01 Morfe v.

Mutuc 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides

that “every public officer, ...after his assumption to office and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as
well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and
file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including
a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year...”
Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative
of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as
an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,
implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the
submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts, the CFI found
for Morfe, affirming that the requirement of periodical
submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause – hence, Section 7 of R.A.
3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed
the decision of the CFI before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical

submission of the sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the
State’s police power and is thus offensive to the due process
clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities
for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality
in public administration. A public office must indeed be a
public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be
pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then
prevailing called for norms of such character. The times
demanded such a remedial device.
In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of
a statute’s validity must prevail over mere pleadings and
stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of
Manila). While in the attainment of attainment of such public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable
that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is
a public trust and as such not amounting to property in its
usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the
proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection
afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked.
02 Sabio Vs. Gordon

FACTS:

On February 20, 2006, Sen. M. Defensor-Santiago introduced

Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 "directing an inquiry in
aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors."

Said Resolution was referred to the Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and
Committee on Public Services. It was then transferred to the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises upon motion of Sen. F.Pangilinan.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the

authority of Senator R. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services for the
deliberation of the Senate Resolution.

On May 9, 2006, Sabio declined the invitation because of prior

commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 that “ No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance."

Sen. Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring

Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio
Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public
hearing and testify on what they know relative to the matters
specified in Senate Resolution.

Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors and

officers of Philcomsat Holdings.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. He sent a letter to

Sen. Gordon invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other
hand, the directors of Philcomstat Holdings raised the issues
on the proper legislative inquiry.

Another notice was sent to Sabio requiring him to appear and

testify on the same subject matter but the same did not comply.
Sabio again sent a letter reiterating his position.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring

Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and
Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt
of the Senate.

Unconvinced with the Compliance and Explanation, the

Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an
Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate.

Sabio was arrested.

Hence, he filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas
corpus against the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker
P. Arroyo and Members.

He together with Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and

Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents,
and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate.

Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers

and directors, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen,
Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members.

Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners alleged that:

1. Respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b)

of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason;

2. The inquiries conducted by respondent Senate

Committees are not in aid of legislation;

3. The inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly

published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation; and

4. Respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the

power of contempt.
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers
alleged:

1. Respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over

the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455;

2. The same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's

Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation;

3. The subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void

for having been issued without authority;

4. The conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res.

No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents
into justiciable controversies over which several courts
and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and

5. The subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and

against self-incrimination.

In their Comment, the respondents countered the petitioners’

arguments:

1. the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions

over which SC has no jurisdiction

2. Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution;

3. Respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt

power;
 4. Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation have been duly published;

5. Respondents have not violated any civil right of the

individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy;
and (b) right against self-incrimination; and

6. The inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into

justiciable controversies.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of

legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff
from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding.

RULING:

No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the

power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.
Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the
committees and it means that the mechanism which the
Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained

more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault
that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is

directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b)
exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power
of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
“to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not

within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic
principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the

Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21),
the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the
policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to

the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.
03 Malaloan v. CA GR No. 104879 May 6, 1994
Facts: A search warrant was sought for in connection with an
alleged violation of PD1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions) perpetrated in Quezon City. The application for
search warrant however was made in Caloocan City. The
petitioners, Malaloan and Luarez, were the ones indicted by
virtue of the said search warrant. Information was filed against
them for violation of PD1866. Petitioners assailed the validity of
the search warrant since it was applied in Caloocan City which
was outside the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City.
Issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an
application for a search warrant in connection with an offense
allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction
Held: Yes, the court may take cognizance and may issue a
search warrant even if the offense is committed outside its
territorial jurisdiction
Ratio: A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed
by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if
one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the
latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some
judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to
where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first
place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may
ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that
wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located.
This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may
be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos
continuados or in those instances where different trial courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal
offense.
04 Valmonte vs. De Villa
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation
of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when,
at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning
the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning
shots fired in the air.

Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of

the people against unreasonable searches and seizures
Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension
at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal.
No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in
the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against
unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed,
or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The
setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt,
in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is,
however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible
of abuse by the military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
05 PEOPLE VS VELOSO 48 PHIL. 169 (1925)

Facts:

-In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member
of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He
was also the manager of the club.

-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called

Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a
result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the
secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a
search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court.
Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary
Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-
mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and
barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of
the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the
outer door.

-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were

apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant
Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told
Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe,
and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's
pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the
game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation
between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting
on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit
to the search.

-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman

Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance.
Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow
in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite
severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and
Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long
sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips
were taken from his pockets.

-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted

to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and shouted
offensive epithets against the police department. It was
necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the
door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were
needed to place him in the patrol wagon.

-The warrant read as follows:

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and does
believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him and which is under his control,
namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in
violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips,
reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in
connection with the game commonly known as monte and that
the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects
with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation
of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in

the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to
make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house
situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and
if you find the same or any part thereof, you are commanded to
bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was
valid.

Ruling: Yes.

RD: It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code

on Criminal Procedure that “a search warrant shall not issue
except for probable cause and upon application supported by
oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person of thing to be seized.”

The name and description of the accused should be inserted in

the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there
must be such a description of the person accused as will enable
the officer to identify him when found.

A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is

unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose
other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and
further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such
warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae
possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be
apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is
to be served; and should state his personal appearance and
peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself described the building to be searched as
"the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched.

As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling

apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe
was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
06 MHP GARMENTS, INC vs. CA September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 86720
FACTS:
In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded
by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to
sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges,
and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was
given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP
received information that private respondents were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de
Guzman (“Larry”), an employee of MHP, was then tasked to
undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the
Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain

Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other constabulary men of the
Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the
Marikina Public Market. WITHOUT any warrant, they seized
the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and
embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the
seized items and the items were then turned over to MHP for
safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed

against private respondents but during its pendency, Larry
exacted from respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be
dropped from the complaint. However, after the preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint against all the private respondents and ordered the
return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had
to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their
goods, and even then, not all the seized items were returned and
the other items returned were of inferior quality.

Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and

damages against MHP and Larry (note: the PC officers were not
sued for damages). The RTC ruled in favor of the private
respondents which was later on affirmed by CA.

ISSUES:

1. Did CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who

did not effect the seizure?

NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team

should have been included in the complaint for violation of the
private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will
not exculpate petitioners. Despite the sufficiency of time, they
did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages
in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case
at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was
no probable cause for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their

employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the
seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and
apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as
the officers themselves.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery
of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties
from public officer or private individual. The very nature of
Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is NOT
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article
32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.

In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks
of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer
for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party… it
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly,
as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
2. Did CA err in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious
manner but penalized the petitioners who did not commit the
act of confiscation?

NO. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private

respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure:

 FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their

covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies.
 SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299,
petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
 THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid,
they should have filed a third-party complaint against
the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in
respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of
Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
07 Stonehill vs Diokno G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending,

and the corporation they form were alleged to committed
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which
they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer
to search petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two

groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of
aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’
residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they
do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to
fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court

ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration
were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the

Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper
parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against
their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only
the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said
warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from
petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search
petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the
searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable

search and seizure. It provides:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be

determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners

committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible
for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In
other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality
or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the
invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be
searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.
08 OKLAHOMA PRESS PUBLISHING v. WALLING

February 11, 1946

SUMMARY:

In a prior case decided in 1945, the Administrator of the Wage

and Hour Division of the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA)
was granted authority by the US Supreme Court to enforce
subpoenas against petitioner pursuant to Sec. 11 (a) of the FLSA
which enforces Sec. 9 & 10 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The subpoenas sought the production of specified records
to determine whether petitioners were covered by the Act and
if they were violating the FLSA. Petitioners, claim that the Act
is not applicable to them, and insist that the question of
applicability must be adjudicated before the subpoenas may be
enforced. It was held that the Administrator as authorized by
Congress and upon a judicial order may enforce the production
of documents because there is a distinction between a
"figurative/constructive search" and an actual search and
seizure. Constructive searches are limited by the 4th
Amendment (equivalent to Section 2 of Art. III), where actual
search and seizure requires a warrant based on “probable cause”.
However, where the subject of the constructive search are of
corporate character, the 4th Amendment does not apply,
since corporations are not entitled to all the constitutional
protections created in order to protect the rights of private
individuals (to be secure in person/home, right against self-
incrimination etc).

FACTS:
 Administrator of Hours and Wages Division ordered
subpoenas against petitioner for the production of specified
records to determine whether petitioners were covered by
or violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.

o Pursuant to Section 11(a) of the Act --- authorizes the

Administrator to "investigate and gather data regarding
the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of
employment in any industry subject to this Act, and
[he] may enter and inspect such places and such
records...”

o Claims that all the books, records, papers and

documents referred to in the subpoena were "relative,
material, and appropriate" to determine whether the
company had violated the Act, and would "aid in the
enforcement of the provisions of the Act".

 Information alleged that petitioner, as publisher of two

daily newspapers, was engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce within the meaning of
the Act.

 Petitioner’s arguments:

a. Neither it nor any of its employees were engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.
(irrelevant)

b. If petitioner or any of its employees are engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
as a newspaper publisher, it is a service establishment
as defined by Section 13(a) (2) of the Act and therefore
exempt from its coverage. (irrelevant)
 c. A forced investigation would be an unreasonable
search and seizure, and, moreover, any attempted
regulation of its business violated the freedom of the
press.

 Will allow fishing expeditions by government to

collect evidence without prior charge or
complaint

 Court of Appeals affirmed Administrator’s orders in cases

No. 61 and 63, hence the current petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrator has the right to

judicial enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum in the course of
investigations.

HELD: Petition is DENIED. Judgments by the Court of

Appeals in cases No. 61 and No. 63 are affirmed.

RATIO:

1. Alleged Violation of 4th Amendment (fishing expeditions)

 Records present no question of actual search and

seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of
court for the production of specified records have been
validly made; and no sufficient showing appears to
justify setting them aside.

2. Standards for Constructive searches involving corporate

documents
  Specific charge or complaint - not necessary, as in the
case of a warrant. It is enough that the investigation be
for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of
Congress to command. This has been ruled most often
in relation to grand jury investigations, general or
statistical investigations authorized by Congress.

 Probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation -

satisfied in an order for production by the court's
determination that the investigation is authorized by
Congress, for a purpose Congress can order, and the
documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.

 Reasonableness and Particularity - applicable to

warrants, comes down to specification of the
documents to be produced adequate, but not excessive,
for the purposes of the relevant inquiry.

 Case to case basis - for relevancy and adequacy or

excess in the breadth of the subpoena are matters
variable in relation to the nature, purposes and scope
of the inquiry.

3. Corporation is not protected by the same rights as that of an

individual

 As applied to the facts of the present case, it is

impossible to conceive how a violation of petitioners'
rights could have been involved.

 The only records or documents sought were corporate

ones. No possible element of self-incrimination may be
claimed. All the records sought were relevant to the
authorized inquiry.
 The purpose of which was to determine two issues,
whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so,
whether they were violating it.

 Administrator issued according to the statute's

authorization, to have the aid of the district court in
enforcing it. No constitutional provision forbids
Congress to do this. On the contrary, its authority
would seem clearly to be comprehended in the
"necessary and proper" clause, as incidental to both its
general legislative and its investigative powers.
09 96 U.S. 727 (1877) EX PARTE JACKSON.

Supreme Court of United States.

*729 Mr. A.J. Dittenhoefer and Mr. Louis F. Post for the
petitioner.

