2A Public Officers
Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
SELECTED CASES [PART 2]
1. FRANCISCO VS. HOR
Date: ​November 10, 2003 GR Number:​ 160261
Doctrine
There is a constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period. ​Initiation ​starts with the ​filing ​of the
complaint; congress may not promulgate procedural rules that contravene
the constitution.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
● On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
● On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
● On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
RULING:
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
● The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
● Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution. - POLITICAL QUESTION
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules
on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution. - YES
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. - YES
Is “​Initiate” ​the same as “​to file” - YES
4. W/N judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings - YES
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any
discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very
lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional. ​Section 3 of Article XI
provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Hence, ​these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which
said rules were intended to effectively carry out​. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules. It is basic that all rules
must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
3. Initiation ​starts with the ​filing ​of the complaint, what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved
by the body. Having concluded that the initiation takes place
by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. ​Not necessary that ⅓ of congress bring it to senate to
be considered “initiated”, filing enough​. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional​. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is ​barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution​.
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral​.
4. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not
an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which
the controversy may be referred.
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2A Public Officers
Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
Assigned: Asia Wy
2. GUTIERREZ VS. HOR-COJ
Date: ​February 15, 2011 GR Number:​ 193459
Doctrine:​There are two components of the act of initiating the
complaint: the ​filing ​of the impeachment complaint ​AND the r​eferral ​by
the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint ​may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period. ​Therefore,
the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first
complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on
Justice.
FACTS:
● On 22 July 2010, Baraquel Group ​filed an impeachment complaint
(First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation
of the Constitution.
● On 3 August 2010, the Reyes Group filed an impeachment
complaint (Second Complaint) against Gutierrez also based on
betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
● On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were ​referred ​by the
House Plenary to the Committee on Justice ​at the same time.
● On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First
and Second Complaints sufficient in form.
● On September 2 2010, The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15​th​ Congress was published.
● On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First
and Second Complaints were sufficient in substance. Petitioner
was served a notice directing her to file an answer to the
complaints within 10 days.
● On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the
Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment
proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
● The following day, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the
issuance of a ​status quo ante ​order.
● Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that ​"no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year​."
ISSUE:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy? - YES
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15​th Congress denied due process
to the Petitioner? - NO
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated
the one year bar rule in the Constitution? - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House
of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court
on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
● FIRST ISSUE: ​YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial
review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of
Baker v. Carr​, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
● There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy
over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign
will.
● However, the SC may not look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis petitioner’s submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. To require the Court
to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislature.
● SECOND ISSUE: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the
difference between ​publication and promulgation.
● To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or
on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published
on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly
substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two
newspapers of general circulation.
● To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these
rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, PROMULGATION ​means "the delivery of
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication​.
● Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
generally understood—that is, to make known. Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to
"publication," the former should be understood to have been used
in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much
the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to
tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate ​when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation​. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
● Inquiries ​in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the ​sole instance in the Constitution where there is a
categorical directive​ to d​ uly publish a set of rules of procedure​.
● Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of
the rules on impeachment is aimed at "​effectively carry[ing] out
the purpose​" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to
provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th
Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and
in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of
the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within
the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
● Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the
procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature,
they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws." In the present case, ​petitioner fails to allege any
impairment of vested rights​. It bears stressing that, unlike the
process of inquiry ​in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender.
● THIRD ISSUE:​ NO. The one-year bar rule was not violated.
● Petitioner contends that the start of the one-year bar is the ​filing of
the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
● There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint:
the ​filing ​of the impeachment complaint ​AND the r​eferral ​by the
House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint ​may
not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.​Therefore, ​the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the
filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the
House Committee on Justice.
● Further, The Constitution states that "a verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business ​within ten session days​, and referred to the proper
Committee ​within three session days thereafter​."
● In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of
discretion on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first
impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no
session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010
that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session
period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010,
Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the
complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said
10-day session period.
● INITIATIVE: ​Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice)
● IMPEACH: ​to file the case before the Senate
● Rationale of the one-year bar: “​that the purpose of the one-year bar
is two-fold: 1)”to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2)
to allow the legislature to do its principal task of legislation,”
Assigned: Christine Leong
3. BOLASTIG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Date: ​Aug. 4, 1994 GR Number:​ 110503
Doctrine
Mandatory preventive suspension as stated in RA 3019; rationale -
The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate
his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the
same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof,
the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is
likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS:
● Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an
information was filed against him and two others for alleged
overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019)
● ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO
MACABENTA, all public officers, duly appointed and qualified as
such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Property
Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members
of Bids and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office
supplies for the Provincial Government of Samar and while in the
performance of their respective positions, confederating and mutually
helping one another and through manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO
ESPARAGUERRA, for the purchase of (100) reams of Onion Skin at
price of P550.00 or a total price of P55,000.00, which contract was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the
prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00)
or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00),
thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of
Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).
● Bolastig was arraigned
● Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's
suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participatio​n, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
● Bolastig opposes this suspension
● SB rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the suspension of
petitioner from office for a period of 90 days saying that RA 3019
