1.

THE PIL IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE FEDERAL COURT OF INDUS

LAND.

In the context of the present case between Organisation for Welfare of People (Herein after
OPW) and Union of Indus Land, the PIL is filed under Article 32 of Constitution, which
guarantees the protection of the Fundamental Rights, enshrined in the Part III of the
Constitution. However, this PIL is filed against the valid actions of central government of
removal of Governor of the State of East Land, which in no way harms the fundamental rights
of the Governor or of the people, but indeed poses a solution for better enhancement of future
of the people of the State of East Land.

It is humbly submitted before the Honourable Court that the filed PIL is non-maintainable
under two limbs of arguments.

1.1. THE PETITIONERS DOES NOT SATISFY THE PRE-REQUISITE FOR THE PRINCIPAL
OF LOCUS STANDI.

In S.P. Gupta v. President of India1, Supreme Court submitted that a writ petition by way of
PIL, to secure relief for the Governors who have been removed from office, is not maintainable
as none of the aggrieved persons had approached the court for relief and the writ petitioner has
no locus to maintain a petition seeking relief on their behalf. It is pointed out that Governors
do not belong to a helpless section of society which by reason of poverty, ignorance, disability
or other disadvantages, is not capable of seeking relief.2 Reliance is placed on the following
observations of this Court in the Supra Case3:

“…..cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the actor omission of the State
or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific legal injury to an
individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public
having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act
or omission, but if the person on specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured
as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or
omission willingly and without protect, the member of the public who complains of a secondary
public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance

1
S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, 1981, Supp (1) SCC 87, 1982 2 SCR 365.
2
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India & Anr, (2010) 6 SCC 33, ¶ 11.
3
Supra, Note 1.
 of such member of the public would be to foist relief on the person or specific class or group
of persons primarily injured, which they do not want.”

Similar Public Interest Litigation came up before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranji
Thomas v. Union of India4, seeking intervention of this court to restrain the President of India
from “forcibly” extracting resignations from various Governors and Lt. Governors. The Court
observed in the case: “The petitioner has no locus to maintain the petition in regard to the
prayers claiming relief for the benefit of the individual Governors. At all events, such prayers
no longer survive on account of passage of time.”

In the present case, it is very clear from the proposition that the governor has not recorded any
statement that shows that he does not respect the decision of the central Government. However,
the counsel on behalf of the respondent puts forward a demarcation that that there is a difference
between being disappointed from a decision and taking any action to reverse it. Mere
disappointment of the Governor, Mr. Tarak Singh, towards the decision of the Central
Government does not make the decision Invalid or Illegal. Hence, an establishment is laid
down which clearly shows that the present filed petition does not have a legal and authoritative
backing and therefore should be dismissed.

1.2. THERE IS NO LEGAL DISPUTE CONCERNED BECAUSE THE FACTS DO NOT DISCLOSE A
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ARBITRARINESS OR CAPRICIOUS ACT.

The Supreme Court ruling5 is being selectively quoted and in fact, misquoted. The Supreme
Court is clear in the operative part of the Judgement in the year 2010 that the union government
or the president has powers to remove any governor.

The Constitution is very clear that a Governor only holds office during the pleasure of the
president.

And the apex court said that courts will presume the bona fide of the president's action in
removing a Governor.6

The second thing the Supreme Court said is that a Governor who is removed has no Right to
demand that the grounds of his removal be conveyed to him. It states that there must be a reason
for removing a governor on file. But if the governor feels that the grounds for his removal are

4
Ranji Thomas v. Union of India, 2000 (2) SCC 8.
5
Supra, Note 2.
6
Supra, Note 2.
mala fide, then he has to make "a very strong case" before the court proving his removal is
capricious and arbitrary. The onus of making such a case is on the governor who has been
removed and not on the government, and only in such "very strong cases" can the court
intervene. There is very limited scope for judicial review in this matter.

There is nothing on record or even a semblance of suggestion that on any account whatever the
Government at the Centre, its functionaries or the President bore an ill-will against Mr Tarak
Singh. Simply because no reason has been mentioned in the impugned order, it cannot be said
that the order is arbitrary, capricious or malicious. Mr Tarak Singh hadn’t expressed any
grievance or was not sore about his termination and the petitioner cannot be allowed to make
any grievance about it.

In B.P Singhal v. Union of India7, it was stated by the Court:

If the aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary,
malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will call upon the Union Government to disclose
to the court, the material upon which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the
pleasure. If the Union Government does not disclose any reason, or if the reasons disclosed are
found to be irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or malafide, the court will interfere. However, the
court will not interfere merely on the ground that a different view is possible or that the
material or reasons are insufficient.8

The Supreme Court observed in K.L. Trading Co. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya9, that to attract
Judicial Review of administration action, the applicant must show that the administrative action
suffers from vice of arbitrariness, unreasonableness and unfairness. Merely because the Court
may feel that the administrative action is not justified on merit, can be no ground for
interference. The Court can only interfere when the process of making such decision is wrong
or suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, unfairness and unreasonableness.

