of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day
before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the
[ GR No. 197597, Apr 08, 2015 ]
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO v. WARDEN +
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty
due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any
lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision[2] reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang
Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for
the Hajj Pilgrimage.[4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited and
prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."[5] He
returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.[6]
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S.
Malang.[7]
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder
for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.[8]
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan
S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23,
2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that
time.[9]
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent
portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"[10]tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.[11]
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest
him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.[12]
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore
off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi
Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu
Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.[13]
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another
10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.[14]
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City
Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.[15]
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his
detention and deprivation of his liberty.[17] He maintained that he is not
the accused Butukan S. Malang.[18]
In the Resolution[19] dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the
Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City
(Taguig Hall of Justice).[20] The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden
10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.[21]
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex
brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to
file a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without
counsel during the hearing.[22]
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29,
2010 at 2:00 p.m.[23]
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ.
However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the
Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal
Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology.[24]
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on
behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor
General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a
habeas corpus proceeding.[25]
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial
court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.[26]
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors
Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the
Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was
"no longer availing."[27]
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant
of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all
point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused.
Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in
Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded
the trial court to order his release from detention.[28]
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under
any resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution,
Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not
charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly
arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest
against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.[30]
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan
S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated
August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime
as of the date of the certificate.[31] A Philippine passport bearing
Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."[32]
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out
of the country"[33] from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This
fact was supported by a Certification[34] from Saudi Arabian Airlines
confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its
flights.[35] A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and
Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.[36]
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release
from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal[37] by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the trial court's Decision.[38] Through its Decision dated
April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that
1
Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest.[39] Even assuming that Salibo was
not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the
Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas
corpus] may be invoked[.]"[40] According to the Court of Appeals,
Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest.[41]
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which the Court of
Appeals denied in the Resolution[43] dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,[44] petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition
for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,[45] after
which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.[46]
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang
charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals'
finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He
is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper
remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.[47]
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the
Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial
court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal
before this court.[48]
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was
duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S.
Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should
have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information,
not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.[49]
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was
appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner
Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
I Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before this court or any of its members,[50] the Court of
Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,[51] or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.[52] The court or
judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody
of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the
writ.[53] A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.[54]
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ.[55] Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower
court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to
determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"[56]Therefore,
the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that
has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.[57]
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,[58] "a petition for habeas corpus was
filed before this Court [o]n behalf of Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."[59]This
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of
the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.[60]
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of
First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.[61]
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First
Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its
original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"[62] Consequently, "this
Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the
petition, and only [this court's decision] should be regarded as
operative."[63]
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more
apparent than real."[64] It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ
of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the
respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the
person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or
deprived of his or her liberty.[65] However, once the superior court
makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of
Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of
effect[.]"[66] The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision
of the lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,[67] Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this
court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance
granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina
be released from detention.[68]
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the
Court of Appeals.[69]
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of
Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court."
The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.[70]
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion
for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal
basis.[71] The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's
Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits of the case[.]"[72] Consequently, the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.[73]
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court,
on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's
Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore,
was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the
Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions
of trial courts,[75] respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before
the Court of Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"[76] the writ of habeas corpus "was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."[77] The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary[78] and summary[79] in nature, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty."[80]
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
2
thereto."[81] The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."[82] "Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."[83]
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense
so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may
be availed of as a post-conviction remedy[84] or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode.[85] In other words, habeas corpus
effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution.[86] Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate
level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be
further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.[87]
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[88] Mario
Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio
Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares
(Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences
of reclusion perpetua.[89]
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were
serving their sentences, this court promulgated People v.
Hernandez[90] in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with
murder does not exist.[91]
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito,
Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed
for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez
doctrine must retroactively apply to them.[92]
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas
corpus.[93] Citing Harris v. Nelson,[94] this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action. The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form
and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands
that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.[95]
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,[96] the Provincial Board of
Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution
ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and
compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in
Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish
themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.[97]
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf
of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the
reservation.[98] Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro
to make a Return of the Writ.[99]
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v.
Lukban.[100] "[T]o exterminate vice,"[101] Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila
ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers
previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in
ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and
deported to Davao without their consent.[102]
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women,
this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo
Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo
Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have
custody of the women.[103]
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to
make a Return of the Writ.[104] As to the legality of his acts, this court
ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had
deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of
domicile.[105] It said that the women, "despite their being in a sense
lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens[.]"[106] The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality."[107]
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the
petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition
for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The
issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of
habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is]
devoid of merit[.]"[108] Although the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the
public safety requires it,[109] the writ itself may not be suspended.[110]
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process
or order of the court.[111] The restraint then has become legal,[112] and
the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.[113] Rule
102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,[114] elements of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C.
Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by
then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister
Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest, 15 from the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp
Catitipan, where he was detained.[115]
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty.
Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the
military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission
Order.[116]
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the
military informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter
of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To
verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like
Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was
arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria,
Regional Unified Commander.[117]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in
behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.[118]
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister
Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander
Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a
Return of the Writ.[119] This court set the hearing on the Return on May
3
23, 1985.[120]
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-
Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2045-A.[121] The lawyers, according to respondents,
allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front."[122]
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the
temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the
recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.[123]
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however,
Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion
for Reconsideration.[124] They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion
stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition
for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.[125]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due
process. Consequently, the Information was void.[126]
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it
became moot and academic with the filing of the Information against
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:[127]
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against
them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The
function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys'
incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had
served its purpose.[128] (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
Ramos.[129] Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia
Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all
arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.[130]
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however,
Informations against them were filed before this court. The filing of the
Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas
corpus moot and academic, thus:[131]
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The
rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed.[132] (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of
trial and exhaust the usual remedies.[133] This ordinary remedy is to file
a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.[134]
At any time before a plea is entered,[135]
the accused may file a motion
to quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
(b)
charged;
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
(c)
the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except when a single
(f)
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
(h)
excuse or justification; and
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
(i) offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."[136] If the accused avails
himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly]
admits the facts alleged in the information."[137] "Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic from the information are not to be considered."[138]
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint
or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."[139] If the
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court
shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment."[140] If after amendment, the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the
complaint or information.[141]
IV
However, Ilagan[142] and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a
court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
(a)
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
(b) cause to believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
4
 When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
(c)
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section
7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the
Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not
the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest
petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to
liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas
corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in
the "disturbing"[143] case of Ilagan.[144] Like petitioner Salibo, Atty.
Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers
against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a
warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,[145] Justice Claudio
Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived
Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to
due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas
corpus:[146]
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without
preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7
and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again,
this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the
cited rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without
a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA
of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory,
if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim
and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its
imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself.
The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes
arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed
the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the
offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were
they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in
promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened
and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an
offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in
point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense
"has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have "personal knowledge of factsindicating that the
[arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to
believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule).
Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the
petitioners without due process and preliminary
investigation.[147] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a
Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo
filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been
cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of
preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan
Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that
the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S.
Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,[148] his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs,[149] his Tax
Identification Number card,[150] and clearance from the National
Bureau of Investigation[151] all bearing his picture and indicating the
name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued
documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S.
Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the
country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre
occurred.
A Certification[152] from the Bureau of Immigration states that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and
arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A
Certification[153] from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner
Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines
Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the
Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20,
2009.
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is
probably the most complex case pending in our courts. The case
involves 57 victims[154] and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become
state witnesses.[155] As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have
been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have
already been resolved.[156] To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial
would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates
that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that
he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his
guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown
that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law
and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at
[its] command"[157] to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we
will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must
pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until
then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty.
His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011
is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City
Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to
this court is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
5

