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EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in
its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both
his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the
alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It
reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
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1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability
is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal
import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted
from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento
no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
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SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y
Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused
die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421.
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in
the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal."
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By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall.
Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case."
People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan
observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with
the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp
civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability
— does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs.
Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are
to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v.
Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the
appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said
cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in
view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of
the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death
(Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p.
717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the
former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior
to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
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We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action
for damages was to be considered instituted together with the
criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply
in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
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originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused
had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws
of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the
court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims
against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred
that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal,
"the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the
case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of
the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants."
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It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources
of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal
of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal
action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was
for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose
of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA
394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability
is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of
the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against
him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed
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to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is
under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned
(Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil
liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise
of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-
examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
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Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during
appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the
event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with
civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to
justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear
on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
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However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which
is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely
new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard
put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It
is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the
same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted
as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases,
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the
civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the
final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent
to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil
liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and
enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from
that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
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refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw
its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of
July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a
separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take
more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it
was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on
the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it
upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the
source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not
applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability,
there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished
which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
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for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In
citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the
inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego
consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued
on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego
cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both
Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the
criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the
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Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to
Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application
in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as
part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in
Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21
of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual
money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto
may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims
may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising
from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims
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arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration.
Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive
by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of
his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction
of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-
delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
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to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against
him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5,
Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
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2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law 20
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

b) Contracts WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED

with costs de oficio.
c) Quasi-contracts

d) ...

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture

of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal

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THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco
seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the
canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and
Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for
the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was
the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for
his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2
inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was
then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano
who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back
portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano
tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and
prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe
brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked
for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis,
the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San
Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier
was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier
but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because
Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C"
dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier,
20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of
the lesser palmar prominence, right.
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As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to
This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Records) Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier
agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00
for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the
two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the
event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both
parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are
neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted
and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all
the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to
this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to
harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On
November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the
hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was

charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having

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Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial
court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with
the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was
ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal
upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of
Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.
The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to
such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a
typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued
irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were
closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the
canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam
leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow
which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area
affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the
late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with
some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know
that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the
petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this
provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed
by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA
631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner
who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the
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22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a
very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15,
1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's
death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful
act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the
appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time
of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve
serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right
away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said
wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was
in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately
caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified
that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the
wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm
(tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People
v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death
was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of
the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet
healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be
reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of
the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound
inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted
the following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume
38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
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and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an
efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until
his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and
the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability,
and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen,
or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening
their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of
tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop
in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction
of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14
days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
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even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside
a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him.
This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980,
he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate
cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
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It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free
of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After
the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of
barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where
Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses
of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the
express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause
and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather
unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is
also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041,
July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of
the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances
of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes
of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
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evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private

