Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(1945 - 1985)
By the
Office of the Army Chief Historian
PHILIPPINE ARMY
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila
Volume II
2011
ᵢ
i
PHILIPPINE COPYRIGHT
By the
ISBN 978-971-011-308-8
1st Edition
March 2011
ii
HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY
Volume II
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS
iii
DEDICATIONS
iv
v
A Tribute to the Soldier
Syngman Rhee
President, Republic of South Korea
“All over the world today, peoples and governments are realizing
that the most important wars maybe fought not on the field of
military combat but in boardrooms, schools and community
centers. All along, the Philippine Army has helped the nation
exploit the opportunities to bring the country to its desired goals
of reform, change and sustainable development.”
Fidel V. Ramos
President, Republic of the Philippines
vi
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword v
Preface vii
Introduction xi
Background
Guerilla Units
Re-establishment of the Philippine Army
Headquarters Philippine Army as an Autonomous Unit
Other Organization Changes
Loyalty and Disciplinary Boards
Military Education and Training after the War
National Defense Plan
Reorganized Philippine Army
Reorganization of Headquarters Philippine Army
Background
Origin of the Dissident Problem
Introduction of Communism in the Philippines
Hukbalahap Movement
The Huks after the War
General Amnesty Proclamation
Huk Depredations
CPP Machinery Streamlined
Major Army Operations
Anti-Subversion Law
Role of Magsaysay
viii
Intensification of Intelligence Operations
Fall of the Politburo
Background
The 10th Battalion Combat Team
The 20th Battalion Combat Team
The 19th Battalion Combat Team
The 14th Battalion Combat Team
The 2nd Battalion Combat Team
Background
Operation Brotherhood
The First Philippine Contingent to Vietnam
Awards/Commendations
PHILCON I’s Accomplishments
Arrival of PHILCON II
PHILCON II’s Activities
PHILCON III
PHILCON IV Absorbed by PHILCAGV
Personnel of the 1st PHILCAGV
Logistics
Comptrollership
Significant Accomplishments of 1st PHILCAGV
Operation Climax
PHILCAV Replacement Unit (PRU)
Accomplishments
Background
Genesis of Student Activism
Subversion of Labor and Professional Groups
Combat Effectiveness
Intensified Operations against CPP/HMB
Birth of the Secessionist Movement
ix
Counter - Insurgency Measures
Combat and Intelligence Operations
ͥ
Chapter VI - Philippine Army under Martial Law 139-205
Background
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Corpus’ Defection
Digoyo Point Incident
Birth of the New Society
Army’s Mission and Objectives
The Army’s Role in National Development
The Kamagong Concept
Education and Training
Revitalization
National Security Operations (Sibalo to Zamboanga del Sur)
Background
AFP Home Defense Program
Motivation and Enlightenment
Endnotes 230-232
Bibliography 233-237
x
Introduction
Even as the Army was winning the hearts and minds of the
enemy, it extended a helping hand to war-torn countries in Asia. To
preserve world peace and democracy, the Philippine government sent
five Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) to beleaguered South Korea. In the
Vietnam War in the sixties, the Army sent contingents of Army doctors,
nurses, engineers and psywar experts on a mission of peace.
xi
STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF THE ARMY CHIEF HISTORIAN
xii
Chapter I
Background
1
Guerrilla Units
2
Intramuros, Manila on fire after an air attack, December 1941(WM. H.
Wise and Co. Inc., 1944)
3
“The world will long remember the epic stand of the
guerillas. After the fall of Bataan and Corregidor and the
tragic defeat of the allied armies in Asia, our people found
themselves pitted against the might of Japan. Then the
guerrillas came into being. It was the people’s fight from
the beginning, hungry and unclothed, but gave battle to the
enemy from every nook and corner of the land. For three
seemingly interminable years and despite unbelievable
hardships they carried the torch of freedom, confident that
America would not fail them…”3
4
The war left the Philippines a vastly ravaged land.
Rehabilitation efforts were hindered by the worsening peace and
order situation aggravated by the proliferation of loose firearms left
behind by the war, and the resurgence of vice and criminality
which local police agencies could hardly contain. A national police
organization was created to assist the local police forces in the
maintenance of peace and order. On June 7, 1945, President
Osmeña issued Executive Order No.51 activating an insular police
force called the Military Police Command (MPC) which was placed
under the Philippine Army.4 This unit was given a three-fold mis-
sion: the restoration of peace and order following the liberation;
the enforcement of military orders and regulations of the Army;
and providing assistance to civil authorities in law enforcement
except in combat zones where fighting was still ongoing against
the Japanese
5
Guerillas use captured Japanese equipment, 1944. Note the horse
as ammunition truck. (PA Museum)
6
PA engineers clear away the last of the Japanese destroyed bridge
across Butac River, Ilocos Sur, 10 June, 1945. (US Army Photograph)
th
Filipino soldiers of the 25 Div. receive “Bronze Star” medals for their
meritorious services in Northern Luzon, 29 June 1945. (US Army
Photograph)
7
A post-war Military Police Station. Note jeeps with white side wall
tires. (National Library)
8
6th Divisions. The 2nd Division was formed out of the USAFIP, NL
force led by Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann, the American officer of
the 31st Infantry (US) who did not surrender to the Japanese. The
4th Division was comprised by guerilla units that operated in the
eastern Visayas. The 5th Division was composed of units in
Western Visayas. The 6th Division assimilated all recognized
guerilla units in Mindanao.
9
cooperation with the MPC. When the unit expanded, it was tasked
as the coordinating agency for the enforcement of immigration,
anti-smuggling, fishing, and maritime navigation laws. An eight-
week theoretical training course was conducted aboard vessels
turned over by the US Navy to the unit.
10
On logistics, the Philippine Army was still dependent on the
U.S. Army as the Philippine Army was paid, fed, clothed and
equipped by the U.S. Army. The Philippine Commonwealth
Government’s appropriation of P300,000.00 annually was in-
adequate to pay the salary increases of enlisted personnel.
11
restructuring of the Philippine Army based on an approved
reorganization plan.
12
The transfer to the Department of the Interior of the
Philippine Constabulary (formerly the MPC) was done in order to
effect a more efficient discharging of its police functions.7All
functions of the MPC, except those of military character, were
thereafter exercised and assumed by the PC. This set-up enabled
the Armed Forces to devote its time to its primary function of
providing defense and security for the entire country as invoked in
the National Defense Act.
13
On March 30, 1950, the Philippine Constabulary became a
major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by virtue of
Executive Order No. 308 issued by President Quirino. All PC units
in Luzon were placed under the operational control of the
Commanding General, AFP, by virtue of Administrative Order No.
113. Tasked with the function of a national police force, it also
participated in the peace and order campaigns.
After the war, the government was faced with the task of
weeding out the undesirable elements in its newly-reconstituted
Armed Forces. The loyalty of personnel as well as anomalies and
irregularities committed during the Japanese occupation had to be
determined and checked.
14
Military Areas and Commanders, 1957
15
Military Education and Training after the War
From the ruins of the war, Lt. Col. Tirso Fajardo was
handpicked by President Roxas to re-establish the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio in 1947. As the first superinten-
dent of PMA after the war, Lt. Col. Fajardo rebuilt the Academy
and simplified its intricate set up by instituting reforms which are
still in effect today. Courses of instruction were revised to conform
to the requirements of a well integrated education program.
16
with the AFP’s accelerated program to promote professionalism
and competence among its officers. Utilizing its training funds, the
PMA sent several of its organic officers to pursue graduate and
special studies to local and foreign educational institutions. Thus,
the PMA became a more effective and efficient institution and the
primordial source of regular officers of the Philippine armed
services.
17
Officers, Mess Management Course Class 2, 16 Nov 1946.
(National Library)
18
the Philippine Army.
19
at Fort Riley, Texas. By the end of 1950, service schools of the
AFP had trained 1,420 officers and men in various courses.
20
tary of National Defense that the Philippine Government press the
United States for a more definite military commitment.
21
st
Reservists report to the 1 mobilization assembly, 1949. (National
Library)
22
rice fields, women and children-all segments of the civilian
populace were equally in danger and could also be of great help
to the military in the National Defense Program. This plan was
geared towards the achievement of two objectives: (1) The
creation of an organization to take care of the welfare and
protection of the civilian populace in the event of war; and (2)
Mobilization of the entire resources of the country for ready
utilization in case of war. 10 In line with the concept, Maj. Gen.
Jalandoni, AFP Chief of Staff, recommended to the Secretary of
National Defense the creation of a Civilian Emergency Ad-
ministration and a War Resources Board.
23
see the fact that, though independence was already granted by
the United States, the Philippine military establishment was still in
a badly shattered and emaciated state brought about by the war,
and which needed a thorough re-structuring and rehabilitation.
24
Provost Marshal General, a special staff of the GHQ that was
created on February 14, 1953.
25
Development Corps (EDCOR) was transferred to the Department
of National Defense. Likewise, transferred to the Military Area
were twenty military intelligence teams.
26
had carried it fighting side by side with the Americans in the
battlefields of Bataan and Corregidor.
.
President Roxas, realizing the tremendous task that lay
ahead of the independent Philippines said:
27
Pursuant to this order, the Philippine Army was activated
and constituted as a major service effective January 1, 1951, with
a three-fold mission:
28
Korea necessitated the incorporation of five Philippine Army
Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) into an organized expeditionary
force, the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTFOK).