GR No. 182926, Jun 22, 2015 ]
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated August 28, 2007 and the
Resolution[2] dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September
21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol,
Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[3] filed by private
respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje,
against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear
that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of
the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The
accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of
Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a
juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe,
Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said
receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and
thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with
DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as
a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit;
to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be
proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article
172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.[4]
On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer
Arraignment[5] on the ground that none of the essential elements of the
crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol,
hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due
to improper venue.
In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to
quash and set the case for arraignment, the decretal portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that
accused has already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set this
case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in
the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.
The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on
November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005
Order, but the MCTC denied it in a Resolution[7] dated January 24,
2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari[8] before the RTC, assailing the
November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the
MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition
for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.[9] On Navaja's contention
that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed
with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence,
the RTC ruled:
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out
by the MCTC, the improper venue was already resolved squarely by the
Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient
evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna”.
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made
to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after
she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in
her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State
Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance.
The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been
intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by the
cashier herself.”
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another
witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when
the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her
request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol,
would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was
done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would
necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.[10]
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's
appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the
Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification
of a private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or
established from the alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally different
and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the
protection of the rights of the accused and to prevent undue
harassment and oppression.
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY
OF FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING
IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE
FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.[11]
The petition lacks merit.
6
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has
jurisdiction over her case for falsification of a private document, Navaja
argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements[12] of such crime
was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that
there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-
affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification of a
private document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In
particular, the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject
receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine
the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element
of the said crime. It was also impossible for her to have committed the
crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement
under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October
4, 2003, was prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City,
while the subject receipt was issued on October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe
in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the issuance of
the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was
absent, hence, there is no crime of falsification of private document to
speak of. She explains that any damage that private respondent could
have suffered would only occur when it pays the request for
reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report submitted on October 6,
2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the
said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[13] This
principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v. People,[14] thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[15]
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted
and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
pertinently states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its identification.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,[16] the Court said that both
provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also
where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place
where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the
falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was
intended.[17]
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no
jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential elements of
falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction,
the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out
a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In
particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed such
crime thereat, to wit:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of
Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No.
6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or
intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to
claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty.
Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of
P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. xxx[18]
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that
the she committed the said crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:
“4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the
amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's
Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October
2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as
Annex “C”.
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in
Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she incurred at Garden's
(sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official
receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of Garden's
Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon
receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.”[19]
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not
by the result of proof[20], the Court holds that Navaja's case for
falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction
of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.
Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have
committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at this point
where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material
allegations of the charge against her, which include the place where the
subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the
trial would show that the crime was indeed committed outside its
territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on
such ground.
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private
document to speak of because at the time of the issuance of the subject
receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the
Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present, as
Article 172 (2)[21] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that
mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.[22]
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the
Regional State Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a certain Cheryl
Labarro[23] for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her
sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla Resort in
Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts
material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said
statement in upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the
provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[24] She submits
that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the
accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another
case, since venue must be determined solely and exclusively on the
facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed
7
from other collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil
down to the factual issue of whether the crime of falsification of private
document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review
on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,[25] the Court held:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question
of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set
of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a
certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact.
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed
in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the
exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and,
subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.[26] In
certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe
and resolve factual issues, viz:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27]
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court
generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.[28] In this
case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of
improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor
when he held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that
the falsification took place in Jagna.”[29] The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb such factual finding.
Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the
findings of the Regional State Prosecutor without specifying the factual
and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC had
squarely addressed such issue as follows:
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made
to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after
she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in
her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State
Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance.
The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been
intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by the
cashier herself.”
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another
witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when
the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her
request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol,
would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was
done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would
necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.[30]
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's[31] aforesaid
statement in upholding the venue of the case violates Section 34, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court,[32] the Court holds that such evidentiary rule
has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was
committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely
requires the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr.,[33] the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in this
wise:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects.
It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.[34]
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed
liberally in favor her favor as the accused, and strictly against private
respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and
inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court
from that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private
respondent willfully chose to prosecute separately the other cases for
falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions,
namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to
harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases,
involving minimal amounts of actual damages,[35] should have been
filed in one (1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound
ruling thereon:
The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against
her should be filed in one jurisdiction would be a blatant violation of
the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other than
where the offense was allegedly committed.
8
In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been
committed in different venues, then it is just unfortunate that whatever
complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different venues.
To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal.[36]
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of
jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.[37] Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this
could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of
jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime
committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed.
Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where
there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the
court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial,
the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.[38] That private respondent filed
several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which
unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in
faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which
would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of
the falsification cases she allegedly committed in different jurisdictions
would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is
only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of
falsification as there are documents falsified[39] and that the venue of
such cases is where the document was actually falsified[40].
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.[43]
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue
of the case, Navaja failed to prove that any of the said special
circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of
discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in
affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to
quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be
discussed further, as they are properly resolved in due course of the
proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated May
7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.

On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave
procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari from the denial of her
motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any
stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion to
quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later
on, and such objection may be raised or considered motu propioby the
court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.

On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed
the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the denial of a motion
to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, but there is
likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with
finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion, she cites a
ruling[41]that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing
of the complaint, the court should dismiss the case, instead of ordering
its transfer.

Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v.

Palmes-Limitar[42] where the Court reiterated the fundamental
principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and,
therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari, thus:

In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “a special civil

action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when
such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to
resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due
course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
appeal in the manner authorized by law.”

On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ

of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order
in the following circumstances:

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy

9

G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - -
whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor should be dismissed after the accused has entered
his plea under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null
and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 19 dated February 26, 20021 and April 3, 20022 which
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin
Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of
Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act
No. 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Act," in an
information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as
proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16
San Mateo St., Peñafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise
known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga
Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing
Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and
fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (₱6,533.00), Philippine Currency,
representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990
to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late
remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (₱11,143.28) computed as of 15
March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-
cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS
and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases in Region V3
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been
conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with
law and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information
is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional State
Prosecutor.4
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On
September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to
the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days thereafter,
the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the
information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of
the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court.7
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an
opposition,8 against which the accused filed a rejoinder.9The People
filed a reply to the rejoinder10 on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the
reply11 was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002,
to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the
Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed
in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, thus:
‘Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.’
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule
as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendant’s plea to the Information is not a
waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibañez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of
authority of the officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at
the same time, pertinent portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion
to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections
to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections
to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by
express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and
by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the objection to
the respondent’s actuations goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction.
10
It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.
accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with Petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot be excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge, viz:18
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated INFORMATION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING
to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;
SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the
Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND
other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be
CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF
devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of
REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION
the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL
former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the
EVIDENCE. THE WORD "MAY" IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF
Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) –
THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;
what has been delegated cannot be redelegated.

3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN

In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum
DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN
dated June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M.
INHIBITION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND THE
Turingan addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
Region V directing them to inhibit and to append the following
NOTATION after the certification in the Information for filing.
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER
DISCRETION IN INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN INFORMATION BY
this case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region
RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER
V is authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of
TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
the request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager as granted by
the Regional State Prosecutor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment19 in
compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated September 23, 2002. 20 It
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that
opines that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section
nowhere in the Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
appended the above-quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority
of the special prosecutor is only for the conduct of preliminary
investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Private respondent contends that:21 1) the instant petition was filed out
Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be in of time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct
conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign
of Rule 112. the information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit
himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the
Court hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that
to cost. the motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it
was filed eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner
received the first questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that
SO ORDERED.12
the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioner’s last
day to file the motion for reconsideration was on the next working day
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as after Good Friday, April 1.22
a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to
handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap
authorized to file the information involving violations of the SSS law
of paper, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the
without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. 13 Letters of
running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously
commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño14 and
assumes that the present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule
Secretary Hernando Perez15 were offered as proof to show that State
45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and
Prosecutor Tolentino’s authority to file the information was recognized.
mandamus under Rule 65.
In response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion
for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or
a mere scrap of paper. 16 Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that "(a) pro
forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the
reglementary period of appeal." (emphases supplied) Hence, the same
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned
provision has no application in the case at bar.
Order which reads:

Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V,
and it appearing that the same has failed to comply with the
requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of
paper.
SO ORDERED.17
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and
not the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc
Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

xxxxxxxxx
11
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order
dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.23 A motion for
reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 200224 which was dismissed
for lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3, 2002.25 This
second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11,
2002.26 A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.27 A motion for leave to file and
admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May
29, 2002.28Having been filed within the reglementary period,
petitioner’s motion for leave to file the instant petition was granted in
this Court’s Resolution dated July 15, 2002.29
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority
and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the
Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial
prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases.30 Petitioner cites the
letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS
Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6, 199731 and copies of
Regional Orders No. 97-024-A32 and 2001-03333 dated July 14, 1997
and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of
State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in
Region V. Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.34 and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et al.35 to prop up its contention that
given the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor
need not participate in the filing and prosecution of the information in
the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a
Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional
State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the
control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders,
circulars and rules and regulations of the Department of
Justice relative to the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all
provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of
provinces and cities comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the
provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers
and employees as may be necessary; and
approve transfers of subordinate personnel within
the jurisdiction of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against
fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his
region and submit his recommendation thereon to
the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review
thereof, submit the appropriate recommendation to
the Office of the President: Provided, that where
the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds
for the filing of charges, he may render a decision
of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against
subordinate personnel of the region and submit his
recommendations thereon to the Secretary of
Justice who shall have the authority to render
decision thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to "the authority of
the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of
such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct
of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to
determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass
upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add
to them."36 This is distinguished from the power of "supervision and
control" which includes the authority "to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units;
determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and
prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs."37
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of
administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no
power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from
handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition.
Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and
provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those
cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the
Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law.
Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the
power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file
an information without the prior written authority or approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275
provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to
wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service
require the creation of positions of additional counsel to assist
provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of
Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable
against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint
said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city
fiscal and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent
or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall
be allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the
lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where
assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,38 "Defining the authority, duties and
responsibilities of regional state prosecutors," then Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state
prosecutors (which included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for
Region V) to, among others, "(i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within
the region." (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by
the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to
investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial
jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter of commendation by
then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to
a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter
of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his
12
authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State
Prosecutor’s attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which
states that all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.39 Thus, Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor within
the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are
cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such
instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word
"may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We
agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should
be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the
Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision
shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. – x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor)
shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties
of such action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city,
provincial or chief state prosecutor should have been obtained, we
shall now resolve the more important issue: whether the lack of prior
written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the
filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not
raised as an objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that
demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to
paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.—
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior
authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a
defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after
arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to
dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v.
Ibañez, et al.40 where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion
to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections
to the informations. The contention is correct as far as formal
objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if
not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent’s actuations
goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information
signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject
matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.41 (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on
the part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and
attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information.42 Hence, while
a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of
the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its
jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional
requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been
ruled that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction
to try the criminal offense.43 In our jurisdiction, we have similarly held
that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are
two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of
procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment
such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper
complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction
over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of
the court to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for
the defendant to exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those
who may validly file or subscribe to the complaint or information
13
under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. 44 (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In
that case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation
in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of
Justice as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the
cases involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his
appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for
falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subido’s authority to file the information
was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for appointment
under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of
Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his
office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to
assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties,
and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the
Attorney General or Solicitor General.45
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were
upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go
Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in
those cases, the appointees were officials or employees in one or
another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of Justice, and
were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of
Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above
decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the
Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor’s office. For
this reason, he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for
appointment to the post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must
be either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so
manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of
the range of choice in the appointment or designation is not without
reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the
Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of
supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the
Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be subject to
orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly,
antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand for
illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention
be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor
while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the
Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or
interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so undesirable, not to say
detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of
justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances
where the person who filed the information is disqualified from being a
special prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, but has been extended to various cases where the
information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,46 the Court held that it is a
fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and
void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor
resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an
information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr.
charging him with graft and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash
the information on the ground that the crime charged did not constitute
a "Marcos crony related crime" over which the PCGG had authority to
investigate and file an information. The Court found that the crime
alleged in the information was not among those which PCGG was
authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then
President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and
void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.47 where
we ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized
party (the PCGG), the information was fatally flawed. We noted that
this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that
could not be cured.1awphi1.net
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,48 we also reiterated the Villa ruling.
The accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga
for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City
where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City
Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense
was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction
was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required
by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another.49 Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.50 It is a
valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter thereof. The accused’s plea to an
information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said
information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions
relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of
the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or
even by express consent.51
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of
information contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under
which Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the
prevailing case law on the matter.52
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the
defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or information before
he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash except (1) "when the
complaint or information does not charge an offense" or (2) "the court
is without jurisdiction of the same." (emphasis ours) Among the
enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the
same Rule was "(t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the
information." With only the above two exceptions provided by the 1940
Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa ruling that if the filing
officer lacks authority to file the information, jurisdiction is not conferred
on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal
changes introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on
unauthorized filing of information similar to the above provisions of the
1940 Rules.53
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of
the officer who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to
quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of
the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but
enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
(c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Apparently, the want of
jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense
and the person, and not over the case as in Villa where the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information. Still, despite the enumeration, the Court
14
continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and
Cudia cases.

The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer
as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these
grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the
exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. Under the regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated
the Villa ruling in the above-cited Romualdez case. With the
enumeration of the four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the
enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not intend to
abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated
exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under the
enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the
Meeting of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court
evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.

In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary

of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special
Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information
by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the
same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

respondent court’s orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 3, 2002
are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized
officer.

SO ORDERED.