Mr. Assistant-Attorney-General Smith, contra.

*732 MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the court.

The power vested in Congress "to establish post-offices and post-

roads" has been practically construed, since the foundation of
the government, to authorize not merely the designation of the
routes over which the mail shall be carried, and the offices
where letters and other documents shall be received to be
distributed or forwarded, but the carriage of the mail, and all
measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy transit, and the
prompt delivery of its contents. The validity of legislation
prescribing what should be carried, and its weight and form, and
the charges to which it should be subjected, has never been
questioned. What should be mailable has varied at different
times, changing with the facility of transportation over the post-
roads. At one time, only letters, newspapers, magazines,
pamphlets, and other printed matter, not exceeding eight ounces
in weight, were carried; afterwards books were added to the list;
and now small packages of merchandise, not exceeding a
prescribed weight, as well as books and printed matter of all
kinds, are transported in the mail. The power possessed by
Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of
the country. The right to designate what shall be carried
necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be
excluded. The difficulty attending the subject arises, not from
the want of power in Congress to prescribe regulations as to
what shall constitute mail matter, but from the necessity of
enforcing them consistently with rights reserved to the people,
of far greater importance than the transportation of the mail. In
their enforcement,

*733 a distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail

matter, — between what is intended to be kept free from
inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter
postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers,
magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left
in a condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of
this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people
to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection,
wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be
opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in
one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands
of officials connected with the postal service any authority to
invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the
mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind
must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the
fourth amendment of the Constitution.
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation
of printed matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so
as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the press.
Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of
publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication
would be of little value. If, therefore, printed matter be excluded
from the mails, its transportation in any other way cannot be
forbidden by Congress.

In 1836, the question as to the power of Congress to exclude

publications from the mail was discussed in the Senate; and the
prevailing opinion of its members, as expressed in debate, was
against the existence of the power. President Jackson, in his
annual message of the previous year, had referred to the
attempted circulation through the mail of inflammatory appeals,
addressed to the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various
publications, tending to stimulate them to insurrection; and
suggested to Congress the propriety of passing a law prohibiting

*734 under severe penalties, such circulation of "incendiary

publications" in the Southern States. In the Senate, that portion
of the message was referred to a select committee, of which Mr.
Calhoun was chairman; and he made an elaborate report on the
subject, in which he contended that it belonged to the States,
and not to Congress, to determine what is and what is not
calculated to disturb their security, and that to hold otherwise
would be fatal to the States; for if Congress might determine
what papers were incendiary, and as such prohibit their
circulation through the mail, it might also determine what were
not incendiary, and enforce their circulation. Whilst, therefore,
condemning in the strongest terms the circulation of the
publications, he insisted that Congress had not the power to pass
a law prohibiting their transmission through the mail, on the
ground that it would abridge the liberty of the press. "To
understand," he said, "more fully the extent of the control which
the right of prohibiting circulation through the mail would give
to the government over the press, it must be borne in mind that
the power of Congress over the post-office and the mail is an
exclusive power. It must also be remembered that Congress, in
the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable
water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is
provided `that no stage, or other vehicle which regularly
performs trips on a post-road, or on a road parallel to it, shall
carry letters.' The same provision extends to packets, boats, or
other vessels on navigable waters. Like provision may be
extended to newspapers and pamphlets, which, if it be admitted
that Congress has the right to discriminate in reference to their
character, what papers shall or what shall not be transmitted by
the mail, would subject the freedom of the press, on all subjects,
political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and
pleasure. It would in fact, in some respects, more effectually
control the freedom of the press than any sedition law, however
severe its penalties." Mr. Calhoun, at the same time, contended
that when a State had pronounced certain publications to be
dangerous to its peace, and prohibited their circulation, it was
the duty of Congress to respect its laws and co-operate in their
enforcement; and whilst, therefore, Congress could not prohibit
the transmission of the incendiary documents through the
mails.
*735 it could prevent their delivery by the postmasters in the
States where their circulation was forbidden. In the discussion
upon the bill reported by him, similar views against the power
of Congress were expressed by other senators, who did not
concur in the opinion that the delivery of papers could be
prevented when their transmission was permitted.

