Page |1
Republic of the Philippines parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camiguin convicting him of parricide, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife,
Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found
under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal
located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking
water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her
body. She was placed in an improvised hammock and brought
to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat
(Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula,
after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the
barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he
(Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral
confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he
had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which
was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His
shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured
by quarrels and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact
that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and
chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The
couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel
induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was
afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration.
Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead
("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal
and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with
parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary examination,
the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on
March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's
counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was
insanity.
RULING
"To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind, as not, to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong."
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test,
supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone
supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility
of a person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving
an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a
condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a
mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a
condition not considered capable of improvement or
deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a
physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F.
2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal
responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to understand the
nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong as to such act, and in a
majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten
case exists along with the "irresistible impulse" test or some
other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the
ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was
unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is
the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits
inability to distinguish between right and
wrong to be considered, even though it
refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it
would appear that insanity which meets this
test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is
over whether there are some cases in which
the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in
which a defense on grounds of insanity
should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am
Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not
substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of
sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of
reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally
wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease
or defect.

The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of
surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable
proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that
he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death.
The lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence
of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death
sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of
September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver,
entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay),
72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as
Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by
saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang
bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her
several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was
in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a
tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes
were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a
neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria
had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the
following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na
iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag
tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio
Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second
cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit,
Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able
to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |2
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left,
notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B.
Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her
bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and
pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of
Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as
the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).
RULING
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of
its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should
be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos,
44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed
Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since
1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8,
1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a
form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and
freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means
that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing
the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17,
1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA
275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el
trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see
I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and
art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the
killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of
superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed
with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength
over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who
was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing
but exclaim " Diyos ko ".
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex
and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which
the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman,
107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612;
U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62
Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be
appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act

manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates,
L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del
culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It
is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion
de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2)
"por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada
por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y
la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident,
meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v
externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo
Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of her old age should be appreciated as generic
aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating
because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed
manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant,
65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De
Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the
authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the
offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic
reaction) which diminished his will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs.
Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and
People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder
should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal
Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the
trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |3
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial
Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe,
Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Pampanga filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the
defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the
Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with
deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in
the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body
thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and
the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect
towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
where public authorities are engaged in the discharge
of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength
and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established
that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the
accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office
at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After
a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was
carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing
the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied
bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp.
5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela
Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14)
wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that,
sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of
his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure
in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
"never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further
testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent
the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses

due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22,
1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was
insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
RULING
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused
was supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation.
However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a
specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that
the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of
the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused
was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was
not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the
effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of
his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing
trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the
Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that
his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for
his counsel to appear and because his counsel did
not appear, he asked for the postponement of the
hearing of the case and to reset the same to another
date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be
insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what
will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this
particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in
short all the assessment necessary to test the
behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime
is one situation to consider if the patient is really
insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the
situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the
violent behavior, then he appears normal he can
reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is
one of the difficulties we have encountered in this
case. When we deliberated because when we
prepared this case we have really deliberation with all
the members of the medical staff so those are the
things we considered. Like for example he shouted
out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the
criminal case.
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |4
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware
when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case,
Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words
because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is
there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis
supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence. The statement of one of the expert witnesses
presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew
the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that
accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As
stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time
that he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence
shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated
the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal
weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the
accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the
victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the
killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the
accused ran away from the scene of the incident after
he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an
indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest.
This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he
was conscious and knew the consequences of his
acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160
SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can
discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of
the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt
as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity.
The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests
on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a
prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the
law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art.
800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305)
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts
were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S.
v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption
of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense
in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and

satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground
of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the
burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People v.
Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned
decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the
barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16,
1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him,
he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked
Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after
which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then
seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her
wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo,
and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the
costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission
of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba"
with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to
come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was
stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was
sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It
was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when
he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him
with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he
got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting
him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the
room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |5
wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have
any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither
did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any
motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and
his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration
the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a
criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but
that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into
depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also
conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead
a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the
defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and
under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and
Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred
from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives
for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of,
but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the
same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right
mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that
the wound of the deceased was direct result of the defendant's
act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say
further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have been
the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody
saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify
that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the
deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the
door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending
himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was
really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment
appealed from, the courts finds that the defendant is not
criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it
is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs
de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RUBEN ESTEPANO, RODNEY ESTEPANO and
RENE ESTEPANO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for
which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney, Dante and Rene,
all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo
died during the trial and before judgment could be rendered.
Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case
was archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on
reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney and Rene were found
guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas
in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and P9,500.00
for actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[1]
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the
testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that on 16 April 1991,
at around ten oclock in the evening, he was on his way home in
Barangay IV, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, with Lopito
Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met Dominador
Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture,
according to Florencio, Lopito started to talk to Dominador while
he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and
without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a
guinunting.[2] Ruben who was armed with a cane cutter and
Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit
in hacking Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador told
his companions, You better kill him! [3]
Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around
ten oclock in the evening, while he was walking home with
Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador
Estepano at the BM Trucking compound near the house of
Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw two
(2) persons, both naked from the waist up, pass by. He
recognized one of them to be Rodrigo Estepano. Soon after, he
heard a couple of splashing sounds and a ring, which made him
turn around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo
from the neck of Enrique. He also saw another person, who was
armed with a cane cutter, standing near the fallen Enrique. He
asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador
replied that that was the result of intense hatred. He then
hurriedly left for home. On the way he met some military men
and told them about the incident. The military men assured him
that they would report the matter to the police authorities. [4]
Dominador Estepano gave his own version of the incident.
According to him, on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the
evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They
were about to eat supper when he heard Enrique Balinas call
out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the
window and saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to
the ground Rodrigo hastily fled. There was no other person in
the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim was
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |6
and saw the latters firearm. He picked it up and when Chief of
Police Balquin arrived, he turned over the firearm to him.[5]
Robert Hautea[6] and Luz Cuepas,[7] both residents of
Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben
claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the
evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City
attending to his wife who earlier underwent a caesarian
operation.[8] Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that
they were at home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene,
who was only thirteen (13) years of age then, testified that he
came to know about the incident that same night when his
mother awakened him to inform him about it.[9] Rodney, on the
other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed
Enrique Balinas.[10]
The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that
the trial court erred: (a) in giving credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Tayco; (b) in finding the existence
of conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged; and, (c)
in finding them guilty of murder.[11]
RULING
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants
Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano guilty of murder as the
killing was attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they
suddenly and unexpectedly attacked the victim while the latter
was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking to Dominador
Estepano. There was treachery because the following requisites
concurred: (a) the culprits employed means, methods or forms
of execution which tended directly and specially to insure their
safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party, which meant that no opportunity was given the
latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. [31] The
penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on them in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[32]
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the
records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of
The Revised Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age
and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is
shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to
here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted
otherwise.[33]
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed
to prove that accused-appellant Rene Estepano acted with
discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio
Tayco only attempted to establish, as it did, Renes presence at
the crime scene and his supposed participation in the killing of
Enrique Balinas. Thus -
Q: Aside from Ruben Estepano alias Texas and Dante
Estepano who helped in attacking Enrique Balinas,
were there other persons involved or helped aside from
these two?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many more (who) helped?
A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.
xxxx

Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by Texas (Ruben)?
A: Cane cutter (espading).
xxxx
Q: How about Rene?
A: Bolo.[34]
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish
Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did
not in any way attempt to show his discernment. He was merely
asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
April 1991 and whether he participated therein. [35] Accordingly,
even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the
presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his
age.[36] The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive
indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the
government miserably squandered the opportunity to
incriminate him.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and RODNEY
ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder and are accordingly sentenced each to reclusion
perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of their victim Enrique Balinas y Gran the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P9,500.00 as actual damages and P367,920.00 for
loss of earning capacity.
Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in
the absence of proof that he acted with discernment;
consequently, his immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ORDERED unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision
and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
FIRST DIVISION
NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040
Petitioner,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 26, 2006
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |7
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with
modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779
convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner
(then only 12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of
Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y
FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of
age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by
means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor,
seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of
Pasay City.[4] One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on
December 8, 1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the
Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and
attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.[7]
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold
quail eggs at a nearby church.[8] Adjacent to their house was
that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually
start selling at 6:30 p.m.[9] Next to Teofistos residence was a
vacant house.[10]
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived
home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded
to her mothers store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home
the container with the unsold quail eggs.[11] Debbielyn did as
told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she
saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow
blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little
light from the lamp post.[12] She resisted to no avail.[13]
Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she
complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed
his own. He got on top of her.[14] She felt his penis being
inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.[15] She felt pain and
cried.[16] She was sure there were passersby on the street near
the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the
girls cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of
Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at
petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told
Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.[17] She
told her father about the incident.[18] Her parents later reported
what happened to the police authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.[20]

Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002,
he went out of their house to get his barbecue grill. He heard
someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.[21]
He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist
down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her
anus.[22] The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, Hoy,
bakit ginawa mo yan?[23] Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on
and fled.[24] Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting
arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to the police
investigator regarding the incident.[26]
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he
was inside their house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly
told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house
by petitioner.[27] He rushed to the place and found her daughter
crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that she
had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then
left.[28] He then looked for petitioner and found him at his
grandmothers house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the
barangay hall.[29] On September 25, 2002, he brought her
daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit
at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella
S. Castillo.
RULING
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,[57]contending
that the prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with
discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court
denied the motion in a Resolution[58] dated November 12, 2004
on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted
with discernment, his conduct during and after the crime betrays
the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have
the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of
the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the
fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled
the scene and hid in his grandmothers house intimates that he
knew that he did something that merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the
accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic awards
and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is]
possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus
poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his age
could, which conduct is right and which is morally
reprehensible.[59]
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code
is defined as follows: the discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits
an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong (People v. Doquena, 68
Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years
of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects
of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26,
1989).
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |8
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p.
375, 1998 Ed.), writes that discernment is more than the mere
understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the
mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act (People v.
Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a
minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, which may
be known and should be determined by considering all the
circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his
appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People
v. Doquena, supra).
The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion,
dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near
the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to
discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto
Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the
scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being
arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay
tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding
grade school student and even received awards. While in Grade
I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He
represented his class in a quiz bee contest.[86] At his the age of
12, he finished a computer course.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic
reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence
of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.
Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.[84] On the
other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and during the trial.[85] The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it
was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with
discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended
party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial
courts ruling.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari
against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City
Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful
questions of law which We are tasked to resolve. Considering
the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded
the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a
resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing
with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other
children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984.
They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle
borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game,
Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which
caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal
exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the
unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The
victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October
1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9
years but below 15 years of age and acting
with discernment, did then and there, without
taking the necessary precautions to prevent
and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate
and cause to be fired, in a reckless and
imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22
caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said
carelessness and imprudence one
TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left
side of the body with its pellet, causing
injuries which directly caused his untimely
death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing
of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in
Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
Page |9
with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment"
connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of
People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case
We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets
the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the
accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner
completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with
intent', then the allegation in the information
that the accused acted with discernment and
willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate
or cause to be fired in a reckless and
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is
an inherent contradiction tantamount to
failure of the information to allege a cause of
action or constitute a legal excuse or
exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the
ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under
Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment
and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain
things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to
such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts.' (46
CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a
means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being
the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case
of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age
but over nine, who commits an act prohibited
by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong . . .
(Emphasis supplied) p. 583
RULING
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed,
raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD
BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE

CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT
DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY
LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing
of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in
Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous
with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment"
connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of
People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case
We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets
the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the
accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner
completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with
intent', then the allegation in the information
that the accused acted with discernment and
willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate
or cause to be fired in a reckless and
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is
an inherent contradiction tantamount to
failure of the information to allege a cause of
action or constitute a legal excuse or
exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the
ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under
Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment
and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain
things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to
such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts.' (46
CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a
means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being
the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case
of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 10
but over nine, who commits an act prohibited
by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong . . .
(Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former
refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the
moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a
person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the
same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above
nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then
he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article
12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of
the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine
the morality of human acts to distinguish a
licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.
(Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and
below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other
hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are
not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be
without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of
appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that
(they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of
the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs.
Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to
two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment,
is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an
offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of
action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such
felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential
element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but
below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in
committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For
him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for
a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the

