Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-
1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was
protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by
COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a
COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez,
Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served
three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC
resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be
counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three
term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also
argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the
1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo
warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of
office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term
because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until
March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of
one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are
absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason
of involuntary relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption
of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a
valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed
candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of
the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who
assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided
with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May
1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. The respondents’ contention that the
petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May
1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the
application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office
and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did
not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from
May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC
finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998
mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the
proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom
a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does
not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case
and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the
trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for
disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification
proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does
not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no
longer be the subject of a separate investigation.” (Lonzanida vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)
ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., petitioner, vs. RANDY L. LIMENA and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. Election Law; Local
Government Code; Term of Office; Requisites disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term of nine years.—Section
2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government
Code from which it was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office,
and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years.
This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply, two requisites
must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he
or she has fully served three consecutive terms. Same; Same; Same;
Where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such threeyear
term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without
the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the threeyear
term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the
fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the
continuity of the terms; COMELEC did not err nor commit any abuse
of discretion when it declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his
certificate ofcandidacy.—In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, 417
SCRA 601 (2003), which involved a similar question, this Court held
that where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such threeyear
term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without
the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the threeyear
term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the
fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the
continuity of the terms. Thus, conformably with the democratic intent
of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this Court’s ruling in Latasa v.
Commission on Elections, we hold that the prohibition in Section 2 of
said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did not err nor
commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified and
cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
Rivera III v Comelec
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran
as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-
2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel
Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected
and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of
Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third
term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a
"caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an
anti-graft case from January to July 1999.
Issue:
1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?
2. If so, who should then take his position?
Held:
1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He
assumed the position. He was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor
(because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only after the expiry
of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his
fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without
any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will
have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His
assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the
full term” and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the
same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted
to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of
power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found
respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the
votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.
2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee
who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place
candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in
the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the
vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)
CASE TITLE: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
CAMARINES NORTE vs. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
G.R. No. 185740
DATE: July 23, 2013
J. Brion
DIGEST BY: John Michael Vida
TOPIC: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION – SECURITY OF
TENURE – Both career and non-career service employees have a
right to security of tenure – they cannot be removed from office
except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process.
The concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a different
rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a
“primarily confidential” position.
Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a
public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed
except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot
be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the
nature of the office held.
FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province
of Camarines Norte by then-Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991,
with her appointment on a permanent capacity. After almost 8 years,
on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a
memorandum to explain why administrative charges should not be
filed against her for “gross insubordination/discourtesy in the course
of official duties” and “conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service”. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an
Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges
against her. Therefore, on September 1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed
Gonzales.
This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), which issued a Resolution, which
modified the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of
insubordination and suspended Gonzales for 6 months. A subsequent
appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC. Upon motion for
execution, CSC through a Resolution directed the reinstatement of
Gonzales upon clarification of service of the 6-month suspension.
Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however she was dismissed the
next day for “lack of confidence”. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the
CSC of his compliance to the CSC’s order and Gonzales’ subsequent
dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC
Resolution where the CSC held that the position of provincial
administrator was highly confidential and coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed
Gonzales’ reinstatement, stating that while the LGC (RA 7160) made
the position of provincial administrator coterminous and highly
confidential in nature, the conversion cannot operate to prejudice
officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC. Gonzales had
acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment and is entitled
to continue holding the office despite its subsequent classification.
The conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure
guaranteed to her by the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent
appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice
and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds
for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under existing
laws.
However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC
alleging that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused
to reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which
ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator
position, or to an equivalent position.
As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for
review with the CA. However, the CA sided with CSC and Gonzales,
citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, which stated that an
appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment. This
legal right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he
cannot be removed from office without cause and previous notice and
hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those
vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. The CA then
enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officer’s removal
under Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Revised
Administrative Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in the
list. The CA concluded that Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of loss
of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has the
right to be reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition
for review on certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial
administrator of Camarines Norte.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
A. The Court supported the CA’s conclusion that the position of
provincial administrator has been re-classified into a primarily
confidential, non-career position upon the passage of RA 7160, or the
Local Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January 1992.
In making the position mandatory for all provinces, the LGC also
amended the qualifications for the position. Further to this, the LGC
made the provincial administrator position co-terminous with its
appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service
position that is primarily confidential. Upon this, the Court took
note of the argument that Gonzales has acquired a vested legal right
over the position of provincial administrator the moment she assumed
her duties in April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be
removed from office except for cause and after due hearing.