In the present case, it is clearly evident that the President, on the advice of the Central
Government didn’t act whimsically and arbitrarily in his decision to remove the governor, Mr.
Tarak Singh. It can’t also be clearly made out from the present case that the President or the
Central Government has something against the Governor, Mr. Tarak Singh. The petitioners has

7
Supra, Note 2.
8
Supra, Note 2, ¶ 50.
9
K.L. Trading Co. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya, AIR 1996 Gau 17.
neither framed a strong case nor provided the court with any Just reason that could prove that
the Central Government has acted unreasonably. Pointing out Random Flaws in the Policies
and Decisions based on the Principals of the Constitutionalism, along with its skilfully framed
Articles would do no help to the Petitioners unless they produce some strong case or evidence
in the Court, which till date, they have failed to.

Supreme Court also observed in a ruling10 that:

But this Court will not sit in appeal over the judgment of the President, nor will the, Courts
determine the weight which should be attached to the evidence. Appreciation of evidence is
entirely left to the President and it is not for the Courts to hold that on the evidence placed
before the President on which the conclusion is founded, if they were called upon to decide the
case they would have reached some other conclusion.11

One may also agree with the reasoning, that removal of the Governor should be for compelling
reasons. Further, there should not be any whimsical or capricious grounds for removal.
However, one may take deviation from the same, where court stated12 that opportunity of being
heard will not be given to Governor while removing him. It is agreed, that the Doctrine of Fair
Hearing is not in itself absolute in nature and is indeed, subject to some reasonable
restrictions.13 The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the judiciary is
assigned the delicate task of determining what is the power conferred on each branch of
Government, whether it is limited and if so, what the limits are and whether any action of that
branch transgresses such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and
to enforce the constitutional limitations.

The extent and depth of Judicial Review will depend upon and vary with reference to the matter
under review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard to administrative action,
legislations and constitutional amendments. But the extent or scope of judicial review for one
will be different from the scope of judicial review for the other. Mala fides may be a ground
for judicial review of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial review of legislations
or constitutional amendments. For withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an

10
Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, 1971 AIR 1093.
11
Id. ¶ 30.
12
<https://www.academia.edu/8233260/B.P._Singhal_V._Union_Of_India_&_Anr_2010_A_Critical_Analysis.
>, accessed on 20th December,2014.
13
A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 422, Universal Law Publishing, 10th Ed. 2012; See also, B. SHIVA
RAO, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 243, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Vol. 6, 2006.
Attorney general, loss of confidence may be a relevant ground. The Ideology of the Minister
or Attorney General being out of sync with the policies of or ideologies of the Government
may also be a ground. On the other hand, for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Governor,
loss of confidence will not be a ground for withdrawal of the pleasure. The reasons for
withdrawal are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney General, when compared to
Governors. As a result, the judicial review of withdrawal of pleasure, is limited in the case of
a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General".14

The situation will be clearer once we apply these above arguments into the practical realm of
the case where the Governor of the State of East Land, Mr. Tarak Singh, asked the President
of the nation for hearing his side of the case, which was not considered by the President. By
doing this, the President and the Central Government did not try to curb his Right to Natural
Justice but acted in an Official Manner in which any Government would have, in their place.
“No Right is Absolute”15 is well known to every person in this nation especially when that Right
is indeed, against the very mind-set of the framers of the Constitution of the Country. The
Central Government is the ruling party of the nation who are brought into the position with
immense trust and faith by the citizens of the country. So it is the very requirement of the
Central Government that they should act in a manner, so that citizens of the Country be
benefitted out of that. We also need to remember that, nothing is above the Constitution which
according to the Preamble is given BY the people TO themselves. Hence, nothing in the
constitution should be construed in a way that harms the rights and the interests of the masses.

“Because, Justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
done.”16

Hence, it is pleaded before the honourable court that the above mentioned arguments and
authorities clearly establishes a system where the filed petition has no legal backing and is
therefore unfit to stand out and hence, should be dismissed straightaway, unentertained.

14
Against The Judgment in Wp(C) v. Byadvs. Sri. P. Ravindran (Sr.), WA. No. 1832 of 2013, in WP(C)
28829/2012, ¶ 23; Gopalakrishnan v. Chancellor, University of Kerala, 1990 (1) KLT 681.
15
Id, Note 14.
16
Nissan Motors India Private Limited (NMIPL) v. The Competition Commission of India (CCI), (2014) 5 MLJ
267; Justice P.D. Dinakaran v. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee and Ors., AIR 2011 SC 3711, 113(2012) CLT
215 (SC); See also, GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
EXPERIENCE, 577, OUP 2004; H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Universal Publishing Co., 4th Ed.,
Vol. II, Pg. 5936.