said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the
phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception
made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words
"intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the
case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to
present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now
invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply
met with the allegation in the information that
she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push
one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of
the Peñaranda River and as a consequence
thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died
right then and there.' This allegation clearly
conveys the Idea that she knew what would
be the consequence of her unlawful act of
pushing her victim into deep water and that
she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis
supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the
words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the
combined effect of the words used in the information is to
express a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the
wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not
validly contend that since the information now in question
alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former
may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses
the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999]
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG,
JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C.
AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the 17 June
1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV
37937 and the resolution[2]denying their motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January
1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City,
Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay
damages and attorneys fees to private respondents Conrado and
Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar.
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of
Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 11
Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch
manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively.
Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store,
Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then
beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body
pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure.
ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH
from the floor.[3]
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
Center where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost
her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by
writing on a magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil
on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident
or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.[4]
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she
sustained. The provisional medical certificate[5] issued by
ZHIENETHs attending doctor described the extent of her
injuries:
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents
demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses[6]
which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay.
Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought
the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for
moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees and an unspecified
amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any
liability for the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH.
They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care
and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam
around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.
ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she
climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy
wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the
past fifteen years since its construction.
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation
maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.
The other petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in
the performance of their duties and countered that the complaint
was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and
mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and
an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in
their favor.
In its decision[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of the evidence
favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall
of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It
believed petitioners witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH
clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with
the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In
contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how
the counter fell. The trial court also held that CRISELDAs
negligence contributed to ZHIENETHs accident.

RULING
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as
errors of the trial court its findings that: (1) the proximate cause
of the fall of the counter was ZHIENETHs misbehavior; (2)
CRISELDA was negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; (3)
petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the counter;
and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH
should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child
below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence.
And even if ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was already
capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically
impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. She
had a small frame (four feet high and seventy pounds) and the
counter was much higher and heavier than she was. Also, the
testimony of one of the stores former employees, Gerardo
Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought
to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied
petitioners theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter.
Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the
doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, [N]othing, I did not
come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. i
Accordingly, Gonzales testimony on ZHIENETHs spontaneous
declaration should not only be considered as part of res gestae
but also accorded credit.
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA
for it was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the
precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the
proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death, was petitioners
negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter
permanently nailed.
On the other hand, petitioners argued that private
respondents raised purely factual issues which could no longer
be disturbed. They explained that ZHIENETHs death while
unfortunate and tragic, was an accident for which neither
CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held
faultless and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial
courts rejection of Gonzales testimony as unworthy of credence.
As to private respondents claim that the counter should
have been nailed to the ground, petitioners justified that it was
not necessary. The counter had been in existence for several
years without any prior accident and was deliberately placed at a
corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they acted without
fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the
matter. In fact, the criminal caseii for homicide through simple
negligence filed by private respondents against the individual
petitioners was dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in
their favor.
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private
respondents and reversed the appealed judgment. It found that
petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted L iii
with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight
of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported
by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or
a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former
employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 12
attention of the management the danger the counter could cause.
But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals faulted
the petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the incident
that befell ZHIENETH could have been avoided had petitioners
repaired the defective counter. It was inconsequential that the
counter had been in use for some time without a prior incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was
below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was
absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that
since a child under nine (9) years could not be held liable even
for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could
not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also
absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong
or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to
walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the
witnesses of petitioners. It found them biased and prejudiced. It
instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness
Gonzales. The Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as
actual damages, the amount representing the hospitalization
expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the
hospital's statement of account.iv It denied an award for funeral
expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a
compensatory damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of
ZHIENETH.
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision,v
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the
lower court is SET ASIDE and another one is entered against
[petitioners], ordering them to pay jointly and severally unto
[private respondents] the following:
1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the
death of Zhieneth Aguilar, with legal interest (6% p.a.)
from 27 April 1984;
2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization
expenses incurred; with legal interest (6% p.a.) from
27 April 1984;
3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorneys fees; and
5. Costs.
Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the
decision but the same was denied in the Court of Appeals
resolutionvi of 16 July 1997.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision and the reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court.
Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court. They stress that since the action was based on tort, any
finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents
would necessarily negate their claim for damages, where said
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. The
injury in the instant case was the death of ZHIENETH. The
proximate cause was ZHIENETHs act of clinging to the counter.
This act in turn caused the counter to fall on her. This and
CRISELDAs contributory negligence, through her failure to
provide the proper care and attention to her child while inside the
store, nullified private respondents claim for damages. It is also

