country¶s foreign aid program, Zhai added that ³China will honor its commitment to
support the development of African countries and continue to encourage Chinese companies to further invest in and
establish businesses in Africa.´ Added the official People¶s Daily, ³Sino-African relations are not, as some have
misrepresented, just energy and resource relations²that is, µneo-colonialism¶ by China in Africa´ (Xinhua News
Agency, February 9; People¶s Daily, February 13).
While in Mali, Hu laid the first brick of the Sino-Malian Friendship Bridge, which the Chinese head of state called ³the
largest project carried out in West Africa paid for with money donated by China.´ Malian government figures put the
cost of the 2.6 kilometers bridge at $74.9 million. Hu told Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete that ³China will
fulfill its pledges and never decrease its aid to Africa.´ The Chinese supremo added in a speech to Tanzanian dignitaries
that China and Africa would ³join hands in meeting the challenge of the global financial crisis [in a spirit] of unity and
mutual aid.´ The Middle Kingdom¶s ties with Africa, of course, are far from being a one-way street. Apart from
importing oil and minerals, China has boosted exports to Africa and Chinese manufacturers have set up plants in a
dozen-odd countries. Bilateral trade multiplied tenfold from 2000 to last year to reach $107 billion, which was 45
percent up from 2007. Given falling commodity prices in the wake of the financial crisis, Beijing, which holds close to
$2 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves, is on a buying spree for strategic resources in the minerals-rich continent.
President Hu¶s demonstrations of Chinese largesse will serve to placate anti-China feelings among African communities,
which are complaining about ³exploitation´ by the fast-growing number of Chinese owners of mines and factories
(China News Service, February 15; Reuters, February 13; Xinhua News Agency, February 16; Stratfor.com, February
11).
Of even more interest to Washington, which is sending Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to China later this week, are
the Latin American trips made by Vice-President Xi and Vice-Premier Hui. Xi, who is expected to succeed Hu as
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary in late 2012, engaged in what some analysts call American bashing
on his stop in Mexico. While meeting representatives of the Chinese community in Mexico City, Xi used extraordinarily
strong language to decry unnamed foreigners for harping on China¶s shortcomings. ³Some foreigners have nothing
better to do after filling their stomachs,´ Xi said. ³They keep picking on things Chinese. Yet China does not export
revolution; it does not export hunger and poverty; and it won¶t make trouble for others.´ Xi¶s fusillade was considerably
more acerbic than the indirect volley that Premier Wen fired at Washington last month. Speaking at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Wen said that ³inappropriate macro-economic policies in some economies´ were behind
the global financial meltdown. It is significant that Xi¶s angry remarks were not carried by China's official news
agencies. And footage of Xi¶s colorful talk²which had been available on some non-official Chinese websites for a
couple days last week²were removed quickly by China¶s ubiquitous Net censors (Straits Times, February 14; Wen Wei
Po [Hong Kong], February 13; South China Morning Post, February 14).
Earlier during his visit to Mexico, Xi told his hosts that ³China would stick to the path of peaceful development and a
reciprocal and win-win open strategy.´ The vice-president, whose main portfolio consists of party affairs, reiterated
while visiting Columbia, Brazil and Venezuela that his country was committed to enhancing global trade on a mutually
beneficial basis. This seemed to be an effort to reassure China¶s trading partners, who are nervous about the apparent
rise of protectionist sentiments in the United States, that the emerging quasi-superpower would not be closing its door to
imports from their countries. Hu, Xi and Hui have also sought the support of African and Latin American countries for
Beijing¶s cherished goal of establishing a ³new global financial architecture,´ which is shorthand for an economic world
order that is not shorn of domination by the U.S.-lead Western Alliances (Xinhua News Agency, February 13; Apple
Daily [Hong Kong], February 16).
The extent to which Beijing will benefit from the goodwill garnered by the marathon trips will be evident during the
Group of 20 (G-20) meeting, which is scheduled in London for early April. Beijing is gunning for a bigger say in
international financial governance at this key multilateral summit. An internal position paper drafted by the Foreign
Ministry said Beijing would demand higher voting powers for developing countries in the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the London conclave. And in a thinly veiled dig at the United States, the paper
said Beijing would also urge the IMF to ³strengthen oversight over macroeconomic policies of all parties, particularly
the major reserve currency economies, and provide oversight information and improvement recommendations to its
members on a regular basis´ (Financial Post [Canada], February 10; Reuters, February 9).
Beijing¶s foreign-policy offensive has taken place while Team Obama is gingerly staking out its position regarding both
China and the developing world. The CCP¶s policy-setting Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, which is headed by
President Hu, evidently wants to occupy the diplomatic high ground with the advent of Secretary of State Clinton¶s first
trip to China. Prior to Vice-President Xi¶s outburst, the Chinese leadership had sent not-so-subtle messages to the
Obama White House that Beijing might be playing tough in future exchanges. For example, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and official media last month blasted Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner¶s remarks about alleged ³currency
manipulation´ by the Chinese government. Beijing has also laid into the ³buy America´ clause in the $787 billion
stimulus package just passed by the U.S. Congress. A Xinhua commentary last weekend said: ³Protectionism is no way
out for a financial crisis. In fact, it could be a poison that will exacerbate global economic plight.´ At the very least,
however, the U.S. government has toned down its criticism of China¶s trading practices. While participating in the
Group of Seven (G-7) meeting in Rome earlier this month, Geithner changed his tune by noting that Washington ³very
much welcome the steps China has taken to strengthen domestic demand and its commitment to further exchange rate
reform´ (Bloomberg, February 14; Xinhua News Agency, February 14).
As of now, the CCP leadership has adopted a ³wait and see´ attitude with respect to the Obama administration¶s
initiatives toward China. The official media has highlighted conciliatory remarks made by Secretary Clinton on the eve
of her maiden Asian tour. For instance, Xinhua and other media outlets have played up her statement that the United
States did not regard China as an adversary, and that ³when you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river
peacefully together.´ Clinton¶s use of the Chinese proverb on the importance of reciprocity seemed to echo remarks
about ³global harmony´ frequently made by Premier Wen and other Chinese leaders. Clinton also announced that mid-
level military-to-military relations with China would soon be restored (Xinhua News Agency, February 14; New York
Times, February 13). Irrespective of the outcome of the Clinton visit, however, Beijing has already demonstrated
through its diplomatic blitz in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America that its voice must be heeded in the new world
order where China¶s position has advanced at America¶s expense.
c (' $

Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Russell Hsiao
NSB Chief Tsai Chao-ming
The ruling party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT), is engulfed in another intelligence-related gaffe. A string of
domino-like events that began with a report in the United Daily News, one of Taiwan's major newspapers with close ties
to the ruling party, which reported that a senior official in the Presidential Office's Department of Special Affairs has
been held for passing secret information to China, is reopening old wounds in Taiwan¶s once reputable intelligence
services.
Wang Ren-bing, the official in question, allegedly passed classified information from the Presidential Office between
March and April 2008 to Chen Pin-jen who is suspected of handing it over to Chinese intelligence officers. Chen Pin-jen
was the former legislative aide to KMT Legislator Liao Kuo-tung and People First Party Legislator Lin Chun-teh (The
Straits Times, January 16).
The spy incident surfaced after the execution last December of a medical researcher, Wo Weihan, who was accused by
Beijing of spying for Taiwan. Wo was charged with supposedly disclosing ³secret´ information on the health of a senior
Chinese official and copied military data from unclassified magazines (Taipei Times, December 2, 2008).
Wo's execution closely followed, perhaps coincidentally, a controversial charge made by National Security Bureau
(NSB) Director-General Tsai Chao-ming during the Legislature's Foreign and National Defense Committee meeting in
October 2008 (Taipei Times, October 7, 2008). Tsai said that information from the bureau's sources in China suggest
that the deadly Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002 has "become a biological warfare
formula" but that, "conclusive evidence had not surfaced" (Reuters, October 7, 2008).
According to a recent leak obtained by a Taiwanese newspaper, Liberty Times, an intelligence source revealed that
Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC), which serves as the Taiwanese president's principal arm for coordinating
national security and foreign matters among various government agencies, may have ordered the NSB²the organ in
charge of the nation¶s clandestine network²to cease the recruitment of agents to work inside China (Liberty Times,
February 13). These networks, also known as its human intelligence resources (HUMINT), have been a Taiwanese asset
in the "invisible war" between the two sides. According to a former Taiwanese spy, Jian Jianguo, who now resides in
Hong Kong, there were about 30,000 Taiwanese spies dispatched to the mainland at the height of the Cold War (Los
Angeles Times, May 31, 2007).
The NSC, which is presided over by President Ma Ying-jeou, is directed by Secretary-General Su Chi, a former KMT
legislator and well known China specialist who served as the chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (1999-2000).
The current director-general of the NSB, Tsai Chao-ming, was first elevated to the position by former President Chen
Shui-bian back in 2001. Tsai stepped down in 2004 to take responsibility for the unsuccessful March 19 assassination
attempt on former President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu during the controversial 2004 Presidential Election but
was reappointed by Ma in 2008. The same report, citing a source familiar with the organization's budget, claimed that
the NSC is ³plundering´ the NSB¶s resources by using funds that were allocated for the two organizations affiliated
with the NSB, the Cross-Strait Prospect Interflow Organization and the Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation (formerly known
as the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies), for NSC uses.
The Presidential Office quickly denied the recruitment report, demonstrating its concern for the negative implications
that such a report can have on the administration¶s trustworthiness to its allies abroad, particularly Japan and the United
States. Spokesman Wang Yu-chi called the leak ³pure fiction;´ and the NSB issued a press release that responded to the
report, but did not refute the charges. Instead the NSB press release stated: ³Efforts to maintain national security cannot
stop or be relaxed" « "The bureau and relevant agencies all understand this and have always done their best to perform
their jobs´ (National Security Bureau, R.O.C. [Taiwan], February 13).
The cooperative intelligence-sharing agreement between the United States and Taiwan allows the U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) and Taiwan's NSB to share information on mainland Chinese military communications through its signal
intelligence (SIGINT) bases (Asia Times, March 6, 2003). These SIGINT sites are run by the Coordination Meeting for
National Security Intelligence (CMNSI), which is chaired by the NSB director-general.
A leading KMT Legislator, Lin Yu-fang, who is now the chairman of the Taiwanese legislature's Foreign and National
Defense Committee, charged in 2007 that the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB), which is a subordinate organ of the
NSB in charge of collection of operational military intelligence, spent only 65 percent of the money budgeted for "China
work" in 2006, down from 75 percent in 2005 and 90 percent in 2004. According to a military report cited by Lin, there
were 10 cases of Taiwanese officials caught leaking military secrets in the first six months of 2007, compared to a total
of 15 cases in 2006 (Taipei Times, October 3, 2007).
c $& )

March 4, 2009 02:34 PM Age: 354 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, Christopher Yeaw
SAC Commander Jing Zhiyuan
The development of China¶s nuclear and conventional missile power has been among the most impressive and most
closely watched aspects of Chinese military modernization over the past two decades. During the past 20 years, the
Second Artillery Corps (SAC) has been transformed from a small and exclusively nuclear force to a much larger and
more powerful force with a variety of roles for a growing and increasingly sophisticated arsenal of nuclear and
conventional missiles. The deployment of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) is enhancing the striking power and survivability of China¶s nuclear forces [1]. Moreover, the deployment of
more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) since the SAC was given a conventional role in the 1990s gives
China many options for striking targets in the region. The development of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability could
deter or otherwise complicate U.S. intervention in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. In addition to these
developments, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) contribution to China¶s nuclear deterrence posture is also
changing with the transition from the PRC¶s first-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which
was armed with the relatively short-range JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and never conducted a
deterrent patrol, to perhaps as many as five Jin-class SSBNs, each of which will be armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs. This
will diversify China¶s nuclear deterrent and may further enhance its survivability [2]. Chinese analysts assess that the
deployment of SSBNs and land-based mobile missiles will ³fundamentally ensure the reliability and credibility of
China¶s nuclear force´ [3]. The SAC's growing conventional ballistic missile capabilities, particularly the anti-ship
ballistic missile, also suggest a growing deterrence role for these conventional forces.
Recently published Chinese sources that include previously unavailable information on nuclear and conventional missile
strategy and campaigns are shedding new light on China¶s evolving approach toward deterrence and Chinese views on
the problems of deterrence and nuclear strategy. By drawing on some of these sources, which include a variety of
Chinese language books, academic and technical journal articles, military media reports, newspapers and periodicals,
and key sources from the secondary literature on the SAC, it is possible to trace the evolution of China¶s deterrence
strategy toward an approach that some have called ³effective deterrence.´
The Evolution of China¶s Nuclear Strategy
In the years following the detonation of China¶s first atomic bomb in 1964, China¶s nuclear strategy and doctrine were
relatively immature due to the constraints imposed by Mao Zedong¶s adherence to his military theories, the domestic
tumult of the Cultural Revolution, and the limitations of Chinese nuclear warhead and ballistic missile technology.
Mao¶s dogmatic approach made it all but impossible to develop innovative ideas about nuclear strategy and doctrine.
The chaos of the Cultural Revolution further inhibited consideration of key issues related to nuclear strategy and
doctrine. Finally, according to some analysts, technological developments influenced China¶s approach to nuclear
strategy, rather than strategy driving technological requirements and program decisions [4].
By the mid-1990s, however, Chinese strategists were engaging in debates about nuclear strategy and doctrine along with
arms control issues. Some of these discussions centered on a potential shift from the traditional posture of ³minimum
deterrence´ to a doctrine of ³limited deterrence,´ which would require corresponding changes in force modernization if
adopted [5]. Chinese nuclear strategists argued that such a shift would require ³sufficient counter-force and counter-
value tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional or nuclear war,´ but China did
not have ³the operational capabilities to implement this vision of limited deterrence´ [6].
By the late 1990s, China was attempting to fill this gap in its operational capabilities at the strategic level and develop its
conventional missile forces with an eye toward theater war fighting missions. Indeed, it was not long before China
appeared to be on the verge of reconciling the significant divergence between the SAC's once largely ambitious doctrine
and its actual capabilities. Whereas Chinese strategists were once severely constrained by technological limitations, but
by around 2000, they appeared to have an increasing number of choices regarding the development, deployment and use
of PLA missiles. At the time, China was developing an increasingly lethal war-fighting capability for the SAC's short-
range conventional ballistic missile forces; a more robust and diversified nuclear and conventional medium-range
ballistic missile force at the theater level; and a more formidable and survivable intercontinental force capable of
providing China with ³credible minimum deterrence´ at the strategic nuclear level [7].
The Transition to ³Effective Deterrence´
Chinese analysts recognized that a more survivable posture was required to make deterrence credible and effective in the
face of growing challenges posed by improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), missile
defense, and conventional precision-strike capabilities. Leaders in Beijing also calculated that more robust nuclear
weapons capabilities were required to support China¶s global political and diplomatic status. According to an article co-
authored by General Jing Zhiyuan, the commander of the SAC and General Peng Xiaofeng, the political commissar of
the SAC, China has recognized the need to develop ³an elite and effective nuclear missile force that is on par with
China's position as a major power" [8]. The SAC has clearly recognized that meeting this objective requires not only
new hardware, but also improvements in training, institutional reforms that will provide the force with highly capable
personnel, and advances in strategic and doctrinal concepts.
Chinese military media reports suggest that SAC training is also growing in realism and complexity. In particular, as
part of the PLA¶s broader program of training reforms, the SAC is making progress in areas such as training under more
realistic combat conditions, incorporating ³blue forces,´ electronic warfare, nighttime training, air defense and counter-
ISR tactics and more rigorous training evaluations. Building talent has been another key priority. The senior leadership
of the SAC has consistently highlighted the importance of cultivating high quality officers, non-commissioned officers
(NCOs), and technical personnel as the cornerstones of missile force modernization. One measure of its success is that
78.2 percent of cadres now hold a bachelor¶s degree or above [9].
Newly available materials have also revealed some of the SAC's key operational principles and the contemporary
doctrinal concepts behind the accompanying transition to ³effective deterrence.´ Among the key doctrinal concepts are
the strategic-level emphasis on ³gaining mastery by striking after the enemy has struck,´ and the campaign-level
concepts of ³self-protection,´ ³key-point counterstrikes,´ and ³counter nuclear deterrence.´ Overall, Chinese nuclear
doctrine is increasingly focused on ³sufficiency and effectiveness,´ meaning that China places a high priority on
ensuring its forces are capable of fulfilling deterrence and counter-coercion missions. China¶s nuclear missile forces are
³trying to catch up rapidly with an increasingly explicit strategy and doctrine premised on using nuclear weapons to
deter nuclear aggression and to preclude nuclear coercion´ [10].
Newly available Chinese language publications also appear to reflect ongoing debates about strategic and doctrinal
issues. For example, recent articles in Chinese military journals have discussed the requirements associated with a wide
variety of possible nuclear deterrence strategies [11]. Newly published Chinese books that focus on missile force and
deterrence issues also raise the issue of Chinese views on signaling and escalation control. In his recent and extensive
treatment of the subject, Zhao Xijun, SAC commander from 1996 to 2003, states that the goal of China¶s deterrent
missile force is to ³shake the enemy psychologically, make the enemy¶s war volition waver, weaken the enemy
commander¶s operational determination, disturb the enemy psyche and public psyche, and achieve [the objective of]
'conquering without fighting'´ [12]. Additionally, however, Zhao sta tes, ³the goal of wartime deterrence is to prevent
conventional war from escalating into nuclear war, and to prevent low-intensity nuclear war from further escalating´
[13]. Thus conceived, deterrence imposes stringent requirements on the Chinese nuclear posture, including an adequate
force size and composition, survivability, and highly reliable nuclear command and control. Moreover, Zhao states that a
³flexible application´ of deterrence across all levels of war, from the strategic down to the tactical, is ³indispensable
[for] effective and credible deterrence´ [14].
Among the other issues reportedly under discussion are the merits of continuing to adhere to the ³no first use´ (NFU)
policy. Some Chinese strategists appear to view the NFU policy as an unnecessary self-imposed strategic constraint. At
least some analysts who influence the debate have already considered at least three scenarios under which Beijing would
discard the traditional NFU policy. The first is retaliation for conventional strikes on strategic and/or nuclear targets and
facilities. According to Zhao, ³In a conventional war, when the enemy threatens to implement conventional strikes
against one¶s major strategic targets, such as the nuclear facilities; in order to protect the nuclear facilities, prevent
nuclear leakage, and to arrest the escalation of conventional war to nuclear war, one should employ nuclear weapons to
initiate active nuclear deterrence against the enemy´ [15].
The second possibility is a crisis-driven change in China¶s declaratory nuclear policy. Specifically, Chinese authors have
suggested that Beijing could lower the nuclear threshold to deter intervention in a Taiwan crisis or conflict. According to
Zhang Peimin's article in Military Art, a Chinese military journal, ³When we are under the pressure of circumstances to
use military force to reunify the motherland¶s territory, we may even lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons to
deter intervention by external enemies´ [16]. The third scenario is when Chinese leaders believe that territorial integrity
is at stake. Some Chinese strategists seem to hint at the possibility of first use under particularly dire circumstances, such
as a scenario in which the PLA is on the verge of suffering a politically catastrophic defeat in a conventional military
conflict over Taiwan.
Conclusion
China¶s nuclear modernization is focused on improving the ability of its forces to survive an adversary's first strike and
making its nuclear deterrence posture more credible, tasks that have taken on increased urgency as a result of growing
concerns regarding U.S. nuclear preeminence, missile defense plans and conventional precision strike capabilities [17].
China is moving toward a much more survivable and thus more credible, strategic nuclear posture with the development
of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. Beijing is also expanding its conventional missile
capabilities, to include not only an increasingly potent SRBM force but also medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
that could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers. According to General Jing Zhiyuan and General Peng Xiaofeng, Commander
and Political Commissar of the SAC, the SAC has ³achieved the great leap in development from a single core unit to a
nuclear and conventional entity which gives equal attention to both´ [18]. Further improvements are still required,
according to General Jing and General Peng, but as a result of the advances that have already been made, China¶s
"strategic deterrence and actual combat capabilities have been vastly improved" [19].
Indeed, the introduction of road-mobile strategic missiles and SSBNs will allow China to achieve a posture of ³effective
deterrence.´ The modernization of Chinese nuclear forces and the transition from silo-based to road-mobile nuclear
missiles and SSBNs might thus enhance strategic deterrence stability. Indeed, deterrence theory suggests that a more
secure second-strike capability should enhance stability by causing both the United States and China to behave much
more cautiously.
There are a number of reasons, however, to be concerned that the transition to a more secure second strike capability
will not necessarily translate immediately or automatically into greater strategic stability. Indeed, it is entirely possible
that these developments could in fact decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, particularly if China¶s
growing nuclear and missile capability tempts Beijing to behave more assertively or planners and decision-makers in
either country fail to consider the potential implications of certain actions. Instability may also result if the undersea
environment becomes a place of uncomfortably close approach between U.S. attack submarines and Chinese SSBNs,
changes in force posture or technological developments result in heightened insecurity, or the alerting and de-alerting of
strategic forces creates a temporary state of increased vulnerability.
Consequently, as China continues to modernize its nuclear and missile forces, problems of strategic stability appear
poised to become much more important aspects of the U.S.-China security relationship in the coming years. Although
China¶s nuclear and missile force modernization may contribute to greater strategic stability in the long run, neither
China nor the United States should assume that this outcome will result automatically from China¶s deployment of a
relatively secure second strike capability. Indeed, successfully managing what could become a potentially dangerous
balancing act will require much of both parties. The United States will need to exercise considerable self-restraint given
the asymmetries that will continue to characterize the U.S.-China nuclear balance despite China¶s recent enhancement of
its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. Planners and decision-makers in the United States will also need to
have an in-depth understanding of Chinese views on strategic signaling, crisis management and escalation control,
particularly in the context of a conflict over Taiwan. In addition, Chinese planners and decision-makers will need to
have a similarly realistic understanding of U.S. views and motivations.
This emerging dynamic underscores the need for greater U.S.-China dialogue and engagement on strategic issues, which
in turn will require Beijing to deal with a dilemma in which continued lack of Chinese transparency of nuclear weapons
and missile developments may complicate China¶s own deterrence strategy. Indeed, as China continues to improve its
conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, it will almost certainly need to become at least somewhat more transparent
in order to help safeguard shared interests in regional security and strategic stability.
[The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.
Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.]
Notes
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China
2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008).
2. ³Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,´ U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, 20 December 2006,
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf.
3. Wang Zhongchun, ³Nuclear Challenges and China¶s Choices,´ China Security (Winter 2007), p. 62.
4. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
5. Alistair Iain Johnston, ³China¶s New µOld Thinking¶: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,´ International Security,
vol. 20, no. 3, winter 1995/96.
6. Ibid., p. 6.
7. Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ³The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible
Deterrence,´ in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew Yang, eds., The People¶s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference
Volume v1.0 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
8. Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, ³Jianshe Zhongguo tese zhanlue daodan budui´ (Building a Strategic Missile Force
with Chinese Characteristics), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), no. 3, February 2009,
www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20090201/GB/qs^496^0^19.htm.
9. Ibid.
10. Evan S. Medeiros, ³µMinding the Gap¶: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA¶s Second Artillery,´ in Roy
Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, ed., Right-Sizing the People¶s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China¶s
Military, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, pp. 143-190.
11. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Li Shaohui and Major Tao Yongqiang, ³The Force Foundations and Strategic
Space of Nuclear Deterrence,´ Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 2006, No. 6, pp. 55-57.
12. See, for example, Zhao Xijun, ed., Coercive Deterrence Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion on Missile
Deterrence (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2005), p. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 47.
14. Ibid., p. 78.
15. Ibid., p. 173.
16. Zhang Peimin, ³How to Develop the Means of Strategic Deterrence,´ Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), February 2004,
p. 34.
17. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, ³Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,´ February 12, 2009, www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.
18. Jing and Peng, ³Jianshe Zhongguo tese zhanlue daodan budui´ (Building a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese
Characteristics).
19. Ibid.
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March 4, 2009 02:32 PM Age: 354 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Featured, Home Page
By: Dennis J. Blasko
The eastward expansion of membership and enlargement of missions undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) over the past decade push a lot of sensitive buttons in China¶s national security policy. These
sensitivities include long-standing opposition to the enlargement of military blocs and strengthening of military
alliances, interference in the internal affairs of other countries, fear of containment, and opposition to ballistic missile
defense systems.
Despite being vestiges of what the Chinese call ³Cold War mentality´ (lengzhan siwei), the government of China has
said very little officially and publicly about NATO expansion. Beijing¶s general opposition to many specific elements of
these policies has been consistently defined by official Chinese policy for decades, most readily accessible in its series
of White Papers on National Defense since 1998. Moreover, the Chinese government¶s declared policy for itself is to
refrain from taking many of the actions NATO has embraced.
Notwithstanding its criticism of ³Cold War mentality,´ China¶s foreign policy is rooted in the unabashedly Cold War
formulation of the ³Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.´ These are 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity (huxiang zunzhong zhuquan he lingtu wanzheng), 2) mutual non-aggression (hubu qinfan), 3) non-interference
in each other's internal affairs (hubu ganshe neizheng), 4) equality and mutual benefit (pingdeng huli) and 5) peaceful
coexistence (heping gongchu) [1].
China expanded and updated these principles early this decade with its ³New Security Concept,´ (xin anquan guan) the
core of which is ³mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.´ Under this doctrine, Beijing seeks
international cooperation ³on the basis of the UN Charter, the ³Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence´ and other
widely recognized norms governing international relations´ [2].
These basic principles can also be traced from the 1998 White Paper to the 2008 edition issued in January 2009. The
White Papers outline China¶s general intentions for its own national defense. For example, ³China does not seek
hegemonism, nor does it seek military blocs or military expansion. China does not station any troops or set up any
military bases in any foreign country´ [3]. (Emphasis added) In this context, the term ³military expansion´ refers to the
use of force to attain foreign territory or resources. ³Military expansion´ does not equate to military modernization, a
process the Chinese readily admit to be underway. At the same time China does not insist other countries follow the
guidelines Beijing sets for itself.
While China does not join military blocs, it accepts the continued existence of military alliances (such as NATO and the
U.S.-Japan or U.S.-R.O.K. alliances), but opposes their expansion. The 1998 White Paper states ³the enlargement of
military blocs and the strengthening of military alliances´ have added ³factors of instability to international security´
[4]. (Emphasis added) This principle continues through the 2008 update that says China ³will encourage the
advancement of security dialogues and cooperation with other countries, oppose the enlargement of military alliances,
and acts of aggression and expansion´ [5]. (Emphasis added) Though Beijing does not support NATO expansion in
principle, the subject is not addressed directly now or in previous White Papers.
The extension of NATO¶s mission to conduct military operations against Yugoslavia was perceived by Beijing as a
serious challenge to UN authority and contrary to the general principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
others. According to the 2000 White Paper:
³Under the pretexts of "humanitarianism" and "human rights," some countries have frequently resorted to the use or
threat of force, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and other universally recognized principles governing
international relations. In particular, the NATO, by-passing the UN Security Council, launched military attacks against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, producing an extremely negative impact on the international situation and relations
between countries´ [6].
Left unsaid was the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by an American B-2 resulting in the deaths
of three Chinese citizens in May 1999. Even while the standard formulation in the Chinese press at the time referred to
the ³U.S.-led NATO attack on the Chinese Embassy,´ it is remarkable that the 2000 White Paper did not refer to the
U.S. specifically by name in this incident [7].
The 2000 White Paper also refrained from citing the United States as the ³certain country´ that ³is still continuing its
efforts to develop and introduce the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems,
which have undermined the international community's efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.´
On the other hand, when it came to America¶s relationship with Taiwan in 2000, Beijing was direct in its criticism:
³The United States has never stopped selling advanced weapons to Taiwan. Some people in the United States have been
trying hard to get the Congress to pass the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. And some are even attempting
to incorporate Taiwan into the US TMD system. The newly revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation has
failed to explicitly undertake to exclude Taiwan from the scope of µthe areas surrounding Japan¶ referred to in the
Japanese security bill that could involve military intervention´ [8].
The subject of Taiwan in 2000, shortly after the election of Chen Shui-bian as president, was important enough to name
names specifically. Likewise, the potential that Taiwan could be brought under a U.S. theater missile defense umbrella
also spurred Beijing to action. Furthermore, consistent with its opposition of the strengthening or expanding of military
alliances, Beijing also criticized the U.S.-Japan alliance for failing to ³exclude Taiwan from the scope of µthe areas
surrounding Japan.¶´ Of all China¶s national interests, these direct references to the United States and Japan underscore
³the question of Taiwan´ as what U.S. strategists would define as a ³vital national interest´ [9]. Opposing NATO
expansion does not rise to that level of national interest.
Within the past year, U.S. arrangements to deploy elements of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses in Poland and the
Czech Republic, two new NATO members, contributed to Beijing¶s continued general opposition to missile defense in
the most recent White Paper: ³China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to strategic
balance and stability, undermine international and regional security, and have a negative impact on the process of
nuclear disarmament´ [10]. However, the 2008 White Paper stated that Washington¶s decision last October ³to sell arms
to Taiwan in violation of the principles established in the three Sino-US joint communiqués, causing serious harm to
Sino-U.S. relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits´ elicited direct condemnation from Beijing.
More concretely, China retaliated by canceling a visit to the United States by a senior Chinese general and port calls by
naval vessels, and indefinitely postponing meetings on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (The Associated Press, February 27). The 5-month freeze on Sino-U.S. military contact
resumed late February in Beijing with the meeting between U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense David Sedney and
Major General Qian Lihua, the Chinese Defense Ministry's head of foreign affairs.
Underscoring the common perceptions among much of China¶s security elite, the 2008 White Paper also identifies
³containment from the outside´ as one of its ³long-term, complicated, and diverse security threats and challenges.´
While Beijing understands the necessity of combating international terrorist organizations (one of China¶s ³three evils´
of µterrorism, separatism and extremism¶), the ongoing, multi-year ³out-of-area´ deployment of NATO troops in
Afghanistan is a constant reminder of its possible encirclement.
The potential of a NATO presence on China¶s western borders was foreshadowed in October 1997 when 500
paratroopers from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division jumped into Kazakhstan after a direct flight of 8,000 miles for
training with forces from (NATO-member) Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgystan. Then-U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Catherine Kelleher statement probably contributed to
Beijing¶s paranoia: ³Militarily stronger neighbors, such as China and India, will likely want access to these resources «
As such, it¶s in the interests of the United States to help establish and maintain regional stability and security´ [11].
Conversely, Beijing does not perceive its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to be a
counterweight to NATO. Formed in 2001 and composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, the SCO is a not a military alliance. Its security cooperation focuses on ³the fight against terrorism,
separatism and extremism´ [12]. The SCO has nothing like Article 5 of the NATO Treaty which states ³an armed attack
against one or more [member] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all´ [13]. Tensions
in the organization were clearly visible during the August War in 2008 between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia
when the member states expressed ³their deep concern in connection with the recent tension around the issue of South
Ossetia,´ but did not back Russia¶s military efforts [14].
Privately the leaders in Beijing and Moscow may rail against NATO expansion, but Chinese leaders have not voiced
their direct concerns publicly. Currently NATO seeks to ³launch a fundamental discussion of the roles [Russia] should
play in the 21st Century,´ but is hampered in beginning this discussion ³when Russia is building bases inside Georgia.´
According to the NATO Secretary General, a ³new European Security Architecture´ needs ³to move beyond a 19th
century µGreat Game¶ idea of spheres of influence´ [15]. The Chinese can commiserate with Russian apprehensions, but
have a different security calculus to consider. Recently the Chinese publication Outlook Weekly (Liaowang) framed
NATO expansion in a purely Moscow-centric context: the United States ³has gone all-out to push NATO's eastward
expansion so as to squeeze Russia's geostrategic space´ (Liaowang, February 9). Writing for Xinhua the same author
observed, ³The U.S.-Russia relationship has been at its worst stage mainly because of the Bush administration's efforts
to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and to enlarge NATO, especially by trying to
bring Ukraine and Georgia into the military bloc´ (Xinhua News Agency, February 20). In the end, the author
recommends no role for China, ³it is hoped that the United States and Russia can make some friendly moves, such as the
US [sic] side shelving ABM deployment in east Europe and temporarily easing up on bringing Ukraine and Georgia into
NATO; and the Russian side could step up coordinated interaction with the Obama administration on the financial crisis
and the Iranian nuclear issue´ (Liaowang, February 9).
In summary, countering NATO expansion has become a ³secondary national interest´ for China. While NATO¶s new
form and substance challenge longstanding tenets of Chinese defense policy and are uncomfortable for some Chinese
leaders, NATO expansion currently does not threaten Beijing¶s vital interests. Other goals are more important to Chinese
leaders than bashing heads with those in Washington and the European capitals who have not yet been visibly influenced
by Moscow¶s more vigorous opposition. Beijing is likely to remain silent on the sidelines and observe the political and
diplomatic infighting surrounding this issue. Finally, because of the sensitivities of a NATO military presence on
China¶s southwestern border, Beijing is unlikely to support the notion of an alternate supply route into Afghanistan via
western China without quietly insisting on significant reciprocal U.S. or European concessions on issues key to China¶s
own vital national interests.
Notes
1. This joint Sino-Indian formulation, however, initially was directed toward the Third World and only over the decades
has it been applied to China¶s foreign policy writ large.
2. ³China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept,´ July 31, 2002, at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm.
3. ³China¶s National Defense,´ July 1998, at www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.2.htm.
4. ³China¶s National Defense,´ July 1998 at www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.1.htm. I am grateful to Dr. David Finkelstein
of CNA who pointed out this nuance in China¶s official position a decade ago.
5. ³China's National Defense in 2008,´ January 2009 at news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
01/20/content_10688124.htm.
6. ³China¶s National Defense in 2000,´ October 2000, at www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/20-2.htm.
7. In contrast, see ³U.S.-led NATO's Attack on the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,´ November
15, 2000, at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/3432/3441/t17317.htm.
8. ³China¶s National Defense in 2000,´ October 2000.
9. See Michael G. Roskin, ³National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy,´ Parameters, Winter 1994, at
www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1994/roskin.htm. Roskin quotes Hans Morgenthau on two levels of national
interest, the vital and the secondary. With vital interests, ³there can be no compromise or hesitation about going to war.´
Whereas, secondary interests are ³those over which one may seek to compromise, are harder to define. Typically, they
are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your sovereignty.´
10. ³China's National Defense in 2008,´ January 2009. The U.S. anti-missile basing agreement was one of the ³Top 10
international military news in 2008´ defined by the PLA Daily. See english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2009-
01/04/content_1607157.htm.
11. Douglas J. Gillert, ³After Jumping, Battalion Learns to Crawl,´ American Forces Press Service, at
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx.
12. ³Shanghai Cooperation Organization,´ at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.
13. ³The North Atlantic Treaty´ text found at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
14. ³Dushanbe Declaration of Heads of SCO Member States´ at www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2008-
10/14/content_156875.htm.
15. ³Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Munich Security Conference,´ February 7,
2009 at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090207a.html.
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March 18, 2009 04:19 PM Age: 340 days
Category: China Brief, Economics, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Featured, Home Page
By: Joseph Spears
Chinese Icebreaker Xue Long (Snow Dragon)
China is very dependent on international shipping for its economic development. Any changes to world shipping routes
will have a direct impact on China¶s economy and potential trade with respect to both imports and exports. The Arctic
Ocean is in a state of rapid flux that scientists have not seen in recent times. The Arctic is changing rapidly and this will
have a profound effect on global shipping routes. This article is based on the writer¶s experience in what a changing
Arctic might look like and the possible impact on China¶s future. This article is by nature a horizon scanning prediction
based on an understanding of shipping theory and practice. Shipping by its nature is secretive and the open source
literature on this subject for commercial reasons is sparse. It is hoped that this article will provide the reader with some
perspective and context to deal with these changes in the Arctic.
Over 50 percent of the sea-ice cover in the Arctic Ocean in the last two summers has disappeared. This reality²a
melting arctic²is outstripping the predictive climate models. An open Arctic Ocean presents a unique opportunity for
China and international trade generally. Commercial shipping is the lifeblood of international trade with over 90 percent
of the world¶s international trade carried by commercial shipping. With or without a great global recession, shipping will
continue to be the thread that keeps the world economy operating²whether the cargoes are bulk commodities, oil or
manufactured goods. China is dependent on foreign trade and 46 percent of its GDP is shipping dependent [1]. Any
event that affects shipping will have a measurable effect on the Chinese economy, and the changing physical landscape
of the Arctic region will certainly have a major impact on China¶s economic future.
The search for the Holy Grail of a Northwest Passage through the Arctic from Europe to China for trade drove
exploration and the ³discovery´ of the New World for centuries. This article, the first of a series, will examine the future
scenarios for new commercial shipping routes across the top of the world²one of the world¶s last frontiers. During the
Cold War the Arctic was the center of action for subsurface activity. The use of polar routes revolutionized air travel in
the last century and the advent of new shipping routes will do the same for commercial shipping in this century. These
new routes, because of significant distance and fuel savings, could produce a seismic shift in world trade patterns and
the nature and form of commercial shipping. China is 4000 nautical miles closer to the European Union and the East
coast of North America sailing through the Arctic Ocean, and currently there are no vessel size restrictions and other
regulations unlike in the Suez or Panama Canal. There are presently no fees for Arctic routes. In addition, the smaller
ecological footprint of reduced fuel costs per ton-mile might also be an added incentive for the development of an Arctic
route. Arctic shipping could be another aspect of the new green wave that is sweeping the shipping industry, as more
attention is being paid to the environmental impact of shipping including fuel efficient and emission reduction of
commercial shipping.
Scientists in Copenhagen attending a conference from March 10 to March 12 hosted by the University of Copenhagen in
conjunction with a number of other universities warned that the predictive climate models that underlay the 2007 United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate change report have underestimated the rate of sea
change. This conference is a precursor to a Governmental Climate Change scheduled for December in Copenhagen and
which will supplement the IPCC Report. Given the effects of global climate change, the scientists are pointing out that
these changes are occurring faster and the potential for feedback loops that increase the sea-ice melting process is very
real. Feedback loops are natural processes that can increase the rate of warming or sea-ice changes, for example melting
permafrost may release methane which has a greater capacity to increase global warming. Methane is essentially CO2 on
steroids. The present concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is 380 parts per million (PPM), which is the highest in
perhaps the last 30 million years. What seems clear is that the sea-ice cover in the Arctic Ocean is going to decrease and
thin in the coming years. Many researchers have stated that in the Arctic the climate changes have magnified at least
twofold. China has maintained a considerable scientific program in both the Arctic and Antarctic and has been
conducting scientific research on climate change with a special focus on how this will affect China in a warming world.
It has partnered with other arctic nations in joint scientific programs and was involved in the recent International Polar
Year (IPY) program, which was a major coordinated research program on Polar research [2].
The opening up of the Arctic Ocean, as early as 2013, will create new opportunities for shipping. At the same time, the
fast melting Greenland ice cap will likely increase the number of calving icebergs, which will continue south into the
Great Circle shipping route across the North Atlantic. The International Ice Patrol led by the United States Coast Guard
maintains a close watch of icebergs in this well traveled shipping lane in the Atlantic.
To enter the Arctic Ocean from the Indo-Pacific where commercial traffic would enter from China, the only entry point
is the Bering Strait, which separates Russia from the United States. It was known as the "Ice Curtain" during the Cold
War, and is now being referred to as the Bering Gate. The Strait is a narrow choke point only 52 nautical miles wide
with a depth of 30 to 50 meters. There are three possible international shipping routes once a vessel enters the Arctic: 1)
The North East Sea Route or Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast (NSR), 2) the Transpolar Route and 3) the
North West Passage (NW Passage) through the Canadian Arctic archipelago.
The former and the latter shipping routes transit internal coastal waters of Russia and Canada respectively and are
subject to the application of the laws of the coastal state. These two countries as coastal nations will control these routes.
The Canadian NW Passage, the shortest route of the three, is, in fact, 5 separate geographical routes through the
Canadian Arctic archipelago. Canada has enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act that imposes a variety of
restrictions on navigation and requires ice classed vessels and ice navigators. Russia has the same type of restrictions
and charges for ice-breaker support along the NSR.
The Transpolar Route would transit the Arctic Ocean and be outside the territorial jurisdiction of any of the Arctic
coastal states and would be on the high seas. There is no specific restriction on navigation under the Law of the Sea
Convention for high seas navigation and the only laws applicable would be the law of the flag state of the vessel. The
Law of the Sea Convention sets out the international legal regime for the Arctic.
In the past, the Transpolar Route was not given much commercial interest because of the barrier posed by multi-year
sea-ice in the Arctic Ocean. The lack of salt content as the ice ages hardens the sea-ice. Again, most shipping companies
do not disclose their future commercial plans. In the Arctic Ocean, there historically was very hard multi-year ice,
which would raft up and prevent even the largest ice breakers from getting through. The sea-ice is dynamic and is
moved by ocean currents and tides and winds that can raft the sea-ice into pressure ridges and extend more then 100 feet
below the surface. The multi-year ice even without the pressure ridges is very hard and difficult to penetrate by even the
largest icebreakers which are presently operated by the Russian government in a public±private partnership with the
Murmansk Shipping Company. MSC manages the powerful Russian nuclear icebreakers on a commercial basis, which
are available for charter. These Russian icebreakers are the world¶s largest and a number are nuclear powered. The
traditional approach to ice breakers has been to have specialized purpose-built vessels usually government owned and
operated to provide icebreaking support to commercial cargo vessels. In other words, the icebreakers have very limited
cargo capacity. China has one large research icebreaker, the Snow Lion (Xuelong), which is used for research purposes
in both the Arctic and Antarctic. This is a former Russian-built icebreaker [3].
The ship design technology presently exists for vessels to operate year round in the Arctic. It simply needs to make
economic sense. There is no reason why China can¶t come up to speed on this technology as it is readily available in the
commercial domain. Finland is arguably the world leader in the development of icebreaking technology. With dropping
bunker fuel costs since the global economic slowdown, a 4000 mile distance saving may not make such a great
difference as it did a year ago but in the longer term the cost saving would be considerable. According to one recent
article, it is estimated that for one containership the cost saving could be in the range of a cost reduction of half a million
dollars [4]. Given the recent fluctuations in the shipping world it is difficult to obtain accurate predictions. The cost
saving could be considerable but this may be offset by increased crewing or marine insurance costs. Given the predictive
nature it is difficult to be more precise given the large number of variables. Shipping costs are a function of supply and
demand.
There are environmental and economic benefits from using few and larger vessels over a shorter geographical distance.
With containerships of which China is a major world operator, the ocean freight costs could be greatly reduced as the
vessel would not have to enter west coast North American ports and/or pay the canal fees which can be substantial. One
can not underestimate the importance of decreased ecological footprints. In a rapidly warming planet this will become
more important to the end consumers most of whom purchase the goods from manufacturers in China.
Shipping remains the most energy efficient way to move goods. In a global economy, with no depth restriction on a
trans-polar shipping route, very large vessels could be built especially if deep water transshipment ports were developed.
The vessels would not have to be restricted to a single type and could include containerships, bulk carriers and oil and
LNG tankers.
In an article that appeared in the Financial Times of London in January 2008, Professor Robert Wade of the London
School of Economics wrote:
The country has lately displayed special interest in relations with Iceland, the tiny island in the north Atlantic, which
with its strategic location is believed to get a key role in future shipping in the region. China wants to start shipping
containers in the north, and sees the deep-sea ports of Iceland as potential port bases.
This was the subject of a recent conference hosted in Iceland in 2007. Given the secretive and commercial nature of
shipping there is little information in the public domain [5].
A melting Arctic Ocean has a major impact on China and it could become a major Arctic shipping nation. It appears that
China has not engaged in the development of ice technology, which tends to be dominated by the Nordic countries and
the focus in recent years has been the development of the Russian gas field in the Barents Sea. Yet this is readily
commercially available and technology transfer agreements could be developed between ship design and engineering
firms and China. This approach has been used in South Korea shipyards for new vessel construction destined for the
icebreaking tankers used in the Russian Arctic gas fields.
China has sought observer status at the Arctic Council, a grouping of the Arctic Nations that looks at various arctic
issues including shipping. The Arctic Council was set up in 1996 and is an intergovernmental forum of nations which
border the Arctic Ocean. This serves as a forum to deal with arctic issues. One example of the work the Arctic Council is
doing is an arctic shipping assessment which is a collaborative effort. The Arctic Council is keenly aware of the
challenges presented by arctic shipping [6].
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is a highly successful United Nations Organization that sets
international maritime standards that are adopted by the world¶s flag and coastal states is working to develop a Polar
Code with the support of the International Group of Classification Societies which will set uniform construction
requirements for commercial vessels and navigation standards for arctic waters. Lloyds Registry of Shipping is one of
the oldest of the Classification standards. Underwriters take these issues into account when setting marine insurance
premiums in underwriting the risk. Marine Insurance costs presently serve more of a barrier to commercial arctic
shipping than vessel icebreaking technology.
China presently is conducting research in both the Arctic and Antarctic with an emphasis on climate change. China has
one of the world¶s largest non-nuclear icebreakers used in Polar research. Much of the international community is
clamoring for a special international regulatory regime to govern commercial activity in the pristine Arctic Ocean Basin
including shipping. Traditionally China has kept a low profile on shipping matters but it is starting to take a much more
active role in increasing arctic research in both the Arctic and Antarctic. In the recent past it has maintained an active
program of Arctic and Antarctic stations and has partnered with a number of Arctic nations and has set up a research
station in Norway. China's arctic research is well coordinated. While China has remained on the outside of the shipping
side, it would take very little commercial effort to come up to speed on the state of the art commercial icebreaking and
polar capable vessels. With a melting arctic that may be less of a problem than we think. China's extensive scientific
research provides a solid basis for the development of Arctic commercial shipping. In 2008 it established a research
station at 87 degrees North. China is a major trading nation that has much to gain with a reliable and low cost shipping
route across the top of the world. Yet, there may be little snow or ice in the coming decades for this emerging and
awakening of a shipping Snow Dragon. China¶s economic future may be intricately linked to a melting Arctic.
Notes
1. This dated shipping data (2003) is taken from a presentation given by Gao Weijie, vice senior executive president of
COSCO Group, at the International Maritime Forum and can be found at
www.cosco.com/en/pic/forum/654923323232.pdf.
2. China¶s polar research is coordinated by the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Agency. See
www.chinare.cn/en/index.html.
3. A good overview on sea-ice changes, ice classed shipbuilding technology and Chinese Arctic scientific research can
be found at the conference proceedings of the Maritime Security Conference 2008 held in Victoria , British Columbia
hosted by the Canadian Department of National Defense and the MarPac Commander. See the Focus on the Arctic Panel
which can be viewed online at www.msc2008.blip.tvwww.msc2008.blip.tv. The writer wishes to thank Dr. James
Boutilier for asking him to participate as a discussant on this panel.
4. An excellent article was written on the Arctic shipping by Dr. Scott Borgerson in the March 2008 issue of Foreign
Affairs µScramble for the Arctic¶ which can be found at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-
meltdown. In the article the writer makes reference to a 17.5 Million dollar cost saving to 14 Million dollar cost saving
with respect to a single containership voyage. Given the number of containerships presently idle, it is presently difficult
to accurately assess the potential cost savings in today¶s economic climate.
5. The 2007 Conference held in Iceland in entitled Breaking-The-Ice- Prospects of a Transpolar Route can be found at
www.mfa.is/media/Utgafa/Breaking_The_Ice_Conference_Report.pdf.
6. The overall work of the Arctic Council work can be found at www.arctic-council.org. The Arctic Shipping Working
Group of the Arctic Council can be viewed at arcticportal.org/pame/amsa.
c % $

March 18, 2009 04:16 PM Age: 340 days
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Economics, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Home Page
By: Evan Ellis
The five-nation visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Latin America in conjunction with the November 2004 Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) summit in Santiago, Chile, marked the beginning of a fundamental
transformation in China¶s relationship with Latin America. Prior to that trip, the People¶s Republic of China (PRC) had
almost no presence in the mainstream Latin American political, business and social discourse. The message sent by
President Hu and his delegation during that trip was the Chinese intent to promote and accelerate a nascent partnership
with the region.
Following Santiago, four years elapsed before the site of the annual APEC summit returned to Latin America. When
President Hu traveled to the region in November 2008 to attend the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, the trip highlighted
how far China¶s relationship with Latin America had evolved in only four years.
President Hu¶s trip came just weeks after the PRC¶s induction as a voting member of the Inter-American Development
Bank. It also coincided with the release of China¶s first policy paper on the region, "China's Policy Paper on Latin
American and the Caribbean." The paper confirms Beijing¶s intention to expand its engagement with Latin America on
multiple fronts, from investment to technology partnerships to military exchanges [1]. En route to Lima, President Hu
stopped in Costa Rica, which in June 2007 became the first Central American nation in the post-Cold War era to switch
its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to mainland China. In Cuba, Hu signed 37 agreements and had a photo op with
an ailing Fidel Castro, which reinforced China¶s role as Cuba¶s principal extra-hemispheric patron [2]. In addition, the
APEC summit highlighted the efforts of Peru and Chile to position themselves as commercial hubs in the developing
trade between China and South America.
The Maturation of the Trade Relationship
Since 2004, China¶s relationship with Latin America has not only expanded quantitatively, but has also matured
qualitatively in terms of both transactions and knowledge.
The growth of China-Latin America bilateral trade from $10 billion in 2000 to $102.6 billion by the end of 2007 [3]
reflects two reinforcing phenomena: 1) the expansion of commodity exports to China by a small set of southern cone
countries, and 2) a broad-based penetration by China into Latin American product markets.
The primary products purchased by China from Latin America have been commodities such as iron, copper, soy and
fishmeal that do not require complex transactions or an extensive local presence. As PRC experience with the region
has grown, however, it has cautiously established an investment presence in key commodity sectors. In Venezuela, it
moved from modest oilfield operations in the Lake Maracaibo area to a more important and potentially riskier presence
as a minority partner in developing the massive heavy oil reserves in the Orinoco river basin. In Peru, China Aluminum
Corporation committed to invest up to 2.2 billion over the next 30 years for the rights to operate a mine at Toromocho
[4]. In February 2009, during an official visit to Brazil, Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping signed a preliminary accord
for a $10 billion loan to the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras, providing it with capital for developing new
deepwater oil reserves, which could ultimately be exported to the PRC [5].
In some cases, these investments have proven problematic for the PRC. Two years after a Chinese consortium invested
$1.42 billion to purchase the Ecuadoran assets of the Canadian oil firm EnCana in 2006. The Ecuadoran government
forced the Chinese to give up property rights in oil fields that had been part of the purchase and sign a new contract in
which they simply extracted oil from the territory under a service contract with Ecuador [6]. Hutchison Whampoa
Limited was forced to withdraw from a concession to operate the port of Manta when it could not resolve a dispute with
the Ecuadoran government concerning the contractual obligations for investment in the port [7]. In Chile, China
Minmetals invested $550 million in a copper advance purchase agreement with the state mining company COLDELCO,
only to discover in 2009 that the agreement did not give it the expected right to acquire a 49 percent stake in the new
Chilean mine ³Gabriel Mistral´ [8]. In Venezuela, a 2006 decision by PdVSA to stop producing the heavy petroleum
product ormulsion left in the lurch a power plant built by the Chinese to use it [9].
Beyond commodities, select Latin American companies such as Grupo Modelo, FEMSA and GRUMA have made some
progress building markets in the PRC, selling recognized brand name products to the growing Chinese middle class.
Latin American governments have also improved their ability to support their nationals seeking to do business in China,
opening commercial attaché offices in secondary locations such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, in addition to their
embassies in Beijing. They are also expanding and refining the capabilities of trade promotion organizations tied to the
government such as ProChile, APEX, Fundacion Exportar, PROCOMER, and CORPEI. Additionally, they have created
technical frameworks to support trade and investment including bilateral free trade agreements with China, such as those
of Chile (2006), Peru (2009), and Costa Rica (initiated November 2008), as well as reciprocal investment protection
agreements (Colombia, November 2008) and individual phytosanitary agreements. Nonetheless, those governments and
producers have discovered that despite such efforts, traditional products such as coffee and fruits have not sold well in
the PRC. In addition to issues of Chinese tastes, these perishable products and the labor required to harvest them makes
them uncompetitive against closer, lower-cost producers such as the Philippines.
With respect to Chinese exports to Latin America, the PRC has not only increased its market share, but also the
sophistication of its product offering in Latin American consumer markets. As factories in the PRC produced more
items and Latin American traders became more sophisticated in dealing with those factories, China has complimented
its offering of labor-intensive manufactured goods such as clothing, toys and footwear with a broad selection of Chinese
motorcycles, cars, heavy machinery, appliances, and consumer electronics. The PRC has also launched projects to build
assembly facilities in the region itself, leveraging the access to third-country markets afforded by regional free trade
agreements. Chinese auto companies DongFeng, Geeley, and FAW [10], for example, have announced plans to create
assembly plants in the Mexican maquiladora sector, in order to achieve duty-free access to the U.S. car market under
provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Finally, China or Hong Kong-based companies with a more multinational character have expanded their physical
presence in the region to service clients. These companies include the logistics company Hutchison-Whampoa, China
Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO), the telecommunications companies ZTE and Huawei, and Hong Kong
Shanghai Bank of China (HSBC).
The Expanding Influence of China

Although the expanding volume of trade and investment between the PRC and Latin America is impressive, perhaps the
most significant transformation has been the expanding weight of the PRC in the calculations of political leaders,
businesspeople, and others in the region.
The perception that China is emerging as a key economic and political player has been a powerful motivator for leaders
to invest time and resources to leverage, accommodate, or defend against such a future. The decision by Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias to diplomatically recognize the PRC in June 2007 was motivated, in part, by his conviction that
positioning his country in line with China¶s rise was necessary for it to play a leading role in the Americas. The
investment of time by Latin American leaders to promote their countries¶ commercial and political relationship with the
PRC through official visits to China has been similarly impressive. During 2008, for instance, four Latin American
heads-of-state made high-level visits to China accompanied by trade and investment-oriented delegations: Peruvian
President Alan Garcia (February), Chilean President Michele Bachelet (April), Mexican President Felipe Calderon
(July), and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (September).
In the private sector, the calculation of businesspeople that the PRC will be among the most important markets of the
future has motivated a wide range of corporate leaders to dedicate significant time and capital to position themselves in
China, even when those companies do not expect to generate a profit from their China operations for years.
In the academic world, Chinese language programs and China studies programs in Latin American universities have
proliferated since 2004. While the United States remains a dominant cultural and economic reference, a growing mass
of Latin American students are investing their futures in the expectations of China's future importance.
The Impact of the Global Recession
The transformation of China¶s relationship with Latin America during the past four years is an inadequate measure of
the rate of change to come. In particular, the deepening global recession, which may bring about financial and political
upheaval, can fundamentally transform the roles of actors such as the PRC in the international system.
In the short to medium term, the recession is likely to severely strain China¶s relationship with Latin America. The PRC
is likely to reduce its purchase of primary products from Latin America, while simultaneously seeking to boost its sale of
goods there to compensate for lost sales to its traditional customers in the United States and Europe. This will exacerbate
the existing trade deficit. The diminishing benefits of the PRC as a customer of Latin American goods, in combination
with heightened competition from China as a major seller²as Latin American producers teeter on the edge of
solvency²is likely to strengthen political forces with the social constituency in the region critical of trade with China
This could fuel local resentment against Chinese companies¶ actions such as the 2006 takeover of an Andes petroleum
oil field in Tarapoa, Ecuador [12], or the 2007 violence against the Chinese company Petroriental in Orellana [13]. It
could also foment violence against ethnic Chinese in the region, as demonstrated by the incidents in 2004 against
Chinese shopkeepers in the Venezuelan communities of Maracay and Valencia [14]. Such events may also motivate the
PRC to work with governments in the region in new ways to protect PRC businesses and the Chinese Diaspora in ways
that it did not do during the previous century when the PRC was weaker.
At the same time, if the PRC is able to effectively manage the tensions generated by economic conditions, both at home
and in Latin America, it may emerge from the crisis with a dramatically stronger position in the region. The evaporation
of Western capital from the region has increased the region¶s leaders¶ focus on the PRC and its $2 trillion in foreign
currency reserves as a potential new source of global liquidity and investment. The steep decline in global commodity
prices and asset values provide an opportunity for the PRC to acquire more assets in Latin America at bargain prices,
while also winning influence and goodwill for investing in the region at a time in which Western investors are not.
As the global recession deepened in February 2009, for the first time ever, two senior Chinese officials made
simultaneous multi-country trips to the region. Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping, mentioned as a likely successor to
Hu Jintao, paid visits to Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, while Hui Liangyu, the Chinese vice-
premier, made trips to Argentina, Barbados, Ecuador, and the Bahamas. Other factors must be considered as well, such
as how the crisis affects the competitive position between China and other outside players in Latin America, such as
India. While it is difficult to determine the outcome of such interactions, it is likely that the next time that APEC hosts
its annual summit in Latin America, the region¶s relationship with China will have evolved as much, if not more, than
the change witnessed from the 2004 Santiago summit to the 2008 summit in Lima.
Notes
1. ³Full text: China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.´ China View. Beijing, China.
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/05/content_10351493.htm. November 5, 2008.
2. ³Cuba propuso a China 37 proyectos por $1,500 millones.´ El NuevoHerald. Miami, Florida. elnuevoherald.com.
November 23, 2008.
3. ³Total Import and Export Value by Country (Region) (2007/01-12)´. Ministry of Commerce of the People¶s
Republic of China.. Http://english.mofcom.gov.cn.aarticle/statistic/ie/200802/20080205371690.html. February 4, 2008.
4. ³Proyecto Toromocho generará 5,000 empleos durante su construcción, señala presidente García (ampliación).´
Andina. Lima, Peru. www.andina.com.pe. May 5, 2008.
5. ³China considera millonaria financiación de Petrobras.´ La Nacion. Buenos Aires, Argentina. www.la-
nacion.com.ar. February 20, 2009.
6. ³La Andes Petroleum y Repsol logran un acuerdo.´ El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. www.eluniverso.com.
August 9, 2008.
7. ³Hutchison ya no seguirá en el puerto del Manta´ El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. www.eluniverso.com. 8
February 2009.
8. ³Codelco y Minmetals podrían acudir a arbitraje por Gaby.´ Diario Financiero. Santiago, Chile. www.df.cl. July 16,
2008.
9. ³China sólo se quedará con dos tercerios de la ormulsión del segundo módulo.´ El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela.
www.eluniversal.
com. April 11, 2006.
10. ³Chinese cars coming to Mexico.´ BusinessWeek. www.businessweek.com. November 23, 2007.
11. Eight Confucius institutes have been established in South America alone, none of which existed in 2004. See
³Worldwide Confucius Institutes.´ Official website. www.linese.com/confucius_institutes/search. Accessed 1 March
2009. New or significantly expanded Asia studies program in Universidad EAFIT in Medellin, Colombia Universidad
San Fransisco in Quito, Ecuador, the Escuela Polyechnica del littoral (ESPOL) in Guayaquil, Ecuador and the
Universidad de Manta, among others.
12. ³Petrolera china dice que incidentes en Amazonia no afectarán sus intereses en Latinoamérica.´ El Comercio.
Quito, Ecuador. www.elcomercio.com. November 14, 2006.
13. ³Protestas contra Petrooriental dejan 31 heridas en ocho dias.´ El Comercio. Quito, Ecuador.
www.elcomercio.com. July 4, 2007.
14. Yolanda Ojeda Reyes, ³Ciudanos Chinos Reciben Protección´ El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela.
www.eluniversal.com. November 11, 2004.
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March 18, 2009 04:07 PM Age: 340 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Economics, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
A string of recent pronouncements from Beijing leaders capped off with a strong statement by Premier Wen Jiabao over
his concerns for the value of China's $681.9 billion investment in U.S. Treasury bonds has highlighted a troubled
Chinese leadership's outlook for 2009. Premier Wen's statement was received by analysts as a strong warning to
Washington. It follows a revision in the $588 billion Chinese fiscal stimulus package (see Willy Lam's article in this
issue) at the recently concluded National People's Congress (China's parliament) and the release of a joint communiqué
at the close of the G-20 finance minister meeting by Brazil, India, Russia and China (BRIC). The timing of these
pronouncements outlines the silhouette of China's nascent comprehensive economic strategy at home and abroad.
Moreover, it is an outlay of the on-going heated debate within China over its roadmap for economic recovery and a test
of Sino-U.S. relations, given China's massive $2 trillion foreign exchange reserves (China Daily, December 17, 2008).
During the "meet-the-press" session after the close of the NPC on March 12, Premier Wen said, "We [China] lent such
huge fund to the United States and of course we're concerned about the security of our assets and, to speak truthfully, I
am a little bit worried." In an unusually direct appeal, Wen added, "I request the U.S. to maintain its good credit, to
honor its promises and to guarantee the safety of China's assets" (Xinhua News Agency, March 13). On the issue of
China's foreign reserves, Wen asserted that Beijing's primary concern will be to preserve its national interest, but he also
acknowledged that, "we [China] also have to consider the stability of the overall international financial system, as the
two factors are interlinked." Wen's statement linking China's national interests to stability in the international financial
system were meant to allay concerns over the possible destabilizing impact of China's rise in the international system.
The statement also reflects the oft-stated official position that China is a responsible stakeholder, and to brush aside any
lingering expectation that China will take a leadership role in reshaping the post-Bretton Woods system.
In an interview with the Chinese publication Economic Observer, Wu Xiaoling, vice president of the NPC Financial and
Economic Affairs Committee, explained that "[China's] reserves were a form of liability that could not be directly used
for public spending" (Economic Observer [China], March 13). "Though the foreign currency reserves are an asset of the
central bank, they are also a liability²the central bank is indebted to society, and must be safeguarded" Wu added. Wu
was also the ex-deputy governor of the central bank and former chief of the State Administration of Foreign Exchanges
(SAFE), which is the administrative agency that manages the state foreign reserve system. When asked about the central
government's approach to the management of its foreign reserves under the global financial crisis, Wu stressed: "ensure
safety, profitability and liquidity." In the same interview, it was reported that China's account surplus declined by 27
percent year-on-year in 2008, illustrating the stress on the value of Chinese assets. "The best way to minimize [further]
risk is to scale down the size of the foreign currency reserves." According to Wu, other ways the government can reduce
the heavy burden of the reserves is by "setting up a Renminbi equity investment fund, or expanding trade and foreign
investment" (Economic Observer, March 13).
One sector for development clearly targeted by Beijing's diversification campaign is its strategic petroleum reserves
(SPR) (China Daily, March 2; Sankei Shimbun, March 4). As early as January 2009, Zhang Guobao, head of the NEA
and Vice-minister of the National Development Reform Commission, penned an article in the People's Daily saying,
"The country [China] should take advantage of falling global energy prices to increase its oil reserves" (China Daily,
March 2). According to a plan recently released by China's National Energy Administration (NEA), China plans to build
nine large refining bases along its coastal areas over the next three years (China Daily, March 2). In a national energy
conference in early February, the NEA also announced that China will build eight new strategic SPR bases on top of the
current four by 2011, and increase China's strategic crude capacity from 103 million barrels (mb) to 281 mb. The four
existing SPR bases are in Zhenhai, Zhoushan, Huangdao and Dalian; two confirmed venues for future SPR tanks are in
Huanggao and Jinzhou; and the following venues are possible locations for the remaining six SPR tanks that are being
planned to be built: Quanzhou, Shantou, Guangzhou, Bao'an, Zhanjiang, Yangpu, Yantai, Binhai, Caofeidian, Tieling,
Linyuan, Lanzhou, Wanzhou and Shanshan (China Daily, March 2).
Western analysts, however, point out that the two countries' current strategy and economic trajectory are in a knot: "If
China refuses to keep buying our bonds, the value of the dollar will plunge, and so, too, will the value of China's foreign
reserves held in dollars," said Peter Navarro, an associate professor of public policy at the Paul Merage School of
Business, University of California, Irvine. Navarro added, "On the other hand, if China keeps buying our debt to prop up
the dollar, it faces a strong likelihood that with so much fiscal stimulus and easy money coursing through the U.S.
system, inflation is all but inevitable. That, too, will ultimately devalue the dollar and therefore Chinese foreign reserves.
So, for the Chinese, the question is whether to cut and run now or hold on and be scalped later."
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April 2, 2009 01:02 PM Age: 325 days
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Economics, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Home Page, Featured
By: William Ratliff
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping
The People¶s Republic of China (PRC) says it places high priority on making Mexico an important link in its widely
publicized ³win-win´ expansion into Latin America. This was evident during Vice President Xi Jinping¶s February stop-
over in Mexico City. In reality, however, after 37 years of diplomatic ties the relationship remains more hoped-for than
realized by China and²in recent years²more feared than utilized by Mexico. What are the prospects now for a ³win-
win´ future for China and Mexico in an unsettled world of financial turmoil?
On his first official visit to Mexico City in December 2003 as China's premier, Wen Jiabao proclaimed Mexico one of
China¶s few ³strategic partners´ in the Western Hemisphere, a designation that today still has largely economic and
energy overtones in the context of the PRC¶s domestic development [1]. This makes sense because Mexico is the 11th
most populous country in the world, with some 110 million potential customers for Chinese products. More important
for China in the long term, however, is Mexico¶s location: 1) in the ³heart´ of the Central American/Caribbean region
and 2) sharing a 2,000-mile border with the United States. Mexico¶s special relationship with the United States includes
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the Chinese hope will open trade doors for them as well as
Mexico through business partnerships.
Mexico¶s links to China are usually in some way related to U.S.-Mexico relations, which today are under stress for
several reasons. Much of the widespread violence, which alarmed Xi¶s delegation [2], is directly or indirectly the result
of Mexican drug cartels, servicing mainly U.S. users, which are heavily armed with automatic and assault weapons
smuggled in from the United States. In addition to perennial challenges of illegal immigration there is the Obama
Administration¶s step back from George W. Bush¶s effort to finally abide by NAFTA trucking terms. Yet above all is
the spillover into Mexico of the financial collapse in the United States and the ensuing global crisis. Since last year the
decline in trade has accelerated, capital investments declined, unemployment risen and crime increased: Mexico¶s GDP
has fallen to one of the lowest in the Hemisphere.
With the United States sometimes a serious liability, as well as an asset, some Mexicans have long pondered closer
cooperation with burgeoning China as a way to counterbalance U.S. influence and help restore some normality, if not
prosperity, to the country. At the time of Xi¶s visit, Chinese leaders reportedly believed Mexicans were thus inclined,
and many were, despite important obstacles [3].
Mexico was the last country in the world to support China¶s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) because of
deep concern over trade and employment issues, and Mexico has charged China repeatedly with "dumping" within the
WTO. The Mexican Secretary of Economy reported during Xi¶s visit that bilateral trade in late-2008 had reached $34
billion, but of that Mexican imports accounted for about $31 billion, reflecting the imbalance that is the source of serious
tensions (Press Release, Mexican Secretary of Economy, February 10; Latin American Herald Tribune, March 28).
These exports from China to Mexico, and to Mexico¶s trade partners, have had a serious negative impact on Mexican
manufacturing, where employment fell by about one million jobs between its peak in 2000 and this year. According to
Enrique Dussel Peters, a Mexican trade expert who specializes in Sino-Mexican relations at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM), jobs in textile production have fallen by 50 percent to 350,000 (ICIS news.com,
February 10). In 2005 one study concluded that 58 percent of clothing sold in Mexico was contraband, a major portion
of it from China [4].
While in Mexico, Vice President Xi met with Mexican President Felipe Calderón, congressional leaders, business
persons, the local Chinese community and others. Calderón said Mexico can learn much from China in this era of
financial crisis, noting that top leaders of the two countries have met 19 times on bilateral and multilateral occasions
during the past eight years. He pledged further efforts to expand bilateral pragmatic cooperation (Xinhua News Agency,
February 11).
Xi outlined a five-part program for the rapid development of economic and trade cooperation (Xinhua News Agency,
February 11). His proposal began with a ³strategic perspective´ asserting the joint benefits of cooperation in expanding
and balancing trade. Both sides should improve legal assurances and efficiency, he said, while removing obstacles to
growth, looking particularly to telecommunications, mining, agriculture, fishing, processing and assembly. Xi reiterated
points about reforming the international financial system that paralleled those of Hu Jintao at the November 2008 G20
summit. Xi emphasized that China believes business is the main force furthering bilateral and global cooperation.
This all relates to the matter of ³winners´ and ³losers.´ Lists of Latin American ³winners and losers´ in economic
relations with the PRC almost always place Mexico first among the losers. The simplest rule of thumb is that Latin
American ³winners´ are south of the Panama Canal while ³losers´ are north of the Canal. The key difference is that
South American countries, foremost among them Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, tend to export large quantities of
natural resources and agricultural commodities. In contrast, Mexico, and the Central American and Caribbean nations
largely lack those resources and depend more on trade in assorted manufactured items [5].
As Johns Hopkins professor Francisco González puts it, ³countries whose production structure and exports resemble
China¶s, that is, countries dominated by unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing, will compete for markets and incur
losses due to strong Chinese competitiveness.´ What is more, China and Mexico ³compete with a similar export basket
of goods for the same market, namely the United States.´ Mexico¶s top ten exports, except for oil, all compete with
Chinese exports [6]. Mexico is the main Latin American country feeling the ³pain´ of emerging China and India,
according to a recent World Bank study, because ³Mexico is the only country´ in the Latin America/Caribbean region
³whose comparative advantage had been moving in the same direction as « the two Asian economies´ [7].
In an article titled "Mexico¶s Trade: Up Against the Great Wall," Mexican analyst Dussel notes factors giving China a
strong trade advantage over Mexico, beginning with a long-term view of developing and maintaining manufacturing and
trade. This edge is sharpened by a research and development budget that is larger for the single city of Shenzhen than the
R&D budget of the entire Mexican government. Also, unlike Mexico, China systematically develops a network of cheap
and accessible suppliers that provide necessary components for a product, thus enhancing value-added benefits. China
also provides stronger incentives for foreign investors, as well as a hard-working and cheaper labor force [8]. Chinese
goals are sought under substantial government supervision through an integrated development program that is missing in
Mexico. Even extant bi-national organizations in Mexico have not yet had the will or government/public support to
bring all Mexican sectors together to understand and deal with the China phenomenon [9].
China is interested in oil anywhere and Mexico has a lot, mostly sold to the United States. The Chinese company
Sinopec in particular has tried to become involved in this oil through the Mexican national company, Pemex, but
without success. Blog comments by a journalist who accompanied Xi suggest both surprise and deep frustration among
Chinese that Mexico turned them down, though also some satisfaction that the United States is not allowed to be
involved either [10]. The result, however, given maturing fields, declining reserves, corruption and stodgy thinking
within Pemex, has made this business one of the least efficient in the world.
Xi rarely made public reference to problems in the Sino-Mexican relationship, but several Chinese analysts have
discussed them in some detail. In late-2007 CASS analyst Wu Guoping even warned that if bilateral trade differences,
from imbalances to Mexican charges of dumping, are not resolved, then trade, economic cooperation and the strategic
relationship itself could suffer [11].
The two main ways to improve Mexico¶s current relationship with China, and thus the bilateral relationship, are greatly
expanding Mexican competitiveness and significantly expanding Sino-Mexican joint ventures. During Xi¶s visit,
Mexican Economy Secretary Gerardo Ruiz said that while up to now trade has been the focus of bilateral economic
relations, in the future ³the key to promoting greater economic integration between Mexico and China is investment´
(Press Release, February 10). Several years ago Antonio Ortiz Mena, the director of Mexico¶s CIDE research center,
lamented the negativism that long dominated Mexico¶s view of China. ³China is a threat,´ he said, ³but it is also an
opportunity,´ particularly as a source of urgently needed capital and collaboration. Mexico has ³depended on tariff
preferences, not on increasing our productivity or improving our physical infrastructure, our business climate or our
conditions for financing´ (Política y Gobierno, February 9, 2005).
Addressing a luncheon hosted by Chinese and Mexican entrepreneurs, Xi reported that two-way investments have
reached almost 500 million dollars, of which 80 percent are Chinese investments in Mexico. He added that Chinese
markets have welcomed Mexican electronic and telecommunications products, as well as Tequila and Corona beer,
while Mexicans have benefited from cheap but high-quality Chinese products of all sorts (People¶s Daily, February 11
and 26). Chinese leaders insist they want to balance the bilateral trade, but little real movement in that direction has
occurred. The simple but tough question, as Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Latin Americanist Jiang
Shixue says, is ³what can Mexico sell to China to reduce the deficit´ (S. Jiang, pers. comm.).
During Xi¶s visit there was much talk on both sides of how China could invest in Mexican factories that would export to
Latin America and the United States, though as Minister Ruiz has said, Mexico does not look favorably on Chinese-
funded factories that use only Chinese rather than Mexican workers (Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 7; Herald Tribune,
March 28). Chinese firms consider business in Mexico desirable, as González says, because it ³can provide a platform
for exports to the US market´ (G. Paz, pers. comm.). Evan Ellis notes Mexico¶s attractions for China in his encyclopedic
new book, namely its close proximity to the United States, some manufacturing skills and ³tariff-free access to the U.S.
market´ under provisions of the NAFTA agreement [12]. Although cooperation could be worked out in many areas,
several Chinese car manufacturers are the most aggressive, or as one Canadian paper put it, ³China cars get Mexico
beachhead´ (National Post¶s Financial Post, January 9).
What are the prospects for a significant improvement in Sino-Mexican relations? Specialist projections cover the
waterfront of possibilities.
CASS Latin Americanists Jiang Shixue and Xu Shicheng are convinced that despite commercial problems the two
countries will strengthen their ³strategic´ relationship (S. Jiang, S. Xu, pers. comm.). Mexican analyst Dussel concluded
that often tense negotiations on tariffs in late-2008 resulted in building a ³closeness and trust´ that had previously eluded
the two parties, and in late March he expressed ³high expectations´ that Mexico will devise a long-term and effective
response to the China challenge (E. Dussel, pers. comm.). Kim Wonho, the president of the Latin American Studies
Association of (South) Korea, notes that now the two countries ³compete with each other in major export markets,´ but
³as China moves ahead toward high tech sectors,´ their prospects for cooperation will improve (W. Kim, pers. comm.).
Guadalupe Paz, co-editor last year of a fine overview of China¶s relations with Latin America, visited China in March
for talks with journalists, diplomats, academics, private sector representatives and Chinese officials. Her impression was
that Mexican officials ³would like to deepen cooperative efforts with China,´ but that they tend to be ³skeptical´ about
China¶s ³medium- to long-term intentions´ (G. Paz, pers. comm.).
Former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda suspects that ³little will change, for better or worse, over the coming
years. Every Mexican president travels to China, everyone says the same thing, and everything stays the same´ (J.
Castañeda, pers. comm.). Luis Rubio, the president of the Center of Research for Development in Mexico City, does not
see profundity in the relationship, saying ³China has placed its bets elsewhere in South America´ (L. Rubio, pers.
comm.). Jerry Haar, an international business professor at Florida International University, sees an economic
³downward spiral´ that may result in ³economic nationalism²a euphemism for protectionism´ and an increasing
Chinese focus on countries closer to home (J. Haar, pers. comm.).
Little wonder prognostications vary. While the need to adapt is particularly great in a period of global unrest, concerns
about intentions and consequences are inevitable. Both China and Mexico have strong incentives to find a ³win-win´
relationship, but the current competitive bilateral conditions are very real and can not be ³willed´ away. Additional
factors figure in as well, ranging from geography and the fact that neither side adequately understands or trusts the other
to differences in natural and cultural resources the players can and choose to bring to the table. China¶s focused
successes and economic and human resources pose opportunities and challenges for China, Mexico and others, including
the United States, that can only be made ³win-win´ with constructive goals, patience and informed persistence on all
sides.
Notes
1. Until November 2008 four countries (Mexico, Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela) had been designated ³strategic partners,´
but a policy paper in November 2008 elevated all of Latin America and the Caribbean to the ³strategic´ level. See China
Brief, November 24, 2008.
2. See blog of Qin Feng, a journalist with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, who accompanied Xi Jinping on his visit
to Mexico, accessed at: blog.ifeng.com/article/2158299.html. I am grateful to Wang Zichen at Shandong Economic
University for drawing my attention to this source.
3. See Qin Feng's blog. Xi made one informal but blunt reference to U.S. arrogance and assertiveness when addressing
members of Mexico¶s Chinese community (China Brief, Feb. 20) and while the comments have not been reported
officially in China they have circulated informally online (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDHjmJ-9w28) with
considerable approval from China¶s super-nationalists and some others.
4. Alma Rosa Cruz Zamorano, China: competencia comercial con México
y Centroamérica, Comercio Exterior, March 2005, p 287.
5. In fact, the ³winner-loser´ terminology may be misleading since ³winners´ usually fail to seriously invest profits in
improving basic economic, social and educational infrastructure. Thus they do not lay foundations for breaking free
from traditional trade patterns or from age-old inequalities and poverty.
6. Francisco González, ³Latin America in the Economic Equation²Winners and Losers,´ in Riordan Roett and
Guadalupe Paz, editors, China¶s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere (Washington, Brookings Institution Press,
2008), pp. 151, 157; and González, testimony to US House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 11, 2008.
7. Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga, Guillermo Perry, China¶s and India¶s Challenge to Latin America (Washington,
World Bank, 2009), p. 7.
8. Enrique Dussel Peters, ³Mexico¶s Trade: Up Against the Great Wall,´ Center for Latin American Studies, University
of California, Berkeley, April 27, 2006. The problems Dussel mentions in 2006 are much the same, indeed often more
serious, in 2009.
9. Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, La China del Siglo XXI: Reto y Oportunidad para México. 2008,
passim.
10. Qin Feng's blog. The Chinese surprise reflects an ignorance of Mexican history and culture. Citing law from the
colonial period, Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized all sub-soil wealth in 1938 and since then oil above all
products has been out-of-bounds to any foreigner.
11. Wu Guoping, ³Ying zhuyi yanjiu zhong mo maoyi xin bianhua,´ CASS, Nov. 20, 2007. Also see Qin Feng blog.
Two other CASS studies are Xu Shicheng, ³Algunas reflexiones sobre el desarrollo de las relaciones chino-mexicanas,´
Cuadernos Americanos, July-Sept, 2007; and Yue Yunxia, ³China & Mexico: Comparison of Trade Competitiveness,´
Nov. 24, 2008, which concludes that although ³China outshines Mexico in the overall competitiveness´ in the US and
EU markets, ³instead of actual threaten [sic], China is just a potential restraint to Mexico. . . .´
12. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Lynne Rienner, 2009), Chapter 6.
c ""$ c$8
April 2, 2009 01:00 PM Age: 325 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Home Page
By: David Shinn
As China expands its engagement throughout Africa, it increasingly finds itself involved in African conflict zones either
by design or accident. This involvement takes essentially three forms: Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping
operations, Chinese weapons, especially small arms, which make their way into conflict zones, and kidnapping of
Chinese nationals or attacks on Chinese facilities and nationals. In the case of kidnappings and attacks, China is
beginning to face some of the same challenges that have confronted western interests for decades.
African Security
It is important to put China¶s African security policy in perspective. China offers a political, economic, and even
security alternative to the West for many African countries. Sudan and Zimbabwe, countries ostracized by the West,
depend on China for much of their military equipment. Countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Niger look to Africa as a source of financing free of Western conditions. On human rights issues, China supports
African governments and they often support China in the UN Human Rights Council. For its part, China increasingly
relies on Africa as a source of strategic materials such as oil, copper, cobalt and tantalum.
Although China is a significant supplier of arms and military equipment to African countries, it has limited military
presence besides the assignment of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, occasional training and exchange
programs and the assignment of defense attachés to Chinese embassies. China rarely sends its naval ships to African
ports; its last naval visit took place in 2002 [1]. China did recently join the international effort to combat Somali piracy
in the Gulf of Aden, and it is pursuing in the Indian Ocean a ³string of pearls´ strategy that will eventually lead to
Africa¶s east coast [2]. China apparently has no plans at the moment to extend its naval influence to Africa¶s east coast,
but it almost certainly is interested in protecting the sea lanes that bring oil from Sudan and around the Cape from West
Africa. In 2000, Chinese naval vessels visited Tanzania and South Africa.
Peacekeeping, Anti-piracy and De-mining Assistance
China began in the early 1990s to send small numbers of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The
numbers started to increase significantly in 2001 when China sent more than 200 troops to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) and soon followed this with other large contingents. In 2007, Major-General Zhao Jingmin became
the first Chinese to command a UN peacekeeping operation, MINURSO in the Western Sahara (UN News Service,
August 27, 2007). By the end of February 2009, China had 1,745 troops, police and observers assigned to six of the
UN¶s seven peacekeeping operations in Africa. The largest units were in Liberia, Southern Sudan, Darfur and the DRC.
About 75 percent of all Chinese peacekeepers serve in Africa. Although China contributes only 3 percent of the UN
peacekeeping budget, it has far more peacekeepers in Africa than any other permanent member of the UN Security
Council [3].
China has received widespread praise from African leaders, the UN and the United States for its willingness to send
peacekeepers to the continent. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
identified three reasons for China¶s interest in peacekeeping. First, making a positive contribution to peace and security
helps China to project a more benign and ³harmonious´ image and to balance U.S. and Western influence. Second, the
PLA wants to expand its non-combat missions such as peacekeeping, anti-piracy, disaster response and humanitarian
relief. Third, the PLA and Chinese security forces can learn important lessons and obtain practical experience that may
improve their responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergency command systems and ability
to conduct non-combat missions at home [4].
China deployed early in 2009 two destroyers, including the Wuhan, one of its most sophisticated warships, and a supply
ship to help combat Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The ships have about 800 crew and 70 special operations troops
(Reuters, January 6, 2009; China Brief, January 22). Some 20 percent of the 1,265 Chinese ships passing through the
Gulf of Aden in 2008 came under attack, including the hijacking of a Hong Kong registered tanker (The Associated
Press, December 19, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, September 16, 2008). This engagement gives the PLA valuable naval
experience far from its shores and permits China to project power in an area that is important to its trade. U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney praised China¶s contribution to the anti-piracy effort. He commented that
³The work they¶ve done has been highly professional, it¶s been highly effective, and it¶s been very well coordinated
with the United States and the other navies that are working there´ (USA Today, February 28).
China¶s de-mining assistance has contributed positively to post-conflict situations in Africa. In the past two years,
China held de-mining courses for Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Sudan. China donated de-
mining equipment to all of the aforementioned countries and Egypt provided Ethiopia with mine eradication funds [5].
Arms Sales
While Chinese contributions to peacekeeping, anti-piracy and de-mining have been positive for Africa, its arms sales
have had negative implications when they become employed in Africa's myriad conflicts. China has provided military
equipment to African countries going back to the Algerian revolution in the 1950s and military support for numerous
African liberation groups. From 2000-2003, China delivered by value about 13 percent of all arms to Sub-Saharan
Africa, the second highest provider after Russia¶s 16 percent. From 2004-2007, China¶s percentage increased to almost
18 percent, although it remained in second place after Germany¶s 24 percent. During 2004-2007, Chinese deliveries
included 240 artillery pieces, 370 APCs and armored cars, 29 minor surface combatants, 10 supersonic combat aircraft
and 40 other aircraft [6].
Of greater concern has been the provision over the years of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to Africa. Although
the dollar value for any particular country has often been small, since 2000 China has delivered SALW to at least 27 of
Africa¶s 53 countries. The largest recipients have been Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Côte d¶Ivoire
[7]. Three of these countries²Sudan, Nigeria and Côte d¶Ivoire²have been experiencing internal conflict since 2000.
There is a growing concern that China, because its small arms are so inexpensive, is becoming the provider of choice for
the generic version of the AK-47 and related assault rifles. Although China sells the weapons to African governments,
they are increasingly finding their way into conflict zones [8].
The eastern DRC constitutes one of the longest-running conflicts in Africa. There have been numerous accounts over
the years that Chinese small arms have contributed to the killing. Amnesty International reported that Chinese AK-47s
were common among soldiers, militia and armed groups operating in the Kivu Provinces and the Ituri District of the
DRC where the weapons have been used to commit atrocities. The UN Mission in the DRC investigated the origin of
1,100 weapons collected in Ituri District and determined that 17 percent were of Chinese origin. Amnesty concluded
they reached the area from deliveries made to the governments of the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi or through
third parties outside the region [9].
China¶s most controversial military sales concern Sudan where there have been two major conflicts²the North-South
civil war and the crisis in Darfur. China provided up to 90 percent of the SALW delivered to Sudan between 2004 and
2006. China also helped build three weapons factories outside Khartoum. Chinese small arms became widely used in
Darfur and found their way to the conflict in neighboring Chad [10]. Most ammunition used by all parties in Darfur is
manufactured in Sudan or in China (UN Security Council report, January 30, 2006). A Darfur rebel group captured
from government forces in Darfur Chinese military trucks, one outfitted with a Chinese anti-aircraft gun. Sudanese
pilots, reportedly trained by China, used Chinese Fantan attack aircraft to conduct operations in Darfur (BBC News, July
14, 2008). China¶s Special Envoy for Darfur, Liu Guijin, denied that Chinese weapons are fueling the conflict, arguing
that China provides only 8 percent of Sudan¶s total arms imports (Financial Times, February 23, 2008).
Attacks on Chinese
Chinese nationals and installations increasingly find themselves in harm¶s way as their presence grows, especially in or
near conflict zones. The most serious incident occurred in Ethiopia¶s Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in April 2007.
There has been a long-standing conflict between Ethiopian government forces and Somali rebel groups. The Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF), after warning foreigners to stay out of the region, attacked a Chinese base camp
operated by the Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau that was exploring for natural gas. The ONLF killed nine
Chinese in the attack on the Ethiopian-guarded facility and captured a number of others who were subsequently released
(Washington Post, April 26, 2007; New York Times, April 25, 2007). China abandoned the project and has not
returned.
China experienced a similar situation in Southern Kordofan, which borders Darfur, where its oil operations protected by
Sudan¶s government have come under attack. In October 2007, the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) briefly
seized Chinese oil facilities at Defra as a warning to China to cease its military and political support for Khartoum
(Terrorism Monitor, August 11, 2008). In December 2007, JEM attacked the Heglig oil facility run by the Great Wall
Drilling Company. JEM¶s leader announced, ³We are doing these attacks because China is trading petroleum for our
blood´ (The Associated Press, December 11, 2007). The most serious incident occurred in October 2008 when an
unknown group carried out a third attack that resulted in the kidnapping of nine Chinese employees of the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The rebel group killed four of them while four others were rescued and one
remains missing (The Associated Press, October 21, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, October 28, 2008).
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria has been conducting attacks against the
government for years on the grounds that the oil producing areas do not receive a fair share of the revenue. MEND
warned Chinese and other foreign nationals to stay out of the Niger Delta (Washington Post, May 1, 2006). In recent
years, more than a dozen Chinese nationals from a variety of Chinese companies with personnel conducting projects in
the region have been kidnapped and eventually released. MEND probably is responsible and likely received a ransom
for the release of the Chinese and other foreign nationals (Xinhua News Agency, January 9, 2007; VOA News, January
18, 2007; China Daily, May 9, 2008).
Tuareg rebels in Niger kidnapped and released several days later a Chinese uranium executive in July 2007 as a warning
to China for disregarding the environment and signing an unacceptable agreement with the Niger government. During
the same month, rebels attacked an armed convoy heading to a CNPC exploration camp in Niger (Reuters, July 10,
2007; China Brief, October 3, 2007). Returning to the DRC, one Chinese national was killed late in 2008 as a result of
conflict near Lubumbashi (China Brief, January 12). Chinese nationals are increasingly experiencing violence in non-
conflict areas too. Two Chinese nationals were killed and four injured as striking Chinese workers in Equatorial Guinea
faced off against local police (Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2008). Armed robbers in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
recently killed a Chinese merchant and wounded another (Xinhua News Agency, March 19, 2009).
Conclusion
Chinese peacekeeping, anti-piracy activity and de-mining engage China in a positive way in current or former African
conflict zones. These efforts are generally appreciated by African leaders and the international community. African
governments welcome the availability of low cost weapons from China, especially when Western governments are not
willing to sell them arms. Together with arms originating in other countries, however, they sometimes exacerbate
African conflicts. China tends to take greater business risks than Western countries in Africa, including allowing
Chinese business representatives to work in or near conflict zones. As a result, Chinese nationals are beginning to pay a
high price for this risk taking.
Notes
1. David H. Shinn, ³Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World,´ in China into Africa,
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 180.
2. Robert D. Kaplan, ³Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century,´ Foreign Affairs, 88, issue 2 (March/April 2009), 16-
32.
3. For peacekeeping statistics, see
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2009/feb09_5.pdf. Also see Garth Shelton, ³China: Africa¶s New
Peacekeeper,´ The China Monitor, issue 33 (September 2008), 4-5.
4. See ³China¶s Expanding Peacekeeping Role; Its Significance and the Policy Implications,´ SIPRI Policy Brief
(February 2009), 4-5. Also see Ian Taylor, ³China¶s Role in Peacekeeping in Africa,´ The China Monitor, issue 33
(September 2008), 6-8.
5. China¶s National Defense in 2008, white paper available at www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-
01/20/content_1210227.htm.
6. Richard F. Grimmett, ³Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007,´ CRS Report for Congress
(October 23, 2008), 50 & 61.
7. Arthur Waldron (ed.), China in Africa (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008), 102-104.
8. Kester Klomegah, ³Russia Supplying Legal and Illegal Arms to Africa,´ (2009), see at ipsnews.net/news.asp;
Reuters, December 14, 2006; ³China¶s Foreign Policy and µSoft Power¶ in South America, Asia, and Africa,´ U.S.
Senate study by the Congressional Research Service (April 2008), 113.
9. Amnesty International, ³China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses: The Flow of Arms Continues´
(2006). Also see Jonathan Holslag, ³Friendly Giant? China¶s Evolving Africa Policy,´ BICCS Background Paper
(August 24, 2007), 9.
10. Amnesty; Holslag; William D. Hartung, ³Deadly Traffic: China¶s Arms Trade with the Sudan,´ Arms and Security
Initiative Policy Brief (August 2008).
3$-9.c +&$$ c c