Though the group caught only the tail end of hostilities in that
theatre, they nevertheless conducted themselves creditably by
participating in two campaigns where they elicited the admiration
of other nations in that United Nations limited policy action.
29
conducted courses designed to satisfy essential current needs in
technical and tactical skills. Training of officers in the military
schools, however, continued along essential associate, advanced
and specialized courses.
30
Inspection of a quarter, 1957. (National Library)
31
Chapter II
Background
32
more serious landlord-tenant problems. What followed was a
series of peasant revolts. However, the encomienda system
generated one beneficial effect for it served as the basis for the
establishment of provinces in the 18th century.
During the American regime, the same social ills that were
the hallmarks of the Spanish regime continued to plague
Philippine society. Ignorance, poverty, and religious fanaticism still
held sway. Those were the fertile grounds upon which dissidence
thrived.
33
Barely two years of its existence, was the CPP outlawed.
Judge Mariano Albert of the Manila CFI ruled that the PKP and the
KAP were illegal associations. The judge also convicted
Evangelista and nineteen others for being the organizers of an
illegitimate organization. They were meted out sentences ranging
from banishment and imprisonment to fines. This case was filed
by Manila police authorities after they had arrested Evangelista
and the others during the annual convention of the KAP held at
the El Retono Building on May 31, 1931.
Hukbalahap Movement
34
An appraisal of the Huk-inspired insurrection revealed that
“the war provided the Communist-led Huks with the opportunity to
move out of the stage of infiltration and maneuvering into a period
of direct armed revolutionary activity.1 The old issue of agrarian
reform and a strong plea for popular support on the basis of
patriotic action came in handy. It vowed to carry on the resistance
movement against the Japanese Imperial Forces and, at the same
time, to continue to seek social and economic reforms.
35
The Huks after the War
36
4. All charges against the Huks and other guerillas for anti-
Japanese activities to be dropped.
5. Remove anti-peasant officials and appoint officials
acceptable to the peasants.
6. Seat the Democratic Alliance congressmen.
7. Protect peasants from arrest, torture and imprisonment.
37
in the last war and who will not give up in peace and social gains
acquired during the war,” wrote Taruc.
38
took place between the government forces and the Huks during
that period were described in a newspaper account:
39
commented that this line of action was doing more harm than
good to the country. They said the grant of a general amnesty to
the Huks would be much more effective. But the President was
not disposed to take this course of action as the dissidents had
spurned all his previous overtures for peace.
40
of the PKM who had no criminal charges filed against them.
Furthermore, Zulueta also urged the President to implement
socio-economic measures and to conduct psychological warfare
operations designed to wean the dissidents away from their deep
rooted resentment towards the government. President Quirino,
however, did not act on these recommendations. Instead, he
inspected the Huk-infested provinces in Central Luzon to per-
sonally assess the situation.
41
Congress a copy of the draft of the amnesty proclamation. Several
congressmen filed concurring resolutions. In the Philippine
Senate, Senators Carlos P. Garcia and Lorenzo Tañada had in-
troduced amendments defining the scope and limits of the
proposed amnesty. Finally, on June 25, 1948, the Philippine
congress approved the proclamation draft. Among other things, it
provided that it would be deemed “necessary, just and wise for the
government to forgive, and forego the prosecution of crimes of
rebellion, sedition, illegal association and assault upon resistance,
and disobedience to persons in authority which said dissidents
have committed” prior to the approval of the proclamation.4
42
to be the keynote speaker. Taruc’s failure stemmed from one
primary reason: he had not convinced his colleagues to give up
dissidence as shown by the fact that only about 100 of them had
surrendered to authorities with their firearms at the end of the
grace period. This led him to give up his congressional seat in
favor of his hunted life once more.
Huk Depredations
Then on April 28, 1949, the nation was jolted into shock
and disbelief. A 200-man dissident band under Alexander Viernes
ambushed in Nueva Ecija, the party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon and
her entourage while on the way to Baler, Quezon. Aside from Mrs.
Quezon, her daughter, Baby, son-in-law Felipe Buencamino III,
Quezon City Mayor Ponciano Bernardo, and eight others were
also killed. This heinous crime spurred a national condemnation of
the dissidents. More outrageous acts followed. Several towns in
43
the provinces of Rizal, Bulacan, Batangas, Laguna, and Nueva
Ecija were raided and pillaged.
44
Another group of 300 Huks under Pedro Caguin, alias
Commander Samonte, successfully staged a dawn raid at Sta
Cruz, Laguna. They divested the provincial coffers of P86, 806.00
in cash. They also looted the town’s commercial section, fleeing
with goods valued at approximately P75,000. After killing the jail
warden and kidnapping several guards, they released twenty
prisoners. Before their flight, they burned many houses and
destroyed a bridge, and killed three of the PC troops sent there to
resist the marauders. The dissidents lost fifteen men.
45
Department of the Politburo. These preparations were dovetailed
for the planned seizure of stat power by May 1952.
46
Apayao, Mt. Province
Regional Command No. 10 Eastern Batangas, Western
Laguna & Southern Quezon
City Command Manila, Malabon, Caloocan,
Navotas, San Francisco del
Monte, Guadalupe, Pasay,
Pasig, Baclaran, Parañaque,
Muntinlupa & Alabang
47
Jose de Leon Chief, Plans and Training Division
Macario Razon Chief, Personnel & Administrative
Division
Ponciano Lina Chief, Finance and Supply Division
48
Magsaysay examined the Huk problem from two different
approaches: a policy of “all-out friendship” towards the civilians,
and “all-out force” not only against the Huks but also against other
lawless elements. He said: “With my left hand, I am offering to all
dissidents the road to peace, happy homes, and economic
security; but with my right, I shall crush all those who resist and
seek to destroy our democratic government.”
49
the 5th and 12th BCT’s 1st Field Artillery and 1st Airborne Battalion,
Scout Ranger teams and one platoon from the Nueva Ecija PA
command made up the striking forces. Seven HMB members
were killed, four wounded and 64 others surrendered, barely a
month after the operation was started.
50
the 5th BCT under Lt. Col. Fidel Llamas and the 19th BCT under Lt.
Col. Ramon Aguirre. Five Scout Ranger teams, ten dog teams, a
PAF unit under the command of Lt. Col. Benito Ebuen and a
Marine Company also lent support to the operation. A total of 4,
220 officers and men were employed in the month-long operation.
Five months after the onset of the operation, the 24th BCT
under Col. Aristeo Feraren got its long-awaited break after the
surrender of Commander Rading, the chief security officer of
Balgos. Thereafter, Scout Ranger Teams headed by Captains
51
Francisco Alesna, Delfin Panelo and Honorato Galan were
ordered to capture Balgos. Simultaneously the 24th BCT cordoned
Upper Buoy, Manito, Albay. Hours later, the troops encountered
the security forces of Balgos. A fire fight ensued, resulting in three
of Balgos’ six guards being captured.
52
On the night of February 22, known Huk hideouts and
production bases were destroyed and burned in the vast sphere of
operation by the 5,000 troops in the Pampanga-Zambales border.
After almost a month of securing the area, it was gathered that the
Huk Supremo had slipped into Mount Arayat at the end of March.
53
was “already ringed in by army troops when he decided to
surrender.”9 In this connection, Col. Papa also concurred with the
view that the 1st MA forces had sealed off Taruc’s hide-out, most
of his retinue had been killed, captured or had surrendered and
he, himself, was being cornered into a fast constricting area,
which left Taruc no alternative but to yield.”
54
of Republic Act 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Law, which was approved by President Garcia. It was approved
on June19, 1957, and was seen as a fitting gift to Dr. Jose Rizal,
the country’s national hero during the celebration of his birth
anniversary. RA 1700 outlawed the Communist Party of the
Philippines and similar associations and penalized membership
therein. The ground upon which the Anti-Subversion Law was
enacted was stated in its preamble, thus:
55
on Anti-Filipino Activities in order to cope with the situation
brought about by the sudden communist change of tactics.
Significantly, during the period, more than 3,000 members were
exempted from the penal provisions of the country’s rebellion laws
upon renunciation of membership within thirty days from the
approval of the law.
Role of Magsaysay
56
President Magsaysay talks to a captured dissident as soldiers
secure the premise. (National Library)
An officer from the Public Affairs Office (PAO) tells the crowd on
the evils of communism (National Library)
57
Encouraged by the success of a raid on the Politburo itself,
Secretary Magsaysay activated on December 15, 1950 the Eco-
nomic Development Corps (EDCOR) in the AFP as an adjunct to
psychological warfare operation of the government. This new
agency was created to look into the economic rehabilitation,
spiritual rejuvenation and the return of normalcy of dissidents who
chose to return to the pathway of peace. While it did not supplant
the armed effort, EDCOR contributed much to the whole cam-
paign. During Magsaysay’s tenure, a total of 9,458 Huks sur-
rendered peacefully to the government, with most of who were re-
settled in EDCOR farms.10
58
Magsaysay’s campaign was not only limited to the Huks.
He frequently visited the Visayan Island to pacify dissatisfied
inhabitants. He also exerted efforts to stop the terrorist activities of
roving bands of outlaws, like the one led by Datu Tawan-Tawan
who roamed Kapatagan Valley as a bandit. Tawan-Tawan per-
sonally surrendered to Magsaysay through the initiative of Senator
Tomas Cabili.
