ANTONIO GAMAS vs. JUDGE ORLANDO A.

OCO

FACTS:
In their Complaint, complainants allege that they are the accused in a case for theft. As
respondent judge had issued warrants for their arrest, complainants went to the MTC Polomolok
to post bail. Complainants allege that respondent Adulacion enticed them to plead guilty to the
charge, apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.

Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying his suggestion,
conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to respondent judge. After
reading the document, respondent judge signed it, and handed the document to a clerk.
Complainants signed the document upon respondent Adulacion's assurance that once the police
apprehend the rest of the accused, 3 the police will revive the case and respondent Adulacion will
present complainants as "star witnesses." Complainants later found out that what they signed
was an Order finding them guilty of theft and sentencing them each to imprisonment for six (6)
months and one (1) day.

Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of a lawyer. Upon
motion of complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the Order, ostensibly on the ground
that complainants had entered improvident guilty pleas.

In the present complaint, complainants contend that respondent judge is administratively liable for
rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment and in violation of their
right to be represented by counsel. 5

In his Answer respondent judge denied complainants' allegations regarding the alleged
procedural irregularities in the issuance of the Order. The contention of the respondent judge is
that he instantly respond to the plea of herein complainants that they be allowed to plead guilty,
meted the minimum sentence, allowed probation and pending probation they be released on
recognizance, they will solve their very immediate problem of being locked in jail because they
had surrendered to Adulacion and they had no ready bails. Knowing the course of action they
wanted, I begun discoursing on their rights as accused. I told them of their right to counsel, to be
given free of charge if they cannot afford to solicit services of one, to confront the witnesses and
cross examine and because they had voluntarily articulated the desire to plead guilty, I estimated
to them the probable penalty. I also told them that they have [a] right to apply for probation but
pending action they may be required to file bailbonds but they begged that they be allowed to
plead guilty but released pending probation proceedings.

The matter was referred to the Executive Judge of RTC Polomok for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his report, the Executive Judge Roxas finds the respondent judge liable for
simple neglect of duty and recommending the imposition of P10,000 fine on the latter. Thereafter,
the report was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA. In its Memorandum, while agreeing with the findings of
Executive Judge Roxas, finds respondent judge liable not for mere simple neglect of duty but for
gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, the OCA recommends that respondent judge to be fined
P20,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arraignment of the accused is valid.

RULING:
No. The Court find respondent Orlando A. Oco, former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, we FINE
respondent Orlando A. Oco P20,000, to be taken from his withheld retirement benefits.

RATIONALE:
The respondent Judge failed to properly apprise complainants of their right to counsel.
The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." 10 Indeed, the accused has a right to representation by
counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to the appellate proceedings. 11 At the
arraignment stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before

arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him
if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de
oficio to defend him. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:

[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an]
attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if
he desires the aid of attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign [an] attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 – If the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. 12

Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. 13 The only instance when the court can arraign
an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the court,
finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. However, to be a valid
waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 14 In
determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the court must take into account all
the relevant circumstances, including the educational attainment of the accused. In the present
case, however, respondent judge contends that complainants waived their right to counsel and
insisted on their immediate arraignment.

After reviewing the records and taking into account the circumstances obtaining in this case, we
find that respondent judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to counsel prior to
their arraignment. Consequently, there was no basis for complainants' alleged waiver of such
right.

Respondent Judge's Arraignment of Complainants Highly Irregular

Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. — The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information.

We have explained the rationale, requirements, and compliance of this rule in this
manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open
court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court [1] furnishing the accused a copy
of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then [2]
reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking
him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a
language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial
courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-
important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed
 of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an
avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an
integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution. 20
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals
that a judge can take lightly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further."

HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners
and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa.

Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the
manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo's advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to
Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and
an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. 8

Relying on Ngo and Gracia's assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of P10,000,000.00. This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost P100,000,000.00. Dy
increased his investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. In
return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment.
Gracia issued checks in the total amount of P114,286,086.14. All these checks were
subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.

Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from
Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the
dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and
realty business of Gracia's husband, Danny Hao. Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners
never returned Dy's money.

On the basis of Dy's complaint and supplemental affidavit, the public prosecutor filed an
information 14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. Judge
Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them
and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thereafter, the
trial court denied the petitioners' twin motions. 16 The petitioners moved for reconsideration but
the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order.

Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the CA. The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and motion to
lift warrant of arrest. The CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after
his personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied
with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arraignment of the petitioners be suspended.

RULING:
NO. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION. Petitioners are charged with simple estafa under the Revised Penal Code.

RATIONALE:
Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there
is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office
of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003.
Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be
suspended indefinitely.

We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, 47 we explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of
the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 48

As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners'
petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to
suspend completely lacks any legal basis.

As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their
arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where
the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.

GASPAR BANDOY vs. JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.

FACTS:
An administrative case filed by Bandoy against Judge Jacinto for alleged Grave Abuse of
Authority. Bandoy was charged with serious illegal detention initiated by DE JESUS which was
raffled to Judge Jacinto’s sala.

Bandoy alleged that the charge was filed by DE JESUS JR. merely to get back against the former
for being instrumental in the filing of a charge against DE JESUS JR. for violating Ballot
switching. Bandoy, who was the poll watcher of Mayor Joel Panaligan, alleged that DE JESUS
JR. was caught in the act of ballot switching. DE JESUS JR. is a public elementary school
teacher who was the chair of the Board of Election Inspectors of a particular precinct in
Occidental Mindoro. He was alleged to be having close ties with the rival of Mayor Joel
Panaligan, Voltaire Villarosa. He was caught by a member of the media and has already been the
object of a warrant of arrest. The case was also raffled in the same sala- that of Judge Jacinto.

Bandoy alleged that Judge Jacinto has been manifestly partial towards DE JESUS, allowing the
latter to postpone his arraignment 7 times, before finally pleading not guilty before Judge Jacinto,
inside his chambers on July 6, 2011. He also submits that the Judge Jacinto failed to dismiss the
serious illegal detention case against him despite the fact that DE JESUS JR. has also failed to
appear whenever he was subpoenaed.
Meanwhile, Bandoy had his case reviewed under the DOJ. Secretary de Lima granted his motion
and ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the case. Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information. Judge Jacinto denied the motion for
withdrawal.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Mayor became the
assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time that the case for serious illegal
detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate
and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching against De Jesus,
Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012, 14 while their bail for the serious illegal detention case
was cancelled. 15

In his Comment, 17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan. 18 He also
denied having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused. Judge Jacinto, Jr. even
refused to issue a warrant of arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the case
anymore. 20.

In its Report, the OCA recommended that:

1) The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, be RE-

DOCKETED as regular administrative matter; and
2) Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure.

ISSUE/s:
1) Whether or not the arraignment proceeding was improper.
2) Whether or not the Judge must be held administratively liable.

RULING:
YES. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the
amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

RATIONALE:
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and
diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. 36

Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted position
of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times. 37

In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned
De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to
delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed against
him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench,
that was being challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him
to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is against human nature to just
remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations." 38 His silence introduces doubt
in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.

Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure,
the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof requiring arraignment of an accused
to be made in open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. — (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned
for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the
 same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can
take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation
"where the issues are joined . . . and without which the proceedings cannot advance further." 39

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division)

FACTS:
Petitioner together with accused Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book
and payrolls for given period. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were
also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee.
In both cases, the petitioner offered plea bargaining proposal which the prosecution found as
acceptable. With respect to the falsification cases, the prosecution explained that the act of the
accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual will strengthen
their cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be
the master mind of these criminal acts. Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the
prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer because accused DAAN has already restituted
the total amount of P18,860.00 and the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval. The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the plea
bargaining offer of the accused.

RULING:
YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May
31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion
to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

RATIONALE:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of
a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit: EaISTD
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference. But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held
that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. 9 ASaTCE

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow
the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty
for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. 12

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, 13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. As regards plea
bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 16

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the
benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve
to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential
grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their
criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the
deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government." Apparently,
the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However,
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer
should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction —
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power
to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so
to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
 substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts. 18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order to
afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, 20 the Sandiganbayan approved the Plea Bargaining
Agreement, taking into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the
agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
The Sandiganbayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty";
and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense,
which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the
offense charged, which is Plunder. The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was
originally charged.
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court state when an offense includes or is included in the
other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the
latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Given,
therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute
the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize
the imbalance.