April 2, 2009 12:51 PM Age: 325 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Russell Hsiao
According to information circulated in the Chinese media, during the meeting between Chinese Defense Minister
General Liang Guanglie and Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on March 20, wherein General Liang
confirmed China's intent to develop aircraft carriers, a mysterious unit was reportedly present at the meeting. The ³048
Engineering Command" is purportedly an inter-agency task force within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
responsible for developing "special large military ships" or aircraft carriers (Stnn.cn, March 22; Nownews, March 21).
"Project 048," as it is referred to in the Chinese media, is reportedly equal in stature with other core units under the
umbrella of the PLAN Headquarters, and under the directorship of the PLAN Party Committee. Although the precise
status of the unit is unconfirmed through available sources, reports speculate that the joint-command of "Project 048"
may be under a PLAN deputy commanding officer, or as high as under the direct command of a PLAN commanding
officer. According to Chinese media reports, the name of the project may have been determined based on the Central
Military Commission's decision to launch its project to build "special large military ships" back in 2004 in the month of
August, which corresponds with the number 04 and 8 (hence Project 048) (Stnn.cn, March 22; Nownews, March 21).
Full preparations for building the aircraft carriers reportedly followed in 2005, which includes the purchase of ship-
based test machines and ship-borne landing gears. While domestic carrier power, power distribution system designs
were all allegedly completed (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, March 22). A Japanese news report citing unspecified
military sources reported that "China will begin construction of two conventional aircraft carriers this year." Citing the
same source the report stated, "production of parts for the electricity control system has already begun in China and
plans call for completing the two conventional carriers by around 2015 « [a] system for operating those carriers will be
established by 2020." "[China's] first nuclear-powered flattops would be constructed in 2020 or later" the report added
(Asahi Shimbun, February 14).
According to Li Ou, deputy-mayor of Siping City in Jilin Province, who wrote a commentary in the People's Daily²the
media organ of the Central Committee of the CCP²the reason behind the timing of General Liang's statement, ³China
cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," has to do with the situation along the Taiwan Strait. According to Li,
China already possessed the "compressive national strength to construct aircraft carriers" many years ago, and the reason
why China denied this capability for so long was due to the tense state of cross-Strait relations. Li said that the central
leadership was concerned that the United States would use this known Chinese capability as an excuse to support
Taiwan's independence. Now that tensions in the Taiwan Strait have eased, Li wrote that the central leadership no longer
has to worry about U.S. interference, and in the event that Taiwan independence forces return, if China has an aircraft
carrier then it will be more difficult for the United States to intervene (People's Daily Online, March 25).
According to the Asahi Shimbun: ³Construction has already begun on a wharf along Yalong Bay in the Sanya district of
Hainan island. The wharf would provide base functions for aircraft carriers as well as include underground storage for
ammunition´ (Asahi Shimbun, February 14). Information concerning "Project 048" also appeared in the same report,
which referred to it as a ³special task force for [the] construction of aircraft carriers´ (Asahi Shimbun, February 14). The
reported unveiling of "Project 048" at the meeting with the Japanese defense minister, whom²along with its Asian
neighbors²has been wary of China's military modernization, is another demonstration of China's increased confidence
in both regional and global affairs. The outpour of statements from high ranking Chinese military officers in recent
months, culminating in Defense Minister Liang's remark, may be "signaling" a major announcement at the upcoming
PLAN Naval Review on April 23, which commemorates the 60th anniversary of the PLAN's founding back in 1949
(China Post, March 6).
' +:
"
April 16, 2009 02:00 PM Age: 311 days
Category: China Brief, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Featured
By: Michael M. Tsai
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) of Taiwan released its maiden ³Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) on
March 16. The report was warranted under provision Article 31 in Taiwan's National Defense Act²which was passed in
2008²and conducted by the Integrated Assessment Office of the MND. The report has to be submitted to the
Taiwanese parliament (Legislative Yuan) for review within 10 months of each presidential inauguration. The purpose of
the QDR is to outline the country's strategic defense vision for the four-year term of the Taiwanese presidency.
The first publication of the QDR has three major implications for the future of Taiwan's defense and civil-military
relations: Firstly, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou¶s guidance on national defense has been embodied in MND policy
planning, thereby solidifying civilian control over the Taiwanese military. Secondly, the QDR consolidates the country¶s
strategic planning system, since the QDR follows the president's guidance and provides directions for its defense
strategy and military buildup. Finally, the first QDR establishes a four-year periodic review mechanism and
institutionalized comprehensive review of major policies by the MND that articulate the vision for future development
and reforms of Taiwan's armed forces.
According to this author's observation, who served as the former defense minister of Taiwan, the overwhelming majority
of Taiwanese people's views toward the country's national defense strategy rests on the following three principles: First
of all, to maintain the peace and security across the Taiwan Strait; two, to safeguard the sovereignty of Taiwan and
territorial defense; and three, to protect people's life and property in Taiwan.
The QDR is based on the core vision of building a professional armed force and maintaining peace across the Taiwan
Strait²with sound strategic logic for future strategic environment analysis, strategic examination, organizational re-
engineering, force planning and resource utilization. The QDR is composed of four chapters: core defense challenges,
strategic guidance, defense transformation and joint war-fighting capabilities development.
All-Volunteer Force
The QDR outlines the Ma administration's plan to institute an all-volunteer force (AVF) by 2014 (based on Chapter 3).
China, however, continues to refuse renouncing the use of force to resolve the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan
and China. Absent is the assurance from Beijing over the intent of its rapid military modernization, Taiwan's defense
planners need to exercise more caution, retain sufficient and effective force capability to insure Taiwan's national
security. Taking into consideration the systematic reduction of compulsory military service undertaken by the previous
Taiwanese administration, mandatory military service, which has been in place since 1944, is a means for Taiwan to
ensure an active force for its defense capability and a level of national alert for contingency planning.
In addition, the QDR's proposal to move toward an AVF warrants further scrutiny on the basis that it requires a massive
budget. The transformation may increase Taiwan's defense budget by more than 20 billion NT-dollars (approximately
$600 million), an estimate by a former senior advisor of Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC). If the current
administration in Taipei rushes through this proposal to move toward an AVF system, it will put an enormous financial
strain on Taiwan's national security structure.
In order to follow the QDR's strategic guidance ³Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence" (fangwei gushou, yousiao
siazu), Taiwan has to strengthen its defense capacity to resist any enemy¶s attack. In terms of the enforcement of
³Effective Deterrence,´ the QDR indicates that strategic defense is in actual planning and concrete measure for the
realization of a ³Hard ROC (Republic of China)´ defense. The specific strategic objectives are ³war prevention,´
³homeland defense,´ ³contingency response,´ ³conflicts avoidance,´ and ³regional stability´ (based on Chapter 2).
In view of the People¶s Liberation Army¶s (PLA) massive military build-up along its coastal areas across the strait, the
author believes that Taiwan needs to set up an effective defense-guided missile system in order to deter the enemy¶s
belligerence, and minimize damages caused by an enemy¶s attack. In addition, Taiwan has to reorganize its military
strength, and improve its systematic fighting capacity of joint operation so as to defend national security and stability in
the region.
It is important to point out that Taiwan¶s QDR is influenced by the main argument of the ³Murray Report,´ which stated,
³Taipei can no longer expect to counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner. Taiwan must therefore
rethink and redesign its defense strategy, emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to
deny the People's Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its weapons systems.´ The "Murray
Report" recommends that Taiwan should forego naval and air superiority, digging in and relying on passive defense by
ground forces. Nevertheless, air and maritime forces still play critical roles in the defense of Taiwan. Given the
substantial imbalances in the defensive and offensive strengths between Taiwan and China, respectively, effective air
and maritime defense capabilities are still a critical deterrent for the self-defense of Taiwan. Accordingly, the "Murray
Report" should not be taken as the blueprint of instructing Taiwan's national defense strategy. The government needs to
show determination in strengthening Taiwan's overall defense capabilities so that the Taiwanese people can be reassured
that a Chinese invasion would be met with an effective Taiwanese counterforce.
Military Confidence Building Measures
The proposal for a military ³Confidence Building Mechanism" (CBM) can positively affect cross-Strait relations. Yet,
for the sake of defending Taiwan's national security, there are several significant conditions to iron out before the two
sides sit at the negotiation table.
First of all, China ought to respect the status quo on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, meaning Taiwan¶s independent
sovereignty. In order for meaningful negotiations to take place, China must first dismantle the ballistic missiles deployed
along the southeastern coast of China, reducing the possibility of war or any conflicts. The most important gesture is for
Beijing to vow not to use military force to solve the Taiwan Strait issue. Only if China is willing to give up its coercive
tactics is it possible for the two sides to negotiate with each other on an equal footing.
Secondly, Beijing should be patient while both sides make efforts toward sustainable peace. For example, China should
refrain from claiming highly controversial issues related to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan under its so-called ³one
China´ policy, and using coercive means to intimidate Taiwan, such as launching its missiles into Taiwanµs coastal seas
like during the 1996 and 2000 Taiwan presidential elections. In addition, the increasing overtone of Chinese nationalism
and military expansionism is also a cause of great unrest and concern for Taiwan's national security. These are the main
current obstacles for developing cross-strait CBMs.
Thirdly, any sort of military CBM across the Taiwan Strait should be supervised by international collective institutions
such as the United Nations or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. CBM may include aerial and maritime free
passages or a non-military zone over the Taiwan Strait, which requires international collective actions and joint
participations by a third party or international organization to safeguard the enforcement of the agreement resulting from
CBM. Relative to the military power of China, Taiwan should be given more assurances to protect national and regional
security. Undoubtedly, China may frown upon this proposal, but these reassurances are essential for the sake of
maintaining long-term military peaceful coexistence between China and Taiwan.
Last but not least, China should enhance transparency of its national defense policy, including national defense budgets
and military exercises. Military transparency plays a crucial role in improving the lack of trust across the Taiwan Strait.
Conclusion
The world has changed considerably and the trend toward collective cooperation in international security offers new
inspiration for a new way forward in cross-Strait dialogue. Yet the most difficult problem remains ahead in dealing with
the growing imbalances between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, especially as China is rising as both a global
economic and military power.
The first ever published QDR by Taiwan¶s MND may be considered by many scholars and military experts as
progressive and innovative in its strategic and military planning and build-up. These estimates, however, tend to
underestimate the PLA¶s rapid military modernization and intention, and fail to consider possible military actions
against Taiwan if political negotiations are unable to reach an agreement for peaceful coexistence across the Taiwan
Strait. Although military CBM¶s may help to bring China and Taiwan into better, friendlier relations, any military
CBMs or political negotiations should be based on Taiwan¶s strengths and international collective participation so as to
ensure peace and security for Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region.
)
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April 16, 2009 01:57 PM Age: 311 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific
Chinese warship in Qingdao
On April 23rd the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy will conduct a ³naval parade´ in the waters off of Qingdao.
This naval review will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PLA Navy and honor in advance the
60th anniversary of the founding of the People¶s Republic of China, which itself will be feted in Beijing on October 1st
by another military parade primarily composed of ground and air units. For those impressed by military hardware, April
23rd should be a memorable day.
Like the Beijing parade, the event in Qingdao aims to promote Chinese national pride in its armed forces. It is intended
to display the progress made by the PLA Navy in its on-going modernization. Surely the most advanced ships and
aircraft in the Chinese Navy will participate in front of an audience comprised of both Chinese and foreign observers.
The two destroyers that took part in the PLA Navy¶s first long-distance, extended operational deployment to combat
piracy off the Somali coast may be part of the review. Naval units from other countries, as well as senior foreign
officers, have been invited to attend and participate.
Unspoken by Beijing during the build up to this event, however, is the parade¶s contribution to China¶s military strategy.
The role of military reviews and foreign visits is openly identified in PLA doctrine as an important component of
China¶s strategic deterrence posture. Contrary to the notion that China¶s strategic intentions are not transparent, the
PLA¶s multi-level deterrence strategy has been enumerated in numerous military newspaper or journal articles, official
publications such as White Papers, and, in particular, in the PLA Academy of Military Science¶s textbook, The Science
of Military Strategy, first published in Chinese in 2001 and then translated into English in 2005 [1].
What is China¶s Concept of Deterrence? [2]
The most recent foreign analysis that mentions China¶s deterrence posture focuses on its nuclear deterrence policy
(China Brief, March 4). In fact, while nuclear deterrence is an important element of China¶s deterrence strategy, the
PLA¶s concept of deterrence is much more expansive.
The Science of Military Strategy defines deterrence as ³the military conduct of a state or political group in (1) displaying
force or showing the determination to use force (2) to compel the enemy to submit to one¶s volition and (3) to refrain
from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility´ (p. 213). Strategic deterrence also ³is a major means for attaining
the objective of military strategy´ (p. 224). By its nature, deterrence seeks to change ³the pattern of the opponent¶s
psychology´ (p. 227).
According to The Science of Military Strategy, ³Warfighting and deterrence are two major functions of the armed
forces´ (p. 213). Therefore, the mission of the Chinese armed forces is not only to be prepared to fight wars, but also to
deter or prevent their outbreak. Specifically, the role of China¶s strategic deterrence is ³to deter foreign invasion, defend
the sovereignty, rights and interests, and to deter the conspiracies of internal and external rivals for separating and
subverting China, so as to protect the stability of national political situation, defend territorial integrity and national
unification´ (p. 217).
In addition to the military component, non-military factors such as territory size, population, economic strength, political
and diplomatic efforts, all of which make up ³comprehensive national power,´ contribute to strategic deterrence
strength.
These concepts have also been explained in Beijing¶s series of White Papers on National Defense. For example, the
2008 edition of the White Paper states:
³[China¶s military strategic guideline of active defense] lays stress on deterring crises and wars. It works for close
coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors, strives to foster
a favorable security environment, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises, and deter conflicts and wars. It
strictly adheres to a position of self-defense, exercises prudence in the use of force, seeks to effectively control war
situations, and strives to reduce the risks and costs of war. It calls for the building of a lean and effective deterrent force
and the flexible use of different means of deterrence´ [3].
Deterrence can be adopted by those in a strategically offensive posture or those on the strategic defensive. The former
pursue deterrence for the purpose of compelling the opponent to submit to their demands without going to war, while the
latter seek to make the ³opponent feel his attack may fail or lead to the loss outweighing the gain´ (p. 216-217). China
officially adopts a strategic defensive posture in the international arena; concurrently, it is arguable that the Chinese
government pursues a strategically offensive form of deterrence toward perceived threats to domestic stability or
national unification.
While China¶s strategic posture is defensive in nature and seeks to deter conflict, The Science of Military Strategy
acknowledges the objective of strategic deterrence ³is attained by non-fighting means or fighting a small war´ to prevent
a larger one (p. 213). China¶s military doctrine is not passive at the tactical and operational levels of war and the PLA
fully understands the decisive nature of the offensive. Even in a strategically defensive posture,
³[t]he strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for enemy¶s strike
passively ... [Striking only after the enemy has struck] doesn¶t mean to give up the µadvantageous chances¶ in campaign
[operational] or tactical operations, for µthe first shot¶ on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from
µthe first shot¶ on the plane of tactics « if any country or organization violates the other country¶s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to µfire the first shot¶ on the plane of tactics´ (p. 426).
These precepts, which are part of the PLA¶s strategic guidelines, are consistent with the ³active defense´ principles
described by Mao Zedong in 1936: ³the only real defence is active defence, defence [sic] for the purpose of counter-
attacking and taking the offensive. As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military
expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics" [4].
The Elements of Deterrence
The Science of Military Strategy describes three components necessary for deterrence:
Possession of ³an adequate deterrent force,´ a force that is both capable and credible;
The determination to use that force;
Communication ³between the deterrer and the deterred´ to assure that the opponent perceives and believes in the
credibility of that force and the will to use it (p. 213-215).
A capable force is the foundation of deterrence. The PLA¶s modernization program, particularly the developments over
the past 10 years, has resulted in a much more capable force than its predecessor of previous decades. Today, the PLA
sees its ³core military capability´ to be ³winning local wars in conditions of informationization´ with the secondary goal
of conducting military operations other than war [5]. As stated in The Science of Military Strategy, ³Strategic deterrence
is based on warfighting « The more powerful the warfighting capability, the more effective the deterrence « those
making purely bluffing threats and intimidations hardly can afford deterrence «´ (p. 228).
New equipment is a major part of the PLA¶s modernization, but even more important is the quality of its personnel,
organization and force structure, training, and logistics. While many improvements in capabilities have been achieved,
the PLA recognizes numerous challenges as it continues its modernization process (China Brief, July 3).
The willingness to use military capabilities must be communicated and the opponent must comprehend China¶s
capabilities and determination. The deterring side seeks to build ³momentum´ to convince others of its seriousness:
³Demonstrating momentum by showing the disposition of the strength to the enemy is to display clearly one¶s deterrent
force for bringing about psychological pressure on and fear to the opponent and thus force him to submit. Such deterrent
forms as large-scale military review, joint military exercise, and military visit, etc., are usually adopted´ (p.223).
The naval review in Qingdao and the military parade in Beijing can be seen as demonstrations of momentum attained
from military modernization and thus a contribution to China¶s deterrence strategy. While potentially impressive from a
hardware point of view, these activities reveal little about the degree of competence the force has attained to actually
employ these weapons according to the PLA¶s new warfighting doctrine or to sustain them in austere locations far from
their home bases.
China¶s ³Integrated Strategic Deterrence´ Posture
The conventional military weapons and strategic nuclear delivery systems on display off Qingdao and in Beijing in part
are directed toward foreign audiences to assert China¶s ability to defend its borders and protect its sovereignty (including
territories in dispute with others). They also are aimed at China¶s own population to illustrate the fruits of Beijing¶s
investment in the military and at the same time remind ³terrorist, separatist and extremist forces´ that the Chinese
Communist Party and China¶s armed forces seek to maintain stability and protect the population from chaos.
The Science of Military Strategy states, ³China currently has a limited but effective nuclear deterrence and a relatively
powerful capability of conventional deterrence and a massive capacity of deterrence of People¶s War´ (p. 222). While its
nuclear force seeks to deter nuclear attacks (or blackmail) against China, conventional capabilities are designed to deter,
and if necessary defeat, threats to China¶s ³national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity´ and safeguard ³the
interests of national development´ [6]. These missions include defense from aggression against the mainland and
increasingly are concerned with missions beyond China¶s borders to protect a wide range of China¶s development
interests.
Article 1 of China¶s Anti-secession Law extends the deterrence strategy to ³the question of Taiwan´ by ³opposing and
checking [i.e. deterrence of] Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence,"
promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.´ Beijing
consistently opposes any form of ³outside interference´ in regard to its objective of peaceful reunification and
specifically disputes arms sales or military alliances with the island (p. 445). Numerous warfighting capabilities
developed over the past decade are aimed at deterring foreign (i.e. United States) intervention by air or at sea in the
vicinity of Taiwan²some of which may be on display in Qingdao and Beijing.
At the same time, the People¶s Armed Police (a component of the Chinese armed forces, but not part of the PLA) is
tasked ³to deter and deal with emergencies which endanger public security´ [8]. According to the National Defense Law
of 1997, both the PLA and militia ³may assist in maintaining public order in accordance with the law´ [9]. The People¶s
Armed Police routinely works with the civilian Ministry of Public Security police force as the first line of defense in
domestic stability.
Finally, The Science of Military Strategy predicts ³the day of employing deterrence of space force is not far off «´ (p.
217). Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the Academy of Military Science, wrote in 2007 after the Chinese anti-satellite test:
³Currently, China does not have a clear space deterrence theory « China¶s nuclear deterrence theory and its perspective
on the use of nuclear weapons offer important and relevant guidelines «. The basic necessity to preserve stability
through the development of deterrent forces as propounded by Mao and Deng remain valid in the context of space´ [10].
Bao acknowledges the ³technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not
impossible to fill´ and concludes ³if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their
capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries´ [11].
Chinese military writings present both a professional and realistic evaluation of their strategic intentions, strategy and
general capabilities. A multi-level deterrence posture is an integral element of PLA doctrine. It is likely much of the
PLA¶s new equipment entering the force will be on display in the coming months for both Chinese and foreign eyes to
see. What will be less visible is the degree to which the Chinese armed forces have been trained to operate and maintain
its new weapons in accordance with a new joint doctrine that it has never executed against a hostile enemy.
Near the end of The Science of Military Strategy caution is recommended: ³Therefore, imprudent decision to use force
is never permitted«. The reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war«. We may not launch a war
in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day´ (p. 468). The weapons featured in the
parades in Beijing and off of Qingdao need to be assessed in the context of the PLA¶s modernization process, its strategy
and doctrine, and threat environment.
Notes
1. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), The Science of Military Strategy, Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2005. All quotes and page numbers are from the English-language text.
2. Complicating the discussion of deterrence is the use of multiple terms in both English and Chinese to express the
same idea. The 2008 White Paper uses three different word combinations for the noun ³deterrence´ or, as a verb, ³to
deter´ (ezhi) , to contain, restrain (weishe), to intimidate militarily (or terrorize with military force), deter (shezhi), a
relatively new term that suggests ³to stop because of fear.´ Other documents use the term zhizhi: to check, curb, prevent,
stop. English translations may use any or all of these words and often, especially with the word ³contain,´ the concept of
deterrence may confused or be lost altogether.
January 2009, at news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/20/content_10688124.htm.
4. Mao Zedong, ³Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War,´ December 1936, found at
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.
5. ³China's National Defense in 2008.´
7. ³Full text of Anti-Secession Law,´ March 14, 2005, found at english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005-
03/14/content_158070.htm.
9. ³PRC Law on National Defense,´ March 1997, found at www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/deflaw97.htm.
10. Bao Shixiu, ³Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,´ China Security, Winter 2007, p. 6.
11. Bao, p. 10.
'1)' )c # 3

1
April 16, 2009 01:55 PM Age: 311 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, Featured, China and the Asia-Pacific, Turkey
By: Yitzhak Shichor
Turkish General Hasan Aksay (L) and Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhengfeng (R)
In the last week of March 2009, Ankara and Beijing may have taken another step toward upgrading their military
cooperation. This has become evident during a visit from General Hasan Aksay, commander of the Turkish military
academies, who spent three days in China, starting March 24. To be sure, this was not the first Turkish military visit.
Since 1985, Turkey has sent 18 military delegations consisting of some 200 members while 14 Chinese military
missions with about 330 representatives visited Turkey at the same time (Today's Zaman, March 25). These are official
figures; the real figures are most likely higher, though confidential. These numbers, however, do not tell the whole story
of Sino-Turkish military relations.
Ostensibly, one should not have expected any significant breakthrough in the military relations between China and
Turkey since the visitor, commander of military academies, does not rank high enough to initiate such a change or even
to deliver such a message. Similarly, General Aksay was hosted by lower ranking Chinese military figures, the Deputy
Chief of Staff General Ge Zhengfeng and the President (Commander) of the National Defense University, General
Wang Xibing. Still, the visit may be significant, less because of the persons involved and much more because of the
circumstances of the developing Sino-Turkish defense relations. Unlike some assertions, these relations by no mean
"remain limited to the realm of military personnel exchanges" (China Brief, February 21, 2007). Mostly concealed from
the public and the media, Beijing-Ankara military collaboration has been substantially expanded over the last fifteen
years.
The Legacy of the Korean War

This is a significant change considering the fact that the two countries clashed in the Korean War in the early 1950s.
Joining the U.N.-led alliance initiated by the United States, by late November 1950, over 5,000 Turkish troops had
already engaged the Chinese "volunteer" forces in violent encounters several times. These clashes inflicted heavy
casualties²on both sides. In the battle of Kunu Ri, one of the bloodiest of the entire war, Turkish troops bayoneted 900
Chinese. These initial clashes were followed by repeated violent confrontations up to the armistice on July 27, 1953.
Throughout the war, Turkish brigades were pulled out and sent home, only to be replaced by fresh ones. Altogether,
over 25,000 Turkish troops fought along U.N. forces in Korea. They suffered 3,277 casualties: 721 dead, 2,147
wounded, 175 missing and 234 captured [1]. General Tahsin Yazıcı, commander of the First Turkish brigade in Korea,
referred to the Chinese as "red dwarfs," cruel and barbaric (Hürriyet, December 9, 1951).
As anticipated, Turkey's participation in the Korean War expedited and consolidated its integration into the Western
security system and on October 22, 1951, Turkey was admitted into NATO, becoming an official member on February
18, 1952, while the Korean War was still going on. This confrontation, and Turkey's admission to NATO, delayed Sino-
Turkish relations by nearly twenty years, leaving sediments of mutual hostility for a long time, perhaps to this very day.
"In contemporary Turkey, China is still portrayed much less favorably than other countries of East Asia. [«] The
Korean War was critical in shaping the long-term relations of China and Turkey" [2]. It had taken another twenty years,
from the early 1970s (when diplomatic relations were at long last established) to the early 1990s, until Sino-Turkish
relations started to improve.
The Dimensions of Military Relations
Sino-Turkish military explorations began in the first half of the 1990s after Ankara's negotiations with Washington for
the joint production and technology transfer of the M-270 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) failed. Washington
criticized Ankara for using U.S.-supplied weapons for human rights abuses, subsequently restricting arms and military
technology transfers to Turkey, and cutting off grants and loans earlier offered to Turkey for arms acquisitions from the
United States. Occasionally, arms embargos and sanctions tend to be counter-productive as they encourage and force the
affected countries to develop their military industry independently as well as to look elsewhere for arms and military
technology. Turkey was no exception and China was ready [3].
In 1997, Turkey for the first time signed an arms deal with China for the acquisition of 24 WS-1 302mm unguided
rockets as well as 144 rockets for assembly in Turkey, to be supplied between 1998 and 2000. Based on Chinese
technology, Turkey began to produce the TR-300 rockets (or T-302, upgraded from to the Chinese four-barrel WS-1B
MLRS) under license, Turkish designation Kasırga (tornado). It is considered to be more advanced than the Chinese
rocket. In late 1998, based on a similar contract signed with CPMIEC (China Precision Machinery Import-Export
Corporation), the Turkish Army ordered some 15 of China's most advanced short-range SSMs (surface-to-surface
missiles), the B-611 and began to license the production of over 200 missiles for over $300 million. The first missiles
were probably deployed as early as 2001. Covered by heavy secrecy and disinformation, the project was called J-600T
and the missile, Turkish designation Yıldırım (thunderbolt), was reported by Turkey to the UN Register of Conventional
Arms in March 2007 and was first displayed during a Victory Day parade in Ankara on August 30, 2007. The B-611 had
been designed as a replacement of the Chinese DF-11 (M-7 or CSS-7) SRBM. Allegedly developed jointly by Turkey's
TÜBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey), MKEK (Mechanical and Chemical Industry
Corporation) and CASIC (China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation), it is a short-range, ground-based, solid-
fuelled ballistic missile system. Its production is undertaken by the Turkish firm Roketsan (Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret, or
Missiles [Rockets] Industries and Trade).
Nevertheless, the PRC is a marginal military supplier to Turkey. Excluding the B-611 yet unconfirmed $300 million
deal, the value of the PRC arms transfers to Turkey between 1998 and 2007 is estimated at a meager $39 million, less
than one percent of Turkey's total arms acquisitions in that period, or about seven percent including the deal (SIPRI
Arms Transfers Database). In addition, China's HQ-9 air defense system is among the competitors in the Turkish bid for
the supply of advanced surface-to-air missile systems, with potential capabilities against ballistic missiles [4]. It is
possible that Roketsan may have received Chinese support in developing its air-to-surface missile Cirit (pronounced
Jereed: javelin, spear), which derives from the NORINCO-made missile TY-90 (Tianyan: Heavenly Swallow) [5]. Yet,
Beijing-Ankara military cooperation has not been limited to missiles. Another dimension of it emerged in 2005 when the
two countries reportedly upgraded the FNSS ACV (Armored Combat Vehicle)-SW chassis by incorporating a BMP3
turret to it. The Turkish army operates a total of 2,500 upgraded Infantry Fighting Vehicles (or IFVs), which the FNSS
firm intended to export (primarily to the United Arab Emirates) [6]. Needless to say, none of these transactions was ever
reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which does not indicate any military relations between Turkey and
China.
Security and Intelligence Relations
In addition, Beijing has been urging Ankara to cooperate in the so-called fight against "terrorism," namely to restrict,
monitor and prevent the activities of Uyghur national organizations and leaders in Turkey. Initially defying China's
pressure, Turkey began to submit to Beijing's demands in the latter half of the 1990s. A first step in this direction was
taken when the Turkish Army Deputy Chief of Staff signed a Sino-Turkish military training and cooperation protocol on
May 28, 1999, during his visit to the PRC (Jane¶s Defense Weekly, June 9, 1999, p. 13). Occasional Uyghur
demonstrations and acts of violence against Chinese staying in Turkey had allegedly paved the ground for the first Sino-
Turkish security co-operation agreement, signed on February 14, 2000. Among other things, it facilitated public security
coordination between the two countries, stressing that hard measures would be taken against separatist activities
targeting the territorial integrity of both Turkey (i.e. the Kurds and Cyprus) and the PRC (i.e. Xinjiang and Tibet).
The PRC has been watching its interests closely in Turkey through both military and "diplomatic" channels. The Third
Bureau (military attachés) of the PLA General Staff Second Department (dealing with military intelligence) has been
operating in Turkey as one of its most important, and presumably one of the most active, stations [7]. Beijing has been
engaged not only in collecting political and military intelligence in Turkey, but also in infiltrating Uyghur organizations
through moles and sleepers. One of the most serious problems Uyghur organizations face (and not just in Turkey) is how
to expose collaborators with China. Uncertainty and suspicions about Uyghur activists²some high-ranking²often
cause Eastern Turkestan organizations paralysis and passivity, exactly what Beijing wants.
Beijing's treatment of Uyghur (and others') activities abroad have been undertaken not only by its intelligence services
but also by the Foreign Ministry in much the same way it monitors the overseas activities of Falun Gong²a spiritual-
religious movement that Beijing has targeted since the late 1990s. This has been done through the 610 Office (an arm of
the Ministry of State Security) that had operated under the Foreign Ministry's General Office. Established on June 10,
1999 (hence its name), 610 Offices are an extra-legal police force formed to suppress Falun Gong practitioners not only
at home but also abroad. Reacting to human rights critics, on July 6, 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 610 Office
was renamed The Department of External Security Affairs (Shewai anquan shiwu si, or guanli si, literally the
Department of Managing Foreign-Related Security). It "aimed at coping with increasing non-traditional security factors"
(primarily terrorism) and the safety of Chinese abroad, as well as "dealing with Eastern Turkistan groups" [8].
The Chinese are also concerned about emerging manifestations (either real or virtual) of Pan-Turkism, a vision recently
resuscitated not only in Beijing's perceptions but also by some Turkish military and political figures. Paradoxically,
some of those who promote Pan-Turkism²including a number of Turkish generals²consider China a possible
substitute to the United States and the European Union and urge increased collaboration with the East. They represent
the so-called "Eurasianist" faction in the armed forces and proclaim ultra-rightists views as well as anti-Islamic attitudes.
Erdoğan's religious government has forced some of them to retire [9]. While enjoying the support and backing of some
politicians (among them ex-Maoists), it is nevertheless a marginal group. It seems highly unlikely that Turkey will turn
to the PRC as a primary ally. Still, the Turkish "Eurasianists" presumably approve of, or are even instrumental in,
forging defense collaboration with China.
Thus, General Hasan Aksay¶s recent visit to China should be interpreted within the context of an already existing
elaborate military and security cooperation. It is during this visit that China and Turkey agreed to intensify military
cooperation that would enable joint military exercises and training and would underwrite defense industrial projects.
Meeting his visitor, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, Ge Zhenfeng hailed the smooth development of bilateral Sino-
Turkish military relations and friendly exchanges and the "pragmatic cooperation" between the two militaries (PLA
Daily, March 25).
Notes
1. Füsun Türkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War," Turkish Studies, 3:2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 161-180. See also: John M.
Vander Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," Middle Eastern
Studies, 36:1 (January 2000), pp. 92-101.
2. Çağdaş Üngör, "Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives," Turkish Studies, 7:5 (September 2006),
pp. 406, 416.
3. The following is based on: Turkish Armed Forces (Land Forces Equipment),
wwwturkishworld.multiservers.com/equipment.html; Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems,
www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jsws/jswsa002.html. See also: Utku Çakirözer, "'J' Booster for the Army," Milliyet
(Istanbul), January 14, 2002, in FBIS-CHI, March 14, 2002; "Chinese Missiles for Turkey," Milliyet, June 2, 2005;
"China to Help Turkey Produce Missiles," Central News Agency (Taiwan), December 21, 1996, in BBC, SWB,
FE/2802, G/1 (December 23, 1996); "Secret Cooperation with China," Star (Istanbul), April 6, 2005.
4. Anatolia News Agency, August 10, 2008; Turkish Daily News, April 29, 2008; John C.K. Daly, "Turkey Ponders
Russian Missile Offer," Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 5, Issue 140 (July 23, 2008); Andrew
McGregor, Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century (The Jamestown Foundation,
June 2008), p. 17.
5. Prasun K. Sengupta, "Eastern Showcase," Force (New Delhi), May 16, 2008; Today's Zaman, July 16, 2008.
6. "A New Birth of Chinese Version BMP3," Kanwa Defense Review (Hong Kong), May 12, 2005.
7. Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 81. See also Ming Pao (Hong
Kong), October 7, 1998, in Global Intelligence Update, October 8, 1998.
8. People's Daily, July 6, 2004; See also the testimony of Chen Yonglin, former diplomat in China's Consulate in
Sydney, in: Falun Gong and China's Continuing War on Human Rights, Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, July 21, 2005
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), pp. 34-36.
9. Ihsan Dagi, "Are the Eurasianists Being Purged?", Zaman, July 21, 2008. See also: Hoonman Peimani, "Turkey Hints
at Shifting Alliance," Asia Times, June 19, 2002; Dr. Sait Başer, "The Strategic Importance of the Ascending East," East
and West Studies, August 6, 2007. Most of the "Eurasianists", including the generals, have been implicated in the
Ergenekon group, accused for trying to subvert the Muslim AKP government. On the Ergenekon affair, see: Daniel
Steinvorth, "Erkenekon Plot: Massive Trial in Turkey Provides Look into 'Deep State'." Spiegel Online, January 26,
2009.
' +&# ( ! '

April 16, 2009 01:50 PM Age: 311 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Taiwanese submarine
Several reports appeared in recent weeks in the Taiwanese media about the possibility that President Ma Ying-jeou¶s
administration has restarted a program to build indigenously designed diesel submarines. According to various reports
citing sources close to Taiwan¶s National Security Council (NSC), the ³Project Diving Dragon,´ which is Taiwan¶s
indigenous submarine program that was aborted five years ago under former President Chen Shui-bian¶s administration,
may have been re-initiated three months ago under the directive of the NSC. According to a report in the Liberty Times,
the NSC reportedly issued an order to the naval military command to conduct a feasibility study on Taiwan¶s capability
to develop indigenously built submarines (China Post, April 7; Liberty Times [Taiwan], April 15).
The China Post also reported on April 7 that ³[a]t least five top-level defense meetings have been held to evaluate the
possibility that the eight underwater warships can be locally assembled.´ According to the report, the result of the
meetings recommended local construction of the submarines, and a final report is being prepared for President Ma's
approval, and ³Ma is likely to give the green light for the local construction to stimulate the economy and help reduce
unemployment´ (China Post, April 7). The U.S.-based Defense News on April 13 cited sources in Taipei as saying that
the decision was based on ³U.S. reluctance to build diesel submarines and the need to create jobs in Taiwan¶s
economically depressed shipbuilding industry.´ The report added that ³[a]n announcement is expected in August´
(Defense News, April 13). Presidential Office Spokesperson Wang Yu-chi and aids to top officials in the National
Security Council (NSC), however, denied any knowledge of that order (Apple Daily [Taiwan], April 15).
Eight diesel submarines were originally included in a 2001 U.S. arms package offer to Taiwan during former President
Bush¶s first term in office, and had been stalled in Taiwan¶s Legislative Yuan for the past eight years, which was
dominated by a KMT-led coalition (China Brief, November 24, 2008).
The NSC is currently headed by Secretary General Su Chi, who is the former chairman of the Executive Yuan¶s
Mainland Affairs Council. The decree from the NSC reportedly surprised some even in the Taiwanese military (Liberty
Times, April 15). In an opinion-piece published in 2006, at the height of a heated debate in Taiwan¶s Legislative Yuan
(parliament) over the stalled allocation of funds toward Taiwan¶s purchase of eight diesel submarines from the Untied
States, then-KMT Legislator Su Chi penned an article titled "New Thinking on Taiwan's Arms Procurement." In his
article, Su argued that Taiwan should devote itself to developing a "defensive" military, rather than an "offensive"
military. The previous pro-independence leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration has been accused
by the now ruling-KMT (Nationalist Party) of building offensive capabilities that risks provoking China. "Taiwan
should boost its defensive capabilities and aim to survive a `first strike' during a Chinese military attack. It is not
necessary to spend huge amounts of money on offensive submarines," Su concluded (Taipei Times, January 9, 2006). If
the information about the Ma administration's decision turns out to be true, this may signal a major turning point in the
long saga of Taiwan¶s quest for additional submarines.
Wang Keh-hsuan, vice general manager of the CSBC Corporation, the state-owned company formerly known as China
Shipbuilding Corporation, confirmed that "[a] research plan is under way to build submarine hulls up to the international
standard." Wang said that the CSBC Corporation is fully equipped to build submarines with 2,000 to 3,000 deadweight
tons (China Post, April 7). The CSBC Corporation established the ³Hidden Dragon Program´ in July 2001 to
demonstrate its technical expertise in building a pressure hull, and the ³Indigenous Defense Submarine´ program that
focused on design options (Jane¶s Defense Weekly, June 30, 2004). "Of course, all weapons and communications
systems will have to be purchased from abroad," Wang added. "We are all set to undertake the construction, if it is
offered" (China Post, April 7).
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April 30, 2009 01:18 PM Age: 297 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, In a Fortnight, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Recent reports circulating in the Chinese press indicate that Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Company Limited²one of
China¶s oldest state-owned shipbuilding company regarded as the ³cradle of China¶s national [shipbuilding] industry´²
could be slated by Beijing to carry out the Chinese military¶s long-standing mission to build an indigenous aircraft
carrier. This information, checked against various reports that appeared in the Chinese press, indicates that the recently
enhanced Changxing Shipbuilding Base, which is located off the coast of Shanghai on Changxing Island, may be the
location where China will build its indigenous carrier (China Review News, April 28).
The new base construction program, which began in June 2005, is being undertaken by Jiangnan Shipyard (Group)
Company Limited, which is a subsidiary of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). One of the purposes for
building the base was to utilize the deep water coast of Changxing Island for the construction of larger naval vessels.
The largest dockyard in the facility is reportedly 580 meters in length and 120 meters in width, which makes it large
enough to accommodate a Varyag-size carrier (China Center for International and Strategic Studies, April 22).
The first phase of the $3.6 billion base project included the construction of four large dry docks, nine outfitting piers and
two cargo piers, which were built along a 3.8 kilometers coastline. These new facilities will expand the CSSC¶s current
shipbuilding capacity from 800,000 deadweight tons (DWTs) a year to 4.5 million DWTs by 2010. In the second phase
of the Changxing base development, two other CSSC subsidiaries, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding (Group)
Corporation and Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Corporation, will build more shipyards along the island's eight kilometers
coastline. By 2015, CSSC is expected to have an annual capacity of eight million DWTs, which is equivalent to half of
China's current shipbuilding production capacity of 16 million DWTs. By then, holding current pace of development
constant, Changxing is expected to become the world's largest shipyard. At the same time, Shanghai is slated to become
the world's largest shipbuilding base, tripling its capacity to 12 million DWTs by 2015 (China Center for International
and Strategic Studies, April 22).
Images of the facilities acquired by Kanwa Defense Review, a comprehensive on-line magazine on East Asian security,
referenced in a Chinese military website revealed the increased security around Dockyard No. 3 at the shipyard, which is
used by the military: all the entrances and exit to that dockyard are guarded by armed police, while the entrances for
Dockyard No. 1, which is for building civilian vessels, are guarded by company security personnel (China Center for
International and Strategic Studies, April 22).
According to a television interview on Shanghai-based Dragon TV with Nan Daqing, the general manager of the
Jiangnan Shipbuilding (Group) Company Limited, which was also cited by the Asahi Shimbun; Nan, who is deeply
connected with the Chinese navy, confirmed that all preparations for equipping the dockyard with the capabilities to
undertake the task from the Chinese navy to build an aircraft carrier are complete. Nan¶s statement was significant
because it is the first public acknowledgement by an involved party concerning China¶s actual development of an
aircraft carrier (Asahi Shimbun, April 21; 3lou.com, April 22). Some sources have suggested that the first Chinese
aircraft carrier will not be a ³knock-off´ of an American or Russian model, it will be an indigenous design (Nownews
[Taiwan], April 22; China Center for International and Strategic Studies, April 22). According to other reports, China
already possesses the catapult techniques that are necessary to operate an aircraft carrier, and if it wants to build an
aircraft carrier, its carrier deck may be modeled after the USS Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier (Nownews [Taiwan], April
22).
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April 30, 2009 01:31 PM Age: 297 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page, Featured
By: Ian Storey
Developments in the South China Sea during the first quarter of 2009 reinforced several trends that have been apparent
over the past two years. First, the Spratly Islands dispute has once again come to dominate Sino-Philippine relations,
despite attempts by Beijing and Manila to move beyond it. Second, China has adopted a more assertive posture toward
its territorial and maritime boundary claims in the South China Sea than at any time since the late 1990s. Third, the 2002
breakthrough agreement between the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to
manage tensions in the South China Sea is in danger of becoming irrelevant. Fourth, the USNS Impeccable incident on
March 8 highlighted the growing strategic importance of the South China Sea for the United States and China, and
reawakened concerns in ASEAN capitals that the region may one day become the principal theater wherein Sino-U.S.
maritime rivalry is played out.
China and the Philippines Spar over Spratlys Ownership
In 2005, Chinese and Philippine leaders were lauding a ³golden age´ in bilateral relations premised on burgeoning trade,
Chinese pledges to invest in several large infrastructure projects, and an agreement between the national energy
companies of the Philippines, Vietnam and China to conduct joint seismic surveys near the disputed Spratly Islands
(China Brief, August 16, 2006). In 2007-2008, however, this forward momentum was thrust into reverse: the
infrastructure projects that China had agreed to fund were cancelled or suspended by Manila in the wake of corruption
allegations; the constitutionality of the tripartite exploration agreement was challenged by Philippine opposition
politicians; and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was accused of bullying the Philippines over legislation to update
the country¶s baseline claims (China Brief, April 28, 2008).
Sino-Philippine relations continued their retrograde motion in early 2009. The legislative process for the archipelagic
baselines bill²which the Philippines is required to submit to the United Nations before a May 13 deadline²was
suspended during the second half of 2008, but resumed in January. On February 17, Congress finally approved the
Archipelagic Baselines Act that designated Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea as a ³regime of
islands´²not part of the main archipelago but still under Philippine sovereignty.
China¶s response was in the high dudgeon. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya summoned the Philippine charge
d¶affairs and denounced the Act as a violation of China¶s sovereignty and therefore ³illegal and invalid´ (Xinhua News
Agency, February 18). As a further sign of its displeasure, Beijing cancelled a planned trip to Manila by vice chairman
of the National People¶s Congress, Li Jianguo.
Several other claimants also protested the bill, including Vietnam and Taiwan. On March 5, in a move clearly related to
the Philippine legislation, then Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi visited Swallow Reef and reiterated his
country¶s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, some of which overlap with those of the Philippines (Bernama,
March 5). In response to Abdullah¶s visit, China reiterated that it had ³indisputable sovereignty´ over the atolls occupied
by Malaysia (Xinhua News Agency, March 6).
The Arroyo administration was unmoved by the protests from China and the other claimants. To avoid exposing itself to
accusations of caving in to Chinese pressure or selling out the national patrimony, the government made clear that it
would sign the bill into law because it complied with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and did not
violate China¶s sovereignty. In a conciliatory gesture, however, the government said it was willing to discuss the issue
with China and explain its position.
China¶s protest provoked a stronger reaction among Filipino politicians. Senator Joker Arroyo, for instance, declared
³We should not allow ourselves to be bullied by China´, while his senatorial colleague Manuel Roxas asked ³Are we
going to surrender just because they [the Chinese] have a stronger army or navy?´ (Philippine Daily Inquirer, February
20).
On March 10 the Arroyo administration signed the baselines bill into law (in a minor diplomatic faux pas this occurred
on the same day the new Chinese ambassador, Liu Jianchao, presented his credentials at the presidential palace).
According to Arroyo¶s staff, by signing the bill into law the Philippines was ³sending the message to the whole world
that we are affirming our national sovereignty and protecting our national interests´ (GMA News, March 12). When
China reiterated its objection through its embassy in Manila, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) downplayed the
protest, claiming that bilateral relations remained ³deep and productive´ (Manila Times, March 13).
The signing of the baselines bill into law coincided with the fallout from the March 8 incident in which the U.S.
surveillance ship USNS Impeccable was involved in a skirmish with five Chinese vessels 75 miles off Hainan Island in
the South China Sea. Beijing declared that the Impeccable was engaged in illegal activities in its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and announced that it would send one of its largest patrol boats, the Yuzheng 311, to protect its vessels in
the Paracel and Spratly Islands and to ³demonstrate Beijing¶s sovereignty over China¶s islands´ (China Daily, March
16).
The Arroyo administration reacted to the Chinese announcement with dismay. National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales called an emergency meeting of the cabinet¶s security cluster to discuss China¶s actions, adding: ³This should
remind us that even in this era of dialogue and understanding in the world there will always be nations that will show
might and threaten perceived weak nations like us´ (PDI, March 16). Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro called the
dispatch of the patrol boat ³an unwelcome development´ while the DFA urged all parties to adhere to the 2002 ASEAN-
China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), which enjoins claimants not to engage in
activities that would ³complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability´ (PDI, March 16). A presidential
spokesperson was reported as saying that while Manila was committed to a diplomatic solution, it might be forced to
seek support from its treaty ally the United States and its fellow ASEAN members (PDI, March 16). Manila¶s rhetoric
was reminiscent of the second half of the 1990s when Sino-Philippine tensions over the Spratly were at their height ²
the ³golden age´ was well and truly over.
Critics, however, accused the Arroyo administration of playing up the incident to undermine a political campaign to
abrogate the 1998 U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) because of a custody dispute over a U.S.
serviceman convicted of rape. The VFA was instrumental in restoring U.S.-Philippine military relations in the late
1990s, and was supported by some Filipino politicians as a possible deterrent against Chinese expansionism in the South
China Sea (Ian Storey, ³Manila looks to USA for help over Spratlys,´ Jane¶s Intelligence Review, August 1999).
The PRC embassy in Manila moved to assuage Philippine anxiety. It argued that the Yuzheng 311 was on a routine
mission to protect fishing boats, and on March 24 Ambassador Liu said China was committed to settling the South
China Sea dispute peacefully and urged all parties to ³engage in cooperation rather than confrontation´ (Xinhua News
Agency, March 24).
Increased Chinese Assertiveness
In the wake of the Impeccable incident and passage of the Philippine's baselines bill, Beijing could have decided to send
a stronger message to Washington and Manila by sending a heavily-armed warship to patrol its territorial claims;
instead, the dispatch of the Yuzheng 311 was a calibrated response and a signal that China did not want tensions to
escalate. Nonetheless, China¶s emphatic response can be seen as part of a pattern of increased assertiveness in the South
China Sea visible over the past two years.
This pattern of events includes pressure on British Petroleum and ExxonMobil in April 2007 and June 2008,
respectively, not to participate in offshore energy projects with Vietnam in waters claimed by China; increased naval
patrols and military exercise off the Paracel Islands in the second half of 2007; the passage of legislation in December
2007 creating a county level city on Hainan Island called Sansha to administer Beijing¶s claims in the South China
(China Brief, December 13, 2007); and perceived attempts by China to dissuade Philippine legislators from including
the Spratlys in the country¶s baselines bill.
Several possible explanations account for China¶s more assertive behavior. The main target of Chinese activities is
Vietnam, and it is possible that Beijing may be attempting to pressure Hanoi into accepting a joint exploration and
production agreement in energy fields off the Vietnamese coast similar to the 2008 pact between China and Japan to
develop the Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea. As a pressure tactic, Beijing has leaned on foreign oil companies
not to enter into deals with Vietnam, the implicit threat being that those corporations that do will be barred from future
energy projects in China. Thus far this tactic has proved ineffective, as the oil companies in question have indicated their
resolve to follow through with existing deals. China may also be sending a signal to Vietnam that it strongly disapproves
of growing U.S.-Vietnam defense ties.
Another likely reason is China¶s continued demand for energy resources despite falling oil prices caused by the global
financial crisis. Indeed in its 2008 Defense White Paper the PRC averred that ³struggles for strategic resources´ were
intensifying (Xinhua News Agency, January 20, 2009). A third reason is that after two decades of military
modernization the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) is now in a better position to project power in support of China¶s
maritime territorial claims. These capabilities include a new generation of surface warships, submarines, and fighter
aircraft with extended operational ranges. As the Pentagon¶s recent annual report on the PLA noted, these capabilities
³increase Beijing¶s options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, and resolve disputes
in its favor´ (Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the PRC, p. 28).
Beijing¶s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea highlights the ineffectiveness of the 2002 ASEAN-China
agreement to manage tensions in the area. The 2002 DoC was concluded after several years of negotiations and
represented an attempt to freeze the status quo, lower tensions, and promote confidence building measures. However, the
final text was a watered down version of a 1996 code of conduct between the Philippines and China, and suffers from a
number of flaws: it is not a binding treaty and does not enumerate sanctions in the event of transgressions; the
geographical scope of the agreement is not set out (because China objected to the inclusion of the Paracels); and the
DoC is not inclusive (Taiwan is a claimant in the Spratlys but not a signatory to the ASEAN-China agreement).
The most promising outcome of the DoC was the 2005 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), an agreement
between the national energy companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam to explore for oil and gas in the disputed
waters of the South China Sea over a three year period. Yet, in 2008 when questions were raised in the Philippines
concerning the JMSU¶s constitutionality and its connection to the scandal-tainted PRC infrastructure projects, the
Arroyo government²which had once hailed the tripartite endeavor as an historic breakthrough for peace and security in
the region²distanced itself from the agreement. When the JMSU lapsed on June 30, 2008 no attempt was made to
extend it. The termination of the JMSU essentially puts the Spratly dispute back to square one.
When the DoC was forged ASEAN and China agreed that negotiations on a formal and binding code of conduct would
continue. While that commitment has been reaffirmed at every ASEAN-China forum since, more than six years on there
is no sign that the two sides are any closer to signing such a treaty.
The South China Sea and Regional Security
The standoff between the Impeccable and Chinese naval vessels on March 8 has reawakened concerns in Southeast Asia
that if Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry heats up, regional stability will be imperiled. The skirmish called to mind the April
2001 EP-3 surveillance plane incident, which also took place off Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Speaking shortly
after that crisis, Singapore¶s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew remarked: ³We in Southeast Asia held our breath. When it
was over, we heaved a sigh of relief´ (South China Morning Post, May 23, 2001). Although the Impeccable incident
was not nearly as serious as the EP-3 episode, and the dynamics of U.S.-China relations have changed substantially for
the better since 2001, the rapid expansion of China¶s naval forces has aroused greater scrutiny from the U.S. military. It
subsequently emerged that the Impeccable was monitoring Chinese submarines based at the Sanya Naval Base on
Hainan Island; given intense U.S. interest in China¶s submarine fleet, future skirmishes between U.S. surveillance ships
and the PLA Navy in the South China Sea cannot be ruled out, especially absent a bilateral Incidents at Sea Agreement.
The ASEAN states view the prospect of further Sino-U.S. naval spats as deeply unsettling: they do not want to see Great
Power rivalry played out in their front yard, nor do they want to be forced to choose between America and China.
In its 2009 report to Congress on the PLA, the Pentagon warned that the rapid transformation of the Chinese armed
forces was changing Asia¶s military balance in favor of the PRC and providing it with the capabilities to conduct
military operations beyond Taiwan, including in the South China Sea. Washington has demonstrated a keener interest in
Southeast Asia¶s most intractable territorial dispute over the past several years, driven mainly by freedom of navigation
concerns but also by the need to protect the commercial activities of U.S. energy companies. It was in this vein that the
U.S. expressed support for ³Vietnam¶s national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity´ at a meeting between
former President Bush and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in mid-2008, and that a month earlier at the
Shangri La Dialogue Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had cautioned against ³pressure tactics´ and ³coercive
diplomacy´ in the race for energy resources ³even when they coexist beside outward displays of cooperation´ (U.S.-
Vietnam Statement, June 24, 2008; Speech Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, May 31, 2008).
During the latest Sino-Philippine spat over the Spratlys, President Barack Obama called Arroyo on the phone to reaffirm
the U.S.-Philippine alliance relationship and Washington¶s commitment to the VFA (PDI, March 17). The intent of that
call is open to interpretation, but the timing suggests it was a gesture of support for the Philippines in its altercation with
the PRC.
Over the past two years the South China Sea dispute has moved from the back to the middle burner of Asian security
issues; if present trends continue, it may not be long before it is seen once again as a major potential regional flashpoint.
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May 15, 2009 03:04 PM Age: 282 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Home Page, Military/Security
By: Russell Hsiao
According to official Chinese media reports, the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) will hold a massive two-month long
military drill that will involve 50,000 troops from four divisions across four of China¶s seven military commands in the
second half of 2009. Citing a source from the PLA Headquarters of General Staff, which undertakes staff and
operational functions for the PLA and implements military modernization plans, the drill, codenamed Kuayue-2009
(Stride-2009), is unprecedented in PLA military exercise history because it comprises four divisions from the Shenyang,
Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou Military Area Command. These exercises will reportedly include Air Force and Army
Aviation units that military analysts say demonstrate a move toward bringing the PLA's growing assets under a
³common operational structure´ to undertake ³integrated joint warfare´ (China Daily, May 5; China Review News,
May 8; Defense News, May 11).
The official Xinhua News Agency on May 5 reported that the PLA has already started preparations for the exercise.
According to the report, the drill is designed to assess the PLA¶s capabilities in six major areas: 1) command and
decision-making, 2) joint operations of land and air troops, 3) operations in complicated electro-magnetic conditions, 4)
paratrooper assault operations, 5) simulated battles, and 6) comprehensive exercises by specialist units (China Daily,
May 5; Global Times, May 5). Although the number of troops mobilized is not substantially large in terms of the scale
of previous exercises, the drill will mobilize ³more than 60,000 vehicles and large weapons and equipments´ over a
terrain that will cover more than 50,000 kilometers, and that ³the longest one-way journey for some units will be more
than 2,400 kilometers,´ which will be a significant feat for the PLA¶s ³overall capabilities of operations under
informationalized conditions´ (Xinhua News Agency, May 5).
Chen Hu, chief-executive editor of the World Military Affairs Magazine, pointed out several notable characteristics of
the Kuayue military exercise, like its organization and how it will likely be simultaneously executed from multiple
locations, which sets it apart from previous military exercises. Chen pointed out that since the exercise has been termed
a ³series´ of ³base training exercises,´ the use of ³bases´ likely refers to the PLA's joint tactical training bases. In recent
years the PLA has been developing training bases in each military command area to better simulate actual battlefield
terrains, such as the Sanjie Joint Tactical Training Base under the Nanjing Military Area Command, the Queshan
Tactical Training Base located under the Jinan Military Area Command, and the Zhurihe Joint Tactical Training Base
under the Beijing Military Area Command. Moreover, since the capacity of one training base is not likely to be able to
accommodate four fully equipped divisions, the exercise will probably be launched simultaneously from different bases
(China Review News, May 8). According to a Western analyst cited by U.S.-based Defense News: ³The PLA is moving
away from µa combination of sequential or single arm or service operations « They are exercising this way and are
doing it across regional and service boundaries¶´ (Defense News, May 11).
A professor at the PLA National Defense University, which is under the leadership of the PLA Central Committee, told
the Global Times²an offshoot of People¶s Daily²that the joint exercise is intended to help evaluate the PLA¶s military
delivery and logistics capabilities, as well as joint command and decision-making. Professor Li Daguang said that, ³The
PLA will practice the drill under almost real war conditions,´ which means that it will most likely be a live-fire exercise.
³Though China transported over 130,000 troops to the earthquake-hit region last year for relief work, troops were not
armed with military equipment,´ in Kuayue-2009 they ³will maneuver 50,000 armed troops 50,000 kilometers in this
drill´ Li added (Global Times [Chinese], May 8).
According to an interview with Major General Luo Yuang, who serves as a political advisor and researcher at the PLA
Academy of Military Science (PLAAMS), a research institute under the direct leadership of the Central Military
Commission (CMC), ³China¶s positive defense policy is not makeshift, but a long-term policy based on traditional
Chinese culture, the basic national situation and the social system´ (Global Times, May 8).
In an interview with China Review News, Liang Yongchun, a military correspondent for China National Radio, noted
that the PLA has made a leap in progress in terms of long-range training exercises in recent years. The first PLA military
exercise involving long-range maneuvers was carried out in September 2006 by 3,400 troops from a mechanized
infantry unit under the Shenyang Military Area Command and a division under the Beijing Military Area Command,
which was held in the grasslands of north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The second long-range military
maneuvers took place in August 2007 with the PLA mobilizing 1,600 troops to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization¶s "Peace Mission-2007," which was held in Russia. The PLA¶s third long-range military maneuver,
Sharpening-2008, took place in August 2008, which involved mobilizing mechanized infantry units from the Jinan
Military Area Command more than 1,400 km to the Zhurihe Joint Tactical Training Base (see ³PLA's µNew Leap
Forward in Information-Centric Command,´ China Brief, September 22, 2008).
A news report from Taiwan-based China Times described the absence of the Nanjing Military Area Command in the
Kuayue-2009 exercise, which may be a possible sign of Beijing¶s µgood-will¶ toward Taiwan, and may also be related to
the current thaw in cross-Strait relations. The failure of the Nanjing Military Area Command to participate in the
Kuayue-2009 exericse is notable because it oversees the ³Taiwan area.´ Chang Liang-ren, deputy minister of national
defense of Taiwan, however, stated while responding to questions from ruling and opposition party members at a
legislative hearing about the military exercise that it is still ³premature´ to draw such a conclusion and the question
whether the exclusion of the Nanjing Military Area Command in the Kuayue-2009 exercise represents anything
significant is being monitored and remains to be seen (China Times [Taiwan], May 7; Radio Taiwan International, May
7).
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May 15, 2009 05:54 PM Age: 282 days
Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Elite, Home Page
By: Willy Lam
Hunan Governor Zhou Qiang
While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) administration seems preoccupied with the twofold task of baoba and
baowen²maintaining an 8 percent growth rate and upholding social stability²it is also giving priority to the
rejuvenation of the party¶s leadership. Attention is being focused on young turks of the Sixth-Generation, meaning
cadres born in the early to mid-1960s. The identity of prominent Fifth-Generation cadres, who were born in the early to
mid-1950s, was already revealed at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. For example, Vice-President Xi Jinping, 56, and
First Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, 54, were inducted into the Politburo Standing Committee, China¶s highest ruling
council, at that pivotal conclave. It is all but certain that Xi and Li will take over from respectively President Hu Jintao
and Premier Wen Jiabao at or soon after the 18th Party Congress in late 2012. Since Xi and Li are deemed ³safe
choices´ who will not deviate from the political line laid down by patriarch Deng Xiaoping, ex-president Jiang Zemin
and President Hu, Beijing¶s political observers are most curious about the Sixth-Generation team, the great majority of
whose members are unfamiliar figures even to their compatriots.
Some of the mystery surrounding these rising stars was lifted when a current issue of the official journal Global
Personalities singled out five Sixth-Generation politicians with colossal potentials: Governors Zhou Qiang, Hu Chunhua
and Nur Bekri, respectively of Hunan Province, Hebei Province and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region; Agriculture
Minister Sun Zhengcai; and First Party Secretary of the Communist Youth League (CYL) Lu Hao (Global Personalities
[Beijing journal], April 22; Sina.com.cn, April 15). Apart from Lu, Zhou and Hu (no relations to President Hu) are
former honchos of the league; and Nur Bekri had served in its Xinjiang branch in his younger days. It is thus obvious
that President Hu, a one-time CYL boss who heads the CCP¶s powerful tuanpai (CYL Faction), has played a pivotal role
in the elevation of these forty-something neophytes. Moreover, Fifth-Generation stalwart Li Yuanchao, a Politburo
member who is in charge of high-level personnel matters, is a tuanpai affiliate and crony of the president. Owing to
factors including density of media coverage²and their prominence in the CCP¶s dominant faction²Zhou, 49 and Hu,
45, seem to have pulled ahead of their Sixth-Generation confreres in leadership sweepstakes (Straits Times [Singapore],
April 27).
Zhou, a native of Hubei Province, began his career as a specialist in youth and ideological work. He gained ministerial
ranking at the tender age of 38, when he was appointed CYL first secretary. Zhou, a protégé of President Hu, was
transferred to Hunan Province in 2006 to widen his exposure to regional issues; he became governor of the central
province a year later. The Chinese media has praised Zhou for helping to lift the economy of one of China¶s six land-
locked internal provinces. Despite the global financial crisis, Hunan¶s GDP grew by a stunning 10.3 percent in the first
quarter of this year, which was 4 percent higher than the national average. A few years ago, Zhou won the United
Nation¶s ³Champion of the Earth´ award for motivating young men and women to show concern for the environment
(Xinhua News Agency, April 29; People¶s Daily, February 15; Hunan Daily, January 13).
The rise of Hu Chunhua, 45, also a Hubei native, has been even more meteoric. Apart from having served as CYL chief,
Hu shares something important with President Hu, his key mentor: long experience in the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR). Immediately upon graduation from the prestigious Peking University in 1983, Hu went to Tibet and worked
there on and off for nearly 20 years²rising to TAR first vice-party secretary in 2006. After serving as CYL party
secretary for less than two years, he became Hebei¶s acting governor in 2008 and governor early this year. A fluent
Tibetan speaker, Hu was credited with reviving the Tibet economy, thwarting separatist tendencies among Tibetans, as
well as moving more Han Chinese into the restive region (People¶s Daily, January 13; Sina.com.cn. January 22). It was
perhaps due to his special relationship with the president that Hu did not need to take responsibility for the tainted milk
scandal that first erupted in Hebei last year. As things stand, it is highly likely that both Zhou and Hu will be inducted
into the Politburo at the 18th CCP Congress (Asiatimes.com, October 10, 2008).
There are important reasons why President Hu, 67, would want to confirm and consolidate the ³core´ of the Sixth-
Generation leadership three years before his scheduled retirement from the post of party general secretary at the 18th
Party Congress. In the run-up to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Hu was prevented by a powerful coalition of party
elders including ex-president Jiang from naming his own successor. While Vice-President Xi enjoys a reasonably good
relationship with Hu, the ³princeling´ son of party elder Xi Zhongxun does not come from the CYL faction, and Hu¶s
original intention was to elevate First Vice-Premier Li, a former CYL boss who is deemed the president¶s doubleganger,
to the very top. Xi, who will most probably become party chief and state president at and soon after the 18th Party
Congress, will have a ten year term (see China Brief, ³Hu¶s Impasse at the 17th Party Congress,´ October 17, 2007). By
ensuring the political future of Zhou and Hu, President Hu will in fact be picking Xi¶s successor. This somewhat
Byzantine practice of gedai, or ³cross-generational´ designation of leaders is not without precedent. At the 14th Party
Congress in 1992, patriarch Deng surprised ex-president Jiang by effectively appointing the latter¶s successor. At
Deng¶s insistence, Hu, then a 49-year-old ex-Tibet party secretary, was promoted a member of the Politburo Standing
Committee²and made the ³core´ of the Fourth-Generation leadership (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], May 7).
This latest development in internal CCP politics has posed a number of questions. Firstly, will President Hu get his way?
As things stand, it seems apparent that Xi, who may feel unhappy about the practice of ³gedai" designation, is going
along with the machinations of his boss. In recent speeches on the grooming of cadres, Xi has toed the president¶s
conservative line that young officials worthy of promotion ³must have both de (³moral and political rectitude´) and cai
(³professional competence´), with priority being given to "de." The vice-president pointed out at a conference on
personnel issues that senior staff in organization and personnel departments must ³raise [younger cadres¶] level in
Marxist theories and consolidate the foundations of their ideals and beliefs´ (Xinhua News Agency, March 30; People¶s
Daily, April 18). Given that most members of the CYL clique are long-standing party functionaries² and that they have
ready access to supremo Hu²tuanpai cadres are generally considered to be politically correct and knowledgeable about
the requirements of the central authorities.
Much more significant for the future of the country, however, is whether CYL affiliates can acquit themselves of the
task of tackling the increasingly complex challenges facing 21st century China. While the likes of Zhou and Hu may
have impeccable credentials as the cream of the party faithful, their expertise in global business and high technology²
two areas where China has to excel in order to maintain its competitiveness²clearly lag behind members of the so-
called haiguipai ("Returnees Faction"), or officials with advanced degrees from Western universities. In terms of their
upbringing, education and working experience, both Zhou and Hu have very little exposure to Western culture and
institutions. It is ironic that the director of the CCP Organization Department, Li Yuanchao, has repeatedly called for the
large-scale elevation of talented cadres with overseas training. Li introduced in the spring a so-called ³A Thousand
People Program´ to lure highly qualified ³returnees´ to work in party and government departments. ³We must speed up
the process of attracting high-calibre returnees so as to combat the global financial crisis and to push ahead scientific
development,´ Li said at a seminar on personnel administration (Xinhua News Agency, April 6). Since the mid-1990s,
more than 200,000 Chinese with foreign academic degrees have returned to work in China, and a dozen-odd members of
the haiguipai have attained ministerial-level positions in the central government.
Like most members of the CYL clique, Zhou and Hu have steered clear of the controversial issue of political reform. It
is noteworthy, however, that President Hu seems to have violated the oft-cited principle of ³intra-party democracy´²
which would at least in theory allow cadres a bigger say in choosing their leaders²by letting two favorite underlings
take the proverbial ³helicopter ride´ to the top. This is given the fact that a large number of CYL heavyweights have
proven to be lackluster cadres who owe their rise to patronage rather than performance. Examples include the party
secretaries of Tibet, Xinjiang, Sichuan and Shanxi, respectively Zhang Qingli, Wang Lequan, Liu Qibao and Zhang
Baoshun. Zhang and Wang have been criticized for suppressing the religious and cultural heritage of ethnic minorities
within their jurisdiction. Liu, together with his predecessor Du Qinglin, yet another CYL alumnus, has been faulted for
the large number of shoddily constructed buildings that collapsed during the Sichuan Earthquake last year. And Zhang
has been widely blamed for failing to cut down on the large number of deadly accidents in the coal mines of his
resource-rich province (BBC news, May 15; AFP, February 22; Telegraph.co.uk, May 11). The onus is now on Zhou
and Hu to prove to other cadres²and 1.3 billion Chinese²that they have what it takes to, in patriarch Deng¶s
memorable words, ³prop up the sky´ at times of monumental challenges.
'
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May 15, 2009 03:20 PM Age: 282 days
Category: China Brief, Home Page, Economics, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America
By: Shixue Jiang
Chinese Trade Minister Li Zhaoxing (L) embraces Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (R)
Brazil is the largest developing country in the Western Hemisphere, and China is the largest developing country in the
world. According to some Western estimates, the combined economies of the BRIC (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and
China) countries would surpass the combined economies of the richest nations of the world today by 2050 [1]. China
and Brazil participate in the G-8 (Group of 8) Summit and are members of the G-20. Although China and Brazil are not
official members of the G-8, Beijing and Brasilia¶s vocal participation in these summits symbolizes, in part, the rise of
the developing world. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the G-20 has emerged as the de facto political vehicle
leading global economic recovery. The realignment of power in the international system precipitating from the current
global crisis has highlighted China¶s relations with the developing world, and in particular, its relations with Brazil,
which is considered the most important bilateral relationship in Beijing's "South-South" strategy. Brazilian President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will pay his second official visit to China from May 18 to May 20. The year 2009 marks the
35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil.
From Tea Growers to Strategic Partners
China¶s relations with Brazil date back to the early 19th century when several hundred tea growers from China were
transferred as laborers to Brazil via Macao (an administrative region of China). In the mid-19th century, Brazil was
eager to import more Chinese laborers so as to make up for the shortage of labor after slave emancipation in Brazil, and
offered to establish diplomatic relations with China, which was under Qing rule at the time. In 1880, China and Brazil
signed a treaty of friendship stipulating the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations and the free flow of people
and goods.
After U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1971 and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was
founded in 1949, assumed the seat of China in the United Nations in 1972, many Latin American countries proceeded to
change their stance toward the PRC. On August 15, 1974, the PRC and Brazil established diplomatic relations and in
May 1984, Brazilian President ë
visited China. The late Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping chose
the occasion of Figueiredo's visit to put forward his well-known theory of a dichotomous international system comprised
of ³East and West´ and ³North and South.´ Deng said, among the many issues that the world was facing then, the two
most important were: to maintain peace by reducing East-West confrontation, and to promote international development
so that it narrows the gap between the developed world (North) and the developing world (South). Nearly a decade
thereafter, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Brazil in November 1993, the two countries announced the
formation of a "strategic partnership" between the two sides. Brazil thus became the first developing country to have a
strategic partnership with China.
Complementary Economies
The economies of China and Brazil are complementary and their respective comparative advantage plays a decisive role
in helping both sides expand market share, develop economic relations and promote economic growth. Brazil is well-
endowed with natural resources (e.g. bauxite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, platinum, tin, uranium,
petroleum, hydropower, timber). For instance, its iron ore reserves account for 22.5 percent of world supply [2]. China¶s
economy is resource-intensive, and the country is dependent on importing natural resources in order to sustain its high-
speed growth.
Another area of increasing complementary cooperation is in Brazil¶s infrastructure sector. Brazil has recently decided to
upgrade its critical infrastructures by proposing the ³Accelerated Growth Plan´ in early 2007, which China can invest in
and supply technology to.
Brazil has a population of 192 million and an economic size of $1.66 trillion. Its per capita GDP reached $8,676 in
2008, which makes Brazil a sizeable market for China¶s labor-intensive export products [3]. At the same time, China's
enormous market, a population of 1.3 billion and more than $4 trillion GDP, is even more attractive to Brazil. Due to
China¶s rising demand for natural resources, Brazil has benefited greatly over the past several years from the high price
of commodities in the world market.
Brazil's Largest Export Market
According to data obtained from the PRC's Ministry of Commerce (see table below), China¶s trade with Brazil has
grown exponentially from $3.7 billion in 2001 to $42.5 billion in 2008 (January to October). In March 2009, Brazil
exported $1.74 billion worth of goods to China and $1.27 billion to the United States, which means that China overtook
the United States as the largest export market for Brazil's goods [4].
China exports electronics and textiles to Brazil and imports raw materials and commodities. China has a trade deficit
with Brazil, which has been increasing from almost $1 billion in 2001 to more than $9 billion in 2008 (January to
October).
Table1 China¶s Trade with Brazil (in 100 million dollars
Total Trade Growth China China Balance

Rate Exports Imports
2001 37.0 « 13.5 23.4 -9.9
2002 44.7 20.8 14.7 30.0 -15.3
2003 79.8 78.5 21.4 58.4 -37.0
2004 123.6 54.8 36.7 86.8 -50.1
2005 148.2 20.0 48.3 99.9 -51.6
2006 203.0 37.0 73.8 129.2 55.4
2007 297.0 46.4 113.7 183.3 -69.6
2008 425.4 81.0 166.4 259.1 -92.7
Note: 2008 covers the period from January to October.
Source: China¶s Ministry of Commerce
(http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml)
By September 2008, China had a stock of non-financial investment totaling $210 million in Brazil, mainly in mining,
wood processing and production of motorcycles and home electronics.
The most impressive Chinese investment in Brazil in scale was made by Baosteel in cooperation with the mining
company Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) for the construction of a steel plant in the southern state of Espirito Santo. The
whole investment, in the amount of $3 billion, was divided between 60 percent for Baosteel and 40 percent for CVRD
(Baosteel.com, October 9, 2007).
By October 2008, Brazil¶s stock of investment in China had reached $270 million, mainly in the manufacturing sectors
making airplanes, compressors, automobile parts, hydroelectric machines and textiles. The largest investment was made
by Embraer in 2002 to make airplanes. The Chinese media coverage of this project has been labeled as a model of
"South-South" cooperation, particularly in the manufacturing sector (Xinhua News Agency, November 8, 2007).
China is also interested in Brazil¶s energy sector. During the visit to Brazil by Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping in
February 2009, China and Brazil reached an ³oil for loan´ agreement. According to this agreement, China Development
Bank would provide Brazil with a loan in the amount of $10 billion to finance the exploration for oil in Brazil's pre-salt
layer reserves. Brazil has agreed to supply up to 100,000 barrels of oil per day to China (Domain-b.com, February 19).
Trade Frictions
Despite the rapid progress made in bilateral relations, further development of this relationship faces one major hurdle:
increasing trade frictions.
Increased economic exchanges have resulted in more trade disputes. Brazil imposed its first anti-dumping measure
against Chinese exports in December 1989. Even though China was granted so-called "market economy status" in
November 2004, Brazil continues to levy anti-dumping tariffs against China. In October 2005, Brazilian President Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva signed an order that allowed the government to restrict imports of Chinese products by imposing
temporary safeguards until 2013.
Brazil¶s lack of competitiveness can be attributed, in part, to its rapidly appreciating currency, which has gained more
than 30 percent in value in the past two years and more than 100 percent since 2002 (Reuters, August 20, 2008). The
rising value of a country¶s currency makes it difficult for it to expand exports.
The rising sense of a ³China Threat´ mentality held by some Brazilians may have contributed to the repeated use of anti-
dumping practices by Brazil against China. Those who subscribe to such views believe that the influx of Chinese
products is a threat to local Brazilian businesses. For instance, Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca, head of trade issues at the
Industrial Federation of the State of São Paulo, Brazil's most powerful business association that represents industry in
the state of São Paulo, said that China is ³not a strategic partner,´ and Beijing merely ³wants to buy raw materials with
no value added and to export consumer goods´ (The Economist, August 4, 2005).
Some Brazilians were disappointed by the extent of Chinese investments in the region, saying that Beijing¶s promises
were ³lots of smoke and little fire,´ in reference to President Hu¶s alleged promise to offer $100 billion in µdirect
investment¶ in Latin America when he spoke to the Brazilian congress during a visit in November 2004. In fact,
President Hu was referring to overall China-Latin American trade value by the year 2010, and not specifically targeted
investment. In terms of investments, President Hu stated that he hoped both China and Latin America would double the
current stock of Chinese investment in the region, which totaled $4 billion (Xinhua News Agency, November 13, 2004).
Crisis and Opportunities for Cooperation
China and Brazil have taken common positions in response to the current financial crisis. Referring to the cause of the
crisis, President Lula said in his speech to the plenary meeting of the Ministers of Finance at the G-20 meeting in São
Paulo on November 8, 2008: ³The crisis started in advanced economies. It is a result of the blind belief in the market¶s
self-regulation capacity and, by and large, of the lack of control of the activities of financial agents´ (Xinhua News
Agency, February 3).
President Lula¶s remarks were echoed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. Speaking at the University of Cambridge on
February 2, Premier Wen said:
³The international financial crisis once again « demonstrates that a totally unregulated market economy cannot work.
We must strike a balance between financial innovation and regulation, between the financial sector and real economy,
and between savings and consumption´ (Brazilian Ministry of Finance, August 11, 2008).
Indeed, the ongoing financial crisis has created multiple fronts for China and Brazil to cooperate. The current financial
crisis has prompted China and Brazil to more systematically coordinate their positions on the issue of reforming the
international financial system, so that their joint efforts, along with actions by other developing countries, may result in
their having a bigger say in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Brazilian Finance Minister Guido
Mantega stated that a new international financial architecture, based on different rules, should be established and BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are expected to play a more important role.
The Future of Sino-Brazilian Relations
Leaders from both nations have repeatedly expressed their desire to further promote the development of bilateral
relations. In his address to the Brazilian congress on August 31, 2006, visiting Chairman of the Standing Committee of
China's National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo, said that the Chinese government attaches great importance to the
relationship between China and Brazil and the Chinese see Brazil as a sincere partner and friend. Meeting with the
visiting Chinese Vice-President Xi on February 19, President Lula said that Brazil is satisfied with the development of
friendly ties with China and is willing to work along with China to deepen the strategic partnership, to which the
Brazilian government also attaches great importance.
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, China and Brazil have realized that they can strengthen cooperation
in both the economic sphere and other areas so as to reap mutual benefits and further strengthen "South-South"
cooperation. Therefore, the future of the relations between the world¶s largest developing nation and the Western
Hemisphere¶s largest developing nation seems promising and bright.
Notes
1. Goldman Sachs, ³Global Economics Paper No: 99,´ October 1, 2003, sourced at:
www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf.
2. See Latin American Business Chronicle website, ³Latin American GDP Ranking,´ sourced at:
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/listado2.aspx.
3. Bhpbilliton, ³Brazil: Analyst Visit,´ March 2007, sourced at:

http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bbContentRepository/brazilpresentationtoanalystsmarch2007.pdf
4. Department of Economics and Commerce of the People¶s Republic of China Embassy in the Federation of Brazil,
³China Surpasses the United States in March as Brazil¶s Largest Export Market,´ April 2, 2009, sourced at:
br.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztdy/200904/20090406143390.html.

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May 27, 2009 01:04 PM Age: 270 days
Category: China Brief, Economics, Foreign Policy, Home Page
By: Loro Horta
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is home to 22 percent of the world¶s population, but has only 7 percent of its total
arable land. Following the Chinese people's recovery from the humanitarian disaster of the "Great Famine," which
according to one authoritative account contributed to the death of 36 million Chinese between 1958 and 1961 (South
China Morning Post, July 6, 2008), the Beijing government has made it a priority to ensure self-sufficiency in the supply
of basic products for the Chinese diet (e.g. rice and grain). In the past three decade, the country's breakneck economic
growth has led to the rise of a new wealthy class in Chinese society made up of hundreds of thousands of Chinese people
whose dietary demands have changed and who consumes more food. Starting in the 1990s, in order to accommodate this
growing demand, China began encouraging its citizens to establish agricultural-businesses overseas. Initially, most of
this investment went to nearby countries such as Laos, Burma and Cambodia. Yet, scarcity of land and sprawling
overpopulation in these countries have led to political backlashes that prompted the central government to turn its
attention to Africa at the beginning of this decade to fill its people's rice bowl.
To put this growing demand into perspective, the Chinese were consuming 25 kilograms (kg) of meat a year in 1985.
Two decades later, its consumption reached 52 kg, and it is expected to climb as high as 70 kg by 2020. The
consumption of more agriculturally intensive products such as soybeans, potatoes and cereals has increased between 16
and 30 percent in the past decade [1]. Rice consumption is declining as a more wealthy urban population develops a
taste for a Western-style diet. The consumption of seafood has increased significantly in the past decade, with shortages
of certain products now common. The increase in China's food consumption also comes at a time when arable land in
the country is sharply shrinking as a result of over planting and land loss due to environmental damage caused by rapid
industrialization. According to Yang Xiong at the ministry of agriculture, China lost 8.9 million hectares of farmland
between 1995 and 2007 [2].
The Scramble for African Land
African nations, with their vast and sparsely populated fertile lands, offer China a solution to its rising food demand.
Most Chinese investment in African agriculture is concentrated in southern Africa: Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi and,
increasingly, Angola. The first major Chinese investment in Africa's agricultural sector was in 1995 when Zhongkan
Farm, a private company, invested $220,000 in a farm project in Zambia (Xinhua News Agency, March 21, 2006). By
2007 China had some 63 agricultural investment projects in southern Africa ranging from small-scale farms to large
cattle-raising grounds [3].
In the past two years the central government has taken the lead and encouraged Chinese state-owned enterprises to
invest in Africa's farms. In August 2008, the Governor of China Development Bank Chen Yuan told a gathering of
African finance ministers in Mauritania: ³China Development Bank is anxious to work in the area of agriculture. Given
the current scenario of a great shortage of food and food price hikes I believe African countries should put agricultural
development as their top priority´ (Reuters, August 1, 2008).
Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola
In early 2008 the Chinese government pledged to invest $800 million to modernize Mozambique's agricultural sector.
The plan includes increasing the rice production of the former Portuguese colony from its current 100,000 tons to
500,000 tons per year in the next five years. With this objective in mind, Beijing is bankrolling the establishment of an
Advance Crop Research Institute and several other small agricultural schools throughout the country. Over 100 Chinese
agricultural specialists are currently stationed in Mozambique, including teams from the Hunan Hybrid Rice Institute,
China¶s top institution in the field of hybrid rice research [4].
Other major Chinese projects include the construction of numerous irrigation and canal networks, including a massive
canal connecting land-locked Malawi by way of Lake Malawi²the second largest in the continent²to rivers and dams
in Mozambique. In the past two years, the search for new land has led Beijing to aggressively seek large land leases in
Mozambique, especially in its most fertile areas, such as the Zambezi valley in the north and the Limpopo valley in the
south. The Zambezi valley is the richest agricultural region of Mozambique with an area of 230,000 kilometers spread
between Tete and Zambezia provinces [5].
Chinese investment in the Zambezi valley started in mid-2006 when China¶s state-owned bank Eximbank (Import
Export Bank) granted $2.3 billion in soft loans to the Mozambican government to build the Mpanda Nkua mega dam on
the Zambezi stretch of Tete province. Since then China has been requesting large land leases to establish Chinese-run
mega farms and pasture areas for cattle raising. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was reportedly signed in June
2007, under which an initial 3,000 Chinese settlers were to move to Zambezia and Tete provinces to run farms along the
valley [6].
The Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania, Liu Xinsheng, announced in April 2008 that China may invest upward of $400
million to modernize the local agricultural sector while in Beijing the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has pledged to
assist Africa in creating a "green revolution," a process of rapid increase in agricultural production that results from the
introduction of advanced biotechnology, modern irrigation and better managerial skills. According to a ministry of
commerce official, China currently has 1,134 agricultural experts serving in Africa and has given $600 million in
assistance to the sector since 2002. This assistance ranges from major irrigation projects to donations of agricultural
equipment to extending generous credit lines. Another former Portuguese colony, Angola, is fast becoming a major
destination for Chinese agri-business [7].
Angola is already China¶s biggest trading partner in Africa and its single largest oil supplier accounting for 15 percent of
the PRC¶s total oil imports. The country, with its vast land²1,246,700 square kilometers²and a population of just 16
million, offers China great opportunities, particularly in beef production, but also in some luxury items now in ever
greater demand in China such as coffee, spices, tropical fruits, sugar and cotton. China¶s agricultural investments, which
were primarily concentrated on Southern Africa, are now slowly spreading to other parts of the continent such as Guinea
Bissau in West Africa where China recently established several hybrid rice experimentation farms. In early 2007
Chinese businessmen pledged to invest $60 million in the country¶s cashew nut industry, which is one of the biggest
such industries on the continent.
While China may be primarily motivated by its need to meet its rising food demand, the modernization of the African
agricultural sector is also likely to benefit the people of that continent. In 2007 the Ugandan government thanked China
for its support in developing the country¶s agricultural industry. After serious food shortages last year that degenerated
into violent riots, the Senegalese government was eager to attract Chinese investment. According to Professor Li
Anshan, one of China's top African specialists at Beijing University: ³Africans desperately need to modernize their
agriculture both to insure their food security and to earn hard currency by exporting it. China needs to deal with its
growing food demand and Africa seems to offer the solution´ [8].
Conclusion
If China is indeed able to help launch a "green revolution" in Africa, millions of Africans will have a chance at a better
future. At the same time, however, if China's ambitious plans are not carried out with proper considerations for the
environment and its impact on Africa's agricultural land, the continent may one day find itself in a similar predicament
to the one confronting China today.
For instance, various NGOs in Mozambique and foreign experts have began to express concern over the environmental
impact of the Mpanda Nkua mega dam on the ecosystem of the Zambezi valley. Daniel Ribeiro, a biologist and the head
of Justica Ambiental, a local NGO, argued that, "No serious environmental impact study was conducted, the people
whose land will be flood were not consulted or properly compensated. No doubts that we need electricity and to
modernize our agriculture [sic]. But at what cost?" [9].
While considerable attention has been paid to Chinese interest in African oil and other mineral resources, it is perhaps in
the agricultural and food processing sector where China may have a more significant impact on the continent's future.
Yet, whether Beijing¶s grand plans for Africa will really materialize and help the continent alleviate its chronic food
shortages, or will it become another of the many empty promises made to Africa remains to be seen.
Notes
1. Hongbo Liu and Claus Diblitz, ³Determinants of meat consumption in China´ Working Paper 40, December 2007,
Asian Agribusiness Research Centre, Stuart University.
2. Interview with Yang Xiong, Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, September 12, 2008.
3. This figure was given during a seminar attended by the author on Trade and Investment Between China and the
Portuguese Speaking Countries, hosted by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Central School in Changing, Beijing
between September 7-10, 2008.
4. Statement by Tomas Mandiate Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries of Mozambique on March 30, 2006 at
www.agroportal.pt/x/agronoticias/2006/03/31.htm.
5. Loro Horta, ³China s relations with Mozambique: A Mixed Blessing,´ April 1, 2008 Online Africa Policy Forum
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington D. C. at forums.csis.org/africa/.
and ³The Zambezi Valley: China s first Agricultural colony?´ June 9th 2008, Online Africa Policy Forum, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington D. C at
forums.csis.org/africa/.
6. Noticias Lusofunas ³Empresas chinesas anunciam investimentos no Vale do Zambeze´ June 3, 2006 (Lusophone
News, Chinese companies announce investment in the Zambezi Valley).
7. Jornal de Angola ³Banco Chines propoen credito para agricultura´ Marco 13 2009 (Chinese bank proposes agriculture
credit line).
8. Interview with Professor Li Anshan, Department of History University of Beijing, September 14, 2008, Beijing.
9. Interview with Daniel Ribeiro, Beijing May 15, 2008.
Y
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May 27, 2009 12:53 PM Age: 270 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, China and the Asia-Pacific, Russia, Military/Security, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Recent reports within the Chinese press revealed that sales of a Chinese state-owned military conglomerate that
produces equipments and arms for both civilian and military applications have rose substantially in the first quarter of
2009. A case in point is the Beijing-based China South Industries Group Corporation (CSIGC), one of the country's
largest civilian-military firms, which stated that its first-quarter sales rose 8.4 percent year on year to $5.73 billion
(38.99 billion Renminbi). According to the official Xinhua report, CSIGC reportedly earned over $100 million (710
million Renminbi) in profits in the first quarter²with profits increasing month-on-month²citing data released by the
company in late April (Xinhua News Agency, April 26).
The figures in the report only cited sales for civilian products such as small cars and motors, and no details were given
on the composition of total sales from military products. "In the first quarter, the company sold 300,000 sets of vehicles,
up 13.2 percent year on year. The growth was more than 9 percent higher than a 3.88-percent growth in the country's
overall domestic auto sales in the same period." Moreover, "sales from its power transmission and transformation, as
well as new-energy sectors, jumped almost 60 percent year on year to 3.44 billion yuan [approximately $500 million].
The company's sales of transformers surged 73 percent" (Xinhua News Agency, April 26).
CSIGC is a state-owned enterprise under the direct administration of the Chinese State Council. The company was re-
structured in the landmark reforms of 1998, which divided China's defense industrial base into civilian and military
components. CSIGC is comprised of 64 large-and medium-sized industrial enterprises, 13 research institutes and other
corporations. According to a Chinese government website, CSIGC holds 11.6 percent and 50 percent of shares of North
lndustries Finance Company Ltd. (NORFICO) and China North lndustries Corporation (NORINCO), respectively
(Techinfo.gov.cn). While CSIGC produces equipment for civilian uses, it is known for its research and development of
"special equipment" for the country's armed forces.
The growth in sales of CSIGC and its sister organizations in recent years have increased in line with the People's
Liberation Army's (PLA) military budget, which analysts say creates a feedback loop for PLA defense modernization.
The PLA's overall budget has been increasing by double-digits annually for the past two decades, and the modernization
of the Chinese military is stoking concerns of a regional arms race and raising international awareness about the impact
of Chinese arms sales toward conflict zones.
Andrei Chang, the editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Weekly, noted in a January report that the quantity of Chinese
military arms and equipment transferred to Africa is expanding. According to Chang, the arms and equipment are being
³traded for oil, mineral resources and even fishing rights.´ For instance, ³Zambia has used its copper resources to pay
China in a number of military deals, for instance, and Kenya has been negotiating with China to trade fishing rights for
arms´ (UPIAsia, January 26).
While China¶s military exports are soaring, Russian arms sales on the other hand have been in decline. According to a
Russian official, Moscow¶s sales of weaponry and military technology to Beijing continue to drop from previous years.
Anatoly Isaikin, general director of Rosoboronexport²a Russian arms export monopoly²told the Rossiiskaya Gazeta
that ³sales have dipped about $1 billion a year´ (The Moscow Times, April 19; UPI, April 11). The Moscow Times
reported that Russia has pulled in $16 billion from arms sales to China since 2001, and this includes Su-27 and Su-30
fighter jets, Kilo class diesel submarines and air defense systems. Yet, Isaikin said that the Chinese share of Russian
arms exports fell to 18 percent last year and could continue dropping to 10-15 percent in the future. Isaikin attributes this
to Russia's expansion into other arms markets (The Moscow Times, April 19). The Russian arms industry, however, has
been trying to lobby for stronger Sino-Russian defense ties due to concerns about the 62 percent drop in Russian arms
sales to China in 2007 (SIPRI's online Arms Transfers Database, March 31, 2008; Moscow News Weekly, March 27,
2008; China Brief, April 16, 2008).
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May 27, 2009 12:59 PM Age: 270 days
Category: China Brief, Home Page, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America
By: Daniel Erikson
Chinese President Hu Jintao (L) and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias
When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Costa Rica last November and announced that the two countries were
initiating free trade talks, it marked the beginning of a new phase in China¶s courtship of Central America. Indeed,
China¶s striking economic growth over the last decade has positioned Beijing as a crucial economic partner of all of
Latin America¶s major economies, with total bilateral trade exceeding $140 billion last year. Yet, Central America
largely remains a missing link in this agenda. While the commodity exporting countries of South America have profited
handsomely from their relationship with China, Central America has felt the sting of Chinese competition in the
manufacturing sector. More crucial, from Beijing¶s perspective, is the fact that the Central American region constitutes
the most significant bloc of countries in the world that continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. As a
result, Chinese leaders are puzzled as to how to improve relations with Central American nations that are largely
peripheral to China¶s economic concerns but central to Beijing¶s mission of peeling away Taiwan¶s remaining trappings
of state sovereignty, which include its diplomatic partners overseas.
Latin America is half a world away from the decades-long conflict simmering in the Taiwan Strait, but the diplomatic
tussle between Taiwan and China remains a red-hot issue in the Caribbean and Central America. Beijing rigorously
promotes its ³One China´ policy, which means that non-recognition of the Taiwanese government is a prerequisite for
conducting formal diplomatic relations with the PRC²in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing
and Taipei. Although each of the Latin American countries involved in this geopolitical chess match have little
individual clout, together they make up the most significant group of states caught in the cross-Strait tug-of-war,
representing 12 of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan. Today, Taiwan preserves official relations with six Central
American countries (i.e. Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama), five Caribbean countries
(i.e. the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and Paraguay²the
lone holdout in South America.
After nearly a decade of fairly stable alliances, the battle between China and Taiwan in Latin America really began to
heat up in 2004, as China¶s economic growth better positioned it to compete head-to-head with Taiwan in the field of
³dollar diplomacy,´ which entails wooing potential diplomatic allies with promises of trade, investment and official
development assistance. The island nation of Dominica defected to China in 2004, followed by Grenada in 2005, but
Taiwan struck back in 2007 by wooing the newly-elected government of St. Lucia. Yet, Beijing notched a major victory
later that year by winning over Costa Rica, which was the first Central American country to recognize China. For
China, which is always sensitive to U.S. perceptions of its involvement in Latin America, Costa Rica¶s benign image in
Washington allowed China to sidestep accusations that its outreach to Latin America focuses primarily on leftist
countries that have hostile relations with the U.S. It would have been far more attention-provoking for Beijing to begin
its Central American outreach with Nicaragua¶s left-wing government, for example, which would have set Washington¶s
neoconservatives on edge.
In March 2008, Taiwan¶s hard-fought presidential election produced political shockwaves that sent ripples all the way to
Latin America when Ma Ying-jeou, a mild-mannered 57-year old lawyer led the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist party
back to power for the first time since 2000. Unlike his predecessor Chen Shui-bian, who sympathized with Taiwan¶s
independence movement, Ma has pledged to improve relations with the People¶s Republic of China. He has said he
opposes both pursuing Taiwan¶s independence and negotiating reunification with China, arguing that ³the status quo is
the best choice.´ These statements have been watched very closely by the dozen Latin American and Caribbean
countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as many leaders wonder whether the time is ripe to jump ship and
seal relations with China. In recent months, China¶s relations with Taiwan have edged toward détente, including
opening trade and travel ties, as well as a landmark decision by China to allow Taiwan¶s participation as an observer at
the World Health Organization. Ma¶s conciliatory stance toward China has in fact lowered the temperature of cross-
Strait competition in the Americas. Nevertheless, when President Ma planned a tour through Central America from May
27 to June 2, a spokesman for China¶s Foreign Ministry firmly restated Beijing¶s position: ³The Chinese government
adheres to the one-China policy and opposes Taiwan having official exchanges with any country. This position remains
unchanged" (Xinhua News Agency, May 21).
The Case of Costa Rica
Costa Rica has now emerged as the stress test for both local and regional neighbors in evaluating the impact of China¶s
expanding partnerships in this distant but vital part of the world. In June 2007, the decision of Costa Rican President
Oscar Arias to revoke relations with Taiwan and embrace China was a major coup for the Chinese leadership. At the
time, it prompted speculation that Costa Rica¶s switch would precipitate a broader ³domino effect´ that could lead to
many of the six other countries in the Central American isthmus to switch sides in favor of Beijing. Instead, a nearly
two year period of hiatus has settled in after several years of frenetic activity, and no other Latin American or Caribbean
country has followed in Costa Rica¶s footsteps. The potential explanations for this include inattention from China,
Taiwan¶s active diplomacy, the lessening of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and a ³wait-and-see´ attitude by other Central
American governments, who want to know how China¶s relationship with Costa Rica evolves before embarking on a
similar path. What has become clear over the past two years, however, is that China is focusing on creating a model
relationship with Costa Rica that will serve as a regional example of the benefits of formalizing ties to Beijing.
Upon announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Costa Rica and China, President Arias described his
decision as ³an act of foreign policy realism which promotes our links to Asia. It is my responsibility to recognize a
global player as important as the People's Republic of China´ (Xinhua News Agency, June 7, 2007). China promptly
dispatched Wang Xiaoyuan, an experienced Chinese diplomat who had served as the PRC¶s ambassador to Uruguay, to
set up a new embassy in San José. At first blush, Arias, who won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his role in helping to
end the wars then raging in Central America, seemed an unlikely candidate to be the region¶s first leader to recognize
China. An advocate of democracy, he frequently spoke out against communism and tangled publicly with Cuba¶s Fidel
Castro. But the tremendous financial rewards that his nation reaped from China soon proved to be an important
component of his realpolitik. Papers released under court order in the fall of 2008 revealed that a secret deal had been
struck between China and Costa Rica during the negotiations over diplomatic recognition. In exchange for Costa Rica¶s
move to expel Taiwan¶s diplomatic mission, Beijing agreed to buy $300 million of Costa Rican bonds and provide $130
million in aid to the country, as well as provide scholarships to enable study in China (New York Times, September 12,
2008).
Now the two countries are embroiled in trade talks as Costa Rica seeks to become the third country in the region, after
Chile and Peru, to sign a free trade deal with China. Costa Rica was among the six countries (including the Dominican
Republic) that signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (known as DR-CAFTA) with the United States in
2005, but it will be the first Central American country to negotiate a trade deal with China. The first round of talks took
place in Costa Rica last January with follow-up talks in Shanghai in April. The process is scheduled to be completed
before Arias leaves office in 2010, but even with a formal trade arrangement bilateral trade has zoomed upwards to $2.9
billion in 2008, a more than thirty-fold increase since 2001. China has also offered to help Costa Rica build an oil
refinery to improve its access to energy (Xinhua News Agency, November 19, 2008). Of course, Costa Rica¶s
deepening relationship with China has circumscribed its ability to deal with issues that are sensitive to the Chinese
leadership beyond just Taiwan. For example, in August 2008, Arias asked the Dalai Lama, a fellow Nobel Peace Prize
winner and the spiritual leader of Tibet, to cancel a planned private visit to Costa Rica. Arias cited ³scheduling
problems,´ but it is clear that he knew that a visit by the Dalai Lama would have sacrificed Costa Rica¶s chance to host
Hu Jintao later that year.
Patience is a Virtue
Given the increasing weight of the Chinese economy in the global system overall, all of Taiwan¶s allies in the Western
Hemisphere are under continually building pressures to formalize their budding ties with Beijing. This makes the fact
that there has been no additional movement in Central America toward recognizing Beijing all the more intriguing. At
this juncture, the loss of even one more Central American ally would represent a damaging reversal for Taiwan that
could further cripple Taiwan¶s claim to sovereignty. The Costa Rica example demonstrates, however, that China¶s
regional strategy has shifted toward providing more succulent carrots (rather than punitive sticks), and there is little
question that Taiwan is desperately trying to prevent additional defections. China appears to have bet that developing an
intensive, multi-faceted relationship with Costa Rica may have a powerful demonstrative effect on other countries in the
region²assuming that Costa Rica is viewed as reaping substantial benefits. Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom may
be too absorbed in his country¶s contentious politics to risk a China diversion, but other governments in El Salvador and
Honduras are certainly eyeing Beijing, even as they play host to President Ma of Taiwan. The spring election of
Mauricio Funes of the left-wing FMLN as El Salvador¶s new president has prompted an especially frantic wave of
outreach from Taiwan, including an impromptu post-election visit by the Taiwanese foreign minister, in an effort to
keep another Central American country from falling into China¶s grasp. Since the election of Daniel Ortega in
November 2006, Nicaraguan officials have been careful to assure Taipei that cooperation between the two countries will
continue. China has attempted to put pressure on tiny Belize by working through the Caribbean Community, a regional
organization of mainly English-speaking governments who have mostly eschewed Taiwan in favor of China. Recently
elected Panamanian president Ricardo Martinelli vowed to review his country¶s relations with China and Taiwan during
the election campaign, but his instincts as a successful businessman may pull him toward China.
Chinese leaders are eagerly interested in expanding their success with Costa Rica to other parts of Central America, but
in the short term they are not going to force the issue. Rather, China correctly views Costa Rica¶s 2007 conversion as a
major victory that they have time to savor and deepen before conducting their outreach to other countries in the region
with renewed intensity. China¶s carefully calibrated patience toward Central America helps to explain why even
President Ma¶s upcoming visit to the region has not caused much of a stir in Beijing. When it comes to the battle for
diplomatic recognition in Central America, China feels confident that time is on its side.
c &&!$' !

June 12, 2009 08:40 AM Age: 254 days
By: Andrew S. Erickson, Michael S. Chase
Two Type-094 SSBNs docked at Huludao
China¶s undersea deterrent is undergoing a generational change with the emergence of the Type-094, or Jin-class, which
represents a substantial improvement over China¶s first-generation Type-092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN). Launched in the early 1980s, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) single Xia-class
SSBN (hereafter Xia) has never conducted a deterrent patrol and is equipped with relatively short-range (1,770 km) JL-1
SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). In contrast, China may build five Type-094 SSBNs, which will enable
the PLAN to conduct near-continuous deterrent patrols, and each of these second-generation SSBNs will be outfitted
with 12 developmental JL-2 SLBMs that have an estimated range of at least 7,200 km and are equipped with penetration
aids. Although the transition to the new SSBN is ongoing, recent Internet photos depicting at least two Jin-class SSBNs
(hereafter Jin) suggest that the PLAN has reached an unprecedented level of confidence in the sea-based leg of its
strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, China¶s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the People¶s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) is enhancing its ³nuclear counterattack´ capability [1]. With the anticipated introduction of the JL-2 missiles on
the Jin and the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), China is on
the verge of attaining a credible nuclear deterrent based on a 'survivable' second-strike capability.
Recent Developments
The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assesses that China will build a ³fleet of probably five Type-094 SSBNs . . .
to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea presence´ [2]. A variety of Chinese publications
suggest that the SSBN forces of France and Britain²which have four vessels each, with one at sea at all times, two in
refit, and one under maintenance²may serve as models for China and hence reinforce the aforementioned indications of
its plans. One Chinese source, however, suggests that China will field six Type-094 SSBNs, divided into patrolling,
deploying and refitting groups [3], with another assessment suggesting that these groups will comprise two SSBNs each
[4].
It is clear that at least two different hulls have already been launched, based on unusually high-resolution internet and
commercial satellite images that have emerged of one Jin in port at Xiaopingdao base, south of Dalian, two Jins in the
water and perhaps one emerging from production at Huludao base east of Beijing, and one at a newly-constructed
submarine facility at Yalong Bay near Sanya on Hainan Island. The images of the facility on Hainan Island provided
some hints as to the PLAN¶s SSBN basing plans. Indeed, the photo of the Jin at Yalong Bay suggests that the facility
may be the base for China¶s future SSBN forces.
Development Motives
Many Western analysts have focused on the 'survivability' issue to explain China¶s decision to proceed with the
development of the Jin and the JL-2. Given the potential vulnerability of Chinese SSBNs to detection by adversary
attack submarines and the challenges of locating dispersed road-mobile missiles, however, it would certainly seem that
Chinese decision-makers must also have been considering other factors, including missile defense, international prestige
and inter-service politics.
Chinese strategists appear to calculate that a nuclear dyad, composed of land-based strategic missiles and SLBMs, or
possibly a triad incorporating nuclear-armed PLAAF bombers as well, is required to enhance the credibility of China¶s
nuclear deterrent in line with the requirements of the ³effective counter-nuclear deterrence´ posture discussed in recent
Chinese publications. Chinese analysts assert that an SSBN is ³the most survivable type of (nuclear) weapon´ [5], and
hint that it may allow China to deter third party intervention in a regional conflict. Citing the development of the Jin, one
Chinese source states, ³If a war erupts across the Taiwan Strait one day, facing the danger of China waging nuclear war,
it will be very difficult for America to intervene in the cross-strait military crisis´ [6]. The authors interpret the Chinese
comments here to mean not that China would be likely to launch nuclear weapons first in response to U.S. intervention
in a China-Taiwan conflict, but rather that Chinese analysts believe strong SSBN capabilities would enhance its
deterrence posture by causing Washington to think twice about intervening in a conflict in which escalation control
might be difficult.
Another potential explanation for the investment in the development of the Jin is that Chinese planners believe SLBMs
launched from certain patrol areas might complicate U.S. missile-defense interception efforts. A Chinese analysis states
that SSBNs ³are more capable of penetrating [missile] defenses´ [7].
Yet another plausible explanation for the decision to deploy the Jin is that Chinese leaders may view the ships as
symbols of China's emerging great-power status. The other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council²France,
Britain, Russia, and the United States²all have modern SSBNs in their fleets, and Beijing may see the deployment of
its own as a way to enhance its international prestige. This certainly appears to be true of nuclear-powered submarines in
general. Indeed, former PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing and others have stated that nuclear submarines
represent one of China¶s clearest claims to great power status [8].
Still another possible explanation is inter-service politics. Although the politics of China¶s defense budget process are
opaque to outsiders, it seems reasonable to speculate that the PLAN leadership may have pushed for the development of
the Jin to ensure that the navy would have a role to play in the strategic nuclear-deterrence mission.
Operational Challenges
Notwithstanding the considerable progress reflected by the launching of at least two Jin SSBNs, the PLAN still faces at
least three key challenges before it realizes a secure seaborne second-strike capability: reducing the probability of
detection; at-sea training of commanders and crew members; and coping with the nuclear command-and-control issues
associated with the operation of SSBNs.
Chinese observers are well aware of the challenges of avoiding detection, as reflected by their analysis of capabilities
allegedly demonstrated during the Cold War vis-à-vis Soviet submarines. Subsequent-generation submarines are
generally significantly quieter than those of earlier generations, so it may be expected that China has made progress in
quieting its submarines as well. Nevertheless, the Jin is still a second generation SSBN, and those of other nations have
faced significant acoustic difficulties.
Training is another potential challenge for China¶s emerging SSBN force. Although digital training and simulations can
be useful, the only way other nations have become proficient at submarine operations is by taking their boats to sea.
Chinese naval exercises have increased in sophistication in recent years and currently encompass such categories as
command and control, navigation, electronic countermeasures, and weapon testing. Moreover, Chinese submarine
patrols have increased in recent years²the PLAN conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice as many as in 2007 [9]. This
increase in patrols and the overall priority accorded to China¶s submarine force development suggest that the PLAN¶s
submarines are now able to range farther afield on a more frequent basis. Indeed, the evolving missions and growing
capabilities of the Chinese submarine force ³create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence
in the Western Pacific east of the Ryukyu Island chain´ [10].
While the trajectory of training specifically relevant to deterrent patrols remains opaque, the PLAN is striving to
improve the rigor and realism of education and training across the board. Within this context, submarines have clearly
been an area of emphasis and the PLAN is using a variety of methods to prepare its sailors for future wars. Official
Chinese publications note, for example, that various types of simulators have been used to improve submarine training.
Establishing and maintaining secure and reliable communications with SSBNs constitutes another major challenge for
any country that desires a sea-based deterrent. Chinese military publications emphasize that the central leadership must
maintain strict, highly-centralized command and control of nuclear forces. China¶s submarine force has reportedly
employed high-frequency (HF), low-frequency (LF), and very-low-frequency (VLF) communications, and researchers
are working on a number of technologies that could be useful for secure communications with submarines, as reflected
by recent publications discussing the prevention of enemy detection of transmissions between submarines and shore-
based headquarters units. Ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an environment in which an adversary
may attempt to disrupt its command and control system could be a critical challenge for the PLAN. It remains unclear,
however, to what extent centralized SSBN command, control, and communication is possible for China across the range
of conflict scenarios.
Beyond the problem of ensuring secure and reliable communications, the deployment of SSBNs also entails use-control
challenges. Given the strong emphasis on centralized control of nuclear forces that is evident in official Chinese military
and defense policy publications, it seems highly unlikely that the PLAN would conduct deterrent patrols without
effective use controls. Presumably, China will strive not only to develop a communications capability that is robust
enough to ensure at least one-way wartime connectivity between Beijing and the Jin-class SSBNs, but also to minimize
the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch by implementing some combination of technical and procedural
controls.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the recent series of revelations about China¶s emerging SSBN force, at least four questions that have
major implications for the future of China¶s sea-based deterrent remain unanswered. First, there is the issue of how
many SSBNs China will ultimately build, which will influence China¶s ability to conduct continuous or near-continuous
deterrent patrols. Second, it remains unclear whether China will attempt to create bastions for its SSBNs in areas close to
the mainland or deploy them to more distant patrol areas²a decision which will no doubt be informed in part by the
capabilities of the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development. Third, little is known about China¶s plans for coping
with the command and control challenges associated with the deployment of a sea-based deterrent force, which could
influence crisis stability. Fourth, authoritative Chinese sources refer to ³joint nuclear counter-attack campaigns´ in
which the Second Artillery¶s nuclear missile force, PLAN SSBNs, and nuclear-capable Chinese air force bomber units
would all participate, but it remains unclear to what extent China will actually integrate its emerging SSBN force into a
joint strategic nuclear deterrence capability [11]. While these uncertainties remain, the investment already made in
SSBN hulls and shore facilities indicates that the program represents a major effort to move beyond the ill-fated Xia and
take China¶s nuclear deterrent to sea. In addition, the emergence of photos showcasing at least two Type-094
submarines²which reflects Beijing's apparent willingness to allow Western analysts to see them²may signal a new
level of confidence on Beijing¶s part, and perhaps even a nascent recognition that modest increases in transparency
could actually support rather than undermine China¶s strategic interests.
Notes
1. ³China¶s National Defense in 2008´ (Beijing: State Council Information Office, January 2009),
merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/China_English2008.pdf.
2. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), ³Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,´ 20 December 2006,
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf.
3. Jian Jie, ³The Legend of the Virtuous Twins,´ World Outlook, no. 448 (August 2002), p. 23.
4. Lin Changsheng, ³The Combat Power of China¶s Nuclear Submarines,´ World Aerospace Digest, no. 103 (September
2004), p. 33.
5. Zhang Feng, ³Nuclear Submarines and China¶s Navy,´ Naval & Merchant Ships (March 2005), p. 12.
6. ³China¶s at Sea Deterrent,´ Military Overview, no. 101, p. 53.
7. Wang Yifeng and Ye Jing, ³What the Nuclear Submarine Incident Between China and Japan Tells Us About the
Ability of China¶s Nuclear Submarines to Penetrate Defenses, Part 1,´ Shipborne Weapons (January 2005), pp. 27±31.
8. Liu Huaqing, The Memoirs of Liu Huaqing (Beijing: People¶s Liberation Army Press, 2004), p. 476.
9. Hans Kristensen, ³Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008,´ Strategic Security Blog, February 3, 2009,
www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/patrols.php.
10. Office of Naval Intelligence, ³Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force.´
11. Yu Jixun, chief ed. et al., People¶s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery
Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 297-298.
&% 1 3