According to the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion
between the nature of the position and an employee’s right to hold a
position. The nature of a position may change by law according to
the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other
hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but
may itself change according to the nature of the position. Congress
has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the
provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily
confidential, non-career service position. When done in good faith,
these acts would not violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even
if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term.
Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or
shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are
aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales’ reliance on the case of
Gabriel v. Domingo’s dissenting opinion (which stated that a
permanent employee remains a permanent employee unless he is
validly terminated) was misplaced. First of all, the factual differences
were pointed out to be dissimilar to the case of Gonzales, and even
granting that they were the same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil
Service Commission v. Javier actually proposes that corporate
secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect protection for their tenure and
appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily
confidential position. These officers cannot rely on the statutes
providing for their permanent appointments, if and when the Court
determines these to be primarily confidential.
Further to this, said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503,
which provided safeguards against termination of government
employees affected by RA 7160’s implementation. According to the
dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive
department’s intent to protect and uphold both the national
government and the local government employees’ security of tenure.
However, the Court emphasized that EO 503, however, does not
apply to employees of the local government affected by RA 7160’s
enactment, as it only applies to National Government Agencies
whose functions are to be devolved to LGUs.
C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service
employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers
and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong
to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this
guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause
provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of
security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for
primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a “primarily
confidential” position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing
authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee.
When this happens, the confidential employee is not “removed” or
“dismissed” from office. The term merely “expires” and the loss of
trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in
the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where the
trust and confidence has been irretrievably “eroded”, Gov. Pimentel
only exercised his discretion when he decided that he could no longer
entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer
or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as
provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to
grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the
office held. The CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled
that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when
she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but
the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was
reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated
under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service.
She was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed
the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’
termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be
reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any
other comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to
Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future
employment in government service.
 # 9 Naval vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014
CASE:
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Before the Court is a Petition for
Certiorari to assail the (a) COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution
granting the petition filed by Julia, seeking to cancel the COC as
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of
Naval, who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon
elective local officials; and (b) COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution
denying Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution issued
by COMELEC Second Diviosn.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and
had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province
of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines
Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second
District to form the present Third District. The present Second
District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor,
merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members
of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member
of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third
District in the 2013 elections. He filed before the COMELEC a
Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval.
Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of
Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from.
Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is
violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the
Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of
Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets
of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the
other eight towns which used to comprise the Second District, the
voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones
as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007
elections.
OSG contends: Seeking the denial of the instant petition, OSG
contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same
local elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated
Section 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of
his ineligibility.
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution: Cancelled Naval’s COC
on grounds:
When a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is
eligible for the elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly
lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he commits a false
material misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of the OEC.
The new Third District where Naval was elected and has served is
composed of the same municipalities comprising the previous Second
District, absent the towns Gainza and Milaor. The territorial
jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same
as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate who
voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate who
shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same
group of voters who elected him into office for three consecutive
terms.
COMELEC en banc’s Resolution: Denied Naval’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed out that
absent the verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly
dismissible. Nonetheless, according to the COMELEC, it is clear that
the position to which Naval has filed his candidacy for the 13 May
2013 elections is the same position for which he had been elected and
had served for the past nine (9) years. The enactment of R.A. No.
9716 did not convert Naval’s post into one different from what he
previously had.
ISSUE:
WON Naval’s, a provincial board member, election to the same
position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the
renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule.
RULING:
YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional
Commission approved that there is no immediate reelection after
three successive terms. For the Body believed that the imposition of
term limits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of
seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local
elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. The “limitation” under this first
branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—“no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.” This
formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. This
examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the
clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional
worth.
In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the
new Second District is to be created, but the Third District is to be
renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean
what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of representation among the
districts.The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize
population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting
shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not
the number of registered voters therein. It is with this mindset that the
Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of
constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.”
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term
limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal representation of any
of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed
Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would
still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs
prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would be to
create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our
Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap
or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise
among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier
exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further,
sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the
same office for 15 years.
The Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public,
the real sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for
public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to
be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as
citizens are restrictions too.
The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public
officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of
term limits and a guarantee of every citizen’s equal access to public
service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they
are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our republican
institutions.

Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the COMELEC are

AFFIRMED.