because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of

the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification

imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case
calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint for
damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res judicata.
The issue involved being a pure question of law, the appellate court
certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.
The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for
plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge
against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the
health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges,
Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz
who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by
Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to
have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and
fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own
criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged
libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the
proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his
appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the
lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that
her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of
the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a
separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon
which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed
and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the
criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified
the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action
for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel.
Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to
mention that there are actually two cases now before us involving
the contending parties. Defendant-appellee Ucol filed an "appeal by
certiorari" before this Court questioning the dissenting opinion of
the Court of Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the present
case but instead in ordering the same remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings ... ."
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Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what
comprises a decision which can be the subject of an appeal or a
special civil action is the majority opinion of the members of the
court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no decision on
appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the
defendant-appellee's counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or
reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be
so careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to
come before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion.
Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit
amusing.
Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends
that there can be no res judicata since nowhere in its decision did
the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case nor did
it make any express declaration that the fact on which said case was
predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of Article
29 of the Civil Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules
of Court which respectively provide:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. ...
xxx xxx xxx
RULE III, Sec. 3(c) —
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
...
We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an
offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to
file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings
whether or not a reservation was made to that effect.
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the
plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to file the civil action
for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the
libel case is not without limitation.
We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no
advantage or benefit in adding to the clogged dockets of our trial
courts what plainly appears from the records to be a harassment
suit.
In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court
made these factual findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against
Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed was an act of
ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate haste
with which the administrative complaint was filed shows that he
was the one personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina
Tagaca told him was double hearsay. The incident, if there was,
happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of
Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in turn
told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check hearsay; and Atty.
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Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did not
do that, and he did not even present Ceferino as a witness. For
these reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz
was the author who concocted the charges in the administrative
complaint and had his laundry-woman, complainant Agustina
Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very little education and could hardly
speak English, yet the administrative complaint was written in
polished English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored
those phrases in the complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this
government service is inimical to the good intentions of the
Department to serve humanity and a disgrace and liability to
present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears that it
is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that
is libelous and not the respondent's answer; and even, assuming
that the administrative complaint may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the face of
proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established
for parties to give bent to their prejudice. The poor and the humble
are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues and
ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp.
8-10).
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of
harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to do with the
administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed. Second, he
filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs. Ucol's
answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private
prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the
very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the
accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a civil
action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are
not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is
doubly true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of
the bar. He should set an example in sobriety and in trying to
prevent false and groundless suits.
In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:
Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code),
independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the
recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the
injured party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words
"may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In
other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may
still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The case of
Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by
plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New
Civil Code the injured party is not required to reserve her right to
institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present case. There
was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in
the prosecution of the offense, and the amount of damages sought
to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so
that a reservation of the civil action was useless or unnecessary.)
(Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa —
upon whose initiative the criminal action for defamation against the
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defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not reserve her right
to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control of the
prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule
106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The
reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene
in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his
right to institute the civil action is that by such action her interest in
the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole
function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et
al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore, is that
the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and
not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65
Phil., 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et al.,
G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1
Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense
charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention
as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment rendered
therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages
based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et
al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).
We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty.
Ruiz has more than had his day in court. The then court of first
instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the dispositive portion of
its decision that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the
disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no
libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty.
Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer." (Emphasis
supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not
malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and
circumstances.
The trial court stated.
Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care,
the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which causes
dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an
unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor,
honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense,
which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity
and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood.
Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes
privileged matter. She did not go further than her interest or duties
require. She did not go beyond explaining what was said of her in
the complaint for the purpose of repairing if not entirely removing
the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive
to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended
Record on Appeal pp. 10-11)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by petitioner
Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on
leave. Gancayco, J., took no part.
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G.R. No. L-18193 February 27, 1963
NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA BESAS DE BERNALDES and
JOVITO BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., as
Guardian-ad-litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION, INC., defendant-appellee.
Lilio L. Amora and Peter L. Amora for plaintiffs-appellants.
Filemon B. Barria for defendant-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
In a complaint for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol by appellants, the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and
Perpetua Besas and their minor son, Jovito, against appellee, the
Bohol Land Transportation Co., a domestic corporation engaged in
business as a common carrier in said province, they alleged, in
substance, that, in the afternoon of November 27, 1958, Jovito
Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's
passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the
town of Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran of the same
province; that on the way the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio
Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, of the said province,
resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to
Jovito.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two
grounds, namely, that the cause of action alleged therein was
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
barred by a prior judgment, and that it did not state a cause of
action.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was established that in
Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court, Leonardo Balabag, driver
of the bus involved in the accident, was charged with double
homicide thru reckless imprudence but was acquitted on the
ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable
doubt, and that appellees, through Attys. Amora and Tirol,
intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve the
right to file a separate action for damages.
Relying on the case of Maria C. Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, et al.,
G.R. No. L-13134, promulgated February 13, 1960, the lower court
sustained the motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment, and
dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
The issues in this appeal are first, whether a civil action for damages
against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of
carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the
driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve
his right to enforce civil liability in a separate action, and second,
whether the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private
prosecutors, in the prosecution of the criminal case against the
driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence — will bar him from suing the latter's employer for
damages for breach of contract, in an independent and separate
action.
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Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the
civil action is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter. This provision evidently refers to a civil action
based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal
case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources,
such as law or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that a civil
action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct
from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or its
employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of
the Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, the same may be instituted and
prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of the
latter. (Visayan Land Transportation Co. vs. Mejia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
8830, L-8837-39. 52 O.G. p. 4241)..
The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on
alleged culpa contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry
safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to their
place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against
appellee's driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of
the latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other words,
appellant's action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a
common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was
charged in the criminal case. Therefore, as held in Parker, et al. vs.
Panlilio, et al., (G.R. No. L-4961, March 5, 1952), the failure, on the
part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil
indemnity against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the latter
based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, such
reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action
to be independent and separate from the criminal action.
Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to
make such reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal
action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila
Electric, 31 Phil. 47).
True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to
intervene — whether properly or improperly we do not here decide
— in the criminal action against appellee's driver, but if that
amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil
indemnity, the claim could have been only against the driver but not
against appellee who was not a party therein. As a matter of fact,
however, inspite of appellee's statements to the contrary in its
brief, there is no showing in the record before Us that appellants
made of record their claim for damages against the driver or his
employer; much less does it appear that they had attempted to
prove such damages. The failure of the court to make any
pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability of the
driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that
the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil
indemnity.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
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Lastly, as appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt,

