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Society
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Review essay
DOUGLAS KELLNER
University of California, Los Angeles
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seems to forget that a few pages earlier she had associated post-
modernism with the celebration of "the triumphs of capitalism and
the joys of consumerism," demonstrating an inability to portray the
tensions and complexity of postmodern theory, typical of its critics. In
fact, there is a tremendous variety of postmodern theories that are
optimistic and pessimist, and that neither deny history nor exhibit a
"fundamental irrationalism." Surely Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari,
Harvey, Jameson, Rorty, and some of the major texts of even Baudril-
lard and Lyotard engage history, and there are a wealth of contributions
to understanding contemporary society and history from the emerging
postmodern tradition; and while these thinkers carry out differentiated
critiques of various forms of Western reason and rationalism, to say
that postmodern theory exhibits a "fundamental irrationalism" is a
crude burlesque.
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The title of his book, History Without a Subject: The Postmodern Con-
dition, would seem to imply a thesis concerning the defining features of
the postmodern in terms of the decline of history and the subject in the
contemporary era, but it is never worked out. Ashley does not discuss
in any focused and sustained fashion the disappearance of the subject
in the contemporary era, the vanishing of history, and the end of
politics, although the substantive analyses in each chapter touch on
these issues. A very brief discussion of "the end of history" (pp. 133-
134) and his more political discussions of the fate of contemporary
politics indicate that what is really at stake in the postmodern turn is
the demise of Marxism's revolutionary and emancipatory hopes for a
better future based on the prospects of the industrial working class
creating a socialist revolution. Ashley, correctly in my view, argues
that as a theoretical discourse Marxism is more relevant than ever,
although as a political phenomenon the collapse of Communism and
widespread questioning and rejection of Marxist class politics under-
mine socialist politics. But Ashley has an unstable relation to Marxism,
adopting aspects of its critique of political economy without sustained
deployment of its philosophy and social theory and with a perhaps too
quick dismissal of its politics.4
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Ashley correlates the rise of Reaganism and the New Right with
postmodernism, but greatly exaggerates the power of the New Right,
failing to see that Clinton and Blair, while admittedly following the
neo-liberal economic policies of their conservative predecessors, intro-
duced different and more flexible social policies, a more active role
for the state, and more aggressive promotion of new information
technology and the "information superhighway," while rejecting the
New Right social agenda. In addition, Ashley underplays the role of
militarism in the new economy and the development of military tech-
nology and role of military intervention in Reagan and Thatcher's
New Right imaginary, while Clinton, by contrast, has been far less
interventionist and militarist than his Republican predecessors, serv-
ing different sectors of capital, especially in the information and enter-
tainment sectors.'1
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held together the Reaganist coalition in the 1988 election, the New
Right elements eventually took over the party and their aggressive
ideological agenda at the 1992 Republican convention is blamed by
many as contributing to Bush's defeat by Clinton in the 1992 election.
Similarly, it now appears that the extremism of the Republican Right
after their victorious seizure of Congress after the 1994 midterm elec-
tions led to a blacklash that Clinton was able to exploit in the 1996
election and was able to continue to deploy in the wake of the 1998 sex
scandals and virulent rightwing attacks on his presidency.
Thus, the hegemony of the New Right is nowhere near as seamless and
powerful as Ashley's analysis implies. Yet it should be admitted that in
many respects Clinton's "New Democrats" and Blair's "New Labor
Party" carry out many of the largely business-oriented politics of their
conservative predecessors and may well be more functional for global
capital than the more reactionary conservatives. In effect, then, I
would suggest that a "postmodernization" of politics has less to do
with the triumph of the New Right than with an implosion of business,
politics, and entertainment and a decentering of modern (parliamen-
tary, party, and ideological) politics in favor of more decentered post-
modern politics with the rise of media and cultural politics, identity
politics, and a general fragmentation of the political sphere.
Thus, there are strong echoes of the political pessimism of the most
quiescent period of the Frankfurt School in Ashley's analysis, although
he does not engage Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of Enlighten-
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Notes
1. For my own take on the postmodern turn, see Douglas Kellner, "The Postmodern
Turn in Social Theory: Positions, Aporia, and Prospects," in George Ritzer, editor,
Frontiers of Social Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 255-286;
R. Antonio and D. Kellner, "Postmodern Social Theory," in Postmodernism and
Social Inquiry, eds. D. Dickens and A. Fontana (New York: Guilford Press, 1994);
and Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations
(Macmillan and Guilford Press, 1991); The Postmodern Turn (New York: Guilford
Press, 1997); and The Postmodern Adventure (New York: Guilford, forthcoming).
2. Ellen Meiksins Wood and John Bellamy Foster, In Defense of History. Marxism
and the Postmodern Agenda (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997); and David
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Ashley, History without a Subjet: The Postmodern Condition (Boulder, Col.: West-
view Press).
3. Compare Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962);
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free
Press, 1992); Elias Canetti, The Human Provence (New York: Continuum, 1978);
Jean Baudrillard, "The Year 2000 has already Happened," in Arthur and Mari-
louise Kroker, editors, Body Invaders. Panic Sex in America (Montreal: The New
World Perspectives, 1988): 35-44; and Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press,
1991).
4. For various takes on the position of Marxism in the contemporary era, in addition to
the Wood and Foster book, see Douglas Kellner, "The Obsolescence of Marxism? "
in Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenberg, editors, Whither Marxism? (London
and New York: Routledge, 1995), 3-30; and Ronald Aronson, After Marxism (New
York: Guilford Press, 1997).
5. On the end of modernity and advent of a postmodern society of simulacra and
hyperreality, see Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (London: Sage,
1993); for my reading of these topics, see Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From
Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (Cambridge and Palo Alto: Polity Press
and Stanford University Press, 1989).
6. On these topics, see Best and Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, Chapter 3; and
Edward Soja, ThirdSpace (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, England: Blackwell,
1996), chapter 1.
7. Compare Best and Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, Chapter 1.
8. See David Crook et al., Postmodernization (London: Sage Books, 1991); Mike
Featherstone, Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (London: Sage, 1991); and
Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1978); and Economies of Signs and Space (London: Sage, 1994).
9. On the Frankfurt School, see Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and
Modernity (Cambridge and Baltimore: Polity Press and John Hopkins University
Press, 1989); on poststructuralism, see Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory.
10. On technocapitalism, see Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity, chap-
ter 8; and Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure (New York:
Guilford Press, forthcoming).
11. This may be changing; days before his impeachment in December 1998, Clinton
undertook a sustained bombing of Iraq and the following week there were announce-
ments that for the first time in a decade, military spending was to be increased; see
Los Angeles Times, December 31, 1998: Al. And in April 1999, Clinton and Blair
led the NATO intervention into Kosovo that involved a sustained bombing cam-
paign against Serbia.
12. On the Gulf war was media spectacle, see Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV
War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and Media Culture (London and New York:
Routledge, 1995), chapter 5.
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