59
To prevent the members of the CCP from infiltrating and
using labor organization for their purpose, the G-2 Division of the
Army monitored the activities of the officials of the big labor unions
of the country to include their plans and intentions. Some of its
agents monitored their activities by infiltrating them during strikes,
labor union rallies, and seminars. In close coordination with the
Secretary of Labor, the Army was able to screen and check the
records of employees and laborers in labor unions especially in
Manila and its suburbs. As this was properly done, the Army was
able to uncover the subversive activities of certain labor unions
and accordingly recommended the revocation or suspension of
their licenses.
60
Joven, member, of the 16-man unit ordered to liquidate President
Magsaysay. Their efforts also led to the surrender of Severo
Colonel, chief of Education Department, RC 3; Remegio Centeno,
CO, FC 11; Federico Geronimo, CO FC 51; Gavino Gulapa, CO
Unit 4, FC 11. All possible evidences against these HMB’s were
made available to assist the city and provincial fiscals in the
prosecution of rebellion cases.
61
government troops. Mention must be made here that this was
Secretary Magsaysay’s foremost accomplishment during his
incumbency.
62
Chapter 3
Background
63
To implement the UN mandate, the Philippines came out
with a bill that would legalize the sending of an armed contingent
to Korea. The bill received favorable endorsement from both
houses of Congress.
64
In addition, it had medical, engineer, signal corps and supply
units.
65
ceremonies aboard the ship, the 10th BCT disembarked. Its
personnel were brought southward to Miryang, a typical-looking
South Korean village nestling between two hills thirty-five miles
north of Pusan.
66
10th BCT soldiers stand proud to fight for democracy before being
deployed to Korea. (National Library)
67
the company dispatched combat patrols to the hills. As a pre-
dawn patrol approached a steel bridge spanning the Naktong
River after descending a hill, the Communists opened fire. The
first to fall was Pvt. Alipio S. Secillano of Libon, Albay, who died
instantly at three o’clock in the morning of October 23. He was
later buried in the United Nations Command military cemetery at
Taegu.
After the raid at Hwangju, the Battalion set out on one of its
first battalion-size combat operations against two enemy bat-
talions well- entrenched in the mountain village of Singye. On the
68
way a truck, at the end of the column, hit a land mine.
Immediately, the battalion deployed into combat formation and
pounded the enemy from high ground. After a heavy artillery and
mortar barrage, the enemy troops attempted to occupy the area
but were quickly mowed down. This encounter resulted in the
death of 50 communists while the battalion lost one soldier with
several wounded.
69
Companies in the vicinity of Sucheddong. Twenty enemy soldiers
were killed, while the rest dispersed towards the hills of
Huangdusan.
70
wounded another. Private Benito Dacusin also killed another
communist gunner with a single burst from his gun.
Captain Yap and his junior officer, Lt. Jose Artiaga Jr.,
were killed in this action at Yultong. For his gallantry and
intrepidity, Capt. Yap was posthumously awarded the Medal of
Valor, the Philippines’ highest award for heroism.
As the 10th BCT was ordered to withdraw; the tank
company was directed to act as holding and covering force.
However, the two flanks were left open by withdrawing units and
the enemy was quick to fill the resulting vacuum. The communists
71
redoubled their efforts to strengthen the envelopment of the tank
company to eliminate this obstacle to their forward drive. But the
tank company refused to move out and instead of withdrawing
according to orders, proceeded to reorganize and rally in a last
courageous assault to recover their dead and injured comrades.
After doing this, the company conducted an orderly withdrawal
despite having to run a gauntlet of enemy fire.
72
A.M. In this engagement, the battalion sustained one man killed in
action, three wounded and forty-four missing.5
73
diers, dubbed the “Fighting Tenth,” entered historic Manila Bay.
Col. Ojeda was with the men as the ship approached Pier 13.
They were greeted personally by Secretary of National Defense
Ramon Magsaysay. In his welcome speech, he praised the 10th
BCT for its fine combat performance. Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson,
Chief of the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), hailed
the battalion and congratulated the boys for their part in the fight
against communism. “The Fighting Tenth” was given a rousing
welcome for a job well done.
74
Immediately thereafter, it was sent to the field to participate
in the anti-dissident campaign. Its various elements operated for
several months in the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga and
Nueva Ecija. It was alerted for possible duties in the Korean War
front because of its fine showing in the government’s punitive
drive against the enemies of the state.
75
Tank crew on top of a Walker tank. Note the Philippine flag placed on
th
the turret / Filipino soldiers attached to the 45 ID on the main line of
resistance north of Yanggu. (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of
Korea)
76
ed objective attack on Line Duluth. It also executed a probing
assault on Osong-san in the vicinity of Snipyser Ridge.
77
Meanwhile, at T-bone Hill in Karhwagol, west of Chorwon,
the battalion engaged the Chinese in nine separate combat
actions. Six of these actions were hand-to-hand and close-quarter
fights at Hills Eerie, 191, 198, 200, “Yoke” and “Old Baldy”, all in
T-bone Hill. Sgt Bill McCrockle of the Pacific Stars and Stripes,
reporting on the Filipino soldiers’ actions on Hill Eerie wrote:
78
On the other hand, the enemy strength in Hill Eerie was
estimated to be one well-dug reinforced platoon. At about 8:21 in
the evening on May 4, the Reconnaissance Platoon of 2Lt. Ramos
started to crawl through the rice paddies towards the objective,
which was about two hours away. Without delay, the team of Cpl
Palis advanced following the trench on the right hill. On top of
Eerie, east of Bunker No. 1, Cpl. Palis emplaced his automatic
rifleman and deployed the rest of his men on a line to cover the
north edge of the hill. As this was done, Chinese forces began
throwing hand grenades, luckily not hitting a single Filipino. A little
later, two enemy soldiers went out of Bunker No 2. Immediately,
Palis’ rifleman fired several rounds killing the two others, then
crept towards Bunker No. 2, dropped several grenades and fired
into its slit, killing four Chinese soldiers inside.
79
Rear command post of the 19th BCT. (National Library)
80
Meanwhile, the Sniper Team of 2Lt. Dizon was already to
its designated position, southwest of Eerie. This team was
assigned to neutralize enemy supporting fire from the west. From
the start, the team received a heavy volume of fire from the enemy
west of Eerie along Hill 191, but the gallant Filipino soldiers kept
on fighting with all the firepower they could muster.
Initially the 19th BCT was known as the 19th Infantry Bat-
talion (Separate) when it was activitated on January 1, 1951. It
was a three-lettered rifle company with a heavy weapons
company. Its service elements consisted of the medical and dental
81
detachments and a signal corps team. Its elements operated
against the dissidents in Manila, Rizal, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.
After its relief from GHQ, the 19th BCT returned to Fort
McKinley. On January 16, it was alerted to replace the 20th BCT in
Korea. From that date on until the completion of its overseas
movement, the unit was officially known as the 19th BCT
(Motorized) PEFTOK Replacement. Beginning February 11,
sixteen-week of intensive ground training was conducted to
prepare its personnel for assignment to the front.
82
On April 28, 1952, the 19th BCT’s overseas deployment to
Korea started. Its personnel were divided into three groups which
were transported aboard Philippine Navy LSTs. Its movement to
Korea was completed on June 28.
With the second group of 19th BCT men, which left the
Philippines on May 26 and reached Pusan on June 5, were Col.
Ramon Z. Aguirre, the BCT’s commander, and his staff. The
command group consisted of Aguirre, unit commanders,
intelligence and operations officers who arrived at Camp Casey on
June 6. The rest of the officers and men followed the next day.
The last batch arrived in Pusan on June 28. Two days later, this
group joined the other 19th BCT elements that were already on the
MLR, taking over from the 20th BCT.
83
wounded. The enemy, on the other hand, reportedly sustained
several losses.
The 19th BCT also fought the enemy in many other battles.
Other UN forces had none but high praises for the Filipino BCT. In
one year of combat duty in Korea, the “Bloodhound”, as the unit
became known, did well. The Korean Presidential Unit Citation
attested to this, as did a Battle Citation from the headquarters of X
Corps, under which the 45th “Thunderbird” Infantry Division (US)
operated in eastern Korea, and under which the 19th BCT
operated.
84
The 14th Battalion Combat Team
In 1953, the 14th BCT under Col. Nicanor Jimenez left the
Philippines for the Korean front, uncertain of what it would face in
the foreign land, but obsessed only with the grim determination of
upholding the democratic ideals for which it had been sent there. It
landed in Pusan on March 26.
On May 15, the battalion hit the frontline on its first combat
mission. Its sector stretched for about one mile astride the Satae-ri
Valley. “B” Company occupied the ridge on the left of “Sandbag”
Castle, and on the valley floor were elements of “A” Company with
a platoon of tanks in support. Elements of “C” Company were on
“Heartbreak” Ridge.
85
denying the enemy the use of the valley. It was also responsible
for securing the commanding terrain at “Sandbag” Castle and
“Heartbreak” Ridge. To successfully prosecute this, they had to
initiate active defensive measures as deemed necessary. These
included aggressive patrol actions, harassing enemy lines with
artillery and small arms, and sending out combat patrols deep
inside enemy-held territory.
86
Miravite was also hit directly in this encounter, causing his
paralysis.
87
Those were the most significant engagements of the 14th
BCT in its year-long stint in Korea. Because of its record in the
front lines, the unit was awarded the Korean Presidential Unit
Citation on December 15, 1953. When it returned to the
Philippines in March 1954, it received the Philippine Presidential
Unit Citation, having successfully fulfilled the country’s
commitment to global peace and security.