15

G.R. No. 153284 April 17, 2007
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN,
as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V and STATE
PROSECUTOR and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS 1 CASES IN
REGION V ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, in their official capacities
and for and in representation of the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MARITES C. DE LA TORRE, in her official
capacity as counsel for the complainant Social Security System
Bicol Cluster, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19, and
MURIEL C. APOLINAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
2 had the authority to file the Information for violation of RA 8282 despite
This petition for certiorari and mandamus seeks the nullification of the
March 13, 2002 and April 12, 2002 orders of respondent Judge Zeida
Aurora B. Garfin3 in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Muriel C. Apolinar. The orders granted private
respondent Muriel C. Apolinar’s motion to quash and denied petitioner
state prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino’s motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 arose from an Information charging
Apolinar for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and
28(e) of RA 82824 for non-remittance of social security and employees’
compensation5 premiums of his workers for the period January 1997 to
December 1998, and nonpayment of the 3% monthly penalty for late
remittance. The Information, signed by state prosecutor Tolentino,
read:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses MURIEL C. APOLINAR, as a
registered trimobile operator with business address at 108-1 San
Mateo Street, Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga City, for Violation of Section
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282[,] otherwise
known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1997 and up to the present, in the City of
Naga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of
SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused while being a registered trimobile
operator, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse
and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for
(sic) his employee to the SSS in the amount of TWO THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PESOS (₱2,256.00), Philippine Currency,
representing SSS and EC premiums, for the period from January 1997
to December 1998, and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in
the amount of TWO THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT PESOS and 26/100
(₱2,048.26) computed as of 30 July 2000, despite lawful demands by
letter in violation of the above-citied provisions of the law, to the
damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.61ªvvphi1.nét
The accompanying certification, also signed by state prosecutor
Tolentino, read:
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN
THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS
REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS
BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY
THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH
THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL
STATE PROSECUTOR.7
Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the
Information on the ground that state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the
authority to sign it.
On February 13, 2002, Tolentino opposed Apolinar’s motion. He
contended that he was clothed with the authority to investigate, file the
necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases in view of his
designation as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V under
Regional Order No. 97-024-A dated July 14, 1997.
In an order dated March 13, 2002,8 respondent Judge Garfin dismissed
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 for lack of jurisdiction. State
prosecutor Tolentino moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied in an order dated April 12, 2002.9 Thus, this petition.
The petition must be dismissed.
The issue in this petition — whether or not state prosecutor Tolentino
the absence of a written authority or approval of the provincial or state
prosecutor — is similar to that in People v. Garfin.10 In that case, the
same state prosecutor Tolentino charged Serafin Saballegue also for
violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA
8282. The certification accompanying the Information (which was
identical to the certification in the Information against Apolinar) was
also signed by Tolentino. The case was also raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge Garfin.
Three days after pleading not guilty to the charge, Saballegue filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Information was filed without
the written authority or approval of the city prosecutor. This was
opposed by Tolentino.
After considering the arguments of the parties, respondent Judge
Garfin granted Saballegue’s motion. She denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Tolentino.
Tolentino filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in this Court
assailing respondent Judge Garfin’s orders granting Saballegue’s
motion to dismiss and denying the motion for reconsideration. This
Court, thru Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno, dismissed the petition
and declared:
[I]n the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating
State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a
prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city
prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was
filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in
the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured,
the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.11
In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the
Information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 because there was
neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as
special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the
Information by the city prosecutor. In accordance with Garfin, the
Information suffered from a jurisdictional defect. Respondent Judge
Garfin correctly dismissed the case against Apolinar for lack of
jurisdiction.
16
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA,
represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one
of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth
(5th) Shari'a District Court's decision1 dated June 11, 2008 and
order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-
200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as
follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter
parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff
Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued
in Roldan’s name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia
occupied the parcel of land.4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-
60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the
same parcel of land.5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a
report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio
occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title. 6
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay
conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of
Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio
at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession
of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. 7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the
registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the
right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of
summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of summons,
Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be
allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court granted in its order9 dated January 30, 2008.10
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to
possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property,
turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as moderate damages and
₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued
the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from
receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He received a copy of
the notice on December 16, 2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.14 In his petition
for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that
Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if
both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake. 16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally
[waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that he was duly served
with summons and had notice of the following: Roldan’s motion to
present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of execution. However,
Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail the decision
via certiorari."18
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the
wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of
Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it had
jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not
prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the
case applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack
of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from
judgment on June 17, 2009.22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer
for issuance of temporary restraining order with this court. 23
In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the decision
dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts
may only take cognizance of real actions where the parties involved
are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings before
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including the decision dated
June 11, 2008, are void.25
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to
comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This court subsequently
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
the writ of execution against Vivencio.27
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for
certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for recovery of possession with
the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy disposition of the case
would be obtained":29
17
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was
duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato
City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner
below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the
case would be obtained when the action is filed with the
Shariah District Court than in the Regional Trial Courts
considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional
Trial Courts[.]30
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of
possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that
no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in
Shari’a court proceedings, especially in actions where the
Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
validly took cognizance of his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively
for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to
participate in the proceedings in the Shariah Courts,
especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the
Code on Muslim Personal Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for
quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the nature of
the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon
one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the
Civil Code and other related laws, and not the Code on
Muslim Personal Laws[.]31
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction
to decide the action for recovery of possession, Roldan
argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of
summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
"effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
[before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]"32 and he cannot
argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent
below) was properly served with summons, notices and
other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200
was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court,
Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally
or without known reason, ignore the proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is
whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has
effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
below and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the
issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court
has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a
non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court
had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent)
intentionally waived his right to defend himself including his
right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District
Court took cognizance of an action under its concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules
applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the
Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of
Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of
herein petitioner (respondent below)[.]33
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio
to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3, 2012, Vivencio filed his
manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer file a reply to the
comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue presented for
resolution in [his petition for certiorari]."35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court
has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim
if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions
of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if
the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
I
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of
law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or
tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings,
including the judgment rendered, are void.39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, the material allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are examined.40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code
of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of
the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from
customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court
shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph
1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxxx
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has
the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is dispossessed of his
or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its
possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is
18
real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real action;46otherwise,
the action is a personal action.47 In such actions, the parties involved
must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance
of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio
stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the
case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based
on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the
claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law
to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the
action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of
filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy
disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid argument had
all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of
the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real
actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of
existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real
actions "is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this
court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.50 When one of the parties is
not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not validate the
proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim
law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving
real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is
no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real
actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of
general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.
This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts
over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent
with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the
parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a
Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The
proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from participating in
Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions
in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the
Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply
to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law,
even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of
the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from
inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and
regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or
spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he
or she would have received without such disqualification." 56 In these
instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited
instances. This case involves an action for recovery of possession of
real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only take
cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this case is
not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real
property. The judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had rendered
judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as
charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for the
first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide
the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over
the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite the
fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction only on
appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal against Metromedia Times
Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively participated in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled
against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the
case involved a grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary
arbitrator."63 This court set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the
fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from
assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a case. In the 1968 case
of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses
Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the court with exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount demanded
does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and
municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of
First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the Spouses
Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance
dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses
Tijam. When the writ of execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses
Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance
granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to
19
quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First Instance
denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision.
Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for the first time
that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this
court for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the ground of estoppel by
laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to the court’s
jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties in
invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to
repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief
sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such
inequitable and unfair conduct.67
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before
assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as
1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued
the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking several affirmative
reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety
company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in
1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.
This court said:
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and
Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all
the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary
once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed
that the "non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction"69 has been ignored,
and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general rule than the
exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted" 72 rule that
objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is
because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law"73 and
"may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied
with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law.
It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even
attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x
x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not
exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from
judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court over Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the action for recovery of
possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s
action.
II
That respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District
Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to file
his answer and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. Since Vivencio waived his right
to participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that his rights were
prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the
initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary
appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam 83 or
actions based on a party’s personal liability.84Since actions in
personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard."86 With
respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly served with
summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the
proceedings in personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a
court to validly try and decide actions in rem.88Actions in rem are
"directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In
actions in rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction over the
res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody
of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective."90 In actions in
rem, summons must still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy
due process requirements.91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest possible
20
opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet
person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August 6,
the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. 109

In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on
Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his
property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his
property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an
action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a
parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing." 94 Also,
in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment directing a
party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. It is
binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action."96
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was
necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire
jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not
being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent
Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio,
are void.
III
The Shari’a Appellate Court and the
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines
Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the
Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an
officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa"110 on any
questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be
based on recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise
accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim
personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and
Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges
in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.
All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only
when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan
E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that Vivencio
B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008 and order
dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are
SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E.
Mala of an action with the proper court.
SO ORDERED.

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for
certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision. Under
the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of
decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his
petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.

However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be

organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the court
system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the
Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system –
a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial,
political, international, and religious laws98 – is part of the law of the
land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system. 100

Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall continue to
discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall
be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District
Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 104 The decisions
of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without
prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court. 105

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time
that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been
organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special
Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations
preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals]
21

