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[client name deleted]
The Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee has just opened its thirteenth
plenum. The agenda includes personnel issues. Could you provide a preliminary
assessment of this meeting and any thoughts on how this plenum will influence
leadership selection at the eleventh national party congress in January 2011?
ANSWER: The holding of the 13th plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party Central
Committee indicates that plans are on track for the eleventh national party congress
in January 2011. The 13th plenum is being held after the conclusion of the round of
provincial, municipal and bloc (such as the army) party congresses. This signals the
commencement of the leadership transition that will be brought about in January.
The outgoing Central Committee approves the lists of candidates for election but the
power to elect will reside with the delegates from the provincial, municipal and bloc
party organizations.
It will now be clear to the Central Committee who is available for nomination as a
candidate and who is not (individuals that failed to gain selection as delegate by
their party organization). The recently concluded Ho Chi Minh municipal party
congress, for example, re‐elected Le Thanh Hai, as secretary. Hai’s name has been
bandied about as a possible candidate for party secretary general. His re‐election
suggests he will remain in that post.
The local party congresses will provide input in the structure and composition of the
new Central Committee. It is clear that the 13th plenum will consider personnel
matters but the final decision will be left to the 14th plenum if all goes well. If the
past is a guide, there could be one or more special meetings prior to the congress to
smooth out leadership issues. This will be a time when the backgrounds of
candidates are examined closely and any hint of scandal could be used to disqualify a
nominee. Allegations of corruption could be particularly poisonous.
The 13th plenum will also examine a pilot program that was carried out in ten
provinces and municipalities directly under central control to abolish the people’s
council at ward and district level. This experiment ended the practice of indirect
election of party officials at local level and instituted a direct election by party
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delegates. In the past the delegates elected the people’s council which in turn
elected the people’s committee. This intermediate layer has been abolished.
It remains to be seen if people’s councils will be abolished entirely in coming years.
But this will feature on the agenda of the National Assembly due for election in May
2011.
Since the pilot program is being touted as a popular step forward in internal party
democracy, it has implications for the selection of the national party leadership. At
the last party congress delegates sought a direct ballot for the post of party secretary
general. A compromise was reached and the delegates took part in a straw poll of
potential candidates and the results of this poll were given to the newly elected
Central Committee for consideration.
In addition to personnel issues, the 13th plenum will heavily focus on economic
issues such as the state budget for 2010 and 2011 and the long‐term socio‐economic
plan. It is likely that plans develop big projects, like the north‐south rail line, will
comes under scrutiny.
Of note is the assessment the Central Committee will make on weaknesses and
shortcomings. This assessment will affect the future careers of the present five
deputy prime ministers and well as individual ministers. Weaknesses in the quality of
education and training, clearly point to Nguyen Thien Nhan a protégé of Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. And then there is the question of the role of large state
enterprises – conglomerates – and, in particular, who should carry responsibility for
Vinashin’s near bankruptcy.
In September the party released several key draft congress policy documents for
public comment. These documents are very general and avoid mention of many
crucial issues. For example, there has been no public discussion how Vietnam will
fund the big ticket military equipment it has contracted to buy, such as the six Kilo‐
class diesel submarines and additional Sukhoi Su‐30 multirole jet fighters. It remains
an open question if a larger defence budget will mean a greater representation of
the army on the Central Committee. No mention has been made of Vietnam’s vexed
relations with China and Vietnam’s slowly developing defence relations with the
United States.