Corliss v.

Manila Railroad Co AUTHOR: Alex Jaleco

[GR L-21291, March 28, 1969]
TOPIC: Negligence, defined Case number: 1
LAW/S INVOLVED (if any):
NCC Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

DOCTRINE/S: 2 Definitions of Negligence:

1) Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree, of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.

2) Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a

relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. Every
case must be dependent on its facts.

FACTS: In December 1956, Ralph Corliss, a 21 year old air police

stationed at Clark Air Force Base, and a P.C. soldier was returning to
said base. Ralph was driving the jeep. When they crossed the railroad
tracks to reach the entrance of the base, it collided with a train
operated by respondent. The P.C. soldier suffered burns and serious
physical injuries while Corliss died of his burns at the hospital days
later.

Preciolita Corliss, wife of deceased, filed a complaint for recovery of

damages against respondent for negligence.

Testimony of 2 of the witnesses for plaintiff-appellant:

1) Ronald J. Ennis: at the time of the accident, he was was about 40 to
50 yards away from the tracks and that he saw the jeep coming
towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching
the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop — dead
stop. He clarified that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into
first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified
that he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando
and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to
avoid the accident.
2) Virgilio de la Paz testified that he saw the train coming from
Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He
stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the
collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped
the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard
the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing,
according to him.

Testimony of the defendant:

Teodorico Capili (driver) the locomotive, which had been previously
inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing,
about 300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in
compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt
and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25
kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep
was caught in the middle of the tracks.

The lower court ruled that based on the evidence presented, Corliss
became a victim of his own miscalculation when he took a risk in his
eagerness to beat the oncoming train. Hence, an appeal was filed to
the Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable for negligence

HELD: NO. Decision of lower court affirmed.

RATIO: This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making

clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage
done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that Manila
Railroad was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable.
Without damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although
this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising
from some person‘s fault or negligence.

Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a

relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. Every
case must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of
lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably
be expected of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be
met, then negligence is ruled out.
During the trial all 3 witnesses, one of which was the train operator,
had warned the oncoming traffic that it was approaching by blowing its
whistle repeatedly in accordance with regulations. Despite this, one
witness observed that, seeing that the train was coming, Corliss
slowed down his jeep but this was due to the fact that he put the jeep
on first gear in an attempt to give his jeep a boost so it could beat the
train. In fact, the train operator testified that the train was only
running between 20-25 KPH and, despite applying he breaks, the jeep
was still caught in its tracks.

On the knowledge of Corliss and his familiarity with the setup of the
checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that
the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said
witnesses, it is clear that Corliss, Jr. was so sufficiently warned in
advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to
avoid a possible accident. A prudent man under similar circumstances
would have simply stopped his vehicle before crossing and allow the
train to move on.

NOTES (if any):