*$
June 12, 2009 08:32 AM Age: 254 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Featured, Home Page
By: Vijay Sakhuja
Chinese President Hu Jintao (R) and Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa (L)
The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government have received praise and accolades from several
quarters after their triumph last month over the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). The total annihilation of this
separatist group brought an end to a civil war that has lasted over two decades. The long civil war resulted in the deaths
of 80,000 to 100,000 people and over 300,000 displaced (Indian Express, May 30; Internal-displacement.org, June 4).
The Sri Lankan victory over the LTTE was made possible by military support from a number of countries who supplied
weapons and platforms, training, intelligence and guidance to the Sri Lankan armed forces. In addition to providing
military support, contributing countries also urged Colombo to seek a political solution to the Tamil problem. Of
particular interest is Chinese political and military support to Sri Lanka in its fight against the LTTE.
The Sri Lankan national government¶s military success was celebrated with a victory parade on June 3 ³to show off the
military¶s prowess´ and also to instill confidence among the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim community in the government¶s
ability to safeguard the nation¶s sovereignty and protect its people. The victory parade was a spectacular event with
columns of military troops belonging to the Sri Lankan army, navy and the air force, police forces, civil defense
personnel and the National Cadet Corps marching along the Galle Face Green, a seaside promenade in central Colombo.
Also on display were Chinese-made armored vehicles and artillery guns, Czech-made multiple rocket launchers, and
Indian-made mobile radars and anti-aircraft guns. Naval vessels and gunboats were stationed close by on the waterfront
(U.S., Indian, Chinese origin) and airpower was displayed in the form of fighters (Ukranian MiG 27s, Chinese F-7 and
Israeli Kfir C7) and helicopters (Russian MI-24 and U.S. Bell) (Wsws.org, June 5; Slsecurityforces.blogspot.com, June
5).
In fact, both Colombo and Beijing have been discussing Sri Lanka¶s security problem since the early 1980s. As early as
1983, the Chinese government has conveyed to Colombo through Harry Jayawardene, the special envoy of President
Junius Richard Jayewardene, that the ethnic problem was Sri Lanka¶s own internal affair and it was important to seek a
political solution. In 1986, Colombo sought assistance to µinstall defense manufacturing capacity for light arms and
supply additional patrol boats,¶ but was declined. Apparently the Chinese refused because of the thaw in Sino-Indian
relations. In 1987, Ranil Wikramasinghe of the United National Party, who later became the Prime Minister of Sri
Lanka, visited China to marshal Chinese support but Beijing preferred a political solution to the ethnic problem.
President Jayawardene had sought extensive military support from China but Beijing only agreed to send a military team
to assess the military requirements of the country in 1986 [1]. President Jayawardene summed up China¶s relationship
with Sri Lanka by saying: ³They were good friends and gave us military equipment, guns etc at reasonable terms. But
what could they do? I could not ask them to start a war in the North to keep the Indian¶s busy. Even if I had, I doubt if
they would have done it?´ obviously referring to India¶s support to the Tamils in Sri Lanka [2].
China continued to provide political and more recently enormous military support to Sri Lanka in its war against the
LTTE. Its initiatives to block attempts by certain countries to place the issue of ethnic war in Sri Lanka on the United
Nations Security Council discussions, and its regular arms supply were critical for Sri Lanka particularly after its new
offensive against the LTTE since 2007. This was a clear indicator of a newfound understanding between Colombo and
Beijing.
The LTTE air raid over Colombo in 2007 that witnessed Zlin-143 bombers dropping bombs over the airport with
impunity came as a big shock to the Sri Lankan government. The rise of LTTE airpower was indeed a turning point in
the Sri Lankan military strategy. Also, the LTTE had been successful in thwarting Sri Lankan military attempts to
capture territory in the North. These developments had prompted the Sri Lankan government to increase military
spending by nearly 20 percent from $1.23 billion in 2007 to nearly $1.47 billion in 2008.
Meanwhile, China was quick to deny that it supplied heavy weapons to the Sri Lankan military. Reportedly, the Chinese
ambassador Dabo Ye met the Tamil MP and rights activist Mano Ganeshan in March 2008 and conveyed to him that
China¶s actions should not be interpreted as µanti-Tamil¶ and according to Ganesan, ³The ambassador made it clear that
China did not want to take sides in the ethnic conflict, and that it did not favor any particular political party or
community in its dealings in Sri Lanka´ (ThaiIndia News, March 20, 2008).
Although Beijing may have conveyed to Colombo its oft-stated position that Sri Lanka must seek a political solution to
the ethnic problem, it did not waste the opportunity to sell military hardware to Sri Lanka after the Indian government
declined to provide military equipment, citing concerns over the use of force against the Tamils. The Sri Lankan Army
chief Sarath Fonseka has noted that ³India had told us they were not in a position to sell or send offensive weapons or
even equipment like radars and basic communication equipment to meet our requirements´ (Indian Express, May 25).
The United States also suspended military aid to Sri Lanka over human rights issues.
During Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa¶s visit to China in 2007 (February 26 to March 4), the joint
communiqué had indirectly referred to the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and noted that ³The two sides resolved to fight
tirelessly against the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and would step up consultation and
coordination on regional and international counter-terrorism action.´ In April 2007, China and Sri Lanka reached a
$37.6 million deal for supply of artillery guns, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry weapons. China also
agreed to supply other systems to counter LTTE ambushes. Beijing also agreed to sell six F-7 jet fighters, considered
critical to destroying the LTTE¶s fledgling air force and also demolish other military infrastructure such as command
posts, underground bunkers, ammunition storages, boatbuilding yards and above all the airstrips (Thaindian, May 2).
Interestingly, Beijing encouraged Islamabad to meet Colombo¶s military requirements and help fight the LTTE
(Thaindian, May 2), it also encouraged Pakistan to train Sri Lankan pilots. Some Indian defence and military experts
maintain that Chinese and Pakistani air force advisors were in Colombo for the last year helping the Sri Lankan military
plan combat missions against the LTTE strongholds. China also supplied the Sri Lankan Army the HJ-8 anti-tank
missiles that were used against the LTTE hardened structures and pill boxes (China-defense-mashup.com). The Sri
Lankan army is also known to possess the Baktar Shikan, a variant of HJ-8 being manufactured under license in
Pakistan. Following the LTTE air strikes, Sri Lanka had planned to upgrade its air defense capability. In 2007, it ordered
JY-11 radar from China but the order was held in abeyance due to objections from India over air coverage that could
overlap with Indian air space.
In Sri Lanka, Lanka Logistics & Technologies, a state-owned enterprise, is the primary agency responsible for the
procurement of hardware for the military establishment. Interestingly, China established the Bonded Warehouse of
China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), a renowned international conglomerate, in the port city of Galle as far
back as 1994. As part of an agreement that is renewed every two years, the warehouse stores military equipment and
ordnance for the Sri Lankan military and the supplies are made on payments; whatever is not available is sourced back
to China and supplied. In a very interesting move, in 2004, NORINCO donated 1 million Renminbi to Sri Lanka¶s
Tsunami relief fund. Mr. Zhang Guoqing, President of NORINCO expressed his grief over the devastation caused by the
Tsunami and hoped that they could actively participate in the rebuilding process (Norinco.com, December 31, 2004).
Reportedly, Sri Lanka owes nearly $200 million for the military purchases from NORINCO and has not renewed its
contract, instead opting for Poly Technologies, a PLA military enterprise. Poly Technologies has supplied a variety of
military equipment including ordnance to the Sri Lankan forces. The Sri Lankan Army has purchased 120 mm mortar
shells valued at $10.4 million, 152 mm artillery shells for $20 million, and 81 mm high-explosive mortar bombs for $3.7
million. Similarly, the Sri Lankan Navy has acquired ammunition and guns at $2.7 million including naval guns, heavy
machine guns, multipurpose machine guns, and submachine guns. Interestingly, Chinese origin weapons including
automatic rifles, anti-tank weapons and grenade launchers have been found in the inventory of the LTTE too (Express
Buzz, May 29). These are believed to be sourced from Myanmar.
Besides military assistance, China increased its aid to Sri Lanka from a few million dollars in 2005 to about $1 billion in
2008 while the United States approved only $7.4 million and the U.K. £1.25 million in humanitarian aid. In fact, China
has displaced Japan as the major aid donor to Sri Lanka (Timesonline, May 16).
China has not only backed Sri Lanka with military assistance and enormous economic aid, it has invested in
development of infrastructure. In May 2007 China and Sri Lanka signed the "establishment of friendship city
relationship" relating to the Hambantota district for development of infrastructure. Designated as the Hambantota
Development Zone (HDZ), the project envisages building a harbour facility, bunkering facilities and a tank farm. The
HDZ is estimated to cost $1 billion and would be completed in fifteen years. The first phase of construction commenced
in October 2007 and is estimated to cost $450 million (Timesonline, May 16).
The HDZ is being developed in the form of dual use infrastructure similar to Gwadar in Pakistan and serves China in a
number of strategic ways. First, because it is a deep water natural harbor it provides facilities for Chinese flagged
merchant ships, container vessels, oil and gas tankers, and military vessels including nuclear submarines operating in the
Indian Ocean or transiting through the western approaches of the Straits of Malacca. Second, China would be able to
establish electronic systems and networks for monitoring Indian Ocean military and civilian traffic, electronic
transmissions from the U.S. base at Diego Garcia and the Indian nuclear facility that is likely to come up at Rambilli in
the Bay of Bengal. Third, Hambantota offers a strategic location for China to set up its space monitoring systems,
considered critical for its ballistic missiles, which can challenge U.S. forces particularly the aircraft carriers who may
threaten Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean. Fourth, the Chinese fleet of fishing vessels that are also deployed for
intelligence gathering duties can be staged from Hambantota. In essence, Hambantota fits well into the Chinese µstrings
of pearls¶ strategy and has the potential to provide Beijing the critical µleverage to play the Great Game in the Indian
Ocean.¶
After the military decimation of the LTTE, Sri Lanka is full of confidence and has the potential to exercise some amount
of µstrategic autonomy.¶ It acknowledges the Chinese diplomatic and military support in its fight against the LTTE and
could resist pressures from its big neighbour India and the West. China¶s politico-economic initiatives and unrestrained
supply of military equipment to Sri Lanka has made New Delhi nervous, finding itself robustly encircled by China. Sri
Lanka will be under tremendous pressure from India and may find itself sandwiched between the two rising powers of
Asia and cornered to µchoose¶ between the two powers.
Notes
1. Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and nation-building in South Asia (Sage publications, 2001),p.331.
2. S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis, (Sage Publications, 1993),p.100, cited in Swaran
Singh ³Sino-South Asian Ties: Problems & Prospects´, Strategic Analysis Volume XXIV No 1, April 2000.
Y
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June 12, 2009 08:14 AM Age: 254 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America
By: Russell Hsiao
NAe Sao Paulo
In a May 9 interview with Brazilian defense, strategy and intelligence news website Defasanet, Brazilian Defense
Minister Nelson Jobim stated that Brazil and China had reached an agreement to train personnel from the People¶s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Brazil. In the interview (available in Portuguese), Jobim announced that the two sides
reached a training agreement to stage PLAN officers aboard the NAe Sao Paulo, Brazil¶s Clemenceau-class aircraft
carrier (Defesanet, May 13). There has been no reported official confirmation from the Chinese government concerning
this agreement, however, on May 19 the official Xinhua News Agency released a news report in its Spanish portal (no
equivalent has been found in the news agency¶s Chinese or English portal), which cites remarks that Jobim made to the
media about the nature of the plan in question. The Xinhua report cited Jobim as saying that the agreement was reached
in April during Navy Admiral Carlos Soares de Moura Neto¶s official visit to Qingdao to attend the PLAN¶s 60th
Anniversary Naval Review (Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20). The defense minister noted that the Chinese
wanted aircraft carriers for power projection, and that he hopes naval cooperation between Brazil and China can serve as
the gateway for defense cooperation in other areas (Defesanet, May 13, Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20).
Jobim is planning a visit to China in September or October, which analysts say is likely to finalize the training
agreement.
Although the details of this alleged agreement are still unknown, given the chronic lack of funding for the NAe Sao
Paulo within Brazil¶s national budget, some observers speculate that a part of the deal may involve the Chinese paying
for some of the restoration of the aircraft carrier in return for some real on-deck operational experience for its carrier
officers. An article that appeared in a Chinese naval university¶s website, ³Why did China Choose Brazil to Train it
Carrier Pilots?´ referenced an unspecified source as saying that the Chinese will provide technical support to Brazil for
constructing its nuclear submarines (Haijun.xaut.edu.cn, June 1). Western and Chinese analysts believe that at a
minimum this agreement will allow the Chinese access to Brazilian naval aviation expertise in addition to the carrier
itself. In any event, training of PLAN officers on NAe Sao Paulo would accelerate the development of Chinese capacity
in naval aviation, which has been a major weakness in China¶s efforts to operationalize an aircraft carrier.
There are currently nine navies with aircraft carriers in active service, and the United States, France, Russia and Brazil
are the only four naval forces that have operational aircraft carriers capable of launching and recovering conventional
aircraft. Reports that appeared in the Chinese press in the past have suggested that the PLAN is planning to employ the
CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery) launch and recovery system for its carriers. This may
explain why Chinese leaders have selected the NAe Sao Paulo as the operational carrier for training its future star carrier
officers. Moreover, France is restricted from participating in any technical training that may lead to a possible transfer of
sensitive technology to China due to the current EU embargo on China. On the other hand, Russian²and the British
navy, which will launch its Queen Elizabeth class carriers from 2014 to 2018²operates STOVL (Short Take-Off and
Vertical Landing) system, thus Brazil appears to be the only viable candidate for the PLAN if they intend to adopt the
CATOBAR system. In addition, China's turn to Brazil may be the result of the standstill in Sino-Russian defense
cooperation, Russia recently suspended negotiations to sell China²its number one client²the Su-33 fighter jet due to
allegations that the Chinese are illegally copying the Su-27SK and other Russian military hardware and technology
(Defense News, May 4; Haijun.xaut.edu.cn, June 1).
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3
June 24, 2009 03:00 PM Age: 242 days
By: Itamar Lee
Chinese President Hu Jintao elevated the concept of ³harmonious ocean´ (hexie haiyang) in an unprecedented maritime
parade during the 60th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at Qingdao on April 23. In Hu¶s
speech, the Chinese leader proclaimed that ³for now and in the future, China would 'never seek hegemony' (yongbu
chengba), nor would it turn to military expansion or arms races with other nations´ (Xinhua News Agency, April 23). In
spite of these assurances, the PLAN's growing activism on the high seas has grown notably more pronounced from the
Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. Despite the absence of a credible military threat in an era of peaceful development,
Beijing ³began a major military build up´ [1]. The increased level of Chinese naval activities in recent years has
unsettled the littoral states that line its expanding belt of maritime activities, particularly India, which has grown
increasingly wary of PLA military modernization.
The growing presence of Chinese naval power around the Indian Ocean, which serves as the conduit between the Gulf
states and Southeast Asia, is deepened by its support facilities in Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the
deepwater facility in Pakistan¶s Gwadar port. Indian military experts have pointed out that these bases have the effect of
³virtually encircling India´ (Hindustan Times, March 17), and senior officials have expressed explicit concerns about
these developments. According to Indian Defense Minister M.M. Paalam Raju, ³We [India] are taking steps [to see] that
Chinese influence does not pose a threat´ (Zeenews.com, June 1). The increased naval cooperation between Pakistan
and China in recent years and the development of the Gwadar naval base are becoming a magnet of growing strategic
concerns for India that may not only transform the regional military balance by sparking an arms race but also
significantly reshape the regional security architecture.
The extent of China¶s current power projection capabilities remains an open question. According to Chinese specialists,
³China¶s sea power and the expansion of its navy are limited´ beyond Taiwan, the Nansha Islands (Spratlys) and the
Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands [2]. For the time being the PLAN has no choice but to ³face an ambition-capability gap in
terms of using military power to secure its foreign energy investments or to defend critical sea lanes against disruption´
[3]. Adding to its Malacca dilemma, which has been well documented in the Chinese media, some noted analysts have
also recently pointed to a Hormuz conundrum for the PLAN to bypass the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) toward
the Middle East (China Brief, September 22, 2008).
In an effort to deal with these ³strategic bottlenecks´ from the Malacca Strait to the Hormuz Strait, China has been
strengthening bilateral relations with Pakistan with a focus on naval cooperation and the development of the Gwadar
port, which is located 400 kilometers from the Hormuz Strait. According to General Pervez Musharraf, the former
Pakistani President, ³Pakistan provides a natural link between the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) states to
connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia´ (Guardian, June 16, 2006). As one Pakistani
expert stressed, Gwadar port in Pakistan not only offers China a transit terminal for crude oil imports from the Middle
East and Africa to Xinjiang to meet its soaring energy demands²which is indispensable both for its economic
development and domestic stability²but also provides a strategic location from which to monitor U.S. naval activity in
the Persian Gulf; to follow Indian activity in the Arabian Sea; and to assess future U.S.-India or U.S.-Japan naval
cooperation in the Indian Ocean [4].
Thus Chinese development of the Gwadar port can not be simply evaluated on commercial and economic terms, since
the port is a dual-use infrastructure that could provide military access for Chinese naval projection and a base for its
strategic warships [5]. If the PLAN deploys its submarines off the Gwadar port in Pakistan, this will allow the PLAN to
bypass the strategic bottleneck presented by the Malacca Strait, while strengthening its power projection capabilities in
the region [6]. Moreover, China¶s deepening bilateral naval cooperation with Pakistan can offer a strategic maritime
buffer zone as well as a useful political and diplomatic outlet toward Islamic states in the Middle East [7]. Pakistan is an
active member of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and oil-rich moderate Gulf States regard it ³as a
counterweight to Iran and Iraq´ [8].
Increased naval cooperation between Pakistan and China hints at an evolving Chinese naval strategy, which seems to be
transitioning from the late Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping's instruction of ³hiding real capabilities to bide our time´
(taoguang yanghui) to ³making some contributions by seizing opportunities´ (yousuo zuowei). By the same logic, as
China continues naval expansion toward Islamabad, ³its strategic goals may shift, which in turn could require the
development of new capabilities´ [9].
Since 1999 the PLA has initiated the new strategy of sanda sanfang (three attacks and three defenses), which refers to
attacks against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and armed helicopters, and defense against precision strikes, electronic
jamming and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. This program was originally initiated by the PLA after its
study of air combat in the Yugoslav War. According to a 2007 report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, ³the PLA
Navy is actively involved in developing and training with its own combat methods for the new µThree Attacks and Three
Defenses¶´ [10]. In an era of information warfare, growing naval cooperation between Pakistan and China will likely be
focused on conducting cooperative naval intelligence, gathering strategic information and obviating an enemy¶s
surveillance activities.
In this regard, China¶s basing activities not only in Gwadar but also in Hambantota of Sri Lanka could be linked with the
PLA Navy¶s overall strategy of keeping the ocean(s) [beyond the Taiwan Strait] 'peaceful and harmonious' in terms of
Chinese national interests (The Times of India, April 26). According to Chen Hu, ³China needs the Oceans « The
Oceans also need China « Hexie shijie [harmonious world] can not exist without hexie haiyang´ (Zhongguo Haijun
Wang [China Navy Net], April 25). The concept of hexie haiyang [in the Indian Ocean] was loudly echoed by Pakistan
with the tacit support of Beijing. More recently, Pakistani Defense Minister Ahmad Mukhtar reinforced the image of the
burgeoning cooperation between the two country's naval powers, saying ³I [Pakistan] want your [Chinese] warships to
stay in Pakistan, for they are really amazing´ (Zhongguo Ribao Wang [China Daily Net], March 12).
China¶s naval cooperation with Pakistan has gradually developed since October 2003, when the Chinese and Pakistani
navy held training exercises in the East China Sea near Shanghai, which was the PLAN's first military training exercise
with a foreign nation. In November 2005, the PLAN conducted a non-traditional military training exercise with Pakistan
in the Arabian Sea. In July 2007, the PLAN undertook its first mult inational military training exercise at sea near
Pakistan. According to Ye Hailin, a researcher in the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), µthe Indian Ocean with Chinese characteristics¶ has emerged since 2007 when two Chinese guided-
missile frigates, Lianyungang and Sanming, participated in the first AMAN 07 multinational naval exercise in Karachi
(Dongfang Zaobao, March 13). In an interview with the official Xinhua News Agency, PLAN Commander Admiral Wu
Shengli stated that, ³Since the new century, the Chinese Navy has conducted 37 joint military drills with its foreign
counterparts in areas including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security defense of sea-land-air
channels, antiterrorism and joint search and rescue.´ Admiral Wu added that the PLAN was on the way of becoming an
³ocean-going iron Great Wall´ (Beijing Review, May 4).
The significance of Sino-Pakistani naval cooperation was underscored by an assessment made by Pakistan¶s Admiral
Afzal Tahir in 2008: ³Pakistan¶s Navy and the PLAN have been continuing a friendly relationship, this not only is a
crucial part of our bilateral relations but also will bring a positive outcome to us. This is my strong and unchanging
belief´ (Dongfang Zaobao, April 8, 2008). In March 2009, the PLAN¶s most advanced indigenous built Type 052B (or
Guangzhou) missile destroyer, which is stationed at the Sanya naval base on Hainan Island, participated in the second
AMAN 09 multinational naval exercise held by Pakistan from March 9 to 12. According to Li Ping, the captain of the
destroyer, ³sending Guangzhou, our most advanced homemade destroyer,´ with the slogan of µTogether for Peace,¶
³showcases China¶s full respect for Pakistan¶s sea «´ [11]. According to Li, ³AMAN 09 will enhance our capabilities
in coping with changes in military technology, multifaceted security challenges as well as diverse military missions.
Non-traditional military tasks, which diverge from the military's traditional tasks of confrontation and war, range from
antiterrorism and anti-piracy to international humanitarian aid and disaster relief´ (Beijing Review, March 13).
Furthermore, the Pakistan Navy recently indicated that it will receive two of four F-22P frigates from China in August
and December of this year. Each frigate is equipped with modern weaponry and sensors, as well as anti-submarine Z9EC
helicopters. Two helicopters have reportedly arrived in Pakistan. The third F-22P Frigate was reportedly launched at
Hudong Shanghai on May 28, and construction of a fourth ship started in March of this year at the Karachi Shipyard and
Engineering Works, and will be delivered to the Pakistan Navy in April 2013 (Associated Press of Pakistan, June 4). In
an effort to neutralize China¶s growing military influence in the regional balance, India has ordered three new Phalcon
Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) for $1.1 billion from Israel in 2004. The first of three AWACS was
delivered on May 27, 2009 and the remaining two planes are expected to reach India in 2010 (Jerusalem Post, May 24).
New Delhi, in tandem with Indo-Israeli military cooperation, recently deployed four Sukhoi fighter aircraft on Tezpur
airbase in Assam along the Chinese border. It is reported that India plans to acquire over 200 Russian-made Sukhoi by
2014 (Daily Times, June 16).
Deepening naval cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad complicates the changing maritime balance of power in
the strategic area between the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. China¶s rising naval influence from the Taiwan Strait
to the Strait of Hormuz via the Indian Ocean aims not only at enhancing its military capability for strategic peripheral
denial but also at developing ³politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a
conflict of great interest to China´ [12]. In particular, China¶s visible maritime investment and naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, under the aegis of Pakistan and the SCO, increases its strategic ability to affect vital sea lanes to the
Persian Gulf while keeping the Taiwan Strait harmonious [13]. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the evolving
naval connections between Pakistan and China could become the hidden teeth of the Dragon along the Indian Ocean
between Tehran and Taipei.
Notes
1. Arthur Waldron, ³China¶s New Navy,´ Looking Forward (December 15, 2005), at
www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp
2. Zhang Wenmu, ³Sea Power and China¶s Strategic Choices,´ China Security (Summer 2006), p. 25, at ww
w.wsichina.org/cs3_2.pdf.
3. David F. Helvey, China¶s Energy Consumption and Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation to Address the Effects
of China¶s Energy Use, Testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 15, 2007, p. 6,
at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/written_testimonies/07_06_14_15wrts/07_06_15_h elvey_statement.pdf.
4. Muhammad Ijaz Butt, Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan, Domestic Concerns (Lahore: Advance Publishers,
2007), pp. 125-128.
5. Lisa Curtis, China¶s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan, Testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, May 20, 2009, p. 3, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_te
stimonies/09_05_20_wrts/09_05_20_curtis_statement.pdf.
6. Mohan Guruswamy, Jeevan Prakashi Mohanty and Ronald Joseph Abraham, ³Will India Catch Up with China?´ in V.
P. Malik and Jorg Schultz, eds., The Rise of China: Perspectives from Asia and Europe (New Delhi: Pentagon Press,
2008), p. 173.
7. Shigeo Hiramatsu, Chugoku no anzen hosho senryaku [China¶s Security Strategy] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2005), p. 59.
8. Thomas Parker, ³China¶s Growing Interests in the Persian Gulf,´ The Brown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 7,
No. 1(Winter/Spring 2000), p. 241.
9. Taylor Fravel, ³China¶s Search for Military Power: Internal Control, Peripheral Denial and Limited Force Projection,´
presented at International Symposium on Security Affairs 2007: ³China¶s Rise and Its Limitations: China at the
Crossroads,´ hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, February 1,
2007.
10. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, China¶s Navy 2007, p. 27, at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/oni2007.pdf.
11. ³Together for Peace,´ MAG: The Weekly Defence(April 18, 2009), at www.magtheweekly.com/52/defence.php.
12. Thomas J. Christensen, ³Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China¶s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security
Policy,´ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4(Spring 2001), p. 9.
13. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Chinese Naval System Modernization Trends, Testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, June 11, 2009, p. 4, at
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_06_11_wrts /09_06_11_fisher_statement.pdf
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June 24, 2009 02:44 PM Age: 242 days
By: Andrew S. Erickson
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress,
p. 21.
China wants to achieve the ability, or at minimum the appearance of the ability, to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group
(CSG) from intervening in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis. China may be closer than ever to achieving this
capability with land-based anti-ship homing ballistic missiles. There have been many Western reports that China is
developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Increasingly, technical and operationally-focused discussions are
found in a widening array of Chinese sources, some authoritative. These factors suggest that China may be close to
fielding, testing, or employing an ASBM²a weapon that no other country possesses. According to U.S. Government
sources, Beijing is pursuing an ASBM based on its CSS-5/DF-21D solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile. The
CSS-5¶s 1,500 km+ range could hold ships at risk in a large maritime area²far beyond the Taiwan theatre into the
Western Pacific [1]. Yet there remain considerable unknowns about China's ASBM capability, which could profoundly
affect U.S. deterrence, military operations and the balance of power in the Western Pacific.
Taiwan as the Catalyst
For the past several decades, the U.S. Navy has used aircraft carriers to project power around the world, including in and
around the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of the USS Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups in response to
China¶s 1995-1996 missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait was a move that the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) could not counter. The impetus behind Chinese efforts to develop ASBMs may be to prevent similar U.S.
carrier operations in the future.
Keystone of µAnti-Access¶ Strategy?
If fielded, the ASBM would be just one of the many new platforms and weapons systems that China has been buying
and building since the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. These systems, collectively, will allow China to assert
unprecedented control over its contested maritime periphery, in part by attempting to deny U.S. forces µaccess¶ to critical
areas in times of crisis or conflict. They do so by matching Chinese strengths with U.S. weaknesses, thereby placing
U.S. platforms on the µwrong end of physics.¶ An ASBM, however, stands above the quiet submarines, lethal anti-ship
cruise missiles, and copious sea mines that China has been adding to its arsenal in its potential strategic impact on
regional allies of the United States and U.S. interests in maintaining regional peace and security.
Firstly, the development of an ASBM would draw on over half a century of Chinese experience with ballistic missiles.
Secondly, it would be fired from mobile, highly concealable land-based platforms. Thirdly, it would have the range to
strike targets hundreds of kilometers from China¶s shores. These factors suggest that China is likely to succeed in
achieving a capability that is extremely difficult to counter and could impose µaccess denial¶ in strategically vital sea
areas well beyond its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
U.S. Technological Influence?
The United States does not have an ASBM. It did have a distantly related capability, in the form of the Pershing II
ground-to-ground theater-ballistic missile, but Washington relinquished this capability when it ratified the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Moscow in 1988. Interestingly, some Chinese sources state that previous
advances in the now-abandoned Pershing II program inspired Chinese research and development relevant to an ASBM
[2]. The Pershing II has adjustable second stage control fins for terminal maneuver. U.S. Government sources, and many
Chinese sources, state that a Chinese ASBM would be based on the CSS-5. While positively identified photos of a CSS-
5 outside its launch canister are not known to exist, at least one version of China¶s related CSS-6/DF-15 missile has a
reentry vehicle virtually identical in appearance to the Pershing II¶s [3]. Based on this strong visual resemblance, it is
possible that the CSS-6 employs terminal maneuvering technology similar to that of the Pershing II, and it is reasonable
to assume that the CSS-5 does too. This is because the reentry vehicle that China obviously has could easily be mated
with the CSS-5 booster, which might then produce an effective ASBM, assuming that its radar has the ability to track
moving targets at sea.
Making an ASBM Work
Chinese schematic diagrams show an ASBM flight trajectory with mid-course and terminal guidance [4]. Second stage
control fins would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures and home in
on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fixed trajectory.
Yet how do Chinese experts envision the ³kill chain´²the sequence of events that must occur for a missile to
successfully engage and destroy or disable its target (e.g. an aircraft carrier)²beyond the five steps that they commonly
list: 1) detection, 2) tracking, 3) penetration of target defenses, 4) hitting a moving target, and 5) causing sufficient
damage? A single broken link would render an attack incomplete, and hence ineffective. What would work based on
what is known about China's capabilities today, and in the future?
China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground-and-space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon
(OTH) radars and electronic signals detection equipment, which can assist ASBM detection and targeting [5]. While
locating an aircraft carrier has been likened to finding a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar
cross section, emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Active radar is the most likely ASBM sensor, since its
signals can penetrate through clouds. Simply looking for the biggest reflection will tend to locate the largest ship as a
target, and the largest ship will usually be an aircraft carrier (if the pre-launch targeting was good).
And Proving that it is Workable
Critical questions remain with respect to missile sensors, however. Does China have multiple sensors that it is currently
capable of applying to ASBM detection and targeting? Even in the absence of relevant space-based intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), is there another way to cue the missile accurately enough so that the possible
parameters of where the carrier could move in the missile¶s brief flight time can be accounted for within the ³window´
of its seeker? As for the seeker, how would it work? How would it accomplish target discrimination? Is this a
challenging issue? Does it hinge on the large size of a carrier? Could smaller ships also be targeted effectively?
What do Chinese experts fear could go wrong, and perhaps even render an ASBM unusable? Missile defense? Other
things? Considerable Chinese research on irregular (³wavy´) ASBM/ballistic missile trajectories and penetration aids
(PENAIDS) to defeat missile defense suggests that this is an area of ongoing concern.
With respect to testing, what would be the bare minimum necessary to make the PLA feel that it had some rudimentary
operational capability²and hence, perhaps, some deterrence ability? Are there any testing/targeting plans?
Demonstration plans? What is the target audience (domestic/foreign public vs. PLA/foreign military¶s eyes only)? The
U.S./Taiwan/Japanese military, public, or all of the above?
The Service in Charge
The Second Artillery, China¶s strategic rocket force, already responsible for China¶s land-based nuclear and
conventional missiles (the latter since 1993), would likely control any ASBMs that China develops. Relatively small,
technologically-focused and extremely secretive, the service is ideally suited to such a mission. It has been studying the
ASBM issue for some time, having published what appears to be a conceptual feasibility study in 2003, and a major
doctrinal publication the following year [6].
This still leaves critical questions of joint operations, and bureaucratic coordination, however. How are sensors
prioritized and coordinated? Which organization(s) control which sensors (e.g. OTH radar), and how are they used? Is
there a risk of seams between services (e.g. Second Artillery, Navy, etc.)? What about problems with bureaucratic
³stovepipes,´ particularly during general wartime crisis management? How to overlap areas of ³uncertainty´ from
different sensors, and thereby accomplish data/sensor fusion? How to accomplish bureaucratic ³data fusion´²a task
beyond even the most competent engineers? Finally, which authorities would need to be in the decision-making loop,
and what are the time-to-launch implications?
Doctrinal Guidance
How does the second artillery conceive of using ASBMs in operational scenarios? The service¶s authoritative high-level
handbook, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, describes in some detail the use of ASBMs against carriers. It in no
way suggests that such an approach is merely aspirational or beset with insurmountable technical difficulties. In fact, in
introducing the section describing their potential employment, it states that ³conventional missile strike groups´ should
be used as an ³assassin¶s mace´ (silver bullet), a term commonly used to describe weapons that match Chinese strengths
against an enemy¶s weaknesses.
According to its handbook, the Second Artillery is thinking seriously about at least five ways to use ASBMs against
U.S. CSGs, at least at the conceptual level:
³Firepower harassment [strikes]´ (huoli xirao) involve hitting carrier strike groups.
³Frontal firepower deterrence´ (qianfang huoli shezu) involves firing intimidation salvos in front of a carrier strike
group ³to serve as a warning.´
³Flank firepower expulsion´ (yice huoli qugan) combines interception of a carrier strike group by Chinese naval forces
with intimidation salvos designed to direct it away from the areas where China feels most threatened.
³Concentrated fire assault´ (jihuo tuji) involves striking the enemy¶s core carrier as with a µheavy hammer.¶
³Information assault´ (xinxi gongji) entails attacking the carrier strike group¶s command and control system
electromagnetically to disable it [7].
All this does not mean that China necessarily has an ASBM capability already, but it strongly suggests that related
research and development has high-level approval from China¶s military and civilian leadership.
Concept of Operations?
The above document offers general insights into the Second Artillery¶s conception of conventional deterrence. It adds
that the Second Artillery will work with the PLAN to ³execute focused naval blockades´ and ³achieve command of the
seas.´ Approaching enemy CSGs are envisioned to be the principal maritime targets, but ³large vessels or large ship
formations´ more broadly are mentioned as well. Coordination and precision are seen as essential for ³deterring and
blocking enemy carrier strike groups´; such ³operational activities need to be coordinated without the slightest
difference in time.´ Coordination with the PLAN is also emphasized in the location of sea targets, as well as with regard
to the notification and demarcation of blockade areas: ³the naval intelligence department should 'relay promptly' the
information obtained by its reconnaissance about enemy ship activities to the Second Artillery campaign large
formation.´ In particular, ³information regarding carrier battle groups « should be gathered on a real time basis.´
Potential sources of ³real-time target intelligence´ include ³military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and foreign
remote sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image information processing systems.´
Still, this leaves critical questions unanswered concerning how the PLA might envision the basing location, number,
employment, and strategic effects of any ASBMs:
Base of operations. Where would the ASBMs themselves be based? What would be the expected range from the
target?
Nature of arsenal. What would be the relative size of the ASBM inventory? Size might have implications for
operational possibilities and willingness to expend ASBMs in conflict.
Concept of operations. It is one thing to call for ASBM capabilities, but how would they be realized in practice?
What would an ASBM firing doctrine look like, and what would be the objective? Target destruction or mission kill (the
equivalent of µslashing the tires¶ on carrier aircraft)? What to shoot at, and when? Would the PLA fire on a carrier if it
knew the planes were off of it? Would it rely on a first strike? Would the PLA plan to fire one ASBM, several, or a large
salvo? If a salvo, then some combination of saturation (many shots in the same space, to overload missile defense),
precision (firing many shots in a pattern to compensate for locating error on the target and to get the CSG in the seeker
window of at least one of the missiles), or both? What type of warhead: unitary, EMP, or sub-munitions? How might
salvo attacks, or multi-axis attack coordination, be envisioned? Do Chinese planners think that the Second Artillery
could handle the mission by itself, or would it be part of a high-low, time-on-target attack with both ASBMs and cruise
missiles?
Concept of deterrence. Deterrence would seem to be a clear purpose of any ASBM development, but what does one
have to show to deter? PLA doctrinal publications mention firing µwarning shots¶ in front of carriers²how does the
Second Artillery think the United States would respond? How would the United States know it was a warning shot and
not just a miss? What if the United States did know and called China¶s bluff? Finally, from a technical perspective, how
to actually fire a warning shot and miss by an intentional margin (versus having the seeker home in on the actual target)?
Conclusion
From Chinese sources, it can be inferred that Chinese leaders seek not to attack the United States, but to deter it. They
want to defend what they perceive to be their state¶s core territorial interests and to ensure a stable environment for
domestic economic development. If they develop an ASBM, they would likely hope that it could prevent U.S. projection
of military power in ways that are inimical to China¶s security interests, which appear to be expanding beyond the First
Island Chain. Yet the strength of Chinese equities, combined with vital U.S. interests in East Asia, make ASBM
development for this purpose a complex and risky proposition. Should Beijing pursue such a course to its logical
conclusion²a demonstrated ASBM capability²only robust strategic dialogue could hope to alleviate the substantial
tensions that are certain to ensue. Until Beijing is willing to discuss in detail its progress and intentions in this area,
however, it will be essential to search for answers to the questions outlined above²not just for a select group of
government bureaucrats and the leaders they advise, but also for the publics in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States,
who fund military development and who must ultimately live with its consequences. Regional peace and stability, and
mutual strategic trust, demand no less.
Notes
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to
Congress, pp. 21, 48.
2. Qiu Zhenwei, ³A Discussion of China¶s Development of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,´ blog.huanqiu.com; ³Special
Dispatch: µAces¶ in µDongfeng¶ Family²Miniaturization, Solidification, and Mobility,´ Ta Kung Pao, 2 October 1999,
p. A11, OSC FTS19991114000862.
3. See www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df15.asp. This could be a case of covergent evolution; it is possible that
the RVs look alike because they solve similar problems.
4. Tan Shoulin and Zhang Daqiao, Second Artillery Engineering College, Diao Guoxiu, PLA Unit 96311, Huaihua;
³Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance for a Ballistic Missile Attacking an Aircraft
Carrier,´ Command Control & Simulation, Vol. 28, No. 4 (August 2006), p. 6.
5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to
Congress, pp. 21, 48; Sean O¶Connor, ³OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat,´ Information Dissemination,
geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-radar-and-asbm-threat.html.
6. Huang Hongfu, ³Conception of Using Conventional Ballistic Missiles to Strike Aircraft Carrier Formation,´ Scientific
and Technological Research, Scientific and Technological Committee of the Second Artillery Corps, 2003, No. 1, pp. 6-
8; Yu Jixun, chief editor, People¶s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns
(Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
7. Yu Jixun, chief editor, People¶s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns
(Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 401-402.
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June 24, 2009 02:41 PM Age: 242 days
Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Domestic/Social, Elite, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Willy Lam
While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must have heaved a sigh of relief over the relatively uneventful 20th
anniversary of the June 4, 1989 crackdown, central party authorities are adopting extra measures to defuse tension
between local officials and the masses. Widespread anger at the callousness, corruption and other misdemeanors of
cadres, particularly those at the level of counties and below, is deemed a main factor behind the tens of thousands of
riots and protests that occur every year. The latest such disaster, where some 10,000 peasants from Shishou town, Hubei
Province clashed last week with police due to the latter¶s alleged cover-up of the suspicious death of a local resident, has
followed upon the heels of similar incidents in Hainan, Guizhou and Yunnan the past year. In all these cases, law
officers and other grassroots personnel offered protection to the rich and powerful instead of helping citizens who were
victimized by corrupt cadres or triad elements (Reuters, June 21; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 22; Outlook Weekly
[Beijing] January 6). Starting in the spring, the CCP Organization Department (CCPOD) and other high-level
departments have launched an unprecedentedly large-scale campaign to ³retrain´ grassroots-level personnel ranging
from civil servants to police officers and judges. The goal is apparently to nurture a new generation of officials who are
³both red and expert,´ meaning that they are politically correct, morally above-board and professionally competent.
In early summer, the CCPOD dispatched around 10,000 inspectors to local-level administrations to check on the
livelihood of peasants as well as the ³governance capability´ of grassroots officials. As Organization Chief and
Politburo member Li Yuanchao indicated, CCPOD cadres must ³have a better grip on the situation and a deeper
understanding of the grassroots.´ While Beijing has not disclosed the number of corrupt or incompetent cadres who have
been sacked, it seems clear that these CCPOD ³plenipotentiaries´ are eager to flush out the bad apples. More
significantly, Li has passed along his mentor, President Hu Jintao¶s concern for propagating officials who can better
handle the increasingly complex ³social contradictions´ at the level of villages, towns and counties. This was behind the
decision earlier this year to send several thousand county chiefs for short- and long-term programs at Central Party
School centers in Beijing, Shanghai and Jinggangshan, Jiangxi Province. The CCPOD has also boosted the number of
fresh college graduates who are being recruited as cunguan, or ³village cadres.´ In Yunnan Province alone, more than
60,000 college graduates are vying for 10,000 cunguan positions. Henan Province Party Secretary Xu Guangchun
indicated last month that it might be a good idea for universities to offer more courses on different aspects of village-
level administration so that graduates can seek a rewarding career as cunguan (Xinhua News Agency, June 4; People¶s
Daily, January 9; China Youth Daily, June 5; Collegenews.cn, May 17).
Even more unusual is the simultaneous training of grassroots police and prison officers, presecutors, judges, as well as
cadres working in the disciplinary inspection committees of counties and other local governments. In China, the Central
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), which is headed by Politburo Standing Committee member He
Guoqiang, is the highest anti-graft agency. The CCDI has branches in all provinces, cities and counties. For example,
3,080 county-level police officers have just finished refresher classes in the Beijing headquarters of the Ministry of
Public Security. Apart from boning up on the law and latest developments in information technology, the senior cops
took courses on ³the construction of harmonious relationship between the police and the people.´ Similarly, judges and
judicial personnel based in intermediate and lower-level courts will, starting in July, undertake a year-long program at
legal and administrative institutes in the capital. The slogan of this gargantuan re-education campaign is: ³the people¶s
judges must work for the people´ (People¶s Daily, June 5; Xinhua News Agency, June 8).
Owing to the ever-increasing cases of confrontation²and sometimes outright battles²between the police and
disadvantaged groups such as poor peasants, the re-education of public security officers has drawn the most attention
from the Chinese media. Police chiefs have waxed eloquent on the fact that their staff should have acquired ³five major
capabilities´ after their half-year training in Beijing. These include the ability ³to build up harmonious ties with masses´;
³to implement the law in a rational, peaceful, civilized and regulated manner´; ³to strengthen and improve ways to
provide guidance to the media´; ³to raise IT standards and to boost their capacity to put [theories] into practice at local
levels´; and ³to better prevent and adequately handle emergency incidents.´ According to Minister of Public Security
Meng Jianzhu, who is personally in charge of the training, ³police officers should avoid being carried away and
becoming emotional when facing complicated situations.´ Meng, also a State Councillor, added that ³police should
avoid using excessively strong language or employing undue force´ in tackling suspects (CCTV news, February 27;
Xinhua News Agency, February 19).
In a similar vein, the President of the Supreme People¶s Court (SPC) Wang Shengjun expressed confidence that more
training will boost the political as well as professional standards of the nation¶s judges. In the past couple of years, the
reputation of the judicial system has been dented by corruption scandals involving senior judges such as former SPC
vice president Huang Songyou. Huang, together with a number of associates, was detained late last year for allegedly
accepting millions of yuan worth of bribes and kickbacks. In a recent speech on the ³construction of judicial human
resources,´ Wang noted that judicial personnel must be imbued with the spirit of ³running the courts with seriousness,
boosting the credibility of and popular support for the courts, and strengthening the courts with science and technology.´
³We must have a corps of judicial staff who is politically reliable, professionally up to scratch, devoted to the people, as
well as fair and uncorrupt,´ he added (Chinacourt.org, April 29; Xinhua News Agency, June 17).
While training of this unprecedented magnitude is a step forward for boosting administrative effectiveness, there are
doubts as to whether the lofty objectives envisaged by the likes of Politburo member Li or Chief Judge Wang can be
realized. One problem is that excessive premium seems to have been placed on ³redness´ as opposed to ³expertise.´
Take for example, the pronouncements of Vice President Xi Jinping, who, as President of the Central Party School, is a
key mastermind behind the nationwide re-education exercise. In speeches on criteria for promoting cadres, Xi has
reiterated that ³while we emphasize that cadres must pass muster in both morality and [professional] competence,
morality comes first´ (People¶s Daily, June 12; Xinhua News Agency, March 30). In his admonishments for judges,
Chief Justice Wang has invariably urged them to follow this hierarchy of values: ³giving top priority to the [Communist]
Party¶s enterprise, the people¶s interests and [the sanctity of] the Constitution and the law.´ ³Let¶s diligently build up a
corps of high-quality judicial personnel that can reassure the Party and let the people be satisfied´ (Xinhua News
Agency, April 29). Loyalty to the party, then, is clearly considered by the CCP to be more important than the officials¶
professional standards as well as their ability to meet the demands of the populace.
Moreover, at least a good part of the re-education campaign is centered on baowen, or ³safeguarding stability´²
codeword for defusing challenges to the CCP²rather than promoting good governance as such. During the training of
the 3,000-odd police officers, senior instructors repeated President Hu¶s mantra for what party leaders consider to be a
trouble-prone 2009: ³We must ensure economic growth, safeguard the people¶s livelihood, and preserve stability.´
Another favorite slogan cited during courses for grassroots cops was that of State Councillor Meng: ³A minor incident
should be solved within the village; even a major incident should be tackled within [the parameters of] towns and
townships. Do not let [social] contradictions go all the way up to the central authorities´ (China.com.cn, February 26;
Yangcheng Evening Post [Guangdong], February 18). In other words, what central authorities are looking for in local-
level officials are superb fire-fighting skills rather than exceptional dedication to or capability for public service.
Moroever, training or re-training cannot be a substitute for the wholesale professionalization of the Chinese cadre and
civil service. The State Council or Central Government has, since the start of the reform era, been generous with capital
projects, particularly the building of infrastructure ranging from highways and railways to industrial parks. For example,
much of the 4 trillion yuan (about $570 billion) that Premier Wen Jiabao approved last November for resuscitating the
economy has been earmarked for infrastructure improvement. Yet, relatively little government expenditure has gone into
boosting professional education. A recent report by the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, which has also
embarked on a massive re-training of its staff, revealed that only 12 percent of its 122,000 grassroots officials have
professional qualifications in fields such as land surveying or mining administration, and each of the ministry¶s 25,000
local-level offices boasts less than one professional staff (People¶s Daily, June 21).
The insufficient weight given to professionalism is evident even in the critical field of justice. While more than 300,000
students are studying in China¶s 634 law schools, a sizable number of courts and prosecutors¶ offices, particularly those
in the central and western provinces, have had difficulties hiring qualified personnel. In a much-noted speech earlier this
year, Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yongkang pointed out that to make up for the shortfall of qualified
legal personnel in the heartland regions, relevant judicial departments can recruit reliable high school graduates among
soldiers or People¶s Armed Police officers²and then send them to a selected number of legal institutions for special
intensive training. Particularly for police, prosecutors and judges serving in trouble-prone spots in Tibet and Xinjiang,
more emphasis seems to be placed on their ability to toe Beijing¶s line than either professional qualification or
competence (Xinhua News Agency, February 1; Beijing Evening Post, March 9; Xinhua News Agency, June 5).
On October 1, the CCP authorities will be hosting a big party, including a gargantuan military parade at Tiananmen
Square, to celebrate the 60th birthday of the People¶s Republic of China. Ensuring that no ³destabilizing factors´ such as
peasant riots will mar national spectacles of this nature²which are deemed essential to boosting nationalism and
bolstering the party¶s legitimacy²is one factor behind the Hu-Wen leadership¶s anxiety to improve the political
rectitude and crisis-management skills of civil servants. Yet, while training programs that prioritize values such as
prolonging the CCP¶s mandate of heaven or ³nipping factors of instability in the bud´ could buy the administration
some time, it is unlikely that they will effectively eradicate endemic corruption and misrule at the party's grassroots.
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June 24, 2009 02:39 PM Age: 242 days
By: Russell Hsiao
Chinese facility at Mischief Reef
The sixth meeting of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's (CPPCC)
Standing Committee, the highest-level advisory body of the People's Republic of China, met ahead of the general
plenary that is taking place in Beijing from June 22 to 27. During one of the committee's working group meetings on
June 18, the former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and standing committee
member of the CPPCC, General Zhang Li, recommended that China build an airport and seaport on Mischief Reef
located in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The additional facilities, Zhang said, would enable China to
conduct aircraft patrol of the area, support Chinese fishing vessels and demonstrate the country's sovereignty over the
disputed islands (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 22). The call for building military installments on the disputed islets by
General Zhang, a senior high-ranking military officer, may be signs of China's increased willingness to use force in
resolving territorial disputes as tension between China and ASEAN-member states (i.e. Philippines, Vietnam) boil over
the contested islets in the region.
A Chinese media source reported that the PLA Navy, under the direct order of the Central Military Commission (CMC)
under President Hu Jintao, recently conducted a large scale naval exercise in the South China Sea to demonstrate
Chinese sovereignty over the islands. China officially imposed a fishing ban in the South China Sea on May 16 to
reportedly prevent "over fishing," and sent eight patrol ships to monitor 128,000 square kilometers of the region (China
Review News, June 19, Xinhua News Agency, June 9).
In recent months, tensions flared between China and Vietnam, which is one of the claimants contesting sovereignty over
the islands, and Hanoi reportedly signed a $1.8 billion deal with Russia for six Kilo-class submarines in what analysts
say appears to be the strongest response sent by Hanoi toward Beijing for what it increasingly sees as China's
encroachment on the South China Sea islands (Ria Novosti, April 27). The submarines, which are designed for anti-sub
and anti-ship warfare, could help protect Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea by denying access to its more than
2,000 miles of coastline. The submarine has a displacement of 2,300 tons, a maximum depth of 350 meters (1,200 feet),
a range of 6,000 miles, and is equipped with six 533-mm torpedo tubes (Ria Novosti, April 27).
In his remarks at the committee meeting, Zhang described the situation in the South China Sea as "very grim," and
recommended that the Chinese navy add vessels and boats that have a displacement of 3,000 tons or higher for the navy
and naval police that operate in the disputed area (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], June 18). According to Zhang, the PLAN
only has eight operational naval vessels that are deployable to the region, and these vessels are usually executing other
missions in different areas, thus their capability to respond to any contingency that develops in the South China Sea is
very limited (Ta Kung Pao, June 18). If the airport and seaport are constructed, Zhang said that China will then be able
to control the Spratlys and provide a platform for Chinese naval vessels to bypass the Straits of Malacca, which Chinese
military strategists consider a strategic choke point for the country's national security.
The Spratly Islands are comprised of over 500 islets, while Vietnam occupies 29 of these islets; the Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei occupy three or more islets each, and the General noted that China only controls four of these islets
(Ta Kung Pao, June 18). Moreover, according to Zhang, China does not possess a single oil well in the area, but other
countries have more than 1,000 wells that extract from 5,000 to 1 hundred million barrels of oil per year. In response,
Zhang advised Beijing to increase its investment in naval surface ships, satellite surveillance, intelligence facilities and
basing construction in the region, while expanding oil exploration and production in the South China Sea (China Review
News, June 19).
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July 9, 2009 01:25 PM Age: 227 days
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: James Manicom
On May 11, 2009, the People's Republic of China (PRC) submitted the preliminary survey findings on the outer limits of
its continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The submission makes a
claim to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) in the East China Sea (ECS). The submission is
reportedly based on data collected over ten years of marine scientific research undertaken by a wide variety of Chinese
organizations including the Academy of Sciences, the Hydrographic Department as well as the People¶s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) [1]. That this research program has been undertaken in waters claimed by both China and Japan has
been the source of considerable discord. The Chinese submission is preliminary, submitted two days before the May 13
deadline for those states that ratified UNCLOS in 1996. In its submission China claims an extended continental shelf
beyond 200nm as far as the western slope of the Okinawa Trough. China states its intention to make a complete
submission after further survey work has been completed. This may not be the last extended continental shelf claim
made by China, as according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu, it also reserves the right to make additional
extended continental shelf claims in the East China Sea and elsewhere [2]. Finally, and consistent with all Chinese
territorial claims, the submission states that China will ³through peaceful negotiation, delimit the continental shelf with
States with opposite or adjacent coasts by agreement on the basis of the international law and the equitable principle´
[3].
The East China Sea dispute stems from overlapping jurisdictional claims under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). Japan claims an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as far as its median line that bisects the East China
Sea. China, meanwhile, has always claimed a continental shelf as far as the Okinawa Trough based on the principle of
natural prolongation, the basis upon which continental shelf claims are made. Political tensions have manifested
themselves in a number of ways. The dispute has been exploited by nationalist and conservative actors on both sides to
reinforce confrontational policy pursuits. The most serious tensions have occurred at sea where Chinese and Japanese
authorities have collided (in some cases quite literally) over resource exploitation and marine scientific research. In June
2008, the two sides agreed on a roadmap toward joint resource development, but no progress has since been made [4].
These disputes stem from competing jurisdictional entitlements to the East China Sea, and thus a ruling by an impartial
third party such as the CLCS could move the dispute toward settlement.
What does this submission mean for the East China Sea dispute? There are two primary implications. First, although the
submission is made to an impartial third party, this body has no authority to rule on the final delimitation of the East
China Sea. The CLCS is not tasked with dispute resolution; it is responsible for evaluating the scientific merits of a
state¶s claim to a continental shelf beyond the 200nm as permitted under Article 76 of UNCLOS. Thus, at most, the
CLCS could rule that the PRC has demonstrated the scientific basis for a continental shelf claim beyond 200nm in the
area included in the submission. This is not the same as granting China exclusive jurisdiction over the area it has
claimed. Japan is still entitled to claim an EEZ as far as 200nm, although it has only claimed an EEZ as far its median
line. Final delimitation is still to be negotiated between the two parties.
This is not to say that a ruling by the CLCS can be expected anytime soon. While the length of time it takes to rule on a
submission varies depending on the complexity of the science involved, there are two reasons to expect a significant
delay. First, the CLCS is understaffed and under funded [5]. UNCLOS remains a relatively new piece of international
law and the entitlement to an extended continental shelf is at the cutting edge of international legal debates. Secondly,
due to the ten year deadline for submissions to the CLCS after a state¶s ratification of UNCLOS, combined with the
enormous amount of ratifications in the mid-late 1990s, the CLCS is confronted with a massive backlog of submissions.
Prior to 2008 the CLCS had received only nine submissions, which took an average of over twenty months to be
adopted. Since 2008 the Commission has received 41 submissions and has yet to make a ruling on one of these [6]. Thus
it will be quite some time before a Chinese submission can be heard, much less finalized.
The second implication for the East China Sea dispute is the location of China¶s extended continental shelf claim; it is
located primarily in the northern portion of the East China Sea. As maritime policy analyst Mark Valencia notes, it is
unlikely that final delimitation will be based on the recognition of natural prolongation over the EEZ regime, as both are
permitted under UNCLOS. It would be more likely that the line reflects compromise over both states¶ jurisdictional
entitlements [7]. Recognition of the Chinese continental shelf claim by the CLCS adds weight to the Chinese entitlement
to a greater share of the ECS, which could arguably push a final delimitation line east toward the Japanese coast. Yet,
any CLCS ruling will not touch on the disputed sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands ²the basis of the
delimitation dispute in the southern end of the ECS²as this is outside its authority. A further problem relates to the
northern portion: China¶s submission may overlap with the extended continental shelf claimed by the Republic of Korea
[8].
To further strengthen its claims to the East China Sea, China has made a rhetorical commitment to the equitable
principle in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. This principle relates to special consideration given to coastal states
based on social, economic, geological, and geographical factors that impact a state¶s entitlement to ocean space. In the
Gulf of Maine case, for instance, the International Court of Justice pushed the final boundary line toward Nova Scotia to
account for the longer coastline on the American side. In light of the length of the Chinese coastline compared to the
Japanese, an extended continental shelf approved by the CLCS further strengthens the Chinese claim to special
considerations that ultimately may result in a more favorable settlement. So, a CLCS ruling on China¶s entitlement to a
continental shelf beyond 200nm²even if it occurs in the near future²does not automatically move the ECS dispute
toward resolution. It may however strengthen China¶s claims to a larger portion of the northern part of the East China
Sea.
The danger in the short term is that the submission and subsequent ruling may escalate tensions in the absence of
attempts to clarify the implications for jurisdictional entitlements. Chinese vessels already behave as if the East China
Sea and South China Sea are Chinese territorial waters. Witness for example the confrontation with the USNS
Impeccable in March 2009 (see China Brief, " Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea," April
30) and the recurrent Chinese naval intrusions into Japanese-claimed waters. In light of the highly decentralized Chinese
command structure (the Impeccable was confronted by a wide variety of vessels in an apparent policing action,
including civilian fishing trawlers) it is possible that the submission could reinforce Chinese authorities¶ and civilians¶
sense of entitlement to the waters off of China. This in turn could increase the latitude with which Chinese vessels
operate in Japanese claimed waters. Early signs are that Chinese authorities²fisheries, coastal patrol, and military²will
increase their presence in waters that China purports to administer [9]. This comes as Chinese foreign ministry officials
and media have condemned submissions to the U.N. by Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines for recognition of their
maritime borders in the South China Sea. Taken as a whole these trends point to continued Chinese assertiveness in its
claimed waters.
This greater naval presence and operational latitude come at a time when Japan is seeking to better protect and exploit its
ocean territory. In response to the growing Chinese naval presence in the East China Sea, pressure has been building on
Japanese leaders to better enforce Japan¶s maritime jurisdiction [10]. In light of Japanese concerns about the longer term
strategic consequences of Chinese behavior in waters claimed by Japan, Tokyo would view an increasingly assertive
Chinese posture in the East China Sea as a threat [11]. In 2007, Tokyo took the first steps toward rectifying this situation
by passing the Basic Ocean Law which created an Ocean Policy Headquarters headed by the prime minister.
Furthermore, the first piece of legislation passed on maritime affairs permits Japanese authorities to protect Japanese
resource production installations in the East China Sea. This was intended to assuage concerns that Teikoku Oil workers
and assets would be threatened by China if they were ever called upon to conduct exploratory drilling east of the median
line. Indeed, last year the Diet began considering a law that would allow Japan to intercept suspicious vessels transiting
its claimed waters [12]. While this is likely a legacy of Japan¶s experience with North Korean espionage boats, it could
just as easily provide the basis for an assertive Japanese response to non-authorised Chinese vessels. Recall that in
addition to increased reports of Chinese naval incursions in the ECS in recent years, a Han submarine transited Japan¶s
territorial sea in 2004 and Chinese naval vessels routinely sail provocatively through the international straits that pass
through Japan.
The two sides have yet to move forward in implementing the treaty called for by the June Consensus reached in 2008.
This means proceeding with plans for Teikoku Oil to conduct joint operations at the Chunxiao gas field with the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and commencing exploration in the joint development zone south of the
Longjing field. The primary barrier to the finalization of a treaty appears to be political. Japanese media reports that
Tokyo is reluctant to proceed as long as the development of the Tianwaitian field continues [13]. China maintains that
Tianwaitian was not included in the June Consensus, and thus CNOOC¶s continued production at the field should not
disrupt joint development [14].
While China¶s submission to the CLCS does strengthen its claim to the East China Sea, it does little to bring the dispute
to a cooperative end. As noted above, it could very well exacerbate tensions in the area. Considerable political will is
needed in both Beijing and Tokyo to ensure the continued stability that has characterized the East China Sea for past two
years.
Notes
1. It is difficult to ascertain which Chinese bureaucratic entity conducts which aspect of the research program. For a
discussion see James Manicom, Cooperation and Confrontation in the East China Sea Dispute: Lessons for China-Japan
Relations (PhD thesis, Flinders University 2009), chapter five.
2. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's Remarks on China's Submission of Preliminary Information Indicative
of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t562208.htm, May 13, 2009.
3. Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles of the
People¶s Republic of China, English translation, 2009.
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/chn2009preliminaryinformation_english.pdf.
4. Reinhard Drifte, "Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea - From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,"
The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol 22-3-09, June 1, 2009.
5. Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, ³Beyond the Limits?: Outer Continental Shelf Opportunities and
Challenges in East and Southeast Asia,´ Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 31, no. 1 (2009): 37-38.
6. Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.
7. Mark J. Valencia, "The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions." Asian Perspective
31, no. 1 (2007): 158
8. Yoo Jee-ho, ³Korea submits proposal to extend outer continental shelf,´ Joon Gang Daily, May 13, 2009.
9. Zhang Xin, ³Change tack with sea strategy: China experts,´ China Daily, May 13, 2009.
10. Masahiro Akiyama, "Use of Seas and Management of Ocean Space: Analysis of the Policy Making Process for
Creating the Basic Ocean Law." Ocean Policy Studies, no. 5 (2007): 1-28.
11. See for example the annual assessment of Japan¶s security environment in Japan¶s Defense white papers.
12. ³Japan to Establish Law Aimed at Cracking Down on Suspicious Ships,´ Kyodo News, February 26, 2008.
13. ³We Have Right to Exploit Disputed Gas Field: China,´ The Japan Times, March 8 2009.
14. ³China Urges Japan not to Distort Consensus on East China Sea Issue,´ Xinhua News, January 6, 2009.
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July 9, 2009 01:22 PM Age: 227 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Richard A. Bitzinger
China is now, on average, the world¶s fifth largest arms exporter, after the traditional leading suppliers: the United
States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In fact, in 2007 it was fourth in terms of global arms transfer
agreements, ahead of France, Germany and Spain [1]. Nearly all of China¶s arms transfers are to developing countries,
and in this arena the Chinese defense industry is emerging as a formidable competitor. In fact, China ranked third in
terms of arms deliveries to the developing world in 2007 [2]. China's largest markets are in Asia, the Middle East, and
particularly Africa. In fact, during the period 2004-2007, China was the single largest seller of arms to Africa; and its
major customers include Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
All these signs point to China returning to the global stage as a major player in the international arms market. In fact,
China has not enjoyed sales this large since the 1980s, when it sold to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War. In 2007, Beijing
signed arms exports agreements worth $3.8 billion, its highest sales figures in more than a decade [3]. In recent years,
Chinese overseas arms sales have averaged more than $2 billion a year [4], considerably higher than during the 1990s,
when Beijing averaged less than $1 billion annually in arms exports [5]. Despite these glowing sales figures, however,
China faces the continual challenge of remaining competitive in a highly cutthroat business. There are no guarantees of
an enduring upswing in Chinese arms exports.
Leading Chinese weapons exports include:
The K-8 trainer jet: China has exported nearly 250 of these lightweight trainer/attack jets since 2000, according to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms transfers [6]. Its biggest client has been
Egypt, which bought 120 K-8s, most of which were assembled locally from kits, between 2001 and 2008. Other
customers include Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while Venezuela is in negotiations to
purchase up to 24 K-8s.
The F-7MG fighter jet: This aircraft is the export version of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force¶s F-7E,
itself an upgraded adaptation of the MiG-21. The F-7MG features a larger wing and, reportedly, a British radar [7].
China has sold more than a hundred of these fighters to Bangladesh, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka,
according the SIPRI Arms Transfers database, since the mid-1990s [8].
The JF-17 Thunder fighter jet: The JF-17, also known as the FC-1, is a lightweight multi-role combat aircraft similar
in design to the U.S. F-20 Tigershark. The JF-17 was co-developed with Pakistan, which is currently producing the
fighter for its air force; estimates are that Islamabad could buy up to 250 of the aircraft. The aircraft is being specifically
marketed to developing countries who need replace aging MiG-21, F-7, or F-5 fighters. Azerbaijan, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe have all been reported to have interest in buying the JF-17 [9].
The C-801/C-802 antiship cruise missile (ASCM): These missiles, also known as the YJ-8 and YJ-82 (YJ stands for
Yingji: "Eagle Strike"), respectively, are similar to the very effective French Exocet (the C-802 version being equipped
with a solid rocket booster for extended range). These ASCMs can be launched from ships, land, or aircraft. Recent
customers for these missiles include Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand [10].
The WZ-551 armored personnel carrier: Although not a particularly high-tech system, the WZ-551 is notable for
being sold widely around the world, including countries like Argentina, Gabon, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Oman, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, and Tanzania [11].
Finally, it is worth noting that China has sold a number of small and medium-sized transport aircraft, mostly to African
states. These include the Y-12 (to Kenya, Nepal, Uganda, and Zambia) and the MA-60 (to Ghana, Nepal, and Zambia)
[12].
A Tenuous Standing?
Still, China¶s current high standing in the global arms marketplace remains tenuous. Most of China¶s biggest arms sales
come from only a handful of customers, particularly Pakistan. The 2007 figures were high mainly because the data
included a couple of big deals with Pakistan, like the JF-17 fighter for instance (which Pakistan is co-producing with the
Chinese) and four Jiangwei-class frigates. It is not certain, therefore, that China will maintain such high levels of arms
exports for the next several years. For example, Myanmar [Burma] was a big buyer of Chinese arms during the 1990s,
but its purchases have tapered off significantly in recent years, in favor of weapons from Russia, India and Ukraine [13].
For the most part, China can still offer only a few advanced weapon systems (e.g. trainer jets and antiship cruise
missiles) that are competitive on the global arms market, and its customers still remain basically the poor (e.g. African
states) and the pariahs (e.g. Pakistan and Iran). Additionally, a large chunk of Chinese arms exports includes small arms
and ancillary equipment, such as trucks, uniforms, and field equipment. Finally, many of China¶s arms deals are still
done at ³friendship prices,´ that is, selling arms at a discount, either for political purposes (i.e. cementing alliances or
promoting cordial relations) or, increasingly, to secure links with oil-and mineral-rich nations, such as Nigeria, Sudan
and Zimbabwe.
Finally, it is important keep in mind that ranking fifth, fourth, even third as the largest arms exporter should not be
exaggerated. While China delivered $1.2 billion worth of arms to the developing world in 2007 to capture the number
three position, the number one-ranked United States exported more than six times as much, or $7.6 billon, while Russia
(number two), exported $4.6 billion, nearly four times as much as China [14]. Additionally, while China exported $7.8
billion worth of arms globally between 2000 and 2007, the United States exported over $92 billion worth; Russia was
second with $36.2 billion worth of arms exports, and the United Kingdom third with nearly $34 billion worth. Even
Germany out-exported China by nearly 60 percent [15]. One good sales year does not necessarily presage a bright
future.
Prospects for Big-Ticket Sales
In order to remain a leading arms exporter, China needs to come up with more competitive products. The JF-17 fighter
jet has already been mentioned as a possible big seller to countries needing a low-cost replacement for their aging
inventories of MiG-21s or F-5s; the JF-17 reportedly costs between $15 million and $20 million apiece, much cheaper
than a U.S.-built F-16, for example [16].
An even more promising prospect for significant overseas sales is China¶s new J-10 fighter jet. This aircraft is a cousin
to the Israeli Lavi (upon which it is based) and roughly equivalent in capabilities to the U.S. F-16C flown by several air
forces around the world. The J-10 started development in the mid-1980s and finally entered production for the People¶s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) about three or four years ago. It is certainly a vast improvement over the 1960s-
and 1970s-era Chinese and Soviet fighters that have filled out the PLAAF for decades, although probably not as good as
the Su-27 or (particularly) the Su-30s acquired from Russia.
There has in fact been considerable speculation that the Chinese might try and flood the global arms market with the J-
10. This aircraft could be a good buy, as it would probably be offered at cut-rate prices, certainly below the F-16, the
Swedish Gripen, and other smaller combat aircraft. Pakistan and especially Iran have been mentioned as prospective
buyers [17].
Other potentially marketable products include the C-701 short-range antiship cruise missile (already sold to Iran and,
reportedly, Hezbollah) [18], the FN-6 man-portable surface-to-air missile (exported to Sudan), and the KS-1A surface-
to-air missile (sold to Malaysia) [19].
That said, the capabilities of most Chinese weapons systems remain unknown. The J-10, for example, may be a very
good aircraft, but its performance and reliability cannot be independently confirmed, and many countries may not wish
to take a chance on it. For its part, the JF-17 is a rather unremarkable aircraft, technologically speaking; buying used F-
16s²of which there is currently a global abundance, given the downsizing of many air forces around the world²may
be seen as a cheaper and more capable alternative.
Finally, keep in mind that countries do not necessarily buy the cheapest weapon systems available²capabilities and
effectiveness count, especially when it comes to military products. Many countries, given the choice, will still pay a
premium price to get a premium product. For example, when Pakistan decided to acquire new submarines, it bought
from France and Germany, not China, and while it is buying Chinese fighters, it is also purchasing F-16s from the
United States.
Even during the current global economic crisis, many potential buyers will still be hesitant to seriously consider Chinese
weaponry more than they might normally, since they may have to live with these weapons for the next twenty to thirty
years. Instead, these countries are more likely to delay any big-ticket arms purchases in general, and wait until the
economy recovers²like most Asian countries did during the financial crisis in the late 1990s.
One product area where the Chinese do have a considerable technological edge is ballistic missile systems, such as the
DF-11 and B-611 short-range ballistic missiles. The DF-11 (also known as the M-11) has been sold to Pakistan, while
Turkey has acquired the B-611 [20]. Sales of longer-range missile systems, however, are restricted by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to which China has agreed to abide.
Chinese Arms Sales: Still an Uncertain Bet?
China is still extremely constrained when it comes to potential customers, the types of arms they may want to buy, and
the types of arms it can sell. Yet, Beijing will increasingly promote its arms on the global market and in the process it
will score some coups when it comes to overseas sales. Certainly, expanding arms exports continues to be a key
business strategy for Chinese defense firms, but as much as it is for almost every arms manufacturer around the world.
Given the global overcapacity in armaments production and economic pressures to keep factories open and preserve
jobs, everybody wants to get in on the arms-export business. China will not be soon supplanting or joining the United
States and Western Europe as a large supplier of sophisticated arms.
Notes
1. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, October 23, 2008,Table 8D, p. 67.
2. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, Table 2G, p. 52.
3. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, Table 1, p. 34.
4. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, Table 1, p. 34.
5. See Richard A. Bitzinger, ³Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World,´ International Security, Fall 1992.
6. SIPRI Arms Transfers database, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/armstransfers.
7. ³Jian-7 Fighter Interceptor,´ SinoDefence.com, www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j7.asp.
8. SIPRI Arms Transfers database.
9. ³FC-1/JF-17 Multirole Fighter Aircraft,´ SinoDefence.com, www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/fc1.asp; Gareth
Jennings, ³JF-17 Production Commences,´ Jane¶s Air Forces News, January 24, 2008,
www.janes.com/news/defence/air/jdw/jdw080124_2_n.shtml.
14. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, Table 2G, p. 52.
15. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, Table 8C, p. 66.
16. ³FC-1/JF-17 Multirole Fighter Aircraft,´ SinoDefence.com.
17. ³Jian-10 Multirole Fighter Aircraft,´ SinoDefence.com (http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j10.asp).
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July 9, 2009 01:05 PM Age: 227 days
Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Domestic/Social, Home Page
By: Willy Lam
Celebrations that Beijing has bowed to global pressure and scrapped an order to use filtering software in all personal
computers have turned out to be premature. On July 1, a Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)
spokesman said that while Beijing had, on June 30, postponed the installation of the China-made Net-screening device,
³the government will definitely carry on the directive on Green Dam.´ While Green Dam allegedly targets only
pornography, foreign and Chinese experts alike think its real purpose is to censor ³subversive´ material and to prevent
the country¶s 300 million Netizens from fomenting dissent on China's growing information superhighways (CNN.com,
June 30; InformationWeek.com, July 2). Also indicative of the Chinese Communist Party¶s (CCP) determination to
combat Net-based anti-government activities are plans to convict leading dissident Liu Xiaobo on charges of ³inciting
subversion to the state and the socialist system.´ Dr. Liu is an internationally known writer who was a key organizer of
the Net-empowered Charter 08 Movement, which the CCP deems one of the most potent challenges to its authority since
the mid-2000s. Beijing leaders also appear to have been taken aback by the so-called ³Twitter Revolution´ in Iran,
where liberal activists have used the Internet and allied vehicles to broadcast their opposition to the controversial
presidential polls held last month.
The ostensible reasons behind Beijing¶s postponement of the deadline for installing Green Dam on all new PCs are
virulent protests by the U.S. Government and a dozen-odd chambers of commerce representing European and Asian
corporations. Well-known American computer and software manufacturers have also complained that the utilization of
Green Dam, which has ³spyware´ functions, would amount to an infringement of intellectual property rights. Most
significantly, several domestic Net-anchored NGOs and lobbying groups, including one led by famous artist Ai Weiwei,
have called upon Chinese PC users to boycott the much-maligned software (The Associated Press, June 27; Wall Street
Journal, July 1). Yet a more probable reason for the censorship moratorium is that MIIT technicians have spotted
problems in the policing software. The official Xinhua News Agency reported late last month that MIIT engineers had
³assigned some staff to repair program faults.´ The daily quoted IT expert Ma Pengfei as saying that ³it will take a long
time before the MIIT can improve the technical level of the software.´ There is widespread report by American IT
engineers that the faultily written Green Dam is an easy prey for hackers (Market Watch, July 2; Xinhua English News
Service, June 27).
Given that the Chinese leadership has, since the turn of the century, boosted its Internet police force²a division within
the Ministry of Public Security that currently employs more than 30.000 officers²why are the censors suddenly
redoubling efforts to weed out Net-based dissent (New York Times, October 2, 2008)? Seasoned analysts in Beijing
point to two apparently unconnected events that have prompted the Hu Jintao leadership to push through the draconian
Green Dam campaign. One is the unexpectedly successful Charter 08 movement, and the other, the Internet-empowered
opposition movement now sweeping Iran.
Late last year, 30-odd intellectuals led by Dr. Liu launched Charter 08, an Internet signature campaign that is based on a
manifesto demanding that the CCP give all Chinese universally recognized liberties including freedom of speech,
religion and political organization. It was modeled upon the Charter 77 movement of Czechoslovakia, which played a
catalyst¶s role in hastening the collapse of a host of former Eastern European Communist regimes. Within six months,
close to 10,000 Chinese²not just intellectuals but also workers and housewives²from different provinces have given
their signatures in support of the manifesto. Dr. Liu was subsequently placed under house arrest in December. His
lawyers fear that the ill-defined, catch-all charges laid against him could lead to a stiff sentence of up to ten years (Times
of London, June 25; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 27).
Political observers in China see the probable incarceration of Liu as the CCP¶s warning to Net-based radicals and
assorted ³troublemakers´ about the use of cutting-edge technology to propagate "subversive" materials on the
information superhighway. Liu had said famously a few years ago that ³the Internet is God¶s present to China. It is the
best tool for the Chinese people in their project to cast off slavery and strive for freedom.´ The past few months have
seen major cases of civil unrest whose detailed audio-video footages were broadcast on Chinese websites, and then
picked up by news media in Hong Kong and overseas. These included the confrontation last month between police and
some 20,000 villagers in the Shishou town of Hubei Province (See China Brief, ³CCP Campaign for a New Generation
of µRed and Expert¶ Officials,´ June 24). Given the popularity of cell phones and PCs in China ²and the increasing
availability of cheap but sophisticated technology²more Netizens are making videos with their phones and
broadcasting them on the Net. Others are circulating juicy materials on the Chinese equivalents of Facebook and
Twitter. Equally disturbing for the authorities is the Internet¶s effectiveness in mobilizing public opinion. The corruption
scandals of several medium-ranked cadres were first exposed on the Net. Lu Jun, a propaganda official in Zhengzhou,
Henan Province was pillorized by tens of thousands of Netizens for asking a reporter this question: ³Do you speak for
the Party or do you speak for the people?´ Also consider the case of Deng Yujiao, a massage parlor hostess in a remote
Hubei town who accidentally killed an official in May while resisting his sexual advances. The overwhelming
Cyberspace support that Deng received was deemed a key reason why she was let go during the trial that took place a
month later (Ming Pao, June 22; People¶s Daily, May 21; Global Times [Beijing] June 5; Times of London, July 4).
Given the sensitive nature of the post-election political drama in Iran, it is hardly suprising that there is little coverage of
the protests²particularly Net-empowered ones²in the Chinese press. Official media stories have focused on Beijing¶s
support of ³the choice of the Iranian people´ as well as its opposition to interference by Western forces. The reports also
honed in on Tehran officials blasting Washington and London for allegedly stirring up unrest among Iranian opposition
parties (Xinhua News Agency, June 21; Chinaview.cn June 23). Yet there have been enthusiastic exchanges in Net-
based forums across China on how the Internet and socializing Net hubs such as Twitter and Facebook have enabled
political participation in both China and Iran. Several Chinese Net aficionados have opined on www.fanfou and
www.taotao, which are Chinese equivalents of social networking websites like Facebook and Twitter, ³that the Iranian
situation today is reminiscent of events in Beijing 20 years ago.´ The Internet police, however, soon intervened and
blocked out discussion about Iran on these sites. Such actions, however, did not prevent a few hundred members of a
Net-based NGO from holding a party to celebrate the postponement of the Green Dam stricture (Yazhou Zhoukan
[Hong Kong weekly]; Christian Science Monitor, June 24; Ming Pao, July 2).
As a famous Chinese saying goes: ³While the Dao [morality] may be 12-inch thick, the Devil is ten-foot tall.´
Irrespective of the Net-nannying efforts by CCP censors, China¶s resilient and resourceful Netizens have always been
able to get around the firewalls and prohibitions. Indications are that Green Dam²or even an improved version to be
rolled out later this year²may not be able to silence Net-based dissent. For example, inexpensively priced ³anti-Green
Dam´ software has already hit the Chinese market. It is ironic that the CCP¶s one-time nemesis, the Falun Gong spiritual
sect²which was the first anti-Beijing group to have used the Net to mobilize its supporters²had offered free
technological assistance to opposition intellectuals in Iran to help beat the regime of silence imposed by the Mullahs
(Radio Australia, July 2). And more anti-censorship software put together by the Falun Gong and other overseas human
rights groups may make its way into China.
Meanwhile, as the countdown to the all-important October 1 celebration of the 60th Birthday of the People¶s Republic
has gotten under way, the authorities are taking no chances, particularly with Net-enabled dissent. Moments after a riot
broke out in Urumqi, Xinjiang last Sunday, in which 156 residents were reportedly killed and at least 800 injured, the
authorities blamed the World Uighur Congress (WUC) for ³instigating´ the mishap. Xinhua quoted the authorities as
saying that the WUC ³had used the Internet and other channels to urge [troublemakers] to µbe bolder¶ and to µhit it big¶.´
The disturbance erupted as a protest over alleged government mishandling of a fistfight between Han Chinese and
Uighur workers in a toy factory in Guangdong late last month. On Monday, the Internet was shut down in Urumqi, and
the Net police removed several videos of the rioting that had circulated on several popular websites (Xinhua News
Agency, July 6; Ming Pao, July 6; Reuters, July 7).
In an article in the just-released party theoretical journal Seeking Truth, Director of the CCP Propaganda Department
Liu Yunshan warned that ³various non-Marxist thoughts and ideas have grown and affected social harmony and
stability.´ Liu, a Politburo member, added that ³how to utilize, develop and scientifically manage the Internet has
become a major and pressing task´ for the country¶s law-enforcement apparatus (People¶s Daily, July 4; Xinhua News
Agency, July 3). While Liu and his Politburo colleagues seem confident that a retooled Green Dam might help the CCP
keep destabilizing forces at bay, the warfare between Net-empowered activists and the authorities seems destined to
remain both ferocious and protracted.
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July 9, 2009 12:57 PM Age: 227 days
By: Russell Hsiao
AIDC's F-CK-1 IDF Fighter
Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (abbrev. AIDC; Chinese: Han Xiang), a state-owned aerospace
enterprise credited with developing the country¶s first indigenous defense fighter (IDF) is reportedly in negotiations to
build a commercial aircraft with China Commercial Aircraft Company (COMAC), a Chinese state-owned behemoth
under the direct supervision of Beijing's State Council (China Times [Taiwan], June 22). The plan has ignited a
hailstorm of criticism from opposition lawmakers and the Taiwanese military over national security concerns because of
possible transfers of sensitive military technology to Mainland China (Taipei Times, June 23). Industry specialists,
however, downplay the security risks due to the complex nature of military technology transfers.
Supporters of the proposed plan argue that AIDC, like any defense business and contractor (i.e. Boeing, Sikorsky,
Lockheed, Raytheon, Rockwell Collins, Honeywell, and General Electric), is just competing for a piece of China's
fastest growing multi-billion dollar aviation market. Other experts note that under the proposed contract, AIDC would
only be manufacturing flaps, slats, leading edge flaps, rudder elevators and belly fairings for the COMAC 919
narrowbody, and thus will not involve any technical transfer of sensitive military technology (Flight Daily News, June
16). Yet, AIDC Spokesperson Li Shih-chang acknowledged that it will be difficult to prevent and control the transfer of
some dual use (military-civilian) technologies, but at the same time he emphasized that AIDC "worked with nine
countries and 16 companies and we [AIDC] have the experience to keep secrets from leaking" (The Associated Press,
June 22; China Times, June 22).
Proponents also highlight the fact that the nature of the COMAC contract order is very similar to the one AIDC signed
with Mitsubishi Aircraft in January to design and manufacture the slats, flaps, belly fairings, rudders and horizontal
stabilizer rotating blades for the Mitsubishi MRJ regional jet (Flight Daily News, June 16). Thus, this contract proposal
is consistent with AIDC's long-term business goal to further commercialize and compete in the global aviation market
by positioning itself as a global supplier. In an interview with U.S.-based Defense News, then AIDC chairman and CEO,
Feng Shih-kuan said: "We [AIDC] want to be a key supplier to China" and "has been pushing the [Taiwan] government
to relax restrictions on investment and trade with state-owned enterprises in and with China" (Defense News, August 18,
2008).
Shuh-fan Ding, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, points out
that AIDC has been struggling to financially stay afloat for a long time since the Taiwanese government ceased
production of the IDF. Industry specialists confirm that the company's growth revenue has been in the red for many
years. According to Ding, after 1992 when Taiwan bought the F-16s and Dassault Mirage 2000-5s and cut production of
the IDF from 250 to 130, it resulted in a critical shortfall in AIDC's finances. Since there were no other securable
sources of revenue, this resulted in a brain drain from the company. The outflow of engineers to foreign companies,
Ding opines, is the biggest risk factor for the transfer of military technology. As a result it is possible that some of IDF's
technical secrets may have already been leaked, Ding says, citing media reports that many AIDC engineers were hired
by South Korean firms and the close resemblance of the new ROK training jets (T-50 Golden Eagle) to the IDF
(Sina.com.tw, June 22; News.rti.org.tw, June 22). Therefore, Ding argues that keeping AIDC as a viable business is the
most important safeguard for maintaining sensitive military technology.
Since its formation, AIDC served as one of the major defense manufacturing arms of the Taiwanese military; and is still
entrusted to undertake many sensitive research and development projects, which includes manufacturing fighter aircraft
and upgrading F-16s. Opponents of the AIDC-COMAC plan raised concerns over the company's technology safeguards,
and whether a decision to move ahead with the plan could possibly delay further or even derail the much coveted sale of
F-16s from the United States. One prominent opposition Democratic Progressive Party lawmaker, Chai Trong-rong,
harshly criticized the plan: "How can a domestic company responsible for developing Taiwan¶s air defense technology
cooperate with the enemy [China]?´ He added, "it made sense that the U.S. has hesitated to sell advanced arms to
Taiwan as it has concerns that advanced technology could end up in Chinese hands" (Taipei Times, June 23).
Opponents argue that even though AIDC is no longer exclusively a military entity, it still receives 80 percent of its
business from the military and it remains a major player in the domestic arms industry (Taipei Times, June 23).
Moreover, since AIDC still holds the majority of Taiwanese government contracts for sensitive military technologies
like developing anti-missile rockets and the Ten Thousand Swords (Wan Chien) cluster bomb, the Taiwanese military
has also voiced its concern over the proposed deal. Ministry of Defense spokesman Yu Sy-tue publicly questioned the
common sense of the proposed deal between AIDC and COMAC: "Of course we have some concerns « But we do not
have the power to interfere with their commercial aircraft deals" (Straits Times, June 23).
AIDC's company sales in 2007 of $475 million amounted to a growth rate of 18 percent from 2006, and according to a
Taiwanese-media report the company's sales reached $484 million in 2008. With its target sale for 2009 set at $574
million, opponents argue that AIDC's chronic shortage of capital is a thing of the past, and cautions against the
company's "adventurism" (China Times, June 22; Defense News, August 18, 2008).
[The author would like to thank Major Mark A. Stokes for his insights.]
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July 23, 2009 12:58 PM Age: 213 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page, Featured
By: Vijay Sakhuja
Bangladesh Ambassador Munshi Faiz Ahmad (L) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (R)
The geographic area encompassing South Asia and its contiguous maritime spaces are of growing strategic importance
to China, as reflected in China¶s web of partnerships and coalitions with states in the region. The dynamics of these
relationships appear on the surface to be based on interdependence, but are actually driven by long-term political,
economic and strategic interests. Among the South Asian states, Bangladesh is an important player in Beijing's political-
military calculus and provides China with added leverage to check Indian forces. This is evident from the regular
political exchanges and enhanced military cooperation between the two countries. According to Munshi Faiz Ahmad,
Bangladesh's ambassador to China, Bangladesh and China have enjoyed a "time-tested, all-weather friendship" (China
Daily, March 26).
During their meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. Conference on the World Financial and Economic crisis in June 2009,
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi assured his Bangladeshi counterpart Dipu Moni that it was China¶s policy to
"strengthen and develop the relations of friendship and cooperation with Bangladesh." For her part, Moni said that
"Bangladesh sees China as its close friend and cooperation partner" (Xinhua News Agency, June 26).
China and Bangladesh established diplomatic relations in 1975, although Beijing initially did not recognize Bangladesh
as a separate state in 1971. Since then, the friendship between the two countries has grown to cover a wide spectrum of
bilateral relations. At the onset of official relations, the Chinese leadership has consistently advised Bangladesh to
pursue an independent foreign policy and encouraged it to move away from India¶s sphere of influence. According to
discussions (March 2009) that this author had with some retired Indian army officers, they believe that Chinese leaders
may have even given Bangladesh security assurances that Beijing would stand by Dhaka and help it defend its national
sovereignty and territorial integrity should it be threatened by India.
Bangladesh maintains a very close relationship with China for its economic and military needs (Daily Star [Dhaka],
February 19, 2006). Over the years, the two sides have signed a plethora of bilateral agreements that range from
economic engagements, soft loans, social contacts, cultural exchanges, academic interactions, infrastructure
development and military sales at "friendship" prices. Top-level state visits, both by the ruling party and the opposition
leaders to China have increased markedly [1]. Bangladesh sees China not only as its close friend, but also as a counter-
weight when dealing with India. This is notwithstanding the fact that China and Bangladesh have not established a
strategic partnership, and according to Bangladeshi analysts, have kept their relationship "unarticulated, flexible and
ambiguous" thus allowing Dhaka "to reap the benefits of a strategic partnership with a nuclear power without involving
itself in any formal defense arrangement" (Daily Star [Dhaka], February 19, 2006).
Arming the Military
China has emerged as a major supplier of arms to the Bangladeshi armed forces. In 2006, China supplied 65 artillery
guns and 114 missiles and related systems (The Assam Tribune, October 9, 2007). Most of the tanks (T-59, T-62, T-69,
and T-79), a large number of armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery pieces and small arms and personal weapons
in the Bangladesh Army are of Chinese origin [2]. There are plans to acquire 155mm PLZ-45/Type-88 (including
transfer of technology) and 122mm Type-96 as well MBRLs from China by 2011 (defence.pk/forum, March 19, 2009.
Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, the erstwhile Commander of the PLA Navy, had reportedly assured his Bangladeshi
counterpart of cooperation in the sophisticated management of the navy [3]. The Bangladeshi Navy is largely made up
of Chinese-origin platforms. These include the 053-H1 Jianghu I class frigates with 4 x HY2 missiles, Huang Feng class
missile boats, Type-024 missile boats, Huchuan and P 4 class torpedo boats, Hainan class sub chasers, Shanghai class
gun boats and Yuchin class LCUs [4]. The BNS Khalid Bin Walid has been retrofitted with HQ-7 SAM from China.
(FM-90 Surface-to-Air Missile System, bdmilitary.com). In 2008, BNS Osman successfully test fired a C-802 ASM in
the presence of the Chinese Defense Attaché Senior Colonel Ju Dewu (The Daily Star, May 13, 2008).
China began supplying fighter aircraft to the Bangladesh Air Force in 1977 and, over the years, has delivered F7 and Q5
fighter aircraft and PT 6 Trainers [5]. In 2005, 16 F-7BG were ordered and the deliveries began in 2006 (Bangladesh
Biman Bahini, scramble.nl, July 5, 2009).
Although Dhaka has argued that its relations with Beijing are based on mutual understanding and political and economic
interests, New Delhi is anxious about Bangladesh¶s growing military contacts on several fronts. First, concern arises
from India's vulnerability in the Siliguri corridor, often referred to as the µchicken neck¶. This 200 kilometers (km) long
and 40 km wide corridor links mainland India by rail, road and air with its Northeast region, a part of which (90,000 sq
km in Arunachal Pradesh) is claimed by China and is a significant source of tension for bilateral relations. At present,
there is significant PLA deployment along the borders. To its north is Bhutan, and in the south is Bangladesh. The
Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino-Bangladesh friendship and the two sides, according to Indian military
experts, have a sophisticated strategy to sever India from the Northeast region. It is also noted that µChina wants to get
Tawang [an administrative district in the state of Arunachal Pradesh] to come closer to the Siliguri corridor¶ so that it
can link up with Bangladesh from the north (Why Assam Bleeds, sify.com, November 10, 2008).
The corridor also contains elements that can destabilize the region. Illegal migrants from Bangladesh and Indian
insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), who have safe heavens in Bangladesh, crisscross
through porous borders that can act as catalysts for social disorder, unrest and insurgency. According to one analyst, the
ULFA leadership has shifted its base to China, and the investigations relating to the March 2004 offloading of a
weapons consignment from China at Chittagong seaport revealed the complicity of government agencies (India,
Bangladesh: Joint Task Force for Countering Militancy, sspconline.org, May 27, 2009) In that context, then-Bangladeshi
Foreign Minister Morshed Khan's warning in 2005 that if India surrounds Bangladesh, Bangladesh also surrounds India,
has many implications.
Snooping and Spying
Firstly, there are fears among the Indian military establishment that Dhaka may grant military basing rights to China,
thus complicating India¶s security in the Northeast. This could result in the monitoring of Indian military movements,
particularly of the Indian Army that is deployed in the region. There are several strategic Indian Air Force bases such as
Bagdogra (with MiG-21 fighter jet deployed), Hashimara (with MiG-27 fighter jet deployed), and Tezpur (with Su-30
fighter jet deployed). These bases and military aircraft could easily come under a Bangladesh-China electronic and radar
surveillance network during a crisis or impending hostilities.
Second, there are concerns that Bangladesh may offer Chittagong port for development to China, ostensibly for
commercial purposes, but which could also be used for staging Chinese naval assets. This is to be expected and can be
reasonably tied to the Chinese development of Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. Third, China
will be able to monitor Indian missile testing conducted at Chandipur-at-sea near Balasore, Orissa, and also naval
activity in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal.
China¶s Bay of Bengal Energy Triangle
At another level, China has cultivated its relations with Bangladesh and has emerged as a mediator in the latter¶s
international disputes. In November 2008, Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma) deployed their navies in a standoff in the
Bay of Bengal over Myanmar¶s decision to issue licenses to oil companies to undertake survey activity in disputed
waters. Among the several oil companies engaged in offshore exploration in Myanmar¶s waters, China National
Petroleum Corp (CNPC) was awarded a block that falls into those belonging to Bangladesh. Dhaka requested Beijing,
their common friend, to mediate, and after his meeting with Zheng Qingdian, the Chinese ambassador in Dhaka,
Bangladesh¶s foreign minister, Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, noted ³I have explained our peaceful intentions to our
Chinese friends and hope that Myanmar stops activities on the disputed waters´ (Reuters, November 5, 2008). The
standoff ended after Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to resolve the issue through negotiations.
Both Bangladesh, which has a reserve of 15.51 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and Myanmar, which has a reserve of 81.03 tcf,
have the potential to satisfy the increasing energy requirements of Asia²particularly, China and India [6]. Chinese oil
and gas companies are aggressively engaged in the Bay of Bengal in exploration and production activities to push the
gas through pipelines linking offshore platforms in Myanmar to Kunming in China and also to feed the new refinery in
Chongqing municipality. According to the China Securities Journal, work on two new pipelines will commence in
September 2009 (Reuters, June 17). The 2,806 km long natural gas pipeline with a capacity of 12 billion cubic meters
annually to Kunming will be ready by 2012. The second 1,100 km pipeline for oil with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per
day (bpd) would run between Kyaukphyu in Myanmar to Kunming and would be extended to Guizhou and Chongqing
municipality.
Likewise, China is also interested in a Malaysian pipeline and refinery project estimated to cost about $14.3 billion. This
320 km west-east pipeline has the capacity to transfer 800,000 (bpd) and the refinery¶s capacity to process 200,000 bpd
would help China overcome the oft-mentioned Malacca Dilemma.
Besides the oil and gas pipelines, China and Bangladesh, along with Myanmar, have decided to build the 900 km
Kunming Highway linking Chittagong with Kunming through Myanmar to facilitate greater trade [7]. This would not
only overcome the long sea passage from the east coast of China through Singapore (for trans-shipment) to Bangladesh,
but would also lower transport costs and add to the economy of Yunnan province. This also fits well in their joint
initiative of improving Chittagong port infrastructure that can now be put to dual use for merchant vessels and also for
the navies of the two countries.
Challenging India
The Chinese approach of systematically nurturing and promoting diplomatic linkages with Bangladesh provides it with a
number of strategic advantages against India. Likewise, there are also several related strategic fallouts for Bangladesh.
As far as China is concerned, it will be in a position to link its electronic listening systems at Coco Island in Myanmar
and the staging/listening systems in Bangladesh and monitor Indian naval and missile activity. Given the wide
disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle, Bangladesh would be under pressure to open its facilities to the
PLA Navy as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. The prospect of Chinese ships and submarines operating in
the North Andaman Sea would have serious repercussions for India's projection capabilities. This is sure to result in
some aggressive counter-maneuvering by the Indian Navy, and the Indian naval response would be to execute a
blockade and entanglement of Chinese naval assets in Chittagong.
China¶s quest to establish a regional power profile is based on sustained and dedicated engagements with India¶s
neighbors for access and basing. It has adeptly reinforced its alliances with these countries through political-military
support and challenging India in its backyard. China-Bangladesh military cooperation has the potential to exacerbate
regional tensions along the Himalayas and result in high-intensity competition. The Chinese are quite clear that they
have a peer competitor and a rival who they must contend with to enhance their influence in South Asia.
Notes
1. Sreeradha Datta, ³Bangladesh¶s Relations with China and India: A Comparative Study´, Strategic Analysis, Volume
32, No.5, September 2008, p.761.
2. The Military Balance 2007, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
3. R. Chakrabarti, ³China and Bangladesh´, China Report, Volume 30, No. 2, 1994, p.155.
4. Jane¶s Fighting Ships 2008-09, pp.46-55.
5. All the World¶s Aircraft 2008-09, pp.94-95.
6. Sudhir T. Devare, (ed), A New Energy Frontier: The Bay of Bengal, (Singapore: ISEAS,2008).
7. Sharif M. Hossain and Ishtiaque Selim, ³Sino ± Bangladesh Economic Relations: Prospects and Challenges´, BIISS
Journal, Volume 27, No 4, October 2006, pp.354-355.
c 1&
)6(7& )
July 23, 2009 12:56 PM Age: 213 days
Category: China Brief, Energy, Foreign Policy
By: Wenran Jiang
In recent months, Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) struck four major overseas energy deals with Russia,
Kazakhstan, Brazil and Venezuela for a combined value of nearly $50 billion in Chinese capital (Dow Jones News,
February 17). The growing footprint and outreach of these NOCs have stoked concerns that Beijing is maneuvering to
lock-up global energy assets [1]. Indeed, China has grown to become the world¶s second largest consumer and importer
of oil, and the government has been pushing its NOCs to implement a ³go-out´ strategy to secure overseas energy
supply. Yet this new strategy is taking the shape of a formula of ³loans-for-energy,´ which involves a mix of state-
owned and private actors. These complex arrangements indicate that China¶s expansion of overseas-energy assets is a
long term goal and that it is increasingly interested in securing Chinese outward investments from its international
partners.
Four major deals in one month
In February, CNPC signed a raft of agreements with Moscow, in which China would provide $25 billion in soft loans to
Russia in return for a long-term commitment to supply China with oil. In the same month, China and Venezuela agreed
to double their joint investment fund to $12 billion by injecting an additional $4 billion from China, in return for
Venezuela¶s state-run oil company PDVSA¶s commitment to sell CNPC between 80,000-200,000 barrels of oil per day
(bpd) by 2015 (Asia Pulse, March 11). On February 19, China Development Bank, a financial institution under the State
Council primarily responsible for raising funds for large infrastructure projects, sealed a similar deal with Petrobras²the
Brazilian state-owned oil major²for a Chinese loan of $10 billion in exchange for a 10-year oil supply memorandum.
This agreement will allow China¶s Sinopec and CNPC to receive up to 150,000 bpd beginning this year, increasing to
200,000 bpd in the next nine years (Dow Jones Chinese Financial Wire, May 19). China¶s fourth ³loans-for-oil´ deal,
which was also signed in February, was with Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the contract, Kazakhstan will receive $10
billion in financing for its oil projects. China¶s Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank), the official export credit agency of
the Chinese government, lent the state-owned Development Bank of Kazakhstan $5 billion, while CNPC extended a $5
billion loan to its Kazakh counterpart KazMunaiGas (Reuters, April 17).
Complex ³Loans-for-Oil´ Formula
The four aforementioned deals all entail extensive and complicated negotiations between the parties involved, and they
all involve arrangements in what the Chinese call ³loans-for-oil´ (daikuan huan shiyuo).
China¶s $25 billion deal with Russia, for example, is comprised of four separate core agreements²two loan agreements
between China Development Bank and Russian oil firms Rosneft and Transneft, respectively; one oil supply agreement
between CNPC and Rosneft; plus one oil pipeline construction and operation agreement between CNPC and Transneft.
Under the provisions of the two loan agreements, Russian firms must use Chinese loans for projects related to oil
supplies that are going to China, but Rosneft is also permitted to use part of the loan to repay its debts to other non-
Chinese financial institutes (Caijing, February 20). These agreements could potentially secure oil supplies amounting to
300 million tons over 20 years. The supplies are worth almost $90 billion at current prices.
Yet it would be inaccurate to presume that China is buying $90 billion worth of oil with $25 billion of loan. Instead,
China is expected to buy the oil at market price at the time of delivery, and Russia will pay back the loans separately in
cash, under an adjustable interest rate. In other words, it may be somewhat misleading to describe the deals as ³loans-
for-oil.´
These arrangements also mean that the construction of a 300,000 bpd link from the Eastern Siberia±Pacific Ocean
(ESPO) oil pipeline to China can now be materialized (Platts Commodity News, February 17). The long-awaited 1030
km pipeline starts from Skovorodino in the Far East of Russia, and ends at the Daqing oilfield in China¶s Heilongjiang
province (China Chemical Reporter, June 6). Once finished at the end of 2010, the pipeline has a capacity to transport 15
million tons of oil to China every year, enough to meet around four percent of China¶s current oil needs (Interfax,
February 17). Rosneft expects to send crude to China under the new deal beginning in January 2011 (Xinhua News
Agency, April 23).
The Petrobras-CNPC/Sinopec deal departs from the former's usual practice of not entering into contracts committing
future production and supply in its new agreement with China. It demonstrates that Petrobras is eager to keep financing
on track for its pre-salt exploration in newly found oil reserves (for 8 billion barrel potential) deep beneath the ocean
floor off Brazil¶s southern coast. The entire project requires a $174.4 billion investment, and $28.6 billion input for this
year alone (LatinFinance, April 29; Reuters, May 19). On the Chinese side, the 150,000 bpd that Petrobras has promised
Sinopec for 2009 would be equivalent to around 4.2 percent of China's overall intake in 2008 (Platts Oilgram News,
May 21).
The agreement with Venezuela is the least definite in contrast to the other three, as it contains no firm commitment of
increasing its supply of oil, but only based on loosely-phrased terms ³calling for´ PDVSA to sell CNPC between
80,000-200,000 barrels of oil per day" (The Associated Press, May 13). During his April 2009 visit to China,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced that the country aims to increase oil shipments to China to one million
barrels per day by 2010, as grand a scheme as it may sound, and it is worth noting that Caracas's petroleum shipments to
China only reached 168,000 bpd by December 2008, which fell way short of Chavez¶s original target of 400,000 bpd for
2008 (Bloomberg, January 27).
China¶s new venture with Kazakhstan deviates from the ³oil-for-loans´ formula. The $5 billion loan from CNPC will
give Chinese oil firms a 50 percent stake in the joint purchase of MangistauMunaiGaz (MMG), Kazakhstan¶s biggest
private oil and gas company (Reuters, April 17). This deal is more like a ³loan-for-oil assets´ transaction than one of
³loan-for-promised-oil supply," which characterizes the previous three contracts, and CNPC will receive half of the oil
that will be produced by the jointly owned MMG (the other 50 percent will be owned by the Kazak state-owned firm
KazMunaiGas). This model is more in line with the Chinese government¶s preference for financing acquisitions, since it
gives Chinese NOCs direct ownership of resources. In contrast to the other three deals, Chinese NOCs could only extend
loans to foreign NOCs for guaranteed oil supplies or possible special access to future exploration projects.
China¶s inability to obtain outright equity oil assets stems mainly from the oil exporters¶ mailed grip of their national
resources. The increasing nationalistic sentiments evoked by oil-producing countries and the use of energy as a national
foreign policy tool suggest that²at least in the short term²these deals far from signal a major breakthrough in China¶s
energy security. Since China was only able to secure 50 percent interest from Kazakstan¶s MMG, and uncertainty
remains as to whether the promised oil supplies are sustainable on a long-term basis without occasional disruption.
Underlying conditions
The global financial crisis -- The ³loans-for-oil´ deals are unfolding against the backdrop of the global financial crisis
and abated global oil consumption. Take Russia for example. Rosneft, 75 percent controlled by the government, was
burdened with $21.2 billion in debt and Transneft with $7.7 billion (Xinhua News Agency, May 19). For Rosneft, its
$15 billion share of the $25 billion loan from China will comfortably cover its $8.5 billion debt maturing this year
(Financial Times, February 18). In addition, China¶s capital injection complements the emergency capital needs of
national oil firms in Venezuela and Brazil, allowing them to further expand their market shares and turning resources
into capital. As for Kazakhstan, Xue Li from the Chinese Academy of Social Science points out that China¶s $10 billion
loan could help the Central Asian country initiate its $14.6 billion dollar economic recovery policy (Xinhua News
Agency, April 19).
Put more of China¶s $2 trillion foreign reserves into hard assets -- Zhang Guobao, vice minister of the National
Development and Reform Commission and head of the NEA, had pointed out in a signed article published in December
2008 in the People¶s Daily (a strong indication of being authoritative statements of government policy) that China
should seize the timing of the oil price slump on the international market to increase imports and Chinese enterprises are
encouraged by the government to expand overseas (China Daily, March 9). Accompanying such appeals is a call is to
take advantage of China¶s fast-accumulating foreign reserves. The global economic crisis has presented China with a
rare opportunity to trade its abundant foreign currency reserves for oil, mineral and other resources around the world.
China now has roughly $2 trillion in foreign exchange, ranking number one in the world, and many state firms are also
flush with funds (The Associated Press, February 18). Beijing is considering setting up an oil stabilization fund to
support purchases of overseas resources by Chinese oil companies. The plan was submitted at NEA¶s National Work
Conference on Energy held in March 2009 (Xinhua News Agency, March 2).
Oil-producing nations trying to diversify export-markets -- China offers oil-producing nations, especially Russia and
Venezuela, an alternative to Western and U.S. markets, thereby giving them more political clout in the international
community and reducing potential vulnerability from their existing buyers. The Russian government plans to increase its
crude oil exports to the Asia-Pacific region from three percent in 2000 to 30 percent by 2020, amounting to 100 million
tons a year [2]. Similarly, Venezuela regards China as a key link in its strategy of diversifying oil sales away from the
United States, which still buys about half of its oil despite years of political tensions. The rationale also applies to
Kazakhstan. In addition to pipelines extending to Russia and Europe, sustainable oil supplies through the existing China-
Kazakhstan oil pipeline can enhance Kazakhstan¶s energy transit potential by diversify its exporting routes, thereby
reducing political and commercial risks.
Assessments and Prospects
The recent large energy activities are not the first time Chinese NOCs have entered ³loans-for-oil´ deals. In 2004,
Chinese banks financed Rosneft¶s acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz with a $6 billion loan and CNPC received a pledge of
long-term supply contracts via rail in exchange (Platts Community News, February 19). Beijing¶s continuous efforts to
secure long-term oil supplies demonstrate that Chinese national oil firms are increasingly using a powerful tool to obtain
overseas assets: loan from government banks to resource-rich but cash-strained nations in maintaining access to oil
supplies.
Yet even under economic pressure, oil-producing countries have kept Chinese oil companies at arms¶ length during the
negotiation. For the former, these four deals represent an optimal outcome²let China provide the financing while they
maintain the control of the energy assets. The terms of the agreements only give China the "right to purchase" the oil,
but not the "right to own" the oil through equity purchase.
These ³loans-for-oil´ activities will remain an active component of the Chinese overseas resource acquisition strategy
given the current global economic and energy conditions. They are accompanied by Chinese NOCs other commercial
and acquisition, such as the latest commitment of $7.2 billion by Sinopec to buy Toronto listed Addax which has large
holdings in West Africa and Iraq (Wall Street Journal, June 25). The Sinopec-Addax transaction, if finalized, will be the
single largest energy asset purchase by the China¶s NOCs, demonstrating the dynamic nature of China¶s overseas energy
security drive.
[The author would like to thank Simin Yu for his research assistance.]
Notes
1. Chinese NOCs normally refer to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and their subsidiaries.
2. Shoichi Itoh, ³Russia¶s Energy Diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific: Is Moscow¶s Ambition Dashed?´ Slavic Research
Center, Sapporo, Japan, 2008.
;c;
' ) 1
July 23, 2009 12:46 PM Age: 213 days
Category: In a Fortnight, Military/Security, Elite, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific, China Brief
By: Russell Hsiao
China's Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao (C) poses with newly-promoted generals.
Beijing instituted a new round of personnel changes among the top-ranking officers of the People¶s Liberation Army
(PLA) and its general departments. According to official state-media, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman
and PRC President Hu Jintao conferred three senior military officers the rank of general on July 20 (Xinhua News
Agency, July 20). A raft of personnel changes that were made recently runs the gamut of the PLA's general departments:
General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments
Department (Nanfang Daily, July 10; China Military Online, July 10).
The three senior officers promoted to the rank of general are Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Ma Xiaotian;
Political Commissar of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences Liu Yuan; and Political Commissar of Chengdu
Military Area Command Zhang Haiyang. The conferment of Ma, Liu and Zhang represents the coming of age of a
generation of PLA stars, whose meteoric rise to the upper echelons of the military establishment has been closely tied to
Hu.
Ma, who now directs the PLA's high-level military diplomacy and intelligence operations, has a long career in the
Chinese air force, and is leading the Chinese delegation in the resumed U.S.-China defense dialogue, which had been
suspended due to Beijing's objections to U.S. sale of advanced weaponry to Taiwan (Ta Kung Pao, July 21). Ma is noted
for his critical stance toward what he sees as the expansion of [U.S.] military alliances in the Asia-Pacific (Straits Time,
June 1, 2008).
Both Zhang and Liu are "princelings," a reference to the offspring of party elders or retired generals. Their successive
appointment up the military ranks affirms Hu's tactic of trying to build up his credentials as the commander-in-chief²
Hu himself lacks personal military experience²by elevating the sons of First- and Second-Generation revolutionaries to
senior PLA slots. It is interesting to note that Zhang and Liu, although coming from different branches of the Chinese
military, have risen up the ranks almost lock-step with one another. Zhang Haiyang is the son of former CMC Vice-
Chairman and Politburo member General Zhang Zhen.
Liu Yuan's promotion, the son of late Chinese statesmen Liu Shaoqi²purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution²
has caught considerable media attention. Liu is referred to as the leader of a faction in the PLA described by the media
as the ³young turks´ (shao zhuang pai), which is composed of realists, nationalists and foreign policy hardliners
(Nownews [Taiwan], July 21). Liu is known for his tough stance on Taiwan, made infamous by his statement
responding to remarks in Taipei about an alleged plan to bomb the Three Gorges Dam in case of a Chinese attack by
telling the media that an air strike by Taiwan "will provoke a retaliation [against Taiwan] that will µblot out the sky and
cover up the earth'" (See China Brief, "The end of the Sino-American honeymoon?", July 18, 2004).
Other personnel changes in the PLA¶s general departments include:

In the General Staff Department:
Chief of Staff of the Shenyang Military Region Lieutenant General Hou Shusen was promoted to deputy chief of the
PLA Headquarters of the General Staff.
Dean of the Nanjing Army Command College Major General Chen Yong was promoted to assistant chief of staff for
the PLA Headquarters of the General Staff.
Assistant Chief of Staff for the PLA General Staff Headquarters Major General Yang Zhiqi is retiring.
Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA General Headquarter and Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region General
Liu Zhenwu is retiring.
In the General Armament Department:
Chief of Staff for the PLA General Armaments Department Major General Niu Hongguang was promoted to deputy
director of the PLA General Armaments Department.
Deputy Director of the PLA General Armament Department Lieutenant General Zhang Jianqi is retiring.
In the General Political Department:
Assistant Director PLA General Political Department Major General Xu Yaoyuan was conferred the rank of
lieutenant general.
In the General Logistics Department:
Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department Major General Ding Jiye was conferred the rank of
lieutenant general.
Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department Major General Tai Yinghe was conferred the rank of
lieutenant general.
Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department Lieutenant General Wang Qian is retiring.
(Source: Nanfang Daily, July10; Wenwei Po, July 10; ETaiwan News, July 10)
c +