After its return, the excess personnel of the 14th BCT were
distributed to the various Philippine Army units where their
services were most needed. It maintained its basic battalion
personnel in accordance with local conditions. Then it was thrown
into the anti-dissident campaign. Not long thereafter, it was
deactivated like the rest of its sister organizations which emerged
during the height of the government’s all-out offensive against the
Huk dissidents.
88
quick operation, the team executed a quick get-away before the
enemy recovered from the surprise attack. The 2nd BCT was the
first AFP unit to undergo this kind of training, which utilized
helicopters, hence the nomenclature, “Chopper.”
The end of the Korean War, however, did not mean the
end of the Army’s participation in foreign wars. For already, war
clouds were thickening in a country that was to eventually become
the focus of multinational effort to halt the communist advance in
Southeast Asia - Vietnam.
89
Chapter 4
Background
90
North and South, with the demarcation line along the 17th parallel.
The North was given over to the Vietminh government while the
South to remain under the French controlled Saigon government.3
Subsequently, the civilian population was granted a three-month
grace period, in which time those people living in the North who
wished to be under democratic rule were allowed to go south. This
international agreement, it was hoped, would end the eight-year
war.
Operation Brotherhood
91
Jaycee president, P.E. Domingo, as well as from the incoming
president, Amelito Mutuc, who helped in carrying out the proposed
Vietnam Relief Project.
92
grand idea. Far from dissipating Philippine resources, he stated
“to help a neighbor in need would establish the Philippine as a
leader in Asia and would be to the best interest of the country.”
93
to do three things: 1) to recruit and send medical mission
composed of doctors and nurses, with supporting personnel; 2) to
provide their transportation to and from Vietnam; 3) to pay the
members of the mission a modest salary. The Vietnamese
government, for their part, guaranteed to provide the mission with
living quarters and transportation expenses. In addition, since the
Filipino spoke neither Vietnamese nor French, the Vietnamese
government agreed to provide and pay the salaries for
interpreters.
94
st
Arrival of OB’s 1 medical mission to Saigon, 1954
(Operation Brotherhood)
95
December 1956, the medical teams treated a total of 721, 379
patients in dispensaries and mobile clinics. In addition, they
attended to 7,862 more patients in hospitals and performed 5, 023
surgical operations. All in all there were 195 Filipino volunteers
who served in Vietnam under Operation Brotherhood.
96
Macapagal, as humanitarian commitment of the Philippines to a
distressed neighbor.
97
Decena, Staff Sergeant Wenceslao B. Macadaeg, Sergeant
Moises Y. Tiglao and Miguel H. Dimaculangan formed the enlisted
technicians.
The “hop tac” or “oil spot” plan called for the gradual
spread of the pacification drive from Saigon. Hence, the initial
emphasis of the effort was in the III Corps. The psywar-civic action
officers were assigned singly to units operating with similar
missions in the region. Each adviser was on his own and in view
of the deficit of logistics at the time, each officer had to improvise,
beg or borrow, or modify his plans.
98
and General Le Van Tat gave the surgical teams all the support
they needed.4
Not only did the medical teams accomplish the noble task
of attending to large numbers of patients, but they also performed
their duties well. Decorations were soon won. Capt. David Abundo
Jr. and Capt. Benjamin Vallejo were awarded the Medal of Honor,
1st Class of Vietnam for participation in the operations in War
Zones A,B,C, and D, particularly in the Boi Loi Woods. Capts.
Agripino de Guzman and Rudy Yabut won the same medal for
distinguished work with the 5th Division of the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN).
99
L - R: An officer looks into a prayer booklet given by relatives. / A soldier
bids farewell to son before leaving for South Vietnam, Sept, 1967.
(National Library)
100
Awards / Commendations
Given recognition for their good work with the 1st Psywar
Battalion were Capts. Eduardo Arciaga, Jacinto Galang, Angeles
Cabigao and Rudy Yabut and 1st Lt. Eusebio Mamaril.6 All surgical
and medical teams, as units, also won medals.
101
7. Participation in the “Boi Loi” operations
8. Close coordination with the Vietnamese civil government
authorities in the implementation of the pacification drive, and
rendering technical advice and assistance to civil government
officials when needed
9. Distribution of relief goods to go out-of-the-way places
10. Hamlet and village community development work
11. Assistance in leaflet and poster information activities
12. Integration of PHILCON medical/surgical activities to
civic action and exploitation of the team’s psychological impact
over the population.
13. Bringing afflicted and sick people to PHILCON
medical/surgical teams for treatment.
Arrival of PHILCON II
102
The pacification of the different war zones “A,” “B,” “C” and
“D” in the area involved generally three phases:
103
2. Participation in training, planning and operation against
the Vietcong.
3. Relief work for RF/PF dependents as well as civilians in
hamlets and villages in Hua Nghia.
4. Participation in “road-clearing” operations.
5. Construction of “Individual Combat Reaction Firing
Courses” for the training of RF/PF troops.
6. Technical assistance to Sector and District Chiefs.
7. Reparative surgery of Harelip-afflicted children in
conjunction with PHILCON surgical teams.
8. Liaison and coordination with foreign relief agencies in
Saigon for the relief goods to the people of Hau Nghia, and their
distribution t the people.
9. Rural health medical service with the assistance of
PHILCON doctors.7
PHILCON III
104
The Vietcong also attacked Gia Kiem village, spraying the
houses with bullets; they mortared Xuan Loc where the psywar
and medical team had bivouacked; they booby-trapped the stage
used in Tran Hung Dao village wher the teams were to have
come; they lobbed grenades at the sleeping team at Ben Cat,
missing and instead wounding seven RVN soldiers.8
105
days, one team served five hamlets, treating 990 patients. The
other team treated the same number of patients in eight days in
eight hamlets.
106
tried to pin down the accompanying ARVN armored unit. The
ARVN suffered 45 killed and 59 wounded in the attack, while the
Vietcong suffered 107 losses.
107
and the regimental commander were killed. The sector head-
quarters was stripped of all available soldiers who rushed to the
rescue of the 7th.
108
A Philcag doctor checks on the condition of a girl patient, 10 Dec 1966.
(National Library)
109
tious help first rendered by Philippine Contingents under RA 4162,
approved on July 21, 1964. The reason for Congress decision to
increase the Filipino commitment in Vietnam was clearly stated in
the preamble of RA 4664, and the national sentiment regarding
Philippine assistance to Vietnam was crystallized in this statement
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
110
Teams which introduced the medical-dental scheme to help the
Vietnamese people in the hamlets, with the aim of developing
popular acceptance of the Philippine effort in Tay Ninh. These
teams treated an average of 2,000 patients per week in various
hamlets and villages in Tay Ninh during the seven-week period
prior to the arrival of the main body of the 1st PHILCAGV. To
further build on the demonstrated success of these Civic Action
Teams in winning the friendship of the masses, two additional
Civic Action Teams were conditionally integrated with the Group.
111
who was chairman, and the National Commander, United States
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV).
Logistics
112
Comptrollership
113
weeks, despite frequent Vietcong resistance, a network of roads
was constructed in the area making it possible for a considerable
number of Tay Ninh residents to earn a profitable livelihood by
reviving the wood-cutting and charcoal-making industry which had
long been inactive because of Vietcong activities.
114
repair and construction project in the Long Hoa area, which was
the most populous portion of Tay Ninh province at that time.
8. Causing the surrender of four Vietcong, one on
November 7, another on December 21, 1966 and two on January
11, 1967, by winning them through friendly approaches by
elements of the command. The goodwill generated by the group’s
personnel through civic action projects among the people of Tay
Ninh won multitudes of friends for the unit and for the Filipino
people, and continued to result in additional surrenderees from the
Vietcong.
9. Active support of the Republic of Vietnam’s Chieu Hoi
(Open Arms) program, a policy of attraction directed towards the
Vietcong, by providing regular medical and dental assistance to
the Chieu Hoi center in Tay Ninh. Seven Vietcong returnees also
underwent technical training with the unit in the operation of heavy
engineer equipment, thus helping to convert them into useful
citizens.
10. Reception and briefing of an average of five VIP
groups of various nationalities per week. Each of these visiting
groups was provided written information and statistical data on
PHILCAGV’s mission and activities.13
Operation Climax
115
The objectives of Operation Climax were the following (14):
116
utilities in the maintenance of the Development Program of the
South Vietnamese government, particularly in the province of Tay
Ninh. These were long range, strong effect scheme planned to
create a lasting source of goodwill.
2. Medical and Dental Civic Action Program (MIDICAP).
Members of the Medical / Dental Team Program were assigned to
My Tho, Bao Trai, Phu Kuong and Tay Ninh City. They were sent
to these places to increase the professional staff and help in the
training of medical and nursing aides. From July 1, 1968 to
November 30, 1969 the MEDICAP operations treated 1,110,356
medical patients, 51, 927 surgical patients and 371,788 dental
patients, for a total of 1, 534,071 patients in sixteen months.
3. Miscellaneous Environmental Improvement Program
(MEIP). Under this program were projects meant to complete the
rural development program of the Republic of Vietnam. It included
the construction of refugee centers for persons who were
banished or rendered homeless, especially those who were
victims of Vietcong raids and attacks; the establishment of a
demonstration farm planted with the new Philippine Miracle Rice;
the imparting of professional help in the training of hospital staffs,
attendants and rural health workers, the teaching of rural people
personal sanitation through the construction of sanitary toilet
bowls; the clearing of forests to serve as sites for model
communities; the putting up of experimental piggery and poultry
projects; and other activities to improve community facilities.
