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Bayan v.

Zamora,
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACT

The Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United States (US) entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951, to further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to defend to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.

On July 18, 1997, RP and US exchanged notes (discussed) about the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved it, and which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

The VFA consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in
the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified
the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental organizations,


citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents’ grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Petitioner contends, under the provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it
must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for
such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA;
(2) Whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII
of the Constitution;

(3) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA
involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that
the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether
under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court
as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without
power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character
and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and
bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers
exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 212426 Jan 12, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, challenged before the Supreme Court the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the
executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.

Under the EDCA, the Philippines (PH) shall provide the United States (US) forces the access and use of
portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the
Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations:
security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops
and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing
the constitutionality of EDCA. -

(2) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”

(3) Whether or not the non-submission of the EDCA agreement forconcurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution

HELD:

(1) No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public
right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right,
and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific
assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure
to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens’ suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

(2) No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of public funds. A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has
been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.

(3) No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves “adjustments in detail” in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S.
that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of
the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not
be transmitted to the Senate.

Imbong vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of
society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.

Petitioners are assailing, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them,
being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control
measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

HELD:

No. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country’s
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH
Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

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