Great reliance is placed by the petitioner upon these views,

coming, as they did in many instances, from men alike
distinguished as jurists and statesmen. But it is evident that they
were founded upon the assumption that it was competent for
Congress to prohibit the transportation of newspapers and
pamphlets over postal-routes in any other way than by mail; and
of course it would follow, that if, with such a prohibition, the
transportation in the mail could also be forbidden, the
circulation of the documents would be destroyed, and a fatal
blow given to the freedom of the press. But we do not think that
Congress possesses the power to prevent the transportation in
other ways, as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from
the mails. To give efficiency to its regulations and prevent rival
postal systems, it may perhaps prohibit the carriage by others for
hire, over postal routes, of articles which legitimately constitute
mail matter, in the sense in which those terms were used when
the Constitution was adopted, consisting of letters, and of
newspapers and pamphlets, when not sent as merchandise; but
further than this its power of prohibition cannot extend.

Whilst regulations excluding matter from the mail cannot be

enforced in a way which would require or permit an
examination into letters, or sealed packages subject to letter
postage, without warrant, issued upon oath or affirmation, in the
search for prohibited matter, they may be enforced upon
competent evidence of their violation obtained in other ways; as
from the parties receiving the letters or packages, or from agents
depositing them in the post-office, or others cognizant of the
facts. And as to objectionable printed matter, which is open to
examination, the regulations may be enforced in a similar way,
by the imposition of penalties for their violation through the
courts, and, in some cases, by the direct action of the officers of
the postal service. In many instances, those officers can act

736 upon their own inspection, and, from the nature of the case,
must act without other proof; as where the postage is not
prepaid, or where there is an excess of weight over the amount
prescribed, or where the object is exposed, and shows
unmistakably that it is prohibited, as in the case of an obscene
picture or print. In such cases, no difficulty arises, and no
principle is violated, in excluding the prohibited articles or
refusing to forward them. The evidence respecting them is seen
by every one, and is in its nature conclusive.

In excluding various articles from the mail, the object of

Congress has not been to interfere with the freedom of the press,
or with any other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities
for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public
morals. Thus, by the act of March 3, 1873, Congress declared
"that no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture,
paper, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or
any article or thing designed or intended for the prevention of
conception or procuring of abortion, nor any article or thing
intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or nature,
nor any written or printed card, circular, book, pamphlet,
advertisement, or notice of any kind, giving information,
directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom, or by what
means, either of the things before mentioned may be obtained
or made, nor any letter upon the envelope of which, or postal-
card upon which indecent or scurrilous epithets may be written
or printed, shall be carried in the mail; and any person who shall
knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or
delivery, any of the hereinbefore mentioned articles or things,
... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall, for every offence, be fined not less than $100, nor
more than $5,000, or imprisonment at hard labor not less than
one year nor more than ten years, or both, in the discretion of
the judge."

All that Congress meant by this act was, that the mail should not
be used to transport such corrupting publications and articles,
and that any one who attempted to use it for that purpose should
be punished. The same inhibition has been extended to circulars
concerning lotteries, institutions which are supposed to have a
demoralizing influence upon the people. There is no

*737 question before us as to the evidence upon which the

conviction of the petitioner was had; nor does it appear whether
the envelope in which the prohibited circular was deposited in
the mail was sealed or left open for examination. The only
question for our determination relates to the constitutionality of
the act; and of that we have no doubt.

