Criminal Procedure Case Reviewer
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Case Details
Canos v. Peralta
G.R. No. 38352; August 19, 1982
Petitioner: Adela Canos
Respondent: Hon. Peralta (Judge of CFI
Davao), Rolando Apas
Ponente: Escolin, J.
Rufo Mauricio Construction v. IAC
G.R. No. 75357; November 27, 1987
Petitioner: Rufo Mauricio
Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court,
People of the Philippines
Ponent: Paras, J.
Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 37404; November 18, 1991
Petitioner: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Gretchen
Cojuangco
Respondent: Court of Appeals, George Sison,
Luis Mauricio
Facts
 Respondent Apas has been employed by petitioner Canos as a cashier in
a gasoline station wherein the former was not paid the minimum wage
or the overtime pay prescribed by law.
 Petitioner was then charged in the CFI of Davao del Sur with violation
of the Minimum Wage Law.
 Respondent then instituted an action against the petitioner for
collection of differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages.
 The provincial fiscal file a “motion for consolidated trial” of the criminal
and civil case, which was granted by the Court.
 Petitioner filed this petition contending that after the criminal case was
instituted, the civil case should be suspended until final judgement in
the criminal action has been rendered, relying on Section 3(a)(b) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
 Illustre Cabiliza, driver of Rufo Mauricio Construction, was convicted
with homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
 Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal, but did not prosper since he died prior
to such appeal.
 The lower Court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear as substitute to
the civil aspect of the case, and ordered a writ of execution.
 However, it was found that Cabiliza was insolvent, hence, the victim’s
widow file a motion for the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution
against the employer, Rufo Mauricio, which was granted by the Court.
 The petitioner filed an appeal to the IAC which was ruled against him,
hence this petition.
 Petitioner contended that the death of the accused-employee wipes out
not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's
subsidiary liability.
 An issue of the GRAPHIC magazine published an article which petitioner
contends it alludes to petitioners-spouses, and that it is false, malicious
and constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife’s virtue, honor and
character.
 Hence, petitioner filed a civil action for damages based on libel against
Graphic Publishing Co.
 The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with the same Court a criminal case
for libel against the respondents.
Issue/Held/Doctrine
Issue: Whether or not the civil case should be suspended.
 No.
 Civil Case No. 558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal
Case No. 326.
 The former is based upon a contract of services entered into by the
parties, not upon the civil liability arising from the offense charged
in Criminal Case No. 326, i. e. non-payment of the minimum wage.
 Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-
contractu, the civil case can proceed independently of the latter,
in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused-employee wipes out
not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also his employer’s
subsidiary liability.
 No.
 The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or
before the judgment of conviction (rendered against him by the
lower court) became final and executory extinguished his
criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the
imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but
not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not
from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused not
having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still
regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and
2177, Civil Code), as in this case.
 The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary
but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can prove there
was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver).
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case and the separate and
independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the
former, may be consolidated for joint trail.
 Yes.
 From the provisions of Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, it is clear that the Civil action for the recovery of damages
arising from a crime, or ex delicto, may be filed separately from the
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Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
People v. Aragon
G.R. No. 5930; February 17, 1954
 Later, the petitioners filed separate motions to consolidate the criminal
case with the civil case which was granted by the Court.
 This prompted the respondents to file a motion for reconsideration of
the order, which was later lifted to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the lower court.
 Hence, petitioners filed this instant petition to the Supreme Court
contending that the criminal case and the separate and independent
civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the former, filed
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, may be consolidated for joint
trial.
 Defendant was charged of bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage with one Efigenia Palomer while his previous valid marriage
with Martina Godinez was still subsisting.
 Palomer filed a civil action against the defendant alleging that the latter
forced her to marry him, praying the annulment of their marriage.
criminal case either before the institution of the latter, which may
be done without reservation, or after such institution, provided,
however, that a reservation to that effect has been made.
 If in the meantime the criminal action is instituted, the civil action
which has been reserved cannot be commenced until final
judgment has been rendered in the former.
 This restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided for
in Section 3 of said rule.
 Thus, in the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant
case), 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed
even after the institution of the criminal case, provided that prior
proper reservation had been made.
 Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the
institution of the criminal cases.
 Since it makes reference to the first paragraph of Section 1, and the
latter necessarily includes the cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code as expressly recognized in the second
paragraph thereof which reads: "Such civil action includes recovery
of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused." it follows
without saying that an independent civil action for the recovery
of civil liability, authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of
the Civil Code, filed before the institution of the criminal case,
may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that
no final judgment has been rendered in the criminal case.
 If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme nor reason why, given
the existence of the condition, an independent civil action under
any of the said Articles, but filed after the institution of the
criminal case, may not be consolidated with the latter.
 This second scenario is equally and logically addressed by the
reasoning behind the provision for the first situation.
 That these provisions were incorporated into the Rules after this
petition was filed may not be interposed to deny their retroactive
application since procedural laws may be given retroactive
application.
Issue: Whether or not the civil action for annulment of second
marriage bars the criminal action for bigamy.
 No.
 The filing, while the bigamy case is pending, of a civil action by the
woman in the second marriage for its annulment by reason of force
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 Defendant filed a motion praying that the criminal charge be dismissed,
on the ground that the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial
question.
 Defendant contended that the civil action for annulment of marriage
bars the institution of the criminal action.
and intimidation upon her by the man, is not a bar or defense to the
criminal action.
 The civil action does not decide that he entered the marriage against
his will and consent, because the complaint therein does not allege
that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second
marriage.
 It was he who used the force or intimidation and he may not use his
own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.
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Criminal Procedure Case Reviewer
Prosecutor Empeso
RULE 112 – Preliminary Investigation
Case Details
Teehankee, Jr. vs Madayag
G.R. No.103102; March 6, 1992
Petitioner: Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.
Respondent: Hon. Job B. Madayag, People of
the Philippines
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Facts
 An information for frustrated murder on Maureen Navarro Hultman
was filed against the petitioner.
 However, after the prosecution rested its case, Hultman died.
 Private Prosecutor Vinluan filed for leave of Court to file an amended
information from frustrated murder to consummated murder.
 Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of preliminary investigation thereon.
 Hence, the petition.
 Petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for
murder charges an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new
fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is
essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be
conducted before the new information can be admitted.
Issue/Held/Doctrine
Issue: Whether or not a preliminary investigation for the amended
information is necessary.
 No.
 It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was
involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
accused.
 The amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it
charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the
original information
 Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally
charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into
one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the
other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not
necessary.
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