a civil action for damages against him may be instituted for the
same act or omission (Rule 107, par. [d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If
such is the rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in the case of his
employer.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find the appeal interposed by

appellants to be meritorious. As a result, the order of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set
aside the January 23, 2001 order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying
respondents motion for deferment of arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and
his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz,[4] represented to Plus Builders, Inc.
(PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square
meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz.
They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was
previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and
Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his
mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did
not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent
and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No.
687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed
lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal
demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount
of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for Injunctive Relief docketed as
Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty
Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20
other John Does.[5] Respondent sought a declaration that he was
merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was
not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the
various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a
complaint for Damages and Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[6]
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification
of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8]
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on
the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case
Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381.[9] On January 27, 2000, the trial court
denied respondents motion.
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A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on
February 27, 2001.[10]
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the
arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case.[11]
The Court of Appeals granted respondents prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19,
2001.[12]
On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January
27, 2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining it from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until
the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment
shall have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May
31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the
pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive
Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question
justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the
respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must
be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until
the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.[13]
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one
is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused
in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.[14]
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
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respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother
are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for
the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale
of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the
purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the
culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is
held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it
does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of
estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a
ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the
purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve
respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still
be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.[15] Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16] the petitioner was accused in a criminal
case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of
another party without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which
consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while
the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case
be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before
the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the
suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial
question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled
that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on
the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957,
that his D-6 Caterpillar Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was free
from all liens and encumbrances will not determine the criminal
liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . .
. (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial
question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the
crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud,
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hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently
of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which
provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (j) That, therefore,
the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the
instant petition was not made with grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such,
it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with
the arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13530 February 28, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE JULIO VILLAMOR, ET AL., respondents.
Felix S. Falgui for petitioners.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to enjoin respondent
court from allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 40865 to
present evidence on the existence or execution of certain document
of sale on the ground that the same presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided in a civil case then pending before the
Court of Appeals.
On October 30, 1956, Eduardo S. Puzon filed a complaint against
Petra A. Querubin before the Court of First Instance of Manila to
declare as inexistent and null and void certain document allegedly
executed by Puzon in favor of Querubin, which was later amended
on December 4, 1956. After issues were joined, trial was held and
on May 10, 1957 the trial court rendered decision holding that the
deed of sale alleged in the complaint was indeed fictitious,
inexistent and null and void, and condemning Petra Querubin to pay
the sum of P10,000.00, with corresponding interest thereon, and
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
the further sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, with costs. In due
time, Querubin took the case to the Court of Appeals wherein it was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 21018-R.
While said case was pending appeal, the City Fiscal of Manila filed
an information for false testimony against Petra Querubin on the
strength of a complaint filed by Eduardo S. Puzon alleging therein
that she falsely testified that Puzon executed a document of sale of
certain mineral claim and later filed and recorded the same with the
office of the Mining Recorder of Naga City knowing that said
allegations were not true. This charge having been given due
course, the Court of First Instance of Manila set the case for trial
during which the people, represented by a private prosecutor,
started to present its evidence. After the prosecution had rested its
case, the defense started to present its evidence to disprove some
of the points covered by the prosecution among which was the
issue relative to the existence or non-existence of the alleged
document of sale involved in the civil case. And it was in the course
of the presentation of said evidence that the private prosecutor
filed a motion to suspend the trial on the ground that the issue on
which the defense was presenting evidence partakes of the nature
of prejudicial question which cannot be done inasmuch as the same
is one of the issues involved in the civil case pending between the
same parties which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Counsel
for the defense objected to this motion contending that such issue
cannot be considered prejudicial since the two cases cover different
questions and issues or do not overlap and that even if they cover
the same issues the defense cannot be prevented from presenting
evidence relative to the matter because the same constitutes an
indispensable element that is necessary to establish the innocence
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of defendant. After counsel for both parties had argued orally and
submitted memoranda in support of their contentions, the court on
December 3, 1957 issued an order denying the motion and setting a
new date for the continuation of the hearing. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the private prosecutor
interposed the present petition for certiorari.
court that he really presented evidence to show the non-existence
or non-execution of the document in question as may be seen from
the following portion of the record:
COURT: You have presented evidence to show that those were not
really the truth — no document and no registration ....