The commitment of the petitioner to the county jail, until his

fine was paid, was within the discretion of the court under the
statute.
As there is an exemplified copy of the record of the petitioner's
indictment and conviction accompanying the petition, the
merits of his case have been considered at his request upon this
application; and, as we are of opinion that his imprisonment is
legal, no object would be subserved by issuing the writs; they
are therefore

Denied.
11 Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz

Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue,
wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of
the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day,
de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by
means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take
the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take
the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and
Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his

witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his

witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence
or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four

distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such
is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit
to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that
‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things

to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are

described in the Search Warrant

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,

columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting
and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,
covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec.
1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
11 US vs Katz, 389 U.S. 347

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz, was convicted of

transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in
violation of federal law. The government had entered into
evidence the petitioner’s end of telephone conversations that
the government had obtained by placing a listening device to
the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals
rejected the petitioner’s contention that the evidence should be
suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not
the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit

wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in
violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI
placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and
recorded the petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations
which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was
denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution

protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth
and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a
person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The

petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a
constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth
Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did
not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the
telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He
did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a
place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a
telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he
utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world.
Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Government’s
activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioner’s telephone
conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon
sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black

observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the
Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United
States Constitution. Had they wished to prohibit this activity
under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would
have added such language that would have effectively done so.
By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue
that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of
things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy,
be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.

Concurrence. Justice John Harlan filed a dissenting opinion. The

Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not
places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is
afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The
critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone
booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely
entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.
On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would
not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of
privacy would not be reasonable.
12 SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585;
14 NOV 1988]

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were

raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when information for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and
academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual
support.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when
information for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President.
(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial

of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated
by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he
filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving
his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due
process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal
case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an

interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word

"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers
as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced
petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be

unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not
been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through
their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount
to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting

to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G.
R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the
status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc
dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April
26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Lim vs. Felix G.R. No. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

Ponente : GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:

 March 17, 1989, 7:30am, Congressman Moises Espinosa,

Sr. & security escorts, Provincial Guards Cortes, Amaro,
& Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin at
the airport road of Masbate Domestic Airport.

 July 31, 1989, After PI, MTC issued an order concluding

that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Bail at 200k

o Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog

filed a motion for the reduction of bail. Granted at
150k

 August 29, 1989, 261 pages records of the case were

transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor, Respondent
Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane.

 September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution

affirming the finding of a prima facie case

 October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the RTC

Masbate, 4 separate informations of murder against the
12 accused with a recommendation of no bail.

 November 21, 1989, petitioners Lims filed with SC

petition for change of venue.
 December 14, 1989, SC issued en banc Resolution
authorizing the change of venue from RTC Masbate to
RTC Makati.

 Raffled to Br. 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio

S. Felix.

 Lims filed manifestations: (1) An order be issued

requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the
preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the
Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment of the respondent Honorable Court in its
personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination
of the existence of guilt; (2) that the court conduct a
hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie
case against them in the light of documents which are
denials of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation.

 July 5, 1990, respondent court denied the petition and

issued warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent
Judge said: “the PI was conducted by the MTC of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable
cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed
and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial
Prosecutor who properly filed with the RTC four (4)
separate informations for murder. Considering that both
the two (2) competent officers to whom such duty was
 entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable
cause, each information is complete in form and
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this
Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's
certification in each information.”
 July 17, 1990 SC issued TRO, CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without
bail issued against the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest

without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists.

SC ruling: Decided in favor of petitioners.

 The Judge does not have to personally examine the

complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the
taking of the evidence. However, there should be a
report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's
bare certification. All of these should be before the
Judge.

 Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
 existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he

may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

 In People vs. Hon. Enrique B. Inting:

I. The determination of probable cause is a function of

the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes
this determination.
II. The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does
not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not
have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.
III. Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or
released.

 Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to

whether it is an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is
an investigation for the determination of a probable cause
 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part
of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
Judge.

 If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the

Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The
Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

 He could not possibly have known what transpired in

Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the
petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on
the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a
probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a
warrant of arrest.

 The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the

report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of
each case. The court cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.
The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all,
the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
 Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court's probing questions when the circumstances of
the case so require.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED.

The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix
of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5,
1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.