4. PHILCAGV-to-People Program (PPP). To help the
people of selected villages attain a better way of life, PPP, as a
special civic action effort using the excess or idle resources of
company-size units, was implemented. The scheme was aimed at
winning the hearts and minds of the populace. They were
undertaken on a self-help basis with stress on activities that
afforded maximum benefits to and participation by the people.
117
1. Place the right man on the right job through efficient
classification and careful assignment;
2. Capitalize on the individual’s intelligence, aptitudes and
interests through training;
3. Stimulate the individual’s desire to contribute to the
group’s goal through adequate incentives;
4. Ensure individual opportunity for professional develop-
ment through intelligently planned and progressive rotation of
assignments;
5. Utilize fully the individual in essential tasks.
Accomplishments
118
7. Conducted six investigations involving PHILCAGV
personnel;
8. Continued to provide early warning of planned hostile
action against PHILCAGV at the various worksites and at the
Command’s Base Camp; and
9. Undertook continuing assessment of the reaction of the
Vietnamese people toward the civic action efforts of the
PHILCAGV.
119
Formation at PHILCAGV Headquarters. (PA Museum)
120
Chapter 5
Background
121
the students became more active. This time they associated them-
selves with organizations clamoring for the grant of independence.
As a result, the Philippine Commission enacted the Sedition Law
banning Filipinos from espousing independence. Despite the
government’s imposed restraints, around twenty demonstrations
were recorded from 1901 to mid-thirties. Considered as the more
active organization was the “Associacion Escolar de Filipinas” that
was an inter-alumni association, which later merged with the
Nacionalista Party.
122
ganizations were temporarily relegated to the background.
123
the masses.
124
On December 26, 1968, Sison, who supposedly re-
linquished the Chairmanship of the KM to Nilo Tayag, took charge
as the Chairman of the re-established CPP. Timed with Mao’s 75th
birth anniversary, Sison and other Maoists in the old CPP
convened a so-called “Congress for the Re-establishment of the
Communist Party of the Philippines” signaling a formal break up
from the old party. Earlier, intelligence operations were able to
gather valuable information about the KM, particularly its internal
troubles spawned by Antonio Araneta Jr and Jose Ma.Sison’s
struggles for leadership. Vital information for the battle of
supremacy between students of the University of the Philippines
and Lyceum of the Philippines were also unearthed.
In the late sixties, it was also reported that the CPP had
established local chapters in Mindanao. During this time, the CPP
recorded 258 major demonstrations of which thirty-three were
violent and wherein fifteen persons died and 540 others were
injured. Military reports disclosed that practically all the violence in
1970 was instigated by KM members.2
125
Originally conceived as the vanguard of the national youth
movement, the KM emerged as the most militant of youth
organizations. The KM initiated demonstrations, rallies and strikes
totaling to 85 in 1969 and to about 300 in 1970.
126
bring together the most articulate nationalists among the different
sectors of the population. Its founders were then Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, then Congressman Ramon Mitra, Domingo Castro, Jose
Ma. Sison, Felixberto Olalia and Jose Lansang, Sr. In the 1960s,
MAN claimed a total of 382 chapters.
Despite the fact that the CPP had made gains in its
infiltration activities, there were contributory factors which led to
the failure of the communists to hold their influence over the
workers. These factors included among others the improvement of
the economic conditions of the workers and effective public
information campaign of the government.
127
Combat Effectiveness
128
total of 118 ROTC units in operation during the year trained 7,071
Basic and 1,936 Advanced ROTC cadets.
129
Intensified Operations against CPP/HMB
130
signaled the turning point in the history of the communists in the
country. It ushered in the establishment of the New People’s Army
(NPA) which was tasked to undertake a protracted struggle in
rural areas. During the Congress which lasted from December
1968 to January 1969, the party program entitled “Program for the
People’s Democratic Revolution in the Philippines” was launched
and a new Party Constitution was ratified. Jose Ma. Sison was the
first elected Secretary General/Chairman of the CPP, while
Bernabe Buscayno was designated as the Commander-in-Chief of
the NPA.
131
a total lack of appreciation in the potentials of the region in
relation to the economic progress of the country. Also,
because of its isolation from the centers of power and
justice, violence has become traditional in some parts of it.”
132
Secessionist members in a huddle. (PA Museum)
133
of innocent civilians. The Social Welfare Administration (SWA)
estimated that some 30,000 Muslims, Christians, Tirurays were
forced to abandon their homes.5
134
the sixties.
135
PAO conducted public rallies, conferences, open forums, movie
showings and distributed propaganda materials to 622
communities. These psychological warfare activities were aimed
at “restoring the faith of the people in the government improving
civilian-military relationships and bolstering the morale of the
troops.” Moreover, the PAO’s Operation “Pakikisama” during the
period did much in arousing the masses against the dissidents
and in raising the morale of the officers and men, while promoting
better relationships between servicemen and civilians.
136
over 230,000 in which it inflicted 404 casualties while suffering
from 243 killed. Military reports further indicated that in August
1971, the NPAs had six encounters in Northern Luzon, staging
one raid which claimed the lives of seven government troops. By
this period, a well armed group of NPAs led by defector LT Victor
Corpuz attacked the Command Post of Task Force Lawin in
Isabela. This particular attack resulted in the destruction of two
helicopters and one plane and the wounding of a soldier.
137
to “intensify violence, disorder and confusion.” As gleaned from
the document, these activities included the conduct of sabotage
operations against universities, military camps, US bases and
selected towns to initiate more violent strikes and demonstrations
and to intensify the bombing of government buildings and other
vital utilities and installations. The overall objective of this program
of action as revealed in the document was indeed to foment
discontent and precipitate a nationwide revolution. The govern-
ment, given the magnitude of the threat had to respond to it de-
cisively. Among its options was the declaration of martial law.
138
Chapter 6
Background
139
our military establishment our nation will rely on it as the sentinel
of our political sovereignty.”
140
With the advent of the seventies, the Greater Manila area
became the staging area for countless strikes due to increases in
oil and gas prices. Schools were in upheaval and violent
demonstrations supported by students which ended in injury and
death. As a result, classes were suspended several times.
141
and Sulu. By October 4, the suspension of the writ had been lifted
throughout the country except in Greater Manila Area and in the
NPA-HMB affected provinces in northern, central and southern
Luzon and three Mindanao provinces. Ultimately, in December 3,
President Marcos lifted the suspension in the entire country.
Corpus’ Defection
142
officers maybe well- meaning. But let me tell you that they cannot
uproot the principal evils that are U.S. imperialism, feudalism and
bureau-capitalism, which now afflict the nation.”
143
However, armed men deployed along the seashore fired upon the
government troops as they tried to board the vessel. A helicopter
dispatched to the area was likewise reported fired upon by hostile
elements in the vicinity.
144
In July 10, President Marcos categorically stated that the
vessel was not foreign, but was registered under Philippine laws
and that it was manned by Filipinos whom he did not identify. He
likewise revealed that the entries in the vessel’s logbook were in
English, but some of its records were in Chinese. The M/V
Karagatan as registered, was twenty five meters long, five meters
wide with over two meters draft, displacing twenty five tons.
145
conspirators, the separatists, and the elements which
although not politically motivated are actually displacing
power.”
146
Army rangers roam the base of Sierra Madre during
the MV Karagatan incident in 1972 (PA Museum)
147
Army’s Mission and Objectives
148
programs in Mindanao, assistance during disasters and calamities
and assistance to AFP units during riots and demonstrations;
4. Relief and rescue missions and operations of essential
public utilities during strikes and other disturbances.
149
The Army’s Role in National Development
150
able to accommodate 55 giant factories, housing facilities and
other service buildings in the area.
In Sulu and Zamboanga, the 1st and 4th Civil and In-
formation Service Teams conducted courses on trade skills and
vocational training to improve employment qualifications of the
residents as well as to generate job opportunities for them. The
vocational training courses were as follows: Carpentry, Heavy
Equipment Operator, Telephone Wire Lineman, Heavy Equipment
Maintenance and Repair with a minimum number of 300 students
lasting for 12 weeks. The Driver’s Preventive Maintenance and
Welding Course were conducted at eight and 16 weeks,
respectively.
151
The food campaign project of the Green Revolution was
intensified by the Command. To attract more participants, various
incentives like cash prizes and garden tools were offered. Under
the project were landscaping, mushroom and vegetable culture,
fish culture and the planting of fruit and non-fruit bearing trees. A
total of 49,599.88 hectares were reforested. This was maintained
by the Philippine Army in the following camps throughout the
country. Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City; Camp Riego de Dios,
Cavite; Camp Lapulapu in Cebu City; Camp Peralta in Jamindan,
Capiz and Camp Paulino Santos in Cotabato.
152
In July 1974, the Army’s Commanding General, Maj Gen
Rafael Zagala reviewed the contingency plans. This study resulted
in the formation of Operation Plan Kamagong. This called for the
employment of extended trainees who were most readily available
and being fresh from their training, were most fit for combat duty.
Within this framework, trainees serving extended duty were given
assignments to Kamagong units which were organized following
their own tables of organization. As its nucleus, the Kamagong
battalion had a cadre of officers and selected regular enlisted
personnel. When the need was foreseen, the Kamagong bat-
talions were activated, equipped and trained as a unit and then
employed. Under RA 4091, a trainee was replaced by another
who had just completed his training when the former completed
his maximum term of service with a kamagong unit.