We find no merit in the contention that the issue relative to the ATTY. FALGUI: Yes, your Honor,
execution or non-existence of the alleged deed of sale of certain
mineral is a prejudicial question that is involved in the civil case
pending between the same parties before the Court of Appeals COURT: How can they prove their side of the case if we don't allow
which was at the time still pending determination, and that for that them to prove that there was such a document? If we put a stop to
reason the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case for false all their evidence, then they cannot prove their innocence.
testimony should be suspended until said case shall have been Nonetheless, since you don't agree, I will give you a chance. How
finally terminated. It should be observed that the criminal case of long do you want? (Tsn p. 24, 10/23/57)
false testimony preferred against respondent Querubin on the
Even therefore if we concede that the issue relative to the existence
strength of a complaint filed by petitioner Eduardo S. Puzon imputes
or validity of the deed of sale in question is also involved in the civil
to the accused, among other things, that she testified falsely that
case pending before the Court of Appeals, the same cannot be
Puzon executed the alleged document of sale knowing it to be false
considered prejudicial in the sense that the trial of the criminal case
and that she later filed and registered the same with the office of
should be suspended until the civil case has been finally terminated,
the Mining Recorder of Naga City when the truth was that such
considering that the prosecution has presented evidence thereon
document never existed and no such document was ever filed and
and the defendant has evinced a desire to disprove it by presenting
registered by said accused with the office of said mining recorder
her own evidence, it being her constitutional prerogative to have
thereby having committed the crime of false testimony. And in
her case terminated with the least possible delay. As the trial court
order to substantiate said imputation the prosecution presented
has observed: "How can they prove their side of the case if you
evidence tending to show that it was not true that Puzon ever
don't allow them to prove that there was such a document? If we
executed the alleged deed of sale covering the mineral claim in
put a stop to all their evidence, then they cannot prove their
question, or that if said document ever existed it is fictitious or null
innocence." Indeed, after the prosecution had presented evidence
and void. As a matter of fact, during the hearing held in connection
tending to prove the imputation contained in the charge preferred
with this incident, the private prosecutor has admitted in open
against the accused, it would be most unfair if the latter should be

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deprived of an opportunity to disprove it and establish her

innocence. In any event, we find it improper for the prosecution to
ask for the suspension of the trial after having lodged the alleged
imputation against the accused and presented its evidence, for if in
its opinion the issue which is now raised is prejudicial in character it
should not have filed the charge in the first place but should have
waited for such a time until the Court of Appeals shall have finally
disposed of the civil case. The attitude of complainant Puzon in filing
this charge against Petra Querubin immediately after the civil case
between them has been taken to the Court of Appeals cannot be
taken in any other light than to cause her harassment or prejudice.