G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000]
SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION LAQUI,
SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE
JUAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 47089 promulgated on March
01, 1999 and the subsequent Resolution[3]dated May 11, 1999 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are
as follows:
On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for
libel against petitioners before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City alleging that the latter circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter
containing malicious imputations against them.
An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City on May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the Metropolitan Trial Court in its
Order dated November 9, 1996 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case
as the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to branch 215 Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the
case in an Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet
prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the
Information for Libel with the RTC.
On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent
court docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to quash on the ground of
prescription. The motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated October
3, 1997.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed
Order dated December 4, 1997.[4]
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of whether
or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly
erred in holding that the offense of libel in the instant case has not yet
prescribed.[5] The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999,
upheld the contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not
yet prescribed and consequently, dismissed the said petition. The
appellate court likewise denied herein petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 11, 1999.[6]
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals and contending that -
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF
LIBEL HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
HAS NOT BEEN DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.[7]
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
crime of libel prescribes in one (1) year, to wit:
ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in
five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
(underscoring supplied)
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall proceed to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly occurred on
December 21, 1993 when petitioner circulated a letter containing
allegedly malicious imputations against private respondents Srs. Helen
Ojario and Bernadine Juarez. At this point, the period of prescription for
the alleged crime had already started to run.
The one-year period of prescription for the crime was interrupted
on February 2, 1994 when respondents filed a joint complaint-
affidavit[8] for libel against petitioner before the Office of the city
Prosecutor in Quezon city. At this point, the prescription period had
already run for forty-two (42) days.
A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City prosecutor was
thus conducted. On April 27, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora
Escasa-Ramos issued a Resolution stating that probable cause exists
against petitioner and recommended the filing of an information for libel
against her. Consequently, an information[9] for libel was filed against
petitioner on May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 32[10]
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the said court proceeded to conduct
trial on the merits. After the prosecution had rested, petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence dated September 18, 1996. However, instead of
acting on the said demurrer, the Metropolitan Trial court, on November
08, 1996, issued an Order[11] ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the
crime of libel as the same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case outright, the MTC
22
ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings. The case was eventually raffled off to
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[12]
On the basis of a Motion to Dismiss[13] filed by petitioner, Branch
215 of the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on April 2, 1997 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the information against petitioner
should have been re-filed anew. The court ruled, however, that the crime
had not yet prescribed and ordered the re-filling of the case[14]. On April
27, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor re-filed the case with the
Regional Trial Court and eventually the same was raffled to Branch 218
of the said court[15]. Petitioner tried to have this case dismissed on the
ground of prescription but her motion to quash[16]the information was
denied by Branch 218 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in a
Resolution[17]dated October 3, 1997. The denial by the Regional Trial
Court of petitioners motion to quash was subsequently upheld by the
Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period for the
crime of libel charged against her commenced to run again when the
Assistant City prosecutor recommended the filing of the information for
libel. Petitioner further argues that the prescriptive period could have
been interrupted again had the information been filed with the Regional
Trial Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for
libel. Considering however that the case was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, which under the law does not have jurisdiction
over the crime of libel, the period of prescription continued to run its
course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that when the information
for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had
already prescribed and the State can no longer pursue the case against
her.
In support of her arguments, petitioner questions the reliance
made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the
landmark case of People vs. Olarte[18]Petitioner submits that the
adherence to the Olarte case must be examined considering that in the
said case, the principal issue was whether or not the filing of a complaint
in the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation,
interrupts the period of prescription of a crime. Petitioner argues that the
cited case is inapplicable as it is not disputed in the case at bench that
the period of prescription was interrupted during the process of
preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded.
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views
as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court for purposes of preliminary investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the correct and
prevailing doctrine, as follows:
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second , even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted
prescription shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, thereby indicating that the
court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to
convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate
without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case had been shown.
Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals[19], broadened the scope of Olarte by holding that the filing of
the complaint with the fiscals office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.
Petitioner insists that the ruling in Olarte with respect to the
interruption of the prescriptive period is not applicable. In the case at
bench, the fact that the period of prescription was interrupted by the filing
of private respondents joint affidavit with the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office is not disputed. The Olarte case, however, makes several other
pronouncements that are determinative of the issues raised by
petitioner.
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or
information for purposes of preliminary investigation represents the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender.This is one of the
reasons why such filing is deemed as having interrupted the period of
prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This period of prescription
commences to run again when the proceedings terminate without
conviction or acquittal, if the court (or prosecutor) should discharge the
accused because no prima facie case has been shown.[20]
It is thus evident that petitioners first premise that the period of
prescription commenced to run again when the Quezon City prosecutors
Office recommended the filing of a criminal complaint against her is
incorrect. When the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of libel
charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her were not
terminated, precisely because a prima facie case for libel was found
against her. Instead of terminating the proceedings against petitioner,
the resolution of the city prosecutor actually directed the continuation of
the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing of the appropriate
information against her and by the holding of trial on the merits. As such,
when the information for libel was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court,
the period of prescription for the crime was still suspended.
Another important teaching in Olarte is that it is unjust to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. This is because in criminal prosecutions,
the only thing that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate
the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their
right to seek grievance against respondent as they filed their complaint
before the city prosecutor forty-two days after the alleged crime of libel
occurred. It was the Office of the City Prosecutor that committed an error
when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper
venue for the crime of libel brought about by the passage of R.A.
7691[21] which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under Section 2 of the said
Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years. However, libel, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from
six months and one day to four years[22] is not covered as the said law
excludes from its coverage cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts[23]. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
the information for libel should be filed with the Court of First Instance,
now the Regional Trial Court. The confusion was cleared up when this
Court issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996
which categorically stated that LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM
TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.[24]
Evidently, branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City was not spared the confusion brought about by R.A. 7691, as its
dismissal of the case then pending before it was made only on
23
November 8, 1996 or more than two years after it had taken cognizance Branch 218.As such, it is clear that petitioner is not without fault in the
of the case. Notably, the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took delay in the prosecution of the case against her.
place a mere eighteen (18) days after the issuance of S.C.
Administrative Order No. 104-96. Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 1, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the
complaint and of the Metropolitan Trial Court in taking cognizance of the SO ORDERED.
case was thus understandable. The error was immediately rectified by
the said court upon realizing its mistake when it ruled it was the Regional
Trial Court which had the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake
should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute
criminal offenses and, more importantly, the right of the offended party
to obtain grievance.

Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later

cases, was not meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the
complaint with the municipal trial court or the prosecutors office operates
to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution of a crime.

In People vs. Galano[25], an information was filed with

the Batangas Regional Trial Court even though the evidence of both the
prosecution and defense shows that the crime was committed in
Manila. This Court, applying People vs. Olarte, held that it was only
when the trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction that the
proceedings therein terminated without conviction and acquittal and it
was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during
the during the pendency of the case in the Batangas Court) commenced
to run again.

In People vs. Enrile[26], informations were filed against civilians

before military tribunals which had no jurisdiction over the persons of
these civilians. These civilians questioned the re-filing of the cases
against them before the civil courts raising, among others, that the
crimes for which they are being charged have already prescribed. This
Court, applying by analogy the ruling in the Olarte case, threw out the
defense of prescription and held that the filing of the first indictments
suspended the running of the prescriptive period, and the prosecutions
under the informations to be filed should be regarded as mere
continuations of the previous proceedings. At the very least, the Court
ruled, the filing of the first charges should be considered as having
interrupted the prescriptive period notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction
of the military tribunal in which they were filed.

More recently, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals[27], an

information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
slight physical injuries was filed with the Regional Trial Court even
though the offense was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
trial court. The Court, even as it dismissed the cases pending before the
Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction, disregarded the defense of
prescription raised by the accused. The Court, citing Olarte and the
subsequent cases of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals[28] and People vs.
Cuaresma[29], ruled that the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending
the termination of the case.

From these cases, it is clear that the Apellate Court committed no

reversible error in ruling that the offense of libel charged against
petitioner had not yet prescribed. The period of prescription for the crime
was interrupted when the complaint was lodged with the Office of the
City Prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of the case
against petitioner. Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, therefore, correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case of petitioner
as the offense of libel for which she was being charged has not yet
prescribed.

Petitioners other argument that she has been denied her right to
a speedy trial deserves scant consideration. Well-established is the
doctrine that the right to a speedy trial is violated only where there is an
unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without participation or
fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time[30]. In the case
at bench, besides the filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals
and this Court, petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to Quash and a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,

24
 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within
which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, case.5
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB
has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by
DECISION reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued
that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if
PERALTA, J.:
he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with
a public officer.6
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information
June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended
Practices Act. that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g)
which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, of R.A. 3019.
through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several portions of which read thus:
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged
was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court,
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein ordered quashed and dismissed.9
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
I
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was
charged before the SB as follows: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO
Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of
the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and II
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of
HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act
7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues,
as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of III
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section
4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN,
Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
Republic of the Philippines.4 CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
25
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons,
when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in
previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is
whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public
officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile,
there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as
such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of
R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the
crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile
for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person
must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances,
be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present
case where the public officer has already died, the private person may
be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an
indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly
responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done
by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them
and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead,
sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more
conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or
more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired
with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-
conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of
the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers
and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would
bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public
officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v.
Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy,
as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an
indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime
is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as
the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their
malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law,
this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes
a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to
commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing
the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
26
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing
is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts
other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done
in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case
where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration
the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act,
for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x
x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and
intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act
of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability
of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the
situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of
the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over
the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry
out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them
the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally
viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that
once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule
of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating
their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and
for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found
guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence
or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary
matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is
better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his
Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise
indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in
violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into
another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on
the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,
2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January
11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R.
No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior
to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in
Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention
that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent
court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the
question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51
Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived
either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If
he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance
gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be
heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance
to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting
of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to
Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the
SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant
case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which
has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of
R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary
Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does
not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer
27
be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which
are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has already
been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the
Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case
and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to
Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

28

G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner,
vs.
LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the issuances of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the
Resolution1 dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, which assailed the trial court’s Orders 2 dated 20
September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-
CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution3 dated 18 July 2008 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the
elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after herein respondent
presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would
negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid
marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the
celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an
Affidavit-Complaint4 for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her
marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved
when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo
in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding
Information5 before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch
115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent
moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.6 He informed the court that his marriage
with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;7 that the decision became
final and executory on 15 May 200[7];8 and that such decree has
already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June
2007.9 He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and
void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak
of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do
not constitute the crime of bigamy.10
In its comment/opposition to the motion,11 the prosecution, through
herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent committed an act
which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution
pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18
November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a
second marriage on 16 February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has
already been committed before the court declared the first marriage
null and void on 27 April 2007.12 The prosecution also invoked the
rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that
facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.13
After a hearing on the motion,14 the court quashed the
Information.15 Applying Morigo v. People,16 it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused
Beronilla was actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this
score alone, the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the
statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first
marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void,
as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case, [the Supreme Court] had the
occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." xxx The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. xxx17
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration
of the said Order18 on the ground, among others, that the facts and the
attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at
bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,19 this Court has
already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense."20
In its Order of 6 December 2007,21 the court denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that Mercado has already been superseded by
Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment22 before the
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity
of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March
2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the
marriage of petitioner with respondent null and void, and required
herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her
"answer to the complaint."23 On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED
the petition for nullity of marriage for failure of herein respondent
(plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial
brief.24 Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the
court before the Court of Appeals.25 The matter is still pending
resolution thereat.26
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court of Appeals,27 herein
petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and
denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the
following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the
assurance that the allegations in the petition are based on
authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial court’s dismissal of the
criminal information for bigamy filed against private
respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted,
should be filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by
29
 the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel
in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the
dismissal of the subject criminal case is tantamount to an
acquittal based on the trial court’s finding that the first
essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage
contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no
clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was tainted
with arbitrariness which violated petitioner’s right to due
process. Notably, petitioner filed her comment/opposition to
private respondent’s motion to quash before the trial court
issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the
information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there
can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the
application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. 28
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. 29
Hence, this petition.30
Our Ruling
I State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite
the defect in the pleading and the question of legal standing to bring
the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified
which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned
pleading.31
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax
the rule in order that the ends of justice may be served.32 The defect
being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may
nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the
pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice xxx may be served."33 At any rate, a pleading is required to
be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that
the allegations were true and correct and not based on mere
speculations.34
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) which has the authority to represent the government in a judicial
proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The Administrative Code
specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.35
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices,
brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over
such legal officers with respect to such cases. 36
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,37 we held that the summary dismissal of
an action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, when not
initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order.38 Not even the
appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for
certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or
his assistant to represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the
proceedings in the trial court.39
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of
actions even when the respective interests of the government were not
properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,40 this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved
by any order or ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and
not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling
before us.41 xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to
comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. 42 In
light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as
its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.,43 without requiring the Office of the
Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court
determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature
and scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to
settle cooperative disputes as well as the battle between two (2)
factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the
very existence of one of the country’s major cooperatives."44
And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of
the instant petition even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General.
After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone."45 To borrow the words of
then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the
dismissal of a criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who
[come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present
their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day
in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. 46
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition
is in violation of the respondent’s right against double jeopardy on the
theory that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial
court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment
or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or
30
the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.47
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case
as (a) respondent has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he
filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was
dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.48
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of
the accused on account of an order sustaining a motion to
quash.49 More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is
"not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."50 Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the
complaint against petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2
of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court – that the facts charged in the
complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of
said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
[now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order
sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now
substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.51
III
We now determine the merit of the petition ˗ did the trial court act
without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it
sustained respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary
to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was
a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information and any
evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of
defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as ˗
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
Information.52
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Information,"53 for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations
contrary to those appearing on the face of the information. 54
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:55
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single
fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion
to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be
properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to
quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined
in the law.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the information will
disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged are
sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at
the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of
a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the
prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the
informations on the basis only of the petitioner’s evidence, such as
[this].56
As in the recent case of Los Baños v. Pedro,57 where we found no
merit in respondent’s allegation that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense because "the Information duly charged a specific offense
and provide[d] the details on how the offense was committed,"58 we
see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case
at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united
in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage
is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for
validity.59
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the
crime of Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.60
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the
beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and
executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact
contrary to that alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid marriage
was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent
marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters
of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to
quash even after taking into consideration the established exceptions
to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the
new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;61 (2) when the Rules
so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy;62 and (3) when facts have been established by
evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie
truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a
motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to
close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution
of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction xxx."63
For of what significance would the document showing the belated
dissolution of the first marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the
impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance with People v.
dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground
that the allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts
31
have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even
destroy the prima facietruth accorded to the allegations of the reinforces the position of this Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of
information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure Appeals:72
technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court,
spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal
as well as of the prosecution.64 (Emphasis supplied.)
effects.1avvphil.zw+ Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
We find that there is none. considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has
criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.73 (Emphasis supplied.)
declared the first marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on
the rulings65 in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a
case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses
because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void Noel and Amelia Serafico,74 this Court pronounced:
ab initio marriage is invalid;66 and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio
has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid
In a catena of cases,75 the Court has consistently held that a judicial
marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
incomplete.67
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral. xxx
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the
Family Code, which was promulgated by the late President Corazon C.
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondent’s subsequent marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
was celebrated in 1991.
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does
The specific provision, which reads: not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may
such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash
by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
raised only during the presentation of evidence.
declaring such marriage void.

All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,68 where this Court settled the
discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No.
"conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of
07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not
nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a
alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is
new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a
a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that
prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,69 this Court,
facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional
concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent
circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a
bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a person, WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the
declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.70 Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the Order dated 6 December 2007 of
the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already superseded SO ORDERED.
Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2)
cases from one another, and explained:

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from

Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated. xxx

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was

actually solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.71
32
G.R. No. 187000 November 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN,
RICKY YU, VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA,
SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA
and RAMON NAVARRO,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to
be made.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated May 29, 2008 and Resolution2 dated
February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are the following:
Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Dionisio R. Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug
test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the
urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected
to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant
Medical Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon
City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested
positive.
After confirmatory tests doneby the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division,
those twenty-one (21) urine samples, which included that of herein
respondents, yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial
screen test. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged
with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165) under identical Informations,3 which read as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice,
accuses AQUILINO ANDRADE for Violation of Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any
manner introduced into the physiological system of his body,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug inviolation of the aforecited law. 4
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their
arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-
trial and trial on August 11, 2006.5
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, which reads:
6. A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165
reveals that the accused did not commit the offense charged. Under
RA 9165, the offense of Violation of Section 15 thereof is committed by
a person apprehended or arrested for using dangerous drug, and who
is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a
confirmatory test, to wit:
xxxx
7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested
for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165,
which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the
proper information in court. In fact, the accused were merely called to
the Maximum Security Conference Hall in the morning of June 30,
2003 and with seventeen (17) other inmates made to undergo drug
testing, pursuant to the directive of then Sr. Usec. Santiago. It was only
after they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information
for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them.
8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons
subject to mandatory and random drug tests, who if found positive after
such drug test shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15. x x x
xxxx
National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections
are not included in the enumeration. Thus, even if the accused have
been found positive in the mandatory or random drug test conducted
by BUCOR, they cannot be held liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the
accused were apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or
for violating the provisions of RA 9165 which led to the June 30, 2003
screen test, or that the accused are subject to mandatory or random
drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a showing that the
same was conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
apprehension or arrest of the offender through a confirmatory test
within fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in accordance with the
provisions of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
xxxx
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the
screening test, thus depriving them of the right to challenge the same
through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day
period after receipt of the positive result.6
Respondents' lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he
intends to pursue the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents' previous
counsel,7 hence, the pre-trial and trial were reset to September 29,
2006.
The pre-trial and trial were further reset to November 29, 20068 due to
a typhoon that occurred on the earlier scheduled date.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled
hearing date for pre-trial and trial, issued an Order9 granting
respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss,10 ruling as follows:
To be liable under this Act the following essential requisites must be
present:
1. The offender must have been arrested or apprehended for
use of dangerous drugs; or apprehended or arrested for
violation of RA 9165 and the apprehending or arresting
officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person
arrested or apprehended on account of physical signs or
symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation is under
the influence of dangerous drugs; or must have been one of
those under Sec. 36 of Art. III of RA 9165 who should be
subjected to undergo drug testing;
2. The offender must have been found positive for use of
dangerous drug after a screening and confirmatory test;
33
 3. The offender must not have been found in his/ or her
possession such quantity of dangerous drug provided for
under Section 11 of this Act;
4. That if the offender arrested or apprehended has been
found to be positive for use of dangerous drugs after a
screening laboratory examination, the results of the
screening laboratory examination of test shall be challenged
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a
confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical
laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry or some such modern method.
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the inmates were not
apprehended nor arrested for violation of any provision of R.A. 9165.
These inmates were in the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) serving
sentences for different crimes which may include also drug offenses.
They were subjected to drug tests only pursuant to the request made
by then Director Dionisio Santiago. Furthermore, they were not one of
those persons enumerated in Section 36 of the said Act who may be
subjected to mandatory drug testing. Hence, the first essential requisite
has not been complied with. If one essential requisiteis absent, the
Court believes that these inmates cannot be held liable for the offense
charged. They may be held liable administratively for violation of the
Bureau of Corrections or NBP rules and regulations governing
demeanor of inmates inside a penitentiary but not necessarily for
violation of Sec. 15 of R.A. 9165. The court need not discuss the other
elements of the crime as the same has become moot and academic in
view of the absence of the first essential element.
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in
the Information these cases are ordered DISMISSED with costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA after its Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's
Order, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Orders of the public respondent Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Cases Nos. 06-224, 06-229,
06-231, 06-232, 06-234, 06-235, 06-237, 06-238, 06-239 and 06-241,
STAND.
SO ORDERED.12
Consequently, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, but was
denied in a Resolution dated February26, 2009. Thus, the present
petition.
Petitioner asserts the following argument:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MAY NOT BE HELDLIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 15, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165.13 According to petitioner, the
CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section
3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court having been already arraigned
before availing of the said remedy.
Respondents, however, insist that the CA is correct in upholding the
RTC's decision dismissing the Informations filed against them. They
claim that since the ground they relied on is Section 3(a), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, their motion to quash may be filed even after they
have entered their plea.
Basically, the issue presented before this Court is not so much as the
timeliness of the filing of the motion toquash, but whether the CA erred
in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually
dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause.
This Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss,"
which is, that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an
offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to
Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after
they have been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion
may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to
raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a
waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. -
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the
exceptions provided under the above-provision, the timeliness of the
filing is inconsequential. The mistake lies inthe RTC's dismissal of the
case.
The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the
cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised
by respondents, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in
the Informationthese cases are ordered DISMISSED with cost de
officio.
SO ORDERED.15
Section 2,16 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any
ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents
claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable
cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been
only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the
arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.18
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,19 this Court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to
the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
34
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes
to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based
on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.20
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued. In People v. Inting:21
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the
two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is the function of the
Prosecutor.22
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent
assessment of the evidence on hand, it isonly for the purpose of
determining whether a warrant of arrest should beissued. The judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause;
rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutor’s finding.23
In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to
the determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial
determination of probable cause was done without orin excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction.24 In this particular case, by proceeding with the
arraignment of respondents, there was already an admittance that
there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have ruled on
whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for
the crime committed since its duty is limited only to the determination
of whether the material averments in the complaint or information are
sufficient to hold respondents for trial.1âwphi1 In fact, in their motion,
respondents claimed that the facts alleged in the Informations do not
constitute an offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should
have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the
amendment of the Information without dismissing the case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not
constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus:
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion
to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. 25
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to
quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an
amended information.26 Generally, the fact that the allegations in the
information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment.27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.28 In the present
case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. In
People v. Talao Perez,29 this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the
information in question is defective, as pointed out by the accused, it
appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by amendment, the
lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have
ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt
about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should
direct its amendment or that a new information befiled, and save the
necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the
complaint might easily be amended.30
Even the CA admitted that the RTC erred in that regard, thus:
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, requires that the
prosecution should first be given the opportunity to correct the defects
in the information before the courts may grant a motion to quash
grounded on Section 3(a), and it may only do so when the prosecution
fails to make the amendment, or the information suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment. Pursuant to this rule, it would thus
seem that the trial court did err in this regard.31
The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that
"whatever perceived error the trial court may have committed is
inconsequential as any intended amendment to the informations filed
surely cannot cure the defects,"32and to justify such conclusion, the CA
proceeded to decide the merits of the case based merely on the
allegations in the Information. Such pronouncement, therefore, is
speculative and premature without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the
Informations. In People v. Leviste,33 we stressed that the State, like
any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings,
the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the
burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner
consistent with public interest.34 The prosecutor's role in the
administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every
fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to
whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption
on what the judge may or is disposed to do.35 The prosecutor owes the
State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence tothe end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts;
that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape
unpunished.36 In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the
prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to
choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness.37Thus, the
RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its
evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively
curtailed the State's right to due process.
35
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29, 2008 and
Resolution dated February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100016 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

36
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The
assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent,
and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to
give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to
quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On
October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon
(Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment
of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his
marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in
June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of
respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
9 WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information for
Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and
without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which
second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying
that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that his
motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds,
to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2)
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying
respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in
the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent
and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved,
respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the
crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the
information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is
not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated
February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court16 before the CA, assailing the
denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his
first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to
the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered
to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion
to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v.
People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion
to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that
his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of
the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further
held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for
the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent
contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against
him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information,
considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an
offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following
grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING
SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING
RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT
EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH
ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this
Court in Montañez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v.
Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but
during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983,
respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the
annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May
14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent.
The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and
dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had
37
already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy
case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the
subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married
Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her
marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is
physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June
8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The
court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second
marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration
of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and
executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an
information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be
quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual
antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez,
respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability
has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the
first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition
for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein,
which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which
is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment
or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of
extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however,
shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime
of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for
in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that
respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage
having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that
the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his
marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the
absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first
valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second
marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.34It is notproper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit
of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would
be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings
and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented
by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts
have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded
to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission
thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s
declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He
claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is
wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the
offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished
his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the
Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused
therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy
were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and
void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the
Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused
contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases
that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. 41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity
of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him.
Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion
above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that
the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only
for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does
not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may
such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash
by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
38
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be
raised only during the presentation of evidence.43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for

certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present
evidence to support his omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4,
2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