153
the courses being offered for officers and enlisted personnel alike.
154
assignments. The conduct of unprogrammed courses to meet the
requirements for the PA’s newly-acquired vehicles and armament
contributed to the Army’s output and capabilities both in combat
and technical know how. Deviation in output was due to the in-
ability of units in meeting prescribed student quotas and the
postponement of courses due to billeting limitations.
Revitalization Plan
155
The revitalization scheme covered both the physical and
non-physical aspects of the Army. Organization, personnel fill up,
equipage and restructuring of new units, their deployment in
accordance with updated tactical concepts and doctrines were
embraced in the physical aspect. On the other hand, the non-
physical aspect covered administrative reforms such as the
introduction of effective career management systems and devising
a wide ranging program for troop motivation and enlightenment.
156
maneuver elements to the infantry battalions or brigades in the
performance of their missions. As the situation required, PALAR
also served as combat and combat service units.
157
Muslims stepped-up their anti-government operations under the
aegis of the Mindanao National Liberation Front (MNLF) and in
Northern Luzon, where the NPA established a foothold to stage a
strong opposition to whatever gains had been achieved by the
New Society’s peace and order campaign.
158
from three to six in every locality depending on the bulk of enemy
forces. Additional components were organized along the Kama-
gong concept. The Army’s forces were concentrated in the areas
where the insurgents conducted their operations, but the way the
Army’s over all operations was carried out, spoke of the govern-
ment’s concern for civilian lives.
Operation Sibalo
159
Infantry Battalion was executing its withdrawal to Camp Seit, it
met superior enemy fire. Fortunately, four APCs were sent to
support the battalion movement, provided the necessary counter
fire which enabled it to accomplish its withdrawal. At about eight
in the morning of December 30, 1972, the composite forces
succeeded in linking up with elements of the 8th Marine Company
at the slope of Sibalo Hill. At 2:30 p.m., the area was cleared and
the operation ended.
Operation Lebak
160
afterwards, the 25th Infantry Battalion under Col. Jose Espinosa
was committed to assist in the operation. Hand in hand with other
government troops, the 6th Infantry Brigade (Provisional) suc-
ceeded in tightening the noose around the rebel’s neck. As the
operation progressed, frontline troops engaged in psychological
operations by distributing leaflets urging the enemy to surrender.
161
Pulangi, the first tactical objective, was occupied immediately.
After four days, Maambung and Parang and other initial objective,
were well under control. In an attempt to turn the tide of battle in
their favor, the rebels attacked at the least expected point: Jolo.
Operation Tanuel
162
Battalion. They continued the attack at about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon of June 24 and found the nine missing enlisted men.
Thirty-four enemy dead were counted in the area.
163
the enemy withdrew under continuous pressure from the attacking
force and volleys from PA artillery and PAF gunships.
164
sembled at the foot of a mountain, four kilometers southwest of
town proper. They were armed with assorted high-powered
firearms and were led y commanders Sumail and Lao.
165
Army troopers board a helicopter for deployment to Lebak.
(PAF Photograph)
166
manpower and supplies of food and ammunition. Soon the people
began a mass evacuation of the area. People in the barrios of Itil
and Ig-bay had already evacuated to the town proper of
Balabagan as early as the first two weeks of July.
167
ransacked the homes in Balabagan and took food supplies and
burned the houses of Christians.
168
The plan of the operation was for “A” Company, 33rd
Infantry Battalion, to execute the main effort on the left, while “C”
Company was to act as a reserve in the rear. One section of
81mm mortar was to support each forward company and an APC
was to follow at a distance of one to two hundred meters behind,
with the group in command. The operation was delayed by twenty-
four hours because of transportation difficulties. The extra time
was used for further preparation and coordination.
169
the hostages scampered in different directions and ran for their
safety. At 6:00 P.M., three hundred civilian refugees and hostages
started meeting the troops and were processed and interviewed
by MSU operatives. They revealed that during the night, rebel
reinforcements arrived and about five hundred were less than a
kilometer away. The battalion commander ordered interdiction fire
along the banks of Maguindanao River. The advance to Pinaring
was halted for the day with the onset of darkness. A perimeter
defense was organized and mortars were emplaced to cover likely
avenues of approach.
170
to move faster. At this time, a helicopter that had been earlier
requested arrived. This rendered suppressive fire on the enemy
positions and observed any movement on the enemy side. The
column had only gone a short distance when the commanding
officer of the Company “B” reported that his company was pinned
down by enemy fires. Since the lead column stretched to about
one and a half kilometers, the elements halted and held their
ground. The second APC moved back and rescued Company “B”.
Soon, enemy pressure eased and Company “B” was able to catch
up, but not after one trainee was killed and one enlisted man
wounded.
171
Meanwhile, 2/3 Infantry Brigade received reports that there
were about one thousand rebels deployed at Bura Crossing up to
the vicinity of Buldon. Based on these reports, an APC of 2/3
Infantry Brigade left Parang to join the 32nd Infantry Battalion
which in turn was to link up with the 27th Infantry Battalion. Both
battalions advanced and occupied Buldon on September 12
without enemy resistance because the reports proved to be false.
172
denial operations and its organization of more CHDFs helped
stabilized the peace and order situation.
173
The Marine Battalion Landing Team and its reserve were
landed together with one APC and a 106mm recoilless rifle (RR)
section. While the landing units encountered no enemy opposition,
the 3rd Marine Company (MC) received heavy fires from the rebels
in the Kraan River.
174
It was reported in these meetings that the NPA was
becoming more active in its recruitment activities. Armed, unified
groups sporting KM patches were often reportedly sighted. These
groups continued to sabotage government installations in the
more seriously affected areas. Some barrio folks had abandoned
their homes and evacuated to safer places.
175
small party of men arrived at the CP and gave the latest in-
formation about the movement and activities of the enemy.
176
MNLF forces would ease up on military action and intensify their
agitation propaganda activities together with building up logistical
support. Intelligence reports, however, indicated the massing of
forces north of the Rio Grande River and their movement towards
Cotabato City. Similarly, it was estimated that enemy activities
would escalate after the religious feast. To prevent this, the
commander of CEMCOM directed the 2/3 Infantry Brigade to
attack the Solon-Tarikan-Tapayan Complex, which was a hotbed
of rebels who continually harassed the city.
177
to contact leaders of the MNLF. As time went on, however, news
came in that the enemy had intensified recruitment and pro-
curement of supplies, and continued to infiltrate workers in South
Cotabato while building up forces in North Cotabato. The military
offensive was thus resumed. The rebels directed their forces to
the municipality of Carmen.
Carmen Operation
178
The attack was flashed out to higher headquarters
immediately and the 32nd Infantry Battalion although still in the
process of moving to Salunayan, Midsayap, was ordered to
proceed to Carmen. At 8:00 A.M., the PAF C-47 gunship
requested by 2/3 Infantry Brigade took off from Awang Airport to
give support for the Carmen operation. On board was Capt.
Bautista, the Brigade S-2, who coordinated the airstrike on enemy
ground concentrations simultaneous with the movement of ground
reinforcements. By 10:00 A.M., the brigade control group departed
for Kabacan by helicopter, and shortly thereafter, the Patrol Craft
Force of 2/3 Infantry Battalion with only one operating truck had
difficulty in transporting its troops, and the movement of its two
companies, A and B, was not completed until 3:00P.P.M., that
day.
With the rebel force at the ferry site in Lumbayong, the 32nd
Infantry Battalion moved along the Kabacan River for about three
and a half kilometers, crossing safely to Bo. Aringay. From there,
they proceeded northward, crossed the Pulang River at Bo. Pidtad
and scoured Bo. Ugalingan. It was finally cleared of rebels by 7:00
P.M. by elements of 32nd Infantry Battalion were on the Carmen
side of Pulangi River. By this time, rebels had withdrawn from
Carmen poblacion, leaving behind hostages and burning a large
portion of the town proper.
179
and forced the enemy to retreat towards north. The enemy
eventually divided into three groups along the river. They then
scattered into small groups, while they were pursued by the
government troops. Although broken up into smaller groups, the
rebels continued to harass some CHDF perimeter defenses.
These incidents forced the government troops to continue their
assault at Bo. Limbalod, Kabakan, and Bo. Ugalingan, Carmen.
180
The diminishing resistance of the rebels gave the
government troops a better chance to scour the area. At noon,
January 29, the 10th Infantry Battalion reconnaissance patrol
discovered rebel documents containing sketches of enemy
defenses, emplacements and withdrawals.
Operation Thunderball
181
Cotabato City is the symbol of government authority in the pro-
vince of Maguindanao. The MNLF started sporadic mortar attacks
on the city spreading fear and apprehension among the populace,
thereby giving the rebels a psychological advantage. The rebels
also fought with government forces in the Kakar-Biniruan complex.
With this prevailing situation, Commander Central Command
(COMCEMCOM) assembled the Brigade Commanders of the 1st
and 2nd Brigades, the RACMIN deputy and CASFCOT pilots on
January 25, 1975, for a coordinating con-ference at the Tactical
Operations Center of Headquarters, CEMCOM about Operations
Order (OPORD) 2 code-named “Thunderball.” It was to be
conducted in three phases:
182
enlisted man killed and six others wounded. Shortly thereafter,
heavy fighting ensued up to 7:00 P.M., Radio contact was lost
among the troops, resulting in a disorderly retrograde movement
northward. The enemy attack grew stronger, leading to hand-to-
hand fighting. Government troops sustained heavy losses: forty-
six M16 rifles, thirty-five M1Garand, one Bar, two .45 cal. Pistols,
two .30 cal. LMGs, five PRC 77s, 11KIAs, 14 WIAS, and 21 MIAs.