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. The case is remanded to the lower

court for further proceedings. Costs against petitioner Eduardo S.
Puzon.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,

Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and
SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of
respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for
the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489,
entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and
Leonilo Jacalan," as well as their motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772
otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information
alleges:
That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa
and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of
the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City,
whereon they constructed their respective residential houses
against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have
deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her
damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the said
accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the
ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in
another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and
Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.,"
concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B.1 In that case, petitioners
seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol
and the partition of the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The
case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May
27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against
them.
On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion
and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had
to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.
On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but their motion was denied by the court in its
order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
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The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of
Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear
not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the
decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be
decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.2 Rule 111, §5
provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a
piece of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and
against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges
that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA
TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "her
property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of
the use of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of
the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil
Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City.
The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be
determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.
In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil
case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private
respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question to be
owned in common by the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance
from their parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private
respondents claim that the decision in that case is not yet final
because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is that
whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of
ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners
are co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of
squatting because they are as much entitled to the use and
occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol
and her family.3
Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land
can be ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case
is the right to its physical possession. Consequently, they contend,
he can also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.
The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner
of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has
let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary
possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by
private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to
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possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the

pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the
proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be
suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is

ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489
until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been
resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the
criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely
against petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

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THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1
and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28,
2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification the August 15,
2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto
S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
69905.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement
carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for
the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective
June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the
mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home
Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the
name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without
notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding
to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to
complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was
delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months of
December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa
argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her
that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was
cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N.,
October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer,
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Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized
the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March
15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her
husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD
and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only
restored and reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records,
p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even
send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr.
Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of
defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days
after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for
payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice.
Neither did they observe honesty.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V.
Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the present
ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have
requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to
pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the
patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had
been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should
have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly
and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar
Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the
cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too
for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
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On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision
disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded damages is
reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages,
while attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty
to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that
when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad
faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a
notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water
line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses
Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based
on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit
any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied
via a Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD
and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June
28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with
the following Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED
THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES
FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION
DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT
PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT
DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER
AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR
WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER
OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
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7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who
were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-
appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant
petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC
and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on
certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave
mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and
Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so, considering
that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred.
Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez
before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the
present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition
for review on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with
finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision
final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned.
Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from participating
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by
filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless,
reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the
RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed
that the main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled
that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain
exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition.13 This
is especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed
by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show
that the instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply, because she
had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she
admitted in the present petition that it was she who requested
COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This
was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against
petitioner. While it was COWD which actually discontinued
respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was
through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's
water supply was disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account
with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
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Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to harm another.15 Otherwise, liability
for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the present case,
intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on
the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she
should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately
after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her
request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation
under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What
made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect
the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil
Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila
Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the
exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to
wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty
and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it
was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability
of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of
the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society,
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
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xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if
the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code
would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having
the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with
her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such
intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to
give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply
despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to
depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner,
COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the
provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and
2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in
sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although it reduced
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the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses were Very truly yours,
deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and
such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief (SGD)
granted by the RTC. LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Division Clerk of Court
Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may be recovered
when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest, and where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28,
2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

July 24, 2013

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___July 17, 2013___ a Decision, copy

attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on July 19, 2013 at 2:25 p.m.