makes it mandatory to make preventive suspension.
● Bolastig appealed this to SC alleging SB committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing its resolution
● a) despite the failure of the prosecution to show any public interest to
be served, or injury to be prevented, or any other compelling factual
circumstance which justifies the preventive suspension of petitioner;
and
● (b) despite the injury not only upon petitioner but also upon the people
of Samar whose political rights are trenched upon by the suspension for
no valid reason of their duly elected Governor
ISSUE:
WON the preventive suspension is mandatory as in pending court case as in
the case of Bolastig?
RULING: Yes. Bolastig's petition has no merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan acted according to law.
It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory
for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property is filed. ​The court trying a case has neither discretion
nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to
prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or
frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office.
● The 90 days is lifted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No.
807), ​which is now sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987 when
the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service
● The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period
prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is
decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than
ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the
preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only.
● The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent
that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case but
not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account
the probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his
prosecution.
● The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate
witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the
grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, as already stated,
to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office.
● Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the
people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least
temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a
mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has
likewise been elected by them, will act as governor
Assigned: Albert Bundalian
4. GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Date: ​January 28, 2014 GR Number:​ 196231
Doctrine
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President​, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman itself​.
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
FACTS:
● This is to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of
the President on the decision of the court which ruled on the petition of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras Sulit. The court in its previous decision upheld the
constitutionality of RA 6770 (An Act Providing For The Functional
And Structural Organization Of The Office Of The Ombudsman, And
For Other Purposes), reversed the OP ruling that Gonzales was guilty
of Gross Negligence of Duty, and asked for the continuation of the
proceedings against Sulit.
​Gonzales’ Petition​:
● There were 2 different charges against Senior Inspector Rolando
Mendoza Gonzales, et al. The first one was filed with the Manila City
Prosecutors Office and he was charged for robbery, grave threat,
robbery extortion, and physical injury. The second complaint was filed
with the NAPOLCOM PNP-NCRPO. This prompted Gonzales, who
was the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement
Officers (MOLEO), to direct NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of
the case to his office.
● On October 30, 2009, Mendoza et al. received a copy of the
Ombudsman decision stating that they were guilty of grave misconduct
and imposed a penalty of dismissal from service. Mendoza, et al. filed
a Motion for Reconsideration.
● On December 10, 2009, all the records of the case were forwarded to
the Criminal Investigation and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. It was
assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis
Garcia. Thereafter, the draft order by Garcia was transferred to his
superiors for them to review and approve the same. On April 27, 2010,
the draft order was transmitted to the office of Gonzales. Then on May
6, 2010 (9 days after his receipt of the draft order), Gonzales sent the
order and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman.
● On August 23, 2010, pending the final action of the Ombudsman,
Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held 21 tourists (Hong Kong
Nationals) as hostages. This incident resulted in the deaths of Mendoza
and several tourists.
● President Aquino created an incident and investigation committee
composed of the DOJ and DILG. In their report, they stated that the
Ombudsman and Gonzales were accountable for the gross negligence
and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza since the
failed to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration
● On October 12, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the Office
of the President(OP) for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in
the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.
● The Office of the President found Gonzales guilty and dismissed him
from service. However, Gonzales posited that under Section 21 or R.A.
6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman. Furthermore, he acted on the
draft order only within 9 calendar days from his receipt of the order.
Sulit’s Petition
● The Office of the Ombudsman drew public outrage when they entered
into a plea-bargaining agreement with Major General Carlos Garcia,
who was charged, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money
laundering.
● This prompted the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives to conduct an investigation.
● The Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed
culpable violations of the constitution and recommended to the
President that they be removed from service.
ISSUE:
1. Is Section 8 (2) of RA 67701 unconstitutional with respect to the
(1) Office of the Ombudsman; and, (2) Office of the Special
Prosecutor?
RULING:
(1) Yes, it is unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
1
​Section 8. ​Removal; Filling of Vacancy​.​ —
XXX
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
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Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]
(2) No, it is not unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
Summary of Votes
‘‘In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,​the Court
resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner
Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). ​We declared Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to
the President over a Deputy Ombudsman​, in violation of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, ​by another vote of 8-7, ​the Court resolved ​to maintain the
validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. ​The
Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.’’
On the Issue of Constitutionality of ​Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
● In the 1987 Constitution a new office of the Ombudsman was created
by constitutional fiat. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in
Section 27, Article 2 and the standard of accountability in public
service under Section 1, Article XI.
● This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically
intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and
guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. The
Ombudsman’s broad investigative power ​includes all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and Executive Officers. Section
21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary.
● Its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. They
do not owe their existence to any act of Congress. This was also shown
during the constitutional deliberations when the framers of the
constitution intended that the Constitutional Commissions should be
independent of executive control or supervision or any form of political
influence.
● Furthermore, ​subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President,​whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority​, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials
who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
● Congress is empowered to determine the modes of removal from office
of all public officers and employees, but this ​must still be consistent
with constitutional guarantees and principles​, namely: the right to
procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the
principle of checks and balances.
On the Dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales
● In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach
of duty is flagrant and palpable. Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross
neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded
to him within 9 days.​the ​OP relied on Section 8, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales
should have acted on Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within
five days:
‘’Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a
motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only
be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt
8
2A Public Officers
Atty. Noel Ostrea
Selected Cases: Law on Public Officers [PART 2]

of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any

of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially
affects the order, directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities
have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant.’’
● Even if the period is mandatory, it cannot apply to Gonzales because
he is a deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case​.
He is not a hearing officer. Also, ​the period does not include the
time covered in reviewing the motion​.

The case of Special Prosecutor Sulit

● It appears that based on legislative history and the present overall legal
structure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the unconstitutionality of
Section 8 (2) of RA 6770 must also apply to the Special Prosecutor.
● Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a
necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies,
by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an organic component
of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman
control and supervision over that office.
● Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made
part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it
performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies.
● Notwithstanding the above discussion, court maintained the validity of
the law in the case of the Special Prosecutor, through a vote of 8-7.

Assigned: Steph Yarte