One soldier escaped from the rebels later.
183
Elements of the 15th Infantry Battalion crossed Kakar creek with
the use of a makeshift bridge. While crossing, the enemy opened
fire at them, wounding the battalion executive officer. The timely
arrival of air and tank support enabled the troops to cross the
bridge.
184
building. Elements of “A” Company linked up with the elements of
15th Infantry Battalion along the Rio Grande River.
185
Infantry Brigade cleared with General Alfonso Alcoseba,
Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, the plan to
launch OPORD No. 6, or OPLAN KAPATID ECHO, within three
days using the 14th, 18th and 24th Infantry Battalions on an
overland operation, while the 15th Infantry Battalion would relieve
the 18th Infantry Battalion of the Camp Andres defense for the
duration of the operation. The operation plan called for the seizure
and occupation of Mt. Tayungan and vicinity by the 14th Infantry
Battalion. The 18th Infantry Battalion would clear the south slope of
Mt. Urot and the 24th Infantry Battalion would clear the North
Slope. The 15th Infantry Battalion would take over the perimeter
defense of Camp Andres and would provide security along MSR.
Alpha Battery, IAR and on an APC section would provide general
support to the operating units.
186
undetermined casualties to the enemy. Three officers and four
troopers of the 14th Infantry Battalion were wounded by an enemy
M79 shell which landed at the vicinity of the Command Group.
These casualties were evacuated to Camp Andres.
187
Tayungan without enemy contact. Atop Mt. Tayungan the Brigade
Commander and staff conferred with the unit commanders and
after discussing the various options, decided on holding Mt.
Tayungan and vicinity for a while.
Operation Ganti
188
In order to frustrate the rebels’ plans of attacking Jolo and
to clear the Indanan area of rebel forces, the ¼ Infantry Brigade
under the command of Col. Rillera launched Operation “Ganti”.
The concept of operations called for the 18th Infantry Battalion to
move from Headquarters, Busbus, Jolo to Tagbak, Indanan, Sulu
and to exchange Area of Responsibility with the 14th Infantry
Battalion. Movements would start with “C” Company, followed by
the “B” Company and “A” Company in that order. The 18th Infantry
Battalion mission was to defend Indanan from rebel incursions
and to conduct offensive combat operations.
189
personnel of “C” Company, 14th Infantry Battalion, while on their
way to a combat outpost approximately four hundred yards
outside their perimeter defense, were cornered by heavily-armed
rebels in the vicinity of GC 823692 Jolo. For about five minutes,
the government troopers returned fire but they were outnumbered
and in a disadvantageous position and were killed in action. The
enemy took the soldier’s firearms. Elements of the 14th Infantry
Battalion immediately came to the rescue, killing about five rebels.
The troopers recovered from the battle scene one hand grenade
and several rounds of DND arsenal ammunition and some
amulets.
190
ten minutes, after which the enemy decided to retreat suffering
three WIA. The government patrol did not sustain any casualty.
191
rebels whom they encountered in the vicinity of GC 835684, Jolo.
The rebels offered strong resistance and the battle continued for
about one and half hours. The rebels sustained four KIA in the
firefight while one CHDF was killed and one EP was wounded on
the government side.
192
sustained 12 killed in action. The government troops sustained
one KIA.
193
but to continue its counter-offensive operations. Among the most
significant encounters with the rebels were the following incidents:
194
and automatic weapons. The government troops fought valiantly
and repulsed the enemy assault. This encounter, however,
inflicted on government forces three WIA, while two civilians were
also wounded.
195
weapons. The enemy sustained thirty KIA while government
troops suffered eleven KIA and seventeen WIA.
196
mained out of reach.
197
Karomatan, Lanao del Norte.
198
With the escalation of rebel activities in Zamboanga del
Sur, intelligence reports indicated that undetermined number of
enemy arms, ammunitions and explosives were being hidden in
the periphery of Pagadian City. This brought about the conduct of
joint zonal search operations at the Santiago-Bonifacio districts,
Pagadian City, on July 21, 1974. The operations were dubbed as
OPLAN SEA BREEZE by Headquarters 4th Infantry Division. The
participating units were the 16th Infantry Battalion, elements of the
4th Infantry Division, PC Zamboanga Sur, Military Intelligence
Group (MIG) and the Pagadian City Police force. Lt. Col. Rome
Rexcian was designated task force commander.
199
The 2nd MBLT continued its mopping up operations towards
Landang Laum, GC 164703 and Busay, GC 176722 without any
enemy resistance. In the vicinity of GC 180082 elements of the 9th
Infantry Battalion under Sgt. Fonda encountered and
subsequently captured three rebels. After a brief firefight, the
troops recovered from the scene of the encounter one shotgun,
fourteen magazines with several rounds, thirty sacks of corn and
assorted spices. A watch tower about thirty five feet high was also
discovered.
200
suspend their combat operations in order to reorganize
themselves. In a provincial-level conference of the rebels held in
the Linguisan area, commander Englishman was elevated to the
top position of provincial chairman to take over Sali Wali’s
position, while Commander Nonan Calalagan was designated
Vice-Chairman. The rebel forces were reduced to an estimated
300 men because of the surrender and subsequent reshuffling of
command. Except for few sporadic skirmishes, an uneasy peace
reigned in Zamboanga del Sur following Sali Wali’s surrender.
201
12 shotguns with live ammunitions. The operation was suspended
on February 23 due to the forthcoming referendum, and the troops
were deployed in critical areas to avert any group which might
attempt to disrupt it. On February 25, four PAF planes conducted
bombing sorties at Pisaan Island and the Tarakan area and sunk
one pumpboat loaded with firearms, ammunition and medicines
coming from Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Again, the ranger
platoon under 2nd Lt. Cabreros was employed to intercept a
possible rebel withdrawal from Pisaan Island.
202
firefight lasted for almost three hours. Air support was made
available and the government troops cleared areas of encounter
to give way to mortar fire and later air strikes. The enemy
sustained twenty five KIA and one WIA. The encounter at barrio
Mandag and Mt. Sungayan, all in the Dinas area, marked the
gradual decrease of rebel hostilities in the coastal barrios of
Dumalinao, Zamboanga del Sur.
The platoon under Lt. Bayan was the first to reach the area
at around 9:00 A.M., with two teams of police forces under Major
Dalid and two teams of PC troopers under a non-commissioned
officer. They found the area evacuated and a part of it already
burning. The rebels at that time were setting big houses on fire
when they were interrupted by the arrival of Lt. Bayan’s platoon
from the south near the river. A firefight ensued until the rebels
returned to their former positions in the vicinity of the school
building. At about 10:15 A.M., Lt. Virgilio Briones party arrived in
203
the area and after gathering information from the civilians and
from the radio, he proceeded towards the school building. From
the distance of about four hundred fifty meters, he ordered for
mortar fire.
204
At this juncture, marketing truck of “A” Company passing
the route of the enemy and a hasty ambush was conducted by the
rebels. The soldiers suffered casualties of one KIA and four WIA.
The front tire of the vehicle was hit. The remaining passengers
including the wounded quickly moved away from the killing zone.
The driver ditched the truck to the left side of the road where
everybody was able to jump off the truck and positioned
themselves in the canal alongside. From there they contained the
enemy, but soon they were also fired at by the enemy forces at
back of a big house. Cpl Opena, sensing that their position was
compromised, decided to move the group forward to look for
better cover. About one hundred yards from their original position,
they took cover on the right side of the road and made their final
stand.
205
Chapter 7
Background
206
and support of the masses, he created the Civil Affairs Office
(CAO) which undertook the psychological warfare phase of the
campaign. Then Major Jose M. Carol was designated Chief of the
CAO. The CAO’s target objectives in order of importance were set
as: troops first, civilians next and the enemy last. Magsaysay
believed that in order to fight and suppress the Huks effectively,
the esprit-de-corps and morale of the AFP must be improved, and
sustained at a high level. In order to develop and sustain hostility
toward the dissidents and minimize the support that can be
obtained by the Huks, the civilian populace must likewise be
informed of the effects of the communist menace. Incentives in the
form of rewards must also be given to civilians who can provide
information leading to the neutralization of Huk leaders. Finally,
the enemy had to be convinced that he was fighting a lost cause.1
207
professionalism in the AFP.2 In so doing, it was hoped that the
AFP would become a more efficient and effective agent of the
nation-building. This program was implemented at the time when
communist-inspired unrest had resurgence in various parts of the
archipelago.
208
To implement these broad objectives, the AFP Home
Defense Program adopted specific objectives which fell under the
following:
1. Reserve affairs activities.
2. Civil Assistance activities.
3. Community relations activities.
4. Agro-military activities.
209
Rev. Father Batnito praises the CAO effort to the public for bringing
mutual civilian-army operations for peace and order in Bicol, 1952.
(National Library)
210
the home of the First Infantry Brigade IID, PA. There the team
taught psychological operations concept, an overview of mass
media and the tools of propaganda, human relations, Filipino
cultural values and several other related topics including review
subjects and activities of the government.
211
were among the factors discovered by the team which made the
task more difficult than simply discussing matters. The team
realized that it needed more than an intellectual or emotional
awareness to commit a soldier to fight wholeheartedly.
“The soldier with his gun and his bullets, plus his
skill and his courage, can destroy the enemy. We would
not expect more than this if the enemy were alien invaders
or agents of foreign powers.”
212
“The battlefield then transcends land and sea and
sky. The battlefield becomes the hearts and minds of men.
Only a stronger faith can defeat another faith, doubt and
ignorance cannot prevail. Only knowledge of and faith in
our cause can win the day.”
213
stressed the role of the soldier as a protector of the people and a
paragon of good citizenship. As a Pilipino acronym. TANGLAW
stood for “Tanod at Gabay ng Lahi at Watawat” (Guardian and
Pillar of Our Race and Flag). The root word itself was a Pilipino
word meaning “Light” or “Beacon.”
214
than just being the protector of social reforms, was by necessity
also an initiator of reforms as well as a partner in the building of
the Filipino nation.
215
1. To develop deeper social and political commitment to
the nation;
2. To arouse in the soldier a deep sense of pride in his
national heritage and organization;
3. To inspire the soldier to embody the spirit of self-
sacrifice in the pursuit of national goals;
4. To instill in the soldier a firm loyalty to the state;
5. To intensify the soldier’s will to defend the interest of
the nation;
6. To cultivate in the soldier an enlightened political
maturity;
7. To induce the soldier to participate positively in the
affairs of the government; and
8. To motivate the soldier to help achieve a government
responsive to the needs of the people.
216
performance of public office; personal morality and the
observance of ethical principles.
6. Positive participation in the affairs of government -
covered active involvement in government affairs; the
sharing of responsibility in the selection and in the
review of performance of the country’s leadership; and
participation in the formulation and implementation of
developments programs and projects.
7. Responsive government (local officials) - included the
sensitivity to the needs and problems of the community
and the effective and speedy implementation of
developmental programs and projects.
217
improving existing programs.5 It was anchored in a reorientation of
values, a recasting of habits and attitudes, a remodeling of the
character of the Filipino.
218
and values of all active members of the Philippine Army. The
targets were the officers, enlisted men, cadets, draftees, trainees
and civilian employees of the command, and also the participants
of the PA Training Program.
It was realized that the key to lasting peace and order was
the soldier himself. With this in mind, the Motivation and
Enlightenment Program was reinvigorated, which gave birth to the
launching of the PA/ME/TANGLAW Program and which was
further given emphasis by the implementation of the Command’s
Revitalization Program. These were effected to inculcate in the
hearts and minds of every soldier the value of loyalty and
discipline in the pursuit of a military career. This program imparted
not so much the knowledge and expertise required of the
Philippine Army’s profession but more of the attitudes necessary
to improve the effectiveness of the Filipino men-in-uniform in
performing their sworn duty. It was believed that it was easy to
impart skills and knowledge, but was much more difficult to
develop attitudes, to inculcate beliefs and convictions, and to
motivate a person to act purposely, consciously and intelligently in
consonance with his or her convictions.
219
through sound personnel administration and management. Even if
an organization had the most inspiring leaders, it was believed, it
would certainly collapse under the weight of administrative inef-
ficiency or mismanagement.
220
The education and training as implemented by the PA’s
regular and reserve components was done through qualitative
training activities coupled with intensive and aggressive
motivational enlightenment programs. This objectives was also
attained by designing career development programs that provided
the soldier with opportunities for growth and advancement
Side by side with the Morale and Welfare Program was the
enforcement of discipline, law and order to ensure that the PA was
manned by reliable personnel who could respond quickly and
effectively as required, in order to maintain a high level of
221
physically, mentally and spiritually stable personnel. Also under-
taken was a continuous weeding out of undesirables and misfits
simultaneous with the improvement of benefits. To effect this
policy, the provost courts and courts martial were utilized as a
working institution aimed at the strict implementation of military
rules and regulations in the Army.
222
News, thus informing not only the troops but likewise key officials
of the government and private agencies and various civilians who
depend much on Army capabilities and activities. This move was
in line with the Army’s policy “to sell the Army to the people”.
223
As part of the all-out campaign to reach and inform more
individuals, both military and civilian, the Army also utilized other
media such as radio, television, stage and public assemblies for
selected audiences. The Army maintained regular radio and TV
programs in areas as far as the Visayas. Some of these programs
were “Radyo Gabay” over DWAR radio in Cabanatuan and “The
CAVALCOM Hour” over DZNG in Isabela. In Sulu, the Army
utilized the Station DPI as its broadcast medium. On the other
hand, the Civil Relations Information Service Group (CRISG)
maintained the “Tinig ng Kawal Pilipino” and “Tambayan sa
Kaunlaran” over DZCC in Cagayan de Oro. The 2CRISG had
“Kasayuran Ug Alagad” over DPI Radio in Cebu and a regular
TV program entitled “Dial OCR for Information” over Channel 9
and simultaneously over Channel 13 and the Channel 7 relay
station in Tacloban City as well as in Channel 10 in Cagayan de
Oro City. Moreover, in coordination with the National Media
Production Center (NMPC) and other TV networks, coverages of
important command events were provided. A close circuit
television system was installed at Headquarters Philippine Army
wherein current and relevant military news were shown from time
to time.
224
vacuum” there made it ripe for an immediate drive to fight
illiteracy. Although not confined to this area alone, the vacuum left
the population prey to rebel enticements and promises. This
illiteracy problem was utilized for maximum effect by enemy which
adversely affected the image of the government and the Army’s
drive was an attempt to nullify enemy gains in this field.
225
country posed a threat to Philippine National Security. Most of the
insurgent activities during these long years were on the
organization, labor unions and mass media were also enlisted to
the insurgents’ cause. The religious leftists posed a more serious
threat to the military. Priests and nuns who utilized the pulpit in
abusing special privileges granted them by the national govern-
ment posed a particularly serious threat.
226
In support of the multifarious developmental programs of
the national government, the Army participated in various aspects
of nation-building, particularly in the area of infrastructure
development which added a new dimension to the traditional role
of the Filipino soldier. Through engineer brigades, the Army
involved and committed itself to this continuing task of
construction, including resettlement and rehabilitation projects. All
engineering units were tapped by the command to coordinate and
work with other government civil agencies in various government
projects ranging from massive infrastructure to relief and
evacuation assistance during calamities in the countrysides.
227
arbitration of cases, referrals to other agencies, food and clothing
aid, harelip and goiter operations, and blood donation assistance
to indigent families and patients were relentlessly pursued to
prove the Army’s deep intention to be of service to the people.
228
Civil Relations and Information Service Groups (CRISG) of the
Army’s divisions and separate brigades implemented year-round
projects such as: Projects “Mapahati” and “Maglanuh” which were
carried out by the 1st CRISG within the area of responsibility of the
1st Infantry “Tabak” Division; Projects “Kilalanin and Dugtong
Buhay” by the CRISG in the 2nd Infantry Division area; Project
“San Juanico” by the 3rd CRISG in the Visayas; Projects “Hanap-
buhay” and “Tulungan”by the 4th CRISG in the 4th Infantry Division
area; Projects “Timpuyog” and “Ugnayan” by the 5th CRISG in
Northern and Central Luzon; Project “Maguindanao” in Central
Mindanao and Project “Reach-out” by CRISG (Army) in Metro
Manila.
229
END NOTES
Chapter I
Chapter II
230
4 Col. Primitivo C. Milan and Lt. Col. Primitivo C. Catalan, Philip-
pine Military Policy and Strategy, 1896-1971 (Quezon City,
Office of Military History, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1972),
p. 56
5 Leighton, The Huk Rebellion … p. 29.
6 Milan and Catalan, Philippine Military Policy and Strategy…
p. 76.
7 Executive Order No. 389, December 28, 1950.
8 Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines (Manila, Alemar
Press, 1958), p. 67.
9 Evening News, June 8, 1954.
10 Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, AFP to the Secretary of
National Defense, July 1, 1955 (Quezon City, GHQ, AFP, 1952)
p. 44.
11 Handbook of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
(Quezon City, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1961). p 49
Chapter III
Chapter IV
231
7 Col. Agripino R de Guzman, personal briefing notes on the
Philippine Contingent to the Republic of Vietnam p. 5-6
8 Quang Minh, “Philcon Ends Role in Vietnam.” Vietnam
Magazine p. 8
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid., p.9
12 Basic Information on the 1st PHILCAGV, Report to the USND,
Annex A. par. 6
13 Ibid.
14 1st PHILCAGV Command Conference (MSS, 1976), Chart I
15 PHILCAGV After Operation Report, pp. 3-4
Chapter V
Chapter VII
232
5 Civil Relations Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP
TANGLAW Program: Course of Study, (Quezon City, AFP CRS)
p.1
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Books
Philippine Air Force. The PAF under the New Society, 1972-1974.
233
B. Government Publications
C. Magazines / Periodicals
234
Minh, Quang. “PHILCON Ends Role in Vietnam,” Vietnam
Magazine (VI, No. 5. 19730).
Sta Ana, Anne Marie P. “The Army through the Years.” Army
Journal (December 1983).
D. Government Reports
235
Civil-Military Operations. 20-Year Accomplishment Report. 1965-
1985.
F. Unpublished Works
236
Quezon City, Office of the Chief Historical Activities,
General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo.
237