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THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated
November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for
short) filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin
[petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short)
from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts
similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products,
with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan
City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the
Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that
of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office,
and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent’s]
employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its
plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that
[petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colors but was selling these products at a lower price as
[respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same
customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in
place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts
such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock
absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others.
[Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with
plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea of using plastic
for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied
[respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair
competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost
and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of
the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled
[respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur expenses
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in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the
[respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic
and metal and that there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office
to [respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s] employees
had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner]
had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially
its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no
unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere
reproductions of original parts and their construction and
composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original
parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent]
cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these
automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
[respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive
parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell
these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore,
[respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-
made automotive parts as there are other establishments which
were already openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It
ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of
respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting
to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the
circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made
automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of
the sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated
over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant
liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual
damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s
fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary
damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those
manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property
protecting a good belonging to another,the copying thereof for
production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as
competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner
further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees
to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by
respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can
be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent
registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to
prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the
characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case
as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to
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good conscience for deliberately copying its products and
employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with
modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said
decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in
advancing its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court
finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is
entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of
Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business,
only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of
Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for
Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of
Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in
comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this
pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of
Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition
on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper
that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate
Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages is also maintained.
xxxx
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in
Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two
Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its
place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the
same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated
February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the
following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human
relations when the parties are not competitors and there is actually
no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be
moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper
although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive
parts, should it be considered in the light of the said copyrights
were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in
SC GR No. 161295?
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(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or
not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner
committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of
the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under
Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not unfair
competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a
damage suit and the products are not covered by patent
registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is
immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much
broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the
present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair
competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases
of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his
employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the
fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference
with the latter’s business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition under
Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right
of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be
prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive
or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance
to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law
prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the
means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade
rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as
"contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities,"
or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a
minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being
engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts.
Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good
conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s
formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and
even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s
customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s
hiring of the former employees of respondent and petitioner’s act
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of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount
to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in
bad faith in competing with the business of [respondent].1âwphi1
[Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with
mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the
findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged
in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its
manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the
services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of
[respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De
Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery
since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It
baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter
and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s]
engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his
experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a
warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he
was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this
accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was
hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with
[respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment
by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as
shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from
manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ
and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not
for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the
sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later
on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose,
he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta
quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in
bad faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted
that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made
automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation
is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and
distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty.
Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris
Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic
automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In
fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with these
products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes,
sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in
terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold by
Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’
employees to Willaware.
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Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this
Manufacturing Company? Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place. A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four
(4) years. I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris
Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it not?
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001,
will you kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic) transpired
between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Q: What is that?

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less? A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the
market and then I passed by the place where they were having a
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3). drinking spree, sir.
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that
to you? time?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1. A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000? Q: And who else was there?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. A: William Salinas, sir.
And the other one, just one month ago.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business upon them drinking?
was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel
Torres: A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Q: And what happened after that?
Corporation?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able
A: Yes, sir. to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.

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Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you? WE CONCUR:

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?" PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya." Associate Justice Associate Justice

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom BIENVENIDO L. REYES
did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"? Associate Justice
AT T E S T A T I O N
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
the Civil Code.
opinion of the Court's Division.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred
Associate Justice
Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the
Chairerson, Third Division
attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to
CERTIFICATION
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to
Division.
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
ANTIONIO T. CARPIO
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Acting Chief Justice
Associate Justice

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the
August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the
Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.
Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against
private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-
2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on
February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint
dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case
was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as
Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the
criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts
and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of
the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. In other words, private
respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question
as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s
Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on
the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as
the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were
issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial
question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this
case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
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Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation
of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by
the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her
cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be
filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111,
Revised Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated
May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision
dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a
"previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in
the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear
evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown.
The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil
action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed
after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in
the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988,
the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in
Beltran v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
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raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
however, became effective and the above provision was amended
by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case
to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it
must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to
guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a
civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to
delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted
to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that
there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court
and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded
the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change
in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously
instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action
involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action.
This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
"subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no
other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action
must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their
petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings
pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
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When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law
as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the
RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute
should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is
consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus
est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly
conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that
resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would
harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted
civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of
the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the
preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court
hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule
111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in
order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant
case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent
move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the
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presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed
involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and
damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of
the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate
that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of
the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in
the criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the
criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent
allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth
noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2
½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more
than three (3) years from the execution of the construction
agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing
of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was
a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and
interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this
scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to
stand.
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question,
as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case.
Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the
construction agreement between the parties is declared null and
void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of
such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be
the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable
under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
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(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement
to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were
issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of
the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.
People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is
the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was
issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason
for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear
intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing
a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we
ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the
issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient
Scientia Ipsa Potentia Est
funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of
BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for
value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance
of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.
Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the
contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do
in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several
checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5%
interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said
account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was
issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an
obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check
was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993
because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista
starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his
relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere
act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless
checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
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Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the
construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the

existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue
in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may
proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC,
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007
and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC,
Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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