39
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ)
SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D.
LORICA, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
For our resolution is the Report and Recommendation1 dated August
13, 2013 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in OCA LP.I.
No. 12-3879-RTJ.
The Antecedents
Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complaint
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law) and
R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the
Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr. Remy Angela Junio
and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School
of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the
Philippines (SPUP).
In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by
SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of
her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her
completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen Program Curriculum.
In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor’s office found
probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and
recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against
them.
On September 8, 2008, Junio and Lorica appealed the August 22,
2008 resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but Undersecretary Jose
Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied their
petition for review in his resolution of February 24, 2011.
On March 31, 2011, the prosecutor’s office filed two informations
against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section 10(a), Article VI, in
relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge Lyliha Aquino.
On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A.
Cacatian-Beltran of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the
inhibition of Judge Aquino.
On April 4, 2011, Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the
DOJ’s February 24, 2011 resolution.
On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of
arrest against Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of
arrest against them.
On May 24, 2011, Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty.
On May 25, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed an urgent motion to hold in
abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest. Junio
posted bail on the same day.
In its order dated June 14, 2011, the RTC denied Junio and Lorica’s
urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall
warrants of arrest.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s
motion for reconsideration and set aside the February 24, 2011
resolution of Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution
dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor
to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations
of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of
probable cause.
On August 12, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and motion
before the RTC, praying for the cancellation of their scheduled
arraignment, and for the dismissal of the cases against them.
On September 5, 2011, the City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica filed a
joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s
August 8, 2011 resolution.
On September 14, 2011, Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order
stating that "the motion relative to the resolution of the Department of
Justice is deemed submitted for resolution."2
On December 20, 2011, Junio, Lorica and the City Prosecutor filed a
joint motion for resolution.
In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to
withdraw informations for lack of merit.
The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order,
but the RTC denied their motion in its order dated April 10, 2012.
The Administrative Complaint
Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-
Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only
resolved the joint motion to withdraw informations after almost four
months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They claimed that
four months was beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the
resolution of simple motions.
Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran
"arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 3 when she
insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De Lima.
In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and
Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at
Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases had been retained,
and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any follow-up by
Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she "lost
no time in finishing the draft"4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the
joint motion for resolution was brought to her attention.
Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not bound by the
findings of the Secretary of Justice since her court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the case. She added that she made an
independent assessment of the evidence before denying the motion.
She further stated that she acted promptly on all other incidents in the
case.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the OCA
recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint against Judge
Cacatian-Beltran be dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (2)
40
Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to strictly comply with the
reglementary periods to act on pending motions and other incidents in
her court.
The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings. It explained that the aberrant acts allegedly committed by
Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to the exercise of her judicial functions,
and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be
administratively sanctioned.
The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-Beltran should be
admonished to be more mindful of the reglementary periods to resolve
pending motions.
Our Ruling
After due consideration, we approve and adopt the OCA’s
recommendations as our own ruling.
Delay in resolving a motion
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court
judges to decide a case within the period of ninety (90) days. Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise holds that
judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge
to dispose of the courts’ business promptly within the period prescribed
by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety (90) day period is
mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or interlocutory
matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.5
In the present case, the City Prosecutor’s joint motion to withdraw
informations was deemed submitted for resolution on September 14,
2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran, however, did not act on the motion
within the prescribed three (3) month period (or up to December 13,
2011), and instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.
In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica
might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch
4 where the records of the criminal cases were retained, and that the
staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any follow-up by Junio and
Lorica and/or their counsel. We note, however, that Branch 4 is paired
with Judge Cacatian-Beltran’s Branch 3 per Circular No. 7-74, as
amended by SC Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos. 14053-
54 had been assigned to Judge Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent
upon her to update herself on the developments in these consolidated
cases; she should have kept her own record of cases and noted
therein the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective action.
To do this, Judge Cacatian-Beltran should have adopted a record
management system and organized her docket – an approach that she
appears not to have done.
Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or
order as a less serious charge, with the following administrative
sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of
more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there
had been undue delay (as shown by the records), any attendant bad
faith, any intent to prejudice a party to the case, or some other ulterior
ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled that the inaction was not
attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion
to withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence
on January 4, 2012.
To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability
of Judge Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or
suspension from office. Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted
the OCA’s recommended penalty of admonition.
Denial of the joint motion to withdraw informations
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a
prima facie case.6 We stress that once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a
dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is
the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.7
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information
filed by the public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant to the
directive of the Secretary of Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence
in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of probable cause, the
trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or of the Secretary of Justice that no crime had been
committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public
prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the
accused.8 To do so is to surrender a power constitutionally vested in
the Judiciary to the Executive.
In the present case, Judge Cacatian-Beltran does not appear to have
arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. The records
show that she evaluated and assessed the informations, the resolution
of the City Prosecutor, the affidavit and reply-affidavit of the
complainants, the counter-affidavit and rejoinder and the appeal
memorandum of Junio and Lorica, and the supporting documents
attached to them.
In her January 6, 2012 order, Judge Cacatian-Beltran notably
explained the basis for her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all
these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended
the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in this regard that
the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint
motion to withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De
Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica’s
remedy under the circumstances should have been made with the
proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not with the OCA by
means of an administrative complaint.
We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that Judge
Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a
judge"9 when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did
not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary
de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or
inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the
prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a
prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay10 best explains why we so
rule:
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny
a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for
such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of
the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that
a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to
Withdraw Information without an independent and complete
assessment of the issues presented in such Motion.
With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation of the
merits of the joint motion to withdraw information that Judge Cacatian-
41
Beltran undertook before dismissing it, she acted as a judge should
and can in no way be said to have assumed the role of a prosecutor.
The parties for their part are not without any remedy as the Rules of
Court amply provide for the remedy against a judicial action believed
to· be grossly abusive when the remedy of direct appeal is not
available. We cannot rule on this point in the present case however as
this is a matter not before us in this administrative recourse against
Judge Cacatian-Beltran.

WHEREFORE, premises considered we APPROVE AND ADOPT as

our own the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator. Judge Marivic A Cacatian-Beltran is
hereby ADMONISHED and REMINDED that she should dispose of her
cases within the period required by law.

SO ORDERED.

42
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
JOEL GALZOTE y SORIAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the twin resolutions 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 76783. The assailed April 30, 2004 resolution dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by Joel S. Galzote (petitioner), while the
challenged July 23, 2004 resolution denied his motion for
reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for robbery
in an uninhabited place against the petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 1, Manila. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the crime
of Robbery in an Uninhabited Place, committed as follows:
That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one ROSENDO
OQUINA Y ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No.
304765, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain, by means of force upon things, break into and enter the
Administration Office of the Prince Town Inn Corporation located at
Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this City, which is an uninhabited place,
by then and there destroying the Jipson board ceiling of the said
establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing through the
same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once
inside, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
took, stole and carried away cash money in the amount of ₱109,000.00
belonging to said Prince Town Inn Corporation, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of ₱109,000.00,
Philippine Currency [sic].
Contrary to law.2
The petitioner moved to quash the above information by alleging that it
was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in substance. The
MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash in its order of September
15, 1997.3Likewise, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial.4
Via a petition for certiorari,5 the petitioner elevated the unfavorable
ruling of the MeTC to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila.
The petitioner argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Respondent Jonathan
Briones (respondent) moved to dismiss the petition for certiorari,
arguing that: (a) the petitioner failed to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and (c) the
MeTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to
quash.6
In its order7 of March 22, 2002, the RTC granted the respondent’s
motion and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The RTC also denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.8
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The CA dismissed the petition in its resolution
of April 30, 2004.9
The CA held that the petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the petitioner should
have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari, upon
receipt of the RTC’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA
also noted that the petitioner failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent in his petition.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the lower courts
erred in denying his motion to quash. It explained that the allegation of
conspiracy in his case need not be alleged with particularity since it
was not charged as an offense in itself, but only as a manner of
incurring criminal liability. The fact that the petitioner’s alleged co-
conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense of malicious
mischief in another case is not a bar to the petitioner’s prosecution for
the crime of robbery.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the CA denied
his motion in its resolution10 dated July 23, 2004.
THE PETITION
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner claims that
his recourse to a petition for certiorari before the CA was proper. He
argues that both the MeTC and the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when they denied his motion to quash. He alleges that the
trial courts failed to see that the information filed against him was
flawed both in form and in substance.
The petitioner additionally claims that his failure to implead the People
of the Philippines as party-respondent was not fatal to his petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the
chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to
question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of
procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in
the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and
the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can
then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the
latter’s ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and
is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed
under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy
remedy.11 The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory
order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an
exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be
firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited
43
the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";12 the was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41
promotion of public welfare and public policy;13 cases that "have of the Rules of Court:
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof";14 or judgments on order
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify
a petition for certiorari.15
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the
attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances. Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, the petitioner
cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.19 1avvphi1
At the RTC
Even on the substantive aspect, the petition for certiorari filed with the
CA must fail considering the petitioner’s failure to show any justifiable
We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for
reason for his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave
certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to
abuse of discretion committed by the RTC since it was merely affirming
show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the
a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of the petitioner’s motion to
above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit
quash.
any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was
consistent with the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. The
ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co- As a final word, we cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a
conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave
robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under abuse of discretion.20 We repeat that it is only in the presence of
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure extraordinary circumstances where a resort to a petition for certiorari is
that warrant the quashal of a criminal information. 16 proper.21 Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s recourses cannot
but be dilatory moves that deserve sanction from this Court.
This ground, too, is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is
irrelevant to the validity of the criminal information filed against the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of
accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court
validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or of Appeals dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
defenses apparent on the face of the information.17 A facial 76783. Treble costs against the petitioner.
examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it
to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the
guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of SO ORDERED.
Criminal Procedure. This section provides:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them

shall be included in the complaint or information.

Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form

and substance for it states: (a) the name of the petitioner as the
accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense
committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was
committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with
particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the
robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the
petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the information.

The CA Resolution

To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution that is the main subject of

this review, we find no reversible error in the CA’s dismissal of the
petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order; the petition
was both procedurally and substantively infirm.

We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong
legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition for certiorari filed
by the petitioner before the RTC was an original action whose resulting
decision is a final order that completely disposed of the petition; 18 the
assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the
petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy
44
45