I. SANTOS VS.

PIZARRO

DULAY VS. CA

SANTOS vs. PIZARRO

465 SCRA 232, July 29, 2005

Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting
to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was eventually convicted in
December 1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil
liability was made by the MCTC. In October 2000 Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan
and Rondaris, the president and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit moved for the dismissal of the
complaint citing, among others, prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4
years from the accrual of the cause of action.

Held: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a
result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation the MCTC did not make any
pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the part of
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action
ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the
choice between an action to enforce liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e. (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2) independent civil
liabilities (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34,
and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings.

While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This
is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement
of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates the controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard
and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that
Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil
liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause
of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable
under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-
delict.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;

(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and

(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification
for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.

(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia
case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is
charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with
reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even
if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide.

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary

extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's
death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

II. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT

AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are:

(1) an act or omission;

(2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or non-performance of the act;

(3) injury;

(4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and

(5) no pre-existing contractual relation.

AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome
from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise
of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for
the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when
he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a
plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in
favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class
ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth
and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the
purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court
is admissible in evidence.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there
is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.

HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry
is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of
the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso
and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt.
The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

III. EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE QUASI-DELICT LIABILITY

MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN

(Yung sa Effect of acquittal, di ko sure kung tama itong cinite ko na case. Yung BLUE ang ruling
about sa acquittal.)

PADILLA VS. CA

FACTS: The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments,
and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise

Contentions:
Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

Roy Padilla, et al

1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence

2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se

3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72)
hours to vacate the market premise

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer
an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties
provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners
were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some
petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted
some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence
of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the
criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to
pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused
was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the same punishable
act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by
law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising
from the same act as a quasi-delict.Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced
against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal
for the same criminal act or omission.

The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A
separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

MANLICLIC VS. CALAUNAN

FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and
driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter
to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook
the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the
jeep on the left side.
 - At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took
place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Petitioner’s version:
- The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to
overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence for the civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its employee.

HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or reckless imprudence
based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the damages caused by the petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.

1. Admissibility of the TSNs

Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to evidence for failure to comply with the requisites of Sec. 47,
Rule 130 of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses because the criminal
case was filed exclusively against Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible on the ground that the petitioner failed to object on their
admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of the evidence is a waiver on the provision of the law.
- In addition, the petitioner even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would deprive the petitioner of due process. For the failure of the
petitioner to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object for the non compliance with the
ROC.

2. Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already acquitted by the
CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that
he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
 (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

- In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex
delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

- The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story however, as they
constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject for a petition for review. Findings of
the trial court and appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in the
criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than
having been forced off the road.

3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
 master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Petitioner’s contention:
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver.
- As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of
ready investigators is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.
- The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as
well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the
supervision of its personnel.
o no evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the
safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles
o no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough. Same
does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the supervision.
o Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and
established.
o the lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
- For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible
for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced
to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00.

IV. EMPLOYER’S LIABILTY UNDER ART. 100 RPC AND UNDER ART. 2176 AND 2180 CC

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.chanrobles virtual law library

-SUBSIDIARY LIABILTY
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

Xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

-SOLIDARY LIABLITY

An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on
a delict is merely subsidiary. (People vs. Fabro, 93 SCRA 200 (1979). The words “primary and direct” as
contrasted with “subsidiary”, refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to
the character and limits of the obligation. (33A Words and Phrases 215 (197, Ed.). Although liability under
Article 2180 originates from negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed
an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.
While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the
employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due
diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. (Ito lang talaga ang sagot.)

For Additional Readings lang ito:

“Owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” does not include a manager of a corporation.
(Spanish term “directores” connotes “employer.” But manager of a corporation is not an employer, but
rather merely an employee of the owner.) [Philippine Rabbit v. Philam Forwarders, G.R. No. L25142
(1975)].

The liability imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to whom they are not bound by contract is based on the employer’s own negligence, such as
when he places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the
method of managing such vehicle [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, supra].

This Court still employs the "control test" to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship
between hospital and doctor. Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists between a
physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which
the physician is to accomplish his task. The Court earlier ruled that there was employer-employee
relationship between the doctor and employee but reversed itself upon motion for reconsideration. They
still held the hospital liable on the basis of agency and corporate responsibility [Professional Services v.
CA and Agana, G.R. No. 126297 (2010)].

“Within the scope of their assigned task” in Art. 2180 includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests, or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage [Filamer v CA, G.R. No. 75112 (1990)].

Basis of liability:

Employer’s negligence in

(1) The selection of their employees (culpa in eligiendo)

(2) The supervision over their employees (culpa in vigilando)

Presumption of Negligence

The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gives rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees [Lampesa v. De Vera, G.R. No. 155111 (2008)].

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 4TH AND 5TH PARAGRAPHS OF ART. 2180

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable.

Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their
assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty [Castilex
Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, G.R. No. (1999)].

DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE IN SELECTION AND SUPERVISION

Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or her employees and the
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted
to ensure performance of acts as indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employee [Metro
Manila Transit v. CA, G.R. No. 104408 (1993)].

Due diligence in the selection of employees require that the employer carefully examined the applicant
for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service.

Criminal Negligence

The vicarious liability of the employer for criminal negligence of his employee is governed by RPC 103.
Conviction of the employee conclusively binds the employer. Defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee is not available. The employer cannot appeal the conviction [Fernando v.
Franco (1971)]. Note: The liability of the employer under Art. 103 RPC is subsidiary.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

When is state/municipal corporations liable for tortious acts of is employees?

1. State Liability

The State cannot be sued without its consent. Consent of the State to be sued can be manifested
through special law or general law allowing the State to be sued.

a. Special Agents

Artticle 2180 of the CC par 5

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable

 The liability is limited to acts of special agents. A special agent is one who receives definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official (Merrit vs. Government)

 Explanation of the vicarious liability of the State:

Merrit vs. Government of Philippine Islands

The responsibility of the State is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through special
agent xxx so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
 executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations.

2. Municipal Corporations

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from
defective condition of roads

Article 2189 of CC

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control and supervision.

Sec 24 of the Local Government Code

Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property.

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan

The plaintiff, while she was about to board motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd.
(a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a
manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. Damages were awarded
against the City of Dagupan although the street involved is a National Road. Exemplary damages were
awarded to serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and
responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or when there
are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order
to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.

Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway
Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as
Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from
Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works
and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively.This function of supervision over streets, public
buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National
Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision
from the city through the City Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil
Code is clear.
XII.

Amadora vs. CA

Facts:

When the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain
Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well
as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident
happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has
already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180,
only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.

Issue: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article
2180 which provides:
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.”

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing
times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That
being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said
provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held
directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the
tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school
exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are
more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act
of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the
semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is
still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary
liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient
evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

St. Marys Academy vs Carpitanos

Facts:
For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among the
students of SMA who took part in the campaign was Sherwin and James. Sherwin and other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by James, then 15
years old. On their way to Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle resulting in the death of Sherwin.

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Vicente and SMA. At the trial, the traffic
investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the steering
wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator was
not disputed by any of the parties.

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special parental
authority at the time of the accident. The parents of Dino were found to be only subsidiarily liable and
were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school. Dino was absolved for being only
a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio, the vehicle owner was not held liable
at all.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is liable for damages.

Held:
No. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over
a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies
to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable fordamages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded.

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed theminor James to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the accident
was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had no control. If the school
may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachmentof the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the registeredowner of the vehicle who should be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

XVII.