August 5, 2009 01:53 PM Age: 200 days
Category: China Brief, Economics, Energy, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Russia
By: Stephen Blank
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (L) and Chinese President Hu Jintao
On April 21, 2009, China formally concluded an agreement to lend $25 billion to Russian state-owned oil company
Rosneft and pipeline monopoly Transneft in exchange for the completion of an oil pipeline from Skovorodino in Russia
to Daqing in China. Russian commentators claim that the deal was not commercially favorable to China [1]. That
contention, however, is arguably misplaced. Admittedly, the price of the oil was set at the floating price of Brent crude
oil when it arrives at the projected Kozmino Bay terminal and Russia has finally gained an Asian entrée for its energy
exports. Yet, while Chinese leaders may cringe at the deal's price tag, Beijing has gained serious geopolitical
advantages over Moscow in the Russian Far East (RFE) because of the effect that the global economic crisis is having
on the latter's economy and on Moscow's ability to control the RFE. Moscow also now looks favorably on China¶s
investments in Central Asia. By opening up the RFE to Chinese investment and blessing similar investments in Central
Asia, Moscow is reversing its policies toward both the Far East and Central Asia. In effect, this and other similar deals
opens the door to a huge expansion²with Moscow's assent²of China¶s strategic profile in both regions. The creation
of a new regional order in the RFE and Central Asia is beginning to take shape and China is set to become the region's
security manager, ensuring foremost that its portfolio investments are safe and secure.
The deal provided the impetus for significant increases in Chinese access to the development of Russian energy assets in
the RFE that has hitherto been blocked (Asia Times Online, February 24). Since Moscow failed to develop the RFE
under present economic conditions, it had to invite Chinese participation starting in late 2008 when it began to negotiate
this loan. Although the direct cause of this move is the global economic crisis, the root cause is the mismanagement of
the Russian energy industry, which is Moscow¶s main²if not only²trump card in the Far East. Yet, in doing so
Moscow is undermining what experts say has been the strategic rationale behind its East Asian policy. That policy
operated on the premise that Moscow would use its energy revenues to develop the RFE and Eastern Siberia further and
promote Russia¶s full integration into Northeast Asia as a major great power [2]. The failure of this policy does not
bode well for Russia¶s quest to be recognized as an independent and key player in Asia.
On May 21, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev admitted in a rare public acknowledgement that unless China invested
in large-scale projects in the RFE, Moscow's plans to develop the region could not materialize. The acute decline of the
Russian economy is clearly illustrated by the contraction of foreign trade, which had contracted by one-third since the
start of the year to May 2009. As of June 2009 forecasts predict an 8 percent decrease in GDP, and the government is
now cutting the budget and being forced into ever more crisis-driven polices [3].
Medvedev candidly stated that the economic development of the RFE cannot depend on Russia¶s ties with Europe but
rather its ties with Russia¶s main Asia-Pacific partners. He also stressed that the RFE¶s regional development strategy
must be coordinated in tandem with China¶s regional strategy of rejuvenating its old industrial base in Northeast China
(e.g. Heilongjiang province) (People¶s Daily Online, May 21; Kremlin.ru, May 21). Other officials quickly followed
suit. Army General Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council, subsequently conceded the
weaknesses of the RFE's infrastructure and outlined the RFE¶s most important priorities: ³The development of cross
border cooperation with neighboring countries, enhancement of transit possiblities, development of infrstructure and
capacities for wood processing, seafood processing and output of products competititve on the world market´ (ITAR-
TASS, July 3. While liberal and other critics of the regime continued to warn about Chinese encroachment in the Far
East, the government¶s leading spokesmen praised Russo-Chinese relations as being at their highest point ever. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov actually lauded Chinese investment in Central Asia for its ³transparency´ [4].
Furthermore, Rybakov declared that,
"We believe that our friends and partners in Central Asia are appropriately meeting the situation and solving the task
facing them in the sphere of economic and social development using the opportunities that present themselves as a result
of cooperation with China. Hence this can only be welcomed" [5].
The Russian leaders' statements constitute a reversal of Moscow's past policy of trying to prevent Chinese economic
penetration of Central Asia, which was meant to avoid economic competition, and probably confrontation, with China in
the region. Moscow¶s elite has hitherto regarded any gain by Beijing in Central Asia with unease, and the Russian
media has repeatedly speculated about China¶s economic ³conquest´ of Central Asia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November
28, 2007) [6]. As a 2007 report of the Russian-Chinese Business Council observed,
Being a member of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), China views other members of the organization as
promising markets. It is China that wishes to be the engine behind the trade and economic cooperation within the
framework of the SCO « China¶s intentions to form [a] so-called economic space within the SCO are well known.
Owing to that fact, experts have been speaking about greater Chinese economic expansion in various parts of the world,
including Central Asia « Beijing has activated ties with all Central Asian countries and strives to comprehensively
strengthen economic relations and the dependency of these countries on its market (Interfax, November 15, 2007).
Rybakov¶s remarks reveal a significant change in Russian policy and a major concession to China. Yet the real payoff
to both sides²although primarily to China apart from this unprecedented concession²can be found in the new and
recent energy deals.
Beijing naturally welcomed this initiative. At the June 16-17 summit with China, Medvedev admitted that, ³we riveted
much attention to investment breakthrough.´ Medvedev stressed both sides¶ acceptance of the need for a qualitiative
breakthrough and the readiness of Chinese firms to make sizable investments in energy facilities, timber processing and
transport infrastructure in the RFE (ITAR-TASS, June 17; Xinhua News Agency, June 15 & 17). Russia¶s Bank for
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs, Vnesheconombank (VEB), had to borrow money from China. As a major
stockholder in Russia's largest oil company, Lukoil, China also indirectly has leverage over that firm. After having
excluded foreign firms from bidding on the huge Udokan copper mine in Southeast Siberia, Moscow had to reopen the
bidding to Chinese, South Korean, and Kazakh mining and refining enterprises. All these moves constitute a major
reversal of past Russian policy in energy and mineral investment dating back to 2003 (Asia Times Online, July 1;
Interfax Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, June 17; Forbes, June 29). Similarly, under the terms of the new
agreement, Russian companies may invest in oil exploration and natural gas distribution in China (for which they lack
the captial at present) but that Chinese firms (who have huge amounts of capital for investment) may also invest in
developing oil and gas fields in Russia along with liquefaction plants (Bloomberg News, June 30). It appears that the
following deals were consummated at the June 16-17 Sino-Russian summit in Moscow, some of which were listed
above. More specificially,
"On June 17, Medvedev and Hu signed a joint statement. Both sides also signed memoranda of understanding (MOU)
on gas and coal cooperation, trade promotion, an investment cooperation blueprint, a framework agreement on [a] $700
million loan from China¶s Export-Import Bank to Russia¶s VEB (Vnesheconomobank), and an additional MOU between
Renova and China¶s state gold mining corporation" (Asia Times Online, July 22).
Also on June 17, Lukoil and Sinopec signed a contract to supply 3 million tons of crude oil from the South Hylchuyu
deposit in Nemets Autonomous Region in Russia between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010 (Asia Times Online, July 22).
Since then the Liaoning Xiyang group announced that it will invest in the development of a 1 billion-ton iron ore
deposit at the Berezov deposit, 20 kilometers (km) north of the Inner Mongolian border town of Shiwei (Caijing Online,
July 20). Aside from these events, China has become Russia¶s largest trading partner as a result of the current crisis.
Russia and China are discussing co-production arrangements in oil, gas, and electric power settlements and deals
totaling $100 billion, the use of their national currencies in mutual settlements, and Russian officials are even promoting
both the ruble and the Renminbi as new international reserve currencies (ITAR-TASS, June 17; Interfax, June 16 & 17;
Interfax Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, June 17).
On June 17 Medvedev claimed that he had clinched deals with China on energy totaling $100 billion by a ³special
mechanism,´ a reference to the April 21 deal.
China¶s Strategy Triumphs Due to the Economic Crisis
China has naturally welcomed these opportunities for expanding its influence over Russian and Central Asian energy
and other assets and is moving to take advantage of them through these deals and energy purchases in Russia,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakshtan, and by expanding its loans and investments in the Central Asian states. Given the
subtlety that characterizes Chinese policy toward the region, Beijing will not loudly proclaim a new order in Asia, but it
is finally in a position to realize the goals it set out to achieve in 2002-03 when it first began to invest in Russian and
Central Asian energy in anticipation of beocming an energy importer.
China first sought to buy into the Slavneft oil firm in 2002 and to deal with Yukos under Mikhail Khodorkovsky¶s
leadership in 2002-03. After those deals were rebuffed by direct state interference, Moscow played a game with China
and Japan, first promising one and then the other that it would build a pipeline to their Asian destination of choice, but
failing to deliver on any of these proposals. Russia failed to live up to many of its previously-announced commitments
to China in energy through 2008 [7]. Now we can expect considerably more Chinese investment in both the Russian Far
East and Central Asia as Moscow is in no position to object and desperately needs the captial that China can provide.
Conclusion
These deals demonstrate not just the failure of Russian policy in the RFE, but also China¶s growing dominance, through
its economic power, of Russia¶s policy toward Asia²a situation facilitated by the global economic crisis. Russia has
seemingly renounced its autocratic dreams in the Far East and solicited Chinese investment. Courting Chinese power
has forced Russia to reverse long-standing Russian policies in the RFE. For all those who are watching for the
emergence of China as a dominant economic and political player in Asia, these new deals with Russia have a profound
significance that we overlook at our peril.
Notes
1. Alexander Lukin, ³Russia to Reinforce Asian Vector,´ Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 2, April-June, 2009, p.
90.
2. Sergei Lavrov, ³The Rise of Asia and the Eastern Vector of Russia¶s Foreign Policy,´ Russia in Global Affairs, Vol.
4, No. 3, July-September, 2006, pp. 70-77.
3. ³Russia Faces GDP Decline of 7.9 Percent This Year, World Bank Says,´ from Bureau News, June 24, 2009,
blog.taragana.com/n/russia-faces-gdp-decline-of-79-percent-this-year-world-bank-says-90732/.
4. Open Source Center, OSC Feature, Russia, OSC Analysis, ³Russian Officials Laud Ties with China; Observers
Express Concerns,´ Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, (FBIS SOV), July 20, 2009.
5. Ibid.
6. Bulat Abdulin, ³For Kazakhstan¶s Army ± a NATO Heading,´ Marketing I Konsalting Internet Version, in Russian,
January 9, 2008, FBIS SOV, January 15, 2008.
7. Stephen Blank, ³At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East,´ Demokratizatsiya, Vol. XVII, NO. 2,
Spring, 2009, pp. 122-144.
; )
4 %" )
Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Willy Lam
As the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) marked its 82nd birthday on August 1, the Hu Jintao leadership has taken
several major initiatives to raise the quality of its senior personnel. President and Commander-in-chief Hu has also given
a big boost to military modernization by pledging unprecedented civilian support for the PLA¶s ambitious goals ³in the
new century and under new historical circumstances.´ Yet China¶s defense establishment still suffers from enduring
problems ranging from an aging leadership to factionalism. Further, Hu¶s re-hoisting of the Maoist standard of junmin
jiehe, or ³the synthesis of the army and the people,´ could exacerbate the privileged, ³state-within-a-state´ status of the
armed forces²and further stoke fears about the ³China threat.´
The prediction that the year 2009 could become a watershed for the PLA is supported by growing evidence of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership¶s eagerness to show off the troops¶ state-of-the-art weaponry. During the
celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy back in April, the authorities unveiled the first
Chinese-made nuclear submarine to an audience that included military delegations from 30-odd countries. More
sophisticated hardware, including jetfighters and missiles, are set to dazzle the world at a gargantuan Tiananmen Square
military parade scheduled for the People's Republic 60th birthday on October 1 (Xinhua News Agency, April 21; Ming
Pao [Hong Kong], August 3). There is intense speculation in Chinese online military forums that Hu and his generals
want to take advantage of the Obama Administration¶s just-announced moratorium on the development of high-tech
weapons to narrow the gap between the two nation¶s combat capabilities.
At a CCP Politburo Study Session last month, Hu, who has chaired the policy-setting Central Military Commission
(CMC) since 2004, noted that the authorities would do more to attract ³high-caliber talent from society´ as well as
³different types of talents´ to military work. He also announced measures to ensure that the next generation of military
chieftains would be full of ³enthusiasm, initiative and creativity´ (Liberation Army Daily, July 25; China News Service,
July 24). In senior-level reshuffles since early this year, Hu has broken new ground by moving more officers from the
academies, research institutes and headquarters units to the frontline. According to the Southern Metropolitan Daily, the
CMC has, since April, rotated 33 high-level officers among the four headquarters departments, the seven military
commands, PLA academics and institutes, the People¶s Armed Police (PAP) as well as headquarters and grassroots units
of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery or Missile Corps. For example, nine generals from departments
in the headquarters have been transferred to grassroots divisions and military academies, while seven generals from
academic and research institutions have been posted to frontline service units. The official daily said this had the
advantage of achieving a ³synthesis between military theory and practice, and between officers from headquarters and
those from the grassroots´ (Southern Metropolitan Daily [Guangzhou], July 28; South China Morning Post [Hong
Kong], July 29).
In an article released on the eve of Army Day, CMC Vice-Chairman Guo Boxiong asserted that the PLA had been able
to nurture a corps of officers who were ³revolutionary, modernized and standardized.´ General Guo saluted the rapid
³intellectualization´ of officers as well as rank and file cadres. He disclosed that 61 percent of PLA officers with the
rank of ³cadre´ held college degrees or their equivalents. Yet Hu and his military colleagues have yet to tackle two
organizational problems within the barracks. One is that rejuvenation within the top brass has severely lagged behind
that in party and government departments. The average age of the 10 CMC members is over 66; while that of the 14
heads²the commanders and political commissars²of the seven military regions is 61 (China News Service, August 1;
Xinhua News Agency, August 1; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], July 30). To bring in new blood, Hu has adopted
unconventional methods such as elevating relatively junior officers to senior slots. For instance, the chief of staff of the
Shenyang Military Region, Lieutenant-General Hou Shusen, was promoted last month to Vice-Chief of the PLA General
Staff Department (GSD). Normally, a regional chief of staff has to become a regional vice-commander and then
commander before being considered for this senior GSD post. Yet at 59, General Hou only has six more years of active
service before reaching the mandatory retirement age (Chongqing Evening Post [Chongqing], July 29; China News
Service, July 29).
An even more daunting challenge for military reform is cliquishness within the top ranks. The so-called Gang of
Princelings²a reference to the sons and daughters of party elders²has occupied a sizeable portion of senior PLA slots.
This is despite the fact that owing to negative public sentiments about ³the revolutionary bloodline,´ the proportion of
princeling cadres in the party-and-government apparatus has declined over the years. One needs only to look at the
background of the three PLA officers who were elevated to full generals last month: Political Commissar of the Chinese
Academy of Military Sciences Liu Yuan; Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region Zhang Haiyang; and
Vice-Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian. They are the sons of former state president Liu Shaoqi, former Politburo
member and senior general Zhang Zhen, and former dean of the PLA Political Academy Ma Zaiyao, respectively (See
³Hu confers hardliner top military rank,´ China Brief, July 23). Of particular significance to factional dynamics within
the CCP is the fact that Vice-President Xi Jinping²himself a princeling²has a reasonably good chance of being named
CMC vice-chairman at the CCP Fourth Plenary Session scheduled for September. Since Xi is a probable successor to Hu
upon the latter¶s expected retirement from the Politburo at the 18th CCP Congress of 2012, it is in accordance with party
tradition that the 56-year-old Fifth-Generation leader be inducted into the CMC at least a couple of years before his
elevation to the party chief position. Due largely to recommendation by his father, former vice-premier Xi Zhongxun, Xi
worked for three years as a secretary at the CMC General Office right after graduation from Tsinghua University in
1979. Moreover, it is well-known that Xi has kept up intimate ties with fellow PLA princelings. Given that Hu and Xi
are heads of respectively the Communist Youth League (CYL) Clique and the Gang of Princelings, Hu has a vested
interest in ensuring that there will be at least a rough balance of power between the two power blocs even after his
retirement. An exacerbation of the princelings¶ grip over the PLA, however, would upset this delicate balance (Asia
Times Online [Hong Kong], July 10).
At the same time, Hu has sought to bolster his support among the top brass by promising extra civilian support in areas
such as research and development of weapons and infrastructure, especially transport and communications. These
massive resources are on top of the 15 percent or so budget boosts that have been granted the PLA for the past decade.
The CMC Chairman said last month that army development in China would be marked by ³the synthesis of the military
and civilian [sectors], and of [the requirements] of peace and war.´ ³The concepts of a rich country and a strong military
should be unified,´ said Hu. ³We will uphold the principle of joint military-civilian development, and push forward the
benevolent interplay between national defense construction and economic construction´ (Xinhua News Agency, July
24). This means, for example, that the planning of new civilian airports, highways, and ports should take military
requirements and applications into consideration. And the fact that much of the R&D expenditure for military hardware
comes from the budgets of civilian government departments is behind the widespread perception that the publicized
PLA budget only represents up to one-third of the actual outlay for China¶s defense forces. While the so-called pingzhan
heyi (³synthesis of war and peace´) dictum was enunciated by Chairman Mao Zedong when he invented guerrilla
warfare in rural China in the 1930s, Hu is the first military chief to have revived this ideal in the age of reform (See
³Hu¶s Tightening Grip: CMC Personnel Shifts and Increasing the PLA¶s Budget,´ China Brief, May 31, 2007).
Critics of the theory of ³army-civilian fusion,´ however, have pointed out that this will tend to make the Chinese
military even more of a ³state within a state.´ They point to the fact that, compared with the situation in almost all other
countries, the PLA has enjoyed a disproportionately large share of political and economic resources. In a Liberation
Army Daily article dated August 2, CMC Vice-Chairman Guo again saluted the principle of ³the party¶s absolute
leadership over the army.´ ³We shall resolutely abide by the instructions of the party Central Committee and the Central
Military Commission,´ General Guo wrote. ³We shall resolutely complete all the tasks mandated by the party´ (Apple
Daily [Hong Kong], August 4; Liberation Army Daily, August 2). Among the nine-man Politburo Standing Committee,
however, only President Hu has the requisite authority to influence day-to-day military operations. As the Sichuan
earthquake demonstrated, even such a senior cadre as Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of
PLA and PAP divisions in emergency situations (See ³Sichuan Quake Reveals Gross Failings in the System,´ China
Brief, June 6, 2008). This perhaps explains why immediately after the horrendous riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang on July 5,
Hu had to drop out of the Group of Eight meeting in Italy to hurry back to Beijing in order to direct military operations
against the ³Uighur splittists´ (Ming Pao, July 9; Asiasentinel.com, July 9).
The CCP leadership¶s less-than-stringent control over the top brass²and the relentless aggrandizement of the PLA¶s
clout²could engender concern particularly among China¶s neighbors that hawkish elements within the defense
establishment could prod the nation into adopting an aggressive foreign policy. Influential PLA theorists including
National Defense University Professor Jin Yinan²who was one of two experts to brief the Politburo last month on
global strategies²have noted that the PLA would play a pivotal role in China¶s emergence as a world power. Jin noted
that ³China¶s rise can never be accomplished in the midst of nightingale songs and swallow dances´²a reference to the
placid pleasures of peacetime. Other military officers have urged tougher steps to resolve the country¶s sovereignty
disputes with Southeast Asian nations including Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines (Xinhua News Agency,
December 31, 2008; Global Times, March 14; Eastern Morning Post [Shanghai], March 12). The upside of the Hu
leadership¶s support for fast-track military modernization is that this could generate national pride among Chinese and
boost socio-political cohesiveness. The downside, however, is that a corps of generals that is not subject to institutional
checks and balances could have an undue impact on the nation¶s foreign and even domestic policies. In conclusion, even
if CMC Chairman Hu is successful in raising the caliber of the top brass, the latter¶s preponderance in Chinese politics
could worsen already serious tensions between China and its neighbors.
3$ % )

Category: China Brief, Military/Security, In a Fortnight, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
A string of Chinese reports, which appeared in recent weeks leading to and following the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) 82nd birthday on August 1, seems to indicate that a debate over reforming China's seven military regions is
maturing. A major reform to the existing PLA's seven military regions, which served as the framework for Chinese
military planning and operations since 1985, has neither been confirmed nor denied by official sources. The story that
these changes may be in the offing was broken by the Hong Kong-based monthly periodical, The Mirror (Jing Bao),
which is a prominent journal covering Chinese elite politics and military strategy. According to its website, the
magazine's articles are also used as "internal references" in various departments at the central government level, and
valued by the Chinese leadership (The Mirror [Hong Kong], August/Issue 385).
Citing unspecified military sources, the journal reported in the featured article of its August issue, stirringly titled
"China¶s Military Reform of the Century," that the PLA's seven military regions (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan,
Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu) will be supplanted by four "strategic zones" (northern, eastern, western and
southern) and a central region, which overlaps the current system of military regions. The article, penned by Liang
Tianren, stated that each strategic zone will reportedly be under the command of a ³small military commission´ (xiao
jun wei) composed of different branches of the armed forces and several provincial secretaries that fall within its
jurisdiction. The heads (shu ji) of the commissions would be appointed by the PLA Central Military Commission
(CMC), which is headed by the current President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao. These military commissions will be responsible for military operations and
defense mobilization in the strategic zones (Wenwei Po [Hong Kong], August 1; China Times [Taiwan], August 3; The
Mirror, August/Issue 385).
According to the journal article, the so-called Northern Strategic Zone will have jurisdiction over China's three
northeastern provinces: Liaoning Province, Jilin Province and Heilongjiang Province, as well as Inner Mongolia (which
is currently under the jurisdiction of the Beijing Military Region), which essentially replaces the Shenyang Military
Region. The Eastern Strategic Zone will have the same jurisdiction over the current Nanjing Military Region, plus the
East Sea Fleet, air force, second artillery and armed police. The Southern Strategic Zone will have the same jurisdiction
over the current Guangzhou Military Region and parts of the Chengdu Military Region (Yunnan Province and Guizhou
Province), and the South Sea Fleet, air force, second artillery and armed police. The Western Strategic Zone will have
jurisdiction over the remaining provinces that fall within the Chengdu Military Region and the entire Lanzhou Military
Region. The Central Zone will have jurisdiction over the current Beijing Military Region (excluding Inner Mongolia)
and the Jinan Military Region, and Hubei Province (which is currently under the jurisdiction of the Guangzhou Military
Region), including the North Sea Fleet. The status of the Central Region in the overall military reform plan is reportedly
a contentious issue as there are disagreements over whether or not the region should be made a strategic zone (Wenwei
Po, August 1; China Times, August 3; The Mirror, August/Issue 385).
According to a military expert cited in The Mirror, the plan to divide the military regions into strategic zones will be
guided by four principles: 1) consideration for long-term national strategy; 2) suitability to future war conditions; 3)
sufficient battle depth in each strategic zone; and 4) structural dexterity, operability and less redundancy (The Mirror,
August/Issue 385).
Indeed, such talks of military reforms are not unprecedented. According to Li Daguang, a military expert at the
University of National Defense, "[r]elevant discussions have been ongoing for several years." In a report by the Global
Times (Huangqiu Shibao)²the English arm of the CCP's People's Daily²Chinese military personnel reportedly have
been mulling over the idea of establishing a cross-sectional mechanism to replace the traditional decision-making
procedure, which had been dominated by the land force for quite some time, and have described the current make up of
the seven military regions as "redundant" and "not up to the demand of modern military modernization or deployment"
(Global Times, July 31).
Yet, an anonymous military source cited by Global Times ruled out the possibility that the Chinese military will carry
out such a major reform this year, because "[t]he main tasks the Chinese military so far are to maintain stability along
the borders and prepare for the military parade on National Day in October" (Global Times, July 31).
Although there are still noticeable disagreements as to whether or not the reforms will be carried out in the near-term or
long-term, the fact that the debate is being parsed out openly in the public signals broader momentum behind the
impetus for substantial military reform intended to boost the combat readiness of the PLA under modern conditions.
$$c&c (

August 20, 2009 06:56 AM Age: 185 days
By: Russell Hsiao
Following a dismal H1 performance (January ± May) for China's shipbuilding industry (SIB)²new orders received by
Chinese shipbuilders decreased by 96 percent year-on-year (yoy), with a net of 1.18 million deadweight tons (DWT)²
the sector posted a substantial boost of 8.8 million DWT in new orders for the months of June and July combined.
According to statistics released by the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry (CANSI), a national
association of the shipbuilding trade, in July, the country's new shipbuilding orders of 4.1 million DWT accounted for
nearly 70 percent of the world's total (People¶s Daily, August 17; China Economic Net, August 18). The surge in orders
has some observers in the Chinese media hailing a recovery for the ailing industry, which faced a shortage of credit and
looming job cuts if the conditions did not improve. Yet, according to some industry insiders and analysts, recovery is far
from certain and the real hurdle ahead for the industry will surface in the coming months, when small- and medium-
scale ship builders may have to stop production or close down factories, and large builders will be forced to lay off
workers and cut salaries (China Daily, July 30). These challenges, however, are buoyed by another trend that may signal
changes in the Chinese leadership's thinking toward further reforms of its defense-industrial complex, in particular, the
ability of its defense assets to solicit private funding²starting with the SBI. As a case in point, in the past month, the
China Securities Regulatory Commission, the main securities regulator of the country, approved an initial public
offering (IPO) in the Shanghai Stock Exchange by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, a state-controlled
conglomerate that is the largest supplier of capital ships to the Chinese Navy, to issue 1.995 billion shares, or a 30
percent stake, with plans to raise 6.4 billion yuan ($936 million) to expand its capacity (China Economic Net, August
18; Bloomberg, July 23).
At the apex of the sector's lagging performance, which was due to overcapacity of the shipping market, was a stagnating
trade volume in new ships. China's SBI was also struck by a number of compounding problems, such as order
cancellations, ship delivery delays and financial strain. A Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
spokesperson described the situation of overcapacity as "acute," and observers placed the blame of the SBI's falling
orders at the feet of the global economic slowdown (China Daily, July 30). These problems, however, may point to
further indication of the need for the industry to enact sweeping reforms to overcome its three major bottlenecks:
financial (1), technological (2) and managerial (3) (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, April 6). As one industry
specialist candidly explained back in 2003: ³At the present time, China¶s shipbuilding industry has the following
problems: obsolete production modes, yet-to-be formed effective technological innovation systems, lack of experienced
scientific research personnel, and lack of administrative and management personnel, etc.´ [1].
In response to the crisis, the central government committed a considerable stimulus to shore up the ailing SBI. In
February, China's State Council approved a stimulus package for the country's SBI aimed at encouraging financial
institutions to lend more to ship buyers and also offer incentives for purchasers of ocean-going ships. According to one
industry expert: "The policy of encouraging financial institutions to lend more to ship buyers has actually helped
Chinese shipbuilders to maintain orders. Because of the unfolding financial crisis, many ship buyers feel incapable of
forking out the money. This policy has undoubtedly given them confidence and helped cut order cancellations and
payment delays" (China Radio International, February 13). Further measures to aid the weakening industry included a
20-billion-yuan (approximately $3 billion) industry investment fund in Tianjin, which would aid in equity investment,
ship leasing, supporting mergers and acquisitions among shipyards and purchasing vessels that are cancelled by buyers.
Nevertheless, most domestic banks continued lending with caution, despite the country's top economic planner vow to
fund the industry in early June (China Daily, July 2).
More telling of the economic crisis¶s implications on the SBI, however, is the effect that it appears to have had on the
Beijing leadership¶s attitude toward China¶s civilian economy and its defense industrial complex²in terms of allowing
its defense assets to vie for private funding. The listing of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation may signal a new
willingness by Beijing authorities to loosen its mailed-grip on the sector and publically list its defense assets. The move
would establish a "refueling pipeline" between the burgeoning Chinese capital market and its real economy, and boost
the development of the real economy. Furthermore, industry specialists believe that the measure could incentivize
management, and it gives it a new funding route for its defense budget²as long as it turns over a profit. It is worth
noting, however, that commercial shipbuilding has always been considered a strategic industry, since its infrastructure
can also support warship construction. Nonetheless, valid concerns over China's growing naval power may at least be
alleviated to an extent by the transparency that listing may bring.
Notes
1. Liu Xiaoxing et al., ³The Development Strategy of China¶s Shipbuilding Industry,´ Chuanbo gongcheng (Ship
Engineering), Vol. 25, No. 4, August 2003.
c (&!'
c $
$
Category: China Brief, China and the Asia-Pacific, Economics, Foreign Policy
By: Vincent Wang
China¶s economic ascent since the early 2000s has generated more equanimity than the fear its military rise caused in
the mid-1990s, which led to accelerated concerns in the international community about a ³China threat.´ While the
Chinese military continues to modernize and its defense budget grows by double digits, China¶s expanding economy is
now regarded more as an opportunity than a threat, and helps the country conduct a savvy ³new´ diplomacy with
confidence.
Nowhere is this shift in perceptions toward China¶s rise more evident than in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of the
changing attitudes of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which was formed in 1967 partly as a
collective response to China²which supported communist insurgents in the region²and did not normalize relations
with China until the 1990s. Thus, the plan to create an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) by 2010 for the
ASEAN 6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and 2015 for the newer members
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar [Burma], and Vietnam) signaled a profound change in the relationship between China and
Southeast Asia. Covering a total population of 1.7 billion people and a combined GDP of about $2 trillion, ACFTA is
billed as the largest free-trade zone in the world. ACFTA is estimated to boost ASEAN¶s GDP by 0.9 percent and
China¶s by 0.3 percent [1].
China¶s emergence as an avid pursuer of FTAs happened in spite of its latecomer status. China did not begin its pro-
market economic reform until 1978-9 and did not join the World Trade Organization (WTO) until the end of 2001.
Beginning in 2002, China has signed FTAs with Chile (2005), Pakistan (2006), New Zealand (2008, its first with a
developed country), and Peru (2009) and is currently studying, negotiating, or implementing FTAs with over 20
countries or regions (China Daily, April 29; People¶s Daily, February 9, 2006) [2].
China¶s impressive trade offensive typifies its ³new´ foreign policy thinking. Yet, it is not clear whether this ³trade
diplomacy´ represents a long-term and fundamental shift in Chinese statecraft or only a short-term tactical expedient
aimed at buying the crucial time that Beijing needs in order to become the preeminent actor in the region capable of
securing its military interests and projecting its power. It also raises the question of whether China¶s active economic
diplomacy in East Asia will spur commercial competition in this region where great-power conflict is still possible.
Despite the standard economic rationales offered by Chinese officials (such as helping increase Chinese exports,
ensuring access to markets and raw materials, and attracting foreign investment), the main motivation for China¶s trade
activism appears strategic. In the case of Southeast Asia, China¶s FTA with the ASEAN is driven by a political logic
that responds to challenges posed by competitive regionalisms in the world economy, to cement growing economic ties
with Southeast Asian nations and to alleviate their fear of a rising China, to secure raw materials crucial to China¶s
economic development, and to ensure a peaceful and stable environment close to home so as to buttress China¶s growing
influence and counterbalance American and Japanese power. It has thus been interpreted as a concrete example of
economic statecraft employed to bolster the image of China¶s ³peaceful rise.´
ASEAN nations are attracted by the opportunities brought about by China¶s economic expansion and trade
liberalization; they also seek to leverage their FTA with China to additional FTAs with important trading partners within
(e.g. Japan) or outside (e.g. the United States) the region.
Although there are economic benefits for pursuing FTAs, nations often pursue them for non-economic reasons (e.g.
strengthening alliance, increasing peace and security, enhancing collective bargaining power, locking in institutional
reform, and sharing resources). Regionalism (and FTAs in particular) plays a critical role in China¶s current grand
strategy²³peaceful rise.´
The policy of ³peaceful rise´ is based on an embrace of globalization as part of the solution to China¶s growth
imperatives. It relies both on China¶s domestic economy and the international marketplace to sustain and fuel economic
growth. To achieve the goal of rising to great power status, Chinese leaders believe that it must secure a peaceful
international environment that is crucial to sustaining China¶s economic development and augmenting China¶s power.
Ensuring stability in China¶s periphery and avoiding a premature showdown with the United States are thus essential
[3].
To achieve the goal of ³peaceful rise,´ China has refashioned its diplomacy. Rather than continuing to act like an
aggrieved victim, China now aspires to be a responsible great power and is acting increasingly like one. Whereas China
used to distrust ³multilateralism´ for fear that multilateral institutions could be used to constrain or punish it, now
Chinese leaders recognize that deeply engaging these organizations help promote the country¶s trade and security
interests and limit American power. On many contentious and intractable issues, China has adopted more pragmatic
stances. China is more aware that its rise has consequences for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. So it is keen on
easing the concerns of various countries. Moreover, China has become much more actively engaged in, and seeks to
shape, regional affairs. Its hosting of the Six-Party Talk over North Korea¶s nuclear issue is a good example. The major
instrument used in advancing China¶s objectives is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal economic
growth, rapidly expanding domestic markets, and driven by its voracious appetite for raw materials needed for its
economic development.
To sum up, China¶s ³peaceful rise´ is a comprehensive long-term strategy leveraging globalization as a catalyst to
accelerate China¶s economic development and elevate China¶s power and stature.
In this context, Southeast Asia is an important arena for China¶s new economic diplomacy and a test case of Beijing¶s
credibility as a ³responsible stakeholder.´ Some noted regional analysts are concerned that ACFTA may turn the region
into a ³backyard for Chinese raw material imports and manufactured exports, and hence a natural candidate for a
Chinese sphere of influence´ [4]. For example, Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN secretary-general, warned that such
industries as textiles, toy, and motorcycle manufactures would be negatively affected in the short term, although he
believed long-term benefits would follow (Australian Business Intelligence (October 8, 2002). Furthermore, because of
its almost inexhaustible unskilled labor and huge amounts of FDI, China may pose a special challenge to the ASEAN-4
in their home or third-country markets.
There are also broader strategic implications of China¶s success in Southeast Asia that is worth noting. In light of
China¶s activism in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asian Summit (EAS) initiatives²both explicitly exclude
the United States²will a Chinese version of the ³Monroe Doctrine´ loom over East Asia?
The first reason for this fear is a historical legacy of hierarchy that characterized China-Southeast Asian relations. Most
nations in the region fell under China¶s tributary system²³a reciprocal foreign relationship between superior and
inferior´ in which tribute offerings were normally reciprocated by lavish gifts from the Chinese emperor. Some scholars
argue that ³accepting China¶s supremacy was materially worthwhile,´ since the tribute system became the institutional
setting and indeed ³cover for foreign trade´ early on [5].
In a modern twist, Chinese leader Hu Jintao, in his report to the 17th Congress of the CCP, singled out trade as an
important instrument for China to achieve its goal of ³peaceful development.´ The same report reiterated that China
would accommodate the ³legitimate concerns´ of developing countries (hinting early harvest) and support efforts to
close the North-South gap [6].
The other important reason is the size asymmetry between China and Southeast Asia. China towers over each individual
ASEAN member and all of them combined. AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) intends to create a regional market of
over 500 million people. Yet even this combined ASEAN magnitude would only constitute 29 percent of the
population, 32 percent of the GDP, and 46 percent of the trade volume, of the combined ASEAN-China FTA. This is
why there is a widely accepted view, expressed by Singaporean Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo, that an
integrated ASEAN is the only viable response to an economically-rising China (The Straits Times, November 12, 2002).
Thirdly, in contrast to China¶s coherent strategic goal, ASEAN does not have a clear picture about its place in the new
strategic environment of an emergent China. Lured by the China market (especially the so-called ³early harvest´
provisions for the ASEAN-4), some analysts worry that ASEAN risks becoming a fringe player on the spokes of China¶s
regional trade architecture, while further enhancing the attractiveness of China as the hub for regional investment and
production (Australian Financial Review, November 12, 2002). In this view, ASEAN will be reduced to a role of
auxiliary actor in the main show²China¶s rise. China can also turn out to be a fierce competitor²having already
attracted the lion¶s share of FDI into developing countries and having posed special challenges to manufactured goods
from ASEAN. Furthermore, there are real concerns that ACFTA may undermine ASEAN¶s own FTA thanks to China¶s
³divide and conquer´ negotiation tactic, because individual ASEAN members may now pay more attention to ACFTA
than AFTA.
Admittedly, under the sovereign state system, a return to a modern version of the tributary system is not very plausible.
China¶s economic diplomacy has presented opportunities and challenges for East Asia. On the one hand, ASEAN
nations have tried to ³bind´ China through regional institutions, such as ACFTA, APT, EAS, and ARF (Asian Regional
Forum), raising the cost of Chinese belligerence. Indeed, China¶s FTA activism has spurred measures by Japan and
India to strengthen their own economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia. For instance, since the ACFTA was enacted, Japan
has signed FTAs with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
In contrast, the interest of the United States in the region, as shown through the lens of economic diplomacy, pales in
comparison [7]. Since 2004, China has replaced the United States as the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, India, Australia, Brazil, and Chile. Admittedly this is mainly due to the rise of China as a world trader, but it is
also an indicator of America¶s relative declining influence. The United States has only signed FTAs with Singapore and
South Korea (the latter still not ratified by Congress). The United States¶ hope of engaging in a FTA with the entire
membership of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) also looks less appealing or feasible than China¶s bilateral
FTAs, especially against the backdrop of the failed Doha Round of WTO multilateral talks.
China¶s economic statecraft toward Southeast Asia will provide the material support for its stated goal of ³peaceful
rise,´ augment its stature and influence in regional and world affairs, and present a challenge to the United States that
calls for the need for Washington to shore up its economic competitiveness and attention toward this key region.
Notes
1. Amitav Acharya, ³China and Southeast Asia: Some Lessons for Africa?´ in Kweku Ampiah and Sanushu Naidu, eds.,
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China (University of KawZulu-Natal Press, 2008), p. 322.
2. For a list of bilateral FTAs submitted to WTO, see www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls.
3. See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, ³The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of µPeaceful Ascendancy,¶´
in China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and regional Challenges, eds., Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 17-41.
3. Ibid., 32-34.
4. Acharya, ³China and Southeast Asia,´ p. 316.
5. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), pp. 112-3; David Kang, ³Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,´ in G. John Ikenberry
and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2003), pp. 172-3.
6. Full text of Hu¶s report can be found at www.newsgd.com/specials/17thPartyCongress/News/content/2007-
10/25/content_4264493.htm.
7. During the author's field research in Singapore in 2007, several informants compared America¶s lack of engagement
with Southeast Asia against China¶s charm offensive.
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Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Central Asia, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Stephen Blank
Most analyses of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership focus either on Russian arms sales to China or on the joint
military exercises conducted by Moscow and Beijing under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which limits the scope of the analytical framework to a consideration of Central Asian scenarios. Given the
recent outbreak of ethno-sectarian violence in Xinjiang in early July, such a scenario may seem appropriate, but
according to the Shenyang Military Area and head of the Center for Commanding and Decision-making for "Peace
Mission 2009," Senior Colonel Zhang Xudong, his military command was ordered to prepare for this exercise in
February, but "Due to the late decision to hold the drill, we only had three months to prepare for it" (China Daily, July
27). This was at the height of regional tensions over Pyongyang's brinkmanship. Experts debate the strategic
implications of this military partnership, which arguably go beyond just Russian arms sales to China, and appears to be
clearly tied to an anti-American military scenario, and probably connected to Taiwan or to ousting the United States
from Central Asian bases, or to a common opposition to U.S. missile defenses. A less discussed but increasingly
plausible scenario includes the possibility of joint military action in response to a regime crisis in the Democratic
Republic of North Korea (DPRK). An examination of their most recent military exercise, ³Peace Mission-2009,"
suggests as much, and furthermore is not the first such exercise allegedly conducted under SCO auspices to raise that
possibility.
In 2005, the ³Peace Mission´ exercises featured large-scale combat operations by both forces. Specifically these
exercises involved:
A substantial naval contingent from the Russian Pacific Fleet, including a large BDK-11 assault ship; an anti-submarine
vessel, the Marshal Shaposhnikov; the destroyer Burny; and diesel submarines. The naval squadron joined with the
Chinese forces to simulate a major amphibious landing on a beachhead in the Jiaodong [Shangdong] peninsula. Russian
bombers (TU-95S Bear strategic bombers and TU-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers) also staged an air landing near
Qingdao City, including air cover by SU-27SM fighters armed with AS-15, 3,00 kilometer cruise missiles against naval
targets.
As experts noted, this exercise sent Japan (and by implication the United States) a message regarding Russia and
China¶s capability to defend their interests in the Korean peninsula against both allies and second, in China¶s case its
capability to defend itself against Japan in any territorial disputes [2]. While such operations have been conducted
against so-called "separatists" in the past, it is likely that the exercises were intended for other audiences as well.
Indeed, both sides had previously considered military intervention in North Korea both individually and jointly. ³In
conversations with JIR (Jane¶s Intelligence Review) in 2003, Russian officials were candid about the scope of a
³Ceausescu scenario´ if conditions worsened in North Korea and Kim Jong Il lost control over some of the security
forces´ [3]. Russian officials also showed concern about a North Korean collapse by holding maneuvers with Japan and
South Korea on a refugee scenario as far back as 2003 [4], but they also made veiled statements in 2004 indicating their
concern for the future of the DPRK¶s regime [5]. Similarly, some Western experts claim that China made contingency
plans for a possible invasion of North Korea in 2003, when it was alerted by rumors about a U.S. strike against the
DPRK¶s nuclear facilities, with the aim of installing a pro-Chinese regime that would forsake nuclearization, but he
reported that China¶s military chiefs said this was not feasible [6].
A noted Japanese military correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, Shunji Taoka, recently suggested that the recent joint
Sino-Russian exercises of 2009 in China¶s Jillin province may be intended to intimidate the DPRK. The five-day joint
military exercise, dubbed ³Peace Mission 2009,´ took place from July 22 in the Russian Far East and the Shenyang
Military Area Command in northeast China, and were intended ³to verify operation plans and capabilities to respond to
unexpected incidents under the unstable environment of countries and regions.´ The exercise involved paratroops,
tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers, helicopter gunships, fighter planes, and jet transports, which led
Taoka to conclude that the scope of the operations extended beyond an anti-terrorist measure, which are the SCO¶s
remit. Taoka further asserts that there may be a joint plan of action for ³unexpected incidents´ in North Korea and that
these exercises verify that claim [7].
Indeed, the supposed terrorists that were targeted in the operation possessed combat aircrafts²a very uncommon asset
for any terrorist force²and a major electro-magnetic operation took place, signaling a very intricate, large-scale, and
even atypical counter-terrorist operation [8]. These large-scale conventional exercises involving combined arms
operations against terrorists in an urban setting, while deploying missiles, air assaults, aerial bombings, air defense
forces and ground attack all point to the fact that these operations could easily be duplicated to scenarios extending
beyond Central Asia [9]. Not surprisingly, a number of commentators on international affairs have argued that the SCO
either should or could take the lead in dealing with the North Korean issue [10]. Finally, at the latest SCO summit the
six members agreed that Pyongyang¶s threats were unacceptable [11]. Certainly venturing into the Korean issue would
mark a major step forward for the SCO and by extension China and Russia in terms of their influence in Asia.
The Russo-Chinese interest in linking their relationship to developments in and around North Korea did not end here.
The 2009 exercises had overt signs of attempts on both sides to connect those large-scale operations that both sides
rehearsed to North Korean scenarios. In kicking off the exercises, Russian General Nikolai Makarov and Chinese
General Chen Bigde, the two Chiefs of Staff of their respective armed forces, appeared together to address the press
about the aim of the exercise. The Chinese were characteristically vague, but Makarov went further and said that ³Russia
and China should develop military cooperation in the wake of North Korean missile threats that prompted intensified
military preparations in Japan and South Korea.´ That cooperation was necessary in addition to the ³complicated¶
situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia as rationales for this cooperation [12]. Makarov went further and
highlighted the need for interoperability in command and control of future common groups of Russian and Chinese
troops. While Chen Bigde denied that these exercises are targeted at a third party, Colonel Li Jiang, Deputy Chief of the
Foreign Affairs Office of China¶s Ministry of Defense stated:
³The world order must be multipolar, which would rule out the possibility of any diktat of any country with regards to
other members of the international community.´ Consequently, it is not ruled out that, as was the case during the
Mirnaya Missiya-2005 training exercises, a situation in which the armed forces of the two countries receive the order:
³Not to allow the navies of third countries to have access to the place of conducting a peacekeeping operation´ will be a
scenario of the current peacekeeping exercises [13].
Since there are no navies or third party naval operations possible in Central Asia, the operation can only be applied to a
Taiwan or Korea scenario. Further, since it is quite unlikely that Russia would send forces to a PLA operation in
Taiwan²and it is currently inconceivable that a ³peacekeeping´ operation is needed in Taiwan²this most likely applies
to Korea and fears of a succession contingency involving violence in North Korea, or a United States and allied
operation against it. Since the United States has admitted that it has contingency plans for any crisis that may develop in
the wake of a succession to Kim Jong Il (and presumably other threatening events), it is not surprising that both Moscow
and Beijing have such plans of their own [14]. Yet, what is noteworthy is the fact that they have been rehearsing quite
extensively what appears to be a plan for a joint operation there. In view of this growing body of evidence, U.S.
policymakers need to rethink the potential contingencies and purposes to which a Sino-Russian military partnership may
be applied. Furthermore, determine whose interests would most be served by a military intervention in Korea? Only
after having answered that question could we then ask ourselves²given the answer to the first question²using
Bismarck¶s analogy of alliance, who then is the rider and who is the horse in this partnership, Russia or China?
Notes
1. Elizabeth Wishnick, ³Russia and the CIS in 2005,´ Asian Survey, XLVI, No. 1, 2006, p. 76.
2. Ibid.
3. Mark Galeotti, ³Moscow Reforms Its Links With Pyongyang,´ Jane¶s Intelligence Review, February, 2004,
www.4janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc.
4. Sergei Blagov, ³War Games Or Word Games,?´ Asia Times Online, August 26, 2005, www.atimes.com.
5. See the warnings uttered by Russia¶s chief negotiator in early 2004 Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr¶ Losyukov,
Moscow, Interfax, in English, February 29, 2004, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, (Henceforth
FBIS SOV), February 29, 2004; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, February 29, 2004, FBIS SOV, February 29, 2004.
6. ³The Nightmare Comes to Pass,¶ The Economist, October 14, 2006, p. 25.
7. Shunki Taoka, ³Unusual China-Russian Drill: Purpose Is To µIntimidate¶ North Korea,´ Tokyo, AERA, in Japanese,
May 18, 2009, p. 65, FBIS SOV, May 18, 2009.
8. Li Xuanliang and Wang Tiande, ³Exercise Peace Mission 2009: A Thorough Interpretation of New Concepts, New
Strategies,´ Beijing , Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese, July 26, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 26, 2009; Cao Zhi, Wang
Tiiande Bai Ruixue, LI Xunaliang, Li Yun, and Yue Ianguo, ³Peace Mission 2009,´ Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service,
in Chinese July 26, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 26, 2009.
9. Cao Zhi, Et al, FBIS SOV, July 26, 2009; Li Donghang, Zhou Feng,´ Peace Mission Exercise Gets Closer to Actual
Combatants,´ Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao Online, in Chinese, July 27, 2009, FBIS SOV , July 27, 2009.
10. ³SCO May Act As Mediator in Korean Issues-Experts,´ Turkish Weekly, June 12, 2009,
www.turkishweekly.net/news/907810/sco-may-act-as-mediator-in-korean-issues-expert; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in
English, June 10, 2009; FBIS SOV, June 10, 2009; Igor Khripunov, ³Multipolarity and Korean Crisis,´ Korea Times,
June 29, 2009, www.koreatimes.co/kr/www/news/include/print.asp?/newsidx=47614.
11. ³SCO Leaders Vow Concerted Action,´ www.chinadaily.com.cn, June 17, 2009.
12. Sergei Blagov, ³Moscow¶s Security Plans Face Reality Check,´ International Security Network, www.isn.ethz.ch,
August 6, 2009.
13. Andrei Kuzminov, ³Russia and China Are Establishing Common Military Forces,´ Moscow, Segodnya.ru, in
Russian, July 23, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 23, 2009.
14. Hwang Doo-hyong, ³U.S. Ready To Execute Contingency Plans After Kim Jong-Il¶s Death,´ Seoul Yonhap, in
English, July 22, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 22, 2009.
c &! "

Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, Featured, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: James Holmes , Toshi Yoshihara
China created a stir late last year when it announced that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would commence
policing the Gulf of Aden for Somali pirates. Two PLAN destroyers and a combat logistics ship arrived on station off
the Horn of Africa this past January. By most accounts, Chinese commanders have coordinated their efforts smoothly
with other antipiracy contingents, notably the U.S.-led Task Force 151, the European Union's Operation Atlanta, and
individual detachments dispatched by the likes of India and Russia. Nevertheless, skeptics saw ulterior motives at work
in the Chinese expedition. China is finding that controversy follows great-power naval actions.
Chinese spokesmen cataloged various reasons for the extended Indian Ocean deployment. Senior Colonel Ma Luping,
director of the Navy Operations Department in the PLAN General Staff Headquarters Operations Department, told
reporters that the mission's main goal was to protect Chinese (and Taiwanese) merchant ships and crews, as well as ships
carrying supplies to Africa on behalf of the U.N. World Food Program. Xiao Xinnian, the PLAN deputy chief of staff,
said the cruise would allow China to showcase its "positive attitude in fulfilling its international obligations," burnish its
"image as a responsible power" (fu zeren de daguo xingxiang), and demonstrate the PLA's capacity to enhance "world
stability and peace" while "handling multiple security threats and fulfilling diverse military tasks" (Xinhua News
Agency, December 23, 2008).
Beijing means to prove that it is a reliable defender of the global maritime order by tangible deeds. For some time
Chinese strategists have debated the part that "non-war military operations" (fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong) can play in
coping with nontraditional security threats like piracy. Analysts contend that combating such challenges will not only
fulfill China's responsibilities as a rising great power, but also help it accrue "soft power" over time, enhancing its
attractiveness vis-à-vis fellow Asian nations [1].
Beijing was stung by its inability to contribute to tsunami relief in 2004-2005, for instance, and set out to correct the
naval shortcomings exposed during the aid effort. Procuring transport aircraft, landing vessels, and a hospital ship has
bolstered the PLAN's capacity for this high-profile non-war military operation (Washington Times, January 26;
Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], June 4, 2008). China's soft-power strategy seems based on the premise that a
nation can store up international goodwill by supplying "international public goods" like maritime security, which
benefit all nations with a stake in the international order.
PLAN patrolling the Gulf of Aden, which will also buttress China's ability to project power along the African seaboard
and prosecute high-seas combat operations, is mentioned sotto voce²if at all²by the Chinese leadership. Portraying
China as an inherently benevolent sea power²a power that Asians need not fear as it constructs a great navy²is central
to Chinese maritime diplomacy. Yet as with all narratives, the reality is subjective and more complex. Good diplomacy
is seldom good history.
The "Inevitable Outcome" of Chinese Maritime History
Counter-piracy is the archetype of an international public good. Ships remain the most economical way to transport bulk
goods. On the order of 90 percent of world trade (by volume) travels aboard ship. Freedom of the seas, suppression of
piracy and terrorism, and regional peace, consequently, are increasingly essential to the "good order at sea" on which
globalization relies [2]. The PLAN leadership recently embraced good order at sea as one of the Navy's core missions.
Admiral Su Shiliang, the PLAN chief of staff, penned an article in the official Navy newspaper, Renmin Haijun
(People's Navy), that ordered his service to "strengthen preparations for maritime non-war military operations in a
targeted fashion" while further honing its capacity to fight and win conventional battles at sea (Renmin Haijun, June 6).
Influential Chinese officials and scholars are increasingly thinking in terms of soft power as a way to augment China's
comprehensive national power. President Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress, "Culture has become a more and more
important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall
national strength" [3]. Fudan University scholar Shen Dingli contends, "China's 'harmonious diplomacy' has been well
received by countries in the region," even as "U.S. influence in Asia has been diminishing." Accordingly, President
Barack Obama is attempting "to remold the image of the United States in the region with soft power and smart power,"
reinvigorate relations with Asian nations, and "tactfully counter the impact of rising big powers in the region" (Phoenix
TV [Hong Kong], July 23).
As Shen observes, China too can tap major reserves of soft power. Chinese leaders have invoked the Southeast and
South Asian voyages of the Ming Dynasty admiral, Zheng He, with increasing frequency to justify Beijing's claims that
China's rise poses no threat. Tales of the Ming "treasure fleet," in effect the first foreign squadron ever forward-deployed
to the Indian Ocean, appear to act as a proxy for China's conduct at sea today. The rationale goes like this: dynastic
China refrained from conquest even when it possessed a big navy. Thus, declares Chinese vice minister for
communication Xu Zuyuan, Zheng He's journeys to the Indian Ocean prove that "a peaceful emergence is the inevitable
outcome of the development of Chinese history" (Xinhua News Agency, July 7, 2004) (authors' emphasis). China's
peaceful rise, that is, is not only a matter of policy but a veritable law of history²or so Beijing would have target
audiences believe.
Maritime security is interlaced with Chinese soft power. Speaking at Cambridge University in February 2009, Premier
Wen Jiabao conjured up Zheng He's "peaceful" missions to convey Beijing's deeply embedded aversion to power
politics and military dominion. "The idea that a strong country must be a hegemon does not sit well with China,"
proclaimed Wen. "Hegemonism is at odds with our cultural tradition, and it runs counter to the wishes of the Chinese
people" [9]. This was a startling claim, given that the tributary system Zheng rejuvenated had everything to do with
power politics. Wen's diplomacy was apt, his history shaky.
Similarly, while celebrating the 60th anniversary of the PLAN's founding, PLAN commander Admiral Wu Shengli drew
a straight line from Zheng He to contemporary Chinese maritime strategy. That the "world's strongest fleet [the Ming
navy] at the time « did not sign any unequal treaty, did not expand claims to any territory, and did not bring back even
one slave," declared Wu before 29 naval delegations, proved that "the Chinese people are active practitioners of the
harmonious ocean worldview"²to this day (Renmin Haijun, April 22).
Whether or not Asian audiences accept the Chinese version of history will determine the efficacy of China's naval soft
power. Governments cannot deploy soft power the way they dispatch army brigades or impose economic sanctions.
According to its proponents, however, soft power lubricates the diplomatic machinery, helping leading powers ease
suspicions about their motives and gather support for initiatives they deem worthy of pursuit. If so, Chinese soft-power
overtures could pay off handsomely.
Setting the Bar High
Despite his enthusiasm for soft power, Harvard scholar Joseph Nye warns that the kinder, gentler approach has pitfalls if
taken to excess. Public goods can become an excuse for meddlesome policies, he says, while "sometimes things that
look good in our eyes may look bad in the eyes of others" [4]. Or a nation's diplomacy can become too soft. For
instance, India abounds in cultural appeal, and indeed, the late Sinologist Lucian Pye maintained that China "has come
in a poor second to the Indian culture in attracting other peoples." Yet, "India is now regarded as a soft state," laments
former Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra, because its physical might lags behind its power of attraction
(India Today, July 23).
In portraying itself as a categorically benign nation, China has set itself an almost unreachable standard. If its behavior
falls short of the Zheng He standard, it will be held to account. For instance, historians depict Zheng's voyages as more
than a gesture of goodwill. The size, sophistication, and combat power of the Ming fleet, declared the late Edward
Dreyer, were deliberately calculated to overawe audiences in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean²to the extent
that using force was unnecessary to impose Chinese emperors' political will [5].
If the Zheng He voyages were in fact an exercise in power projection, it would help explain why some Asian observers
read dark meaning into the PLAN counter-piracy deployment rather than accepting it as the act of a benign China. The
PLAN has acquitted itself well off Somalia, rendering useful service from a public-goods perspective. Yet at the same
time, the Navy has shown it is no longer a coastal defense force, short on the capacity to replenish fuel, arms, and stores
at sea or relieve deployed forces on station. It has been experimenting with a more ambitious fleet.
That fleet is now making its debut. This is not lost on wary Indian commentators, who depict counter-piracy as China's
first step onto a slippery slope toward a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Many in New Delhi appear
utterly convinced that Beijing intends to militarize its "string of pearls," or network of basing agreements with South
Asian states. One well-known analyst sketches a Sino-Indian "rivalry arc" all the way from Japan, along the first island
chain, and through the Indian Ocean. Not so coincidentally, the arc's western terminus lies off of Somalia [6].
For India, which fancies itself South Asia's foremost power, signs of Chinese naval skill and capability portend future
trouble²trouble that might require India not only to fortify its defenses in the Indian Ocean but also to project power
into the Pacific, delivering a riposte to Chinese deployments near the subcontinent. It is no accident that this year's
annual Malabar exercise will take place not off India's Malabar coast but off the coasts of Japan and Okinawa, bringing
together the Indian, U.S., and Japanese fleets. Nor is skepticism confined to the Indians. The efficacy of China's charm
offensive in the South China Sea remains an open question.
Lingering Questions
Three issues associated with soft power deserve close scrutiny. Chinese counter-piracy provides a test case for this
approach to diplomacy. First, to what extent does soft power yield hard results? Soft-power advocates appear to assume
nations will set aside their interests if provided enough public goods or if a nation boasting sufficient power of attraction
asks them to do so.
That is doubtful. Beijing may well find that fellow Asian leaders respond politely to their Zheng He narrative yet still
abstain from Chinese-led ventures. Perhaps soft power eases qualms about a nation's actions²a useful thing in itself
from China's standpoint²but cannot summon forth positive action. Standing by passively while big powers do
something is easy; expending lives and treasure on another's behalf can be both hard and politically hazardous.
Second, is any nation's appeal universal? Council on Foreign Relations scholar Walter Russell Mead says no, pointing
out that not all people feel the tug even of America's open, liberal society. Evidence emerging in the Indian Ocean and
South China Sea supports Mead¶s claim. China's "smiling diplomacy" seems destined to meet with some combination of
enthusiasm, indifference, and²as the Indian case shows²disbelief. How Beijing conducts itself over time will
determine whether it succeeds.
Third, how can a nation sustain its soft power once it begins to use hard power? It is relatively simple to sustain an
attractive image when that image remains an abstraction, pure of messy realities. Beijing can tell its story however it
wants. Yet as it starts deploying naval power in new theaters, China's beneficent image will be tested against empirical
evidence. What appeals to one foreign audience may not appeal to another, and Chinese soft power may decay as
Beijing acts in its own interests.
China's admittedly attractive civilization, then, provides no guarantee of diplomatic and military success. If Beijing²or
any other government²sees soft power as a talisman to brandish in the face of stubborn challenges, its hopes are apt to
be frustrated.
Notes
1. Jonathan Holslag, "Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions," Washington Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2009): p.
109; Joel Wuthnow, "The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse," Issues & Studies 44, no. 2 (June
2008): pp. 1-28.
2. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The American National Interest and Global Public Goods," International Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002):
p. 239.
3. Wen Jiabao, "See China in the Light of Her Development," Speech at Cambridge University, United Kingdom,
February 2, 2009, Foreign Ministry Website, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t536420.htm.
4. Nye Jr., "The American National Interest and Global Public Goods," p. 239.
5. Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405-1433 (Old Tappan, N.J.:
Pearson Longman, 2006), p. xii.
6. Gurpreet Khurana, "China-India Defense Rivalry," Indian Defense Review 23, no. 4 (July-September 2009),
www.indiandefencereview.com/2009/04/china-india-maritime-rivalry.html.
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September 10, 2009 02:19 PM Age: 164 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Home Page
By: Vijay Sakhuja
Chinese and Indian border guards

In less than one year, China and India will celebrate six decades of bilateral relations capped by festivities in their
respective country. This period, however, has been marked by a border war in 1962 that precipitated a long phase of
antagonism and hostility between the two sides. Yet, there were several positive trends in their bilateral relations since
the late 1980s that buoy the decline in mutual trust: regular high level political interactions; increasing bilateral trade that
may reach $60 billion in 2010; boundary demarcation talks since 2003; and joint military exercises, which included two
µanti terror¶ exercises in 2007 and 2008. Most recently, during border talks in August in New Delhi, the two sides agreed
to µseek a political solution¶ to the boundary problems and work towards µsafeguarding the peace and calmness in the
areas along the border¶ (Xinhua News Agency, August 6).
Notwithstanding these positive trends, the two Asian powers still suffer from a trust deficit and are increasingly
concerned about each other's strategic intent, particularly over their respective military developments across the
Himalayas. The Chinese side has specifically warned India of its µmilitary initiatives¶ in Arunachal Pradesh, a
northeastern state of India that includes Tawang²home to one of Tibetan Buddhism¶s most sacred monasteries²and
claimed by Beijing (Asia Times, July 10), and New Delhi has raised the specter of the People¶s Liberation Army¶s
(PLA) µsystematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance, quick response and operational
capabilities in the border areas¶ (Indian Express, July 12). Besides border intrusion, incursions, air space violation and
even on one occasion an ambush by PLA soldiers (Tibetanreview.net, August 11) are causing immense concern to the
Indian army. In 2008, there were reportedly ³270 border violations and nearly 2,300 instances of µaggressive border
patrolling¶ by Chinese soldiers´ (New York Times, September 4). Although leaders on both sides try to downplay the
border sparring, there is ample evidence pointing to the further augmentation of defense forces and military
infrastructure along the border. This could be the harbinger of a spiraling arms race.
Geographical Determinants
Geography is an important factor in the military infrastructure developments along the India-China border. A large part
of China¶s border lies along the flat Tibetan plateau, which gives China the advantages of higher operational and
logistical capability for strategic planning during a military contingency. These favorable geographical settings allowed
China to build an extensive network of roads, railheads, forward airfields, pipelines and logistic hubs that appear geared
toward supporting military operations. Moreover, China is reportedly deploying intercontinental missiles such as the
DF-31 and DF-31A at Delingha, north of Tibet, which can strike targets in northern India (Asia Times, July 9).
Unlike China, Indian troops are deployed on high mountains and have to negotiate a tougher terrain comprising of snow
capped peaks, deep valleys, thick jungles and difficult mountain passes. Some of the Indian army posts can be accessed
only during favorable weather conditions by animal transport and human porters [1]. Furthermore, a number of forward
posts can only be serviced by helicopters for troop induction, logistics support and casualty evacuation. In essence,
China enjoys geographical advantage and has built a sophisticated logistic network for conducting offensive operations
against India.
Military Infrastructure
China has established a long distance rail link between Beijing and Lhasa and this service would later be extended to
Xigaze, South of Lhasa, and then to Yatung, near Nathu La passes [2]. Further, Lhasa would be connected to Nyingchi,
just north of Arunachal Pradesh, and the rail network would then run along the Brahmaputra River and the Sino-Indian
border to Kunming in Yunnan. The rail project, when complete, would be a technological marvel, but it will be useful to
keep in mind that it is being developed on the Tibetan plateau, and thus can provide China with a strategic advantage by
enhancing the PLA¶s logistic supply chain.
Furthermore, the Chinese authorities have announced plans to widen the Karakoram Highway, which links China to
Pakistan, from the existing 10 meters width to 30 meters to allow heavier vehicles to pass throughout the year.
According to an Indian military analyst, China has deployed ³13 Border Defence Regiments, the 52 Mountain Infantry
Brigade to protect Southern Qinghai-Tibet region, the 53 Mountain Infantry Brigade to protect the high plateau in the
Western sector, the 149th Division of the 13th Group Army in the Eastern Sector and the 61st Division of the 21st
Group Army in the Western Sector´ [3]. This is a substantial military concentration, which can provide a forceful initial
response in case of a breakout of hostilities across the Himalayas.
Similarly, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has established airfields at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka, two airfields at Lhasa
and an additional four in the region that can be rapidly operationalized [4]. Beyond just supporting fighter aircraft, these
air bases have enhanced PLA airlift capability that includes division strength of troops (20,000), air-drop a brigade
(3,500 troops) and helicopter lift of approximately two battalions. These figures are for a single lift [5].
In mid-August 2009, the PLA commenced a major military exercise that would be conducted over two months. The war
game code named µStride-2009¶ (Kuayue-2009) involves nearly 50,000 troops drawn from the military regions of
Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou, who would conduct operations over long distances. Significantly, one of the
primary aims of the exercises is to test the PLA¶s µcapacity of long-range projection¶ (Xinhua News Agency, August
11). The exercise would also marshal civilian assets such as high-speed trains traveling up to 350 kilometers per hour
and commercial aircraft to move troops over long distances (China Daily [Beijing], August 12). According to Ni
Lexiong, a military analyst at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, ³This is really about a rapid response
to sudden events in Tibet and Xinjiang, but also the military will play an increasing role in moving supplies and
responding to disasters´ (Startribune.com [Canada], August 11).
China's sprawling military infrastructure provides the PLA with a strong logistic back up, which enables the rapid
deployment of troops and a robust offensive capability. India, on the other hand, is constrained by geography. In June
2009, General J.J. Singh, the governor of Arunachal Pradesh and former chief of the Indian Army stated, ³Two army
divisions comprising 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers each will be deployed along the border in Arunachal¶ and ³[deployment]
was part of the planned augmentation of our capabilities to defend the country ... The increase in force strength is to
meet the future national security challenge´ (Reuters, June 8). These two divisions are specially trained in mountain
warfare and would augment the number of Indian troops to 120,000 (Stratpost.com, June 8).
Soon thereafter, in July 2009, the Indian Air Force (IAF) announced that it had planned to forward-deploy two
squadrons (18 aircraft each) of Su-30 MKI advanced fighter jets at its airbase in Tezpur (150 kilometers south of the
Chinese border) in Arunachal Pradesh. According to the IAF chief, ³We have plans to improve infrastructure in the
north-east. We¶re upgrading four-five airfields and Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG). We¶re also going to be basing a
fleet of Sukhoi-30s in Tezpur in addition to the existing MiG 21s fighter jets´ (Stratpost.com, July 21). The ALGs are
strategically located at Daulat Beg Oldie and in Chushul on the border with Aksai Chin in the proximity of Karakoram
Highway. In addition, the IAF has plans to position Su-30 MKIs at Chabua and Jorhat in Assam, Panagarh in West
Bengal and Purnea in Bihar (Sifynews.com, July 10).
Interestingly, there is a maritime dimension to the military developments in the Himalayas. Located at an altitude of
14,500 feet, the Pangong Lake is under t he control of both China (90 kilometers) and India (45 kilometers), but a stretch
of about 5 km is disputed (Indian Express, October 6, 2008). Both sides have positioned patrol vessels and conduct
routine surveillance. There have been regular incidents of transgression and incursions but both sides have exercised
restraint and adopted a standard drill that helps disengagement; when boats from both sides come face to face with each
other, they raise flags and shout µhindi chini bhai bhai¶ (Indian and Chinese are brothers) and disengage. China operates
22 boats manned by 5-7 personnel each and India has deployed 2 large boats operated by 21 personnel each. In 2008, the
Indian navy chief had visited the lake and India has plans to augment its capability by deploying more boats in the lake
(Indian Express, October 7, 2008).
The Indian Ministry of Defense Report 2008-2009 has expressed concerns over China¶s military capabilities and
observed that µgreater transparency and openness¶ is critical but on a conciliatory note also stated that India will µengage
China, while taking all necessary measures to protect its national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty¶ (Indian
Express, July 12). There are fears in India about China¶s military modernization and augmentation of military
infrastructure along the borders. China has been increasing its defense budget on a regular basis and in 2009 it
announced a 14.9 percent rise in military spending to 480.6 billion renminbi ($70.3 billion) marking 21 years of doubl e-
digit growth (Defence.pk, March 4). Yet, unofficial estimates place the total amount much higher than the figures the
Chinese government claims.
The Indian military leadership has expressed concern about the growing military power potential of China. Admiral
Sureesh Mehta, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, categorically stated that ³In military terms, both
conventionally and unconventionally, we can neither have the capability nor the intention to match China force for force
«´ but cautioned that as China consolidates itself and builds its comprehensive national power and a powerful military,
it is ³likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in the immediate neighborhood [sic].´ Further, ³It is quite
evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our [India] primary challenges in the years ahead. Our trust
deficit with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved´ (Zeenews.com, August 10).
In the 21st Century, China and India have emerged as major Asian powers and are engaged in building their respective
strengths. The current trends in their bilateral political and economic relations augers well for Asian prosperity. Yet, the
slow pace of talks on demarcation and delineation of the boundary (commenced in 2003), military infrastructure
developments along the border, are some of the issues that remain uppermost in the minds of Indian planners and
strategic analysts. The boundary dispute gains greater salience given the fact that China has resolved its boundary
disputes with most of its neighbors, while its dispute with India remains unresolved. It is fair to argue that China is
biding time to build its comprehensive national power including military capability reflected in Deng Xiaoping¶s
thought ³tao guang yang hui," which literally translates as "hide brightness, nourish obscurity," and in Beijing¶s
interpretation, "Bide our time and build up our capabilities" and then challenge India at the time of its choosing.
Notes
1. Author's discussions with retired Indian army officers in August 2009.

2. Shailender Arya, ³The Train to Lhasa¶ Journal of Defence Studies, winter 2008.
3. Rajan, D.S. 2009. µChina: Media Anger on Arunachal Pradesh Continues Unabated¶, SAAG Paper No. 3260, June
18, 2009.
4. Arun Sehgal, ³Military Moves and Reactions: The PLA¶s Profile in Tibet is Increasing in Strength and
Sophistication´, Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, No 28, July 2009, pp.15-18.
5. Ibid.
%&( ' m1 $

Category: China Brief, Home Page, Featured, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic/Social
By: Ian Storey
Armed conflict between Burma¶s armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) and the Kokang militia (known as the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, MNDAA), along the Sino-Burmese border in late August brought into
sharp focus the complex and sometimes testy relationship between Burma (Myanmar) and the People¶s Republic of
China (PRC). During the fighting the MNDAA²which has close links to the PRC²was routed, over 40 persons were
killed, and tens of thousands of refugees streamed across the border into China. The incident underscored how the ruling
junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), is capable of undertaking actions that challenge Beijing¶s
interests, belying characterizations of Burma as a client state of China.
Burma and China forged close relations in the late 1980s following international disapprobation and economic sanctions
in the wake of their crackdowns on anti-government demonstrators in August 1988 and June 1989, respectively. On
balance, both governments benefited greatly from tightening relations: the Burmese military regime was able to
consolidate power largely thanks to arms, economic aid and the diplomatic recognition provided by the PRC; in return,
China gained privileged access to Burma¶s rich natural resources and access to the Indian Ocean (China Brief, February
7, 2007).
China¶s economic penetration of Burma deepened in the first decade of the twenty-first century as the West tightened
economic sanctions against the regime. Bilateral commerce reached $2.4 billion in 2007-2008, accounting for a quarter
of all Burma¶s foreign trade and a 60 per cent increase over what it was three years ago (Mizzima News, October 24,
2008). Chinese companies have invested heavily in the country¶s manufacturing, mining, power generation and energy
sectors, and in 2008-2009 China emerged as Burma¶s number one investor, pumping $856 million into the country, or
87 percent of all foreign investments (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 14).
Close relations with Burma have also enabled China to improve its energy security situation. In March, after several
years of negotiations, an agreement was signed to build twin oil and gas pipelines from the port of Kyaukphyu in Arakan
State to Kunming, Yunnan Province. Construction of the 1,200 mile pipelines is scheduled to begin this month, with
China footing the $2.5 billion bill. When completed in 2013, the pipelines will not only be used to transport oil and gas
from Burma¶s offshore energy fields to the PRC, but also from the Middle East and Africa, thereby bypassing the Strait
of Malacca, which Chinese strategists view as a strategic vulnerability (China Brief, April 12, 2006).
Despite the obvious gains Burma¶s junta has accrued from its ties to the Chinese government, the ruling generals²many
of whom fought against the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the 1960s and 1970s²resented their
dependence on Beijing and from the mid-1990s moved to lessen that dependence by joining ASEAN and courting other
major powers such as India and Russia [1].
Notwithstanding the SPDC¶s success in diversifying the country¶s foreign relations, China remains Burma¶s most
important international partner. Moreover, despite the absence of genuine trust between the two governments, China and
Burma have arrived at a mutually beneficial arrangement: Beijing provides diplomatic cover for the junta at the United
Nations, soft loans and weapons supplies; in return it expects the SPDC to provide stability so Chinese companies can
reap long-term returns on their considerable investments.
China has lived up to its side of the bargain. Twice in 2007 it wielded its veto at the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) to protect Burma in the face of international criticism (China Brief, October 17, 2007). More recently, in
August, China used its diplomatic clout at the UNSC to dilute a statement of concern following the conviction of Aung
San Su Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), for violating the terms of her house arrest
with the visit by John Yettaw²an American who swam across Inya Lake to her house²in May (Straits Times, August
15).
On the bilateral front, the PRC has shown increasing signs of frustration, however, with the SPDC for the slow pace of
political reform and economic development, both of which it believes would defuse popular resentment against the
regime and enhance stability. Beginning in 2004, Chinese leaders publicly called on the junta to move forward with the
so-called ³roadmap to democracy,´ the framing of a new Constitution and national reconciliation. A new Constitution
was framed in 2008, but Beijing has kept up pressure on the SPDC to maintain the momentum. In April, for instance, on
the sidelines of the Baoa Forum in Hainan Province, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told his Burmese counterpart Thein
Shein that China hoped the SPDC could achieve ³political stability, economic development and national reconciliation´
(Xinhua News Agency, April 17). The detention of Ms. Suu Kyi in May was a major setback for national reconciliation,
and prompted China¶s Foreign Ministry to call for reconciliation, stability and development through ³dialogue with all
parties´ (Xinhua News Agency, May 19). According to some reports, China has advised the junta to allow U.N. Special
Envoy Ibrahim Gambari to play a more active role in fostering dialogue between the SPDC and Suu Kyi, advice the
junta is loath to accept (Mizzima, January 20).
Burma¶s Policy Toward Ceasefire Groups Generates Tensions
Another source of instability, and one that puts China in a difficult position and threatens to undermine its economic
interests in Burma, is the SPDC¶s policy toward ethnic armies in the north and northeast of the country.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC provided the BCP with arms and money to sustain an insurgency against the
central government. In the 1980s, however, Beijing phased out its material support to the BCP in the interests of
promoting greater economic interaction between the two countries, especially along the 1,300-mile border where
fighting had stymied trade. In 1989 the BCP fractured along ethnic lines, and China was able to use its long-standing
connections with local leaders to facilitate ceasefire agreements between the Burmese government and ethnic groups
such as the Wa, Shan, Kachin, and Kokang. Seventeen ceasefire agreements were reached, (rising to 27 in the 1990s): in
return for ending hostilities against the junta, the ceasefire groups were allowed to retain control over their territories,
armed militias and lucrative businesses, including gems, lumber and narcotics production. The ceasefires ushered in two
decades of uneasy peace.
According to the new Constitution, the Tatmadaw has sole responsibility for national defense. In April, therefore, the
SPDC demanded that the ceasefire groups disarm or transform their armies into smaller, lightly armed border guard
militias under the command of the Tatmadaw. While some of the smaller ceasefire groups have accepted the
government¶s demand, the largest ones such as the Wa, Kachin, and Shan have rejected it for fear of losing their
autonomy and business interests.
The most important ceasefire group to reject the SPDC¶s demand is the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which has an
estimated 20,000 men under arms. Formerly the shock troops of the BCP, China has maintained close links to the
UWSA over the past two decades. The U.S. government labeled the UWSA a narcotic trafficking organization on May
29, 2003. Chinese businessmen have extensive commercial interests in the Wa region (both legal and illegal) and the
area provides a conduit into Burma proper: according to some estimates, one to two million Chinese citizens have taken
up residency in the country and now dominate the commercial life of Upper Burma centered on Mandalay. Over the
years, China has ensured a steady supply of weapons to the UWSA, including shoulder fired surface to air missiles,
artillery and anti-aircraft guns (Jane¶s Intelligence Review, March 2008). Moreover, Beijing has been able to use its
influence with UWSA leaders to redirect the flow of illegal narcotics produced in the Wa area, including
methamphetamines, away from China and into Thailand, Laos and Cambodia [2]. Nevertheless, narcotics produced in
Burma continue to find their way into southwest China, fueling a major drug addiction problem there.
Determined to consolidate control over the entire country before elections next year, the SPDC has refused to take no for
an answer. In June the Tatmadaw attacked and captured bases belonging to the Karen National Liberation Army along
the Thai border. In early August the government shifted attention to the MNDAA in Kokang, an ethnically Chinese
region in the northern Shan State bordering China. As with the UWSA, the Kokang have maintained close links with
China since the dissolution of the BCP in 1989. On August 24, the Tatmadaw routed the 1,000-strong MNDAA and
occupied the capital Laogai. The conflict sparked an exodus of 37,000 refugees²mainly Kokang Chinese but also PRC
nationals²into Nansen county, Yunnan (Xinhua News Agency, September 4). Among the refuges were 700 MNDAA
fighters who were disarmed by the Chinese authorities (The Irrawaddy, September 1). During the fighting, shells fired
by the Tatmadaw landed on the Chinese side of the border, killing one person (Xinhua News Agency, August 30).
Beijing issued a sharp rebuke to the SPDC, calling on it to immediately restore stability along the border and,
unprecedentedly, to ³protect the safety and legal rights of Chinese citizens in Myanmar´ (Global Times, August 29).
According to both governments the situation has stabilized and the Chinese authorities have been encouraging the
refugees to return. According to Chinese official estimates, a total of 9,304 Kokang inhabitants had returned to Laogai
(Xinhua News Agency, September 4). Reports suggest, however, that the majority of refugees are reluctant to return
home for fear of retribution (The Irrawaddy, September 4). Naypyidaw justified the attacks on the MNDAA as part of a
crackdown on illegal narcotics and arms production. Yet, the assault on the Kokang militia can be seen as a warning
signal to the UWSA that the SPDC is committed to bringing the border areas under its control before 2010. According to
some observers, the junta has been inspired by the Sri Lankan government¶s military victory over Tamil separatists
earlier this year (Straits Times, August 30). An attack on the UWSA, however, would be a risky undertaking. Although
the Tatmadaw is numerically superior, the UWSA is well-armed and knows the territory intimately. Even if the
Tatmadaw was able to seize the Wa capital of Panghsang, UWSA fighters could simply melt away into the mountains
and forests from where they would be able to mount a lengthy insurgency against government forces.
A protracted and bloody conflict along the border is an unsettling prospect for the PRC for four reasons. First, fighting
would severely disrupt bilateral trade, much of which is conducted at the border, and hence the economic development
of China¶s landlocked southwest provinces. Second, as demonstrated by the Kokang incident, conflict would inevitably
trigger an outpouring of refugees into China that the authorities would be forced to feed and house. Third, construction
of the Kyaukphyu-Kunming pipelines, which China considers a strategic necessity, may have to be suspended as the
proposed route passes close to Wa controlled areas. Fourth, the Wa would likely increase narcotics production to finance
operations against the Tatmadaw, which could fuel drug addition in the PRC.
With so much at stake, Chinese officials are undoubtedly working frantically behind the scenes to broker an agreement
between the SPDC and UWSA. Such a deal would almost certainly involve China providing financial sweeteners to
both sides. If China fails to pull off a deal, a return to hostilities cannot be ruled out. In the final analysis, however,
Beijing¶s relationship with the SPDC is more highly valued than its ties to the Wa, meaning China might have to cut its
proxy loose, and possibly close the border in the event of hostilities.
Instability along the frontier is not the only contentious issue in Sino-Burmese relations. The growing nexus between
Burma and North Korea, including allegations that Pyongyang is assisting the junta to acquire nuclear weapons
capabilities, has generated a lot of negative publicity for the PRC because of its close links to both governments (Sydney
Morning Herald, August 1). If there is any substance to the allegations²and thus far no concrete evidence has been
produced²a Burmese nuclear weapons program would pose a major foreign policy headache for Beijing, as it would
not want to see two nuclear armed pariah states²North Korea and Burma²along its borders.
China¶s increasing frustration with the Burmese government has prompted speculation that Beijing may be hedging its
bets by opening a tentative dialogue with the NLD (The Irrawaddy, July 15). Yet, contacts between Chinese diplomats
and the Burmese opposition seem to have been initiated by the NLD rather than Beijing, and a dramatic shift in support
by China from the SPDC to Ms Suu Kyi¶s party is highly improbable: the NLD is a spent force in Burmese politics
while the SPDC¶s power remains firmly entrenched. Similarly, talk of Naypyidaw hedging its bets with Beijing by
exploring a possible rapprochement with the United States seem overdrawn, though the SPDC might be using the
prospect of more amicable ties with Washington to pressurize Beijing into using its influence with the ceasefire groups
to accept the junta¶s demands.
The Kokang Incident has laid bare the fault lines in Sino-Burmese relations. Negotiations aimed to avert renewed
conflict along the border will test the limits of these relations over the coming months.
Notes
1. Jurgen Haacke, Myanmar¶s Foreign Policy: Domestic influences and international implications, IISS Adelphi Paper
No. 381 (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).
2. Donald M. Seekins, ³Myanmar: Secret Talks and Political Paralysis´ in Daljit Singh and Anthony L. Smith (eds.),
Southeast Asian Affairs 2002 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002), p. 208.
c+! )& $ c +

By: Russell Hsiao
The Hu Jintao administration appears to be pulling out all the stops for the October 1 celebration of the 60th anniversary
of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The country¶s National Day will be inaugurated by a keynote
speech by Paramount Leader Hu. The occasion of the speech has been used by his predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin, as a capstone on the state of China¶s path toward modernization, which was spearheaded by Deng's
"opening-up" reforms in the 1970s. The ceremony will be crowned by a gargantuan military review through Tiananmen
Square that is slated to showcase the coming of age for China's second-generation military hardware and technologies
and to demonstrate the Chinese military's designing and manufacturing prowess. The October 1 parade will be the 14th
military parade since 1949.
Rehearsals for the epic military review are already underway and not a shred of doubt about security in the central and
neighboring administrative regions is being taken lightly as the authorities tackle growing unrest in its peripheral
regions. Chen Jiping, deputy director of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security²
which coordinates the activities of the police, state security agents and judicial departments²announced on September 6
that seven municipalities, provinces and an autonomous region (i.e. Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Liaoning
and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) have signed an agreement that will establish a security "moat," or
comprehensive security checks, to "fence off the potential threats" (Xinhua News Agency, September 6).
While Chinese experts remain tight-lipped about the specific missile models that will be on display, outside experts have
been able to gleam the fact from photos of the September 6 rehearsal, which analysts say exhibit an unprecedented show
of strength. According to a Chinese state-media report, there will be five types of missiles, including nuclear
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), conventional cruise missiles and medium-range and short-range
conventional missiles on display that have never been officially reported before (Xinhua News Agency, September 2).
Andrei Chang (aka Andrei Pinkov), editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, pointed out that during the 1999
military parade, the PLA only displayed three Dong Feng-31 (East Wind-31) ICBMs, while this year that number leaped
to eight. The DF-31 (CSS 10 Mod 1) and its longer-range variant DF-31A (CSS 10 Mod 2) are road-mobile, solid-fuel
ICBMs developed by the Academy of Rocket Motor Technology that have a maximum range of over 4,500 and 7,000
miles respectively. According to a recent U.S. government estimate, China has fewer than 15 launchers for each model
(U.S. Air Force Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats 2009). "This is a sign they are
sending to Washington that they have a counterstrike capability," said Chang (United Daily News [Taiwan], September
7; Defense News, September 8).
According to an anonymous source cited by the official Xinhua News Agency, who was only referred to as an expert
from the Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China¶s strategic missile forces: ³Our [China's] second generation [missiles]
can match their [Russian and U.S.] third and fourth generations, and the third generation under development [e.g. DF-
41] is comparable to their fifth and sixth generations´ (Xinhua News Agency, September 9).
In recent years, the Chinese government has come under increasing pressure from the international community for the
lack of transparency in its growing defense spending, which has experienced annual double-digit percentage increases
that extend back for more than a decade. According to Chinese-official figures, China's 2009 defense budget of $70.2
billion reflects an increase of 14.9 percent over 2008, and follows a rise of 17.6 percent in 2008 compared with the
previous year (China Daily, March 4). U.S. sources put China's actual defense budget closer to between $97 billion to
$139 billion.
According to PLA Major General Luo Yuan, senior researcher and former deputy director of World Military Studies at
the Beijing-based Academy of Military Sciences and member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), a military review can serve four purposes:
First, a military review can provide an account of the country's military spending to the Party and people. Since Western
countries are increasingly calling for more transparency in Chinese military spending, according to Luo, greater
transparency is needed not only toward the international community, but rather toward the Chinese people to
demonstrate how the taxpayers' money is being spent. The Chinese people have the 'right to know' how the mili tary is
revolutionizing, modernizing and regularizing.
Second, a military review is a form of promoting national defense awareness, and according to Luo, a strong nation must
have a military spirit, a positive and firm attitude, and thus, having troops march in formation in front of the people can
have the effect of raising national pride.
Third, for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), a military parade can instill the feeling of honor and responsibility in the
troops, and thereby boost morale.
Fourth, according to the major general, a military review can intimidate hostile countries. It can showcase China's power
and national power, and exhibit the formidable achievements that its defense sector has made in the past decade, and
nurture patriotism (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], September 8).
c +#$c + $&$$

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By: Eugene Kogan
On September 6, the China National Space Administration²the national space agency for the People's Republic of
China (PRC)²announced that it has started developing the Long March 6 (Changzheng 6) carrier rockets for its
burgeoning space program, which is backed by an industry that has rapidly advanced in nature and scope during the past
decade (China Daily; Xinhua News Agency, September 6). The rockets are reportedly being designed by the 8th
Academy at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC, also known as CASC), a large state-
owned holding company composed of a number of subsidiaries that design, develop and manufacture a range of
spacecraft, launch vehicles, strategic and missile systems and ground equipment along with a number of high-end
civilian products (People's Daily Online, September 4). Even as a relative newcomer in the market, CASC provides
commercial launch services to the international market and is recognized as one of the world¶s most advanced
organizations in terms of the development and deployment of high energy propellant technology, strap-on boosters, and
demonstrated capability to launch multiple satellites atop a single rocket. Back in 1999, CASC together with China
Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) were separated from a single company in order to promote
greater competition within its space industries. Since then CASC has undergone gradual streamlining and reorganization
to improve internal integration, cut excessive waste, and spin-off peripheral operations. A decade later, signs of progress
underscore the success of these structural and management reforms to the space industry, which are beginning to bear
fruit [1]. According to some estimates, the corporation had a registered capital of $1.3 billion in 2005 and employs over
110,000 people (GlobalSecurity.org; Techinfo.gov.cn; Jane¶s Defence Weekly, July 30 2008, 27) [2].
CASC¶s Primary Subsidiaries
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT, also referred to as the 1st Academy) carries out research and
development (R&D) for long-range ballistic missiles (LRBM) and space launch vehicles (SLV)
(http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). CALT is based in Beijing. Li Hong is president of CALT,
while Liang Xiahong is vice president and Secretary of the Party Committee of the 1st Academy (China Internet
Information Center, July 3, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, July 19). CALT currently employs 22,000 staff, including
8,000 engineers, and 1,800 senior engineers and scientists. In order to provide a wide range of launch capabilities,
CALT has established a comprehensive organization including ten research institutes, two manufacturing plants and
various administration units (China Great Wall Industry Corporation Website, www.cgwic.com/Partner/index.html).
Jane's Defence Weekly noted that the government currently holds the majority of shares in CALT and other defense-
related companies, but under the defense-industrial reforms outlined in China's National Defense White Paper in 2008
investors are being urged to purchase stakes in CALT. The same Jane's report also revealed that the publishing of the
White Paper had an almost instant impact on most of the defense companies listed on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong
Kong stock exchanges. Among the most active defense and aerospace stocks were aircraft specialist Hafei Aviation and
aviation component manufacturer Long March CALT, whose stocks surged from January 20 to January 22, 2008 by 10
percent to 11.3 renminbi (RMB) (Jane¶s Defence Weekly, February 4). Whether this was 11.3 billion was not disclosed.
Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology (AASPT, also referred to as the 4th Academy) carries out the
design of solid-propellant rocket motors (http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). The Academy is
directed by Weimin Zhou [3] and it is the country¶s largest development and production base for solid rockets. As can
be seen above, the Fourth Academy is an integral part of CASC. What is important, however, is that according to Tai
Ming Cheng, since the end of the 1990s, the 4th Academy has restructured its preliminary R&D system by adopting a
new project management model. Under the new framework, projects are assigned to managers who are chosen by a
transparent competitive process and are then entrusted with full responsibility for planning, funding, daily management,
research, implementation, and the selection of project staff. These managers are, in theory at least, able to offer rewards
and administer punishments necessary to create an effective incentive-centered system to motivate employees. This new
management system is said to have contributed to several of the academy's achievements in solid-fuel rocket motor
technology. The progress and performance of projects are separately monitored and evaluated by appraisal committees
at both the institute and academy level [4]. According to Tai Ming Cheung, the defense-related R&D work undertaken
by the 4th Academy played a major role in improving the financial and technological performance of its parent company
[5]. Yet, there are no financial data to back up this assertion.
China Academy of Space Technology (CAST, also referred to as the 5th Academy) is responsible for all spacecraft
development management and the Academy develops and manufactures most of the Chinese satellites
(http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). Although the English website is useful [6], it is not up to
date. For instance, Liu Fang, who appears on the management chart (see R. Battiston, ³The Chinese´) is no longer on the
board, but has been promoted to the position of vice president of CASC. On the other hand, Yang Baohua, who appeared
on the management chart as vice president (Ibid.), became president of CAST (Xinhua News Agency, July 19, 2008).
CAST is located in Beijing [7].
The Academy of Aerospace Liquid Propulsion Technology (AALPT, also referred to as former Base 067) is China's
sole producer of liquid-propellant rocket motors. AALPT is headquartered in Xi'an and produces a variety of different
types of motors for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. No further information about the location of CAPA has
been disclosed.
Sichuan Academy of Space Flight Technology, or Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation (SCAIC, also referred to
as former Base 062), designs, develops and manufactures various spacecraft and missile components as well as series
multiple rocket launchers (http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). In addition, SCAIC develops and
manufactures many civilian products, including automobile components, engineering plastic-pressure units, security
products, optoelectronic products, construction materials and environment protection sets. SCAIC is located in Chengdu,
Sichuan Province.
Shanghai Academy of Space Flight Technology (SAST), or Shanghai Bureau of Aeronautics (also referred to as the
8th Academy), designs and develops the Long March-4 family of launch vehicles and FY weather satellites (Jane¶s
Defence Weekly, June 13, 2007, 25) (http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). Furthermore, SAST
develops and produces ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, satellites, manned spacecraft, SAMs, and AAMs. SAST
is also involved in the development of civilian products, such as automobile air-conditioners, office automation, home
appliances, mechanical and electronic products, import and export trade, and property management. SAST currently
employs about 20,000 staff, including 6,000 engineers (http://www.cgwic.com/Partner/index.html).
China Aerospace Times Electronics Corporation (CATEC) is mainly engaged in the research, development,
production and sales of the technologies and products in the fields of aerospace electronics
(http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). CATEC is located in Beijing and employs 16,000 people
(China Beijing Equity Exchange's Website, www.cbex.com.cn/article/en/projects/200811/20081100005651.shtml).
China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA, also referred to as former Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics
(BIA) or the 701 Institute of CASC) is China¶s principal missile and rocket manufacturer, first institute for theoretical
research and aerodynamic testing in China, and is located in Beijing
(http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). CAAA employs 1,000 workers, over 60 percent of whom
are researchers, engineers and technicians [8].
"Special Businesses"
China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) is the only organization authorized by the Chinese government to
provide satellite in-orbit delivery (IOD) services, commercial launch services and aerospace technology applications.
Yin Liming was appointed president of CGWIC in March 2009, while Zhang Xinqiang was appointed vice president of
CGWIC in January 2007 [9]. CGWIC is located in Beijing. It has a U.S. subsidiary, Great Wall Aerospace Inc. of
Torrance, California (Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 26, 2006, 24).
The China Aerospace Engineering Consultation Center (or CAECC) encompasses several former engineering
consultancies centers for aerospace and Center for Economic Research and, as such, was established in 2003
(http://www.sinodefence.com/space/organisation/casc.asp). Some 168 people work at the Center. Ma Xingrui is the
general manager [10].
China Satellite Communication Corporation (or China Satcom) as the state-owned enterprise (SOE) was founded on
December 19, 2001 (http://www.e-expo365.com/eng/pcen_pcindex.asp?peid=878). The main services of China Satcom
include satellite special services in communications, broadcast and other fields, satellite mobile communications
services, internet services and VSAT services, network services etc. On 10 April 2009 China Satcom (Xinhua News
Agency, April 10) became a fully-owned subsidiary company of CASC. Total assets of China Satcom transferred to
CASC came to 6.6 billion renminbi ($965.81 million). CASC deputy director-general Rui Xiaowu, who was director-
general of China Satcom prior to the merger, said that China Satcom will now mainly focus on three service aspects:
satellite spatial operations, provision of geographic data and locations, and satellite-ground-communications.
CASC and its subsidiaries business involvement
At the 2004 Air Show China, CASC exhibited a range of previously unknown unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) projects
including a new tactical UAV. CASC¶s involvement in the UAV field is a clear sign of just how energized the scope of
China¶s UAV development has become (Jane¶s Defence Weekly, May 10, 2006, 26) [11]. At the Air Show China 2008,
CASC revealed several new designs described as ³micro UAV concept demonstrators´ (Robert Hewson and Reuven
Johnson, ³China displays,´ 34).
The West¶s air campaigns in various conflicts have been closely watched in China, and some of the impact of these
observations was evident at the Air Show China, held between October 31 and November 5, 2006. China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation FT-1 and FT-3 satellite navigation guided bombs were presented there. FT-1 and
FT-3 are aimed at potential export customers for the combat aircraft FC-1, with Pakistan first in line. They are also
probably intended to address national requirements (Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 6, 2006, 26;
November 20, 2006, 45).
CGWIC and CAST

Despite disappointing in-orbit failures and a relatively effective U.S. embargo, China is slowly becoming a player in the
international telecom market. China first broke into the telecom market in the late 1990¶s when CGWIC landed contracts
from Chinese and southeast Asian operators to launch American and European spacecraft on the Long March-3B (LM-
3B). The market opening closed abruptly at the turn of the century when the U.S. government, stung by a series of
security lapses, barred Chinese launches for spacecraft equipped with American components. Yet, China, with a fast-
growing domestic market and growing international clout, persisted. In 2004, China reorganized its space industry under
CASC with the goal of making its satellites and launch services competitive with Western and Russian suppliers.
Over the years, the U.S. government has sanctioned CGWIC on many occasions for being a serial supplier of weapons
to Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Syria. Yet, to the mystification of all, in June 2008, the State Department dropped
sanctions against the CGWIC (Space News, April 13).
In addition to launching spacecraft, as long ago as June 2006 it was reported that CGWIC was involved in commercial
aviation via its airliner Great Wall Airlines [12].
CAST, which like CWGIC became a wholly-owned subsidiary of CASC, was entrusted with developing a new high-
power long-life telecom bus, the DFH-4, while CGWIC was tasked with improving launch and production processes and
developing a turnkey in-orbit delivery service offering (Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 15, 148-149).
A Chinese LM-3B rocket successfully placed Venezuela¶s Venesat-1 telecommunications satellite into orbit on October
30, 2008. Venesat-1 was built by the CAST and is the third of the high-power DFH-4 platforms to be built. An official
with CGWIC said that China would be launching a replacement satellite for Nigcomsat-1, orbited in May 2007. China
signed a contract on October 16, 2008 with the Pakistani government to build and launch the Paksat-1R
telecommunications satellite in 2011 (Space News, November 3, 2008; Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 15,
2009, 149). Speaking at the margins of the Pagnanelli Space Insurance Conference in Venice in April 2009, He Xing,
vice president of CGWIC, said that the company has three or four additional contracts in ³serious negotiations.´ He
Xing noted that since 1996, the Long March family had had a perfect launch record, with 73 straight successful liftoffs
(Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 15, 149). In addition to the LM-3B, China is developing the Long March 5
rocket launcher. According to Liang Xiaohong, vice president of the CALT, these launchers will ultimately be used to
send astronauts to the Moon (Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 9, 35).
To conclude, although it is very difficult to assess the financial operations of both corporations because they are not
disclosed, it can be said, however, that both corporations¶ business involvement demonstrate their fortitude and ability to
withstand sanctions imposed by the United States. The case of the CGWIC has been highlighted in particular.
Furthermore, CASC broke into a new business venue²the development of the UAVs. CASC streamlining and
reorganization in general of AASPT in particular clearly demonstrate that the management of the corporation does not
shy away from reforms. It appears that CALT is the next CASC's subsidiary that is likely to undergo reforms. The
CALT path of reforms might be easier and quicker to undertake since the experience of CASC and AASPT can be very
useful. The reform experience gained by the management of CASC and its subsidiaries would help to streamline and
reorganize the rest of CASC's subsidiaries. Yet, such reforms would take some time to pursue.
[The author would like to thank Tai Ming Cheung, Associate Research Scientist, Institute of Global Conflict and
Cooperation (IGCC), University of California San Diego (UCSA) and School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies, UCSA.]
Notes
1. Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China. The struggle to build a modern defense economy. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2009, 255. Hereafter cited as Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China.
2. According to Tai Ming Cheung, CASTC¶s workforce numbers more than 100,000, of which 40 percent are scientists
and engineers. Fortifying China, 120t. The financial information for CASTC is not publicly disclosed. Tai Ming Cheng
in an e-mail to the author, July 22 2009.
3. www.ista-net.net/agm13/Participants%20list_E.pdf ± online on November 1, 2008.
4. Ibid, 151-152. According to Christian Lardier, the 4th Academy (ARMT) is one of the CASIC¶s main subsidiaries.
³Restructuration de l¶Organisation Spatiale Chinoise´ (³Restructuring of the Chinese Space Organization´), Air et
Cosmos, no. 2132 (July 2008), 33. Hereafter cited as Christian Lardier, ³Restructuration de l¶Organisation´. This
information is, however, incorrect.
5. Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China, 152.
6. www.cast.cn/CastEN/index.asp. See also R. Battiston, ³The Chinese Space Program´ online
www.Inf.infn/conference/2005/spazio/ChinaSpace_Battiston.pdf. Hereafter cited as R. Battiston, ³The Chinese´. For the
current post of Liu Fang, see Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 5, 2008, 29.
7. Christian Lardier, ³Restructuration de l¶Organisation´, 33.
8.http://ssp07.buaa.edu.cn/department/unit/China%20Academy%20of%20Aerospace%.
9. For further information, see www.cgwic.com/About/index.html. The official English website is very useful and
provides information about corporate leadership, organizational structure, and shareholder profile.
10.http://74.125.77.132/translate_c?hl=de&sl=zh-
CN&u=http://www.spacetalent.com.cn/comintroduce/cascgczxa.asp&prev=/search%3Fq. For the corporate leadership
click on Führende Mitglieder des (German).
11. For the continued CASC¶s involvement in design of the UAVs, see Aviation Week and Space Technology,
November 10, 2008, 27; Jane¶s Defence Weekly, November 12, 2008, 14. See also Robert Hewson and Reuben
Johnson, ³China displays airpower credentials with glimpse of new weapon systems´, Jane¶s International Defence
Review (February 2009), 34. Hereafter cited as Robert Hewson and Reuven Johnson, ³China displays´.
12. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 5, 2006, 17. According to the Great Wall Airlines website
(http://www.gwairlines.en/aboutus.asp?id=6), Great Wall Airlines has three shareholders ± Beijing Aerospace Satellite
Application Corporation (BASA), which is a fully-owned subsidiary of CASC, Singapore Airlines Cargo and Dahlia
Investments Pte Limited. What is important is that BASA is a subsidiary of CASC.
c 3 $ *"

Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Home Page, Featured
By: Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson
Although China has traditionally avoided basing its troops abroad, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing
global interests and its military's evolving missions are leading some Chinese analysts to suggest that Beijing may need
to reconsider its traditional aversion to establishing overseas military facilities. In particular, the People's Liberation
Army Navy's (PLAN) experience with anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden that began in December 2008 appears
to have sparked a debate over the efficacy of continuing to adhere to China¶s oft-stated and longstanding policy of
refraining from establishing any overseas military bases or other dedicated facilities capable of supporting military
operations in distant regions. As the PRC¶s global interests rapidly expand, Chinese security analysts are debating the
potential value of such new steps as "establishing land-based supply and support facilities" with increased frequency and
intensity [1]. This suggests China may be on the verge of moving beyond its traditional approach. Indeed, some Chinese
scholars and military officers are now calling for the establishment of such overseas support facilities to handle the
logistics required by a more active role abroad for the Chinese military.
A radical departure from previous Chinese policy seems premature. Instead, statements by some Chinese scholars
suggest that China may adopt a relatively cautious approach, which allows the PLA to more effectively carry out its new
missions without requiring the formal alteration of Beijing¶s longstanding approach to foreign basing. The most likely
outcome is one in which China would follow an approach analogous to the ³places not bases´ strategy put forward by
the U.S. Pacific Command in the 1990s: establish facilities capable of supporting expanded PLA participation in non-
traditional security missions such as anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, rather than
developing a network of traditional military bases, which would be extremely expensive, politically and diplomatically
controversial and highly vulnerable in the event of a crisis or conflict.
China¶s Traditional Approach to Overseas Bases
China has refrained from setting up overseas military bases as part of Beijing¶s foreign policy emphasizing non-
alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Chinese security analysts frequently stated that
forgoing overseas military bases was consistent with a defense policy that emphasized caution about entering into
military alliances and deploying troops abroad. Several official documents published from the mid-1990s to 2000
highlighted this longstanding approach. For example, China¶s 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament
states, ³China does not station any troops or set up any military bases in any foreign country´ [2]. Similarly, China¶s
1998 National Defense White Paper repeats this statement about refraining from establishing overseas bases [3]. China¶s
2000 National Defense White Paper also indicates that ³China does not seek military expansion, nor does it station
troops or set up military bases in any foreign country´ [4].
Numerous statements by Chinese diplomats, scholars and military officers have echoed the positions expressed in these
official documents. In particular, Chinese strategists have highlighted the PLA¶s lack of overseas bases as a reflection of
China¶s broader approach to national security and defense policy, which they typically portray as inherently defensive.
For example, in a 1997 address at the U.S. Army War College, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, then vice president of the
PLA¶s Academy of Military Science (AMS), cited China¶s minimal overseas military presence and its lack of foreign
military bases as evidence of China¶s purely defensive military strategy. ³China has not occupied a single square inch of
foreign soil,´ Li said, ³nor has it possessed any overseas military bases´ [5]. Such statements have become less strident
in recent years, however, and the PLA has begun to take incremental steps toward a more active global role, especially
through China¶s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, China has continued to maintain a self-
imposed prohibition on foreign basing.
Chinese Scholars Debate a New Approach to Overseas Basing
Notwithstanding China¶s historical aversion to the establishment of permanent overseas bases, there are a number of
indications that this longstanding policy may be the subject of vigorous debate among Chinese scholars and security
specialists in the coming years. For example, in an article that appeared in Global Times²the offshoot of People's
Daily²PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Colonel Dai Xu openly advocated the development of overseas bases to ³safeguard
commercial interests and world peace´ [6]. Specifically, Dai argues that 'support facilities' are required not only to
protect China¶s growing global economic interests, but also to enable PLA participation in peacekeeping activities, ship
escort deployments, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
Colonel Dai warns that ³If we make things difficult for ourselves in this matter by maintaining a rigid understanding of
the doctrines of nonalignment and the non-stationing of troops abroad, then it will place a lot of constraints on us across
the board´ [7]. Moreover, Dai argues that overseas bases or support facilities are required if China is to ³effectively
shoulder its international responsibilities and develop a good image.´ Perhaps anticipating the possibility that overseas
bases would heighten international concerns about China¶s growing power, however, Dai states that Chinese bases
would not be part of a global military competition and ³would not require long-term stationing of large military
equipment or large-scale military units.´
As a first step, Dai advocates the establishment of a ³test´ base in the South China Sea. This follows Gen. Zhang Li's
recommendation at the 11th CPPCC that China should construct military support facilities on Mischief Reef [8]. Dai
states that the base should be ³suitable for comprehensive replenishment´ and suggests that it could be used to promote
common development with neighboring countries. Future bases should then be established in other areas where China
has important strategic interests; when possible, bases should be located in countries with which China already has
³friendly, solid relationships´ (e.g. Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan). Looking beyond China¶s immediate
neighborhood, Chinese analysts have also suggested establishing overseas bases or support facilities in Africa and the
Indian Ocean.
The anti-piracy operations that the PLAN has been conducting since late last year off of Somalia are typically cited in
discussions about the potential value of establishing logistical support facilities in Africa. On December 26, 2008, China
dispatched destroyers Wuhan and Haikou as well as supply ship Weishanhu to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. After
about three months, the destroyer Shenzhen and frigate Huangshan were deployed to replace Wuhan and Haikou, while
the supply ship Weishanhu remained on station. The second escort fleet conducted operations for about 112 days before
being relieved by a third escort fleet composed of the frigates Zhoushan and Xuzhou and another supply ship,
Qiandaohu. The PLAN handled the logistics and supply requirements associated with these deployments through a
combination of underway replenishment and port visits.
Although this mission was a major breakthrough for the PLAN, some Chinese strategists argue that it proves that the
PLAN requires overseas support facilities to more effectively safeguard China¶s growing maritime interests. According
to Dai Xu, the deployment is burnishing China¶s image, but logistics and supply constraints limit the amount of time
each of the escort fleets can spend in the area [9]. As such missions for the Chinese military become more common,
however, China will need to carry them out in wider areas, at lower costs, and over longer periods of time. According to
Dai, ³moves toward establishing an overseas base are a logical extension of this line of thinking.´ Similarly, Senior
Captain Li Jie, a strategist at the PLAN¶s Naval Research Institute, has recommended establishing a supply and support
center in East Africa to facilitate PLAN operations in the region. Li argues that setting up a support center in the area is
feasible since the PLAN has already conducted resupply and maintenance activities in African ports and China has
friendly relationships with key countries in the region [10].
The other part of the world most often mentioned in discussions of future requirements for overseas support facilities is
the Indian Ocean (i.e. Gwadar and Hambantota). Indeed, it is the Indian Ocean with its rich resources and busy energy
sea lines of communications (SLOCs) that seems the most likely future area of Chinese naval power projection. Chinese
analyses note that from ancient times through the Cold War, the Indian Ocean has been a critical theater for great power
influence and rivalry [11]. Some PLA analysts argue that China will need to advance to the Indian Ocean to protect its
national interests [12]. Another assessment in China¶s official media suggests that China should develop several
overseas bases and build three or four aircraft carriers [13]. China¶s growing maritime interests and energy dependency
may gradually drive more long-ranging naval development; indeed, reports of imminent aircraft carrier development
seem to represent an initial step in this direction. The PLAN¶s capabilities in key areas are currently insufficient to
support long-range SLOC defense missions, but it may gradually acquire the necessary assets, trained personnel and
experience.
To sustain a serious naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN would need to expand its at-sea replenishment
capacity and secure access privileges in locations such as Pakistan, Burma and perhaps Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. Yet
China remains far from having a naval base beyond Chinese waters. According to Indian Naval analyst Gurpreet
Khurana, ³China and the [Indian Ocean region] countries involved maintain that the transport infrastructure being built
is purely for commercial use. There is no decisive evidence at this point to assert otherwise because these facilities are in
nascent stages of development´ [14].
Instead, in an effort to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean littoral, China has established a complex ³soft power´ web
of diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, arms sales, and strategic partnerships with countries in the region²
including Pakistan and Bangladesh. One goal of this strategy is to maximize access to resource inputs and trade in
peacetime, while making it politically difficult for hostile naval powers to sever seaborne energy supplies in times of
crisis. Greater access to regional port facilities may be one outcome of China¶s soft power initiatives. Indeed, for several
years, China has been developing a number of what Kamphausen and Liang refer to as ³access points,´ or ³friendly
locations´ that are intended to enhance the PLA¶s ability to project power in Asia [15]. Locations such as the ports at
Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka) as well as various other facilities in Burma and the South China Sea do
not appear to amount to the supposed ³string of pearls´ envisioned by some analysts, but these facilities may offer some
capability to support transiting PLA forces, and could be rapidly improved in the future.
Conclusion
There is virtually no reason to suspect that China intends to establish a worldwide network of military bases that would
give the PLA a global presence even approaching that of the United States, but some Chinese analysts clearly support
establishing at least a limited number of facilities capable of supporting Chinese forces in areas deemed vital to China¶s
expanding political and economic interests. It is unclear as yet whether their writings reflect the emergence of a school
of thought that favors a change in policy or simply embody their personal views, but it appears that the anti-piracy
deployment to the Gulf of Aden is sparking serious consideration of the support requirements associated with PLA
missions outside of China¶s immediate neighborhood. One alternative that may prove attractive to Chinese strategists
could be an approach similar to the ³places not bases´ strategy put forward by the U.S. Pacific Command in the 1990s,
in which China would have arrangements in place for access to key facilities in strategic locations while still refraining
from establishing permanent military bases abroad.
The development of ³places´ would enable the PLAN to project power in key regions without necessitating a potentially
controversial change in longstanding Chinese policy. Chinese analysts may also calculate that an approach centered on
³places´ would be less alarming to the United States, India, Japan, and other concerned regional powers. This is in part
because support centers could presumably handle the requirements of non-war military operations²such as food, fuel,
and maintenance and repair facilities²without the propositioned munitions and large-scale military presence typically
associated with full-fledged overseas bases. For the same reasons, ³places´ would presumably be easier for host
countries to accept, thus allowing China to more readily leverage its relationships with key countries in regions of
strategic interest.
The extent to which China¶s approach to overseas basing may be revised remains unclear, but one thing that seems
certain is that a debate has begun. As recently as a few years ago, Chinese analysts were adamant that Beijing desired
³no bases and no places.´ Today that approach appears to be changing as a consequence of Beijing¶s growing global
interests and the expansion of the PLA¶s roles to include missions well beyond China¶s immediate neighborhood.
Although ³places´ would not mark as dramatic a departure from the past as overseas military bases capable of
supporting a full range of potential conflict scenarios, support facilities designed to enable non-war military operations
in regions far from China would still represent an important step forward for the PLA as it begins to shoulder new
missions in support of China¶s growing global interests.
Andrew Erickson, Ph.D., is an associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College (NWC).
He is coeditor of the Naval Institute Press books China Goes to Sea (July 2009), China¶s Energy Strategy (2008), and
China¶s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (2007). Michael Chase, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in NWC¶s Strategy and
Policy Department. He is the author of Taiwan¶s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics (Lynne
Rienner, 2008).
Notes
1. Li Jie, as quoted in ³Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing a Land-based Support Center in East
Africa,´ Zhongping News Agency,May 21, 2009, gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/4_16_100975224_1.html.
2. ³China¶s National Defense in 1998,´ www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.2.htm.
3. ³China: Arms Control and Disarmament´ (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 1995), www.china.org.cn/e-
white/army/index.htm.
4. ³China¶s National Defense in 2000,´ www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176952.htm.
5. Lieutenant General Li Jijun, ³Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China: Address at the
United States Army War College,´ August 1, 1997, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm.
6. ³Colonel: China Must Establish Overseas Bases, Assume the Responsibility of a Great Power,´ Global Times,
February 5, 2009,
www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/7_0_100877861_1.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Russell Hsiao, ³PLA General Advises Building Bases in the South China Sea,´ China Brief, vol. 9, issue 13, June 24,
2009,
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/.
9. In Dai¶s words, ³The Chinese expeditionary force in Somalia has been attracting a lot of attention from around the
world, but with only a single replenishment ship, how much escort time can two warships provide for commercial
vessels from various countries?´
10. Li Jie is cited in ³Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing a Land-based Support Center in East Africa,´
Zhongping News Agency, May 21, 2009, gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/4_16_100975224_1.html.
11. Senior Captain Xu Qi, ³Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century,´
China Military Science, (Vol. 17, No. 4) 2004, pp. 75-81.
12. Wang Nannan, ed., ³Expert Says China¶s Advancement toward the Indian Ocean Concerns National Interests and
Gives No Cause for Criticism,´ Xinhua, June 10, 2008, news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-06/10/content_8338128.htm.
13. Sun Ruibo, ed., ³The U.S. Military Strengthens Forces on Guam²For What Purpose?, Xinhua, July 4, 2008,
news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-07/04/content_8489422.htm.
14. G.S. Khurana, ³China¶s µString of Pearls¶ in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications,´ Strategic Analysis,
Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2008, p. 3.
15. Roy D. Kamphausen and Justin Liang, ³PLA Power Projection,´ in Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang, and
Evan S. Medeiros, with Oriana Skylar Mastro, ed., Assessing the Threat (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2007), pp. 111-50.
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Tongzhou Airfield Second Artillery Contingent (L) and Tongzhou Airfield Barracks North (R)
The Chinese press has announced that 52 types of ³new weapon systems´ will be on display in 30 vehicle and 12 air
formations during the October 1st military parade portion of the 60th anniversary celebration of the founding of the
People¶s Republic of China (PLA Daily, September 17). Fourteen dismounted formations from active and reserve
People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) units, military academies, the People¶s Armed Police (PAP), and militia will follow the
tri-service honor guard. All personnel will wear new (Type-07) camouflage, service, or dress uniforms issued in recent
years.
Based on what can be deduced from other official media reports, unofficial Chinese blogs and internet postings, and
public satellite images (i.e. Google Earth), outside observers can verify what the Chinese have said and make a pretty
good prediction of what will be seen during the parade. Yet, the new uniforms and newly painted equipments on display
indicate little about actual Chinese military capabilities. The more pertinent issue for Chinese military experts is how the
parade reflects military doctrine and how the preparations for this event impact the annual training schedule for the
personnel and units involved.
All of the Chinese Armed Forces on Parade
This is a parade of the entire Chinese armed forces, not just the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The Chinese armed forces are a ³party army´: their loyalty is pledged to the Chinese Communist Party (CPP), not the
state (People's Republic of China). The first mission defined by Party General-Secretary and Chairman of the Central
Military Commission Hu Jintao in his ³historic missions in the new century´ is to safeguard the Party¶s governing
position (Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2007). Every parade formation, except for the honor guard, will be led by
two leaders or two vehicles. These pairs represent unit commanders and political officers. In the Chinese armed forces,
the commander and political officer are jointly responsible for the actions of their unit. There are many examples where
both commander and political officer were relieved of their duties when something went wrong.
By law, the Chinese armed forces are composed of 1) the active and reserve units of the PLA, 2) the PAP, and 3) the
militia. The PLA is composed of three services, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and an independent branch, the Second
Artillery²the strategic missile force composed of both nuclear and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. Each element of the armed forces has a primary mission: the PLA is focused primarily on defense against
external enemies; the primary role of the PAP, in conjunction with the civilian Ministry of Public Security police force,
is internal/domestic security [The security tasks of the PAP were enumerated recently in the Law on the People's Armed
Police Force of the People's Republic of China passed on August 29, 2009.]; while the militia may provide support to
both external and domestic security missions. As secondary tasks, the PLA and the PAP may support the other in their
primary missions.
According to Chinese doctrine (for example, see The Science of Campaigns), all elements of the armed forces are to be
integrated with civilian support into joint campaigns to fight local wars under informationized conditions or conduct
³non-traditional security´ missions (e.g. anti-terrorism, disaster relief operations, internal stability functions, public
health security).
In any mission the armed forces undertake the Chinese leadership will seek to mobilize the public to support their efforts
politically, economically, and materially as necessary. In that regard, while stoking national pride the 60th anniversary
parade aims also illustrate to the Chinese population that the last decade of double-digit increases to the defense budget
have resulted in tangible progress (China Brief, September 10). This is a people¶s parade and the uniformed participants
fully understand that they need the public¶s support as they continue to operate within the modernized ³strategic
concept´ of People¶s War, which originated as a political-military strategy invented by Mao Zedong.
Also according to Chinese doctrine, military parades contribute to China¶s overall, multi-layered posture of strategic
deterrence (e.g. deterring conventional attack on Chinese territory or sovereignty, deterring nuclear attack, deterring
further steps toward Taiwan independence, and deterring the ³three evils´ of ³terrorism, separatism, and extremism´).
The Science of Military Strategy, published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science, the country's premier military
research institute for the development of military strategy, operations, and tactics and which is directly controlled by the
Central Military Commission, states:
³Demonstrating momentum by showing the disposition of the strength to the enemy is to display clearly one¶s deterrent
force for bringing about psychological pressure on and fear to the opponent and thus to force him to submit. Such
deterrent forms as large-scale military review, joint military exercise, and military visit, etc, are usually adopted´ [1].
The ³enemies´ that Beijing seeks to deter may be individuals or groups of terrorists, separatists, or extremists either in
China or along its borders or may be state actors which challenge its sovereignty. Thus, the parade is intended for both
domestic and foreign audiences. The Chinese leadership will hail it as a measure of their transparency in military affairs.
Parade Preparations Reveal Much
A Google Earth satellite image of Beijing taken in June 2009 covers the ³Parade Villages´ at the Tongzhou and Shahe
military airfields near Beijing. The preparations and training that have been underway at these sites for five months are
clearly visible even to an untrained eye. Foreign journalists have been allowed access to the Shahe ³Parade Village´ to
observe living conditions and training for dismounted personnel marching in the parade (China Military Online,
September 11).
Multiple ground and air rehearsals have been conducted along the parade route down Chang¶an Boulevard and the
Chinese blogosphere is abuzz with close-up photos and videos of equipment and personnel. Analysis of Google Earth
imagery matched with rehearsal photographs reveals much of what will be seen on October 1st.
Earlier this year, barracks and vehicle parking lots were constructed along the main runway at Tongzhou airfield. Open
unit parking lots for 30 vehicle formations are visible on the Google Earth imagery. At the time of the image, nine units
were on the runway assembling or practicing driving in formation. The standard formation seen in 1999, four rows of
vehicles with four columns led by two vehicles (for a total of 18 vehicles per formation) is evidenced once more on the
runway.
Near the north end of the runway, perhaps the most prominent sight is the perfect formation of 18 armored personnel
carriers painted white, denoting their subordination to the PAP. Main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, self-
propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and
ballistic and cruise missiles of the Second Artillery are all recognizable on the runway and parked in open lots.
Among the parked vehicles, many formations are green (generally indicating Army units) and four can be seen to be
blue (indicating Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Airborne). In addition to the 18 vehicles that will drive in the parade, each
unit has a few spares in case of maintenance problems.
The Second Artillery contingent is seen at the southern end of the airfield. Five types of missile systems can be seen: 19
DF-11 short-range ballistic missiles, 19 DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles, 19 DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles,
14 DF-31/31A intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 19 DH-10 cruise missiles. (There has been no sighting yet of the
new JL-2 SLBM, which is eventually expected to be deployed to the Navy.) Significantly, the 14 DF-31/31As present at
the airfield comprise a very large percentage of the total number of DF-31/31As deployed. According to the 2009
National Air and Space Intelligence Center report on the ³Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,´ less than 15 of each of
the DF-31 and DF-31As have been deployed.
While, like the Chinese say, the weapons on display have been made in China (albeit some under license from Russia
and France), it is evident from the rehearsal photographs that more than half of the systems are the same as or
modifications or upgrades of weapons seen in the 1999 parade. Unlike previous parades, however, communications and
logistics support vehicles will also participate.
The 12 formations of aircraft to over-fly Beijing will include China¶s newest fighter, the J-10, other fighters and fighter-
bombers (J-8, J-11, and JH-7), airborne refuelers, early warning and control aircraft, and multiple types of helicopters.
Many of the weapons in the parade are considered ³assassin¶s mace´ (shashoujian) weapons in the Chinese literature.
However, the fact that so many different types of weapons from all services, to include communications and logistics
vehicles, are included in the parade represents Chinese military doctrine that calls for all weapons, new and old, to be
integrated into campaigns. ³Assassin¶s mace´ weapons will be used in joint campaigns with other elements of firepower,
mobility, and special operations integrated with systems to prosecute electronic and information war. Yet, according to
PLA doctrine, ³information warfare is a means, not a goal´ [2].
The Parade and Military Organization and Training
Whether or not the new equipment has been seen officially in public before, military enthusiasts and analysts inside and
outside of China have been monitoring the status of nearly every weapon (if not all of them) in the parade. Long before
the parade rehearsals, websites such as the excellent SinoDefence.com had photos and specifications for the majority of
Chinese gear to be seen in the parade.
The appearance of equipment in the parade says nothing conclusive about how widespread it has been deployed to the
force. For example, the Type 96 and Type 98/99-series main battle tanks were both seen in 1999. Only 10 Type 98 tanks
led eight Type 96s in a mixed formation suggesting there were only 10 Type 99s deployed within the whole of the PLA
at that time (a second formation composed entirely of 18 Type 96s preceded the mixed formation in the 1999 parade).
This year a full formation of 18 Type 99 will be followed by a second formation of 18 Type 96 series tanks. Currently
only about 200 Type 98/99 series tanks are estimated to be deployed to the force, but some 1,500 Type 96-series are
found in units throughout the country. These two most advanced main battle tanks make up less than one-third the 6,700
tanks in the PLA (total number found in the 2009 Department of Defense Report to Congress).
This year, much larger formations of Second Artillery missiles will be paraded as compared to the 1999 performance. At
that time, nine each of the early models of DF-11 and DF-15s, six DF-21s, and three DF-31s were included. Despite it
making a showing at the 1999 parade, according to the 2009 Department of Defense Report to Congress, the DF-31 was
not deployed operationally until some seven years later in 2006. Full formations of these ballistic missiles (perhaps
ranging from 12-18 missiles depending on type), as well as the recently deployed DH-10 land-attack cruise missile, will
be in the parade. However, the numbers of each type of missile seen in the parade do not correspond to the actual
numbers of missiles found in operational units. Again according to the Department of Defense Report to Congress, 700-
750 DF-11s, 350-400 DF-15s, 60-80 DF-21s, and 150-350 DH-10s missiles are in PLA units (the number of each type
of launcher is usually less than the number of missiles available).
The set-piece parade formations of personnel, vehicles, and aircraft also provide no insights into how the PLA has
restructured itself over the past decade. The structure of army divisions has been modified; new brigades have been
created (many from former divisions). The mix of equipment in the parade does not provide any clue to how these
divisions and brigades are organized.
What is more important is that the parade does not reveal how well-trained the troops are to actually use these weapons.
While marching or driving in precise formations is rigorous work requiring a high degree of discipline and stamina, the
parade formations have absolutely no tactical value or relevance to how units actually move, shoot, and communicate in
battle or are integrated into larger systems-of-systems necessary for modern war.
Parade personnel and equipment will miss an entire season of unit field training. Yet the impact is greater than just for
the personnel and equipment involved in the parade. In order to assemble sufficient soldiers of the proper height, many
subordinate units in the larger organization will have to contribute personnel to create a detachment of the proper size to
march in the parade. Units also must send clerks, cooks, medics, and mechanics to support the marchers. Parent units
can consolidate those left behind for training or train at less than full-strength, but the parade will have an impact on
many units¶ annual training schedules.
Conclusions
The individuals and units involved in the execution of the parade can rightfully be proud of their accomplishments. It
will be no small maintenance accomplishment to get so many pieces of military equipment to complete the route without
breakdown after months of slow formation driving. Participation undoubtedly increases unit esprit and confidence in the
soldiers and their leaders. Many small unit leaders will likely have improved their own leadership skills to motivate
subordinates during what certainly have been trying times during parade practice. The logistics effort to support this
commitment also gives the units experience at operating away from their home bases (even if in nice barracks along
airfields). Therefore, some benefits accrue from this event, but these intangibles say little about the warfighting or
³military operations other than war´ capabilities of the Chinese armed forces.
No judgment about Chinese military capabilities can be rendered simply by watching this parade. And more importantly,
based on the weapons on display no judgment can be rendered as to the Chinese intention behind the deployment of
these weapons. The best that can be said is that these weapons are inventory²but from the parade itself, we do not
know how many have been deployed into units or if the units have developed personnel capable of planning for their
employment, operating them to their maximum effectiveness, and supporting them in the field under the stress of
combat.
The 60th anniversary parade is one milestone in China¶s long-term, multi-faceted military modernization process. It will
be major morale boost for the force and a source of national pride for the Chinese public, but the parade should not be
misinterpreted by attributing unwarranted intentions to this single event.
Notes
1. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), The Science of Military Strategy, Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2005, p. 223.
2. The Science of Campaigns. National Defense University Press, both 2000 and 2006 editions make these points.
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October 7, 2009 02:08 PM Age: 137 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, China and the Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping
Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping departed for Europe on October 7 for a two-week long official visit spanning from
Brussels in the West to Bucharest in the East. The five European countries include Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania. This high-level trip by the Chinese leader most likely to succeed President Hu Jintao in 2013
may signal momentum behind a change in the Chinese leadership¶s attitude toward the Eastern European region, and
mark the beginning of a new stage in their bilateral relations.
Vice-President Xi¶s European tour has been framed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and official-media as a visit to
consolidate and develop cooperation in economic relations between China and the five countries (Xinhua News Agency,
October 1). While Xi¶s stopovers in Brussels and Berlin are no surprise given Western Europe¶s important position in
the Chinese economy, more telling of China¶s evolving ³go-out´ investment strategy is Xi¶s visit to the Central and
Eastern European countries. Xi¶s call to Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania against the recent backdrop of a massive $1
billion Chinese loan to neighboring Moldova in August²which some analysts say signal an intensification of Beijing¶s
strategy to diversify its estimated $2 trillion foreign reserves²may be an indication that the Chinese are eager to
accelerate their diversification strategy through the emerging countries in the region, and is sure to raise expectations.
The Moldovan loan has apparently been in the works for some time; the plan was initially announced at a Chisinau
Beijing videoconference in February (Moldova.org, February 6). Chisinau could not accept the loan at the time because
it signed a memorandum with the IMF valid until April that restricted it from taking out credits from China.
In the lead-up to Xi¶s visit, which will include a raft of economic forums, the Chinese media has been touting Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania as important commercial partners for China in the Central and Eastern European region (Wen
Wei Po [Hong Kong], October 6). Data released by the General Administration of Customs of the Chinese government
indicates that commercial trade between China and the region has been developing rapidly in recent years. China¶s total
trade with the three countries was $1.4 billion in 2000 and increased to $12 billion in 2008, which represents an almost
eight-fold increase. The share of total bilateral trade is divided by Bulgaria (~$1.3 billion), Hungary (~$7.5 billion), and
Romania (~$3.2 billion), which ranks these countries 5th, 2nd, and 4th respectively in China¶s overall trade in terms of
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Wen Wei Po, October 6).
According to Chinese government customs data, Belgium is China's seventh largest commercial partner in the European
Union (E.U.). In 2008, commercial trade between China and Belgium was $20.2 billion, which represents a 14.4 percent
increase over the previous year. Belgium is the ninth largest source of foreign investment to China from the E.U. By
August 2009, Belgium had direct investments in China worth over $1 billion. From January±August 2009, Belgium's
real investment in China increased by 85.8 percent year-over-year (Wen Wei Po, October 6).
Currently, Germany is China¶s largest commercial partner in Europe. In 2008, China-Germany commercial trade
reached $115 billion and accounts for about a quarter of total China-Europe commercial trade. Germany¶s investments
in China reached $1.6 billion, which also accounts for about a quarter of total E.U. investments in China. Chinese
enterprises invested $980 million in Germany, which accounts for 29 percent of China's total investments in the E.U.
(Wen Wei Po, October 6).
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October 7, 2009 02:19 PM Age: 137 days
Category: China Brief, Home Page, Foreign Policy, Economics, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America
By: Evan Ellis
Brazilian President Lula (L) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (R)
Since 2008, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has moved forward with a series of large aid and investment deals,
indicating that the PRC is raising its stake in Latin America to a new level [1]. The impact of China's expanding
commitment in Latin America extends far beyond the PRC's immediate goals of securing access to Latin American
markets and reliable sources of primary products at favorable prices. The implications of this trend can be understood in
terms of four overlapping effects: (1) the interaction is transforming the physical, economic, educational and social
structure of the region; (2) it is enabling the survival and spread of regimes oriented against the United States, Western-
style democracy and economic models; (3) it is enabling the emergence of Brazil as a regional powerbroker; and (4) it is
undermining the United States as a source of political and economic influence in the region, as well as U.S. options for
regional engagement. While China is transforming Latin America through such effects, however, this does not imply
that they are deliberate, primary objectives of Chinese foreign policy toward the region.
The mechanism by which Latin America¶s expanding relationship with the PRC is transforming the region has as much
to do with expectations by Latin American investors of future business with China. Inspired by expectations of selling
to, or importing from China, Latin Americans are investing to improve their infrastructure, including the expansion and
modernization of Pacific ports such as Ensenada, Buenaventura, Manta, Callao and Iquique, among others. The desire to
facilitate commerce with China has also breathed new life into contemplated but long unfunded infrastructure projects,
connecting the continent to its Pacific coast, including the Manta-Manaus corridor, inter-oceanic corridors to Paita and
Ilo in Peru, and the bi-oceanic corridor connecting São Paolo in southern Brazil with the Chilean port of Iquique.
Beyond physical infrastructure, the belief held by students in the region that China is the wave of the future has driven
the establishment of China-oriented programs throughout Latin American universities, as well as a wealth of offerings
for learning Mandarin, from private institutes to university language programs, including the establishment of 18
officially sanctioned Confucius Institutes in the region.
Chinese engagement is also shaping the politics of the region. One such impact is the contribution of Chinese aid and
investment in the survival of the ³caudillo socialist block´ (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia). The PRC has been
extremely cautious to avoid associating itself with the anti-U.S. proclamations of leaders such as Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela. Nonetheless, the PRC benefits from the policies of these regimes insofar as their disruption of relationships
with Western companies, and the personalistic character of their regimes creates opportunities for Chinese companies to
gain access to their resources and deepen penetration of their markets.
The principal example of how China has enabled ³caudillo socialism´ in the region is its relationship with the Hugo
Chavez regime in Venezuela. As Chavez has consolidated control of the petroleum industry and other sectors of the
Venezuelan economy, China has played an increasingly important role in buying Venezuelan oil, working the oilfields
and loaning money to the Chavez regime. Over the past two years, China Development Bank has loaned $8 billion to
Venezuela, to be repaid in future oil deliveries, and is currently negotiating an additional loan of up to $4 billion.
Although initially intended for Venezuelan infrastructure projects, these funds arguably helped the Chavez regime to
meet its internal and external commitments when oil prices fell from $140 per barrel to less than $40. China National
Petroleum Company (CNPC) has expanded its Venezuelan oil operations while Western companies have pulled out, and
in September 2009 announced its intention to invest an additional $16 billion (El Universal [Venezuela], September 17).
In Ecuador, like Venezuela, China has helped to maintain the solvency of that country¶s anti-U.S. regime, issuing a $1
billion loan, which helped the government of Rafael Correa to manage a liquidity crisis associated with the repayment of
foreign debt obligations (El Universo [Ecuador], July 23), as well as a $2 billion 1.5 Gigawatt hydroelectric plant, 90
percent self-financed by the Chinese company that performs the work (El Universo, September 12). The Chinese
consortium Andes Petroleum is a key investor in Ecuador¶s oil sector, and has become increasingly important as other
companies have pulled out in response to the Correa regime¶s move to force them to re-negotiate the terms of their
concessions. Even in Bolivia, where the Chinese have proceeded cautiously, the state petroleum company YPFB is
pursuing a strategic partnership with CNPC for the investment and technical expertise that it requires to maintain
Bolivian gas production (La Razon [Bolivia], November 5, 2008).
In addition to contributions as a resource provider and customer, China is also playing an expanding role as an
alternative provider of technology and military goods. China has helped Venezuela to create a factory to assemble
drilling rigs to develop its oil, as well as other joint ventures for producing cars and cell phones. The PRC has also
launched a telecommunication satellite for Venezuela in 2008, and has become an important telecom infrastructure
provider. In addition, the PRC sells the country increasingly sophisticated military end items, including air surveillance
radars and military aircraft [2].
Ecuador and Bolivia have followed Venezuela¶s lead with respect to military purchases from the PRC. Ecuador, which
had previously leased two MA-60 transport aircraft from the Chinese in 2007, is negotiating to purchase four more (El
Universo, August 23), as well as taking delivery of two Chinese radars for evaluation, and purchasing four more, to be
delivered by the first quarter of 2011 (El Universo, August 23). Bolivia, which previously received trucks, small boats
and night vision goggles from the PRC, is now working with them to launch a satellite (Los Tiempos [Bolivia], July 22)
and purchasing six K-8 aircraft for counter-narcotics missions after being denied access to U.S. and European planes (El
Universo, October 2).
In addition to providing resources, technical support and military goods that have contributed to the survival of the
³caudillo socialist block,´ the PRC has also been contributing to Brazil's ascendancy as a regional power broker.
Brazilian economic performance has been driven, in part, by its export-oriented iron and soy industries, for which China
is a key customer. Indeed, the global recession emphasized and magnified the importance of China to Brazil. While
Brazilian exports to the United States fell 37.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009, exports to the PRC increased by 62.7
percent (La Jornada [Nicaragua], May 4) thanks in part to a Chinese stimulus package that included $740 billion in
infrastructure projects (Brazzil Magazine [Brazil], January 15), thus maintaining high levels of Chinese demand for
factor inputs such as iron, purchased from Brazilian suppliers such as CVRD. Consequently, in the first half of 2009,
China became Brazil¶s number one export destination (Xinhua News Agency [China], April 3). China has also emerged
as a key financier as Brazil reaches out for the $174 billion that it requires to develop newly discovered deepwater oil
reserves in the Campos and Santos basins. In discussing a $10 billion loan from China Development Bank to Brazil (La
Nacion [Argentina], May 28), the president of Petrobras, Sergio Gabrielli, noted, ³There isn¶t [sic] someone in the U.S.
government that we can sit down with and have the kinds of discussions we¶re having with the Chinese´ (The Wall
Street Journal, May 18).
The PRC is also an increasingly important partner in technology transfer for Brazil. The two nations are pursuing a
range of important joint ventures, including joint production of mid-sized business jets, the China-Brazil Earth Research
Satellite (CBERS) program and other space cooperation programs (Xinhua News Agency, May 19).
Brazil¶s expanding trade with China is also giving Brasilia reasons to become more interested in the affairs of its
neighbors. In cities such as Manaus in the interior of Brazil, the economics of importing factory inputs from the PRC is
greatly facilitated by routes linking the Brazilian Amazon to Pacific ports. Projects currently underway include highway
corridors from the Amazon River over the Andes Mountains to the Peruvian ports of Paita and Ilo, as well as a possible
multimodal corridor linking the Brazilian city of Manus, with its free trade zone, to the Ecuadorian port of Manta. In a
similar fashion, Brazil¶s growing commerce with China also heightens its stake in the trade policy and political stability
of its pacific neighbors, as well as major infrastructure projects affecting the economics of that trade such as the
expansion of the Panama Canal.
In addition to sustaining the caudillo socialist block and contributing to the rise of Brazil, in a broader sense, Chinese
investment and aid in Latin America is undermining the primacy of the United States' role as an economic and social
actor in the region. This can be seen in the re-orientation of Latin America¶s trade structure away from the United States,
Latin American efforts to either please or avoid offending China, and in the declining power of the United States as a
³reference model´ for economic development and democracy.
With respect to trade structure, PRC financial deals to facilitate commerce, such as the $10.2 billion debt swap with
Argentina in March 2009 (La Nacion, March 31), represent an expanding challenge to the primacy of the dollar as an
international reserve currency (Nacion [Costa Rica], March 31). Brazilian President Lula explicitly argued for working
with China to move away from the dollar during his trip to China in May 2009 (Xinhua News Agency, May 22).
Even before such challenges to the primacy of the dollar, however, the lure of China as a market was arguably one factor
that helped to permanently derail the proposed ³Free Trade Area of the Americas.´ Chinese bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Peru, and FTA negotiations with Costa Rica can have the effect of moving the region
away from a structure of trade relationships and incentives focusing the region on the United States, to a world in which
Latin American states are more independent global actors. At the individual country level, such influence can be seen in
Chile, the foreign economic policy of which focuses on positioning the country as a gateway between Asia and Latin
America. A similar enthusiasm can be seen in Peru, which hosted the 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit, and in which the PRC has made important investment commitments in the oil and gas sector, purchases of
fishing fleets and fishmeal processing facilities, and mines in Toromocho, Rio Blanco and Maracona. It is also
evidenced in the desire of countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica to tie themselves more closely to the Pacific
economic community by joining APEC.
In the realm of what has been called ³soft power,´ the United States is also losing influence in the region where U.S.
initiatives conflict with Latin America¶s desires to maintain a positive relationship with the PRC for economic reasons.
The decision by the Ecuadorian regime of Rafael Correa not to renew the agreement giving the U.S. access to Manta
was a necessary step in inviting the Chinese to develop the airport into a hub for trans-pacific flights, even though the
two were probably never explicitly connected by the Chinese. In the future, as Latin American regimes contemplate
whether to allow potentially intrusive cooperation with U.S. law enforcement in areas such as counternarcotics,
telecommunications, or banking, the impact of such cooperation on attracting investment from partners such as the
Chinese will cast a growing shadow over their decisions.
The desire of Latin American leaders to court, please, or avoid offending the PRC, is becoming increasingly evident.
When Costa Rican President Oscar Arias switched his country¶s diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May
2007, a key factor was his belief that the emergence of the PRC as a global power made being on the ³right side´ of the
China/Taiwan issue in Costa Rica¶s interest [3]. The importance that Latin American leaders place on China can be
discerned by the number of its presidents who have led delegations to the PRC in recent years: in addition to the six trips
to China by Hugo Chavez (La Estrella [Panama], April 6) and multiple trips by Rafael Correa and Evo Morales,
virtually all the rest, including President Lula of Brazil, Alvaro Uribe, Felipe Calderon, Tabaré Vásquez, and Oscar
Arias.
To date, the PRC has limited its attempts to exert influence over its Latin American partners to areas tied to core Chinese
interests, such as their recognition of Taiwan or Tibet, the opening of their markets to Chinese goods, and favorable or
neutral positions with respect to China in forums such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Trade
Organization. As China sinks more investment in Latin America, and becomes more dependent on the region as a
market and a source of supply, it is logical that China would seek to motivate Latin American leaders to protect these
interests. Although it is difficult to imagine the PRC demanding that a Latin American state not cooperate with the
United States on police and security matters, it is increasingly easy to imagine that such a state might think twice, if it
believes that a U.S. presence could jeopardize a major PRC purchase or investment in the country.
Finally, in the world of ideas in Latin America, the rise of China can become a powerful force in derailing the U.S.
political, economic, and human rights agenda in the region. The ability demonstrated by the PRC to sustain growth rates
in excess of 10 percent and recover rapidly from the global recession, by contrast to the United States, which
precipitated the financial crisis and continues to contract, sends a powerful message to Latin American states that U.S.-
style political pluralism may not be necessary for development, and in some circumstances, may be detrimental to it.
Notes
1. Analysts have generally acknowledged that Chinese aid and investment in Latin America is relatively small,
compared to comparable investments by the United States and the European Union. Cumulative aid from China to Latin
America from 2002 thrugh 2007 was less than $25 billion, comparred to $620 billion from the European Union and
$340 billion from the United States over the same period. Thomas Lum, et. al. China¶s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa,
Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Congressional Research Service. Doc. No. 7-5700. R40361. www.crs.gov. February
25, 2009. Nonetheless, such figures overlook both the order-of-magnitude increase in Chinese aid to Latin America that
occurred in 2008, as well as the disproportionate impact that Chinese aid has on the region because of the hopes of
attacting even more such aid from the PRC as an emerging market and rising power.
2. China has sold Venezuela 18 K-8 aircraft, which are designated as trainers, but which can be given combat capability
by outfitting them with missiles and other munitions. Venezuela is also exploring the purchase of a more advanced type
of trainer from the PRC, the L-15.
3. Based on a series of interviews with Costa Rican government leaders in January 2008. See R. Evan Ellis China in
Latin America: The What¶s and Wherefores. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
' >?&?(' c

October 22, 2009 09:54 AM Age: 122 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, Home Page
By: Ed Ross
F-16 Fighting Falcon
For 30 years now, ever since the United States severed formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on
Taiwan and recognized the People¶s Republic of China (PRC), the U.S. has continued defense cooperation with Taiwan
to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Despite continuing pressure from Beijing and volatility in the U.S.-
PRC relationship, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and a sense of America¶s moral obligation to the people of Taiwan
have worked to ensure U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation and the continued sale of U.S. defense articles and services to
the island. Every U.S. presidential administration, from Ronald Reagan¶s onward, has understood²albeit tacitly²that
the use of military force by the PRC against Taiwan would necessitate a reciprocal U.S. response; and the U.S. Pacific
Command has maintained its contingency plans for the defense of Taiwan.
Nevertheless, Taiwan¶s military capabilities have failed to keep pace with China¶s aggressive military modernization
and expansion over the past decade²the direct result of policy decisions in both Washington and Taipei. The annual
U.S. Department of Defense 2009 China Military Power Report states that, ³Since 2000, there have been two peaceful
political transitions on Taiwan and a gradual and steady maturation of Taiwan democracy. While Beijing¶s strategy
toward Taiwan appears to have shifted from seeking an early resolution of the Taiwan issue to one of preventing
Taiwan¶s de jure independence, by force if necessary, Beijing¶s objective of unifying Taiwan with the Mainland has not
changed. Since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift in Beijing¶s favor, marked by the
sustained deployment of advanced military equipment to the Military Regions opposite Taiwan´ [1].
Improvements in Taiwan-China relations since Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist) President Ma Ying-jeou took office
and growing U.S.-China economic interdependence, however, also have altered the status quo. The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and Nationalist may be on a path toward the peaceful resolution of the differences that have been the source
of tension across the Taiwan Strait for over 60 years. Thus, in spite of the fact that China¶s military buildup in the
Taiwan Strait continues, President Barack Obama may now see a Taiwan-China détente as a rationale for dramatically
reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the irritation they have consistently been to U.S.-China relations for the past 30
years.
To better understand how U.S.-Taiwan defense interaction may change in the future, however, it is first necessary to
consider how it has already changed. In 2000, the March election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President
Chen Shui-bien in Taiwan and the November election of George W. Bush in the United States had major impacts on the
dynamics of U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. Chen¶s election unseated the KMT, which had controlled Taiwan since
1949, and completed the peaceful transformation of Taiwan from a dictatorship to a democracy. In April 2001, President
George W. Bush, recognizing that the relative military balance in the Taiwan Strait was changing rapidly in China¶s
favor, approved in principle approximately $35 billion in major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. He also altered the structure
of the high-level U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogue [2]. Senior Bush administration policy makers sought to place the U.S.-
Taiwan defense relationship on a more balanced footing. The collision of a U.S. Navy E-P3 aircraft with a Chinese F-8
fighter over the South China Sea on April 1, 2001, and China¶s detention of the U.S. crew after it made an emergency
landing in China, no doubt factored into that decision [3].
Chen, however, focused more on his domestic policy agenda and Taiwan¶s status in the international community than on
Taiwan¶s defense needs and U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation. At the same time, KMT members of the Legislative
Yuan (LY)²Taiwan's parliament²thwarted Taiwan Ministry of National Defense efforts to fund many of the programs
President George W. Bush had approved to undermine Chen¶s popularity and credibility (Taipei Times, April 16, 2006).
Moreover, President Chen¶s pursuit of policies intended to move Taiwan toward de jure independence angered senior
Bush administration officials because it complicated their attempts to pursue better U.S.-China relations as Washington
became more dependent on China internationally and economically. Washington needed Beijing¶s assistance in the Six-
Party Talks with North Korea and sought its vote in the United Nations to put pressure on Iran. China¶s rapid economic
growth and U.S. borrowing to finance deficit spending made China and the United States more economically
interdependent.
By Bush¶s second term, U.S.-China relations were again improving and serious strains in U.S.-Taiwan relations were
apparent. Major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan slowed dramatically. Toward the end of the Bush administration, they came
to a halt. When Taiwan failed to adequately fund U.S. programs, Washington became increasingly less willing to take
the heat from China for U.S. arms sales it might approve but Taiwan might not follow through on. Therefore,
Washington forced Taiwan to withdraw its request for 66 new F-16C/D aircraft in an attempt to use it as leverage to
influence Chen¶s policies and behavior. In October 2008, after a long delay, the Bush administration, following the 2008
U.S. presidential election and just prior to leaving office, notified Congress of only half of the $12 billion in sales
pending at the State Department [4]. As of this writing, no arms sales to Taiwan have been notified since President
Obama took office in January 2009.
By 2008, when President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in Taiwan and President Barack Obama was elected in the United
States, both U.S.-Taiwan defense interaction and the international and cross-strait environments in which they took place
were much different than during the 20 years after 1979. Democracy in Taiwan, and the indecision and political
infighting that is part and parcel of the democratization process, added a new dimension to U.S.-Taiwan defense
dialogue and a new set of players on the Taiwan side.
During the 20 months since President Ma, who made a Taiwan-China détente the centerpiece of his campaign, took
office, has made improving Taiwan-China relations a top priority. Cross-strait interaction has increased exponentially,
reflecting Ma¶s and the KMT's attitudes that better Taiwan-China relations are critical to Taiwan¶s economic growth and
future prosperity. It also reflects their concern that Taiwan cannot keep pace with PRC military improvements. Their
concern is fed, in part, by Washington¶s unwillingness to provide Taiwan with the weapons it would need to do so and
by the impact such purchases would have on Taiwan¶s national budget in these hard economic times. The downturn in
Taiwan¶s economy resulting from the current global financial crisis will have immediate and longer-term impacts on
Taiwan¶s defense budget and its defense acquisition decisions [5].
During the 10 months since President Barack Obama took office, pressure on the U.S. economy brought about by the
global economic crisis, unprecedented U.S. deficit spending, and challenges facing the United States in North Korea,
Iran and Afghanistan have heightened his concern for good relations with China. Changes in the global strategic
political, military and economic environment have led to further improvements in U.S.-China relations, further
complicating U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. As of January 2009, China held $739.6 billion in U.S. treasury securities
amounting to 24 percent of the U.S. national debt [6]. While China may be as equally dependent on the U.S. market as
Washington is on Chinese foreign exchange reserves, keeping U.S.-China relations free of friction is a major objective
of the Obama administration.
President Obama recently said that the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century,
demonstrating the great importance that the United States places on good relations with China and the two countries¶
growing economic interdependence. In this context, President Obama will travel to China this November seeking to
harmonize U.S. and PRC policy on a broad spectrum of political, economic and military issues. In preparation for his
meetings with Chinese leaders, U.S. policy officials have conducted a review of U.S.-China and Taiwan policies. The
nagging issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, no doubt, loomed large in that review. As Assistant Secretary of State for
Asia-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell indicated in his confirmation hearings, the challenge for the United States is to
facilitate the best environment that is conducive to Taiwan¶s continuing peaceful engagement with China while
providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of U.S. support in its interactions with
China [7]. How the Obama Administration plans to implement this strategy, however, remains unclear.
As has always been the case, there is much debate within the U.S. government about what constitutes ³appropriate´
defensive weapons and in what quantities the United States should provide them. China will argue, as will some in the
United Sates, that it¶s time to adhere to a strict interpretation of the August 1982 Communiqué, which has never been
strictly interpreted by the United States in the 27 years that it has been in existence. Since April 2001, the U.S.
government has largely ignored it. Nevertheless, China attaches great importance to the communiqué and no doubt will
remind President Obama of the commitment made when the U.S. government signed it.
China may even try to convince President Obama, as it tried to convince President George W. Bush, that the time has
come for a new communiqué²one which commits the United States to even greater reductions or even a moratorium in
arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese leaders, who have interpreted the slow down in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in recent years,
at least in part, as a response to their frequent demarches will continue to press what they believe has been a winning
strategy.
Nevertheless, the United States remains bound by the provisions of the TRA [8]. As long as China maintains an array of
forces and ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait it is difficult for Beijing to claim that it has only peaceful intentions
toward Taiwan. Sooner or later, the Obama Administration will notify the sale of Blackhawk helicopters and additional
Patriot PAC-3 missiles that the Bush administration held back and the Po Sheng (Broad Victory) C4I operations and
sustainment program; to not notify these sales would constitute a major change in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan policy [9].
Taipei requires continued U.S. assistance with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to bolster its military capabilities across the board and to achieve an effective
missile defense. It is unclear when or if the Obama administration will permit Taiwan to submit a Letter of Request for
66 new F-16C/D fighters. Taiwan cannot maintain a minimal air-defense capability in the coming years without them.
The United States and Taiwan positions on diesel-electric submarines remain unclear. The Bush administration held
back a notification on the design phase for an FMS program to provide Taiwan with submarines; now Taiwan appears
ready to pursue a domestic submarine program with or without U.S. assistance (China Brief, April 16).
Uncertainty clouds the future. The United States will not abandon the core requirements of the TRA; Congress is not
about to change the law and many senators and representatives remain strong supporters of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the
Executive Branch has broad latitude in how it interprets and executes the TRA. Long delays in U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan during the George W. Bush administration saw only modest pressure from the U.S. Congress. The outlook,
therefore, given the current state of play in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations for future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is unclear.
Simply stated, the closer U.S.-China relations become, the more difficult it is for the United States to resume major arms
sales; and while the U.S. commitment to the TRA is always invoked by those who advocate them, a Congress dominated
by the incumbent president's party is more unlikely to hold hearings or put pressure on the president on Taiwan policy
unless U.S.-China relations take a negative turn. Also uncertain is how hard the Ma administration will press the United
States for arms purchases. Ma¶s initial reluctance to request U.S. and foreign disaster relief in the aftermath of Typhoon
Morakot due to his concern for how Beijing might react raises questions about how he will approach U.S. defense sales
to Taiwan (Taipei Times, August 26).
China-Taiwan ³reconciliation,´ however, will likely not happen quickly. Despite recent improvements in Taiwan-China
relations, fundamental differences between the systems of government in China and Taiwan, and a lack of broad-based
public support in Taiwan for near-term reconciliation will inhibit progress (NowNews [Taiwan], October 20).
Furthermore, no one should assume the gains made to date are irreversible. History never moves in a straight line.
While the above portends negative trends for U.S.-Taiwan defense relations, the outlook is not without positive aspects.
U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation after 1979 has survived numerous difficult challenges. Taiwan¶s first Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) published in March 2009 sets forth ambitious goals for improving Taiwan¶s military capabilities
and transformation of the Taiwan armed forces to an all-volunteer force. It provides for a defensive posture the Obama
administration can support while maintaining good relations with China so long as the United States stands firm on its
obligations under the TRA. Assistant Secretary Campbell hit the nail on the head: the challenge for both the United
States and Taiwan is to find the optimal environment that is conducive to Taiwan¶s continuing peaceful engagement
with China while providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of U.S. support in its
interactions with China. Responsibility for success rests with both Washington and Taipei.
Notes
1. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China, p. VIII.
2. Following the resumption of US arms sales to Taiwan after the 1979 one-year moratorium, the US accepted Taiwan¶s
arms purchase requests once a year during an annual arms sales meeting. Beginning in April 2001, President Bush
determined that Taiwan should be treated as a normal FMS customer and allowed Taiwan to submit Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) Letters of Request (LORs) at any time.
3. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001:
Assessments and Policy Implications, October 10, 2001.
4. Arms sales notifications to Congress are posted at www.dsca.com.
5. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, pp. 13-15.
6. Major Foreign holders of U.S. Treasury Securities (2008), U.S. Treasury Department, www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt.
7. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, p. 15.
8. The Taiwan Relations act of 1979.
9. No administration official has ever questioned the propriety or appropriateness of these sales, it is just a matter of
when they will be notified.
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October 22, 2009 09:52 AM Age: 122 days
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Iran
By: Christina Lin
Frodoo nuclear facility near Qom
On September 15, a task force co-chaired by Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) and Senator Daniel Coats (R-IN) at the
Bipartisan Policy Center released a report [1], calling on President Barack Obama to devise a tougher strategy to prevent
a nuclear Iran. The subtitle of the report is ³Time is Running Out´ and it draws the conclusion that, ³time is running out,
and we [United States] need to adopt a more robust strategy in order to prevent both a nuclear Iran, and an Israeli
military strike´ (Voice of America, September 15). This report comes on the heels of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) report and secret annex, released in August, entitled ³Possible Military Dimensions of Iran¶s Nuclear
Program,´ which stated that Iran will attain breakout capacity within 3-6 months (by November 2009 to February 2010)
and that it was working on nuclear warhead designs [2]. While such startling revelations have prompted some Israeli
politicians to ratchet up war talks, some members of the Six Power Talk (i.e. Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia
and the United States) (P5+1) are still placing their hope on tougher sanctions of refined petroleum products to Iran if
talks do not yield positive results by the end of the year. Beijing has so far resisted calls for stiffer sanctions²acceding
only to restrictions on trade in nuclear-related materials and orders to freeze the overseas assets of some Iranian
companies.
Meanwhile, Iran appears to be taking a leaf out of the playbook of its strategic ally, North Korea, and using the Six
Power Talk (and Six Party Talks) to run out the clock before achieving nuclear breakout capacity. Unless China, along
with Russia, are convinced to join the rest of the parties and become a responsible stakeholder and pass UNSC
resolutions for tougher sanctions, the Iran nuclear merry-go-round will go on. For its part, Moscow seems to have
signalled its willingness to go along with tougher sanctions if Iran does not implement the Geneva result (Financial
Times, October 13). To understand the likelihood of China agreeing to apply sanctions on Iran, it is important to
examine Sino-Iran relations to gauge China¶s perceived costs and benefits of this action.
Iran in China¶s Strategic Calculus
In 1993, China became a net importer of oil, and its rapid economic growth fueled by its increasing energy consumption
has placed it as the second biggest energy consumer in the world, after the United States. Yet, maritime supplies of oil
are under the stewardship of the dominant naval power²the United States²that controls sea-lanes of communications
(SLOC), and which also views China as a peer competitor. As such, China is worried about (1) U.S. restriction of
China¶s oil imports over a Taiwan clash and (2) events abroad that may lead to price volatility hurting the Chinese
economy. In 2000, an article published by the prestigious Chinese Society for Strategy and Management (CSSM) under
its influential Strategy and Management Journal recommended that China¶s strategy in the Persian Gulf should be to
continue to align with Iran [3]. According to the article's author, Tang Shiping, an associate research fellow at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)²a leading government think-tank²the United States already controls the
west bank of oil rich Persian Gulf via its pro-American proxies (e.g. Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states). Thus,
according to Tang's analysis, the Gulf is in effect an ³internal sea´ for the United States, and challenges to that position
are likely to fail. Yet, if China and Russia expand relations with Iran, they could maintain a ³minimum balance´ to
thwart U.S. moves. Since securing oil imports from the Gulf requires both U.S.-controlled west bank and the China-
Russia supported Iranian east bank, this axis would prevent the United States from implementing oil embargoes against
other countries. If the United States and China should ever have a military clash over Taiwan, Washington would not
shut off China¶s Gulf oil supplies since China, Russia, and Iran control the Gulf¶s ³east bank´ [4].
China needs Iran not only to keep an open flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, but also to serve as a node in the new
energy Silk Road connecting the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea and Central Asia to China. In what has been coined as an
Asian Energy Security Grid²or Pipelineistan (Asia Times Online, July 26)²China needs Iran in a series of pipelines
such as the Iran-Pakistan (IP) pipeline and the interconnection between Iran and Turkmenistan, with an eventual direct
land link between Iran and China to bypass the Strait of Malacca, patrolled by U.S. navy. In September 2009,
Turkmenistan announced it would begin to supply natural gas through two new pipelines to China and Iran in December
(The Associated Press, September 19).
Moreover, China views Iran as a key partner in counter-balancing U.S. hegemony and the drive toward a multi-polar
world. Thus, China¶s strategy appears to be a balancing act of engaging Iran while simultaneously not alienating the
United States (Xinhua News Agency, June 22; Tehran Abar, June 29).
China¶s Persian Gulf Strategy
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

China¶s Persian Gulf Strategy of aligning with Iran was visible during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. During the war, China
maintained neutrality while voting against UNSC Resolution for sanctions. Its official position is that sanctions intensify
conflicts, and China thus refused to move the 1984 Resolution 552 (which would prevent attacks on neutral commerce
in the Persian Gulf) to sanctions. It also supplied arms to Iran²in 1982, U.S. officials charged China and North Korea
of accounting for 40 percent of Iran¶s arms supplies, and by 1987 this figure increased to 70 percent [5]. When Iran
began attacking neutral Kuwaiti vessels in 1986, and U.S. satellite imagery in 1987 indicated that Iran was installing
Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles along the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. decided to reflag Kuwaiti vessels. Yet, the
United States and China almost went to war over Iran when in October 1987 a Silkworm struck a U.S. reflagged tanker,
which prompted U.S. retaliation by striking and destroying an Iranian oil production platform in the Gulf. Concerned
with negative perception of China perpetuating the war by arming Iran, and helping Tehran to challenge the United
States militarily in a conflict that may escalate into a full war [6], Iran finally accepted Resolution 598 for ceasefire in
July 1988. During the war, China was perceived to be a reliable partner to Iran and thereafter became a key interlocutor
for Iran.
Israel and a Nuclearizing Iran 2009
The alignment of China¶s Persian Gulf strategy with Iran appears to be playing out in the current "stalemate" over Iran¶s
illicit nuclear program²especially in light of the new Fordoo nuclear site near Qom. The Six Powers plan to apply
sanctions on refined petroleum products if the Geneva talks fail to produce concrete results over the next few months,
but it is highly unlikely China will support it based on its history and its strategic interests in Iran. China signed a $40
billion deal in July 2009 to refine Iran¶s oil (Times, July 16), and is delivering about 40,000 bpd of gasoline (F ars News
Agency, October 6). Yin Gang, a senior expert on Middle East studies at CASS, stated that China will reject any efforts
by the United States to bar Iran from exporting crude oil, but added that the possibility is low. "China views Iran's
medium and long-range missile technology as a strategic deterrence," Yin said, "and nuclear non-proliferation is the
bottom line that China adheres to" (Global Times [China], September 29; September 30). According to Yin, China's
agreement to a fourth resolution to impose new sanctions on Iran would depend upon whether the United States "insists
on tough action" and whether Iran "remains defiant." According to Tian Wenlin of the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), "Iran is an important economic and trade partner of China." "All cooperation between
the two countries abides by international laws and regulations, which should not be criticized by any third party," Tian
said (Tehran Times, October 1).
Additionally, Malaysia¶s state-owned oil company Petronas delivered three shipments of gasoline to Iran in August,
each containing about 93,000 bbl (Times, September 29). This is in addition to Venezuela supplying 20,000 bpd of
gasoline to Iran beginning in October (The Associated Press, September 7). Iran imports about 120,000 bpd of gasoline,
so these bilateral deals are presently supplying about half of Iran¶s total imports. Thus, Iran seems to hedge itself against
possible sanctions by (1) finding additional friendly nations to export refined petroleum products in the near term; (2)
building its domestic refining capacity in the medium term; and (3) continuing on its nuclear path to reach break out
capability, based on North Korea¶s successful model of ³running out the clock´ with engagement and Six Power Talks.
Conventional wisdom holds that China and other nations with energy interests in Iran would not support sanctions,
whether to maintain their trade relations or for fear of Iranian retaliation by corking the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, this appears to be a relatively minor concern to China. Although 1/3 of China¶s oil
imports flowing through the Hormuz seem to be a large figure, by disaggregating the data and looking at China¶s overall
energy mix, oil consists of only 20 percent of its total mix, while 70 percent of China¶s economy is fueled by its
abundant domestic supply of coal [7]. So 1/3 of 20 percent yields just 6.6 percent of China¶s total energy use coming
through the Strait of Hormuz. Japan, a U.S. ally, is actually the number one East Asian importer of Middle East oil, and
as Yitzhak Shichor from the University of Haifa argued, China¶s limited reliance on Persian Gulf oil relative to other
Asian economies is one reason for Beijing¶s reluctance to flag the Hormuz Strait as an issue (China Brief, September 22,
2008). Other reasons include the fact that China does not want to jeopardize its economic benefits, political advantages
such as arms trade (more profitable than energy trade), and having Iran as a key node in the land-based energy Silk Road
mentioned earlier.
Indeed, China has used its arms trade with Iran to entangle its U.S. relations over Taiwan. For example, on 2 September
1992, President Bush announced the sale of 150 F-15 fighters to Taiwan, and China immediately threatened to sell M-11
missiles to Pakistan and components to Iran. China contends that F-16 and missiles were both arms proliferation, and the
U.S. has no right to play a double standard. The U.S. protested that M-11 missile components violate China¶s
commitments to MTCR guidelines and parameters, while China riposted by stating that F-16 sales to Taiwan violate the
1982 Joint Communiqué dealing with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (The Washington Times, October 4, 1994). Over
subsequent years, Chinese officials repeatedly evoked the Taiwan-Iran linkage to justify its continued arms proliferation
to Iran [8].
According to Professor Shi Yinhong, the director of the Center for American Studies at Renmin University in Beijing,
"China will do its utmost to find a balance « dilute it [sanctions], to make it limited, rather than veto it" (New York
Time, September 30). Given its Persian Gulf strategy standing as the Great Wall of China blocking the road toward
future sanctions on Iran, this will present serious challenges for Israel and for the global nonproliferation regime.
Challenges for Israel and global nonproliferation regime
For Israel, given the grim prospect of sanctions, inability of the Six Powers to arrest Iran¶s nuclear weapons
development, impending delivery of the S-300 anti-aircraft system, and increasing Israeli perception that the United
States would not support Israel, the military option remains on the table. In March 2009, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released a study on possible Israeli strikes on Iran¶s nuclear facilities without U.S. support [9]. The
first scenario consists of three possible routes of Israeli air-force strike, with the highest political risk but the lowest
operational risk via a southern route over Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraqi airspace. The second scenario consists of a
ballistic missile attack, the Jericho III, capable of carrying a 750 kg nuclear warhead and a range that covers the entire
Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and almost all parts of North America [10]. Yet, given the increasing complications
of an air strike, some Israeli defense analysts posit that a more realistic military option is a nuclear missile strike [11].
If Israel is forced to act alone, and the international community is unable to stop Iran¶s nuclear weapons aspirations, a
nuclear strike in the Middle East would be a disaster. Israel almost used nuclear weapons (The Samson Option) during
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when 13 twenty-kiloton atomic weapons were assembled and the Middle East teetered on
the edge of a nuclear strike [12]. With the current Iranian nuclear program, the Middle East once again finds itself
teetering on the edge of a nuclear strike as the sand clock nears empty before Iran acquires breakout capability or Israel
launches its nuclear missiles. Thus, unless China, along with Russia, unite with the remaining six powers to accelerate
effective sanctions to arrest Iran¶s illicit nuclear weapons program, this may lead to a cascade of destabilizing nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East and East Asia. If China wants to maintain a new energy silk road with Iran in the long
term, it would need to act soon and remove itself as an obstacle to immediate and effective sanctions on Iran¶s nuclear
program.
Notes
1. Senator Daniel Coats, Senator Robb and General (ret.) Charles Wald, Meeting the Challenge: Time is Running Out,
Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2009.
2. Institute for Science and International Security Report, ³Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged Iranian
Nuclear Weaponization,´ October 2, 2009; Julian Borger, ³IAEA secret report: Iran worked on nuclear warhead´, The
Guardian, September 18, 2009; William J Broad and David Sanger, ³Report says Iran has data to make a nuclear bomb´,
New York Times, October 4, 2009.
3. Tang Shiping, ³Lixiang anquan huanjing yu xin shiji zhonguo da zhuanlue´ [ideal security environment and China¶s
grand strategy in the new century], zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no 6, (2000), 45-46; Lin, Yueh-Chyn,
International Relations in the Gulf Region after the Cold War (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2002).
4. This scenario would provide ³insurance against a remote contingency´ (fang wanyi de baoxian), Tang Shiping, Ibid;
Christina Y. Lin, ³Militarisation of China¶s Energy Security Policy: Defence Cooperation and WMD Proliferation
Along its String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean´, Institut fur Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung
(ISPSW), Berlin, Germany, June 11, 2008.
5. ³Iran¶s Chinese Air Force,´ Middle East Defense News 2, no. 4 (November 21, 1988): 1-2; John W. Garver, China &
Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), p.72.
6. Ibid, Xinhua news analysis after the October clash said, ³The military involvement of big powers has aggravated
tension´ in the Gulf, creating an ³explosive situation.´ (Xinhua News Agency, October 21, 1987; 26 October, 1987,
p.3.). An article in Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily²the newspaper of the PLA) quoted a 1984 comment by
Henry Kissinger that ³if both sides (Iran and Iraq) lose in the war, this will be advantageous to the West.´ It assessed
that although the U.S. was concerned about ³safety in oil transportation´, it was more concerned about control of the
Gulf, and concluded that both superpowers should withdraw their military forces from the Gulf. Zhang Hanlong, ³Peace,
the General Trend in the World,´ Jiefangjun bao [Liberation Army Daily], August 29, 1988.
7. Energy Information Agency, ³China Country Profile,´ updated July 2009.
8. ³China Ire at U.S. Could Prompt More Arms Sales to Iran,´ Defense News, 14-20 September 1992, p.19; ³PRC to
Boycott UN Arms Talks,´ Qol Yisra¶el (Jerusalem), 16 September 1992; Barbara Starr, ³U.S. Links Chinese Ties to
Missile Exports,´ Jane¶s Defence Weekly 22, no. 15 (October 15, 1994): 5. Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The
Vital Triangle: China, The United States, and the Middle East, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2008), p.48.
9. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, ³Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran¶s Nuclear Development
Facilities,´ CSIS, 14 March 2009.
10. Cordesman and Toukan, ³Study on a Possible Israeli Strike´; Wikipedia, ³Jericho missile,´ updated October 1, 2009;
Dan Williams, ³Israel could use ballistic missiles against Iran-report´, Reuters, March 17, 2009.
11. Amir Tsarfati, former vice governor of Jericho and captain in the Israeli army reserve, author¶s conference notes on
Israel, ³Standing Alone´, Costa Mesa, California, August 21, 2009; Dan Williams, ³Israel could use ballistic missiles
against Iran-report´, Reuters, March 17, 2009.
12. LTC Warner D. Farr, The Third Temple¶s Holy of Holies: Israel¶s Nuclear Weapons, The Counter-proliferation
Papers Future Warfare Series No. 2, Air War College (Alabama: Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, 1999), p.10.
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November 4, 2009 01:42 PM Age: 109 days
Category: China Brief, Home Page, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Bonnie S. Glaser, Benjamin Dooley
President Hu Jintao with Chinese diplomats
This past July the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened the 11th Ambassadorial Conference in Beijing. The
foreign policy conclave was attended by hundreds of Chinese ambassadors, diplomats, officials responsible for foreign
affairs work from the capital as well as select provinces, regions, and municipalities, and individuals from a small
number of state owned enterprises. The conference served as both a working session for Chinese foreign policy
professionals and an opportunity for party leaders to discuss the prevailing international environment and the future
direction of Chinese foreign relations. As in previous years, the conference provided a venue for announcing new policy
directions, as well as adjusting diplomatic strategy. Although widely reported in the Chinese media, the conference has
received remarkably little attention from both Western and Chinese scholars.
The conference was jointly organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Foreign Affairs Office under
the CCP Central Committee. Key speeches were given by Premier Wen Jiabao and Dai Bingguo, and work reports were
provided by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, and his vice minister, Wang Guangya. The conference¶s
centerpiece was a keynote speech by President Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and
Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Flanked by the other eight members of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, Hu paid tribute to Deng Xiaoping¶s legacy, while simultaneously hinting at
updates to Deng¶s long-standing foreign policy guideline discouraging China from assuming an active role in shaping
international affairs.
Several of the themes in Hu¶s speech recalled key ideas presented at the 10th Ambassadorial Conference (held in 2004)
and the 2006 Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs (FAWC), the two most recent major foreign policy
gatherings. For example, in keeping with both of these meetings, the 11th Ambassadorial conference cited peaceful
development and adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence among the primary objectives of Chinese
foreign policy. Hu also emphasized two major themes from the FAWC: (1) the increasing linkages between China¶s
external and internal situation brought about by globalization and (2) the necessity of harmonizing the management of
foreign and domestic affairs in pursuing national objectives.
In addition to these continuities, Hu¶s speech included three modest but significant supplements to his previous remarks
on foreign policy. First, the speech demonstrated an increased emphasis on the role of ³soft power´ in building China¶s
comprehensive national power. Second, it called for foreign policy practitioners to adopt a more active diplomatic
posture in select areas of foreign affairs. Third, Hu presented an unusually positive perspective on the international
system¶s progress toward multipolarity and a growing consensus among the party leadership on the importance of
multilateralism in promoting China¶s interests.
The ³Four Strengths´
Introducing a notable new formulation, Hu urged diplomatic envoys and foreign policy officials to make efforts to give
China ³more influential power in politics, more competitiveness in the economic field, more affinity in its image,´ and
³more appealing force in morality´ (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). The Chinese media quickly dubbed these four areas
the ³four strengths´ (sili) [1], and discussions of the significance of Hu¶s comments soon appeared in the Chinese
blogosphere and the online version of the CCP mouthpiece People¶s Daily. Confirming the importance of this new
concept, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, in an August interview with China¶s official news service, Xinhua News
Agency, repeated Hu¶s call to build the four strengths, accentuating the need for ³diplomacy and other work « [to]
promote each other and develop in a coordinated manner´ (Xinhua News Agency, August 24).
Three of the four strengths (political influence, image appeal and moral suasion) fall under the category of soft power,
which for many Chinese encompasses political factors and thus goes beyond Joseph Nye¶s definition. This emphasis
underscores growing recognition by the party leadership of soft power's importance in promoting China¶s ³peaceful
development´ strategy. Hu first publicly stressed the value of soft power in his political report to the CCP¶s 17th Party
Congress, but in that speech he focused solely on its cultural dimensions, stating, ³We must . . . enhance culture as part
of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people¶s basic cultural rights and interests«´ [2]. Hu¶s
statements at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference, however, were notable for addressing the importance of developing
the political and moral aspects of soft power as well.
Hu¶s reference to the importance of developing political influence and moral suasion suggests Beijing¶s thinking on the
issue of soft power is undergoing a significant shift. Since the 1990s, China¶s academic discourse on soft power has
been dominated by two schools. The first defines soft power exclusively in terms of culture and emphasizes its pull
factors²what Joseph Nye has described as the ability of ³a country to get other countries to want what it wants´ as
opposed to ³ordering others to do what it wants´ [3]. In contrast, the second school focuses on soft power¶s push factors,
maintaining that its essence resides in exerting political influence [4]. Thus far, observers of Chinese politics have
credited the first school with having the strongest influence on Beijing¶s soft power policies. Yet, the debut of the four
strengths formulation suggests the second school has boosted its sway among Chinese leaders.
A More Proactive Stance in Foreign Affairs?
Implicit in Hu¶s discussion of the four strengths is a suggestion that soft power can be used as a means for actively
pursuing China¶s foreign policy goals. This contrasts with prior authoritative statements on soft power, which portrayed
its role in Chinese foreign policy as primarily passive [5]. Following the Ambassadorial conference, commentators
suggested that this more active stance on soft power signaled a departure from taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei (keep a
low profile and bide our time, while also getting something accomplished), an important guideline of Chinese foreign
policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1989 in reaction to the dissolution of Eastern Europe¶s socialist bloc [6]. For
example, an editorial that appeared in the Canadian newspaper Xingdao Daily and republished on the web site of the
People¶s Daily claimed that Hu¶s speech signaled that the taoguang yanghui concept would be discarded²this is not the
case (People's Daily Online, July 24). Following the practice of the 2006 FAWC, Deng¶s eight-character phrase was
included in the internal documents of the 11th Ambassadorial Conference, but excluded from public reporting [7].
There are at least two explanations for the omission of Deng¶s instructions to keep a low profile from media coverage of
key leadership statements on foreign policy. First, Chinese leaders are concerned that western nations have misconstrued
the essence of the phrase to the detriment of Chinese interests. Some observers in the West have interpreted the phrase to
mean China is ³amassing its power and hiding its true intention to dominate the world´ [8]. To avoid fueling the ³China
threat theory,´ the expression has been excluded from publicly circulated Chinese policy documents. Second, to many in
China the taoguang yanghui formulation implies a passive role for China in world affairs, a position that increasingly
meets disapproval from a Chinese public eager for Beijing to assert itself globally. As China¶s power has grown,
nationalism has risen apace, and a growing number of Chinese are disenchanted with the leadership¶s unwillingness to
flex its newfound muscle. According to Chinese scholars, references to Deng¶s dictum are excluded from the media to
limit pressure on the leadership to more aggressively protect Chinese interests around the world.
Despite its absence from public reports, Chinese sources insist that taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei remains a fixture
of intraparty discussions and internal documents and that there is a consensus to preserve it for the foreseeable future [9].
Yet, at the same time, the leadership has decided to slightly modify Deng¶s axiom, signaling an emphasis on the last four
characters²the importance of getting something accomplished in Chinese foreign policy. According to leading Chinese
scholars, Deng¶s eight-character guideline was expanded to ten characters at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference. The
new version calls on China to ³uphold (jianchi) keeping a low profile and bide its time, while actively (jiji) getting
something accomplished.´ Although the difference may seem negligible, it was reported to be the subject of heated
dispute. Apparently, other formulations were proposed and rejected. In the end, the decision to add the word ³actively´
was made by Hu Jintao himself [10].
Specifically, Hu called for China to ³actively participate in dealing with the impact of the global financial crisis´
(Xinhua News Agency, July 20). There is a growing interest in re-shaping international financial institutions to
strengthen the global economy and to provide China with a bigger voice in those institutions. Other possible areas where
Beijing may seek to be more assertive were hinted at by Premier Wen, who stated that China should ³extensively
participate in international cooperation in the nontraditional security area and « dealing with climate change´ (Xinhua
News Agency, July 20). This reflects the higher priority China is assigning to transnational issues, especially those
resulting from globalization, such as the financial crisis, energy security and climate change. Foreign Minister Yang has
referred to this new component of Chinese foreign policy as ³functional diplomacy´ (lingyu waijiao), which, he said,
would receive greater attention as China¶s comprehensive national power grows [11].
Even as Chinese leaders agreed to stress the importance of making achievements in China¶s foreign policy, they
cautioned that China should eschew adopting a leadership role on international issues. The 11th Ambassadorial
conference apparently reiterated admonishments to ³not take the lead´ and ³not raise banners,´ which Premier Wen
Jiabao had made at the FAWC, echoing language Deng used in 1989 (Xinhua News Agency, February 26, 2007). The
leadership remains wary of being entangled in overseas predicaments that could divert the country from its main task of
development. Indeed, President Hu Jintao placed even greater weight than in the past on the importance of China¶s
interest in domestic development and the essential need for foreign policy to serve the interests of that development,
stating:
The relations between diplomatic work and national development have become closer. We must rely on development,
serve development, promote development, and earnestly safeguard China¶s development interests (Xinhua News
Agency, July 20).
A Multipolar International System is Emerging, but Hasn¶t Arrived
In addition to introducing the four strengths, the 11th Ambassadorial Conference was also notable for Hu¶s positive
assessment of the international system¶s progress towards multipolarity. In his speech, Hu suggested that damage to U.S.
reputation might help move the international system closer to 'true' multipolarity, a situation that most Chinese believe
will benefit their national interests. ³The prospect of global multipolarization has become clearer (minglang),´ Hu
remarked, a formulation that significantly differed from his statements at the FAWC, where he described the path
toward multipolarity as ³tortuous´ (Xinhua News Agency, July 16; August 23, 2006). This assessment reflects a general
trend in China¶s perception of the international system that was signaled earlier in the year in China¶s 2008 defense
white paper, which referred to multipolarity as ³gaining momentum (shenru fazhan)´ [12].
In accordance with this positive outlook, Hu emphasized the increased importance of multilateral diplomacy, stating,
China must ³actively advocate multilateralism [and] promote democratization of international relations´ (Xinhua News
Agency, July 20). This change is indicative of the positive lessons Beijing has drawn from its participation in
multilateral diplomacy in recent years and demonstrates an increased willingness to enhance China¶s role in
international organizations. Nevertheless, multilateralism remains positioned in fourth place in China¶s diplomacy, after
relations with the major powers, the neighboring countries and developing countries, unchanged from the 10th
Ambassadorial Conference (Xinhua News Agency, August 29, 2004).
Although the Chinese view the process of multipolarization as more conspicuous, they are not ready to declare an end to
the unipolar world dominated by the United States. Considerable controversy persists in Chinese debates over whether
U.S. power is, in fact, in decline (China Brief, July 9). While a growing number of Chinese experts have taken this
position, no such official judgment has been made, and financial decision makers are reputed to believe reports of the
U.S.¶s demise are greatly exaggerated [13].
Implications for China¶s Foreign Policy
Rather than indicating a sea change in China¶s foreign policy, as suggested by some commentators, the 11th
Ambassadorial Conference is best described as an adjustment (tiaozheng) that affirms the trend toward China¶s more
active involvement in select issues that are crucial to the country¶s national interests.
It is notable that the leadership rejected a proposal by the foreign ministry to hold another large-scale FAWC this year
instead of the ambassadorial conference. According to several sources, Chinese leaders concluded that the international
situation had not changed dramatically in the three years since the last FAWC, and therefore a more extensive review of
Chinese foreign policy was unnecessary [14].
China¶s foreign policy continues to serve domestic interests. Yet it is no longer sufficient for foreign policy to create a
stable external environment to support China¶s internal reforms, as Deng instructed three decades ago. Now, foreign
policy must actively aid in the development of Chinese comprehensive national power. Domestic growth, for example,
requires a more pro-active diplomacy to secure resources, markets, and technology.
The decisions taken at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference demonstrate the party leadership's increased interest in
building and actively implementing Chinese soft power, as well as desire to deepen involvement in multilateral
institutions. The new focus on functional diplomacy recognizes that China¶s expanding interests require going beyond
its traditional emphasis on bilateral relations. The Conference also signals an intention to use China¶s economic weight,
financial resources and growing geopolitical influence to expand its say in designing any future international and
economic system. This suggests a new assertiveness in areas where the Chinese see a close internal-external linkage.
Given the conference¶s emphasis on the four strengths, soft power can be expected to play a more prominent role in
China¶s foreign policy. Although soft power has long been a hot topic in Chinese intellectual and policy circles, Beijing
has not yet articulated a comprehensive strategy for its development and use. Thus far, the development of China¶s soft
power has depended less on the central government than on such disparate actors as state owned enterprises and
provincial-level governments. Hu¶s call to build the four strengths is a natural extension of the FAWC¶s emphasis on
coordinating the activities of Chinese actors overseas to ensure that they serve domestic interests; there are concrete
indications that efforts to develop a more comprehensive approach to managing China¶s soft power are already
underway. Xinhua¶s recent plans to increase the presence of its foreign language networks overseas highlight Beijing¶s
determination to improve its image abroad (The Malaysian Insider, July 23). Wen Jiabao has also called for an
expansion of China¶s ³going out´ (zouchuqu) strategy, which encourages Chinese firms to expand overseas with the
explicit, albeit secondary, purpose of strengthening ties with other nations.
The internal debate over the modest reformulation of Deng Xiaoping¶s taoguang yanghui dictum suggests that even
though China is willing to become more involved on the global stage, it will do so cautiously and selectively. Although
Beijing appears to now be willing to ³actively get something accomplished´ in certain areas that directly impact
domestic stability and development, it is not prepared to abandon its policy of avoiding excessive involvement in
overseas commitments. China is not merely paying lip service to Deng¶s guidance to ³keep a low profile;´ it remains a
central part of China¶s approach to foreign affairs. Despite calls by Obama administration officials for China to assume a
leadership role on critical regional and global security issues, Beijing is likely to remain reluctant to heed this call.
Notes
1. Depending on the publication, the four strengths have also been referred to as si ge li and si ge geng youli.
2. Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007,
www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm
3. J. S Nye Jr, ³Soft power,´ Foreign Policy (1990): 153±171.
4. Glaser, Bonnie and Melissa E. Murphy in Carola McGiffert, Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United
States (CSIS, 2009), 13.
5. Li Mingjiang, ³Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity, Parameter, and Prospect,´ Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2008).
6. Four of the eight characters are from a longer 24-character expression that is attributed to Deng Xiaoping. The
original phrase called for China to ³Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities
and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.´ See, for example, Ding Guangen
³Speech at the Third Chinese National Deng Xiaoping Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Theory
Research Conference´ (zai quanguo disanci Deng Xiaoping jianshe you zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi lilun yantaohui
shang de jianghua), People¶s Daily, December 24, 1996.
7. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, and October 2009.
8. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People¶s Republic of China 2007
(Department of Defense, 2007), 7.
9. For a dissenting view, see Shulong Chu and Yuli Guo, ³China's "Peaceful Development" Strategy and Model
(Zhongguo "Heping Fazhan" Zhanlue Ji Moshi), no. 002 (2008): 1±9.
10. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, October, 2009.
11. Yang Jiechi, ³Safeguard World Peace, Promote Common Development ± Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of
New China¶s Diplomacy,´ Qiushi Online, no. 19, Oct. 1, 2009, Open Source Center, CPP20091005710001.
12. Beijing, ³China's National Defense in 2008,´ January 2009.
13. Interview with leading Chinese scholar August 29, 2009, Beijing.
14. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, and October 2009.
c +& )

*$
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Home Page
By: Vijay Sakhuja
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been tirelessly working to dispel the µChina threat¶ perception, which
appears to be increasing concomitantly with the country's rapid economic and military rise. Beijing argues that China's
growing initiatives in the Indian Ocean are for 'peaceful purposes' (China.org.cn., June 3). Yet, in recent years, many
China watchers in India have captured another side of Beijing's foray that depicts China carving into the Indian Ocean's
security architecture by regular incursions into the region and the recent naval deployment in the Gulf of Aden to fight
piracy. These initiatives appear based on a strategy that pivots on energy sea-lane security, which can be broadly
characterized by the µstring of pearls¶ theory, µMalacca dilemma¶, sale of military hardware at friendly prices to Indian
Ocean littorals, maritime infrastructure developments in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh
(Chittagong), road/energy pipeline networks and electronic surveillance installations in Myanmar (Burma). The thrust of
these traditional security and economic initiatives are complemented by naval diplomacy involving maritime
multilateralism with Indian Ocean littorals, which Chinese leaders believe can facilitate the regional perceptions that
China's intent in the region is benign. Indeed, these goodwill visits and naval exercises by the People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) are an important tool to further China¶s attempts to portray its presence in the Indian Ocean as benign. It
has effectively created conditions to develop a broad and substantive agenda for building relations with other nations. In
some cases, these initiatives have the potential to translate into strategic partnerships that would consolidate its presence
and expand its engagements with the Indian Ocean littorals.
Multinational Naval Exercises
China¶s forays in the Indian Ocean date back to 1985 when the PLAN made port calls to South Asian ports in Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka [1]. Pakistan emerged as an important partner in South Asia for China and today their
cooperation covers a wide spectrum of political, economic and strategic issues including the sale and joint development
of military hardware and nuclear cooperation. Both sides have also engaged in bilateral/multilateral naval exercises.
Commenting on the first ever joint exercise with the Pakistani Navy held off the coast of Shanghai in 2003, Rear
Admiral Xiu Ji, a Chinese navy official observed that the exercises were µthe first [for China] with any foreign country¶
(Defencetalk.com, October 21, 2003). Two years later, the second bilateral exercise was held in the Arabian Sea in
November 2005 (Voanews.com, November 24, 2005). In 2007, Pakistan hosted a multinational naval exercise, Aman
2007 (Peace 2007), off Karachi and invited the PLAN to join the exercises. Beside the Pakistani Navy ships, warships
from Bangladesh, China, France, Italy, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and the United States engaged in maneuvers in
the Arabian Sea (Xinhua News Agency, March 9, 2007). Interestingly, the Commander of the Chinese flotilla Luo
Xianlin was designated as the tactical commander for the joint maritime rescue exercise and the PLAN missile frigate
µLianyungang¶ was entrusted with the coordination of the exercise (Chinaview.cn, March 10, 2007). The exercises were
significant since it provided the PLAN with the opportunity to coordinate complex maneuvers with other naval forces. In
2009, the PLAN once again participated in Aman 2009, which was held in the Arabian Sea, and this time it carried out
exercises along with 19 foreign naval ships (Theasiandefence.com, March 17).
Although the PLAN has engaged in bilateral and multinational naval exercises, it is important to point out that
deployments for multinational operations are relatively different and more complex. Conducting multinational
operations involves structured communication procedures, synergy among different operational doctrines, establishing
mutually agreed rules of engagement (RoE), helicopter controlling actions, and common search and rescue procedures,
which the PLAN is still developing.
Shifting Geography of Peace Mission
A close partnership between China and Russia is evident in the maritime domain and rests on joint naval exercises,
Chinese acquisition of Russian naval hardware including ships, submarines and aircraft and high-level naval exchanges
[2]. In 1999, the two navies conducted a joint naval exercise that involved the Russian Pacific Fleet and the PLAN's
Eastern Fleet (China Daily, July 8, 2004) and the 2001 joint exercises included Russian strategic bombers. Peace
Mission 2005, another naval exercise involving the PLA Navy and the Russian Navy was conducted under the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the six-nation security group. The exercises were conducted off the East Russian
coast-Shandong Peninsula in northeastern China (News.bbc.co.uk, August 18, 2005). Peace Mission 2007 focused on
counter-terrorism and was conducted on land (En.rian.ru July 24, 2007).
Interestingly, the two sides utilized their presence in the Gulf of Aden and conducted Blue Peace Shield 2009, a joint
exercise involving counter piracy operations, replenishment-at-sea, and live firing (Defencetalk.com, September 18;
Taiwan News, September 17). The exercise showcased Chinese intention to be more transparent in its deployment, test
interoperability with foreign navies and the PLAN¶s ability to engage in a range of operations in distant waters.
Engaging Straits of Malacca Littorals
China has adopted diplomacy as a tool to ally apprehensions among the Straits of Malacca littorals thus setting aside
their fears that Beijing may deploy its navy in times of crisis to escort Chinese flagged vessels transiting through the
Strait. Further, China is averse to any extra regional attempts to deploy naval vessels in the Strait for the safety of
merchant traffic transiting. For instance, in 2000, it strongly objected to Japanese attempts to deploy vessels to patrol the
Straits of Malacca where shipping had been threatened by piracy (Sspconline.org, April 11, 2005). Instead, it has offered
financial and technological assistance to improve the safety and security of merchant traffic transiting the Strait of
Malacca. In 2005, during the International Maritime Organization (IMO) meeting in Jakarta, China reiterated its position
of supporting the littoral states in enhancing safety and security in the Strait (Xinhua News Agency, September 7, 2005;
China Brief, April 12, 2006). In 2005, China offered to finance the project for the replacement of navigational aids
damaged during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the estimated cost for the project is pegged at $276,000 [3].
Benefits of Multinational Exercises for PLAN
Multinational naval operations are fast gaining higher priority in the PLAN¶s strategic thinking. There are at least three
reasons. The first relates to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the international disaster relief operations in Southeast
Asia-South Asia. PLAN¶s conspicuous absence in the operations had exposed the limitation of a rising power and its
navy. As a result, China was excluded from the core group comprising the United States, Australia and India who
quickly deployed their ships for relief efforts. The Chinese Navy's absence might also be attributed to its lack of
experience in working with multinational forces.
The second reason for participation in multinational exercises is prospects for interoperability with international navies.
Further, these operations assist the PLAN in identifying international trends in naval weaponry, gathering information
on operating procedures and gaining a better understanding of the changing nature of naval warfare. The third reason is
that multinational exercises help China showcase to the international naval community its military industrial prowess
and PLAN technological sophistication.
Yet, China embraces selective maritime multilateralism. For instance, China did not participate in the U.S. Naval War
College's International Sea Power Symposium in Newport (Bernama [Malaysia], October 1). This year's event is the
40th anniversary and provides an occasion for the heads of the world's navies and coast guards to discuss issues of
mutual interest (Navy.mil, October 8). The 2009 Symposium focused on common maritime challenges and explored
prospects for enhancing maritime security cooperation, including combating piracy.
Impediments to Chinese Maritime Multilateralism

Several Chinese initiatives in the Indian Ocean have stirred considerable unease among some regional powers,
particularly India, which has a tendency to perceive every Chinese move in the region as a step toward its µstrategic
encirclement.¶ Indian strategists have often argued that China¶s naval capability is fast growing and would soon be
capable of conducting sustained operations in the Indian Ocean supported by the maritime infrastructure being built in
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma). Indian fears are accentuated by a suggestion by a Chinese
admiral to Admiral Timothy J. Keating, then-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) of dividing the Indo-Pacific
region into two areas of responsibility between the United States and China (Navyseals.com, May 6, 2007).
According to the Indian press, the Chinese naval officer stated, ³You, the United States, take Hawaii East and we,
China, will take Hawaii West and the Indian Ocean. Then you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the
Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if
something happens here, we will let you know´ (Indian Express, May 15).
New Delhi has not been receptive to Chinese requests to join Indian Ocean multilateral maritime security initiatives such
as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the trilateral grouping of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA),
which has a significant maritime component in its interactions. IONS is an initiative by 33 Indian Ocean littorals
wherein their navies or the principal maritime security agencies discuss issues of maritime security, including
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief (HADR) throughout the Indian Ocean Region (Indiannavy.nic.in, February
15, 2008). The PLAN had approached the Indian Navy to µexplore ways to accommodate Beijing as either an observer
or associate member¶; however, New Delhi turned down the request because, in its perspective, there was µno strategic
rationale to let China be associated with IONS as it was strictly restricted to littoral states of the Indian Ocean¶ (Indian
Express, April 21).
The IBSA trilateral grouping is an offshoot of the broader South-South cooperation started in 2003. Although
cooperation in the security domain was not envisaged at its inception, maritime security issues (sailing regatta, trilateral
naval exercises IBSAMAR, and high-level naval exchanges) have gradually gained momentum in the discussions. China
has been exploring the possibility of joining IBSA, but the fact that ³IBSA¶s common identity is based on values such as
democracy, personal freedoms and human rights´ preclude its membership (The Wall Street Journal, April 7).
In response, China craftily has attempted to dent the IBSA architecture and wean some of the actors away through
bilateral political-military engagements much to the consternation of other partners. Beijing has adopted a sophisticated
strategy to build-up bilateral military relations with Brazil, and Brasilia has offered to help train Chinese naval pilots on
NAe São Paulo, which is a Clemenceau class aircraft carrier (China Brief, June 12). According to discussions (August
2009) that this author had with some Indian naval analysts, there are fears that the above collaboration could well be the
springboard for reciprocity involving the training of Brazilian naval officers in nuclear submarine operations by the
PLAN and joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. Further, these initiatives would add to China¶s power projection
capability and could be the catalyst for frequent forays in the Indian Ocean.
Although the Chinese strategy of maritime multilateralism is premised on cooperative engagements, Beijing is
leveraging its naval power for strategic purposes. The development of military maritime infrastructure in the Indian
Ocean would provide China access and a basing facility for conducting sustained operations and emerge as a stakeholder
in Indian Ocean security architecture. Maritime multilateralism has so far produced positive gains for China and would
be the preferred strategy for conduct of its international relations in the future, particularly with the Indian Ocean
littorals.
[The views expressed in the above article are the author¶s own and do not reflect the policy or position of the Indian
Council of World Affairs.]
Notes
1. John W. Garver, "China's Approaches to South Asia and the Former Soviet States" U.S.- China Economic and
Security Review Commission, available at
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/garver_john_wrts.pdf .
2. Richard Weitz, ³China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?´ available at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
3. Hasjim Djalal, ³The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,´ available at
www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/current/malacca_sympo/6.doc.
%$ $ '
' ( ='
Category: China Brief, Featured, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
While elements of units from all services in the People¶s Liberation Army (PLA) were preparing for the military parade
on October 1st, a much larger slice of the PLA was conducting routine unit training. Following several months of
individual skill and small unit training, late summer/early fall is the peak season for unit evaluation training, often
culminating in relatively large force-on-force exercises and live fire drills. Even as the most modern equipment in the
PLA was on display in the parade, units from all over the country were practicing how to deploy, operate and sustain the
mix of old and new equipment that is actually found in operational formations.
Adding new equipment and upgrading or retiring older weapons is but one element of the PLA¶s long-term
modernization program. Training is another keystone of reform. Former Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang
Zemin instructed, ³We must train qualified personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel wait for
equipment than the other way round´ [1]. Large amounts of new equipment have entered the PLA inventory over the
past decade, but an even greater task is training personnel to properly plan for the employment and maintain and operate
the new gear.
As the PLA transforms itself into a modernized military, the exercises it conducts reflect to some degree its capacity to
implement the joint doctrine issued in 1999, which seeks to integrate all services and civilian support into seamless
operations. Every year there are a number of ³firsts´ or ³largest´ events. This year was no exception and included some
significant accomplishments. These advances notwithstanding, the PLA recognizes it is still experimenting to find
operational solutions appropriate for its large force with limited funding. It also acknowledges it still has a long way to
go before it meets the standards other countries have demonstrated in modern operations.
The following sections address the much-publicized, mainly ground-oriented exercises ³Stride-2009,´ ³Airborne
Movement-2009,´ and ³Vanguard-2009.´ These were only a few of many exercises in 2009 from which the PLA seeks
to identify shortcomings in order to improve capabilities in future training.
³Stride-2009´ (Kuayue-2009)
The 2008 Defense White Paper foreshadowed the emphasis on ground force training seen in 2009, stating, ³The [PLA]
Army has been moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility. It is gradually making its units small, modular
and multi-functional in organization through appropriate downsizing and structural reform«´
³Trans-regional mobility´ focuses on moving units within China from one of its seven Military Regions (MR) to
another. Multi-mode movements (by ground, rail, water and/or air) have been reported in the PLA press for at least a
decade including some cross-MR movements. These exercises do not represent armed invasions of foreign countries, but
the lessons learned in trans-regional mobility exercises could be used outside of China if countries permit movement of
PLA units through or over their territory.
For several years, ³small, modular and multi-functional´ unit organization has focused on forming combined arms
battalion task forces within both divisions and brigades [2]. ³Modularization´ (mokuaihua), also known in the West as
³task organization,´ consists of temporarily assigning smaller combat and support units (such as artillery, air defense or
engineers) to infantry or armor battalions based on the mission, terrain and enemy. Once organized, however, in many
cases combined arms battalions face challenges because most battalion commanders have not been formally trained to
command such formations. Moreover, battalion staffs are yet too small to handle all the tasks that come with added
units. Some battalions have temporarily brought officers up from companies to work on the headquarters staff (PLA
Daily Online, February 6), but these problems require formal long-term changes to both the organizational structure and
professional military education system to properly train and staff for these new responsibilities.
³Stride-2009´ was a two-month exercise in which approximately 50,000 troops from four divisions in four different
MRs crisscrossed the country moving to four regional combined arms training bases. While there was some Air Force
support in moving the troops and providing air cover, the exercise was primarily a ground operation (China Daily,
August 12). During deployments of approximately five days in length, small reconnaissance, headquarters and
communications units were flown on both PLA Air Force and chartered civilian aircraft while larger formations of
personnel drove in trucks along highways and heavy equipment was transported via rail.
The four divisions involved in the exercise moved independently of each other as follows:
o In mid-August, the 61st (³Red Army´) Division of 21st Group Army from the Lanzhou MR moved to the Shenyang
MR Taonan Combined Arms Training Base
o In mid-to late-August, the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division (³Ferocious Tigers´) of the 54th Group Army from
Jinan MR traveled to the Guangzhou MR Luzhai Combined Arms Training Base
o In early September, the 115th Mechanized Infantry Division of the 39th Group Army from the Shenyang MR moved
to the Lanzhou MR Qingtongxia Combined Arms Training Base
o In mid-to late-September, the 121st Motorized Infantry Division of the 41st Group Army moved to the Jinan MR
Queshan Combined Arms Training Base [3]
While en route, troop convoys practiced defending against air and chemical attacks and bivouacked along the roads at
night. Local military and militia units provided traffic control and logistics support (such as food, water and
maintenance) along the way. Once they arrived at their objectives, troops linked up with their heavy equipment and
conducted force-on-force drills and live-fire exercises.
While units took 90 percent of their organic ³artillery, engineering machinery and other large weapons,´ only 50 percent
of armored vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, were transported. Since tanks provide both mass and
firepower, the participating divisions would have lacked a large portion of their combat power in an actual situation.
CCTV reports show that the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division and the 61st Division formed combined arms battalion
task forces in exercises [4]. Such task organization was seen in several other exercises conducted by Army divisions and
brigades (e.g., the 1st Armored Division and 235th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Beijing MR and a motorized
infantry brigade in Jinan MR) broadcast on CCTV in August and September [5].
With 50,000 personnel involved, most Chinese sources called ³Stride-2009´ ³the army¶s largest-ever tactical event, in
which they will be mobilized and transported vast distances across the nation´ (China Daily, August 12). The key to that
claim is its reference to the ³trans-regional´ nature, not the overall size. For example, the amphibious exercise
³Liberation 1´ on Dongshan Island in 2001 was reported to be ³the largest ever joint exercise of the three services
(army, navy and air force), involving nearly 100,000 troops´ (China Daily, July 12, 2004). Yet, troops from either the
Nanjing or Guangzhou MRs for ³Liberation 1´ did not have to cross MR borders to get to the training area, which is
located along the boundary between the two MRs.
³Airborne Movement-2009´ (Kongjiang Jidong-2009)
After ³Stride-2009´ was completed, the Air Force¶s 15th Airborne Corps conducted a similar 20-day, large-scale, multi-
modal transportation, trans-regional exercise called ³Airborne Movement-2009´ beginning in mid-October. ³Airborne
Movement-2009´ paralleled the tasks Army divisions performed in ³Stride-2009,´ but with the addition of personnel
parachute jumps and long-distance foot marches.
Starting on October 18th, elements of all three of the 15th Airborne Corps¶ divisions, including ³more than 13,000
people, 1,500 vehicles, and 7,000 pieces of equipment,´ began moving through Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu
provinces (Xinhua News Agency, October 18; PLA Daily, October 26).
Heavy equipment, including ZBD-03 Airborne Fighting Vehicles, which were seen in the October 1st parade, was
transported by rail while other personnel moved by road convoys to the exercise area in ³central China.´ Airborne
infantry battalions performed parachute drops to enter the exercise area and then subsequently linked up with their
equipment [6]. After assembling into regimental formations on October 20th the units began opposing force exercises
which included evaluation of battalion and company-size elements. Six battalions were selected ³by lot´ to conduct
force-on-force maneuvers ³with troops air-landing at the rear of the enemy´ as the scenario. Live fire exercises were
also included.
After a week of training, the units moved to northern Jiangsu province to conduct another week of confrontation
exercises. In addition to unit evaluations, training focused on duties of regimental staffs and officers at battalion and
lower levels. Redeployment was scheduled to take place from November 4th to 6th.
The size and scope of this training probably merits the superlative of ³the largest ever Chinese airborne force trans-
regional campaign mobility comprehensive training exercise´ (Xinhua News Agency, October 18).
³Vanguard-2009´ (Qianfeng 2009)
Beginning on October 21st, the joint exercise ³Vanguard 2009´ got underway at the Queshan Combined Arms Training
Base. The main participants were the armored brigade of the 20th Group Army, the 1st Army Aviation Regiment, an
element of the 15th Airborne Corps, and aircraft from units in the Guangzhou and Jinan MR Air Forces [7].
According to exercise director and deputy commander of the Jinan MR Lieutenant General Feng Zhaoju, ³This exercise
is the PLA¶s first joint operation and joint training activity for basic campaign army groups in the true sense´ (China
News Service, Oct 11). In other words, the key to ³Vanguard-2009´ is that a group army headquarters formed the
exercise¶s joint headquarters incorporating both ground and PLA Air Force officers. Although the doctrinal basis for
independent group army campaigns is found in both the 2000 and 2006 versions of The Science of Campaigns (Zhanyi
Xue), evidently all other joint training exercises had been controlled by Military Region headquarters. ³Vanguard-2009´
thus serves as a good illustration of how long it can take to move from doctrinal guidance to actual implementation of
tactical and operational concepts.
In an interview with the official Xinhua News Agency, Major General Xu Jingnian, commander of the 20th Group
Army, stated, ³We are an experiment unit. We are still in a testing and evaluation stage, in terms of how to organize
joint combat operations at the basic campaign group level « joint training exercise at the basic campaign group level is
still in its infancy, leaving issues at many deeper levels to be further resolved´ (Xinhua News Agency, October 13).
In the same interview, General Xu pointed out that communications was the biggest challenge for the exercise, saying,
³How to achieve mutual connections and real-time intelligence gathering and sharing among various service branches is
the biggest issue « we are able to resolve issues related to voice command; we are able to partially resolve digital
communications issues also. However, we are still unable to achieve seamless [communications] connectivity.´
An important element of ³Vanguard-2009´ was helicopter and fixed wing air support to ground operations: ³We will
adopt the method of having planned fire power playing the leading role, supplemented by impromptu requests for fire
power; meticulously organize the overall coordination of air, ground, and air defense fire power«´ (China News
Service, October 11). Listing ³planned fire power´ first reflects existing PLA doctrine that includes Air Force provision
of ³battlefield air interdiction´ (preplanned attacks against enemy locations not in close proximity to friendly forces).
³Impromptu requests for fire power´ suggests something approaching ³Close Air Support´ (also known as CAS²air
attacks against enemy locations in close proximity to friendly forces, which are controlled by units in contact with the
enemy). PLA procedures for conducting CAS are still in the developmental and experimental stage. At the same time as
³Vanguard-2009,´ a division of the 14th Group Army and a PLA Air Force aviation division in the Chengdu MR were
also experimenting with air support to ground operations (PLA Daily, October 28).
The PLA invited over 200 foreign military observers and military students studying in China to attend parts of
³Vanguard-2009.´
The 20th Group Army is one of a few group armies organized into an all-brigade structure in which the group army
headquarters has no divisions under its command. As demonstrated by ³Vanguard-2009,´ group armies are only
beginning to explore how to conduct independent joint operations.
Conclusions
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the pace and scope of PLA training in 2009 is that these
exercises are much more costly and complex than the exercise seasons of the mid-1990s. Units now routinely spend
weeks in the field often calling on civilian logistics support, which requires the military to reimburse the enterprises that
have been mobilized to support operations. Advanced weapons consume more fuel and fire more expensive ammunition
than their less technologically complex predecessors. Long distance maneuvers outside of traditional training areas
results in ³maneuver damage,´ which requires the PLA to provide compensation to local entities. Moving even portions
of units by air is much more expensive than ground transport. If the PLA continues to train at recent levels, or increases
the pace, the central government must continue to provide adequate funds to support this operations tempo.
Over the past decade, all units, not only those considered as ³rapid reaction units,´ have trained to assemble and deploy
quickly. If ³Stride-2009´ and ³Airborne Movement-2009´ are considered successful by higher headquarters, the
relatively rapid movement of large units across Military Region borders could portend the need for fewer units.
Therefore, MRs may not need as many standing forces if they can count on out-of-area reinforcements to arrive within
reasonable timeframes. A more rapidly deployable ground force may not require as many active units as found today.
This could set the stage for more personnel cuts and force reductions.
These exercises also reflect the transitional nature of the PLA today. Its leaders recognize they have not yet reached their
operational objectives and must continue to motivate their troops to continue to improve their capabilities. Military
leaders have a realistic understanding of the capabilities of their forces compared to other modern militaries and the
diverse missions the PLA may be called on to perform. Many other senior leaders would agree with 20th Group Army
Commander Xu Jingnian: ³We are still in a testing and evaluation stage«´
In March the commander of the 38th Group Army (generally considered one of the PLA¶s premier units), Major General
Wang Xixin, gave an interview noting that despite a ³series of achievements´ made in his unit, ³the modernization level
of the PLA is still incommensurate to the demand of winning local war under information-based conditions, the military
power is still incommensurate to the demand of performing the historical mission in the new century and the new period
and raising the capability of troops in accomplishing diversified military mission is still a historical subject in front of
the officers and men´ (PLA Daily, March 2).
General Wang¶s observation is similar to many others found in PLA literature (China Brief, July 3, 2008). It indicates
the senior leadership¶s self-knowledge of the PLA¶s level of modernization and the need for many years of hard work in
the classroom, on the training field, and in unit maintenance bays. The Chinese expect several more anniversary parades
to pass before the PLA reaches its ³strategic goal of building informationalized armed forces and being capable of
winning informationalized wars by the mid-21st century´ [8].
Notes
1. Jiang Zemin's Book on Technology, Army Building Viewed CPP20010221000077 Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao
(Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese 13 Feb 01, translated by the Open Source Center (OSC).
2. According to The Military Balance 1996-1997, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1996, prior to the
two force reductions amounting 700,000 from 1997 to 2005, the PLA had a total of some 90-100 infantry and tank
divisions and another 15-20 infantry and tank brigades. The author's current estimate of the Army order-of-battle shows
a reduction to approximately 35 infantry and armored divisions and an increase to some 41 infantry and armored
brigades. Many of the divisions remaining in the force have been restructured so that they now have only three
maneuver regiments instead of the four regiments found in the former Soviet style organization. Divisions in the PLA
command regiments, not brigades (as in the U.S. Army model). Despite the growth of the number of brigades in the
PLA, the division appears to still be a viable organizational level for some time into the future.
3. PLA Daily has a series of reports at tp.chinamil.com.cn/manoeuvre/kuayue2009.htm. Unit identifications can be
derived from information at news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-08/10/content_11858323.htm. The time sequence of
movement is found at Xinhua Chart: Locations, Times for PLA's Stride 2009 Series of Exercises CPP20090911540004
Beijing Xinhua Wang in Chinese 12 Aug 09, translated by OSC.
4. Video: Jinan MR Motorized Division Holds Drill With Modular Combat, Tactical Units CPM20091015013024
Beijing CCTV-7 in Mandarin 1130 GMT 28 Aug 09 and Video: Lanzhou MR Division in 'Stride 2009' Presents New-
Type Combined-Arms Battalion CPM20091015017010 Beijing CCTV -7 in Mandarin 1130 GMT 18 Aug 09, translated
by OSC.
5. Video: Beijing MR Armored Division Adopts New Combat Methods in Training CPM20091015017036 Beijing
CCTV-7 in Mandarin 1130 GMT 26 Aug 09; Video: Beijing MR Mechanized Infantry Brigade Holds Confrontation
Exercise CPM20091015013006 Beijing CCTV -7 in Mandarin 1130 GMT 05 Aug 09; and Clip: Jinan MR Motorized
Infantry Brigade Conducts Exercise in Mountain Area CPM20091015017003 Beijing CCTV-7 in Mandarin 1130 GMT
18 Sep 09, translated by OSC.
6. The exact sizes of the personnel drops were not published. However, the PLA Air Force¶s capacity to airdrop both
personnel and equipment is limited, thus requiring the large-scale ground and rail movement of equipment.
7. People¶s Daily has a webpage that compiles reports on the exercise at
military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/69693/171424/index.html. Unit identifications are made based on information in PRC:
PLA To Conduct 'Vangard-2009' Exercise in Jinan Theater CPP20091011172003 Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She in
Chinese 0914 GMT 11 Oct 09. Some sources say this exercise involves 10,000 personnel, while others claim 5,000.
With an armored brigade as its core, the lower number is more likely.
8. ³China's National Defense in 2006,´ at www.china.org.cn/english/China/194332.htm.
c A "/c %

Category: China Brief, Home Page, Domestic/Social, Elite, China and the Asia-Pacific, Willy¶s Corner
By: Willy Lam
Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai
The ongoing campaign against triads, or Chinese-style mafias, in the west-China metropolis of Chongqing is the largest
such operation since 1949. Yet what renders this so-called ³anti-triad tornado´ (fanhei fengbao) so disturbing is not
simply that close to 3,000 big-time criminals have been nabbed by authorities, the Chongqing disaster has laid bare the
full extent of the collusion between organized crime on the one hand, and senior officers in the police and judiciary on
the other. Even more shocking is the fact that what the local media calls ³dark and evil forces´ have become so
entrenched and prevalent in this megacity of 34 million people that it required a directive from the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee²the highest level decision-making body in the state²before sufficient law-
enforcement resources could be mobilized to combat the well-heeled²and well-connected²syndicates (Guangzhou
Daily [Guangzhou], October 30; The Associated Press, October 21; Apple Daily [Hong Kong] August 14).
The scale of Chongqing¶s triad operations can be gleaned from the fact that 1.7 billion yuan ($250 million) of ill-gotten
gains have so far been uncovered from 24 crime bosses. According to the official China News Service, triads have
infiltrated business sectors including finance, transport, construction and engineering, entertainment, restaurants and
retailing. More than 200 mid-to-high-ranking officials in the Chongqing police and judicial departments are under
investigation for sheltering or otherwise abetting the felons (People¶s Daily, October 24; Ming Pao [Hong Kong]
October 25). These bad apples include the former head of the Chongqing Judicial Bureau Wen Qiang and the former
deputy-head of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau, Peng Changjian. Wen, who is also a former police chief, has
admitted to taking bribes and gifts totaling nearly 100 million yuan ($14.6 million). The corrupt cadre even threatened
interrogators that he would spill the beans on a number of more senior officials if he were given the death sentence. ³If
you sentence me to death,´ he reportedly said. ³I'll reveal everything²then everybody will die together!´ (Chongqing
Evening News, October 25; Global Times [Beijing], October 20).
While Wen might have been bluffing, there is now no denying that the triads have been operating in Chongqing for
more than two decades²and that they had, for reasons that are coming to light, been tolerated by the municipality¶s top
party and government leaders. Most of the 24 triad chieftains started their careers in Chongqing, and they have been
expanding their empires in the metropolis since the early 1990s. These billionaire thugs include Li Qiang, a well-known
business tycoon in transportation and real estate who had been repeatedly appointed a delegate to the Chongqing
People¶s Congress. Another criminal, Xie Caiping, had run underground casinos²a few of them in five-star downtown
hotels²in Chongqing for years (Chongqing Evening News, October 24; China News Service, October 31). Since
Chongqing gained the status of a muncipilatiy (with the same ³administrative ranking´ as Beijing and Shanghai) in
1997, its party secretaries have included such luminaries as He Guoqiang (now member of the Politburo Standing
Committee in charge of fighting corruption) and Wang Yang (Politburo member and Party Secretary of Guangdong).
Current party secretary Bo Xilai, who is also a Politburo member, has been in charge of Chongqing for two years. It is
well-nigh impossible that He, Wang and Bo had not been knowledgeable about the triad problems in Chongqing (Apple
Daily, October 27; Chongqing Evening News, October 27). The officials' complicit attitude begs the question, why did
the authorities wait until early summer before taking action?
While meeting a group of foreign reporters recently, Bo, a former minister of commerce known for his flamboyant
lifestyle, had some surprising things to say about the triad scourge. The Politburo member admitted that ³it wasn¶t [sic]
us officials who wanted to take the initiative in fighting the triads; the 'dark and evil' forces have put so much pressure
on us that there is nothing we can do [except combating them].´ Bo added: ³Chongqing residents often come to the
municipal government office, holding photographs that are full of bloody bodies « The triads are chopping up people,
just like butchers killing animals. It is unbearable.´ On another occasion, Bo said that cadres ³must absolutely not adopt
a gentle and tolerant stance toward triads.´ ³While we may be gentle, the triads will never be gentle,´ he said.
³Permissiveness toward the minority means injustice for the majority.´ Bo¶s extraordinary frank words suggest that
there is a well-entrenched practice among cadres to treat crime syndicates with kid gloves. Hong Kong papers have
reported that the Chongqing ³anti-triad tornado´ was made possible only after President Hu Jintao had personally given
approval to the unprecedented crackdown. Bo indirectly confirmed this by saying late last month that the ³anti-triad
operation was handled by the party central leadership´ and that it was ³not a case of Chongqing trying to set a
sensational example´ (Guangzhou Daily, October 17; China News Service, October 29; Chongqing Daily, October 29).
While Bo seems to be striking a delicate balance between praising Beijing¶s leadership on the one hand and claiming
credit for having done the right thing on the other, neither the CCP authorities nor the gung-ho regional ³warlord´ has
been able to reassure the nation about the viability of China¶s legal apparatus.
The CCP¶s apparently permissive attitude toward triads stands in stark contrast to the ³zero tolerance´ strategies that the
police, state-security agents and the People¶s Armed Police have adopted toward other so-called ³destabilizing agents´
in society. The latter include dissidents, activist lawyers as well as NGO activists, in addition to alleged ³splittists´ or
pro-independence elements in Xinjiang and Tibet. For example, in the run-up to the 60th anniversary of the People¶s
Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, several liberal intellectuals have been detained by police and subsequently given
hefty prison terms. Their ³crime´ is nothing more than writing articles urging a faster pace of political reform (Ming
Pao, October 18; New York Times, October 30). So what underpins the authorities¶ surprising tolerance for underground
criminal gangs? It seems that a sizeable number of cadres consider triads as a useful tool for maintaining socio-political
stability. For example, police and state-security units in many cities and counties often employ triads to do ³dirty jobs.´
Thus, gang members are used extensively in ³land grab´ cases²whereby corrupt officials who are colluding with real-
estate developers force residents of old buildings (or farmers in the villages) to vacate their dwelling places in return for
extremely low compensation. When the concerned residents or villagers refuse to budge or hold demonstrations, they are
often intimidated and beaten up by triads. No wonder then, that former Minister of Public Security Tao Siju said in 1993
that ³the triads are patriotic elements´ (Guangzhou Daily, October 20; BBC news, November 10, 2006; The Independent
[London], March 22, 1998).
Irrespective of what individual party cadres may think of the ³useful role´ of triads, the fact that Beijing had repeatedly
procrastinated in tackling organized crime has raised big questions about the CCP leadership¶s willingness and ability to
enforce the law. Even after the Chongqing triads became big news in early summer, Politburo Standing Committee
member Zhou Yongkang, who heads the Central Commission on Political and Legal Affairs (CCPLA), waited until the
end of October before announcing a nationwide crackdown. ³We must get to the bottom of the task of wiping out all
triad and evil forces,´ Zhou said. ³And we must nab all those [officials] who provide shelter to the criminals.´
Characterizing the anti-triad operation as a minxin gongcheng, or ³an engineering project to warm the hearts of the
people,´ Zhou pledged that police departments and bureaus in every province and city would pull out all the stops in
exterminating the gangs (China News Service, October 30; South China Morning Post, October 31). China¶s
increasingly vocal Netizens, however, could not help criticizing the cavalier attitude of Zhou and his colleagues. This
was evident in many postings in popular chatrooms such as that run by People¶s Daily Online. ³Fighting triads is the
basic responsibility of every policeman,´ went one comment. ³How come Zhou called this an µengineering project¶?´
Another angry Netizen had this to say about corrupt police officers sheltering triads: ³Those who are charged with
fighting triads have themselves become triad members. Rice in the granaries will naturally be depleted if you ask mice to
guard them´ (People¶s Daily Online, October 27).
An allied issue is whether senior officials in Chongqing²and leading cadres in units such as the CCPLA and the
Ministry of Public Security²have to take administrative or political responsibility for the triad scourge throughout the
country. After all, a centerpiece for political reform since the turn of the century has been to enforce ³administrative
responsibility.´ This means that cadres guilty of dereliction of duty or failing to measure up to minimal standards of
performance should be sacked, demoted or given warnings. In the past four years, the authorities have investigated some
400,000 cases of civil servants and cadres who are suspected of failing to fulfill administrative responsibilities. A much-
cited recent example is Zhang Heping, the Party Secretary in charge of the No. 2 Prison in Huhhot, Inner Mogolia.
Zhang was fired last month soon after four felons in the prison escaped after killing a prison guard. (Ming Pao, October
25; Xinhua News Agency, October 30).
While the apparent success of Chongqing¶s anti-triad crusade might have lifted Bo Xilai's political fortune, the eldest
son of party elder Bo Yibo is careful to be seen as giving all the credits to Beijing. Chongqing authorities have also
emphasized that previous party secretaries and mayors of the municipality have played a pivotal role in at least
monitoring the activities of the gangs (Guangzhou Daily, October 30; Time Asia Edition, October 21). Apart from the
age factor²Bo will be 63 by the time the 18th CCP Congress is held in 2012 and thus may be deemed too old to be
inducted into the Politburo Standing Committee²the high-profile princeling has continued to suffer from his tendency
to shoot from the hip. For example, his assertion, which suggested that Chongqing authorities were forced into taking
action against the triads, has given the impression that the party boss has been lax and weak in the face of serious law-
and-order problems. In the final analysis, Bo²together with his Politburo colleagues²has to share the blame for the
further erosion of the ruling party¶s credibility.
c )&" ' )

Category: China Brief, Elite, Foreign Policy, Domestic/Social, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Arthur Waldron
The Chinese Communist Party
When Westerners examine the events of 20 years ago that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union²or even when they
try to look at how China may change in the years ahead²their approach is very different from that officially followed in
China today. Westerners almost without exception look instinctively for deep trends and deep causes²such things as
rising literacy, increasing social complexity, or ethnic problems. Chinese officialdom approaches the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in quite a different way.
Although much literature exists on the topic in China, not all of it is in accord with the official narrative that follows, and
some of it at odds. What is addressed here is the most authoritative official analysis to date, which is interesting above
all for the implications it has for future policy as China seeks to avoid the Soviet fate. It is an eight part television series
called Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety²Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism
(Ju¶an siwei) [1].
As this essay will seek to make clear, today¶s official China believes that nothing deep or fundamental was wrong with
the Soviet Union even in the late 1980s. According to the Chinese official narrative, the failure of the Soviet regime to
continue is not attributable to a broad systemic phenomenon, but rather to a very specific failure of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
This viewpoint is becoming very clear as the first fruits of the nearly decade-long research program that examine the
events mentioned are made public. The Chinese authorities distinguish clearly between two events that Westerners tend
to merge: the first, as they see it, is a failure of the communist party of the Soviet Union and consequent loss of authority
with the second, which is the result of the first, being the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
This negative evaluation of Soviet party policy is a post-1989 phenomenon. A perusal of Beijing Review for the
Gorbachev years before that date will reveal much more positive and optimistic coverage, which began to diminish after
Li Peng became premier in April 1988 [2].
After the collapse, the year 2000 saw the establishment in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences of research groups
devoted to two topics: one to the strength and decline of the Soviet Communist Party and the other the rise and fall of
the Soviet Union. The work of these groups was considered so important that it was subsequently designated a
³fundamental national social science research topic´ and other organizations were brought into the work, including the
National Party Construction Committee and the Central Disciplinary Committee [3].
The result was what Westerners may consider the most authoritative official Chinese assessment of the end of the Soviet
Union to date. This film focuses not on world events, or on general trends in the socialist world, but rather on the details
of the history and policies of the Soviet communist party²presented with an orthodox purity one might have expected
in the 1940s. The message is that the Soviet party failed because it gave up the dictatorship of the proletariat, ceased to
practice democratic centralism, criticized Stalin, was beguiled by western concepts such as democracy, and also tripped
up by Western propaganda and other operations.
The series begins by listing some possible causes for Soviet collapse such as ³lack of flexibility within the Stalinist
model´ and the ³betrayal of Gorbachev´ but then asks:
[W]hat is the most fundamental cause? Comrade Mao Zedong once told us that µif there are multiple conflicts within any
process, there must exist one major conflict that plays the leading and decisive role.¶ In his famous 1992 talks in the
South, Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out µIf problems are to occur, they are bound to occur inside the CCP
[Chinese Communist Party].¶ In December 1991, Comrade Jiang Zemin pointed out that the transformation of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is not due to the failure of Scientific Socialism [emphasis supplied]
but to the abandonment of the Socialist path. In December 2000, Comrade Hu Jintao also pointed out that there are
multiple factors contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, very important ones being Khrushchev throwing
away Stalin¶s knife and Gorbachev¶s open betrayal of Marxism-Leninism¶ [3]. The Introductory segment concludes:
³What went wrong? It is found in the CPSU´ [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] [4].
What exactly went wrong in the CPSU? According to official interpretation, most importantly, the party ceased to insist
that it was the sole ruling party, seeking instead to bring society in as its own ultimate governor.
To explain this historically, the film turns to the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party
(Brussels and London) where 190 of Lenin¶s ³Bolsheviks´ insisted on party dictatorship [5]. Yet theirs was a view not
shared by all socialists or communists. Marx and Engels were vague about the ³dictatorship of the proletariat´ seeing it
as a transitional mechanism that would be unnecessary in a socialist society where contradictions had ceased to exist [6].
With the idea of a permanent ruling party went the idea that it would make its decisions according to the procedures of
³democratic centralism´ of which Lenin is the great exemplar.
At the center of the presentation is a most favorable presentation of Stalin. As the narrator states, while images of
impressive industrial development and prosperous farmers fill the screen, ³From April 1923 to March 1953 Stalin . . .
held the country¶s top leadership positions . . . This was a thriving and prosperous period of time in the history of the
CPSU and the Soviet Union. During this period, the speed of Soviet¶s social and economic development and growth of
its overall national power greatly exceeded that of the capitalist countries . . . The Soviet Union during Stalin¶s time
announced to the world the incomparable superiority and vitality of the new socialist system´ [7].
Some lip service is paid to the idea that Stalin made errors, including ³expansion of his purges, as well as the bitter fruits
of his non-democratic working style and the mistakes caused by his abusive manner.´ But these are minor. As the
narrative concludes, "[A]s time goes by, when we brush off the dust of history, people feel more than ever that Stalin¶s
errors should never tarnish his position as a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionist in history´ [8].
In particular, the figures commonly given for deaths under Stalin are ridiculed and diminished: ³Wild exaggeration´
took place of ³the number of people killed in Stalin¶s purges of counter-revolutionaries. The number was exaggerated
several dozen times to reach 10 million or tens of millions´ [9].
If Lenin and Stalin are the heroes of the piece, Khrushchev and later Gorbachev are most emphatically the villains.
At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 14, 1956 First Secretary Khrushchev made a presentation of a secret report
called ³On Personal Worship and its Consequences´²the ³secret speech´ which detailed Stalin¶s true record [10].
As bad as Khrushchev¶s denunciation of Stalin was his attempt to change the nature of rule in the USSR. The platform
that was passed by the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 stated, ³The Proletarian Dictatorship is no longer necessary
in the Soviet Union. At its new stage, or this stage, the country, born as a country of Proletarian Dictatorship, has
become a State of the People´ [11]. With this quasi-democratic idea taking the place of dictatorship, the rot set in,
particularly in the younger generation.
Young people in the CPSU grew up under Khrushchev¶s influence at the 20th Congress¶s criticism of Stalin. They were
unfamiliar with the party¶s revolutionary tradition, and lacked firm beliefs in socialism. They were later known as ³the
babies born at the 20th Congress.´ After the mid-80s of the 20th century, it was exactly these people who became the
backbone that disintegrated the CPSU and buried the socialist system [12].
In 1964, Brezhnev and his associates ousted Khrushchev, which is presented as a positive development in the
documentary. This is not least because in June 1967 the CPSU¶s Central Committee passed a resolution that restored
some of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, stressing that the µState of the People¶ still had a class character
and would µcontinue the cause of the Proletarian Dictatorship.¶´
Yet after Brezhnev¶s death in 1982, ³Andropov and Chernenko passed away in three years´ and in March 1985
Gorbachev came in bringing slogans of ³democratization,´ ³openness,´ and ³media diversity´ [13].
Gorbachev¶s ideals are seen as a continuation of Khrushchev¶s quasi-democratic concept of the ³state of the people.´
Gorbachev¶s memoirs are quoted as follows:
If you try to succinctly sum up the idea of political reform, then the thinking and implementation can be summarized as
to transfer power from the monopoly of the Communist Party¶s hands to the hands of the people who are entitled to
enjoy it through the Constitution, or to the hands of Soviets comprised of freely elected representatives [14].
Such ideas led to the amendment of the Soviet Constitution in 1991 to allow political freedom²and the collapse of any
vestige of proletarian dictatorship or democratic centralism as ³20 parties were formed in one year at the Union level
and 500 at the Republic level´ [15].
All of this is very different from the standard Western analyses of the Soviet failure. To be sure, the authors allow that
between the time of Stalin and Brezhnev the Soviet Union began to lose its leading place among the nations of the
world:
³In the 1960s, the capitalist world¶s electronic, information, biological, and other science and technologies had made
great progress but the Soviet Union was lacking timely knowledge of the world¶s scientific and technological
revolution´ [16].
But the situation could have been salvaged, perhaps if the Soviets had adopted the path subsequently followed by China.
If the ruling Communist Party could have adhered to Marxist-Leninist theory and paths, timely and correctly solve the
accumulated problems and conflicts, and correct the mistakes with courage, it would have been possible to pull the
Soviet Union and the Communist Party out of danger, and to continue to push the socialist cause forward [17].
Such is the Chinese official²it must be stressed official²diagnosis of the Soviet failure, and from the diagnosis will
flow the policy solution. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that party discipline and unity are at the top of the list of
issues being stressed publicly in China today, and simple repression is regularly employed as a means of dealing with
tensions, while relatively less emphasis is placed on how to cope with the vast challenges posed to any authoritarian
government by a dynamic, growing, and ever-differentiating society. [To be continued]
Notes
1. Ministry of Education, 2/20/2009. The Chinese text is now available on the internet at chinaelections.org, while a
Chinese-English transcript, upon which this essay draws with modifications [³Transcript´], is available at
chinascope.org. In addition, CDs of the entire series circulate unofficially; one is in the possession of the author.
2. See Arthur Waldron, ³The Soviet Disease Spreads to China´ Far Eastern Economic Review 172.8 (October 2009), pp.
24-27.
3. Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety²Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism.
Ministry of Education, 2/20/2009.
3. Transcript, p. 1.
6. See ³Dictatorship of the Proletariat´ in Tom Bottomore, et al, eds. A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983) pp. 129-131.
8. Ibid.
[The first of an occasional series on how China views the collapse of the Soviet Union.]
' "' )& )c" $

$
Category: China Brief, Featured, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: York W. Chen
Taiwan's National Defense Report 2009
On October 19, Taiwan¶s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the National Defense Report 2009. This is the
first NDR issued by President Ma Ying-jeou¶s administration since it won the March 2008 presidential election. Under
the sanction of the National Defense Act, Taiwan¶s MND has published the NDR biannually since 1992 and the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) since March 2009. The NDR and QDR are the most important policy documents
published by the MND as they are the only open sources available for understanding Taiwan¶s evolving military strategy
[1].
Neither President Ma's original vision of a ³Hard ROC (Republic of China),´ a military strategy that was first articulated
during the 2008 presidential campaign, nor his predecessor's ³Decisive Campaign Outside the Territory,´ were
assimilated in the NDR without some resistance and modification. A careful reader of Taiwan¶s military strategy should
pay attention to these implications. Even a slight alteration in the word order, as the author will deliberate in the
following sections, such as Fang Wei Gu Shou, You Siao He Zu (resolute defense and effective deterrence, 1996-2000;
2008-present) and You Siao He Zu, Fang Wei Gu Shou (effective deterrence and resolute defense, 2000-2008) represent
major conceptual differences in Taiwanese military strategy.
Akin to the previous Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration under Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the ruling
Kuomintang (KMT) administration came into office with the belief that their predecessor had made critical mistakes in
military strategy with regard to the defense of Taiwan. The newcomers, eager to encode their new ideas into military
strategy, set forth to change the directives of the previous administration within the QDR and the NDR. Thus, both
documents provide a good point of reference for understanding different doctrinal preferences between the DPP and the
KMT.
While the current civilian executives are pushing to change Taiwan¶s military strategy, the military establishment
appears to be pushing back²preferring to maintain consistency in military strategy and reduce uncertainties over
existing plans and programs. After all, the military views the business of military strategy as better left in the hands of
professionals. The extensive internal edits and reviews that are built into the standard protocols for formulating these
high-level policy documents reflect a consensus among the different services. As a result, the NDR and the QDR may be
seen as the product of a political tug-of-war between civilian and military authorities.
From Offensive Defense, Forward Defense, to Defense-in-Depth (1949-2000)
From 1949 to 2000, Taiwan¶s military strategy underwent three stages of evolution. In the beginning, the military's
overall goal under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was to retake Mainland China by force; however, Chiang did not
have the military capabilities to carry out such a military adventure nor complete U.S. support. As a result, Taiwan¶s
military strategy at the time was an ³Offensive Defense´ strategy (1949-1966), which was executed by increasing
military presence on Taiwan-controlled offshore islands and conducting frequent raids on China¶s coastal area.
In the mid-1960s, Chiang abandoned the plan to use military force in retaking the Mainland after the United States
repeatedly rejected his proposal. The raids along China's coastline gradually ceased. No military engagement occurred
between both sides since the naval battle off Wu Chiou Island in 1965. Instead, Taiwan concentrated on fortifying its
offshore islands and, at its peak, increased the force level to 170,000 troops on the tiny outposts. This was the era of
³Forward Defense´ (1966-1979).
For Taiwanese military planners, the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan following the break of diplomatic
relations between Taiwan and the United States in 1979 implied that they would need to take over completely the
responsibilities of rearguard (the defense of Taiwan). In so doing, the first division-level redeployment from Kimmen
Island to Taiwan took place in 1983 and marked the beginning of a continuous troop reduction on its offshore islands.
Taiwan¶s military strategy thus entered the stage of ³Defense-in-Depth´ (1979-2000), which was heavily influenced by
Army General Hau Pei-tsun¶s (as Chief of the General Staff during 1981-1989) operational concept of ³Decisive
Campaign at the Water¶s Edge.´
The tactical depth that Hau proposed encompasses a three-layered defense:

1) to check the enemy on his shore,
2) to strike the enemy in transit, and
3) to destroy the enemy on Taiwan¶s beachhead.
Yet Hau argued that there was no hope for Taiwanese forces to sustain its command of air and sea power over the
Taiwan Strait. In addition, according to Hau¶s concepts, China could not conquer Taiwan without first landing on
Taiwan and in doing so would suffer great casualties when trying to defeat Taiwan¶s ground forces. That, according to
Hau, would deter China from invading Taiwan or, at least, buy sufficient time for U.S. intervention. Thus, Hau argues
that to maintain ³strategic sustainability,´ Taiwan¶s air and naval assets should avoid being committed in full strength
during the initial stages of the campaign. All forces should be preserved in order to concentrate on the decisive campaign
of engaging the enemy at the water¶s edge [2].
All of Taiwan¶s NDRs prior to 2000 adopted Hau¶s concepts. In NDR 1996, the MND first introduced ³resolute defense
and effective deterrence´ as the overarching principles of Taiwan¶s national military strategy. It stated:
Based upon the guidance of ³strategic sustainability and tactical decisiveness,´ our strategy is to fight the enemy
vehemently with coordinated manpower and firepower, to let the enemy pay the unbearable price as to deter the enemy
from invasion and ensure our national security. Should the enemy dare to land, we will gradually annihilate the enemy in
the prepared positions by destroying the enemy on the beachhead, firmly defending our strongholds, and striking the
enemy via our mobile forces. We will also mobilize the reserves to wear down the enemy. The enemy¶s attrition will be
so high as to contribute to our final victory [3].
The concept of ³resolute defense and effective deterrence´ was defined in NDR 1998 as ³a kind of defensive
deterrence.´ Its purpose is ³to dissuade the opponents that the cost of using military forces will outweigh the gain´ [4].
In short, ³resolute defense and effective deterrence´ represents a model of ³deterrence by denial´ with "resolute defense"
as the means to achieve effective deterrence.
Active Defense (2000-2008)
Yet, the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995-96 exposed critical shortfalls in the ³Defense-in-Depth´ strategy. China's
missile tests over Taiwan demonstrated that its ballistic missiles could penetrate Taiwan¶s layered defense without much
difficulty and could inflict considerable damage on Taiwan. In the late 1990s, many civilians including then-Legislator
Chen Shui-bian began questioning the validity of the ³Defense-in-Depth´ strategy. Meanwhile, Taiwan¶s military rushed
to build up its missile defense capabilities and, under the instruction of then-President Lee Teng-hui, initiated several
clandestine programs for developing indigenous cruise and ballistic missiles in order to check China¶s missiles at its
source.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Chen proposed the new operational concept of ³Decisive Campaign outside the
Territory´ to replace Hau¶s ³Decisive Campaign at the Water¶s Edge,´ and called for radical changes in Taiwan¶s
military strategy that could be labeled as the ³Active Defense" strategy (2000-2008) [5]. Chen¶s original concept of
³Decisive Campaign outside the Territory´ inferred two operational options: First, when deterrence is about to fail and
enemy attack is imminent, Taiwan should employ pre-emptive measures to neutralize enemy military targets. The
capabilities of deep strike against the enemy at its source would be the key factor for success in defending Taiwan.
Second, given that the Army was seen to have no significant role in the fulfillment of ³Decisive Campaign outside the
Territory,´ it was imperative to develop deep strike capabilities and strong air and naval forces [6].
After Chen was elected president in 2000, the first option was abandoned and the second option was refined [7]. Yet,
what remained unchanged was the emphasis on checking the enemy on its shore and striking the enemy in transit rather
than on destroying the enemy on Taiwan¶s beachhead. During Chen¶s first term, his ideas received considerable
resistance from the Army, but the strategy of ³Active Defense´ gradually took shape [8]. In NDR 2000, though the term
³Decisive Campaign outside the Territory´ was omitted, some of Chen¶s ideas were clearly visible:
After our force modernization and the continuous upgrade of our weaponry, we have already had active capabilities to
conduct counter-measure operations and to achieve some deterrence effects. Therefore, traditional concept of ³resolute
defense and effective deterrence´ is adjusted to ³effective deterrence and resolute defense.´ In addition to a compact,
responsive, and efficient modernized force, [we are] to build an appropriate effective deterrent force [9].
It was not merely a change of word order. Implicit in NDR 2000 was a redefining of the relationship between ³effective
deterrence´ and ³resolute defense.´ Both effective deterrence and resolute defense are means to achieve the purpose of
defending Taiwan. The latter refers to the traditional concepts of ground war while the former specifically refers to air,
naval and information counter-measure capabilities in general, and Hsiung Feng 2E (HF-2E, 600 kilometers range)
cruise missiles in particular. NDR 2004 offered the most comprehensive description of the ³Active Defense´ strategy:
In order to fulfill the concepts of ³effective deterrence and resolute defense,´ « [t]o cope with the changing strategic
environment in the future and maintain our military superiority, [we will] actively develop, research and acquire the
precision stand-off weapon systems and establish electronic counter-measure forces in order to augment our deep strike
capabilities. Through the buildup of defensive counter-measure capabilities, [we hope to] deter the enemy from initiating
hostility by complicating its probability of success [10].
Under the ³Active Defense´ strategy, the tactical significance of Taiwan¶s outpost islands was reduced. The troops
deployed on Kimmen, Mastu and other offshore islands were reduced to below 20,000 in 2008. Meanwhile, the first unit
of HF-2E was operationalized and the MND programmed the budget for the mass production of HF-2E. The longer
version HF-2E BLOCK II (estimated 1,000 kilometers in range) was also developed and tested (United Daily News,
April 26, 2007) [11].
Toward Fortification Defense? (2008-Present)
Before 2008, most KMT politicians were not in disagreement with the ³Active Defense´ strategy or those counter-
measure weapons such as HF-2E. Rather, they were opposed to having them under Chen Shui-bian¶s command on
grounds that Chen might abuse them. Then-Legislator Su Chi (now Ma Ying-jeou¶s Secretary General of the National
Security Council), however, fundamentally rejected the ³Active Defense´ strategy and stated openly that the KMT
would never consider developing any weapon that could strike Mainland China (China Radio International, September
12, 2007). Su believed that Chen¶s ³Decisive Campaign outside the Territory´ was irrelevant to defending Taiwan and a
dangerous idea that might provoke military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, then-Legislator Su Chi
boycotted the MND budget for the HF-2E production. As an alternative, Su proposed the idea of the ³Hard ROC´ during
Ma's 2008 presidential campaign, which has become the mantra of Ma¶s military strategy. Under the ³Hard ROC,´ Su
argued that the imperatives of defending Taiwan were ³« the capabilities to sustain China¶s surprise attack and
maintain air superiority in order to deprive China from landing and occupying Taiwan. If China can not ensure its swift
victory and create a fait accompli before the U.S. intervention, then China¶s incentive of invasion is naturally decreased´
(United Daily News, January 24, 2006).
By exclusively focusing on the defense of Taiwan Island, Su¶s ³Hard ROC´ strategy ignored the tactical depth of Hau¶s
³Defense-in-Depth´ strategy. Under the concept of a ³Hard ROC,´ Su argued that Taiwan¶s arms procurement should be
redirected to those items that could contribute to hardening the political or military assets on Taiwan Island. Rather than
big ships and fast planes, Su preferred runway repair kits (for maintaining local air superiority), sea mines (to deny the
enemy¶s command of the sea), and troop transport helicopters (for rapid force redeployment within Taiwan Island)
(Liberty Times, October 20, 2007). The concept of the ³Hard ROC´ appears to be no more than a strategy for
fortification defense²and to some extent even a relegation of the traditional ³Defense-in-Depth´ strategy.
Thus, it is not surprising that the new idea of a ³Hard ROC´ encountered some resistance within the military. Moreover,
the passivity of the KMT administration toward the MND's existing procurement programs invited considerable
criticism. As Chen¶s case in 2000, despite the fact that the MND highlights Ma¶s term of ³Hard ROC´ in QDR 2009 and
NDR 2009, many concepts of ³Active Defense´ strategy from the previous DPP administration in fact remain
unchanged. For example, in QDR 2009, it suggests that Taiwan should ³keep strengthening and developing the
defensive counter-measure and asymmetric capabilities´ in order to strike ³against the enemy¶s center of gravity and
vital weak points « as to utilize favorable time and space, to paralyze and delay the enemy¶s offensive, and to defeat the
enemy¶s invading forces´ [12].
Also, while QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 reaffirm the return of Taiwan¶s military strategy to ³resolute defense and
effective deterrence´ [13], the line of argument is not necessarily the same as before. Though responsible for different
branches [14], both use nearly identical language to emphasize the importance of checking the enemy on its shore and
striking the enemy in transit.
According to [our] defense plans, after the enemy commences its offensive, [we will] utilize favorable opportunities and
use [our] defensive counter-measure capabilities to strike the enemy¶s vital military targets and the enemy¶s amphibious
forces while assemble and upload at [the enemy¶s] ports. Later, depending on the situation development, [our military
actions] will place emphasis on two critical phases of ³joint [sea] interdiction operations´ and ³joint anchorage attack´
as to destroy the enemy at its weakest when in transit across the Strait [15].
QDR 2009 makes the clear distinction that effective deterrence, comprised exclusively of those deep strike weapons
such as HF-2E cruise missiles ³is the means to achieve the goal of resolute defense´ [16]. Thus, the positions expressed
in QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 resemble the concept of ³Active Defense´ rather than ³Defense-in-Depth´ strategy.
In spite of the military's apparent concern about returning to the traditional concept of ³Decisive Campaign at the
Water's Edge´ under the ³Hard ROC´ strategy, there have been no indications from the Ma administration that it will
compromise their views encapsulated in the term ³Hard ROC.´ For instance, even though the KMT finally agreed to
appropriate the budget for the production of HF-2E, which is already a mature and operational system, Ma ceased the
development of the HF-2E BLOCK II, which has scored several successful records during the tests (China Times,
September 1, 2008) [17]. QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 do not mark the end of this saga. Considering the widening gulf in
threat perception presented by the civilian and military authorities, the publication of the two documents represents only
the beginning.
Notes
1. In Taiwan¶s military terminology, the definition of military strategy is slightly different from the American usage. The
term of military strategy in this article was adopted the American usage which focused on the employment of the armed
forces ± an operational art oriented definition. In Taiwan, the equivalent term is field strategy (Ye Jhan Jhan Lyue).
2. `Hau Pei-tsun Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 1,
p. 238.
3. National Defense Report (NDR), 1996, pp. 63.
4. NDR, 1998, p. 53.
5. In Chen¶s campaign pamphlet. It claimed that ³The concept of ³Decisive Campaign at the Water¶s Edge´ should be
abandoned. The attrition style of warfare should be replaced by paralysis warfare. [We should] deprive the enemy¶s
capabilities for waging war against us in order to prevent it from bringing war into our homeland and putting the lives
and property of our population in danger.´ See Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian¶s Presidential Campaign, Chen Shui-
bian¶s Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security (Taipei: Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian¶s Presidential
Campaign, 1999), pp. 50-51.
6. Chen Shui-bian¶s Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security, pp. 37 and 51.
7. In June 2000, Chen first officially declared his ideas of ³Decisive Campaign outside the Territory´ in front of the
military. The first argument referred to pre-emptive strike was totally deleted from his speech and the second one that
exclusively highlighted the importance of air and naval forces was moderately modified.
8. Yet old ideas die hard. In Chen¶s first term, some notions embedded in the traditional ³Decisive Campaign at the
Water¶s Edge´ were still kept in the NDR. For example, in NDR 2002, in addition to sustaining information, air and
naval superiority, it still highlighted that ³based upon the principle of annihilation of invading enemy and safeguard the
homeland, [we will] concentrate precision firepower of all our Services in combination with Air-Land mobile strike
capabilities, through continual counter-offensive, destroy the enemy on the beachhead and at the air-drop zone.´ The
³Active Defense´ strategy was fully implemented only after Admiral Lee Jei assumed the position of defense minister in
2004.Quotation from NDR, 2002, p. 81.
9. NDR, 2000, p. 64.
10. NDR, 2004, p. 63,
11. In order to ease U.S. suspicion over Taiwan¶s indigenous development of cruise missiles, the MND affirmed in the
NDR 2004 that these missiles serve a defensive purpose and will be used against China¶s military targets only. See
NDR, 2004, p. 63.
12. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2009, p. 42 and 49.
13. QDR, 2009, p. 47. NDR, 2009, p. 79.
14. The NDR and the QDR are responsible by the Strategic Planning Department and the Integrated Assessment Office
of the MND respectively.
15. QDR, 2009, p. 48. The NDR 2009 also makes an almost identical statement, see NDR, 2009, p. 80.
16. QDR, 2009, p. 42.
17. There are significant strategic and operational implications between HF-2E and HF-2E BLOCK II for the latter has
the range of striking China¶s inland targets while the former can only reach China¶s coastal area.
c + (

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Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific, Military/Security
By: Russell Hsiao
PLAAF Deputy Commander Gen. He Weirong
On November 9, General He Weirong, deputy commander of the People¶s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF),
confirmed long-standing speculations that the PLAAF is developing fifth-generation fighters (fourth-generation in
Chinese standard), which may be in service within 8 to 10 years, and certainly by 2020. During an interview with state-
owned China Central Television (CCTV) two days ahead of the 60th anniversary of the PLAAF on November 11,
Deputy Commander He announced that the next-generation fighter would soon undergo its first flight, closely followed
by flight trials (Xinhua News Agency, November 9). The senior military officer's disclosure reflects the considerable
progress that the PLAAF has made in force modernization, which has exceeded Western expectations in terms of the
pace of development and the capabilities of its defense industrial base. While China remains several steps behind the
United States in operationalizing its advanced fighter jets, the PLA's rapid military modernization has raised concerns
among U.S. allies in the region that the military balance is beginning to tilt toward China's favor.
In an interview with Global Times, PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang stated, ³superiority in space and in air would mean,
to a certain extent, superiority over the land and the oceans´ (Global Times, November 2), thereby highlighting the
PLAAF's position in Chinese military planning. At an event commemorating the PLAAF¶s 60th anniversary, President
Hu Jintao heralded a ³new chapter´ in the development of the PLAAF (Global Times, November 10).
China¶s fifth-generation fighters will reportedly have 4S capabilities: stealth, super cruise, super maneuverability and
short take-off. According to Air Force Colonel Dai Xu, ³its most striking characteristic is the capability of invisibility,
which also could be called low detectability´ (Global Times, November 10). The U.S. F-22 Raptor serves as the gold
standard of fifth-generation fighters, which is currently the only fifth-generation fighter in service among all the world's
armed forces. According to General He's interview, Chengdu Aircraft, the country's leading fighter manufacturer, is
reportedly developing the fighter with Shenyang Aircraft (Xinhua News Agency, November 9).
General He¶s startling revelation that the next-generation fighter may be in service by 2020 stands in stark contrast to the
Chinese habit of closely guarding its military capabilities, yet consistent with a recent trend that reflects the Chinese
Armed Force¶s growing confidence in its military strength. During an interview with the official Xinhua News Agency
back in September, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie proclaimed that, "Our [China¶s] capabilities in waging defensive
combat under modern conditions have taken a quantum leap « It could be said that China has basically all the kinds of
equipment possessed by Western countries, much of which reaches or approaches advanced world standards" (Xinhua
News Agency, September 21),
Indeed, an ongoing survey conducted by Global Times among its Chinese users revealed some telling observations
about how they perceive China's security environment and PLA airpower. The short four-question survey asks the
respondents questions ranging from where they think the biggest security threat to China in the future will come from to
how they rate China's airpower and what type of air force should be developed in the future. The first question, which
asks how respondents view China's security environment, 46 percent of the 9,335 who answered said that they think the
biggest security threat to China comes from the sea, while 43 percent responded that it is airborne. The second question
asked respondents to rate China's air force, and 50.8 percent rated the Chinese Air Force as average, while 44.9 percent
rated it as weak. The third question asked respondents what kind of airforce China should develop, and an overwhelming
majority, 75.3 percent, responded that China ought to develop a strategic air force capable of covering the entire globe.
The final question asks respondents where China should place its emphasis with regard to air force development, and the
majority²47.6 percent²responded that China's air force should develop a space-based combat unit (satellites, space
weapons, etc.), while 21.3 percent responded that China's emphasis should be placed on developing large airlift
platforms (strategic bombers and cargo aircraft, etc.) (Survey.huanqiu.com, November 17).
In light of China¶s rapid air force modernization, Japan is increasingly concerned about Chinese regional air superiority.
A Kyodo News report cited by the Global Times quoted Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canada-based Kanwa
Defense Review Monthly, as saying that the PLAAF currently has 280 J-11s, whose combat performance is comparable
to Japan's Air Self Defense Forces' 200 F-15s, and 140 J-10s, which are a match for the F-16s. According to a Japanese
military source, "even though [Japan] has a disadvantage in numbers at the moment, but combined with its airborne
early warning and control system Japan can win in terms of quality." Yet, the source cautioned that, "once China
deploys its AEWC [KJ-2000, which were on display at the October 1 National Day Parade] « Japan's air superiority
will gradually diminish" (China Daily, November 11; Global Times, November 12).

c c +! " ) ;
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December 3, 2009 02:01 PM Age: 80 days
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Home Page
By: Richard Weitz
Chinese fishing vessel Tianyu No. 8
For a few days in mid-November, it looked like the Chinese government was prepared to take the unprecedented step to
lead a multinational security operation involving the armed forces of Russia, the United States, the EU, and other
countries. Following the seizure of yet another Chinese commercial vessel by Somali-based pirates, Beijing convened a
two-day conference to enhance international coordination of the many foreign fleets currently seeking to defend
shipping around Somalia from pirate attack. Participants included senior navy officers from EU and NATO countries
along with representatives from India, Japan, Russia, and other navies whose warships have joined the maritime patrols
around the Horn of Africa (BBC, November 6).
According to some media reports, at a subsequent meeting of the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE)
group, which includes representatives of the some three dozen navies currently participating in the maritime counter-
piracy mission, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) delegates expressed a willingness to integrate their
operations more closely with the other navies on the mission (Fox News, November 10). In addition, they reportedly
told officials from the European Union Naval Force for Somalia (EU Navfor) that they wished to assume more of a
leadership role in the multilateral maritime patrols. In particular, the PLAN members suggested they favored rotating the
SHADE co-chairmanship among the other participating navies so that China could serve in that role. Thus far, these
monthly meetings have been co-chaired by the EU Navfor and the multinational Combined Maritime Force led by the
United States (Telegraph, November 10).
Both of the existing co-chairs supported the proposal. At an international anti-piracy conference in Hong Kong that
convened a few days later, Commodore Tim Lowe, the deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces, said that
the chairmanship position was ³a leadership role in terms of making sure that the meetings and the agendas for the
meetings are properly coordinated.´ Lowe added that he hoped ³that perhaps in April or May next year, we would see
China taking on that lead coordinator role for the corridor´ that the international fleets established for protecting the
commercial vessels (Reuters, November 13).
A few days later, however, the Chinese government reverted to their previous stance of simply calling for greater
international cooperation against the pirates. Rather than leading or even joining a combined multilateral force, Chinese
representatives called for a division of the sea lanes currently being patrolled into separate national sectors. Writing in
China Daily, Zhang Haizhou observed that Chinese ³officials deftly parried appeals for China to lead the anti-piracy
mission´ that were made by Lowe (China Daily, November 20).
For example, senior Colonel Huang Xueping, a Defense Ministry spokesman, said that, ³China is always open to
boosting international patrolling cooperation (and) wishes to cooperate, bilaterally and multilaterally, with all nations
involved´ in the counter-piracy operation off Somalia. But he added that Beijing wanted to ³reach consensus´ on an
arrangement for defining specific national patrol areas (China Daily, November 20). Liu Zhenmin, deputy permanent
representative of the People¶s Republic of China (PRC) to the UN, likewise proposed to the UN Security Council that
the navies engaged in the counter-piracy mission ³define areas of responsibility.´ He argued that such an approach
would improve escort operations and reduce the risks of pirates hijacking vessels. Liu also called for an ³integrated
solution´ to overcome the piracy problem, which would include promoting political stability in Somalia and enhancing
the ability of the country¶s neighbors to counter regional piracy. He further urged that the navies now supporting the
counter-piracy mission off Somalia ³should expand maritime escort operations and other countries should also improve
how they carry out maritime escort operations´ (Xinhua News Agency, November 18).
Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo maintained that allocating specific areas for each patrolling country would ³significantly
increase´ the efficiency of the operation. He observed that, ³When each country takes care of a specific area, density of
the patrolling mission will grow,´ though he added that the navies involved had to have effective means of coordinating
their activities (China Daily, November 20). When discussing appropriate coordinating mechanisms, Beijing¶s
reluctance to engage in close military cooperation with NATO was again evident, a factor also seen in China¶s cautious
policies toward the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The Chinese press quoted
Admiral Yin as arguing that the United Nations ³is the best candidate to take the leading coordinating role´ in
countering the pirates because China lacks formal relations with NATO (China Daily, November 20).
PLAN Procedures
The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and neighboring regions from pirates operating from
ports in lawless Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. The UN, NATO, the EU, and various national
governments have organized separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa
region to patrol sea lanes, escort merchant vessels, and respond to distress calls and pirate sightings. Since the PLAN
first sent three warships to conduct counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden this January, the Chinese Navy has
focused on protecting Chinese-flagged vessels and Chinese sailors. Thus far, PLA representatives have resisted EU and
NATO proposals to join a more centrally commanded operation (BBC, November 6).
The PLAN has traditionally concentrated on defending Chinese coastal waters and on impeding U.S. military
intervention in any Taiwan contingency. Although Chinese warships have engaged in port visits and unsophisticated
exercises with foreign navies, the current operation represents the first potential combat mission for the PLAN outside
the Pacific. The Chinese Navy has now sent four task forces, consisting of two or three warships, typically frigates,
along with a larger supply ship and hundreds of sailors and special force troops, since the beginning of the year (Xinhua
News Agency, October 30). In November 2009, Liang Wei, the deputy chief of operations for the PLAN¶s South Fleet,
said that the four Chinese flotillas had escorted or protected approximately 1,100 commercial vessels from potential
pirate attack (Reuters, November 13).
Yet, none of the Chinese warships on patrol thus far appear to have engaged in large-scale combat with the pirates,
raising the interesting question of what rules of engagement the Chinese flotilla follows. At a November 2009 maritime
seminar in Hong Kong, Liang Wei, deputy chief of operations for the South Sea fleet, said the standard operating
procedures were for the PLAN first to investigate any incident ³to make sure it is not a fisherman but a pirate.´ The
Chinese sailors would fire warning shots if the pirates initiated the use of force. If this show of force failed to stop the
pirate attack, then the Chinese ships would fire in self-defense of themselves or in defense of others (South China
Morning Post, November 14). Yet the same source cites another unnamed Chinese military official who acknowledged
that the PLAN weighed additional criteria when determining its response to a pirate attack. ³For us to use force is a very
complex matter ... it is not just a simple question based on an operational requirement.´ Rather, the decision over how to
respond also involved ³political questions²and these are not issues dealt with by military commanders alone. Our
warships off Somalia are very well aware of this. We are fully prepared to use force, but we do not take that step lightly´
(South China Morning Post, November 14).
Threats and Opportunities
Despite the large international counter-piracy operation, the Somali piracy threat has worsened this year after showing
some signs of improving in 2008 after foreign navies established a five-mile wide protection corridor that ranged up to
300 nautical miles off Somali¶s coast. As of mid-October 2009, the pirates had conducted almost 150 attacks on
commercial vessels in the waters off the Horn of Africa since the beginning of the year. They succeeded in hijacking
more than 40 ships and at least 270 hostages (RIA Novosti, October 21). Many of the recent attacks have occurred at
great distances from Somalia¶s shores²including some in the Indian Ocean and even the Gulf of Oman²as the pirates
have sought to prey on vessels outside the protection corridor (United Press International, November 19).
Chinese ships have suffered several prominent attacks. On October 19, the pirates seized a vessel owned by China Cosco
Holding, the De Xin Hai, and its 25 crew members while they were conveying 76,000 metric tons of coal over 700
nautical miles from Somalia's coast (New York Times, October 22). Following the incident, PRC Foreign Ministry
spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said China would ³make all-out efforts to rescue the hijacked ship and personnel,´ but no such
operation occurred (Time, October 27). Instead, the PRC Ministry of Transport subsequently issued a warning that
³Chinese ships must urgently steer as far away from the area as possible. Ships within the region must exercise caution
and increase their vigilance´ (RIA Novosti, October 21). In November, the pirates launched their most distant attack to
date on a Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker sailing 1,000 nautical miles from Mogadishu.
This upsurge in maritime assaults may account for Beijing¶s recent efforts to strengthen the international response to the
piracy challenge. In addition to hosting last month¶s international counter-piracy summit in Beijing, the PLAN in
September conducted a three-day joint exercise with the Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden that rehearsed capturing and
detaining pirates. The Chinese warships that participated in these simulated search-and-detain operations included the
Zhoushan and the Xuzhou along with support vessels (RIA Novosti, September 21).
Several considerations led the PRC leadership to make the unprecedented decision to deploy the PLAN on a counter-
piracy mission around the Horn of Africa. China possesses one of the world¶s largest commercial shipping fleets and
relies heavily on international maritime commerce, including for energy imports from the Persian Gulf which are carried
on tankers that traverse regions potentially threatened from long-range pirates operating from Somalia [1]. Chinese
policy makers and security experts have cited this dependence on foreign energy imports as a Chinese security
vulnerability [2]. The PRC¶s counter-piracy efforts near Somalia enjoy the legitimacy of several UN Security Council
resolutions calling on UN member states to curb piracy in the region. The counter-piracy operation also has the support
of Somalia¶s transitional government. In addition, many other foreign navies are engaged in the same mission. The
Somali campaign marks the first widespread participation of the world¶s rising naval powers²which besides China
includes India and other non-NATO navies²in an active maritime operation distant from their shores [3]. On January
14, 2009, a Chinese delegation attended the founding meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia,
giving Beijing a leading role in this institution from the start (unlike in the case of such institutions as the Proliferation
Security Initiative, which the PRC has resisted joining partly because China would have to accept a set of principles
Beijing had no say in establishing). The Contact Group provides a mechanism to allow states and international
organizations to exchange information on aspects of combating piracy off Somalia¶s coast [4].
In addition to whatever protection of China¶s shipping that results from the PLAN¶s participation in the counter-piracy
operation around Somalia, the Chinese Navy and the PRC have benefited in other ways from supporting the mission.
The Chinese sailors involved have had ample opportunities to improve their tactics, techniques, and procedures by
working in close proximity with several more experienced navies. Rear Admiral Du Jingchen, commander of the first
PLAN task force, earlier told the Chinese media while returning to his home port of Sanya that he used the 123-day
patrol to test his sailors¶ capabilities, weapons, and support mechanisms as well as promote maritime defense diplomacy
(China Daily, April 29). ³The first anti-piracy fleet had zero experience,´ he explained, but it had learned valuable
lessons applicable for future overseas PLAN missions. A week earlier, Zhuang Congyong, a researcher with the Naval
Command Academy, likewise observed that, ³The ability to go deep into the ocean to conduct integrated operations is a
key criterion for a strong navy. The escort operation to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters reflects and starts the
transformation of our military strategy,´ Zhuang said, adding that, ³The Chinese navy will conduct more long-distance
escort missions in the future´ (Xinhua News Agency, April 22). By engaging in such a high-profile operation, moreover,
the PLAN can highlight its contribution to advancing China¶s foreign interests to PRC policy makers, including those
determining the Navy¶s budget.
The Chinese government in turn has characterized it¶s support for the counter-piracy operation as meeting Beijing¶s
commitments as a benign international security actor (what some non-Chinese analyst have termed a responsible global
stakeholder). It also confirms China¶s growing capacity and willingness to contribute to international humanitarian
missions. The day after the PRC celebrated the 60th anniversary of the PLAN in April 2009, an editorial in the People¶s
Daily Online lauded the Somalia operation on the grounds that, ³The protection offered by the PLA fleet safeguards the
national interests of China and projects a favorable image of China to the world.´ The commentary added that, ³This
mission indicates that as a responsible power of the international community, China is fulfilling its promise to advance
the construction of a harmonious world, and is taking actions to uphold world peace and boost mutual development. At
the same time, it is demonstrating to the world that China, currently in the course of peaceful development, is utilizing
its own military power to provide µpublic goods¶ to the international community´ (People¶s Daily Online, April 24).
Yet, assuming a leadership position in the international counter-piracy coalition in the form of the SHADE co-
chairmanship appears to have been a step too far for Beijing¶s still cautious government, despite the encouragement
offered the PRC by European and U.S. Navy commanders. In this regard, China¶s wavering over leading the maritime
mission off Somalia is symptomatic of how Beijing has approached many other international security issues. Chinese
policy makers stress their desire to support world peace and security, but they still shun leadership roles in prominent
international institutions and endeavors seeking this end. In Central Asia, for instance, Chinese officials continue to
defer to Moscow¶s primacy when it comes to many political and military questions, including those addressed in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The PRC¶s most prominent security role has been with respect to the Korean Peninsula, where Beijing has played a key
part in establishing and sustaining the Six-Party Talks. But even here the Chinese government has performed the role
primarily of facilitator and mediator rather than that of leader. Instead of defining the terms of a preferred solution and
seeking to impose it on the other parties, Beijing has sought to encourage Pyongyang and Washington to reconcile their
differences through direct dialogue and use the multilateral framework of the talks to reach a comprehensive agreement
that would also satisfy Seoul and Tokyo, who in turn are expected to provide financial support for any deal.
Notes
1. Andrew S. Erickson, ³New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses,´ China Security, vol. 3, no. 4, Autumn
2007, p. 40.
2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report 2009 (Washington, D.C.), p. 133,
www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/chapter2_section_2.pdf.
3. Brian Wilson and James Kraska, ³Anti-Piracy Patrols Presage Rising Naval Powers,´ YaleGlobal, 13 January 2009,
yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article.
4. "First Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, New York, January 14, 2009," Fact
Sheet, U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2009, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/130610.htm.
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Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Economics, Africa, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page, Featured
By: Yitzhak Shichor
Leader-in-waiting Sayf al-Islam Qadhafi
As anticipated, the fourth ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was held in Sharm al-
Shaykh (Egypt), November 8-9, reflected wall-to-wall praise for Sino-African "cooperation" in general and particularly
for the positive Chinese role in Africa. China announced its readiness to pour more money into Africa, planning more
projects and increased presence with "no strings attached." Yet it is precisely this emphatic divorce between economics
and politics in Chinese external activities, or between economic aid and political aid, which has triggered unprecedented
criticism not heard of before from some African leaders.
In recent years China's Africa policy has attracted fire from many quarters outside the African continent²governments,
NGOs, the media and academics. African governments, on the other hand, appeared to have welcomed the Chinese
presence and underlined its benefits, often compared to their negative experience with the Western and even the Soviet
presence, occasionally termed "colonialism" and "imperialism." Africans, with the possible exception of some
opposition groups, have failed to criticize the so-called Chinese "model." Fully aware of the "Western" sources of this
criticism, Beijing has indeed defied its Africa-policy critics as competitors who envy China's achievements in the
continents that trespass "their" territory and undermine "their" interests. When asked by a journalist about this criticism,
Wen Jiabao, China's prime-minister, replied: "There have been allegations for a long time that China has come to Africa
to plunder Africa's natural resources and practice neo-colonialism. The allegation in my view is totally untenable. Who
is really asking these questions? Is it the African states or is it the West looking on nervously?" (Africa News, November
16). Indeed, for a long time Africa failed to ask questions about the implications of the Chinese offensive in the
continent. "Africa offers China«friends who do not judge it" (Reuters, November 1). Not anymore.
African Criticism of China
This forbearance was interrupted²apparently for the first time²before, during and after the recent FOCAC meeting,
and not just by opposition groups and parties but by high-ranking officials. They expressed concern about a number of
issues related to the Chinese offensive. Thus, Nigeria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Bagudu Hirse blamed China
for financing corrupt and repressive regimes: "We accept what China is doing. And we welcome their investment. But,"
he underlined, "they must understand that we are very sensitive to good governance and democracy. We can't start
thinking of imposing sanctions on Guinea or Niger for bad governance and then they [China] go behind us and strike
some other deals. We suspect they do that anyway. They will never confirm it, but we read the newspapers²we know
what is going on" (Africa News, November 16).
He was referring to Beijing's decision (reportedly of June 2009) to invest $7 billion in a mining deal in Guinea,
announced by Guinea's military junta immediately after the September massacre of the opposition when over 150
protestors were killed. Though Beijing has denied the deal had been signed, it draws international condemnation and
protests by human rights groups (CBS News, October 25). Precisely a year earlier, a $5 billion oil deal that was made
between China and Niger "in the greatest of secrecy and with contempt for regulation," has been denounced by unions
and civil rights groups that called for an investigation of how the funds resulting from the agreement are spent and a
general parliamentary inquiry into the deal, out of concern that the people of Niger would not benefit from it (BBC
News, July 30, 2008). Yet China's activities in Africa are not only breeding corruption.
"Hugely fearful of China's way of doing business", the Egyptian independent Member of Parliament Mustafa al-Gindi,
used the unmentionable word: "Whatever they say, it is a fact that the Chinese come to Africa not just with engineers
and scientists²they are coming with farmers. It is neo-colonialism. [«] There are no ethics, no values." (Africa News,
November 16, emphasis added). Still, these are kind words compared to the interview with the Libyan Foreign Minister
Musa Kusa, published on November 10, 2009 by the influential (Arabic and English) daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat (The
Middle East) in which he lashed out at China's Africa policy as harshly as ever before. As a former head of Libya's
foreign intelligence service (for 15 years), he is probably one of the Africans most familiar with Chinese operations on
the continent.
Libya's Foreign Minister Interview
In the interview²given on the occasion of the fourth meeting of FOCAC held in Egypt²the Libyan foreign minister
tried to tone down his criticism by praising China's support for the African "liberation movement," its unity and
contribution to balancing the international system, "but", he said, "not at the expense of the [African] people." He then
added: "When we look at the reality on the ground we find that there is something akin to a Chinese invasion of the
African continent. This is something that brings to mind the effects that colonialism had on the African continent [in the
past]. [«] Therefore we advise our Chinese friends not to follow in this direction i.e. [sic] bringing thousands of
Chinese workers to Africa under the pretext of employment, for at the same time Africa is suffering from
unemployment." He went on saying that China's programs of training and employing thousands of Africans is welcomed
"but this welcome does not mean [accepting] the Chinese coming to settle in Africa."
A number of themes were singled out in his criticism. For one, accusing China of a "divide and rule" policy, he rejected
Beijing's refusal to allow delegates of the African Union (AU) to participate in the Forum or to consider the AU as a
representative of Africans. It "is an insult to the African Union. [«] Is it reasonable for China²as a single country²to
preside over an entire continent? This is an injustice. [«] China's unwillingness to accept the presence of African Union
commissioners means that they do not want the African Union, or African Unity, but rather China wants to cooperate
with Africa as separate nations, rather than as a union."
For another, he accused China of betraying the African countries that had facilitated China's admission to the United
Nations and the Security Council. Yet, when the Chinese reached an international position they "did not support their
friends." "We did not see the Chinese playing an effective role, and [they] did not help the African [bloc] gain a
[permanent] seat on the Security Council, but on the contrary, opposed it. This caused us to ask the question 'What is the
difference between them and imperialists?'" Finally, he raised an interesting point, accusing China of evading politics
and Beijing of abandoning the movements and countries that need its support. "Here I am reminded of the strange
Chinese position on the Goldstone report«China should have a more visible position on this, rather than being satisfied
with a tentative vote." In an unequivocal statement he said: "Genuine cooperation must include politics [«] and should
not be limited to building roads and schools. It is true that this is required, but international cooperation is not based on
constructing buildings and giving aid, but rather through political positions." These remarks highlight one of Beijing's
principal weaknesses in the international system: its systematic attempts to avoid taking clear-cut positions on global
issues in an effort to please all sides. Sooner or later, Beijing's political passivity will begin to undermine its economic
interests. Implicitly, Libya's Foreign Minister warns the Chinese that the countries and people of Africa (and the Middle
East) expect more vigorous political support and, while they may appreciate China's economic contribution, they have
no intention of becoming subjugated to the Chinese and prefer to keep their options open.
The Origins of Libya's Criticism
This criticism is just one additional crack in a series of Sino-Libyan disagreements in the last few years. The most recent
concerns Libya's decision to block the sale of the Canadian firm Verenex, that controls oil assets in Libya, to China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and to buy it instead (CNPC offer was 57.5 percent higher). At about the same
time and in a similar way, Angola's state-owned Sonangol announced it wanted to block the sale of Marathon Oil's 20
percent oilfield stake to Chinese oil companies (CNOOC and SINOPEC). The Chinese insistence on keeping local
hiring to a minimum has brewed resentment. "Some in Africa are starting to find the Chinese embrace too tight" (The
Australian, September 30). This could signal increased intervention of African governments in the oil sector to ensure
more diversification of oil customers and thus to maximize income and to diminish dependencies, to the detriment of
China (Petroleum Economist, November). Yet, Sino-Libyan friction concerned not only economics but also politics.
Earlier, in 2006, the two countries squabbled over Libya's relations with Taiwan. The deterioration began in January
when Sayf al-Islam Qadhafi²chairman of the Libyan Qadhafi Foundation²met President Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan,
acting as an envoy of his father, Mu'ammar Qadhafi. Libya, which had maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan
from 1959 to 1978, recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 but delayed the establishment of
diplomatic relations until 1978. Qadhafi invited Chen Shui-bian for an official "state visit" to Libya and said that his
father was resolved to develop relations between the two countries, with Libya serving as Taiwan's gateway to Africa.
"He hoped that the two nations sign a memorandum on establishing mutual representative offices before his departure"
[1]. Adding insult to injury, this invitation came on January 19, precisely when PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing was
meeting Qadhafi (the father) in Libya. An online Libyan newspaper reported recently that Sayf al-Islam Qadhafi was
officially and practically appointed as successor to his father (Libya al-Yaum [Libya Today], October 15).
To be sure, a few months later, in May 2006, Libya allowed Chen Shui-bian to make a stopover in Tripoli, and used the
opportunity to negotiate the issue of representative offices in the two countries, despite Beijing's protests and "strong
opposition." A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "We demand that Libya live up to its commitment and
immediately cease all official exchanges with Taiwan in whatever forms so as to maintain the overall China-Libya
relations«This is a serious violation of Libya's long-term commitment to the one-China policy and will exert a negative
impact on China-Libya relations" (Xinhua News Agency, May 11, 2006). Indeed and inevitably²it has. Probably in
response to Beijing's implicit threats, Libya sent a low-ranking representative to the third FOCAC and ministerial
meeting held in Beijing in November 4-5, 2006.
Conclusion
These incidents should by no means create the wrong impression. It is far too soon to eulogize China's Africa policy,
one of the most remarkable success stories in global politics over the last two decades. China is not only heavily
invested in Africa for many years to come, but most African governments and public opinion still appreciate the Chinese
economic contribution, while overlooking its negative implications such as bad governance, corruption, human rights
abuses and lack of transparency. Yet, there are initial signs that Africa's leaders are becoming aware of these
shortcomings based not only on their historical experience but also on current international norms, greater visibility and
demands for accountability. Qadhafi by no means reflects these norms. Addressing Oxford University students via
satellite on May 17, 2008, he said that both the PRC and the United States compete for influence in Africa: "American
interference has been much more harmful and hypocritical « China's influence was conducted in a purely business
fashion that did not resort to military adventures and double standards" (Middle East Online, May 17, 2008). Qadhafi
does not want to drive the Chinese away as they have played a significant role in Libya's housing, energy,
communication, transportation, and other sectors. He wants the Chinese to behave themselves and to realize who is in
charge and it is not Hu.
Notes
1. Office of the President, Republic of Taiwan, News Release, January 18, 2006.
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Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Elite, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
"Sixth-Generation" leader Hu Chunhua

In the first major re-shuffle at the party provincial committee level following the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Congress in 2007, several changes have caught the attention of Chinese leadership-watchers. While the personnel
changes, which were announced on November 30, affected six out of the 31 provincial committees, two changes stood
out in particular. Hebei Provincial Governor Hu Chunhua (46) and Agriculture Minister Sun Zhengcai (46) were
elevated to provincial party-secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Jilin Province respectively
(Xinhua News Agency, November 30; Ming Pao, December 1).
Prior to his promotion as party-secretary, Hu Chunhua's (no relation to Hu Jintao) portfolio included serving as chief of
the Communist Youth League (CYL), an affiliation that begs close ties to President Hu Jintao²the ringleader of the
CYL faction. Moreover, he spent nearly 17 years in the Tibet Autonomous Regions (TAR) that included a tour as the
region's first vice-party secretary in 2006, which earned him the nickname "Little Hu [Jintao]" in the media (United
Daily News, November 30; Ming Pao, December 1; The Straits Times, December 1).
Sun Zhengcai, a native of Shandong Province, earned his Ph.D. in agriculture from China Agricultural University. Sun
was selected to serve as the agriculture minister in late 2006, which made him the country's youngest ministerial-level
official at the tender age of 43 years old. Sun also used to be head of Shunyi district in Beijing and served as secretary-
general of the Beijing CCP municipal committee (Ming Pao, December 1; Ta Kungpao, December 1).
The meteoric ascendance of Hu and Sun, who were both born in the 1960s, marks the first time that party members of
the so-called "sixth generation," who range from 42 to 49 in age, were promoted to the ranks of party-secretary at the
provincial levels. This move positions Hu and Sun ahead of their peers in becoming the core of the "sixth-generation" of
Chinese leaders. Indeed, Hu and Sun were both featured in an issue of the official journal Global Personalities, which
shined the spotlight on five "sixth-generation" politicians (See Willy Lam, "Hu Jintao Picks Core Sixth-Generation
Leaders," May 15). Interestingly, Hu and Sun also represent different factions among the rising stars of cadres. Hu with
his CYL background is deeply rooted in the President Hu-led tuan pai (CYL faction), and Sun, who had won accolades
from Premier Wen Jiabao for his competence in office, is identified more with the "elitist" group spearheaded by Vice
President Xi Jinping²even though Sun is not a "princeling."
President Hu has apparently been trying to promote a corps of young cadres up the ranks in order to consolidate the
"sixth-generation" leadership in recent years²a practice handed down by the late patriarch, Deng Xiaoping²and the
latest personnel shuffle may represent Hu's attempts at staging the aftermath of the 18th Party Congress in 2012 when
Hu and Wen are scheduled to step down (Sina.com.hk, December 1). Some media reports have even suggested that the
personnel changes were made in preparation for the "sixth-generation" leaders coming of age at the 19th Party Congress,
which will be held in 2017²effectively laying the foundation for the ruling coalition that will govern following the
2017 conclave and in the "post-Xi Jinping era" after 2022 (United Daily News [Taiwan], November 30).
Another notable characteristic found in this raft of personnel changes was an emphasis on transferring the ³team leader´
(yibashou) between the different provincial committees: From Hebei to Inner Mongolia, Jilin to Liaoning (vice-versa)
and Fujian to Henan. These personnel arrangements appear in line with Deng¶s dictum that senior officials in party units
should hail from ³the five lakes and four seas.´ From the central leadership's perspective, these movements of top party
officials may also serve as a bridge between different provincial regions and at the same time strengthen the central
authorities¶ control over the local branches. According to Huang Zhongqing, the director for the Beijing bureau of
Nanhwa Morning Paper, the contradiction between the central and local government has become wider since Deng's
economic reforms. The major problem lies in a growing divide between local interests and comprehensive economic
development. Moreover, Huang pointed out that the plague of corruption among party officials has grown more severe,
and even though routinely changing personnel cannot root out corruption, it can at least impede the development of a
patron-client relationship in politics (BBC [Chinese], December 1).
The five changes at the provincial party-chief level also include former Fujian Provincial Party-Secretary Lu Zhangong,
who was assigned to serve as party-secretary at the Henan Provincial committee, and replaced by the party¶s only female
party chief in 20 years, Sun Chunlan. Sun served as party chief of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.
Additionally, former Jilin Provincial Party-Secretary Wang Min was assigned to serve as the party-secretary at the
Liaoning Provincial committee, and will be replaced by Sun Zhengcai (Xinhua News Agency, November 30).
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Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Home Page
By: Daniel Erikson
Top legislator Wu Banggou in the Bahamas
When Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) Wu Banggou arrived in the
Bahamas in early September 2009 on the second leg of his Americas tour, it quickly became clear that he was not on
vacation. As China¶s top legislator and the highest-ranking member of the Chinese government to ever visit the
Bahamas, Chairman Wu's entourage included 150 Chinese officials and business leaders. The delegation signed a series
of critical economic deals, including an agreement for mutual protection of Chinese and Bahamian investors, a multi-
million dollar loan to help build a highway to Nassau¶s international airport, and additional support for a major cricket
stadium under construction (Caribbean Net News, September 10).The visit was hailed as a major diplomatic event by
the Caribbean press, while Chinese media emphasized that the two sides were ready to intensify exchanges and that the
Bahamas ³would unswervingly stick to the µOne China¶ policy´ (Xinhua News Service, September 5). In 2008, bilateral
trade between the two countries had surged to $386 million, more than double the year before, and sustained growth was
expected in 2009 despite the onslaught of the global financial crisis (CaribbeanPressReleases.com, September 5).
Chairman Wu was greeted warmly by Bahamian Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham, who had overseen the normalization
of diplomatic relations between China and the Bahamas in 1997, during a previous term in office. Indeed, as this rising
Asian power becomes more deeply engaged with the tiny micro-states of the Caribbean, China is positioning itself to be
an increasingly influential actor in a distant part of the world traditionally attached to its principal rival, the United
States.
At first glance, China and the Caribbean would appear to have few interests in common. China, with a population of
over 1.3 billion, has undertaken an impressive economic expansion that has earned it renewed recognition as a global
power. The sovereign states of the English-speaking Caribbean consist of small, micro-states with sluggish levels of
economic growth. This region of 12 countries includes the island nations of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and
Tobago²as well as Belize, which is located on the Atlantic Coast of the Central American isthmus, and Guyana, which
is located east of Venezuela along the northern coast of South America. The global financial crisis that began in the
United States in late 2008 has devastated the Caribbean economies, and muddied the prospects for the region's future
growth. While China has been both a primary driver and beneficiary of world economic growth, the Caribbean has, for
the most part, been a reactor to it. It is this difference that makes China an alluring, yet potentially dangerous economic
partner.
Trade and Strategic Issues
Trade between China and the Caribbean has expanded dramatically in recent years. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), trade between China and the Caribbean Community (also known as CARICOM, this 15-member
regional grouping includes all the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean plus poverty-stricken Haiti, the former
Dutch colony of Suriname, and the tiny British territory of Montserrat) grew by a factor of 100 between 1990 and 2008,
from a paltry $20 million to over $2 billion [1]. Antigua and Barbuda is China¶s t op trading partner in CARICOM, with
trade worth about $600 million reported in 2008. Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Dominica round out
China¶s top five CARICOM trading partners. For these nations, trade with China is surely a boon, but because China has
little demand for their products or services, trade is heavily one-sided. In 2008, 93 percent of CARICOM-China trade
came in the form of Chinese exports to the region. Only Dominica approached a balance of trade, exporting over $60
million in goods to China in that year. In the last ten years, Chinese exports have consistently made up more than 70
percent of total trade (IMF Trade Statistics Directory.). This imbalance is cause for concern but is more indicative of the
severe economic imbalance that plagues the Sino-Caribbean relationship.
Chinese-state affiliated companies have also made significant investments in Caribbean infrastructure, especially
Hutchison Whampoa Limited, the Hong Kong-based conglomerate whose chairman, Li Ka-shing, is known to have
strong links to the Chinese People¶s Liberation Army (PLA). Active with port concessions on both ends of the Panama
Canal, Hutchison Whampoa established a fully operational $2.6 billion port facility in Freeport, Bahamas in 2001
(Washington Times, November 20, 2001). This past fall, unconfirmed rumors swirled through the Caribbean that the
company is in the process of purchasing the Grand Bahama Port Authority (The Freeport News, October 5). Beginning
with the first China-CARICOM Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, which took place in Jamaica in February
2005, China has convened periodic meetings with Caribbean counterparts to advance its economic interests. China is
also playing a robust role in the regional multilateral banks as a member of the Caribbean Development Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank, which it joined in 2008 with a contribution of $350 billion (Inter-Press Service,
May 27, 2009).
China¶s overall strategy for the Caribbean has been driven by a desire to ensure the security of Chinese offshore
financial holdings, woo countries with infrastructure projects and investment deals to ensure support for China in
multilateral organizations, and promote the crucial ³One China´ policy to isolate Taiwan on the world stage.
The Taiwan Issue: Caribbean Minnows and Asian Sharks
Now that China has become a major actor on the world stage, it is demanding the diplomatic recognition that for years
had been bestowed on the Republic of China (ROC), commonly referred to as Taiwan. The ³One China´ policy makes
diplomatic recognition of China versus Taiwan a zero sum game, which means that Beijing will not maintain relations
with any state that recognizes Taipei. Only 23 nations maintain official relations with Taiwan and Latin America and the
Caribbean account for half of these, making the Commonwealth Caribbean a competitive arena in which both Beijing
and Taipei have a strong interest. China, in competition with Taiwan, offers economic support to the Caribbean through
trade, aid and investment, which returns the favor²for the most part²by maintaining the ³One China´ policy.
Taiwan¶s alliances with the Commonwealth Caribbean have been whittled down by Beijing's increasingly skillful
diplomacy in recent years. The Bahamas defected in 1997, and the island nation of Dominica severed ties with Taipei in
2004. Not long after that, Grenada²still grappling with the legacy of the communist takeover that prompted U.S.
military intervention in 1983²turned its back on its staunch anti-communism rooted in the Cold War era to open its
arms to China in 2005. Four countries²Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines²
recognize Taipei over Beijing, but the support of these Caribbean nations often comes down to dollars and cents. In
2008, 91.5 percent of China¶s trade with CARICOM was with countries that recognize Beijing. Only 8.5 percent of
China¶s trade was with countries that recognize Taipei despite the fact that more than half of the people in CARICOM
live in Haiti, a state allied with Taiwan [2].
In the case of St. Lucia, the competition between China and Taiwan veered into the theater of the absurd as the debate
became heavily polarized along political lines leading up to the 1997 election of Dr. Kenny Anthony as prime minister.
As a result, recognition of China became a domestic issue with Anthony¶s party, the St. Lucia Labor Party, supporting
Beijing while Sir John Compton, leader of the United Workers Party (UWP), favored Taipei. These internal divisions
are often rooted in ideological differences but enhanced by the ³dollar diplomacy´ practiced by both China and Taiwan
in the Caribbean. When Anthony was elected prime minister in 1997, he switched allegiance from Taiwan to China
within the first four months of his administration. During his administration St. Lucia was the recipient of much
Chinese aid, especially in preparation for the Cricket World Cup, hosted by the West Indies in 2007. Four key Chinese
aid projects, including the construction of a national stadium and a psychiatric hospital were used to woo the tiny nation
out of Taiwan¶s dwindling fold. Nonetheless the extent to which China¶s ³internal affair´ with Taiwan was a domestic
issue in St. Lucia became clear when the island¶s most recent electoral results provoked a change in recognition of the
³One China´ policy.
The general election of December 11, 2006 saw a return to power of two-time Prime Minister Compton, and St. Lucia¶s
position on the Taiwan question was once again in play. With a population of almost 170,000 and an estimated GDP of
$1.8 billion, the tiny nation emerged as a key fighting ground in the geopolitical battles for diplomatic recognition
between China and Taiwan. On April 30 2007, St. Lucia formally recognized Taiwan and within a few days China
withdrew its diplomatic corps (New York Times, May 2, 2007). In reality, St. Lucia¶s switch does not represent a
turning of the tides back to Taiwan but instead merely re-emphasizes the fact that recognition of China or Taiwan in the
Caribbean is not an ideological issue, but instead one fueled largely by economic opportunism.
Moreover, St. Lucia¶s flip-flop represents an exception, as most other English-speaking Caribbean states have moved
decisively toward recognizing Beijing. Meanwhile, gaining confidence from its ever-expanding economic prowess,
China is learning quickly to play the dollar diplomacy game. The PRC has an advantage over Taipei in this endeavor to
the extent that its foreign ministry operates unconstrained by the scrutiny of either a legislature or independent media,
and its willingness to dig into its deep pockets have already paid some dividends. Dominica¶s Primer Minister
Roosevelt Skerrit switched recognition in 2004 after receiving a pledge of $112 million over a six-year period from
Beijing. Though in 2003 Grenadian Prime Minister Keith Mitchell said that maintaining relations with Taiwan is
³practical,´ by 2005 he had changed his tune, signing a joint communiqué in support of the ³One China´ policy. In
exchange, Beijing promised financial assistance to rebuild and expand Grenada¶s national stadium for the 2007 Cricket
World Cup; construction of 2,000 housing units; new hospital facilities; agricultural support; a $6 million grant to
complete projects previously financed by Taiwan; and an additional $1 million scholarship fund [3].
Furthermore, Caribbean governments are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment.
As a rising superpower without a colonial or ³imperialist´ history in the hemisphere, China is in many ways a more
politically attractive partner than either the United States or Europe for some local politicians confronted with
increasingly anti-American constituencies. China, in this view, offers a more benevolent version of the ³Big Brother´
role typically played by Western powers. Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that the Caribbean¶s embrace of
China²to the extent that this has actually occurred²is potentially linked to their perception of neglect and disinterest
from the United States.
China and the Caribbean: A Delicate Embrace
More than 8,000 miles separate Beijing from most Caribbean capitols, but given the historical, economic and political
differences between China and the Caribbean, distance has not diminished the eastern economic powerhouse¶s interest
in forging ties with these tiny Caribbean islands. Nonetheless, China¶s engagement with the Caribbean has intensified
significantly in recent years and small Caribbean states can no longer ignore the dragon in their midst. Today, virtually
every Caribbean nation²including those that do not formally recognize China²has extensive political and economic
contacts with the nascent economic powerhouse in East Asia. This marks a dramatic change from the days when
Caribbean nations lacked significant economic or diplomatic relations with China. Recently, a surge in trade between
China and the Caribbean, increased diplomatic recognition of China in the region, and a flurry of official visits have
signaled a significant strengthening of Sino-Caribbean ties.
While the reasons for this are complex, the relationship between China and the Caribbean hinges on two critical
components: China¶s economic might, and its focus on diplomatically isolating Taiwan. Economic cooperation is the
underlying basis for Caribbean interest in strengthening ties to China. As an economic powerhouse that is well equipped
to deal with the effects of increasing globalization, China stands opposite the vulnerable Caribbean and can offer the
attention of a superpower to a region looking to take part in the globalized economy. The desire to strip Taiwan of its
remaining allies, as a step toward reincorporating it under the domain of mainland China, has given the Caribbean a
level of political salience in Beijing that it would otherwise lack. Yet, the true shape of China¶s relations with the
Caribbean will be determined by broader global forces and the dexterity with which Chinese policymakers and their
Caribbean counterparts are able to forge mutually advantageous ties. It is clear that China is mapping out a long-term
vision for engaging with the Caribbean, but it is too early to tell whether this vulnerable region will sink or swim as a
result.
Notes
1. Direction of Trade Statistics ± International Monetary Fund, July 2009. Exports of a country to the world by partner
and Imports (c.i.f.) of a country from the world by partner, www.imfstatistics.org (accessed July 2009).
2. Direction of Trade Statistics of International Monetary Fund and author¶s estimates.
3. Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen,´ China, Taiwan and the Battle for Latin America,´ The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs, Summer 2007.
Y
c &
Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Stephen Blank
HQ-9
The year 2009 will likely be remembered as the beginning of a more assertive phase in Chinese foreign policy, as seen
in Beijing's stance on reform of the international financial system, its massive investments in foreign countries, and in
particular its investment in and acquisition of energy assets. At the same time, China¶s newfound assertiveness is also
manifested by the inroads it is making in the global arms markets. Beijing's rising profile as an exporter of arms attests
to the progress made by its defense industries because it shows that China is beginning to master the complex challenges
involved in producing quality military systems for foreign customers. Moreover, these products duly give China greater
competitive viability in those markets. For instance, China has begun to develop its own competitive weapons systems
(e.g. its first large military transport plane) (Nikkei Telecom 21, November 13), and may soon start selling other post-
Soviet states its own weapons (e.g. the L-15 Falcon advanced jet trainer to Ukraine) (Jane¶s Defence Weekly, November
23).
China¶s emergence as a major arms exporter owes much to its successful indigenization (aka piracy) of Russian
weapons and technologies that Moscow has sold to Beijing since 1990. This indigenization is a long-standing and
deeply ingrained practice going back many years, and a systematic Chinese policy to advance the technological level
and quality of indigenously produced weapons while reducing its dependence upon foreign suppliers (See "Recent
Trends in Russo-Chinese Military Relations," China Brief, January 22). As a result, China¶s advances in the arms sales
markets come largely at the expense of Russia, as Chinese arms are becoming more competitive in those markets where
Russian weapons and technologies have established a niche in recent years. Naturally, this situation discomfits arms
sellers in Russia but policymakers in Moscow still insist on maintaining a strong relationship with Beijing even if Russia
will sell China fewer weapons than before (ITAR-TASS, September 30; FBIS SOV, September 30). Thus, it remains
unclear²to what degree if any²China suffers any penalties from its indigenization policy. In this way, China is
becoming a direct competitor to Russia in the international arms markets, and even among the commonwealth of
independent states (CIS).
The scope of China¶s arms sales offensive is global. In Africa, China sells arms to those states from which it buys oil
and gas or where it has gained access to explore for oil or gas (e.g. Sudan). Yet it is also clear that China is competing
with Russia in the African arms market with indigenized versions of Russian-made weapons systems. For instance,
according to Japanese reports China is ³frantically´ trying to sell SU-27 fighters in the guise of China¶s J-11 Fighters to
African states (Foresight, February 19; FBIS SOV, September 30). Similarly in South America, an area that Russia has
targeted as one of the key future markets where it hopes to increase its market share, China is beginning to offer the
same states competitive weapons systems (Interfax-AVN Online, October 22; FBIS SOV, October 22). In 2010, China
will deliver six of the eighteen K-8 Karakorum trainer or light attack planes that it sold to Venezuela, and is lending
Ecuador $52 million to buy aircraft for its air force. In early 2009, Ecuador signed a contract for $60 million to buy
Chinese air defense radars; its first purchases from China in 15 years (Defense News, November 28).
Perhaps the most significant example of China¶s aggressive arms sales posture can be found in the Middle East, the key
market where it competes with Moscow and Washington. Iran has already reached the point where it can appeal to
China for defense exports (ironically probably knock-offs of Russian weapons). Thus, Iran has raised hints that if
Russia does not sell the S-300 SAM for which it signed a contract in 2007, Tehran might turn to the HQ-9 surface-to-air
missile (FD-2000) as the alternative (Press TV, May 10). As an Iranian report noted:
As Iran¶s quest for the advanced Russian-made S-300 air defense system is believed to have hit rock bottom, a report by
RIA Novosti said Tehran is eyeing a Chinese-made HQ-9 surface-to-air missile under the name FD-2000²recently put
on the export market. The HongQi-9/FD-2000 reportedly combines elements ³borrowed´ from Russia¶s S-300 and
America¶s MIM-104 Patriot. It uses elements of the Russian system¶s ³solid rocket, aerodynamic layout, gas-dynamic
spoilers and launcher technologies, as well as some search and guidance systems.´ The missile has a range of 7-125
kilometers for airborne targets²a range much lower than the 150-kilometer range of the Russian S-300 PMU1. The
Chinese system¶s range for missile targets, or air-to-ground missiles, is 7-50 kilometers, with a firing altitude of 1-18
kilometers. Its range for cruise missiles is 7-15 kilometers, at a firing altitude of 0.025 kilometers. The range for ballistic
missiles is 7-25 kilometers at a firing altitude of 2-15 kilometers (Press TV, May 10).
Egypt, a former Russian client who, like others, became frustrated with the poor quality of Russian weapons, also began
switching to Chinese arms (FBIS SOV, February 19). Moreover, China has announced that it will compete with Russia
and the United States for entry into Turkey¶s surface-to-air missiles (SAM) market (FBIS SOV, August 31).
Finally, in South and Southeast Asia where China has sold its weapons and technology²which are generally copies of
Russian systems²and in particular to Pakistan, China is intensifying the regional arms race with India, and competing
with Russia in Southeast Asia. Specifically, China¶s recent sale of at least 36 J-10 fighter jets, and the possibility that it
could sell Pakistan up to 150, is a testament to its strength in the Pakistani market and to the enduring quality of the
regional arms race with India. This sale is perhaps the most impressive testimony to China¶s new assertiveness in the
global arms market (See "J-10: The New Cornerstone of Sino-Pakistani Defense Cooperation," China Brief, December
16).
Accordingly, China¶s Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) has also emerged as a rival to Russia¶s Sukhoi and MiG
Aircraft that are marketed abroad by Rosoboroneksport, Russia¶s arms seller, in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Eastern Europe, and eventually in Africa with regard to helicopters. Meanwhile, Pakistan will soon roll out its first
indigenously produced JF-17 that China copied from Russia and sold (FBIS SOV, October 7). Indeed, it has become
clear that China has sold or otherwise transferred Russian defense technologies like RPGs, the PK-10 Assault gun,
howitzer ammunition and anti-tank rockets to Pakistan, much to the anger of Russian officials (Kanwa Asian Defense,
August 2009; FBIS SOV, August 31).
Beyond these considerations, the deal with Pakistan also has important geopolitical ramifications. Clearly, China is
concerned about the growth of Indian military power and political standing and Beijing is showing that it intends to
restrain New Delhi by keeping it preoccupied with Pakistan. This sale demonstrates the long-standing policy of China in
action. Second, it also shows that China will not supinely let the U.S. challenge it for primacy as the main foreign
influence in Pakistan. As the Times of India reported:
Beijing is keen to reduce U.S. influence on Pakistan, which will make it easier for it to deal with India, sources said.
Washington's recent decision to extend massive financial assistance to Islamabad is seen in some quarters as a policy
setback for China. It is now trying to get back its influence over Pakistan by selling two squadrons of advanced jets,
sources said. Even more significant is Beijing's eagerness to share advanced technology with Pakistan, which is
something US suppliers are usually reluctant to do. A report from Pakistan said it wants to buy a larger number of
warplanes from China besides the two squadrons of J-10 fighter planes it is buying at the moment. A Pakistani official
described the plane sales deal as a "landmark" in Pak-China relations (Times of India, November 11).
In spite of agreements in late 2008 where China agreed not to create any suspicion of copying or exporting weapons
using Russian technology to third countries in return for a renewed effort at a cooperative relationship with Russia,
China failed to adhere to the agreement and it led to a temporary blocking of Russian arms sales to China (Sankei
Shimbun Online, February 2; Kanwa Asian Defense, August 2009; FBIS SOV, August 31).
Conclusion
These arms sales and their scope indicate that China fully intends to become a permanent competitor with Russia and
eventually with European and American firms in the international arms market. There does not seem to be a way to stop
Beijing from indigenizing systems that it has received from Russia other than to curtail sales to it. Yet even if Russia
stops selling China arms, an action that entails serious costs for Russia, it may be too late to stop Chinese firms from
introducing their own competitive refinements and improvements to a host of weapon systems. Moreover, Chinese
systems are attractive to countries based on price or in return for the political and economic support that China gives to
their regimes (e.g. Sudan). Iran¶s example also suggests what could happen to Russia if China supplants it in the arms
market, namely a turn from Moscow to Beijing in Iran¶s foreign policies. And the rivalry for the Turkish SAM (a project
whose urgency grows with Iran¶s rising missile capability) suggests that Russia in some cases may actually not even be
competitive to customers relative to China. In other words, in this manifestation of China¶s assertiveness in the
international arena this is only the beginning of China¶s rise in its arms sales policies, just as this is only the beginning of
its self-assertion in financial system reform and other areas of international affairs.
[ The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.]
=(C-' ! c&( 1 c

Category: China Brief, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Featured
By: Tarique Niazi
J-10
China and Pakistan have forged a formidable partnership in high-tech defense production. This partnership is born of
their ever-deepening military and strategic cooperation that is also reflective of the burgeoning capacity of China's
defense industries and the budding Sino-Pakistani defense relationship. The epitome of this bilateralism is the recent
revelation that the Chinese have agreed to the sale of 36 J-10B fighter jets to Pakistan (Financial Times, November 10).
The J-10 aircrafts are known to be one of the most advanced weapon systems in China¶s arsenal, of which Pakistan will
be the first recipient. With the delivery of 36 fighter jets, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) will raise two fighting squadrons
that will further sharpen its combativeness. The J-10 deal was reportedly sealed for a whopping $1.4 billion, which
accounts for 70 percent of Chinese average arms sales of $2 billion a year (China Brief, July 9).
The J-10 Sale Epitomizes Strategic Alliance
The deal marks the depth of a strategic alliance between Beijing and Islamabad. Some reports suggest that Pakistan is
actually seeking 150 J-10 fighter jets, which go by Chengdu Jian-10 in China and F-10 in Pakistan, for a sum of $6
billion (The Hindu, November 11). The Pakistani government, however, dismisses such reports as inflated (Financial
Times, November 10). Although Pakistan has not yet made the deal public, its prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, on
November 23, confirmed that ³his country is in talks with China for securing the J-10s´ [1]. Pakistan turned to China for
these aircraft in 2006 after it failed to secure the F-16s from the United States (Dawn, May 1, 2006). General Pervez
Musharraf, Pakistan¶s former military ruler, who negotiated the deal during his visit to China in 2006, is the real
architect of this grand sale (The Hindu, November 11).
The J-10s are China¶s third generation fighter aircraft that it has indigenously developed (The Hindu, November 11) and
manufactured at the Chengdu Aircraft Industry (CAI). Some observers, however, believe that J-10s are China¶s fourth
generation aircraft. ³This aircraft is a cousin to the Israeli Lavi (upon which it is based) and roughly equivalent in
capabilities to the U.S. F-16C flown by several air forces around the world´ (See "China¶s Re-emergence as an Arms
Dealer: The Return of the King?" China Brief, July 9). The J-10s started development in the mid-1980s and finally
entered production for the People¶s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) about three or four years ago. Aviation experts
rank them below the F-16s, the Swedish Gripen and other smaller combat aircraft (China Brief, July 9). According to a
report in The Hindu (November 11), China is working on developing its fourth generation fighter jets as well. The
United States, The Hindu report further claims, is the only country that possesses a fourth generation combat aircraft²
the F-22s. Yet aviation experts believe the F-22s are fifth generation fighter jets. Chinese Deputy Commander of the
PLAAF General He Weirong claimed that ³China would operationalize its very own fourth generation aircraft in the
next eight or ten years´ (The Hindu, November 11). The Chinese official further claimed that the fourth generation
planes would ³match or exceed the capacity of similar jets in existence today´ (The Hindu, November 11).
In anticipation, China is also training Pakistani fighter pilots for flying the fourth generation combat aircraft. On January
16, it delivered eight Karakoram K-8P trainer jets to Pakistan for this purpose. According to an official statement, the K-
8P jets had enhanced the basic training of PAF pilots and provided a ³potent platform for their smooth transition to more
challenging fourth generation fighter aircraft´ (The Asian Defence, January 16). The K-8P is an advanced trainer jet that
has been jointly developed by China and Pakistan. It is already in service at the PAF Academy. At the handing-over
ceremony for the K-8Ps, a visiting Chinese delegation as well as high-ranking PAF officers were in attendance.
China¶s sale of the J-10 fighters to Pakistan, however, signals the depth of its strategic alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan
will be the first country to receive the most advanced Chinese aircraft, which speaks volumes to Chinese faith in its
strategic partnership with Pakistan. Defense analysts, however, believe that the sale sends an important message to the
world that China¶s ³defense capability is growing rapidly´ (Financial Times, November 10). China-Pakistan military
relations spanned over 43 years, starting in 1966 when China provided Pakistan with F-6s, which were followed by the
successive supply of such aircraft as FT5, A5, F-7P, F-7PG and K-8 (Jang, November 22).
These relations continue to grow with high-level exchanges in the defense sector. As recently as October of this year,
Chinese Vice-Minister Chen Qiufa, administrator of China¶s State Administration for Science, Technology & Industry
for National Defense (SASTIND), led a delegation of Chinese defense-companies to Pakistan. He called on Prime
Minister Gilani and discussed cooperation in the JF-17 Thunder Project, Al Khalid tank, F-22 frigates, Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), and aircraft and naval ships (APP, October 17). The Chinese delegation
included representatives from China's missile technology firm Poly Technologies as well as Aviation Industries Corp. of
China, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, China Electronics Technology Group and China North Industry
Corporation.
Although there is a proliferation of joint defense projects between China and Pakistan, their collaboration in aviation
industry has peaked at the turn of the millennium. The mainstay of their joint defense production is the Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC) in Kamra (Punjab), which services, assembles and manufactures fighter and trainer
aircraft. The PAC is rated as the world¶s third largest assembly plant. Initially, it was founded with Chinese assistance to
rebuild Chinese aircraft in the PAF fleet, which included Shenyang F-6 (now retired), Nanchang A-5, F-7 combat
aircraft, Shenyang FT-5 and FT-6 Jet trainer aircraft. The PAC also houses the Kamra Radar and Avionics Factory
(KARF), which is meant to assemble and overhaul airborne as well as ground-based radar systems, electronics, and
avionics. The KARF, which is ISO-9002 certified, has upgraded the PAF Chengdu F-7P interceptor fleet. Over time, the
PAC has expanded its operation into aircraft manufacturing, and built a specialized manufacturing unit in the 1980s: The
Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF). The AMF got noticed in the region when it partnered with the Hongdu Aviation
Industry Group of China to design, develop and coproduce the K-8 Karakoram (Hongdu JL-8), which is an advanced jet
trainer. The AMF¶s flagship project, however, is the Sino-Pakistani joint production and manufacture of the JF-17
Thunder aircraft, which it is producing with the Chengdu Aircraft Industry (CAI).
JF-17 Thunder Makes Over the PAF
In recent history, China and Pakistan set out for the joint production of JF-17 combat aircraft that both countries
consider a substitute for U.S. F-16s. Pakistan¶s indigenous manufacture of the first JF-17 (which goes by FC-1 in China)
came to fruition on November 23, when Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), an arm of the Pakistan Air Force,
turned it over to the PAF to the chants of ³Long Live Pak-China Friendship´ (The News International, November 24).
Pakistan¶s Prime Minister, Pakistan Chief of Army Staff and Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Lou Zhaohui, were
among the dignitaries who attended the handing-over ceremony. Chinese Ambassador Zhaohui, speaking on the
occasion, told his audience: ³China wants to further broaden the defense cooperation with Pakistan´ (Jang, November
23). The PAF already has 10 JF-17s, which were produced in China, in its fleet. The JF-17 project began in 1992, under
which China agreed to transfer technology for the aircraft¶s joint production. The project was hampered in 1999, when
Pakistan came under proliferation sanctions. It gained momentum in 2001.
On September 3, 2003, its prototype, which was manufactured in China, conducted the first test flight. The PAF claims
that the JF-17s, with a glass cockpit and modern avionics, are comparable to any fighter plane (Jang, November 23). It is
a lightweight combat jet, fitted with turbofan engine, advanced flight control, and the most advanced weapons delivery
system. As a supersonic plane, its speed is 1.6 times the speed of its sound, and its ability to refuel midair makes it a
³stand-out´ (Jang, November 23). Pakistan intends to raise a squadron of JF-17s by 2010. The Chief of Air Staff of the
PAF told a newspaper that JF-17s would help ³replace the existing fleet of the PAF comprising F-7s, A-5s and all
Mirage aircraft´ (The News International, November 8). Eventually, Pakistan will have 350 JF-17s that will completely
replace its ageing fleet.
Pakistan also plans to export these aircraft to developing countries for which, it says, orders have already started pouring
in (Jang, November 22). China and Pakistan anticipate an annual export of 40 JF-17s to Asian, African and Middle
Eastern nations [2]. At $25 million apiece, the export of 40 aircraft will fetch them $1 billion per year. There are
estimates that Asia will purchase 1,000 to 1,500 aircraft over the next 15 years. In this Sino-Pakistani joint venture,
Pakistan will have 58 percent of shares, while China will have 42 percent (The News International, November 25).
Besides defense aviation, China and Pakistan are closely collaborating on the joint production of naval ships as well.
Chinese Frigates for the Pakistan Navy
China and Pakistan worked out a $750 million loan to help Pakistan build four F-22P frigates (The News International,
September 16, 2004). In 2004, Pakistan negotiated this non-commercial (i.e. low-cost) loan with China for the joint
manufacture of naval ships. China and Pakistan have since moved fast to begin work on this project. They have now
expanded the original deal to build eight F22P frigates respectively at Hudong Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai, China,
and Karachi shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW), Pakistan. The manufacturing cost of each F22P Frigate, which is
an improved version of China¶s original Type 053H3 Frigate, is $175 million. At this rate, the cost of eight frigates will
run at about $1.4 billion.
The first Chinese-built F-22 frigate, named PNS Zulfiqar (Arabic for sword), was delivered to Pakistan on July 30 (The
Nation, July 31). A month later, the ship was formally commissioned in the Pakistan Navy fleet in September. Soon
after its arrival in July, the ship participated in the Pakistan Navy¶s SeaSpark exercises. Of the original four frigates,
three were to be built in China and one in Pakistan (Asia Times, July 11, 2007). After the delivery of PNS Zulfiqar, the
remaining two ships that are being built in China are expected to be commissioned in the Pakistan Navy fleet by 2010.
The fourth ship being built in Pakistan¶s Karachi shipyard will be ready by 2013 (Asia Times, July 11, 2007).
The Pakistan Navy describes the F-22P frigate as a Sword Class ship that is equipped with long-range surface-to-surface
missiles (SSM) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM), depth charges, torpedoes, the latest 76mm guns, a close-in-weapons
system (CIWS), sensors, electronic warfare and an advanced command and control system (The Nation, July 31). The
ship has a displacement of 3,000 tons and carries anti-submarine Z9EC helicopters. China has already delivered the first
batch of two such helicopters to Pakistan. Although the Pakistan Navy has Sea-King helicopters for anti-submarine
operations, it is now acquiring Chinese Z9ECs to enhance its operational capabilities (The Nation, July 31). In addition
to building eight frigates, the Sino-Pakistan defense deal includes the upgrading of the Karachi dockyard for indigenous
production of a modern surface fleet. The frigates deal is the first of its kind between China and Pakistan, which forges
their two navies into a high-level collaboration for boosting their surface fleet.
Conclusion
At the turn of the millennium, China and Pakistan have diversified their defense trade into joint defense production.
They have since been collaborating on the production of most advanced weapons systems, such as the JF-17s combat
aircraft and F-22P Frigates. Pakistan will receive the transfer of technology for the J-10s as well. China recognizes that
Pakistan is rich with human capital in the high-tech defense industry, which serves as a magnet for its investment. Both
China and Pakistan look to capture wider defense export markets in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. At the same time,
their growing cooperation in aviation and naval defense systems signals an important shift in Pakistan¶s military
doctrine that traditionally favored Army (especially ground forces) over its sister services²Navy and Air Force. In the
region¶s changing strategic environment, in which China has growing stakes, Pakistan has come to recognize the critical
importance of air and naval defense. The China-Pakistan collaboration in aviation and naval defense amply embodies
this recognition.
Notes
1. ³NRO beneficiaries will be held to account.´ Daily Intekhab, daily dailyintekhab.com.pk/news/news10.gif.

2. Tarique Niazi, ³China-Pakistan Relations: Past, Present and Future,´ A presentation made at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars on January 29, 2009.
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Category: China Brief, Willy¶s Corner, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific, Elite
By: Willy Lam
The latest reshuffle in the provincial-party leadership has validated a seminal trend in Chinese politics: the rise of party
apparatchiks and the relative decline of technocrats. Early this month, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Organization
Department announced two promotions: Hebei Governor Hu Chunhua was made Party Secretary of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, while Agriculture Minister Sun Zhengcai became Party Secretary of northwestern Jilin Province.
Hu and Sun, both 46, have thus become the two most senior members of the Sixth-Generation leadership, a reference to
top-level cadres born in the 1960s. Other personnel movements in the past year have reinforced the ascendancy of
danggong or party affairs specialists over professional administrators. The Politburo will, early next year, begin
preparations for the 18th CCP Congress of 2012, when the bulk of Central Committee and Politburo members will retire
in favor of Fifth- and Sixth-Generation cadres. The preeminence enjoyed by a cohort of party functionaries can have a
lasting impact on not only the composition of China¶s ruling team but also the country¶s policy orientations in the
coming decade or so.
While Sun, a respected agronomist with a doctorate in agriculture, can be classified as a technocrat, Hu and the bulk of
Sixth-Generation rising stars are career danggong with little exposure to portfolios in the economics, trade, foreign
affairs or technology portfolios. The latter group includes Governor of Hunan Province Zhou Qiang, 49; Chairman of
the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Nur Bekri, 48; Party Secretary of the Communist Youth League (CYL), Lu Hao, 42;
Party Secretary of the Hebei boom town of Tangshan, Zhao Yong, 46; and Party Secretary of Hefei, capital of Anhui
Province, Sun Jinlong, 47. Most of these young Turks are already in the Central Committee as either full or alternate
members. Moreover, Hu Chunhua, Jilin¶s Sun as well as Hunan¶s Zhou stand a good chance of being promoted to
Politburo members at the 18th Party Congress (China News Service, December 1; Ming Pao [Hong Kong] December 2;
Global Times [Beijing], December 3).
There are several reasons behind the growing prominence of party apparatchiks. Firstly, most of them are ranking
members of the so-called CYL Faction, which is headed by Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao, 67. Hu
Jintao, Hu Chunhua²who are not related²as well as Hunan¶s Zhou are former party bosses of the league. Since
becoming party chief in 2002, Hu and close aides such as Director of the CCP Organization Department Li Yuanchao²
a Politburo member who is also a CYL stalwart²have elevated a few dozen CYL alumnae to important slots at both the
central and regional levels. The most high-profile Sixth-Generation CYL Faction member is undoubtedly Hu Chunhua,
who, like President Hu, had a remarkable career in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The younger Hu is even deemed a
probable successor to Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is the odds-on favorite to become party general secretary at the
18th Party Congress, when the older Hu is expected to retire from the Politburo (Le Monde [Paris], December 5; Straits
Times [Singapore], December 9).
President Hu's preference for danggong veterans over technocrats is in line with the practice of ex-president Jiang
Zemin. Eight among the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), China¶s supreme ruling council,
are career party functionaries who have served as party secretaries in major provinces. The exception is Premier Wen,
who has been both a party affairs specialist in the CCP headquarters and a State Council technocrat. In addition, 18
among the 25 Politburo members are either former or serving provincial party secretaries. According to the respected
party journal Decision-Making, salient attributes of provincial party secretaries include the power of ³political
discrimination´; ability to grasp the ³big picture´; capacity for strategic thinking; and ability to appoint capable
underlings and to build a good image for the party (Global Times, December 7; Chongqing Evening News [Chongqing],
December 6).
Most significantly, given their expertise in Marxist ideology, CCP dogma and propaganda work, senior danggong are
considered more politically savvy and ³trustworthy´ than numbers-crunching experts handling finance or trade
portfolios in the government. Since the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Vice-President Xi and Li Yuanchao, who are
Politburo members in charge of organization and personnel matters, have made scores of speeches on ways of
identifying neophytes with potential for top-echelon posts. While Third-Generation leaders including Deng strove to
strike a balance between ³redness´ (ideological purity and political correctness) and expertise (professional
competence), President Hu, Xi and Li have come down heavily in favor of de, meaning ³morality´, and in the CCP
context, political rectitude and readiness to toe the Beijing line. Li has reiterated that cadres being groomed for fast-track
promotion ³should pass muster in both de and competence, with priority given to de.´ ³Quite a number of cadres have
gone astray not due to the question of professional competence but because of lapses in morality,´ the Organization
Department Chief said last month (People¶s Daily, December 1; Outlook Weekly [Beijing], November 30).
By contrast, only a handful of well-regarded Sixth-Generation technocrats seem destined for the top. They include the
Chairman of China Commercial Aircraft Co., Ltd. (CCAC), Zhang Qingwei, 48, and the President of the mammoth oil
monopoly Sinopec, Su Shulin, 49. A famous rocket scientist who played a key role in China¶s space program, Zhang
served briefly as Minister at the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense a few years ago.
Su spent his entire career in the oil and gas sector, except for two years as a ranking member of CCP Committee of
Liaoning Province (Businessweek, November 4; lanyue.com [Beijing], December 2). According to time-honored
practice, however, cadres who have excelled in the fields of industry, business and technology face a glass ceiling after
reaching the level of minister. It is most unusual for technocrats to be inducted into the policy-setting Politburo. Zhu
Rongji, the Deng protégé who was prime minister from 1998 to 2003, is one of the few exceptions of a technocrat who
made it to the PBSC.
Moreover, even among technocrats who are expected to play a big role in central government ministries after the 18th
Party Congress, few of them are ³returnees,´ a reference to officials and professionals with advanced degrees from the
United States and Europe. For instance, both Zhang and Su are graduates of Chinese universities. By contrast, several
ministers in the first and second Wen Jiabao cabinets, including Health Minister Chen Zhu, Minister of Science and
Technology Wan Gang and former Education Minister Zhou Ji boast doctorates from well-known universities in the
West. Wan, an award-winning auto engineer and Chen, a specialist on leukemia, also spent several years working in
senior positions in Germany and France respectively (New York Times, April 10; Newsweek International, April 6).
Partly due to their relatively sensitive portfolios, however, the majority of career party functionaries, particularly those
affiliated with the CYL, have neither studied nor worked in the West.
The contrasting political fortune of apparatchiks versus that of technocrats may adversely affect the ability of the CCP to
adapt itself to the fast-shifting realities of the 21st century. In major addresses on the future of the party and country,
President Hu and Vice-President Xi have put emphasis on innovation and theoretical breakthroughs. For example, in his
much-noted speech a year ago marking the 30th anniversary of the start of the reform era, Hu underscored the
imperative of the spirit of ³bold exploration and brave innovation´ in reforming party institutions and government
policies (Xinhua News Agency, December 18, 2008). In order to satisfy the ³morality´ criterion, however, danggong
veterans seem more adept at demonstrating political trustworthiness and avoiding mistakes than at trying out new ideas
that may be deemed controversial and ideologically suspect. Moreover, apparatchiks¶ lack of exposure to areas such as
international finance and foreign trade has constrained their ability to keep abreast of the latest economic and IT
developments in a fast-changing world.
Even more disturbing is the trend that more and more graduates from top institutes of learning such as Peking University
and Tsinghua University have opted for danggong careers. This is in the footsteps of both Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua,
who decided in 1966 and 1983 respectively to become party cadres immediately upon graduation from these elite
colleges. The past few years have witnessed a phenomenal increase in college graduates applying for the post of party
secretary or vice-party secretary in grassroots administrative units ranging from villages to counties. Last year, more
than 66,000 university graduates were appointed village-level cadres. This was equal to the aggregate number of
college-educated rural officials who had been hired for such jobs in the previous 15 years. Also rising rapidly are the
numbers of male and female students who want to join the army upon graduation. A record 130,000 college graduates
were recruited by the PLA this year. A stint in the PLA is a much-valued experience that can help young men and
women advance their careers as party functionaries (People¶s Daily, October 21; Guangzhou Daily [Guangzhou],
October 31; China Youth Daily [Beijing], April 22). While this trend may have been partially caused by rising
unemployment among new graduates this year, there is little question that college students see a bright future ahead as
party functionaries.
The rising political fortune of apparatchiks perhaps explains the CCP¶s increasingly tight embrace of the traditional
canon. This has been evidenced by the resuscitation of Maoist values particularly in a number of central and western
provinces and cities (See ³The CCP¶s Disturbing Revival of Maoism,´ China Brief, November 19). By contrast,
technocratic officials are much more conscious of the need to sell Chinese products²as well as China¶s image²abroad
in the age of globalization. As such, professional managers and administrators seem generally less willing to be
identified with political campaigns of previous generations. Very much in the tradition of ex-premier Zhu and Premier
Wen, they usually make an effort to steer clear of the ideological issues. The stranglehold that danggong veterans have
over top-echelon slots in the party-and-government apparatus, however, seems to render it unlikely that China can make
a clean break from orthodox norms of yesteryear.
c +>

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!$ $
Category: China Brief, China and the Asia-Pacific, Military/Security, Home Page, In a Fortnight
By: Russell Hsiao
China's "underground Great Wall"
In early December, the People¶s Liberation Army's (PLA) publication, China Defense Daily (Zhongguo Guofang Bao),
published a report that provided a rare glimpse into an underground tunnel that is being built by the Second Artillery
Corps (SAC)²the PLA's strategic missile forces²in the mountainous regions of Hebei Province in northern China. The
network of tunnels reportedly stretches for more than 3,107 miles (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency,
December 14). The revelation of the semi-underground tunnel highlights the strides being made by China's nuclear
modernization efforts, and underscores a changing deterrent relationship between the United States and China.
The labyrinthine tunnel system, dubbed by the Chinese-media as the "Underground Great Wall´ (Dixia Changcheng),
was built for concealing, mobilizing and deploying China's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. According to military
experts cited by various reports, the main purpose of the underground tunnel is to provide the SAC with a credible
second-strike capability. The building of an underground tunnel for this purpose is consistent with China's evolving
nuclear doctrine from its traditional posture of "minimum deterrence" to a doctrine of "limited deterrence," since the
subterranean bunkers strengthen the survivability of China's nuclear forces and bolster its nuclear deterrence posture.
Analysts have long speculated that the SAC' most important underground missile positions were located in the
mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited
for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 3,017 miles and can feed a web of underground launch silos. According
to a military analyst cited by Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep
and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News
Agency, December 14). Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried
targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the of
case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the
transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-
duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground (Ta Kung Pao, December 11;
News.sina.com, December 13; Xinhua News Agency, December 14).
The SAC arsenal of land-based nuclear warheads is believed to include the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5 (CSS-4), DF-21, DF-31
and the DF-31A. These land-based ballistic missiles have a range of 200 to 5,000 kilometers. According to one U.S.-
estimate, "China has approximately 176 deployed warheads, plus an unknown number of stored warheads, for a total
stockpile of approximately 240 warheads" (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3).
This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995,
according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a SAC project called the "Great Wall" was
completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of army engineers. Furthermore, the
Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese-state run television network CCTV on
March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project"
(Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
An article published in the Taiwan-based Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, entitled "A Destructive Projection Power:
PLA Second Artillery Corps' Long-range Guided Missiles," by former Taiwanese Vice Admiral Lan Ning-li, included
an analysis that also discussed underground installations of the Second Artillery Corps. According to Vice Admiral
Lan's assessment: "The early version of China's mid-to long-range missiles had all been deployed above ground and
were vulnerable to detection by spy satellites and attacks by interceptor missiles. That prompted the Chinese military to
move all of their missiles hundreds of meters underground" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Chosun Ilbo, December 14).
Moreover, a Hong Kong-based military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao suggested that the timing of the open declaration
about China's nuclear modernization before negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may be meant to draw
attention to China's nuclear stature (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
Yet, while deterrence assumes that a more secure second-strike capability could enhance stability by causing adversaries
to act more cautiously, some analysts have pointed out that strategic stability may not be the necessary outcome of
China's deployment of a secure second-strike capability (See "The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy," China Brief,
March 4). Since China continues to conceal details about the size and composition of its nuclear stockpile, this may lead
to more concerns from China's regional neighbors over Beijing's nuclear modernization.

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Changing Domestic Priorities and China-DRC Relations

A Chinese "Marshall Plan" or Infrastructure for Resources?

The Lubumbashi Copper Boom and Bust

Another ³Great Game´ by the Great Powers?

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A Mixture of Confidence and Caution

China¶s Concerns for Grand Schemes

Z-9G Attack Helicopter

Battlefield Aerospace Aviation Units

Army Aviation Capabilities

Helicopter Fire Support and ISR

Unmanned Air Vehicles

Battlefield Unmanned Ground Vehicles [16]

Africa and China

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Missions and Capabilities: Evolving China

Peacekeeping Deployments: Increasing Participation

Anti-Piracy Efforts: A New Role Abroad

The Olympics as MOOTW

China¶s 2008 Defense White Paper

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

The Sino-Indonesian Strategic Partnership

Lack of Follow Through

China, Indonesia, and Maritime Security

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NSB Chief Tsai Chao-ming

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SAC Commander Jing Zhiyuan

The Evolution of China¶s Nuclear Strategy

The Transition to ³Effective Deterrence´

Chinese Icebreaker Xue Long (Snow Dragon)

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The Expanding Influence of China

The Impact of the Global Recession

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Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping

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Military Confidence Building Measures

What is China¶s Concept of Deterrence? [2]

The Elements of Deterrence

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The Legacy of the Korean War

The Dimensions of Military Relations

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China and the Philippines Spar over Spratlys Ownership

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From Tea Growers to Strategic Partners

Brazil's Largest Export Market

Table1 China¶s Trade with Brazil (in 100 million dollars

Total Trade Growth China China Balance

Note: 2008 covers the period from January to October.

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