for these reasons that parents are made accountable for the
damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor children.
Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held
responsible for the accident that befell ZHIENETH.
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was
already separated from Syvels at the time he testified; hence, his
testimony might have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them.
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated
their arguments that neither ZHIENETH nor CRISELDA was
negligent at any time while inside the store; the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals are substantiated by the
evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who heard
ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the
hospitals emergency room should receive credence; and finally,
ZHIENETHs part of the res gestae declaration that she did
nothing to cause the heavy structure to fall on her should be
considered as the correct version of the gruesome events.
We deny the petition.
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of
ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence; and (2)
in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was
attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective
counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise
due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no
fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.vii It is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.viii
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.ix Negligence is the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. x
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory;
one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by
any means suggested by common prudence.xi
The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith,xii thus: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.xiii
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no
accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to
negligence.
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at
the scene of the incident and accompanied CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH to the hospital:
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or
notice anything while the child was being treated?
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 13
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the
child. And when the doctor asked the child what did
you do, the child said nothing, I did not come near the
counter and the counter just fell on me.
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?
ATTY. BELTRAN
Yes, your Honor.
COURT
Granted. Intercalate wala po, hindi po ako lumapit
doon. Basta bumagsak.xiv
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETHs
statement formed (and should be admitted as) part of the res
gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain
or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally
considered declarations and admissions.xv All that is required for
their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made
or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the
declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH,
a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzales testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH
performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly,
petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counters base.
Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to
keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping
counter proved their negligence, thus:
Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to
keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping
counter proved their negligence, thus:
Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second
floor, will you please describe the gift wrapping counter, were
you able to examine?
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean
that counter and since it is not nailed and it was only standing
on the floor, it was shaky.
xxx
Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 oclock [sic]
in the afternoon on [sic] May 9 1983?
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing
beside the verification counter. And since the top of it

was heavy and considering that it was not nailed, it can
collapse at anytime, since the top is heavy.
xxx
Q And what did you do?
A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic]
shaky and since Mr. Maat is fond of putting display
decorations on tables, he even told me that I would put
some decorations. But since I told him that it not [sic]
nailed and it is shaky he told me better inform also the
company about it. And since the company did not do
anything about the counter, so I also did not do
anything about the counter.[24] [Emphasis supplied]
Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated
the testimony of Gonzales, thus:
Q Will you please described [sic] to the honorable Court the
counter where you were assigned in January 1983?
xxx
A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor
ordered me to carry that counter to another place. I told
him that the counter needs nailing and it has to be
nailed because it might cause injury or accident to
another since it was shaky.
Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the
second floor on February 12, 1983, will you please
describe that to the honorable Court?
A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in good
[sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her that we had to
nail it.
Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her
that the counter was shaky?
A She told me Why do you have to teach me. You are only
my subordinate and you are to teach me? And she even
got angry at me when I told her that.
xxx
Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any,
did Ms. Panelo or any employee of the management do
to that (sic)
xxx
Witness:
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed
the counter after the accident happened.[25] [Emphasis
supplied]
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store
supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the
unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the stores
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family.
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra,
petitioners failed to establish that the formers testimonies were
biased and tainted with partiality. Therefore, the allegation that
Gonzales and Guevarras testimonies were blemished by ill
feelings against petitioners since they (Gonzales and Guevarra)
were already separated from the company at the time their
testimonies were offered in court was but mere speculation and
deserved scant consideration.
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 14
It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of
witnesses, the appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb
the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to
determine the same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of
actually hearing the testimony of and observing the deportment
of the witnesses.[26] However, the rule admits of exceptions such
as when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or
failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case.[27] In the
instant case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the
exception.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9)
years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In his book,[28] former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years
of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal
or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that
the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as
a matter of law. [Emphasis supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail
six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court
of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence[29]on record reveal
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an
inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with
formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its
base was not secured.[30]
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDAs waist,
later to the latters hand.[31] CRISELDA momentarily released the
childs hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip.
At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot
away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just
four meters away from CRISELDA.[32] The time and distance
were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did
not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did
not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which
affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No.
4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias
"Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape 3
committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing
the award of civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and awarding
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00
for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996
against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years,
AAA’s father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against
herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the
evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay
upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated
September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality
of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6
years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with
the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim
AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the
Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 15
denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel
Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of
the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004,
while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
its Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
RULING
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the
instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s]
parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they
have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine
Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother
and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been
stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable
for a girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so
humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly
subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate,
a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be
expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any
man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the
rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not
motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s
transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be
imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-
appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law,
the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is
a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of
AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was
committed, was alleged in the information and proven during
trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her
date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be
imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty
imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion
that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article
68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant

testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years
old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found
by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in
any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution
was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape
was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused,
it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases,
this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a
lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. 35
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is
reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding
damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is
committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides
that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the
award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence
here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of
Doña Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA].
While he knows [AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they go
to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does
not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from
Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in
the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of
the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring
seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They
were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they
transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from
barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña
Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while
his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard
testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years
old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between
1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he
took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily
routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon after school
before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at
the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1
kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his
mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most
surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows
Saling Crisologo and the latter’s place which is more than half
kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7,
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 16
2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the
docile cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related to
Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge
against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10,
2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he
already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in
1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister,
Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000
when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when
he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing
and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have
the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently,
from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was
ordered dismissed.
The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the
commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly
considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the
accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack
of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape
rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present
CARPIO
VELASC
- versus - PERALT
ABAD, a
MENDO
Promulg
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
Accused-Appellant. July 20,
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decisioniii dated
July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgmentiii dated
September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an
informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17)
years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was
organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and
two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of
P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the
team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4,
Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust
operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was
sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1
Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other.
Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of
the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the
appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers
and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in
the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and
Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big
sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay
officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by
the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same
barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the
items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet
of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small
sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3)
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty
peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of
the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-
violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by
Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City,
who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory
examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the
presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and
the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before
the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
P a g e | 17
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of
October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously sell zero point zero four one
two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu
which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).iii
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of
October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously possess zero point six one
three one (0.6131) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of
Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).iii
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried
jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against
him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgmentiii dated September 14, 2005,
the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a
dangerous drug, as defined and penalized
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A.
9165, where the offender is a minor, the
penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba
y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the
Court likewise finds accused Allen
Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for illegally possessing
shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131
gram as defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
and accused being a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, after applying the
 P a g e | 18

suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in

Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years,
as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
RULING
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court
finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his
suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17)
years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the
said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with
the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the
law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the condition of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the
child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while
If said child in conflict with the law has
the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September
reached eighteen (18) years of age while
14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC
under suspended sentence, the court shall
did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of
determine whether to discharge the child in
P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32
accordance with this Act, to order execution
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
of sentence, or to extend the suspended
the Law,[32] the laws that were applicable at the time of the
sentence for a certain specified period or
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for
until the child reaches the maximum age
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
of twenty-one (21) years.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one
entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and
(21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38
68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of
would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under
Sentence. - Once the child who is under
its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the
commission of the offense is found guilty of
age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in
the offense charged, the court shall
2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been
determine and ascertain any civil liability
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
which may have resulted from the offense
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to
committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows
the judgment of conviction, the court shall
the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
place the child in conflict with the law under
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D.
suspended sentence, without need of
603.[34]
application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years
minority[39] can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that
(18) of age or more at the time of the
should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the
minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated
Upon suspension of sentence and after
above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than
considering the various circumstances of the
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
child, the court shall impose the appropriate
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
disposition measures as provided in the
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
(ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the
Conflict with the Law.
penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 P a g e | 19

circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.[40] The ISLAW is

applicable in the present case because the penalty which has
been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC