Section 4

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC November 24, 2009
RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommitee on Rules Procedure for
Family Courts submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the proposed revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on December 1, 2009 following its publication in two(2) newspapers general
circulation not later than November 27, 2009.
November 24, 2009.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
________________________________________
REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases involving children in conflict with
law.
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the offense is below eighteen
(18) years old but not less than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.
This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the initial contact as defined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule
shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) in which case, the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply
without prejudice to the rights granted under Secs. 53,54,55 and 56 of this Rule.
Section 2. Objective. - The objective of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system treats every child in conflict
with the law in a manner that recognizes and upholds human dignity and worth, and instills in the child respect
for the fundamental rights ad freedom of others. The Rule considers the developmental age of the child and
the desirability of the child's reintegration in the assumption of a constructive role in society in accordance
with the principles of balanced and restorative justice.
To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
(a) To provide child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for crime prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure the normal growth and development of the child in
conflict with the law;
(b) To provide procedural rules dealing with children in conflict with the law that take into account their
distinct circumstances, assure all parties of a fair hearing with each party's constitutional and statutory rights
recognized and respected, and ensure that appropriate disposition measures are implemented by law
enforcers social services and the courts;
(c) To divert from the formal justice system children in conflict with the law who can be cared for or placed
under community continuum alternative programs of treatment, training and rehabilitation in conformity
with the principles of balanced and restorative justice;
(d) To deal with the child in a family environment whenever possible, and to separate the child from the
parents only when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interest of public safety.
(e) To remove from children in conflict with the law the stigma of criminality and criminal behavior;
(f) to promote, facilitate and implement in administrative and judicial proceedings respect for the view of the
child;
(g) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children
in conflict with the law; and
(h) To promote and protect the rights and interest of children as zones of peace in situations of armed conflict,
but who are alleged to be in conflict with the law. (a)
Section 3. Interpretation. - This Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the best interest of the child in
conformity with Philippine laws, the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child and relevant
international treaties and protocols.
Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,
(a) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but
below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
(b) Bail refers to the security given for the release of the child in custody of the law, furnished by the child,
the child's parent, guardian, or a bondsman, to guarantee the child's appearance before the court. Bail may
be posted in a form such as corporate security, property bond or cash deposit.
(c) Balanced and Restorative Justice is a principle in juvenile justice that requires a process of resolving
conflicts with the participation of the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community. It seeks to
obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation to the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the
community, and the reassurance that the child in conflict with the law can be reintegrated into society. It also
enhances public safety by involving the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community in
prevention strategies. (a)
(d) Best interest of the child refers to the totality of congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development.
It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development.
(e) Case study report is a written report on the social case inquiry conducted by the social worker of the local
government unit or the Department of Social Welfare and Development or by the social worker designated
by the court on the social, cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the child in conflict in the law. It
shall include, among other matters, the child's development age; educational attainment; family and social
relationships; the quality of the child's peer group; the strengths and weaknesses of the family; parental
control; the child's attitude towards the offense ; the harm or damage done to others resulting from the
offenses, if any; and the attitude of the parents towards the child's responsibility for the offense. The social
worker shall also include an initial determination of the child's discernment in the commission of the offense.
(a)
(f) Community continuum refers to the aftercare of a child in conflict with the law and is a provides continuous
guidance and support to the child in conflict with the law upon release from rehabilitation and subsequent
reintegration into society. Community continuum for the child includes timely release, suitable residence,
food, clothing, available employment and sufficient means to facilitate successful reintegration in local
government unit and other appropriate agencies. (n)
(g) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment inflicted on the body as distinguished from
pecuniary punishment or fine.
(h) Court refers to a designated family court or in places where there are no designated family courts, any
regional trial court hearing family and youth cases. (a)
(i) Deprivation of Liberty refers to any form of detention or imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in
conflict with the law in a public or private custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the law is not
permitted to leave at will except by order of any judicial or administrative authority. (a)
(j) Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense to understand
the differences between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act.
(k) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with the social worker who prepared the case study
report, together with the child in conflict with the law and the parents or guardian ad litem, and the child's
counsel for the purpose of determining the disposition measures appropriate to the personal and special
circumstances of the child.
(l) Diversion refers to an alternative child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment
of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of the child's social, cultural, economic psychological or
educational background without resorting to formal court adjudication.
(m) Diversion programs refer to programs the child in conflict the law is required to undergo in lieu of formal
court proceedings.
(n) Expedited Transfer of a Child is a process where a child who commits an offense is immediately brought
by the apprehending officer or private individual to a social worker for preliminary determination of
discernment. (n)
(o) Guardian Ad Litem is a person appointed by the court to protect the best interest of the child. (a)
(p) In conflict with the law means take into custody, detained, or charged with the commission of an act
defined and punished as a crime or offense under the law, including violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations, and ordinances of local government units. (a)
(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension or taking into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law
enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time the child alleged to be in conflict with the law
receives a subpoena under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons
under Section 6 (a) or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary investigation, or
where there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be in conflict with the law under immediate custody.
(n)
(r) Intake report is the initial written report containing the personal and other circumstances of the child in
conflict with the law prepared by the social worker assigned to assist the child entering the justice system.
(s) Intervention programs refer to a series of individualized treatment activities or programs designed to
address issues that caused the child to commit an offense . These may include counseling, skills, training,
education, and other activities that are aimed to improve and enhance the child's psychological, emotional
and psychosocial well being. (n)
(t) Law Enforcement Officer refers to the person in authority or an agent as defined in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, including a barangay tanod. (n)
(u) Non-Serious Offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not
more than six (6) years imprisonment. (n)
(v) Probation is an alternative disposition, ordered by the court, under which a child in conflict with the law is
released after conviction and sentence and permitted to remain at home or with an appropriate custodian,
subject to certain terms and conditions imposed by the court.
(w) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond, assumed by a mother or father, or appropriate guardian
or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, or any responsible member of the community to assume
custody of a child in conflict with the law and be responsible for the appearance of the child in court whenever
required during the pendency of the case. (a)
(x) Segregation refers to the procedure where, upon initial contact with a child alleged to have committed an
offense, the law enforcer places the child in a separate and different area from adult detention prisoners, and
ensures that female children are separated from male children. (n)
(y) Serious offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the offense committed exceeds six
(6) years imprisonment. (a)
(z) Status offenses refers to offenses that discriminate only against a child, such as curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience and the like. (n)
(aa) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the sentence imposed by the court upon
a finding of guilt of the child in conflict with the law, whereby the child undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed
period under such terms and conditions as may be ordered by the court. (n)
(bb) Victimless Crimes refer to offenses where there are no private offended parties. (n)
(cc) Youth detention home refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution managed by accredited local
government units and licensed and/or accredited non-government organizations providing short-term
residential care for children in conflict with the law and where the child may be physically restricted by order
of any judicial, administrative or other public authority, and from which the child is not permitted to leave at
will, pending court disposition of the charge or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction. (a)
(dd) Youth rehabilitation center refers to a 24-hour residential care facility managed by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, local government units, licensed and/or accredited non-government
organizations monitored by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The Center provides care,
treatment and rehabilitation services for children in conflict with the law under a structured therapeutic
environment through the guidance of a trained staff, where the physical mobility of the children may be
restricted pending court disposition of their cases. (a)
Section 5. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority
and shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until proven to be eighteen years old or older at
the time of the commission of the offense. The age of the child shall be determined according to the following
rules:
(1) The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth;
(2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and
school records or any pertinent document that shows the date of birth of the child;
(3) In the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section due to loss, destruction or
unavailability, the testimony of the child, the testimony of a member of the family related to the child by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the child pursuant to Sec.40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, the testimonies of the other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence, shall suffice.
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the age of the child in conflict with the law has the
burden of proving the age of such child.
If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the information in court, a case for determination of
age under summary proceeding may be filed before a court which shall render its decision within 24 hours
from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical finding as to the age of the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program as provided for in Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child and the
parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability which shall be enforced in
accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of the child involves a
quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Section 8. Procedure for Handling Children Exempted from Criminal Liability. - If it is determined at the initial
contact that the child is 15 years of age or below, the procedure provided in Section 20, Republic Act No. 9344
shall be observed as follows:
(a) The authority who had the initial contact with the child shall immediately release the child to the custody
of the mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative.
(b) The authority shall immediately notify the local social welfare and development officer of the taking of the
child into custody.
(c) The local social welfare and development officer shall, with the consent of the child and the person having
custody over the child, determine the appropriate intervention programs for the child.
(d) If the child's parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody,
the child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization;
a barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children; a local social welfare
and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
(e) If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development office to be abandoned, neglected
or abused by the parents, or if the parents and the child do not consent to or do not comply with the
prevention program, the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office shall file before the court a petition for involuntary commitment pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code." (a)
Section 9. Procedure for Children Not Exempted from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen (15) years and one (1)
day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense shall, at
the sound discretion of the court and subject to its supervision, be released on recognizance to the care of
the willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or, in their absence, the
nearest relative. However, if the prosecution determines that the child acted with discernment, the child shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Secs. 25 to 29 or, in case of diversion, Secs. 31 to 38 of this Rule.
Section 10. Determination of Discernment. - Discernment is preliminarily determined by a social worker and
finally by the court in the case of a child charged with a non-serious offense. In all other cases, discernment is
determined by the court.
The determination of discernment shall take into account the ability of a child to understand the moral and
psychological components of criminal responsibility and the consequences of the wrongful act; and whether
a child can be held responsible for essentially antisocial behavior.
Section 11. Duties of a Person in Authority Taking a Child into Custody. - Any person taking into custody a child
in conflict with the law shall:
(a) Assign an alias to the child;
(b) Ensure that the blotter details containing the true name of the child, if any, are modified, to reflect the
alias by which the child shall be known throughout the proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that can be understood the reason for placing the
child under custody, and the offense allegedly committed;
(d) Advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect understandable to the child;
(e) Present proper identification to the child;
(f) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the child;
(g) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instrument of force or restraint, unless
absolutely necessary and only after all methods of control have been exhausted and have failed;
(h) Avoid violence or unnecessary force and refrain from subjecting the child to greater restraint than is
necessary for apprehension and custody;
(i) Ensure that a body search of the child is done only by a law enforcement officer of the same gender as that
of the child;
(j) Ensure expedited transfer of the child by immediately, or not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension,
turning over custody of the child to the local social welfare and development office or other accredited non-
government organizations;
(k) Notify the child's parents, guardians or custodians or in their absence, the child's nearest relative and the
Public Attorney's Office of the child's apprehension;
(l) Ensure that the child is not locked up in a jail or detention cell during the investigation;
(m) Bring the child immediately to an available government medical or health officer for a thorough physical
and mental examination;
(n) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be necessary, the segregation of the child
be secured in quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders, except where a child is
taken into custody for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy, and
families are accommodated as family units in which case, the child shall not be separated from the family;
(o) Record all the procedures undertaken in the initial investigation including the following: whether handcuffs
or other instruments of restraint were used, and if so, the reason for such use; that the parents or guardian
of the child, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the Public Attorney's Office were
informed of the taking into custody of the child and the details thereof; the measures that were undertaken
to determine the age of child, and the precise details of the physical and medical examination or in case of
failure to submit a child to such examination, the reason therefore; and
(p) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during the investigation are witnessed and signed by the
child's parents or guardian, social worker or legal counsel in attendance. (n)
Section 12. Rights of a Child Under Custody. - At the custodial investigation, a child who has been taken into
custody shall have the following rights:
(a) At the police station, to be immediately assisted by a lawyer and a social worker who shall make sure that
the child is effectively informed of his/her rights, as far as the child's maturity and discernment allow;
(b) To demand that the questioning or interrogation take place in conditions that respect the rights of the
child and are complaint with child-sensitive procedural rules;
(c) To have the child's family located and notified with dispatch;
(d) To be informed, together with the parents, guardians or custodians or nearest relatives, by the social
welfare and development officer of the local government unit or of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development of the consequences of the offense alleged to have been committed with a view towards
counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from criminal justice system and reparation if appropriate;
(e) To have the results of the child's medical and dental examination kept confidential unless otherwise
ordered by the court. Whenever medical treatment for any physical or mental defect is necessary, to demand
that steps must be immediately taken by the medical officer to provide the child with the necessary and
proper treatment;
(f) To have the right of privacy respected and protected at all times, including the utilization of all measures
necessary to promote this right, including the exclusion of the media; and
(g) While under investigation, not to be fingerprinted or photographed in a humiliating and degrading manner.
Section 13. Taking Custody of a Child Without a Warrant. - The law enforcement officer or a private person
taking into custody a child in conflict with the law without a warrant shall observe the provisions in Sections
5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith deliver the child to the
nearest police station. The child shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 14. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. - The police officer conducting the initial investigation
of a child conflict with the law shall do so in the presence of either or both of the parents, guardian or
custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative of the child, the child's counsel of choice, or a lawyer from
the Public Attorney's Office, and the local social welfare officer. A representative of a non-government
organization, religious group, or member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children shall be
allowed to be present at the investigation in the absence of the parents, guardian, relative, or social welfare
officer. (a)
Section 15. Guidelines for Fingerprinting and Photographing of the Child. - The following guidelines shall be
observed when fingerprinting or photographing the child:
(a) The child's fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept separate from those of adults and shall be kept
confidential. They may be inspected by law enforcement officers only when necessary for the effective
discharge of their duties and upon prior authority of the court; and
(b) The fingerprint and photograph shall be removed from the files and destroyed: (1) if the case against the
child is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age and there is no
record that the child committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of age.
Section 16. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. - Upon the taking into custody of a child in conflict
with the law, the social welfare officer assigned to the child shall immediately undertake a preliminary
background investigation of the child and, should a case be filed in court, submit to the court the
corresponding intake report prior to the arraignment.
Section 17. Filing of Criminal Action. - A criminal action may be instituted against a child in conflict with the
law by filing a complaint with the prosecutor.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor assigned to the court.
Petitions for confinement of a child drug dependent shall be filed under Section 21 of the Rule on Children
Charged under Republic Act No. 9165. (n)
Section 18. Prosecution of Civil Action. - When a criminal action is instituted against a child in conflict with the
law, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent with this Rule, the preliminary investigation of a
child conflict with the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A specially trained prosecutor shall be assigned to conduct the inquest, preliminary investigation
and prosecution of the case involving a child in conflict with the law. The child, on the other hand, shall be
assisted by a private lawyer or if none, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If there is an allegation or
evidence of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be
the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the
following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion; (b) when the
child, the parents or guardian do not agree to diversion as provided in Sections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No.
9344; or (c) when, after considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor
determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the law. (n)
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory questions to be propounded on the
child, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to hold the child in
conflict with the law for trial, there being discernment, the corresponding Resolution and Information shall
be prepared for the approval by the provincial or city prosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the
mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative, and
the child's private counsel or lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office shall be furnished forthwith a copy of
the approved resolution and the Information.
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the preliminary
investigation. (n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:
(a) status offences;
(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of their parents, guardian or
custodian, instead undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information. - The Clerk of Court, upon receipt of the
Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children in conflict with the law. Whenever
possible, the Clerk of Court shall use color coding or other method to easily distinguish the records of children
in conflict with the law from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is it punishable by imprisonment of
not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of fine, or fine alone regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately assign a temporary case number in
accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle off the case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can
immediately undertake the appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is punishable by imprisonment of more than
twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a regular criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for
formal proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for diversion under paragraph 3 of the preceding
Section shall not be docketed as a regular criminal case but instead shall be assigned a temporary case number
as follows: CICL-(no.) ___- (year) ___ -D (which means diversion), before the same is raffled off to the
appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict with the law shall be instituted and tried in
the appropriate court nearest the place where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian, Custodian or Nearest Relative. -
The release of a child from a custody during the pendency of the case involving a non-serious offense as
defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this rule may be ordered by the court only after a hearing for that purpose, and upon
favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned to the child, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the private complainant. The child shall be released to the custody of a willing and responsible
mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who shall be
responsible for the child's good behavior and appearance in court whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case, subject to the provisions
of this Rule. (n)
Section 26. Commitment and transfer to a youth Rehabilitation Center. - A child charged with non-serious
offense as defined in Section 4 (u) of this Rule, unless released on bail or recognizance, may be transferred to
a youth detention home rehabilitation center or other appropriate facility such as the Department of Social
Welfare and Development which shall ensure the appearance of the child in court.
In the absence of a youth detention home established by the local government pursuant to Section 8 of the
Family Courts Acts, in the city or municipality where the child resides or, a local rehabilitation center
recognized by the government in the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court, or the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or other appropriate local rehabilitation center, the youth
shall be placed under the care of a provincial, city or municipality jail which shall ensure the appearance of
the child in court when so required. (a)
Section 27. Bail as a Matter of right. - All children in conflict with the law shall be admitted to bail as a matter
of right before final conviction of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua life imprisonment.
Section 28. When Bail Not a Matter of Right. - No child charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the court
shall commit the to a youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center, or in the absence thereof, to the
care of a provincial, city or municipal jail as provided for in Section 27 of this Rule, which shall be responsible
for the appearance of the child in court whenever required.
Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The child in conflict with the
law who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation center or youth detention home shall be provided with
a healthy environment. If the child is placed under the care of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child
shall be provided with adequate quarters separate from adults and prisoners of the opposite sex depending
on the age, sex, sexual lifestyle, and such other circumstances and needs of the child.
Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the social worker assigned to the
child shall immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the child and the child's family, the child's
environment and such other matters relevant to aid the court in the proper disposition of the case. The report
shall be submitted to the court preferably before arraignment. If not available at that time, the Report must
be submitted to the court as soon as possible.
Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a Diversion Committee composed
of its Branch Clerk of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office assigned
to the court, and the social worker assigned by the court to the child, as members.
Section 32. Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion Committee shall determine if the child can be
diverted and referred to alternative measures or services. Subject to pertinent provisions of this Rule and
pending determination of diversion by the Committee, the court shall release the child on recognizance to
the parents, guardian or custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable, commit the child to an
appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center which shall be responsible for the presence
of the child during the diversion proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or when the child or the private
complainant object to the diversion, or when there is failure if the diversion program if undertaken by the
child, it shall submit a report to the court recommending that the case be subjected to formal criminal
proceedings. The court in turn shall direct the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk
of Court for the assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the case as follows: CICL Crim. Case No.___-
___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall thereafter return the case to the court for arraignment and
formal proceedings.
Section 33. Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon receipt by the Committee of a case for
diversion from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to the
child, the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, the
child's counsel, and the private complainant and counsel to determine if the child can be diverted to the
community continuum instead of formal court proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the Committee shall consider the following
factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself and the community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will increase the possibility of
delinquent behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a diversion program in accordance with
Section 34 of this Rule for the consideration and approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall make the corresponding report
and recommendation in accordance with Section 31 of this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the private complainant objects.
Section 34. Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a diversion program talking into consideration
the individual characteristics and peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the law. The program
shall be for a specific and definite period and may include any or a combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii) problem-solving and/or conflict resolution
skills; (iii) values formation; and (iv) other skills that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that can
lead to a repetition of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure satisfaction of the civil liability of the
child in accordance with Sec. 2180 of the Civil Code. Inability to satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself
be a ground to discontinue the diversion program of a child. On the other hand, consent to diversion by the
child or payment of civil indemnity shall not in any way be construed as admission of guilt and used as evidence
against the child in the event that the case is later on returned to the court for arraignment and conduct of
formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the termination of the hearing.
Section 36. Undertaking. - In all cases where a child in conflict with the law is granted diversion by the court,
the child, together with the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the
nearest relative, and the child's counsel shall sign an undertaking to comply with their respective duties and
obligation under the terms and conditions of the express agreement by complainant assisted by counsel to
the diversion of the child, shall be approved by and enforced under the supervision and control of the court.
It shall contain the following minimum principal terms and conditions:
(a) The child shall appear before the social worker assigned to the child by the Court that approved the
diversion program at least once a month for evaluation of its effectiveness.
(b) The child shall faithfully comply with the term and conditions of the program. Should the child fail to do
so, the Committee shall report such failure to the court which shall set a show- cause hearing with notice to
the child and private complainant. The court shall thereafter determine whether to allow the child to continue
with the diversion program, or to end the same and direct that the case now undergo a formal proceeding.
Should the child be permitted by the court to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control
and supervision over such child shall be transferred to the appropriate court of that place. The diversion
records of the case such as the minutes of the diversion proceedings, copy of the undertaking, the intake and
case study reports and all other pertinent documents shall be transmitted to the court to which jurisdiction
over the diverted child has been transferred.
Section 37. Report of Social Worker. - The court social worker shall conduct regular monthly visit to the child
undergoing diversion proceedings and shall submit the corresponding reports about the status of the diverted
child to the committee. At any time before or at the end diversion period, the committee shall file with trhe
court of the report recommending termination or extension of diveertion, as the case may be. The report and
recommendation shall be heard by the court within fifteen (15) dyas form receipt, with notice to the members
of the Committee, the child, the mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absensce
thereof, the nearest relative, the child's councel, and the complainant and counsel.
The court shall thereafter determine whether the diversion program has been full and satisfactorily complied
with
Section 38. Closure Order. - On the basis of the report and recommendation of the Committee, the court may:
(a) Issue a closure order terminating the case if it is convinced that the child has complied satisfactorily with
the diversion program; or
(b) Extend the period of diversion if it is convinced that the child may still be rehabilitated; or
(c) Order the case to undergo formal court proceedings if it finds that the child has not complied with the
diversion program, is incorrigible, or that the program is not serving its purpose.
In case of the judicially-approved transfer of residence of the child in conflict with the law, the court to which
supervision of the diversion program was transferred shall make the proper finding. IF it finds that diversion
has been successful. It shall order the closure of the case. However, if it determines that diversion has failed
it shall return the case to the original court for formal criminal proceedings.
Section 39. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - In all criminal proceedings, the child in conflict with
the law shall have the following rights which shall be respected and protected by the court:
(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the charge and if appropriate, through
the child's mother, father, legal guardian, or appropriate custodian;
(c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgement. The
child may, however, waive presence at the rial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in the bail bond, unless
presence at the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the child
without justifiable cause at the trial of which there was due notice shall be considered a waiver of the right of
the child to be present. Escape by the child under custody shall be deemed a waiver of the right to be present
in all subsequent hearings until custody over such child is gained;
(d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of the child's defense;
in case of a child arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, to have immediate free legal assistance;
(e) If detained, to be released (I) on recognizance to the willing and responsible mother or father or
appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative; (ii) on bail; or (iii) by
commitment to a youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center, 1avvphi1
(f) Not to be detained in a jail or transferred to an adult facility pending trial or hearing of the case, unless
detention is used as a last resort which must be done for the shortest time possible, and only upon order by
the court;
(g) In the case the child has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier,
guide or spy:
(i) To be segregated and have separate detention quarters from adults except where families ate
accommodated as family un its;
(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of private counsel;
(iii) To immediate notice of such arrest to the parents, guardians or custodians or nearest relatives of the child;
and;
(iv) To be released on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court.
(h) To testify as a witness in his/her own behalf; and subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by
direct examination. The child shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself/herself and the child's
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him/her;
(i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him/her;
(j) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence
in the child's behalf
(k) To have speedy and imparial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferable in the presence
of the child's parents or legal guardian or custodian, unless such presence is considred not to be in the best
interest of the child taking into account the latter's age or other peculiar circumstances;
(l) To be accorded all the rights un der the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness;
(m) To have the child's privacy fully protected in all stages of the proceedings; and
(n) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
Section 40. Rights if Victims of Offences Committed by Children in Conflict with the Law. - In any case involving
a child in conflict with the law, the victim has the following rights:
(1) To be reasonably protected from the child in conflict with the law;
(2) To timely notice of any public proceedings, or any parole proceedings involving the crime or of any release
or escape of the child in conflict with the law;
(3) Not to be excluded from any public proceeding, unless the court, after receiving any clear and convincing
evidence, determines that the testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other
testimony in that proceeding.
(4) To be reasonably heard at any administrative or public proceeding involving diversion, release, plea,
suspension of sentence and determination of disposition measures, or any parole proceeding;
(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;
(6) To avail of legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. any other
legal aid office or any law practitioner.1avvphi1
(7) To be informed of the availability of compensation from the Department of Justice Board of Claims in
accordance with the provisions of Rep Act. No.7309.
(8) To be entitled to support services from the Department of Social Welfare and Development and local
government units;
(9) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code;
(10) To be informed of the rights and the services available to victims of offenses including the right to apply
for a protection order;
(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay; and
(13) To be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.
Section 41. Responsibilities of the Court. - For the protection of the rights of the child in the conflict with the
law, the court shall have the following responsibilities:
(1) To monitor the status of a child whose case is pending in its court placed in a youth detention center or
other institution during the pendency of the child's case;
(2) To receive and investigate complaints concerning violations of the rights of the child whose case is pending
on its court;
(3) To require all professionals working for the welfare of the child, such as barangay captains, teachers, social
workers, medical professionals, and law enforcers, to render regular monthly reports to the court.
(4) To order access to adequate services for rehabilitation, counseling and other forms of reintegration for
the child;
(5) To ensure that the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express those
views freely in all matters affecting the child, and that such views be accorded due weight in accordance with
the developmental age and maturity of the child;
(6) To ensure that the child, either directly or through a representative , is provided the opportunity to be
heard in all proceedings affecting such child;
(7) To ensure communication at all times between the judge and the child;
(8) To ensure that the child sits with close family members of the child's choice during the court proceedings;
(9) To ensure that the child can communicate freely with counsel at all times;
(10) To ensure that the child is informed in age-appropriate language of all stages of the judicial proceeding
affecting such child;
(11) To ensure that a child placed in a Youth Detention Home or Youth Rehabilitation Center or in any child
facility be given appropriate medical examination in order to determine and put on record any evidence of ill-
treatment; to identify any physical or mental condition requiring medical attention; and thereafter make sure
that child is provided by adequate treatment and medical attention;
(12) To insure that a child is informed as soon as possible of the death, serious illness or injury of any
immediate family member and be allowed to visit the ill family member or attend the funeral, when
appropriate and advisable;
(13) To ensure if a child dies during the pendency of the case or within six (6) months of release, an
independent inquiry is conducted on the circumstances of the death and a report thereof, including the child's
death certificate, be made available to the child's mother or father , guardian, custodian or nearest relative;
(14) When appropriate and advisable, to allow the child temporarily leave the detention home or
rehabilitation center by means of an "out-on-pass" order to attend special family occasions such as Christmas
and New Year celebrations. The "out-on-pass" order shall contain reasonable restrictions to ensure safety,
security and timely return to detention as may be determined by the court;
(15) To allow at all times, and from the moment of initial contact, any member of the family or the guardian
of the child to visit the child, unless prejudicial to the latter's best interest;
(16) To allow the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem if available and advisable, to enable the child to raise
concerns and complaints without fear or retribution; and
(17) To undertake all other appropriate measures to ensure the promotion of the best interest of the child
and the child's eventual reintegration in society.
Section 42. Determination of the Bests Interests of the Child. - The following factors may be considered in
determining the best interests of a child in conflict with the law: the child's age and sex, the child's mental and
physical health, the mental and physical health of the parents, their lifestyle and other social factors; the
emotional ties between the parents and the child, the ability of the parents to provide the child with food,
shelter, clothing and medical care; the established living pattern for the child concerning school, home,
community and religious institution, quality of schooling, the existence of other relatives who may be in a
better position to be with the child and the child's relationship with these relatives; the child's background,
maturity and level of understanding, sexual lifestyle and any other characteristics and needs of the child that
the court may deem relevant.
Section 43. Arraignment and Plea. - The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure shall apply to the arraignment of the child in the conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be
scheduled within three (3) days from the date of receipt of the complaint or information by the court, unless
a shorter period is provided for by law.
In case the child is not assisted by a private counsel, the court shall immediately appoint its Public Attorney as
the child's counsel de oficio.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing the child and counsel a copy
of the complaint or information, reading the same in a language or dialect known to and understand by the
child, explaining the nature and consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and asking the child's plea.
Section 44. Pre-trial. - The provisions of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall govern the
pre-trial of the child in conflict with the law. Agreements or admissions made during the pre-trial conference
shall be in writing and signed by the child, the mother, the father or duly appointed guardian, and counsel;
otherwise, the agreements or admissions shall not be admissible against the child.
Whenever possible and practicable, the court shall explore all possibilities of settlement of the case, except
its criminal aspects. Plea bargaining shall be resorted to only as a last measure when it shall serve the best
interest of the child and the demands of truth and restorative justice.
Section 45. Trial. - All hearings shall be conducted in am manner conductive to the best interest of the child
and in an environment that will allow the child to participate fully and freely in accordance with the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness.
Section 46. Guiding Principles in Judging the Child. - Subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a child in conflict with the law shall be guided by the
following principles:
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall consider the circumstances and
the best interest of the child, the rights of the victim, and the needs of society in line with the demands of
balanced and restorative justice.
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum. Where discretion is given
by the law to the judge whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine
should be proffered as the more appropriate penalty.
(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
(4) In case of the presence of any exculpatory evidence or doubt in the prosecution's evidence, the doubt shall
be resolved In favor of the child.
Section 47. Promulgation of Sentence. - If. After the trial, the court should find the child in conflict with the
law guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall impose the proper penalty, including any
civil liability which the child may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules if Criminal Procedure.
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - If the child is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgments of conviction, shall palce the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be availed
of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21) years old, at
the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child's availing of other benefits such as
probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in interest of justice.
The benefits of the suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 9344,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a maximum period of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one
(21) years of age, or to order service of sentence.
Section 49. Disposition Conference. -In case of suspended sentence, the court shall set the case for disposition
conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence with notice to the social worker of the
court, the child and the parents or guardian ad litem of the child and the child's counsel , the victim and
counsel. At the conference, the court shall proceed to determine and issue any or a combination of the
following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child:
(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;
(2) Community service orders;
(3) Drug and alcohol treatment
(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities; and
(5) Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or
other centers for children in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
Section 50. Compliance with the Disposition Measures. - The social worker assigned to the child shall monitor
the compliance by the child in conflict with the law with the disposition measures and shall submit regularly
to the court a status and progress report on the matter. The court may set a conference for the evaluation of
such report in the presence, if practicable, of the child, the parents or guardian, counsel and other persons
whose presence may be deemed necessary.
Section 51. Discharge of Child Subject of Disposition Measure. - Upon the recommendation of the social
worker assigned to the child, the court shall, after due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case
against the child who has been issued disposition measures, even before reaching eighteen(18) years of age,
and order a final discharge if it finds that the child has been rehabilitated and has shown the capability to be
a useful member of the community.
If the court finds that the child (a) is incorrigible; or (b) has not shown the capability of becoming a useful
member of society; or (c) has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of the disposition or rehabilitation
program; (d) or the child's continued stay in the training institution is not in the child's best interest, the child
shall be brought before the court for execution of the judgment.
The final release of the child shall not extinguish the civil liability. The parents and other persons exercising
parental authority over the child shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the child living in their company and under the parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
Section 52. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a child in conflict with the law and upon application at any time, place the child on probation if
qualified, in lieu of service of sentence taking into account the best interest of the child.
Section 53. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law who has undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of the sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full
time during which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment, if the child agrees voluntarily in writing
to abide by the same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the child is a recidivist or has been convicted twice or more times of any crime; or
(2) When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, the child failed to surrender voluntarily.
A child who does not agree to the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners shall be credited
in the service of the sentence with four-fifths of the time during which the child has undergone preventive
imprisonment.
Whenever the child has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which the child may be sentenced and the case is not yet
terminated, the child shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of any on-going
intervention program, and the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case
the maximum penalty to which the child may be sentenced is destierro, the child shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict with the law, including community service and
commitment to a rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive imprisonment.
Section 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. - All proceedings and records involving children in
conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case by the court shall be considered
privileged and confidential. The public may be excluded from the proceedings and pursuant to the provisions
of Section 31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceeding for any purpose whatsoever,
except to determine if the child may have the sentence suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if the child
may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal
action.
The court shall employ other measures to protect confidentiality of proceedings including non-disclosure of
records to the media, the maintenance of a separate police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with
the law and the adoption of a system of coding to conceal material information, which lead to the child's
identity. The records of children in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings or cases
involving the same offender as an adult.
Section 55. Non-liability for Perjury or Concealment or Misrepresentation. - Any person who has been in
conflict with the law as a child shall not be held guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by
reason of failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry.
Section 56. Sealing of Records. - The court, motu proprio or on application of a person who has been adjudge
a child in conflict with the law, or if still a minor, on motion of the parents or legal guardian, shall, upon notice
to the prosecution and after hearing, order the sealing of the records of the case if it finds that two (2) years
have elapsed since the final discharged of the child after suspension of sentence or probation, or from the
date of the closure order and the child has no pending case of an offense or a crime involving moral turpitude.
Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated as if it never occurred. All index references shall be deleted
and in case of inquiry, the court, prosecution, law enforcement officers and all other offices and agencies that
dealt with the case shall reply that no record exist with respect to the child concerned. Copies of the order
shall be sent to these officials and agencies named in the order. Inspection of the sealed records thereafter
may be permitted only by order of the court upon petition of the child who is the subject of the records or of
other proper parties.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule on destruction of video or audio tapes under Section 31
of the Rule on the Examination of Child Witness.
Section 57. Prohibition of Labeling. - In the conduct of proceedings from initial contact with the child in conflict
with the law to the final disposition of the case, there shall be no branding or labeling of the child as a young
criminal, juvenile delinquent, prostitute, vagrant, or attaching to the child in any manner any derogatory
description or name. Likewise, no discriminatory statements, conduct and practices shall be allowed,
particularly with respect to the child's social or economic status, physical or mental disability or ethnic origin.
Section 58. Contempt Powers. - A person who directly or indirectly disobeys any order of the court or obstruct
or interferes with its proceedings or the enforcement of its orders issued under this Rule shall be liable for
contempt of court.
Section 59. Effectivity. - This Rule as revised shall take effect on December 1, 2009 after its publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation not later than November 27, 2009.

See A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, April 15, 2002

Section 6
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.
Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659),
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for
commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to
grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2254 and House Bill No. 4826 was finally passed bu the
Senate and the House of Representative on July 7, 2006.
OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: June 24, 2006
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Section 9

G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015

CABIB ALONTO TANOG, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, 12th Judicial Region, MARAWI CITY, AND GAPO SIDIC, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog (Cabib) assailing the orders dated
February 11, 2009; February 13, 2009; and March 2, 2009, respectively, issued by respondent Hon. Rasad G.
Balindong (Judge Balindong), then Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Marawi
City, in Criminal Case No. 4471-04.

The Antecedents:

On July 5, 2004, Cabib Tanog, Jr. was shot to death by a group of armed persons inside the canteen of Dansalan
College Foundation, Inc. in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur.

On the same day, members of the Marawi City police apprehended Gapo Sidic (Sidic) at a police checkpoint
while he was on board a Tamaraw FX vehicle bound for Iligan City.

On July 8, 2004, the petitioner filed a complaint for murder before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Marawi
City against Sidic, Anwar Bonsalagan, Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong, and Arsad Balindong for the death of
his son, Cabib, Jr.

In its resolution dated August 3, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the five
(5) accused, and recommended the filing of an information2 for murder against them.

The prosecution filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City against the
accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 447i_04. This case was raffled to Branch 9, which was presided by
Judge Amer Ibrahim. Thereafter, Judge Ibrahim issued an "order of arrest" against the accused.

On January 8, 2005, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail before the RTC, claiming that the evidence of guilt against
him was not strong.3 After the prosecution presented four witnesses, the RTC, Branch 9: (a) considered the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution for the purposes of the motion to fix bail deemed terminated;
and (b) set the presentation of Sidic's counter evidence on May 21, 2008.

Due to the death of Judge Ibrahim, Judge Lacsaman Busran of the RTC, Branch 11, Marawi City, was designated
as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9. The records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 was re-raffled to Branch 10
because Judge Busran had been previously designated as its Acting Presiding Judge.

On February 4, 2009, Sidic filed an urgent ex-parte motion to direct special raffle before the RTC, Branch 10
since he had been in detention for more than four years, and Branch 10 was already overburdened with
numerous cases.

In its Order of February 4, 2009, Judge Busran granted Sidic's motion to direct a special raffle, and directed
his Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to the Office of the Clerk of
Court (OCC).
On the next day, the OCC transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to RTC, Branch 8, presided by
respondent Judge Balindong.

In its order dated February 11, 2009,4 the RTC, Branch 8 granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, and fixed the amount
at P30,000.00. It essentially held that evidence of guilt against Sidic was not strong since the witnesses
presented by the prosecution did not actually see the victim shot.

In its order5 of February 13, 2009, the RTC, Branch 8 directed the City Warden to release Sidic after the latter
had posted the P30,000.00 cash bond.

The prosecution filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty
of the accused and for inhibition6 before the RTC, Branch 8.

In his order7 dated March 2, 2009, Judge Balindong held that "[t]he motion to fix bail was resolved justly and
fairly in accordance with the law, rules and jurisprudence."8 He, however, opted to inhibit himself "from
further taking action on the other incidents"9 of the case out of "delicadeza." The dispositive portion of this
order provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the undersigned Acting Presiding Judge is inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case
of accused Gapo Sidic. The rest of the accused are at large, hence, the most that the next Judge/Acting Judge
can do is to archive the case insofar as they are concerned and issue alias Warrant of Arrest.

Let the record in its entirety be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for appropriate action considering
that it cannot be re-raffled to RTC Branch 9 as the latter sala is presided by Judge Lacsaman M. Busran of RTC
Branch 10 who earlier inhibited himself from trying this case.

SO ORDERED.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

The Petition for Certiorari

In the present petition, the petitioner alleged that Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the
strong evidence of guilt against him, and in fixing the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. He maintained that
Judge Balindong should have inhibited himself from taking part in Criminal Case No. 4471-04 since the latter
is related to the accused within the prohibited degree under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

OUR RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to DISMISS the petition.

The case is already moot

A case is said to be moot or academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a ruling would be of no practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction
over moot cases because there is no substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the petition.11

In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,12 we held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy—one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.cralawlawlibrary

The events which took place during the pendency of the present case have rendered the present petition for
certiorari moot. The record shows that during the pendency of this petition, the RTC, Branch 28, Catbalogan
City, presided by Judge Sibanah E. Usman,13 rendered a decision on January 20, 2015, in Criminal Case No.
4471-04 finding Sidic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The decision became final and executory on March 26, 2015.

We recall that the present petition questioned Judge Balindong's orders granting the motion to fix bail filed
by Sidic and setting the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. Sidic was charged with a capital offense, and his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of guilt against him of the offense charged was strong. Thus,
whatever judgment is reached in this case would no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, can no longer be enforced. Simply put, the petitioner's conviction of a capital offense, which had
already attained finality,14 warranted his incarceration. Any resolution on the propriety of Judge Balindong's
challenged orders relating to Sidic's provisional release would be of no useful or practical value.

The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.

We also point out that the present petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the CA, and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, the commonality does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom
of choice in the forum to be used.15 The appropriate forum is the court lowest in the judicial hierarchy.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases that
some of these cases may have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the
rules of procedure, or because these courts are better equipped to resolve the issues given that this Court is
not a trier of facts.16

In Dy v. Bibat-Palamos,17 the Court recognized various exceptions to the strict application of the principle of
hierarchy of courts, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when
dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional
and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the
case.cralawlawlibrary

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances (such as cases of national interest
and of serious implications) justify the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, calling for the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction.18 Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:
(a) Chavez v. Romulo on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America v.
Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Quijano-Padilla on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
v. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich v. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win
Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial
area.19

In the present case, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation on why he failed to comply with the principle
of judicial hierarchy; he gave no justification why he did not challenge the assailed RTC orders before the CA.
We thus reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts below, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to this Court through the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.20 We
reiterate that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and the party who seeks to avail of this
remedy must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law and the rules.

The grave abuse of discretion issue

Even if we decide the case on the merits, we still dismiss the present petition for its failure to establish that
the assailed orders of Judge Balindong were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

a. The grant of the motion to fix bail

The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the
law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any
court, as required under specified conditions. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If
the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Bail is denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong.21

Corollarily, Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that no
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

We point out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. If
the information charges a capital offense, the right to bail becomes a matter of discretion and the grant
thereof may be justified as a matter of right if the evidence of guilt is not strong. The determination of whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised
within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual
opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules that, while allowing
the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent rulings that are out of
control.22

In the present case, we find that Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious manner
when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The records showed that a hearing on the application for bail was
conducted and that the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely Noma Tanog, Cabib Tanog, Sr., Saripada
Tanog, and Saripoden Tanog Lucman. Judge Balindong evaluated the testimonies of these witnesses, and
found out that none of them witnessed the actual shooting of the victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running
towards the direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went to Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. to verify the
gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did not see Sidic shoot the victim; Cabib admitted that it was
Noma who pointed Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants; and Saripoden merely described the attire of
one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did not mention the name of Sidic. On the basis of these
testimonies, Judge Balindong concluded that the prosecution failed to show that the evidence against Sidic
was strong.

We additionally examined the affidavits of Cabib and Noma,23 and found that these documents supported the
findings of Judge Balindong.

In his affidavit, Cabib stated that he was informed of the death of his son by Adil Dima;24 and that it was Noma
who told him the identities of five of the assailants. For his part, Noma stated in his.affidavit that he saw Sidic
as one of the persons who ran towards a maroon Tamaraw FX (bearing plate number ATF 754) and a blue
Toyota Corona (without any plate number) after the shooting. He (Noma) mentioned, however, that the
Tamaraw FX the police flagged down was colored red.25cralawred

In the light of the testimonies and affidavits of the witnesses, we cannot fault Judge Balindong if he had ruled
that the evidence of guilt against the accused was not strong.

That the RTC eventually convicted Sidic is of no moment, since the trial judge, in determining the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail, did not sit to try the merits of the case.

b. Amount of bail

Contrary to the petitioner's claim, we also hold that Judge Balindong did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when he set the amount of Sidic's bailatP30,000.00.

Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges
shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and
circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused;
(e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused
appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

It is settled that the amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. In implementing this mandate, regard
should be taken of the prisoner's pecuniary circumstances. We point out that what is reasonable bail to a man
of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Thus, the right to bail should not
be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is relatively excessive. The amount should be high enough to
assure the presence of the defendant when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.26

Judge Balindong explained how he arrived at the amount in this manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Considering the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among them: the health of the accused
who has languished in jail since his apprehension on July 5, 2004 and up to the present or for more than four
(4) years; his character and reputation as he is a former Councillor of Pualas, Lanao del Sur, in fact, he was
incumbent councillor at the time of his detention; the weight of evidence against him, a weak one; and his
financial ability and considering further the constitutional and statutory provision that "excessive bail shall not
be required," the bail is fixed at P30,000.00.27cralawlawlibrary

Assuming that the bail set by Judge Balindong is low considering that the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommends "no bail" for murder, we cannot use this fact alone to hold that his
order -with respect to the amount of bail set - had been issued with grave abuse of discretion. We point out
that the DOJ Bail Bond Guide - while persuasive and merits attention - is not binding on the courts. In fixing
the amount of bail, the judge is given the discretion to set an amount which he or she perceives as appropriate
under given circumstances in relation to the factors enumerated under Section 9 of Rule 114. As quoted
above, Judge Balindong enumerated the reasons (i.e., accused's incarceration for more than 4 years; his
reputation as a former councillor; his financial ability; and the weak evidence against him) why he set the
amount of bail at P30,000.00.

c. Non-inhibition of Judge Balindong

The rule on disqualification of judges is laid down in Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

xxx

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above, (emphasis ours)
cralawlawlibrary

The reason behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges was explained in Villaluz v. Judge Mijares28
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent
judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary
principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a
judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.cralawlawlibrary

In the present case, we hold that the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Judge Balindong is
related to Sidic within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to warrant his (Judge Balindong's)
mandatory inhibition from the case.

In his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and
for inhibition, the petitioner prayed, among others, that Judge Balindong inhibit himself from trying and
deciding the case on the merit[s]. He alleged that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx the accused is allegedly a relative of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge of this Court especially the other
accused, namely: Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong alias Hilal and Arsad Balindong. Besides, accused Gapo
Sidic is a resident and native of Barangay Yaran which is an adjacent or adjoining barangay of Barangay Dapao
which is allegedly the native place of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge. Moreover, Barangays Yaran and
Dapao are parts of the Sultanate territory of Picong wherein the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge of this
Honorable Court was crowned as Sultan [of] Picong.29 (emphasis ours)cralawlawlibrary

The petitioner described the relationship between Judge Balindong and the accused with more specifity in
the present petition for certiorari by alleging that: Judge Balindong is the "uncle-in-law" of Sidic; Judge
Balindong is the first cousin of accused Papas; and accused Nago and Arsad are Judge Balindong's "nephews
by first degree cousins."

To support these claims, the petitioner attached to the present petition an affidavit executed by Manorbi Sidic
essentially stating that: (1) Sidic's mother-in-law is the sister of Judge Balindong; (2) Judge Balindong and Papas
are first-degree cousins; and (3) Nago and Arsad are the "nephews by first-degree cousins" of Judge Balindong.

To our mind, these bare claims, supported by a mere affidavit of Manorbi that had not been presented before
the RTC, Branch 8, are grossly insufficient to determine whether Judge Balindong falls within the compulsory
inhibition under Rule 137. We point out that the petitioner's use of the term 'allegedly' in his omnibus motion
for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition revealed
that he himself was unsure and uncertain if Judge Balindong was indeed related to Sidic and the other accused.
Corollarily, the presentation of Manorbi's affidavit - attached for the first time in this petition for certiorari -
without any other evidence to substantiate the matters stated therein, is inadequate and lacking to determine
the degree of Judge Balindong's relationship to the accused. We note in this regard that a mere relation by
affinity or consanguinity is not enough cause for the compulsory inhibition of a judge; it should be shown that
the he or she is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree.

We are not unaware that after Judge Balindong had granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, he opted to inhibit
himself "from further taking action on the other incidents"30 of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 out of "delicadeza."
The records do not indicate what Judge Balindong meant to convey when he used the term "delicadeza" to
justify his inhibition; we cannot imply something that is not supported by the records of the case.

It would have been ideal if the petitioner had filed an administrative case against Judge Balindong if he truly
believed that the latter committed a violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the Rules. This would have
enabled Judge Balindong to properly answer the charges against him, particularly his decision not to initially
inhibit from Criminal Case No. 4471-04. It would have also given us ample and sufficient basis to rule on the
validity of the petitioner's claim that Judge Balindong was related to the accused within the prohibitive degree
under Rule 137.

We reiterate that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. In this case, the petitioner failed to establish that Judge Balindong gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the challenged orders.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto
Tanog.

SO ORDERED.
Section 11
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC
IN THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 4, DOLORES,
Present:
 EASTERN SAMAR

DECISION

PER CURIAM: This administrative case arose from a memorandum1 an audit team of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) submitted. The audit team reported on the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar (trial court) on 7 October 2004.

Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez (Judge Alvarez), who was due for compulsory retirement on 9 September 2005,
used to preside over the trial court. In view of his compulsory retirement, the audit team conducted a judicial
audit of cases. The audit team found that the trial court had a total caseload of 200 cases consisting of 132
criminal cases and 68 civil cases.2

The audit team found that Judge Alvarez inhibited himself from hearing Civil Case Nos. 3 (206), 53, and
139, and A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2. Civil Case Nos. 3 (206), 53, and 139 were assigned to Judge Arnulfo O.
Bugtas (Judge Bugtas), RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, while Administrative Matter Nos. 03-1 and
03-2 were assigned to Judge Juliana Adalim-White (Judge Adalim-White), RTC, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar.3

The audit team found that:

1. Judge Alvarez failed to act on 27 cases for a considerable length of time.

2. Judge Bugtas:

a. failed to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the reglementary 90-
day period;

b. failed to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for more

than four years; and

c. failed to resolve a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No.

139.
 3. Judge Adalim-White failed to act on A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 for a considerable length of
time.4

The audit team also found that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and
358, both of which were pending before Judge Alvarez.5 In Criminal Case No. 393, the supposed surety,
Esperanza G. Aseo (Aseo), filed with Judge Alvarez an affidavit of disclaimer6 dated 28 January 2004 stating
that (1) she did not know the accused, neither was she related to him; (2) the use of her property as bail bond
was unauthorized; (3) the signature on the property bond was forged; (4) she did not sign as a surety; (5) her
real signature was different from the signature on the property bond; (6) she did not sign her name as
Esperanza Galo, but as Esperanza G. Aseo; (7) Galo was her maiden name while Aseo was her family name;
and (8) the truthfulness of the property bond was questionable because copies of the tax declaration and
original certificate of title over the property were not attached to the bond.

In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond on 9 December 1999 and, on the same
day, then officer-in-charge Ernesto C. Quitorio (Quitorio), now legal researcher, RTC, Branch 2, Borongan,
Eastern Samar signed the order of release. Judge Bugtas and Quitorio did not forward the bail, order of
release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29
January 2002.7

Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to:

1. Direct Judge Alvarez to explain his failure to act on the 27 cases for a considerable length of
time, act on these cases, and submit to the Court a copy of his decisions, resolutions, orders,
and other documents.

2. Direct Judge Bugtas to:

 a. explain his failure to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the 90-day
reglementary period, decide the case, and submit to the Court a copy of his decision;

b. explain his failure to resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case

No. 53 for more than four years, resolve the incidents, and submit to the Court a copy of his
orders;

c. explain his acceptance of the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393
and 358;

d. explain his order to release the accused in Criminal Case No. 393 on
the strength of a spurious property bond; and

e. resolve the motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 139 and
submit to the Court a copy of his order.

3. Direct Judge Bugtas and Quitorio to explain their failure to forward the bail, order of release,
and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358.

4. Direct Judge Adalim-White to:

a. explain her failure to act on A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 for a
considerable length of time, act on these cases, and submit to the Court a copy of her
orders.8

The OCA sent a memorandum9 dated 18 March 2005 to Judge Alvarez, Judge Bugtas, Quitorio, and
Judge Adalim-White detailing the audit teams recommendations.
 In his letter10 dated 6 April 2005, Judge Alvarez explained the status of the 27 cases. Thereafter, he
submitted a copy of all his decisions, resolutions, orders, and other documents.11

In his letter12 dated 25 April 2005, Judge Bugtas explained that he (1) failed to decide Civil Case No. 3
(206) within the 90-day reglementary period because the transcript of stenographic notes of the case was
incomplete; (2) failed to resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for more than four years because
he misplaced the records of the case; (3) accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 because
Judge Alvarez was unavailable; (4) ordered the release of the accused in Criminal Case No. 393 because the
property bond and other bail documents were regular on their face and the suretys signature was genuine;
(5) was in the process of resolving the motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 139; and (6) failed to
forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358 because the accused
failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title.

On 11 May 2005, the OCA received a copy of Judge Bugtas resolution in Civil Case No. 139. On 2 August 2005,
it received a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 3 (206).13

In his letter14 dated 25 April 2005, Quitorio stated that he failed to forward the bail, order of release,
and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358 because the accused failed to cause the annotation of
the lien on the propertys certificate of title.
 In a letter,15 Judge Adalim-White stated that she had already resolved A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 by her
orders dated 24 November 2004 and 31 January 2005, respectively. She submitted a copy of these orders.16

In its 1st indorsement17 dated 16 May 2005, the OCA referred Judge Bugtas explanation regarding his
acceptance of the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 to Judge Alvarez for comment. On Criminal
Case No. 393, Judge Alvarez stated that he issued several orders for the arrest of the accused and forfeiture
of the property bond after the supposed surety, one Esperanza Galo, failed to produce the accused before
the trial court. Thereafter, Aseo filed with Judge Alvarez the affidavit of disclaimer dated 28 January 2004.18

Judge Alvarez directed Aseo to furnish the trial court a copy of her voters affidavit. He then compared
Aseos signatures on her voters affidavit and affidavit of disclaimer with the signature on the property bond.
After a very careful study, Judge Alvarez concluded that the signature on the property bond was forged the
signatures on the voters affidavit and the affidavit of disclaimer were different from the signature on the
property bond.19 On 12 May 2004, Judge Alvarez cancelled the property bond and ordered the issuance of
an alias warrant of arrest.20

On Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Alvarez stated that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond and Quitorio
signed the order of release on 9 December 1999.21 However, Judge Bugtas and Quitorio failed to forward the
bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was
issued on 29 January 2002. Judge Alvarez directed Quitorio to appear before him and answer questions
regarding the bail. Instead of appearing before Judge Alvarez, Quitorio sent a written explanation stating that
he did not forward the bail documents because the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the
propertys certificate of title.22

In its memorandum23 dated 6 May 2006, the OCA:

1. Found that Judge Alvarez had fully complied with its directives when he acted on the 27 cases
within the given period and submitted a copy of all his decisions, resolutions, orders, and other
documents;

2. Found that Judge Bugtas:

a. failed to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the 90-day

reglementary period;

b. failed to resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for

more than four years;

c. acted without authority when he accepted the bail bonds in Criminal

Case Nos. 393 and 358;

d. violated the Rules of Court when he failed to forward the bail, order
of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358; and

e. went beyond the call of his duties when he approved the spurious
property bond in Criminal Case No. 393.

3. Found that Quitorio erred when he:

a. presented to Judge Bugtas for acceptance the bail bonds in Criminal

Case Nos. 393 and 358; and
 b. signed the order of release in Criminal Case No. 358.

4. Found that Judge Adalim-White had substantially complied with its directives when she acted
on the two adminisrative cases and submitted a copy of her orders.

5. Recommended that:

a. the audit teams memorandum dated 18 March 2005 be treated as

an administrative complaint against Judge Bugtas and Quitorio;

b. Judge Bugtas be dismissed from the service for gross inefficiency

and gross ignorance of the law; and

c. Quitorio be suspended for one month and one day for simple
misconduct.

In a Resolution dated 3 July 2006, the Court approved Judge Bugtas application for optional retirement
effective 31 January 2006, but held in abeyance the release of his retirement benefits. In a Resolution24 dated
2 August 2006, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
decision based on the pleadings already filed.

In his manifestation dated 11 August 2006, Judge Bugtas stated that (1) the Court had no jurisdiction
over the instant case because of the approval of his optional retirement effective 31 January 2006, and (2)
the Courts attitude towards judges is the reason why there are many unfilled positions in the judiciary. He
told the Court to dismiss the instant case outright for lack of jurisdiction and order the immediate release of
his retirement benefits.

In a Resolution dated 11 December 2006, the Court (1) considered Judge Bugtas to have waived his
compliance with the Resolution dated 2 August 2006 and (2) dispensed with Judge Alvarezs compliance with
the Resolution dated 2 August 2006. In a Resolution dated 26 February 2007, the Court considered Quitorio
and Judge Adalim-White to have waived their compliance with the Resolution dated 2 August 2006.

The Court agrees with the OCAs recommendations, with some modifications.
 Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution25 states that judges must decide all cases within three
months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City,26 the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case
is submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-
compliance therewith. (Emphasis ours)

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice without
delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana,27 the Court held that:

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required
period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend
promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law
and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide
cases within 90 days from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the
integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of
justice more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty
so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of
congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. (Emphasis ours)
 In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco,28 the Court held that the 90-day reglementary
period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for
administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.29

Civil Case No. 3 (206) was submitted for decision on 10 December 2003; therefore, the decision was
due on 10 March 2004. Judge Bugtas decided the case only on 22 July 2005, and only after the OCA required
him to do so. If it were not for the judicial audit, Judge Bugtas would have left the case undecided indefinitely.

Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because the transcript of stenographic notes was
incomplete. This is unacceptable. The incompleteness of the transcript of stenographic notes is not a valid
excuse for delay in rendering judgment. Judges are required to personally take down notes of the salient
portions of the hearings and to proceed in preparing the decisions without waiting for the transcript of
stenographic notes. In Re: Report on Judicial Audit in RTC Br. 26, Manila,30 the Court held that judges are
required to take down notes and to proceed in the preparation of decisions, even without the transcript of
stenographic notes as the reglementary period continues to run with or without them. In OCA v. Judge
Salva,31 the Court held that:

[T]he 90-day reglementary period for deciding or resolving cases submitted for such purposes
is reckoned from the date when the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules
of Court or by the court itself is submitted, and not from the time when the transcript of
stenographic notes of a case is completed by the stenographer.32 (Emphasis ours)

Judges are allowed, for valid reasons, to ask for an extension of the 90-day reglementary period.33
Judge Bugtas did not ask for any extension. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branches 3, 5, 7, 60 and 61, Baguio City,34 the Court held that failure to decide even one case within
the 90-day reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency.

Aside from the long delay in deciding Civil Case No. 3 (206), Judge Bugtas also failed to resolve pending
incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for more than four years. Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
judges must resolve all matters within three months from the date of submission unless the law requires a
shorter period. Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts business promptly. In
Sianghio, Jr. v. Judge Reyes,35 the Court held that unreasonable delays in resolving pending motions violate
the norms of judicial conduct and in Custodio v. Quitain,36 the Court held that unreasonable delays in
resolving motions or other incidents are administratively sanctionable.

In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not act on the pending incidents for more than four years. Inaction
for more than four years is clearly unreasonable. Worse, if the audit team had not conducted the judicial
audit, Judge Bugtas would have left the pending incidents unresolved indefinitely.

Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because he misplaced the records of the case. This
is unacceptable. Judge Bugtas explanation cannot exonerate him or mitigate his inefficiency.37 Losing the
records of the case constitutes gross negligence.38

Judge Bugtas was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court
services.39 Rule 3.08, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct40 states that judges should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities and
maintain professional competence in court management. Rule 3.09 states that judges should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times
the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Judge Bugtas opted to ignore these rules. The
audit team had to ask for the assistance of one Atty. Crisolito A. Tavera in looking for the records of Civil Case
No. 53, which were later found in a heap of papers. In Sianghio, Jr.,41 the Court held that:

If only respondent judge performed his mandated duty of devising an efficient recording and
filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy
and timely disposition, the records of the case would not have been misplaced.

Canon 3, Rule 3.09 requires judges to manage their dockets in such a manner that the
work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. However, we would like to
emphasize that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the
presiding judge. (Emphasis ours)

This is not the first time Judge Bugtas has been found grossly inefficient. In Montes v. Bugtas,42 the
Court found him grossly inefficient for failing to decide a case within the 90-day reglementary period. In
Montes, Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because he left the decision in his chamber and
forgot about it.43 The Court sanctioned him and warned him that a repetition of the same act will be dealt
with more severely.44
 Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court45 classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a
less serious charge. It is punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one month nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.46

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where
the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (Emphasis ours)

In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,47 the Court held that:

There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the
court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the
application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.

In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not present any proof to show that (1) Judge Alvarez was
unavailable, or (2) the accused were arrested in Borongan. According to the OCA:

The criminal cases were pending before RTC, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar and
there was no showing that Judge Alvarez was absent or unavailable when Judge Bugtas
approved the bail bonds in Criminal Cases [sic] Nos. 393 and 358 on December 20, 1996 and
December 9, 1999, respectively. There is also no proof that the accused were arrested in
Borongan to clothe Judge Bugtas with authority to grant bail.48 (Emphasis ours)
 Since (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, (2) there was no showing
that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not arrested in Borongan, Judge Bugtas had no
authority to accept the bail bonds in these cases. In Espanol v. Mupas,49 the Court held that judges who
approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance
of the law. In Lim v. Dumlao,50 the Court held that:

The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may
grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before
he can approve [the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is
rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)

In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail but also failed to forward
the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez as required in the Rules of Court.
ection 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by
the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.

When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting
papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different
one to be filed. (Emphasis ours)

In Naui v. Mauricio, Sr.,51 the Court held that judges should forward the records pertaining to the bail
bond immediately after receiving them. In the instant case, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond in Criminal
Case No. 358 on 9 December 1999. He forwarded the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers only
after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002. If the subpoena duces tecum were not issued,
Judge Bugtas would have continued to ignore the provisions of Section 19 indefinitely.

Judge Bugtas explained that he did not forward the records pertaining to the bail because the accused
failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title. This is unacceptable. Section 19
is very clear: When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the
bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the
case is pending.

Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court52 states that failure of the accused to cause the annotation
of the lien on the propertys certificate of title within 10 days after the approval of the property bond shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation of the bond and re-arrest and detention of the accused. Judge Alvarez
could have cancelled the property bond and issued the warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas
followed Section 19. Moreover, since Judge Bugtas opted to accept and retain possession of the bail bond,
albeit erroneously, the least he could have done was to cancel the property bond and issue a warrant of arrest
when the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien within 10 days, yet he did not do so.

Not every judicial error constitutes ignorance of the law. When the error is committed in good faith,
it does not warrant administrative sanction. However, the error must be within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. When the law is clear and leaves little room for error, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.53 In the instant case, the law is very clear and Judge Bugtas is grossly ignorant.

This is not the first time Judge Bugtas has been found grossly ignorant of the law. He has had two cases
finding him grossly ignorant of the law, both dealing with the release of persons charged with penal offenses.
In Adalim-White v. Bugtas,54 the Court found him grossly ignorant of the law for ordering the release of the
accused on recognizance pending approval of the accuseds application for parole and before serving the
minimum period of his sentence. And in Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,55 the Court found him grossly
ignorant of the law for granting bail to the accused charged with murder without conducting a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong. In both cases, the Court sanctioned him and warned him
that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court56 classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a
serious charge. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.57 Considering that this is Judge Bugtas fourth offense, the Court agrees with the OCAs
recommendation to impose the penalty of dismissal.

Although Judge Bugtas can no longer be dismissed because of his early retirement, his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, shall be forfeited, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

In Criminal Case No. 393, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail bond but also approved
a spurious property bond. In Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property
Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Branches 63, 64 and 65,58 the Court held that judges are bound to review the bond
documents before approving the bond. In that case, the Court agreed with the observations of the OCA that:

Although the duty to ensure compliance with the requisites of bail bond application
rests mainly with the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel and the task of the Judge
is only to approve the same, said task has an accompanying responsibility on the part of the
approving Judge to review or determine its validity. Understandably, he should be employing
the minimum standard the rules require the clerks of court to observe. Considering the
seriousness of the purpose in the posting of bail bond, approval thereof should pass through
strict scrutiny and with utmost caution on the part of both the Clerk of Court (or his duly
authorized personnel) and the approving Judge. (Emphasis ours)
 In Padilla v. Judge Silerio,59 the Court sanctioned a judge for his negligence in approving a spurious
bond and held that judges are enjoined to carefully pore over all documents before they sign the same and
give their official imprimatur. It agreed with the observations of the OCA that:

[R]espondent Judge should be made liable for carelessness and failure to exercise the
necessary diligence when he signed the Order approving the spurious x x x bond of [the]
accused x x x.

Signing of Orders must not be taken lightly nor should it be considered as one of the
usual paperwork that simply passes through the hands of a judge for signature. Respondent
Judge should be made to account for his negligence and lack of prudence which resulted in the
anomaly now in question. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Judge Bugtas approved the property bond in Criminal Case No. 393 without the
knowledge and consent of the registered owner of the property. In her affidavit of disclaimer, Aseo stated:

I was shocked to receive an ORDER issued by Hon. Presiding Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez, ordering
the alleged bond forfeited in favor of the government and directing the sheriff to cause the
confiscation of the bond[.]

x x x [T]he use of my said property as a surety [sic] is of dubious character since what is now
attached to the BAIL BOND is only a CERTIFICATION from the Office of the Treasurer, Dolores,
Eastern Samar, signed by Dario C. Quitorio, the Real Property Tax Clerk, certifying to the effect
that Esperanza Galo is the owner of TD No. 400100, and another CERTIFICATION signed by
Adolfo V. Codiamat, Asst. Municipal Treasurer, to the effect that the said Tax Declaration No.
400100 has no record of liens and encumbrances of claims to the said property, and no copy
of the said Tax Declaration was attached nor a copy of the original certificate of Title, being a
titled property[.]60

In his letter dated 25 April 2005, Judge Bugtas stated that he found no significant disparity between
the signature on the property bond and Aseos signature on her voters affidavit. He stated that Judge Alvarezs
conclusion that the signature on the property bond was forged had no legal basis because it was not supported
by findings of a handwriting expert. These are unacceptable.
 The Court agrees with Judge Alvarezs conclusion that the signature on the property bond was forged.
The dissimilarity between the signature on the property bond and the signatures on Aseos voters affidavit and
affidavit of disclaimer is glaring. The signature on the property bond reads Esperanza Galo, while the
signatures on the voters affidavit and affidavit of disclaimer read Esperanza G. Aseo. Moreover, the
handwriting on the property bond is markedly different from those on the voters affidavit and affidavit of
disclaimer.

In De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,61 the Court held that resort to handwriting experts is dispensable in
cases involving comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not entirely depend on the testimony of
a handwriting expert because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in arriving at a conclusion on its authenticity. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory
especially when, as in this case, the dissimilarity is so obvious.

The Court agrees with the OCA that, Judge Bugtas should be held liable for approving the spurious
property bond x x x in Criminal Case No. 393.62 Simple misconduct is any unlawful, wrongful, or improper
conduct.63 It constitutes a less serious charge, punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.64

Judge Bugtas contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant case because of the
approval of his optional retirement effective 31 January 2006. This is unacceptable. In Concerned Trial Lawyers
of Manila v. Veneracion,65 the Court held that cessation from office because of retirement does not render
the administrative case moot or warrant its dismissal:

Cessation from the office of respondent judge because of death or retirement does not
warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the
 service or render the said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was
this Courts at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere
fact that the respondent public official had ceased [to hold] office during the pendency of his
case. Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
(Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, the audit team conducted the judicial audit on 7 October 2004 and submitted to
the OCA a memorandum dated 18 March 2005. Upon the recommendation of the OCA, the memorandum
dated 18 March 2005 was treated as an administrative complaint against Judge Bugtas and Quitorio. The OCA
sent a memorandum dated 18 March 2005 to Judge Bugtas detailing the audit teams recommendations. On
28 April 2005, the OCA received Judge Bugtas letter dated 25 April 2005 containing his explanations. These
show that, when Judge Bugtas retired on 31 January 2006, the instant administrative case was already
pending.

In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda,66 the Court held that it is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative
case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of
respondents case. The retirement of Judge Bugtas did not preclude the finding of any administrative liability,
to which he shall still be answerable.67

Aside from the instant case and the three previous cases decided against him, Judge Bugtas has
another administrative case68 pending against him. Undoubtedly, he has demonstrated his incorrigibility and
unfitness to be a judge. In Adalim-White,69 the Court agreed with the observations of the investigating justice
on Judge Bugtas. These observations continue to hold true today, and with more reason. According to the
investigating justice:

The undersigned Investigating Justice does not accept Judge Bugtas good faith because
Judge Bugtas was apparently lacking in sincerity. He was not unaware that [the accused] was
serving final sentence for which his indeterminate penalty had a minimum of 4 years and 2
months. When Judge Bugtas ordered the release, [the accused] had not yet served even the
 minimum of the indeterminate sentence, a fact that Judge Bugtas should have known through
a simple process of computation. x x x He was fully aware that [the accused] could not be
released even upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden.

xxxx

Judge Bugtas could give no acceptable explanation for his acts.

xxxx

The undersigned Investigating Justice opines that Judge Bugtas contention compounds
his already dire situation. x x x Such ignorance, whether pretended or not, is terrifying to see
in a judicial officer like Judge Bugtas, a presiding judge of the Regional trial Court. (Emphasis
ours)

Clerks of court have no authority to order the release of persons charged with penal offenses. In
Gonzalo v. Mejia,70 the Court held that:

There is usurpation of judicial function when a person who is not a judge attempts to
perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only upon a judge. In Escanan vs.
Monterola II, we ruled that the clerk of court, unlike a judge, has no power to order either the
commitment or the release of persons charged with penal offenses. Thus, respondent, in
ordering the release of the four prisoners, has duly usurped the judicial prerogative of a judge.
Such usurpation is equivalent to grave misconduct. (Emphasis ours)

In Judge Vallarta v. Vda. De Batoon,71 the Court held that:

[T]he approval of the bail of an accused person and the authority to order the release of a
detained person is purely a judicial function. The clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has
no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of person [sic] charged with
penal offenses. (Emphasis ours)
 In Biag v. Gubatanga,72 the Court held that:

Clearly, the Clerk of Court is not empowered to issue the questioned order in the name
of the judge. It was gross misrepresentation on the part of respondent to issue the Release
Order x x x, thus causing the release of the accused x x x without a proper court order. By taking
a direct hand in the release of the accused, who is now at large, respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct, as she has arrogated unto herself the disposition of a judicial matter pending
adjudication before the court. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Quitorio personally signed the order of release in Criminal Case No. 358. The OCA
found that:

He x x x signed the Order of Release in Criminal Case No. 358 on the same day that Judge Bugtas
approved the property bond of the accused. By releasing the accused on account of the
property bond he had posted, Quitorio arrogated unto himself the authority to exercise judicial
discretion.

The issuance of a release order is a judicial function, not an administrative one. A Clerk
of Court has no power to order the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses
(Hon. Jose S. Arcilla vs. Alfredo Sabido, 88 SCRA 53 [1979]).73

Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial
judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial
Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were both pending before Judge Alvarez, (2)
there was no showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not arrested in Borongan.
Thus, Quitorio should not have presented the bail bonds in these cases to Judge Bugtas for approval. In Judicial
Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Branches 63,
64 and 65,74 the Court agreed with the observation of the OCA that the duty to ensure compliance with the
requisites of bail bond application rests mainly on the clerk of court. Considering the seriousness of the
purpose in posting a bail bond, its approval should pass through strict scrutiny.

Quitorio fully knew that Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, yet he
opted to present the bail bonds in these cases to Judge Bugtas for approval.

Section 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge
with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.

When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted
the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the
court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be
filed. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Quitorio failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers
to Judge Alvarez for more than two years. He only did so after a subpoena duces tecum was issued. Quitorios
failure to observe the clear and simple mandate of Section 19 is sanctionable. In Santiago v. Judge
Jovellanos,75 the Court sanctioned a clerk of court for failing to forward the bail documents.

Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of
conduct for public officers.76 It is an unlawful behavior.77 Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a
public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally means wrongful, improper,
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.78
Section 52(B)(2)79 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service80 classifies simple
misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the
first offense.

Section 15

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

x--------------x

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC March 31, 2006

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

x--------------x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 March 31, 2006

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)

LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran
1

THE CASES

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.

Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving
the way to Atty. Floro’s appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4
November 1998.

Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to
erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that
Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.

In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the
complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by
the audit team:

(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation
of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules
of Procedures;

(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial
Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;

(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;

(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused;

(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case,
by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor;

(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
up";

(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;

(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;

(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;

(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez
(consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was
directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was
barely eight months into his position.

On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.

On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute.7
However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice
Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against
Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge
Floro’s motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the
question of Justice Ramirez’s inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled
against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13

On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floro’s motion
to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.

Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a
"Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17

In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez
came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing
cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.

A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:

1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader,
Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18

2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Malabon City 19

3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino,
Jr.20

4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court
Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21

5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22

6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23

7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24

On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed.25 On 14
February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26

The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide)
in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to
sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother
of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31
July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On
5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October
2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27

The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in
Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng
Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.

This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioner’s
counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:

In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null
and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so
that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges
through an impartial raffle.

When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and
taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:

"8. Raffle of Cases:

xxxx

8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party
who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that
unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.

x x x x"

Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only
allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the
Executive Judge’s finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.

Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks
highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family,
social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial
Conduct).

The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial
matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29

The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."

In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge
Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a
resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.

For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the
second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed
Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to
submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the
evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two.
On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to
submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February
2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the
evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.

In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to
render as well a consolidated decision.

But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floro’s alleged mental illness
and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is
indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is
frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine once and
for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge
Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or
mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.

As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly
discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to
treat them separately will be superfluous.

DISCUSSION

As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against
Judge Floro

(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for
announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct

As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and
with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise
reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a
graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask
Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33

Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards
containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title"
should be broad enough to include a Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law
School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like
President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues
that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to
other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other professional
employment.

As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was
his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she
would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice.
Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.

Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession,
cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading
authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any
undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35

The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?

In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers
is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floro’s
calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty
required of judges.

Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or
only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise.
An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge
Floro’s very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these
cards. 39

As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule
140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious
charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a
serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a
case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.

"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. 41

With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from
the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all
too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the
proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they
must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.

As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a
sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice – confident, competent and true.
And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the
litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of
simple misconduct only.

(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters

The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the
right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon
seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42

Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on
his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in
between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping
during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.

This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another
person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the
room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of
government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was
found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his
family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.

Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes
fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and
attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement
of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.

(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedure

(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused

The memorandum report reads:

c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr.
still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:

(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246
and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino",
and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded
questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by
the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the
accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are
qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be
consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the
custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong
tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by
Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order.
Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session.
Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN
are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion
without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44

In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the
cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that –

Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory
orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.

xxxx

Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with
the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance,
thus:

a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE
ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.

b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by

respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the
City/Public Prosecutor.

c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC,
MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14
years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible member
of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of
direct and even cross examination questions.

d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such
requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation
(optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had
previous cases, etc.

e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on
recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing
on the applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in the chambers.45

The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an
accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the
application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty."

Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for
an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is
warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for
probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :

It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the
provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant
for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and
report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application
for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case study
and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment
of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in
writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals
50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and

unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for
filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge
when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,"
"People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence
on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.

In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the
release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of
the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual
probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the
cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not
deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been
approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for
said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance
what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and
the private complainants of their right to due process." 52

Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. 53

Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.
54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is

constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing
short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule,
however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59

(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct

The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always
"pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.

Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the
need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose
cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to
Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases
had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge
Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused.

Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro,
during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those
under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses. 60

Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by
independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floro’s unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.

Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the
law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused,
opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge
should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.
Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be

realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity
for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice. As we
held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :

In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-
times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts,
of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well
as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience
and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally
important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.

(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.

(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.

The memorandum report states:

During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador",
Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not
being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private
complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by
making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex "8").

xxxx

In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put
on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle
the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until
after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the
aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the
said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in
the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further
reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of
Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the
revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes
"8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).

In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint
67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughter’s case

against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the
amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested
respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the
case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them
believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise be
dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not
reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.

Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining
that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the
litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of
reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due
course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is
tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the
hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.

Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts
have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu
proprio.

The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared:

x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down
in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and
unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order
or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing
with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court
rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of
any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained
finality. (Emphasis supplied)

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court – ostensibly a judicial approval
of a compromise agreement – which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the
written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties
to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69

Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus
ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).

Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the
same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for
complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached
during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the instance
of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"

The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro
"motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70

In refutation, Judge Floro argues --

In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and
noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of
the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:

a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;

b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling
and stammering;

c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has
difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;

d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea,
from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;

e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of
Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform
to justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";

f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL
EXAMINATION.

The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a
physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues
involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71

PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the
suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness
for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."

Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February
1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:

SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused
unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro
to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact,
jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even
with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition
of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are
recovered. x x x.

xxxx

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives. x x x.

Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial is
already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the
case, is not an actionable wrong.

(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits
a judge from engaging in the private practice of law

(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing

In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:

i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in
Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the
cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence.

Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that
in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even
indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.

Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus –
Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the
same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr.
even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid
pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".

Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76

Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides
that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
cases. 77

A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having
appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared
a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission")
jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in
the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that the
pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended
Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed
the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80

The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:

[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges
give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81

Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than
an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the
"Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or
appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore,
that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not
lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.

Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty
of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only
logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." By doing what he
did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.

As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of
his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue,
it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative
proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84

(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system

(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings

The memorandum report reads:

In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding
conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the
court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A".

xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the
plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the
counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.

There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:

"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court
natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila
maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko
lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
… except … na hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …"

In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open
court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his
disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:

"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko
napakayaman, ako walang pera."

He continued:

"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In
memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun
… ganun … Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko
pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh
parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs)
baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85

Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications
supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to
allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all
unearthed by Judge Floro).

As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge
Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
(Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also
made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his
chambers.

During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the
"yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was
being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they
were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized
recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87

Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floro’s word
against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to
criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore
depend upon which party is more credible.

Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:

Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?

A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng
hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of
law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system
did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang
corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."

To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his
respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself
did not believe in the justice system?

xxxx

Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings?

A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it
did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN
"Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of
this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the
Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the
case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a
certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact,
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he
integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise
the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained offensive
languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel
ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88

The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.

The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge
Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law
and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account
of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are not far removed from his reactions to
what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in
charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no
direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as
intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is
more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming
conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In
this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.

(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987

The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –

[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs.
Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain
order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is
orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere
must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to
ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is
supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should
be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of
time is avoided.

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep
in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen
"little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry
out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to
psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90

Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets
the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably
linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue
discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro
proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.

But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the
13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven
of the 13 charges against him. Thus:

1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct

2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law

3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct

4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct

5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a
serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely
warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor.
And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we
hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will
treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91

Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office

As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo
an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office
notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.

The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship
(which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist),
stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:

There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.

REMARKS:

Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over
solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He
emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether
it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls
this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related
that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest
secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic
phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the
13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" – seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.

He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.

Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the
interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92

Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic
when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P.
Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:

Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he
was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and
academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize
to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to
vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
provocation.

From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of
others’ motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.

Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected
cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses
in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as
a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he
is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may
decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93

It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically
ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination."

On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate
psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by
the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or
mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied
by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on
17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. 97

On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive
special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99

On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme
Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of
licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and
the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959
Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103

On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge
Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000
resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.
Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latter’s intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104
The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and
detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105

Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services
of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3
January 2001. 107

Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in
connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:

Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual
with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and
impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.

He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is
characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic
process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses
in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing
have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a
judge. 108

Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer
Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –

The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the
three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but
to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.

Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations
were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having
"failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff
psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
 I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday
demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to
details, he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and
ideas.

2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to
arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures
and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional
standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept
others’ ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.

3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally,

he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions.

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievement-
oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to
these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be expected to comply with
conventional social demands. 109

Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that
"psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:

JUDGE AQUINO:

Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of
the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxxx

Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Fatal [flaw]?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?

A: He did not.

Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?

A: He did not.

xxxx

Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making
pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?

xxxx

A: Yes sir.

Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of
his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree
with that?

A: I agree with you, Sir.

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha
naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng
iba’t iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.

xxxx

Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir. 110

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center,
stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro –

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of
topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented,
intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
disturbances. 111

This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report
that –

Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When
interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert,
oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances.
Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were
no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and
other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his
nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112

On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had
its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known
as duwendes?

DR. JURILLA: He did not.

xxxx

Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five
psychic in the country?

xxxx

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?

A: He did not.

xxxx

Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used
to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?

A: Not during our interview.

xxxx

A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it
is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.

Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you
in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?

xxxx

A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of
any corroborative contradiction.

Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?

A: The interview has its limitations.

Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?

A: Yes.

Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the
number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx

Q: Would it be really more altered?

A: I would say so.

xxxx

Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro
did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you
that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?

xxxx

A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.

Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental and psychological x x x?

A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.

Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person
of Judge Floro?

A: Given the data.

Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is
capable of typing a letter?

xxxx

A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115

Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001,
the relevant portions of which state:

Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and
dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to
be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately
functioning.

xxxx

An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family
and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also
talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal
and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test
consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language
Test (4) Sack’s Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an
individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed
capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard
to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major
psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making
sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.

On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a
judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:

JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed
with power of [bi-location]?

xxxx

DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.

Q: And that something must be wrong?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in
this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen
who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".

xxxx

A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.

Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?

xxxx

A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.

Q: No, Delusion.

A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.

Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?

A: Both are on the same footing.

Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?

xxxx

A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions
could be transient and short in duration.

Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?

A: Yes, doubtful capacity.

Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.

Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.

xxxx

A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound
syndrome and it could also be an indication … Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of
organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the
counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge
Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control
expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.

Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?

A: No, I have not encountered any.

Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal
person.

A: Maybe weird.

Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October
10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you
tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance,
but I distinguished not the trance that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. That’s a trance that is created
by the so called… Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection.
He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come,
and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I never was changed physically
or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very
moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are
here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but… ATTY. DIZON: No, can you
see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein
Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you
still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?

A: No.

Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the
transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a so–called counter
part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?

A: No.

Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?

xxxx

A: Yes. 118

Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.

It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not
finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of
Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name
Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of
his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of
him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he
is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge
to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets
into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he
is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit
to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from
such office. 119

We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of
mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that
neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists
and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.

When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general layman’s term, a catch–all word referring to
various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs.
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.

Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An
honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are
entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if
the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123

There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the
13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.

Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of
his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis,
Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people
to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains
on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing
blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro
explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro
conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the
Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge
Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial
system.

Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive
law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference
to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore
thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic
phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. The
pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is quoted hereunder:

3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that
due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of
belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby
declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:

a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by
Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he
saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE
WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he
SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;

b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked
to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he
NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the
TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B.
Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have
been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the
seeming error ‘DAY’ should be corrected; the Court’s sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in
having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING
DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)

In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –

What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law. 128

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to
the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129

Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to
be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:

Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge,
indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:

Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the
judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired to a judge’s status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less
unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the
bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes
his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected
of him as a judge. 131

The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are
seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than
legislators or executives. 132

As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and
justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The
function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art,
whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice
Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit
of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward
views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the
qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with … judicial power.

xxxx

The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon
the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134

In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and
objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a
serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.

Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3)
years.

In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However,
we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.

Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the
entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out
that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floro’s submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by
mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that
Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.

The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental
and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution
which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-
009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had
previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:

SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of
the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice.
xxx

SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be

conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.

It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist
or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological
evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.

It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the
seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of
seven years.

Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges.
Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended
pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took
effect on 1 October 2001.

The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which
prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:

(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from
notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3)
SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by
the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.

Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the
duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating
Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of
the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing
findings of fact and recommendation." 142

From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of
his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it
would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143
This is because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting
preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged.
Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused
by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as
temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.

This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position.
Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy,
judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. 144

In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge
Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the
hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate
psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases
which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven
cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he
filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146

Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:

Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension
pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly
apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
"until further orders".

In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during which period he was not paid
his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred
several loans to provide for his family’s basic needs.

It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time
to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is
no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits
that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.

Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may
not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his
salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in
the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his
preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed
be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause
for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and
equitable grounds. 147

Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the
investigation." Judge Iturralde’s suspension of 13 ½ months even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income
as Judge.

Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days
should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled
to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven
years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be
compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his case
through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust him out of
office. In Judge Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly,
Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension
in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because,
being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed
to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been
adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.

These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148

In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case,
equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a
period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is not a penalty
as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the
functions of his office.

The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to
give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role
in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14
February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then
the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with
Damocles’ sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.

Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC

It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-
7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is
without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.

Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry
with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public
office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment
against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do
not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that the Court
cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:

a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149

b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150

c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and

psychic phenomena … not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151

d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency …. His
concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and
cautious." 152

e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153

Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said
position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.

Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s current administrative and medical
problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now,
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and
debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.

Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors
(and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes
and/or adverse environment – factors they have no control over.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00)
PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office,
effective immediately;

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and
other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
for LACK OF MERIT; and

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas of RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar GUILTY of
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. Accordingly, the Court orders the FORFEITURE of his entire retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality

Section 16.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6036

AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BE REQUIRED IN CASES
OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES AND IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES WHEN THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR SUCH OFFENSES IS NOT HIGHER THAN ARRESTO MAYOR AND/OR A
FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS OR BOTH.

Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person
charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed
penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both,
where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority hearing his
case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:

(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;

(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later
repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted through force
or intimidation;

(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
jumped bail;

(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;

(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously convicted
for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;

(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and

(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for violation
of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.

Section 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section 1 hereof shall be
required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding
himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every
two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he
be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be
willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the
person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk
of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to
report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any
violation of this sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the
amount forthwith fixed by the Court.

Section 3. This Act shall apply to all person who, at the time of its approval, are under temporary detention for
inability to post bail for charges contemplated by Section 1 above.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 4, 1969

of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court also finds Judge
Bugtas guilty of (1) UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION, (2) UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING ORDERS, and
(3) SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. These constitute aggravating circumstances to the offense of gross ignorance of
the law.

The Court finds Ernesto C. Quitorio, Legal Researcher of RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar
GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from office for three months without
pay and STERNLY WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Section 18

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

These two administrative cases at bar, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976 and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977, were originally
consolidated with two other cases: A. M. No. RTJ-06-1978, Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Roberto
A. Navidad, RTC, Br. 32, Calbayog City, Samar, and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1980, Eric C. Isidoro and Atty. Anecio R.
Guades v. Judge Roberto A. Navidad, RTC, Br. 32, Calbayog City.

By Resolution of January 31, 2007,81 this Court dismissed the complaint in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1978,
while that in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1980 was also dismissed, Judge Roberto A. Navidad (Judge Navidad or
respondent) was reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties. This leaves for
disposition the first and second cases.
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976

On July 16, 2003, Provincial Prosecutor Manuel Torrevillas, Jr. brought to the attention of then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the inapropriate actuation of Judge Roberto A. Navidad of Branch 32, the RTC of
Calabayog City in the handling of cases before his sala. The Chief Justice thus instructed the Provincial
Prosecutor to submit a written report thereon to which he complied by letter-complaint dated August 15,
2003,82 attaching thereto the reports83 of the trial prosecutor in the sala of Judge Navidad.

By 1st Indorsement dated August 25, 2003,84 the above-said August 15, 2003 letter-complaint was
referred by the Chief Justice to then Court Administrator and now a member of this Court, Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., for comment and recommendation.

By Resolution of September 23, 2003,85 this Court acting on the recommendations of Justice Velasco
in his September 8, 2003 Memorandum86 to the Chief Justice, required Judge Navidad to comment on the
complaint and directed the Court Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to: (1)
conduct a judicial audit on all undecided criminal cases, which include cases that are pending, submitted for
decision, archived, etc. for the purpose of determining any inappropriate actuation with respect to the
issuance of court orders especially on matters pertaining to the grant of bail in non-bailable offenses; and (2)
coordinate with Trial Prosecutor Cicero T. Lampasa as regards the other cases that needed to be investigated.
 By Resolution of March 8, 2006, the Court referred the complaint to Justice Isaias P. Dicdican of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

Covered by A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976 are: (1) Criminal Case No. 4037, People of the Philippines v. Nestor
Sandongan, for murder; (2) Criminal Cases No. 4023 and 4024, both entitled People of the Philippines v.
Simproso Paghunasan, for frustrated murder and murder, respectively; and (3) Criminal Case No. 4147, People
of the Philippines v. Alfredo L. Tesoro, et al., for murder.

Justice Dicdican synthesized the version of complainant in his October 25, 2006 Report of Investigation
and Recommendation87 as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4037 People of the Philippines v. Nestor Sandongan

In this case, respondent allegedly improperly cited a witness, SPO2 Rolando Rebortura,
in contempt of court for not telling the truth or for violating his oath. Complainant, through
(then) Prosecutor Lampasa, alleged that SPO2 Rebortura was testifying on the matter of
whether or not he recovered a shotgun from the crime scene. When the said witness first
stated that he did not recover any shotgun, he was reminded by defense counsel, Atty.
Sisenando Fiel, that he had already revealed to him (Atty. Fiel) in a conference earlier held that
he had recovered a shotgun. After the respondent sought a clarification on the matter, SPO2
Rebortura replied to the effect that he might have said that he recovered a shotgun to Atty.
Fiel but, because of the lapse of time, he could not anymore recall.

The respondent then adjudged SPO2 Rebortura in contempt of court and allegedly
ordered the witness to be detained under the custody of the Clerk fo Court for two (2) days.
This order of detention was not, however, stated in the order issued by the respondent.

After that session, SPO2 Rebortura allegedly pleaded with the respondent that he be
not detained.88
Criminal Cases No. 4023 and 4024 - People of the Philippines v. Simproso Paghunasan

In these cases, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Calbayog City, on July 1, 2002,
a copy of a Motion to Grant Accused Provisional Liberty filed by the accused. On July 11, 2002,
the prosecution then interposed its Opposition/Comments thereto, not knowing that, on July
2, 2002, the respondent had already issued an order granting the accused provisional liberty
and approving the bonds filed by the accused.

Complainant claims that the accused had been charged with the capital offense of
murder which is a non-bailable offense. The respondent granted bail without conducting a
hearing and without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove the strength of its
evidence.89

Criminal Case No. 4147 People of the Philippines v. Alfredo l. Tesoro, et al.

An Information was filed against the accused in June 2002. The accused later on filed,
on August 13, 2002, a Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest and For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause. The prosecution filed an opposition to said motion, contending that the
accused should first submit to the jurisdiction of the court before he could ask for any positive
relief.

During the scheduled hearing of the case on December 4, 2002, counsel for the accused
filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and for Accused Alfredo L. Tesoro To Be Allowed To
Be Placed Under the Custody of Counsel Pending Resolution of Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause. The prosecution vehemently opposed such motion but the
respondent recalled the warrant of arrest previously issued and allowed the accused to be
places under the temporary custody of his counsel.

The December 4, 2002 order issued by the respondent was received by the prosecution
only on August 7, 2003. Moreover, the recall of the warrant of arrest was not stated therein.

On December 10, 2002, the prosecution filed its Comments/ Opposition to the Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Reinstate the Recalled Warrant of
Arrest. Since the accused had not filed any opposition to the motion to reinstate the recalled
arrest warrant, the prosecution filed, on March 11, 2003, a Motion to Submit Incident for
Resolution.
 However, the respondent granted the motion for judicial determination of probable
cause filed by the accused without acting on the motion to reinstate recalled warrant of arrest
filed by the prosecution.90

Justice Dicdican summarized respondents defense as follows:

Regarding the alleged irregularities in his handling of Criminal Case No. 4037,
respondent contends that he cited SPO2 Rebortura in direct contempt of court because he
found the said witness lying and telling untruths at the witness chair. Respondent further
contends that it was very evident then that the said witness was the one masterminding the
manufacture or filing of trumped-up cases. At the behest of (then) Prosecutor Lampasa, the
witness asked for forgiveness and admitted his wrongdoings and misconduct. Upon a sincere
promise by the said witness, the citation for contempt was lifted and he was released from his
detention at the office of the Clerk of Court.

As for Criminal Cases Nos. 4023 and 4024, respondent denies that the prosecution was
not given the opportunity to prove the strength of its evidence and that the petition for bail
was granted without a hearing.

Respondent claims that an oral petition for bail had been presented in open court
which was duly heard and partially argued. In fact, the prosecution had allegedly energetically
argued and suggested that the defense reduce its petition into writing so the matter can be
brought up to the Provincial Prosecutor. The proceedings even revealed that there was an error
on the part of the prosecution in not applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the
petition for bail was granted only after the prosecution refused to rectify the error.

Finally, as to Criminal Case No. 4147, respondent said that he quashed the warrant of
arrest for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence. Furthermore, the preliminary
investigation was allegedly improperly conducted with a tutored alleged sole eyewitness.

As for the grant of custodial rights to the counsel for accused who were charged with
heinous crimes, respondent contends that this grant is given only to the said counsel as officer
of the court. Respondent further contends that he followed certain parameters before granting
such custodial rights.91

Justice Dicdican thus came up with the following Evaluation:

 From the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, the undersigned investigator,
after a judicious evaluation and scrutiny thereof, has come up with a finding that the
respondent had indeed committed irregularities and procedural lapses in the handling of the
cases pending before his sala.

Anent the charge that he granted the accused bail without a hearing in Criminal Cases
Nos. 4023 and 4034, the record shows that, in reality, no hearing had been conducted by the
respondent before he issued the order dated July 2, 2002 granting the accused provisional
liberty and approving the bonds filed.

Respondents claim that there had been an oral petition for bail which was extensively
heard and argued during the pre-trial of the cases on June 20, 2002 is not supported by the
record .x x x x

While the respondent maintains that the stenographer failed to take down the
discussion on the oral petition for bail, the undersigned finds this unsubstantiated and totally
self-serving. The record speaks for itself and the transcript of the stenographic notes is wholly
bereft of any reference to the oral petition for bail...

The motion filed by the accused for the grant of provisional liberty was dated June 27,
2002 and was received by the prosecution on July 1, 2002. On July 2, 2002 the respondent had
issued an order granting said motion.

It was established by the undersigned that the July 2, 2002 order was based on the June
27, 2002 motion filed by the accused. Respondent contends that the motion filed by the
accused was in compliance with an order by the court for the accused to file a formal petition
for bail. However, no such order requiring the accused to file a formal petition for bail can be
found in the record. The undersigned is thus convinced that the respondent did not conduct a
hearing before he granted the motion filed by the accused for the grant of provisional liberty.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing,

whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, whether bail is a
matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether
it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail, in
cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidenceis strong
is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence, he
must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even
in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.

After the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence of the prosecution and, based thereon, the judge should formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of
the accused. However, the July 2, 2002 order of the respondent judge does not contain such
summary and conclusion.

Based on his investigation and on the evidence presented in this case, the undersigned
concludes that the respondent did not conduct the requisite hearing before he granted bail to
the accused, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure...
 xxxx

It has been held that such error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore,
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In line with existing jurisprudence, the undersigned
recommends that the respondent be fined P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 4147, where accused Alfredo Tesoro is charged with
murder, the respondent judge allowed the said accused to be placed in the custody of his
counsel. The record shows that a warrant of arrest for the said accused had already been issued
long before he filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest and for judicial determination of
probable cause. Thus, at the time of the filing of the motion to place the said accused under
the custody of counsel dated December 4, 2002, the accused was technically a fugitive in the
eyes of the law. In granting the said motion on the same day when it was filed, the respondent
acted prematurely and incongruously in allowing the accused to be placed under the custody
of counsel when, in fact, the freedom of the accused had yet to be curtailed.

The basic rule is that the right to bail, or in this case to be released on recognizance,
can only be availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. The respondent also deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of said accused is strong, considering that the accused was charged with
murder.

Likewise, in granting the motion to recall the warrant of arrest, the respondent did not
allow the prosecution sufficient time to oppose said motion. There is no showing that
respondent conducted a hearing to determine whether or not there was probable cause which
respondent contends was made the basis of his recall of the warrant of arrest previously issued.

For this irregularity in the recall of the warrant of arrest and for allowing the accused
to be placed in the custody of his counsel, the undersigned recommends that the respondent
be fined P20,000.00

Anent the charge in Criminal Case No. 4037, the undersigned did not find any
impropriety in the respondents act of citing the witness in contemot of court. There is no
showing that the respondent acted with malice and bad faith.92 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Accordingly, Justice Dicdican recommended that respondent be fined in the total amount of
P40,000.93
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977

Per his October 25, 2006 Manifestation,94 Justice Dicdican manifested his incompetency in passing
upon the findings made by the judicial team that conducted the audit in Branch 32 and thus prayed that the
matter be referred to the OCA.

As recommended and prayed for, the results of the judicial audit were referred to the OCA which, by
Memorandum dated September 12, 2007,95 came up with the following findings:

The audit team found that Judge Navidad failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440,
3043 and 3274 within the reglementary periods. Instead of deciding these cases after the
expiration of the period to file memorandum, respondent judge issued Orders similarly dated
July 3, 2003 directing the parties to study their cases and submit the necessary pleadings so
that the cases can be disposed of accordingly.

There were eleven (11) cases with pending motions/incidents which Judge Navidad
failed to resolve within the reglementary period. These are Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586[,]
4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and 4101; and Civil Cases Nos. 809, 846, 747 and 712. Moreover, fifty-
one (51) cases had not been acted upon by Judge Navidad for a considerable length of time
which have not moved since then, to wit: 3631, 4143, 4098, 4082, 4179, 4180, 4097, 4098,
4036, 4084, 4125, 4126, 4226, 3783, 4122, 3724, 3869, 3902, 3914, 3943, 3975, 4001, 4022,
4080, 4069, 4094, 4121, 4124, 4130, 4205, 4298, 3847, 4231 and 4214; and Civil Cases Nos.
845, SCA 050, SP 189, 394, 546, 722, 721, 527, 293, 209, 675, 755, 758, 766, SCA 051 and SP
171.

xxxx

Aside from [the] four (4) cases mentioned in the complaint of Prosecutor Torrevillas,
irregularities in other cases were also uncovered. Judge Navidad released the accused under
the custody of Atty. Fiel in Criminal Cases Nos. 3701, 4101, 4109 and 4110, despite the fact
that they were all facing charges for murder and homicide. Respondent judge also granted bail
to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4109 for Murder, and 4110 for Murder, without
conducting hearing. In Criminal Case No. 4350, Judge Navidad ruled that the offense
committed was only homicide allegedly becuase the qualifying circumstances stated in the
information were not supported by evidence, despite the findings of Judge Salvador P.
Jakosalem, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Sta. Margarita, Samar of probable cause for the
crime of murder. In Criminal Case No. 3718, the information for murder was downgraded by
Judge Navidad to homicide. Similarly, he dismissed Criminal Case No. 4373 on the ground that
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not supported by any credible
evidence, despite the contrary.

... On March 22, 2004, Judge Navidad was also directed to explain (a) his failure to
decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 within the reglementary period, (b) his
inaction in fifty-one (51) cases, (c) why he allowed the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3701,
4101, 4109 and 4110 to be placed under the custody of Atty. Fiel, and (d) to inform the Court
whether the pending incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586, 4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and
4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 850, 809, 846, 747 and 792 had already been resolved.

In his Comments, Judge Navidad claimed that Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274
were not yet submitted for decision when the audit was conducted. He said that the
prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 3440 and 3093 had not yet formally offered evidence, while
the parties in Criminal Case No. 3274 had not yet filed their respective memoranda. He also
informed the Court that the incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586, 4248, 4312, 4350,
4373 and 4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 850, 809, 846, 747 and 792 were already resolved.

Judge Navidad contended that some cases were left unacted upon because his court
personnel failed to archive ten (10) cases, the police officers failed to make return of the
warrants of arrest issued in eighteen (18) cases, and in other cases, the parties failed to submit
the pleadings he required them to file.

Respondent judge explained that he released on recognizance to Atty. Fiel all the
accused in four (4) criminal cases because the charges were mere fabrications and no
preliminary investigation was conducted or if conducted, was improperly done...96(Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)

The OCA came up with the following Evaluation:

Judge Roberto A. Navidad should be held administratively liable for gross inefficiency.
He failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 within the 90-day reglementary
period. Judge Navidads contention that the cases were not yet submitted for decison when the
audit was conducted is an outright falsehood meant to mislead this Court. The audit was
conducted on October 14-17, 2003, but Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 were already
submitted for decision on February 28, 2003, June 2, 2002 and April 30, 2002, respectively.
The failure of the parties to file their memoranda within the period given them is not a valid
reason for Judge Navidad not to decide the cases. A case is considered submitted for decision
upon the admission of the parties evidence at the termination of the trial and respondent is
well aware of this. Should the court allow or require the submission of memorandum, the case
is considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the expiration
of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.

The issuance of respondent judge of an Order in these cases requiring the parties to
file the necessary pleading so that the cases can be disposed of accordingly was purposely done
to subvert the 90-day mandatory period to decide cases. Respondent judge could have asked
the Court for an extension of time to decide these cases instead of issuing this Order. If he
honestly believed that he could not decide the cases within the reglementary period, all he had
to do was to ask for an extension of time. The Court, cognizant of the caseload of judges and
mindful of the difficulty encountered by them in the disposition of cases, usually grants the
request.

Judge Navidad also failed to promptly resolve the incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585,
3586, 4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and 4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 809, 846, 747 and 792. The
resolution of the petition for bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585 and 3586 was due on February
22, 2000, yet it remained pending in October 2003 (three years and eighth months since then)
when the audit was conducted. In Civil Case No. 792, the Motion for Special Raffle was due for
resolution on May 16, 2001 but was likewise not yet resolved as of audit date.

xxxx

Respondent judge ascribes his inaction in fifty-one (51) cases to the inadvertence of his
court personnel and the failure of the police officers to make a return of the warrants of arrest.
This is totally unacceptable. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his court
personnel, for the latter are not guardians of the judges responsibilities. Efficient court
management is primarily the duty of the presiding judge. In this, he is found wanting. As
regards the cases where there were no return of the warrants of arrest, Section 4, Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the head of the office to whom the warrant of
arrest was delivered for execution to cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days
from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it
was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. Thus, it is
the duty of respondent judge to see to it that this is strictly complied with by the police officers
assigned to serve the warrants. His failure to faithfully comply with this duty has contributed
to the delay in the disposition of cases in his court.

Judge Navidad should also [be] held liable for gross ignorance of the law. In granting
bail without conducting any hearing to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4023, 4024, 3701,
4109 and 4110 who were charged with murder and frustrated murder, respondent judge
knowingly disregarded the well-established rule that no person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Under the
present rule, a hearing on application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought. These tasks were ignored by the judge.

Judge Navidad also erred in allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 4147 through his
counsel, to post bail notwithstanding that the accused was not yet in custody of the law. The
right to bail or to be released on recognizance can only be availed of by a person who is in
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. An application for admission to bail of
a person against whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is premature.

The judge likewise has no authority to conduct his own determination of probable
cause and downgrade the offense charged or dismiss the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. Judges of the Regional Trial Courts no loner have the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. This authority was removed from them under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985. The determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. Whether that
function has been correctly discharged by the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
the trial court itself cannot and may not be compelled to pass upon. As a general rule, if the
information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the courts should not dismiss the
case for want of evidence.

Judge Navidad should also be sanctioned for placing the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3701, 4101, 4109 and 4110 who were charged with heinous crimes under the custody of Atty.
Sisenando Y. Fiel, Jr. pending re-investigation of the cases. The grant of bail based on
recognizance in these cases are not among the instance the accused may be released on
recognizance.

Section 15, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the Court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. The accused may be released on recognizance
under Republic Act No. 6036[,] P.D. No. 603[,] and P.D. 968, as amended. Also, Section 16 of
Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides, A person in custody for a
period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion
of the court.

It is clear that Judge Navidad not only failed to perform his duties in accordance with
the Rules, but he has also been acting willfully, and grossly disregarding and defying the law
and controlling jurisprudence. Verily, his actions indicate a blatant contempt for the law and
the rules of procedure. This cannot be countenanced especially because the laws involved are
simple and elementary for which he cannot claim ignorance. It is imperative that a judge be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, law or
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done
in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

This is not the first time Judge Navidad has been charged administratively. Verification
with the the Statistical Reports Division, CMO-OCA shows that from the time Judge Navidad
was appointed to the judiciary (January 30, 1987), several cases had been filed against him[.]

xxxx

While several of the charges were dismissed, this however is not at all reflective of his
innocence, because the issues raised in these cases were judicial in nature, hence, improper
for an administrative charge, or respondent had already inhibited from the case, or
complainants failed to attend the investigation conducted by investigating justices/judges and
failed to substantiate their charges. There were complaints though which even if dismissed,
the Court nevertheless rebuked respondent judge and reminded him to be more circumspect
in the performance of his duties, reprimanded him for improper conduct, advised him to
refrain from the use of intemperate language or the use of the words Supreme Court in any of
his judgments, orders, letters and correspondence presumably to show that these acts were
authorized by or had the imprimatur of the Court, to avoid any misinterpretation and confusion
by the public and directed him to couch his inhibition orders in clear and specific language.

Respondent judges outrageous conduct was again exhibited recently when he

stubbornly refused to inhibit himself in Civil Case No. 586 (Ciriaco Tan vs. Emmanuel Lao),
despite the fact that he is residing in a building owned by plaintiff, in that case, a fact he has
not denied, and which is of public knowledge in Calbayog City. Judges must maintain and
preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. They must hold themselves above reproach
and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-
grounded or not, the judge has no alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. Judge
Navidads persistent refusal to recuse himself from the case has impaired the peoples faith in
the court and destroyed the ideal of impartial administration of justice.

Respondent judges comportment shows that he is not an upright man of the law who
deserves to sit on the bench. That an NGO, the Samarenos for Equity, Justice and Reform, saw
it fit to file a case against him, shows how badly he has performed as member of the bench.
Such reputation by itself has besmirched the integrity not only of his court but more
omportantly of the entire juducial system which he represents. Respondent does not deserve
to remain any further in the bench.

Informatively, Judge Navidad was absent for the whole month of May 2007 as reported
to OCA by Executive Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, RTC, Calbayog City, Samar., However, on July
30, 2007, the Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services, OCA received a Certificate
of Service of Judge Navidad for May 2007 stating that he had rendered the services required
of him by the law for the period May 1, 2007 to May 31, 2007 except on May 16, 17, 18 and
21 when he was on sick leave and on May 22, 23, 24 and 25 when he was on vacation leave.
He did not indicate therein that he was also absent from May 2-15, 2007....He was also absent
on June 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 25, 27, 28, and 29, 2007 , but he declares in his
Certificate of Service for that month that he was absent only on June 6, 7, 8, 28 and 29.
Likewise, his Certificate of Service for July 2007 showed that he was absent only on July 4, 5, 6,
9 and 10 but Judge Clemens reported that Judge Navidad did not render service on July 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 30. Attached to Judge Navidads Certificates
of Service for June and July 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10, 2007. All his leave applications did not bear the
signature and approval of his Executive Judge, Judge Clemens. Simply put, he was absent
without leave.

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges. In the case at bar, respondent judge violated Sections 1 and
2 of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[.]

xxxx

Judge Navidad also violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 4 of the same Code, which provides
that Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
 particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

Respondent judge likewise transgressed the Judges Oath wherein he swore that he
shall perform his judicial duties efficiently, fairly and to the best of his knowledge and ability.97
(Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied))

The OCA thereupon recommended respondents dismissal from the service for gross ignorance of and
contempt for the law, gross inefficiency and negligence and violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and the Judges Oath.98

The Court finds the respective recommendations of the Investigating Justice and the OCA well-taken.

Rule 114, on bail, of the Rules of Court reads

Sec. 8. Burdern of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed
by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burdern of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall
any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify.

xxxx

Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8
of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
 While it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged, the judge may dismiss a complaint if he finds
it to be insufficient in form or substance or without any ground; otherwise, he may proceed with the case if
in his view it is sufficient and proper in form.99

In the discharge of a judges duties, however, when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider
so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle, the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. If the rule or law is so elementary, as the above-quoted sections of
Rule 114 are, not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without
even the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith on the part of the judge, as it can be clearly inferred
from the error committed.100 On this score, as reflected in the Investigating Justices and the OCAs separate
reports, the Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent also committed undue delay in disposing of the cases assigned to him. Judges have the
sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do so has to suffer the
consequences of his omission, as any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.101

Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to decide cases promptly. Delay
not only results in undermining the peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt
hearing of their applications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the
litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites
suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.
 Likewise, delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the
reglementary period of 90-days fixed by the constitution and the law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency. We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge, especially
at a time when clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary, whose present
leadership has launched an all out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket
congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess these
traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable, to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to promptly administer justice.102

In the course of exculpating himself, respondent committed dishonesty, by falsely claiming, for
instance, that Criminal Case Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 were not yet submitted for decision when the judicial
audit was conducted, and that he conducted bail hearings, albeit the records do not show so.

Likewise, among other things, in his Certificates of Service for May, 2007, respondent declared that he
was on sick leave on May 16, 17, 18 and 21, and on vacation leave from May 22, 23, 24 and 25. Executive
Judge Reynaldo Clemens declared, however, that respondent was absent for the entire month of May 2007.

Dishonesty, especially when committed by judges who are supposedly the visible representation of
the law, not only tends to mislead the Court; it also tarnishes the image of the judiciary.

Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. This is a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service, even for the first
offense, with forefeiture of retirement benefirs except accrued leave credits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service.103
 Respondent, on his inaction in 51 cases, ascribes it to the inefficiency of his staff and the failure of the
police officers to make a return of the warrants of arrest.

Judges cannot, however, take refuge in the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel
since proper and efficient court management is their responsibility. Court personnel are not the guardians of
judges responsibilities. It is the duty of judges to devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts
to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.104 And as
correctly pointed out by the OCA, it is the judges duty to see to it that the police officers assigned to execute
the warrants comply with Section 4, Rule 113, requiring them to make a report to the judge who issued the
warrant within ten days after the expiration of the period within which to execute the warrant.

Respondent was felled by a bullet of an assassin on January 14, 2008, however, in view of which the
penalty of dismissal that the proven charges against him call for can no longer be imposed. He could still be
fined, however, in the amount of P40,000 each in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976 and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977, to be
deducted from the benefits due him.

WHEREFORE, for Dishonesty, Gross Ignorance of and Contempt for the Law, Gross Inefficiency and
Negligence, and Violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Judges
Oath, respondent, Judge Roberto A. Navidad, who has, in the meantime died, is in each of these cases subject
of this Decision FINED the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos. The Financial Management Office, Office
of the Court Administrator is authorized to deduct the total sum of Eighty Thousand (P80,000) Pesos from the
benefits due respondent and to release the remaining amount to his heirs unless there exists another lawful
cause for withholding the same.
 SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Section 20

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the
law filed by Lydelle L. Conquilla (complainant) against Judge Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent judge), Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.

The Facts

In a verified complaint dated 30 July 2008, complainant Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation
of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before
the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the
Bocaue Police Station.

On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold
the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest
dated 8 July 2008, with the bail fixed at P12,000.

On 10 July 2008, upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for
complainants provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date, complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her
provisional liberty.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level
court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant avers that
respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he
conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the hasty
issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived
her of her liberty. Complainant submits that respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was
not even given the chance to comment on complainants Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant
alleges that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called respondent judges wife, who said she
would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault against herein
complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wifes debt of P35,000.00 and provided that
herein complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00.1

In his Comment, respondent judge states that he issued the warrant of arrest in good faith because he was
convinced that there was probable cause and that it was necessary to place the complainant under immediate
custody to prevent a frustration of justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already
amended Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of the
preliminary investigation from judges of first level courts, he argues that the power to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power to
determine probable cause was indeed revoked by the amendment, respondent judge submits that technical
rules can be relaxed if their implementation will result in injustice.

Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the prosecutor when he reduced the bail
considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.

Lastly, respondent judge denies any knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between
complainant and his wife.

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 12 February 2009, the OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for his patent and unjustified violation of the provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The OCA
stated that the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, removed the conduct
of investigation from the scope of authority of first level courts judges. Had respondent judge been more
prudent in understanding the pertinent provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which are very
clear and concise, no administrative complaint would have been filed against him.

The OCA, however, found the charge of usurpation of authority without merit. The OCA agreed with
respondent judge that the power to determine the amount of bail is vested in the judge.

The OCA recommended (a) that the administrative complaint against respondent judge be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.

The Ruling of the Court

In this case, respondent judge makes it appear that he merely conducted a preliminary examination for the
purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. However,
the records of the case clearly show that respondent judge indeed conducted a preliminary investigation on
8 July 2008. After finding probable cause to hold complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault,
respondent judge then issued a warrant for her arrest. That respondent judge conducted a preliminary
investigation and not just a preliminary examination to determine existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest is evident in his Order dated 8 July 2008, which reads:

ORDER

The undersigned, after personal examination of the witnesses in writing and under oath, finds that a
probable cause exists and there is sufficient ground to hold the accused LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA for
trial for the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT as charged in the complaint. In order not to frustrate the ends
of justice, there is a need to place the accused in immediate custody. Let warrant immediately issue
for his [sic] arrest hereby fixing bail in the amount of P12,000.00 for his provisional liberty.2

SO ORDERED.

Bocaue, Bulacan, July 8, 2008.

(signed)

HON. LAURO G. BERNARDO

Judge

Furthermore, after complainant posted bail on 10 July 2008, respondent judge then issued an Order dated 10
July 2008, ordering the complainants release and setting the case for her arraignment on 3 September 2008.

The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-
26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus,
under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c)
Other officers as may be authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. ‒

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ‒ Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. ‒ When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of
this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public school teacher, who is
a person in authority under Article 1523 of the Revised Penal Code.4 Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, when the assault is committed against a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his
official duties or on the occasion of such performance, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. The duration of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the offense charged against complainant
requires the conduct of preliminary investigation as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. ‒ Preliminary investigation is an inquiry

or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.
 Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is
at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without regard to the fine. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation
himself.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office.5 Section 3, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct6 requires judges to
maintain and enhance their knowledge and skills to properly perform their judicial functions, thus:

SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
qualities for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training
and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross
ignorance of the law.7 Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules,8 and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.9

On the alleged promise of respondent judges wife that the bail would be reduced provided her P35,000 debt
will be cancelled and that complainant grant respondent judges wife an additional loan, we find that
complainant did not substantiate her allegation. Nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent
judge denies knowledge of such transaction between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did not
categorically deny his wifes debt to complainant. In his Comment, respondent judge states: Assuming
arguendo that there really was a loan made by his wife, he did not know of such transaction between his wife
and the complainant and given this, he did not allow such transaction to take place.10

Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance of
propriety to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.11 Furthermore, judges
and members of their families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.12
On respondent judges issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of bail, we find such acts
void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to grant bail in bailable
offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case,
respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of arrest.
Thus, these acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in the first place,
respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.

The Court notes that this is respondent judges third offense. In 2003, the Court found respondent judge
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions and fined him P19,000, with a stern warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.13

More importantly, in the 2008 case of Santos v. Bernardo,14 the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and basic rules of procedure and fined him P20,000, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.15 The Court found no merit in respondent
judges supposition that grave coercion is an offense not subject to preliminary investigation. The Court,
however, emphasized that when the complaint was filed on 3 January 2006, respondent judge no longer had
authority to conduct preliminary investigation by virtue of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Thus, the Court held that
respondent judge should have referred the complaint to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor instead of
issuing the subpoena directing complainants to appear before the Court.

Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a
serious charge, for which the imposable penalty is any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.16

Considering that this is respondent judges third offense, the second of which was also for gross ignorance of
the law, we hold that the penalty of six (6) months suspension from office without salary and other benefits
is in order.17

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Lauro G. Bernardo GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and SUSPEND
him from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Section 21

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a Memorandum dated October 23, 2007 in A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC (Audit Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 72, Olongapo City), of then Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock, which recommended the following:

1. that A.M. 06-3-196-RT[C] (Letter of Judge Josefina D. Farrales, Acting Presiding Judge,
RTC, Br. 72, Olongapo City [Re: 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution
in the said Court]) be CONSOLIDATED with this instant administrative matter;

2. that Judge Eliodoro [G]. Ubiadas be held administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT,
GROSS INEFFICIENCY and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and he be FINED in an amount
equivalent to his six (6) months salary;

3. that Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe be held administratively liable for GROSS
INEFFICIENCY and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and that he be FINED in the amount of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely;

4. that Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket Books,
same Court, to SUBMIT a quarterly report until the updating of aforesaid docket books are
completed with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely;

5. the Documentation Division-Legal OCA to COLLECT from Pacific Union Insurance

Company Incorporated its liability for forfeited bonds in the following cases:

CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF

THE BOND
 Atty. John V. Aquino

488-0, Series of Office of the Clerk of Php256,000.00

2005 Court
Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks
Bond

72 CR No. 435-02 Php Bond of accused

12,000.00 Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00
which was reduced
to 15% included in
the Php530,000.00
reduced bond.
74 CR Nos. 321- 64,000.00
02- and 270-02
75 CR Nos. 662- 180,000.00
Not paid yet paid to
03,
the OCC
134-03 and
743-03

It is likewise recommended that the Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to

make a REPORT and RECOMMENDATION that will be used as guidelines for the reduction of
the liability of the bondsmen in forfeited bonds within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The present consolidated administrative matters have the following antecedent facts:

A.M. 06-3-196-RTC

The Court, through the First Division, issued Resolution dated February 7, 2005 in A.M. No. RTJ-05-
1902 (PAGCOR, etc. v. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, etc.), preventively suspending Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas
(Judge Ubiadas), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo City, effective immediately pending
resolution of the said administrative case. Judge Ubiadas received the said Resolution on March 11, 2005.
 Subsequently, several judges were designated105 to preside over Branch 72, namely: Hon. Renato J.
Dilag, RTC, Br. 73, Olongapo City from April 18 to June 10, 2005; Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, RTC, Br. 74, Olongapo
City, from June 10, 2005 to January 25, 2006; and Hon. Josefina D. Farrales, RTC, Br. 69, Iba, Zambales, from
January 30, 2006 until the present.

Upon her assumption, Judge Farrales immediately conducted an inventory of the pending cases in
Branch 72. In her letter dated February 15, 2006, Judge Farrales reported that there are still 30 cases and 84
motions submitted for decision and resolution and that she requested for sixty (60) days extension to resolve
the same. Of the cases, 15 cases and 33 motions were already beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve even before Judge Ubiadas was suspended. The other 15 cases and 51 motions were
submitted for decision/resolution when Judge Caguioa took over as presiding judge of Branch 72, of which 6
cases and 30 motions were already beyond the reglementary period.

The Court106 noted Judge Farrales letter, directed her to resolve the cases/motions within six (6)
months and to submit a copy of each of her decisions/resolutions within 10 days from rendition/promulgation
thereof. The Court likewise required Judge Ubiadas and Judge Caguioa to explain within 10 days from notice,
their failure to decide/resolve the subject cases/motions within the reglementary periods and to make the
necessary request for extension of time within which to decide/resolve the same.

In a series of compliances, Judge Farrales informed the Court through the OCA that she had
decided/resolved all the 30 pending cases and 84 motions. The Court noted said compliances and considered
the same as full compliance in the present administrative matter.

In the meantime, Judge Caguioa, in a letter dated April 19, 2007, explained that upon his designation
as the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 72, he immediately heard all the cases already set and calendared thereat
in order to prevent a disruption of the court calendar and settings already made during the incumbency of
Judge Ubiadas. Thus, together with the equally heavy docket of his own station in Branch 74, he heard all
pending incidents calendared and conducted trial of scheduled cases in Branch 72 in order not to cause any
further delay in the proceedings. Judge Caguioa further explained that he inherited all the unresolved cases
and motions as acting judge of said branch. During his incumbency therein, they were not brought to his
attention even at the time the Semestral Docket Inventory of Branch 72 was prepared. He was therefore
unaware that he had to address the matter or at the very least ask for an extension of time to decide all of
them.

On June 20, 2007, the Court noted Judge Caguioas letter and referred the same to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from receipt of the records.

A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC

On May 17-26, 2006, a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted at Branch 72, RTC,
Olongapo City due to Judge Ubiadas indefinite suspension and his forthcoming compulsory retirement on July
3, 2006.

The Report dated June 29, 2006 revealed that Branch 72 has a total caseload of 1,114 cases, consisting
of 880 criminal cases and 234 civil cases.

Apart from the 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution mentioned in A.M. No. 06-
3-196-RTC, the audit team noted that there were still other cases submitted for decision/resolution and
matters which were not acted upon for a considerable length of time, to wit:

Status Criminal Civil

SFD* beyond the reglementary period 1 3
SFD* still within the reglementary period 7 7
SFR** beyond the reglementary period 4 6
SFR** still within the reglementary period 2 13
Cases in different stages of proceedings
without further action for a considerable
length of time 3 5
Warrants of Arrest

1. No Return/Unacted 39 -

2. For issuance of alias warrant of arrest 32

Summons - 2
No further action/setting 4 17
For compliance of the parties 4 23
For compliance of the Bondsmen 51 -
 Total

* SFD-Submitted for Decision

** SFR-Submitted for Resolution

Consequently, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated July 26, 2006, reiterating the directive to
Judge Farrales to decide/resolve the 114 cases subject matter of A.M. 06-3-196-RTC until July 31, 2006. As
regards the other cases submitted for decision/resolution which were not acted upon for a considerable
length of time, the Court gave Judge Farrales a period of three (3) months from notice to decide/resolve/take
appropriate action thereon.

In the same resolution, the Court directed Judge Farrales and Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Gerry R.
Gruspe, to take appropriate action on the lapses in records management,107 as well as on the observation of
the Audit Team concerning the archiving of cases.108 They were also required to submit a report on the action
taken and the present status of all the cases mentioned in the audit report, with instruction to attach to the
report the copies of the orders/decisions/resolutions for reference as well as the measures taken with regard
to the records management issues.

The latter part of the said resolution is quoted as follows:

(c) DIRECT Presiding Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas to

(i) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof his failure to
decide/resolve the cases enumerated in Exhibits A-A-1 and B-B-4 of the subject OCA
Memorandum, which cases are already beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve, and FILE a request for extension of time to decide/resolve the same;

(ii) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof why he granted the
reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in the following cases, to wit:

AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND
CR NO. 383-02 Pp vs. Joel Llanilo Php 10,000.00
CR NO. 356-02 20,000.00 each
Pp vs. Rey dela Cruz
CR NO. 357-02 Accused
CR NO. 642-03 Pp vs. Renato Silva 200,000.00
CR NO. 22-02 Pp vs. David Dengwas 10,000.00 each
Total Amount of the Bond Php340,000.00
REMARKS

1. In a joint Motion to Reduce Bondsman Liability dated August 31,

2004, Commonwealth Insurance Company, thru its authorized
representative, Dolores K. Millora, moved that the liability of the
bonding company be reduced from Php340,000.00 to
Php17,000.00 or equivalent to five (5%) of the total forfeited bond.
She averred that bondsman has already exerted earnest effort to
locate them and had already spent much more than the premium
of the bonds received from them.

2. Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas approved the

said motion and reduced bondsman liability to Php17,000.00.

3. Order dated April 27, 2005, considering the payment of

Commonwealth Insurance paid the reduced amount of
Php17,000.00 per OR No. 21257141 dated January 31/ February 1,
2005 said Bondsman was absolved of its liability in the aforesaid
cases. The said Order was signed by Pairing Judge Dilag as Judge
Ubiadas was already suspended at that time.

AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND
CR NO. 18-01 Pp vs. Sernan Patero
CR NO. 675-01 Pp vs. Beth Mendoza, et
al. Total Amount of
CR NO. 672-99 Pp vs. Edgar Natividad the Bond
CR NO. 95-01 Pp vs. Pedro Sarmiento
CR NO. 435-02 Pp vs. Cecilia Asuncion
CR NO. 397-01 Pp vs. Joel Santos
Php530,000.00
CR NO. 289-99 Pp vs. Remedios De Dios
CR NO. 30-02 Pp vs. Michael Garon
REMARKS
 1. In the Order dated February 16, 2005, Judge Ubiadas approved
the Motion for Mitigation of Suretys Liability of Pacific Union
Insurance Company from the above-mentioned cases from the
total amount of Php540,000.00 to 15% of the aforesaid amount
(Php81,000.00) and accordingly the writs of execution issued by the
Court in connection with the bonds posted was amended (Annex F).

2. Per confirmation with the Office of the Clerk of Court, said

amount was not paid by the bonding company.

(d) DIRECT Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, same court, to EXPLAIN within thirty
(30) days from notice hereof:

(i) why the Monthly Report of Cases for the months of May 2005 up to
February 2006 were only submitted to the Court on April 17, 2006;

(ii) his failure to execute the judgments on the bond in the following cases as
well as those cases enumerated in paragraph 2.d (B), to wit:

Case No. Name of Bondsman Amount of Date of

Accused Bond Judgment
1. 124-03 B. Sangco P
Plaridel 24,000.00
October 21,
2. 296-03 I. Baula Surety 24,000.00
2004
3. 297-03 I. Baula Company 24,000.00
4. 501-03 A. Naga 80,000.00

(iii) the non-submission of the stenographic notes of the cases submitted for
decision/resolution that further causes the delay in the disposition of the cases;

(e) DIRECT Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket
Books, same court, to UPDATE the entries in the docket books assigned to them from year
2005 to 2006, and SUBMIT COMPLIANCE herewith within sixty (60) days from notice hereof;
and

(f) REQUIRE Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito to SUBMIT a quarterly report
until the updating of the aforesaid docket books is completed.

The Court further resolved to:

(a) REFER the Orders dated September 23, 2004 and February 16, 2005 of
Judge Ubiadas, reducing the liabilities of the Commonwealth and Pacific Union
Insurance Company, respectively, as well as the Certification No. 488-0, Series of 2005,
issued by Clerk of Court John V. Aquino, RTC, Olongapo City, to the COMMITTEE ON
BONDS-OCA and DOCUMENTATION-LEGAL DIVISION, OCA, for study, report,
 recommendation and appropriate action, including Judge Ubiadas liability, if there is
any, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof; and

(b) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to WITHHOLD the retirement
benefits of Judge Ubiadas pending the submission of the recommendation of the
Committee on Bonds-OCA.

In a Resolution dated November 27, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC
with A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC and to note the OCA Memorandum dated October 23, 2007.

With regard to the status of the pending cases and incidents subject of these consolidated
administrative cases, records show that Judge Farrales had already resolved and acted upon all the cases and
unresolved motions pending in Branch 72. She also informed the Court that new measures/procedures are
being implemented in order to correct the lapses in records management and that regular counter-checking
is being done to avoid recurrence of similar incidents.

We now come to the OCAs recommendations with respect to Judge Ubiadas. Two (2) issues must be
addressed herein: first, whether Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross ignorance and/or gross misconduct in
reducing the liability of Commonwealth Insurance Company (Commonwealth) and Pacific Union Insurance
Company, Incorporated (Pacific Union); and second, whether he is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct
of court business and violations of existing SC circulars.

On the first issue, the Audit Team reported that Commonwealth filed a motion to reduce bondsman
liability from P340,000.00 to P17,000.00 or equivalent to 5% of the total forfeited bond in Criminal Case Nos.
383-02, 356-02 to 357-02, 642-03 and 224-02. In said motion, Commonwealth averred that it exerted earnest
efforts to locate and apprehend the accused and has already spent much more than the premium of the bonds
it had received from the accused.

In an Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas granted the motion. Accordingly,
Commonwealth paid the amount of P17,000.00.109 Later, then acting presiding Judge Dilag issued an Order
dated April 27, 2005 absolving Commonwealth of its liability.
 Pacific Union, on the other hand, filed a motion for mitigation of suretys liability in Criminal Case Nos.
18-01, 675-01, 672-99, 95-01, 435-02, 397-01, 289-99 and 30-02 in the total amount of P 530,000.00. Pacific
Union claimed that it had already spent nearly the amount of the bond posted in the said cases and that it
spared no time and effort to comply with the court orders but was, however, hampered by unavoidable
circumstances. It also claimed that should it be held liable to the full amount of the confiscated bonds, it will
suffer tremendous losses in its business. Hence, it prayed that the court reconsider its order of execution and
that it be allowed to pay 10% of the P530,000.00.

Judge Ubiadas, in an Order dated February 16, 2005, reduced Pacific Unions liability to 15% of the P
530,000.00 or to P 79,500.00. The writs of execution previously issued were thus amended. From the records,
it would appear that Pacific Union did not pay even this greatly reduced amount, among other unpaid liabilities
as found by the Audit Team.

On this matter, the OCA further informed the Court that there is no existing Committee on Bonds
which could appropriately act on Judge Ubiadas Orders dated September 23, 2004 and February 16, 2005.
Although the Court created three (3) committees which will handle the property bonds, cash bonds and
recognizance, their creation was however solely for the purpose of drafting the guidelines thereon110 and
that the said committees have been inactive for a considerable length of time. The OCA, thus, believed that
the instant administrative matter is beyond the competence of the said committees.111

As a defense to charge of misconduct with respect to the reduction of the liabilities of the
aforementioned bondsmen, Judge Ubiadas explained that he was guided in good faith by the ruling112 of this
Court which were cited by Commonwealth and Pacific Union.

The rule governing forfeitures of bail bonds is found in Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court
or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date
and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited
and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce the principal and to show
cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within
the said period, the bondmen must:
a. produce the body of the principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do
so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The Court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted.

Significantly, OCA Circular No. 100-2006 (Re: Guidelines on the Reduction of Bond Liability) provides:

1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Court may

reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges reduce or mitigate the
liability of the bondsmen. (RULE 114, SEC. 21)

The OCAs assessment of Judge Ubiadas mitigation of the liabilities of Commonwealth and Pacific Union
follows:

In the case at bar, Judge Ubiadas not only failed to perform his duties in accordance
with the Rules, but he also acted willfully and in gross disregard of the law and controlling
jurisprudence. As noted, the case of Pp vs. Sanchez is one of the cases cited by Judge Ubiadas
in explaining his grant of the motion for reduction/mitigating the liabilities of bondsmen.
Hence, he is fully aware that the surrender of the accused is the common consideration in the
reduction of liability of the surety. It can be said, therefore, that the said oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
However, other issues should be clarified. In this particular instance, the said orders
were not questioned by the accused nor the surety company as the same were not adverse to
them. It was only discovered during the audit of the records. There is no way by which the
abuse of discretion/propriety, if there is any, in granting reduction of the liability maybe
counter-checked. It is necessary, therefore, that specific guidelines be used as basis for the
reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in order to prevent appearance of impropriety
and/or impropriety in the grant if the reduction of the liability of the surety. (emphasis
supplied)
 We agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas failed to strictly comply with the rules pertaining to
forfeitures of bail bonds, in particular the prescription that the bondsmans liability can only be mitigated when
the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. However, Judge Ubiadas conduct on this matter cannot be
readily characterized as gross ignorance or gross misconduct in the absence of specific guidelines which the
OCA itself stated in its report as necessary as a standard to measure the propriety or impropriety of mitigation
of a bondsmans liability.

Anent the second issue, We hold that Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of
court business and of violations of existing SC circulars.

The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within which to decide cases or
resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. 113 Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges
to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.114 In addition, this Court
laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that [j]udges shall observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or
resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so. We have reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution
for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.

In his letter, Judge Ubiadas cited his health conditions as an explanation for the delay in
deciding/resolving the cases/other matters submitted for decision/resolution in Branch 72. Judge Ubiadas
averred that on August 2, 1997, he suffered a heart attack, diagnosed as myocardial infraction, and was
confined in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the UST Hospital. He had a second heart attack on January 2, 1998,
this time it was diagnosed as cardiac arrest. Again, he was confined in the ICU of the same hospital. Then a
third heart attack occurred in July 1998, which, although not as serious as the first and second attacks,
nevertheless, required his confinement at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital.

Judge Ubiadas further explained that he was confined since March 19, 1999 and subjected to a triple
by-pass operation on April 13, 1999. It was only on June 1, 1999 that he was able to return to work.
Notwithstanding his failing health then, he still acted as the judge of the four (4) RTCs for two (2) months as:
(1) presiding judge of Br. 72; (2) pairing judge of Br. 73;115 (2) acting presiding judge of Br. 75;116 and (3)
pairing judge of Br. 74.117

Indeed, Judge Ubiadas illness could have adversely affected the performance of his duties. Despite
having just been subjected to a triple by-pass operation, he knew fully well that he still had to act as the judge
of four (4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered him in the discharge
of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have requested this Court for additional time to decide/resolve pending
cases and incidents. His illness cannot be an excuse for his failure to render decisions or resolutions within the
constitutionally prescribed period, considering that he could have requested an extension or other relief from
this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon him to dispose the cases assigned to him without undue delay.

This Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer justice without undue
delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all levels of our judicial system
cannot be cleared unless every magistrate earnestly, painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate
of the law. Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn, brings the
courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary.118
 On this point, our ruling in another case is instructive:

The Court finds deserving of due consideration, the explanation of respondent Judge
for leaving ten (10) undecided cases before his retirement from the service. Serious illness may
justify the inability of a judge to perform his official duties and functions. But then, the Court
has to enforce what is required by law and to impose a reasonable punishment for violation
thereof. The members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue
delay. Failure to decide cases within the period fixed by law constitutes a neglect of duty, which
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. When he was hindered by a grave
malignancy, it was incumbent upon the respondent Judge to request this Court, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, for additional time to decide the cases which he could not
seasonably act upon and decide. For failing to do so, respondent Judge has to suffer the
consequences of his omission.119 (emphasis supplied)

Aware of the caseload of judges, this Court has viewed with understanding requests for extension
made by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable to decide cases within the 90-day period for doing
so, he can ask for an extension of time for deciding the same. Such requests are generally granted.120

In his letter, Judge Ubiadas acknowledged that it would have been better had he requested for an
extension of time to decide the cases. Yet, he hoped that this Court would understand his failure by explaining
that, [t]o my mind, the measure of a judges efficiency and hard work should be viewed more in the light of
the total work accomplished rather than ask for a prior excuse to decide the case beyond the period allowed
by the Rules.

Judge Ubiadas position is untenable. This Court wishes to remind him that as an official of the Judiciary,
he is expected to follow the rules laid down by this Court for the prompt and speedy disposition of cases.
Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction. If a judge can not comply with this Courts directives on
the matter of disposition of cases, he may seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas should be held administratively
liable. Records show that prior to these consolidated cases, he had been held administratively liable four (4)
times.121 Had he not compulsorily retired on July 3, 2006, the OCA opined that the appropriate penalty would
have been dismissal from service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits except his earned leave credits,
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporation.

Instead, the OCA recommended that Judge Ubiadas be meted the penalty of a fine equivalent to six
(6) months of his salary. We approve the recommended penalty. In one case,122 We explained, thus:

We have always considered the failure of judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days
as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such.
The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstancesthe damage suffered by the parties as a result of delay, the health and
age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case, we set the fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
for failure of a judge to decide 82 cases within the reglementary period, taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was the judges first offense. In another case,
the fine imposed was sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00), for the judge had not decided about
25 or 27 cases. Still in other cases, the fines were variably set at fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), for nineteen (19) cases left undecided, taking into consideration that it was the
judges first offense; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for three (3) undecided criminal
cases; eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case for three (3) years;
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), for not deciding 278 cases within the prescribed period,
taking note of the judges failing health and age; and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), for
belatedly rendering a judgment of acquittal in a murder case, after one-half years from the
date the case was submitted for decision. In another case, suspension without pay for a period
of six (6) months was imposed since, besides the judges failure to timely decide an election
protest for eight (8) months, the judge submitted false certificates of services and was found
guilty of habitual absenteeism. (emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Here, Judge Ubiadas failed to decide 15 cases and 33 motions which were beyond the reglementary
period to decide/resolve. Here were also other matters that were not acted upon. In affirming the OCA
recommended penalty, we took into consideration Judge Ubiadas health. We also noted that his caseload
then was 1,300 more or less and that during his tenure, as in his letter, he has done [his] best and in
 utmost good faith to serve the ends of justice and perform [his] duties as a judge. However, previous
administrative sanctions imposed upon him must likewise to given appropriate weight.

With respect to Judge Caguioa, records show that his letter was referred to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation. At the time of the consolidation of these two administrative matters, the OCA
has yet to submit its report.

We shall dispense with the report and rule on Judge Caguioas liability, if any. In gist, Judge Caguioa
explained that the unresolved cases and motions were not brought to his attention; hence, he was unaware
that there are still matters that he had to address or he could have asked from the Court an extension of time
to decide on them.

The Court takes this opportunity to again remind judges, clerks of court, and all other court employees
that they share the same duty and obligation to dispense justice promptly. They should strive to work together
and mutually assist each other to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, judges have the primary responsibility of
maintaining the professional competence of their staff. Judges should organize and supervise their court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.123

Although Judge Caguioa was merely the acting presiding Judge of Branch 72, he ought to have been
vigilant and probing in the management of the said court. His proffered excuse, that the undecided cases and
unresolved motions were not brought to his attention, is untenable. Accordingly, Judge Caguioa is hereby
reminded to be more circumspect in performing his functions as a judge, whether in his own court or in other
courts where he is just in an acting capacity.

With respect to Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, the OCA recommended that he should be held
administratively liable for gross inefficiency and violations of SC circular and that he be fined in the amount of
P2,000.00.
The OCAs findings are quoted below:

As mentioned, at the end of each month the branch clerk of court shall be responsible
for the preparation of the monthly report of cases and shall be certified under oath as true and
correct by the branch clerk of court and must be also be certified by the presiding judge to the
correctness of the report (A.C. No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004).

Notably, the reports for the months of January to April 2005 were solely signed by
Branch Clerk of Court Gruspe and filed only on June 15, 2005 (Annexes E, F, G). Also, a
comparison of the List of Cases submitted for decision contained in the aforesaid monthly
reports and in the letter-request of Judge Farrales reveals that there are cases in the request
which were not included in the reports as submitted for decision to wit:

Date
Case No. Case Title
Submitted

1. CV No. 354-0-94 G. Dela Llana vs. City of Olongapo 03-21-95

2. CV No. 28-0-00 L. Viacrusis vs. J. Asada, etc. 07-12-00

3. CV No.652-0-00 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-04-04

4. CV No. 456-0-02 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-14-04

5. CR No. 55-01 Pp vs. Wang Chan Chun 03-24-04

6. CR No. 626-02 Pp vs. Judith Villatema 10-20-04

Under the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the negligence of Branch Clerk of
Court Gerry Gruspe in the performance of his duties and responsibilities compounded the
delay in the disposition of cases and his lackadaisical attitude in the supervision of court
personnel aggravated the mismanagement of the courts business. If he is only assiduous in the
performance of his official duties and in supervising the court personnel and managing the
courts dockets, the prompt disposition of the courts business will be attained, despite the
failure of Judge Ubiadas to adopt an efficient system of court management.

A Clerk of Court who is lax in the supervision of court personnel is subject to disciplinary
action.

However, considering that this is the first time that the said Clerk of Court has
committed the said infraction and in order to avoid repetition of similar offense, a fine in the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (Php2,000.00) with a stern warning that his failure to submit
the reportorial requirements on time and similar lapses in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
 In his letter, Atty. Gruspe informed the Court that he personally prepared the data in the Monthly
Report of Cases Form and that he had already issued writs of executions in Criminal Cases Nos. 124-03 (B.
Sangco), 296-03 and 297-03 (I-Baula) and 501-03. He apologized for the delay in its submission due to heavy
workload. Also, Atty. Gruspe averred that he has been a Clerk of Court V in Branch 72 and legal researcher at
the same time since September 1, 2000. In the early part of 2005, he assumed the duties of the interpreter in
addition to his functions and other duties assigned by his judge. His duty as interpreter lasted for several
months until the appointment of a regular interpreter.

After consideration of the foregoing, We agree with the OCAs findings and recommendation. In Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod
City,124 we held that a branch clerk of courts administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice. A branch clerk of court is charged with the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records, besides having supervision over court personnel. Having been assigned a key
role in the complement of the court, one cannot be permitted to slacken on ones job under one pretext or
another. The clerk of court in this case was advised to be assiduous in performing official duties and in
supervising and managing court dockets and records.

In another case,125 We held:

Clerks of Court Caparros and Pulgar-Navarro should be reminded that they are ranking
officers in our judicial system. It is their basic responsibilities to conduct docket inventory and
to ensure that the records of each case are constantly accounted for. The volume of work
cannot be an excuse for their being remiss in the performance of these functions, and it may
not be underscored enough that the office of a clerk of court involves the performance of
delicate administrative duties essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice.
(citations omitted)

Thus, under Section 52 (B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple
neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that this is Atty.
Gruspes first offense, he should be imposed a fine of P2,000.00.

As regards the docket books, the OCA did not receive any updates from Misses Catalina A. Atienza and
Rizanilla R. Vito from the time that the Memorandum dated October 23, 2007 was submitted to the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:

1. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, retired Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City, is
GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violations of SC circular and hereby FINED an amount
equivalent to his six (6) months salary;

2. Judge Ramon S. Caguio, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 74, Olongapo City, is REMINDED to
be more circumspect in the performance of his duties;

3. Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Gerry R. Gruspe RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City, is GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and hereby FINED the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt
with more severely;

4. Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket Books, same
Court, are DIRECTED to submit quarterly reports until the updating of the docket books are
completed with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same lapses shall be dealt with more
severely;

5. The Documentation Division-Legal OCA is DIRECTED to collect from Pacific Union Insurance
Company Incorporated its liability for forfeited bonds in the following cases:

CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF

THE BOND

Atty. John V. Aquino

Php256,000.00
 488-0, Series of Office of the Clerk of
2005 Court
Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks
Bond

72 CR No. 435-02 Php Bond of accused

12,000.00 Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00
which was reduced
to 15% included in
the Php530,000.00
reduced bond.
74 CR Nos. 321- 64,000.00
02- and 270-02
75 CR Nos. 662- 180,000.00
Not paid yet paid to
03,
the OCC
134-03 and
743-03

6. the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to report on and recommend guidelines
for the reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in forfeited bonds within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151970 May 7, 2008

WINSTON MENDOZA and FE MICLAT, petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO ALARMA and FAUSTA ALARMA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 9 July 2001 and Resolution3
dated 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58139.

The Facts

Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents) are the owners of an 11.7 hectare parcel of land (land)
located in Iba, Zambales. The land, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2087 of Iba Cadastre, was posted as a
property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms
in Criminal Case No. 1417-I, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gregorio Cayan, et al."
When the accused failed to appear in court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court ordered his arrest
and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. It also directed the bondsmen to produce
within a period of 30 days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered
against the bail bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court
issued a writ of execution against the land in an Order dated 14 April 1986.4 The land was eventually sold at
public auction and petitioners Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat emerged as the highest bidders. Thus, the land
was awarded to petitioners and they immediately took possession of the same.

Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners with the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70,5 grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating
to the property bond. During the pre-trial conducted on 3 May 1988, the parties agreed that the property
would be placed in the possession of respondents. On 2 August 1989, the court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint and declaring that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the
execution, sale, and issuance of the writ of possession.6 Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 101103 and entitled "Winston Mendoza, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al." In a Resolution dated 18 March 1992, this Court denied the petition and ruled with finality
that the assailed 14 April 1986 Order was not a judgment on the bond.7

Meanwhile, petitioners applied for the registration of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 70.8 On 9 September 1987, the trial court granted the registration and issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. O-7249 in the name of petitioners.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

Respondents then filed an action for the annulment of title and reconveyance of ownership of the land
covered by OCT No. O-7249 with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71.9 On 24 September
1997, the trial court dismissed the action contending that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, a co-equal court.10 The trial court declared
further that since the issue of the case was the validity of OCT No. O-7249, the case should have been filed
with the Court of Appeals which has exclusive original jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of a Regional
Trial Court.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the findings of the trial court and
annulled OCT No. O-7249.11 The appellate court also ordered that a new title over the property be issued in
the name of respondents. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied in
a Resolution dated 30 January 2002.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings
and in ordering the annulment of OCT No. O-7249.

Petitioners contend that even if the execution proceedings were nullified, they were not privy to the
irregularities of the auction sale. Thus, as buyers in good faith, they must be protected by the law.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the basis for the acquisition of the land and the issuance of
title over it had already been declared void by this Court in G.R. No. 101103. Thus, petitioners cannot now
claim good faith. With no valid title to the land, petitioners must reconvey the land to respondents.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules,
his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the
accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen
given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen
must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of
the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

The provision clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a
judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. In Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Amante, Jr.,12
we outlined the two occasions upon which the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in
cases when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the
judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the
bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not
be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period, during which the
bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a
judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such
judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the
accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.13

In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court and that the
trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day
period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had
passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the
bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up
for sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest bidders.

These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued,
not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.

An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be
done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. In
People v. Dizon,14 we held that an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant "to show
cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different
from a judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The
judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes
final, execution may issue at once.15 However, in this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has
an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this
violated respondents’ right to procedural due process.

In addition, we find that the issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is no longer material.
This Court in a previous case had already ruled upon the invalidity of the execution and sale of the land. As a
result, the basis for which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on. The appellate court,
therefore, was correct in ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a matter of course. There being
no valid title nor any right to possess the land, reconveyance to the respondents is only proper under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 July 2001 Decision and 30 January 2002 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58139.

SO ORDERED.

Section 22

G.R. Nos. 156687-88 May 21, 2009

PANFILO D. BONGCAC, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FORTUNATO LIM, and TORIBIO BON,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Facts

The Mayor of Tagbilaran City, Jose V. Torralba, designated his secretary, petitioner Panfilo D. Bongcac
(petitioner), as the "Mayor’s representative to the City Market Committee," "Consultant and Coordinator on
market matters," and "adviser to the Acting Market Administrator." In January 1991, respondents Engr.
Fortunato Lim (Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran
City and were referred to petitioner. Petitioner showed them the Minutes of the City Market Committee
meeting held on 9 January 1991 which included their names as among the awardees of the market stalls.
Petitioner informed Lim and Bon that the city government could not afford to construct a new market and if
they were interested, they should give him more money for the construction of the stalls or tiendas they were
applying for. Accordingly, Lim issued and delivered to petitioner a BPI check, pay to cash, in the amount of
₱62,000. Bon issued and delivered to petitioner two Metrobank checks, pay to cash, in the amounts of
₱30,000 and ₱10,000. Petitioner issued handwritten receipts to Lim and Bon. Petitioner assured Lim that his
stalls would be finished on or before 30 June 1991 and promised Bon that his stall would be finished before
the fiesta in Tagbilaran City. The checks were subsequently encashed.

Thereafter, Lim and Bon read in the 30 June 1991 issue of a local newspaper that petitioner was "sacked" as
market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded
that he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already
constructed.
Petitioner failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with two counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 18005 and 18006.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.

On 28 March 2001, the Fourth Division1 of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of
Estafa, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 18005, the accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of ₱54,000.00) defined under subdivision 1,
paragraph (b), and penalized under the 1st paragraph, both of Article 315, Revised Rules of Court, and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from Four (4) Years and Two (2)
Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eleven (11) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify
Engr. Fortunato Lim in the amount of ₱54,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

In Criminal Case No. 18006, the same accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the same crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of ₱35,000.00) defined and penalized under
the aforestated law, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years, Three
(3) Months and Five (5) Days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Nine (9) Years of prision mayor, as
maximum, to indemnify Toribio Bon in the amount of ₱35,000.00; and to pay the costs.2

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The motion
was denied in the Resolution dated 3 September 2001.3

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari4 with this Court, which was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 149711-12. The petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

On 20 February 2002, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 149711-12, issued a Resolution denying the petition for: (a)
failure of the petition to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision and resolution; and (b) failure of the petition to show extraordinary circumstance
justifying a departure from the established doctrine that findings of facts of the Sandiganbayan are well-nigh
conclusive on this Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.5 No motion for reconsideration was
filed. Consequently, the Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002.6

On 4 December 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing them to be
present on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases.7

On 26 December 2002, petitioner filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief
with this Court. The petition sought to "reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan" and to
"declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged."8

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006, a Manifestation
and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in
abeyance to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed in G.R.
Nos. 149711-12.9

On 10 January 2003, the Fourth Division10 of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos.
18005 and 18006 denying, for lack of merit, petitioner’s Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend
Further Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve
the sentence imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered
cancelled. Petitioner was given five days to voluntarily surrender.11
On 3 March 2003, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 denying, for lack of merit, the Very
Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order praying that the Resolution dated 10 January 2003
issued by the Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the bench warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the
bail bond pending resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Petitioner
likewise sought to suspend the final execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision until after the
resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

Respondents People of the Philippines (People) and Lim filed their respective Comments to the petition.
Respondent Bon did not file his comment and the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the comment
as the notices sent to him were returned with the notation "RTS party abroad, USA."12

The People, in its Comment, asserted that this Court had no more jurisdiction to entertain the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief because the Court’s Resolution of 20 February 2002 in G.R. Nos. 149711-12
had already become final and executory. Petitioner’s bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon
execution of the judgment of conviction.

In his Comment, respondent Lim alleged that the instant petition should be dismissed outright. He argued
that the present petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days and that the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief was not sanctioned by the Rules of Civil Procedure and was barred by res
judicata. He further argued that the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the present petition are
obviously dilatory tactics to delay the execution of judgment in the criminal cases.

Issue

The resolution of the present petition hinges on the sole issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioner’s motion to hold in
abeyance the execution of judgment.

The Court’s Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

Petitioner appealed the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision via a petition for review on certiorari before
this Court. The appeal was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149711-12. This Court, however, denied that petition in the
Resolution of 20 February 2002. The Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April
2002 after petitioner failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the 28 March 2001
Sandiganbayan Decision likewise became final and executory. Petitioner could no longer seek a reversal of the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan, as what petitioner did when he filed the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief.1avvphi1.zw+

In the present petition, petitioner prayed that the execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision
be "suspended until after final resolution of petitioner’s Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief." The
Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 sought to "reverse and set aside the
decision of the Sandiganbayan" and to "declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged." While
technically, the Very Urgent Petition for Extraodinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 is not sanctioned by
the rules, nonetheless, that petition was likewise denied in the Court’s Resolution of 3 March 2003. It is clear,
therefore, that the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the instant petition are merely dilatory
tactics employed by petitioner in his efforts to delay the execution of the judgment in the criminal cases for
estafa which had long become final and executory.
 Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment.
Execution of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in
court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he
should not be permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001
Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision,
amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after
it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. In Lim v. Jabalde,13
this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated
to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon
any attempt to prolong them.

Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as
a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the "life of the law."14 To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is
to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should
write finis to this litigation. Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion when the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion to hold in abeyance the execution of judgment.1avvphi1

On the cancellation of petitioner’s cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction.
Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail
may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (emphasis supplied).

From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of
conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioner’s cash bailbond after the judgment of
conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 157147 April 17, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO CAWALING, Accused -Appellant.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

We are confronted with conflicting accounts of the commission of a crime, a reverse whodunit1 rivaling the murder mysteries
of Agatha Christie, in this review of the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) conviction of accused Wilfredo Cawaling for murder and
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.2 However, unlike Agatha Christie, we are guided by the test of moral
certainty in ascertaining the guilt of the accused.

This legal poser arose because, after the prosecution presented an eyewitness to the crime pointing to Cawaling as the
perpetrator thereof, the defense offered the testimony of a person, initially charged with Cawaling in the same Information
and who previously pled not guilty to the crime, confessing that it was he, and not Cawaling, who murdered the victim.

Even the two courts below us parleyed and rendered conflicting decisions. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) partially upheld the
defense’s version of the events, rejected the prosecution’s eyewitness account of the murder and convicted Cawaling only as
an accomplice to the offense of homicide. In stark contrast, the CA found the eyewitness’ testimony credible and convicted
Cawaling of murder.

The following are the long and arduous facts, seen and appreciated from two different perspectives by the lower courts.

Cawaling was charged with Murder in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of April, 1987, in sitio Hinulugan, barangay Agcogon, municipality of San Jose, province of
Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
conspired and confederated with Palti Umambong whose case was already dismissed after arraignment, did then and there
by means of treachery, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a firearm the late ex-vice mayor
Leodegario Capispisan, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal gunshot wounds in different parts of his body which were
the direct and immediately (sic) cause of his instantaneous death, thus causing damage and prejudice to his family.

Contrary to law.3

The RTC laid out the facts based on the testimonies of the witnesses, to wit:

The forerunner of the case at bench was OD-275, for murder. It was filed on June 24, 1987.

The respondents were Palti Umambong and Wilfredo Cawaling.

The case against Umambong was dismissed on January 25, 1991 on the basis of an affidavit of desistance.

On February 4, 1991, this Court likewise dismissed the case against Cawaling upon the initiative of the prosecution.

Four (4) years thereafter, specifically on August 17, 1995, Cawaling was arrested, the case against him for murder having been
revived and accordingly docketed as OD-852.

xxx

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The Prosecution presented three (3) witnesses.

Rommel Brigido, 29 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon, testified as follows:

That witness was with the accused Wilfredo and Palti in coming from the town of San Jose to barangay Busay.

That they passed by the house of Porferio Bina where they drank the locally fermented "tuba."

Later, he saw accused Wilfredo sitting on a bench under the "talisay" tree on the other side of the road.

Thereafter, he saw Leodegario, Gloria, Roberto and Leon passing by the road. When Leodegario got near the bench where
Wilfredo was seated, the latter suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario saying "who is brave," and two shots
rang out and that there was a handkerchief covering the gun (t.s.n., p. 4, 8/23/95).

That the distance between Wilfredo and Leodegario was six (6) meters.

Witness, on direct examination, declared that although he was the companion of Wilfredo in coming from the town, he ran
away and that he did not anymore know what happened to Leodegario (t.s.n., p. 5, supra).

On cross-examination, witness Rommel admitted that he executed and affixed his signature on an affidavit (Exh. "1" and "1-
A") and that the same was executed only on July 27, 1995 narrating therein the incident that happened [in] April 1987.

Asked as to why witness took a long time before executing the affidavit, he commented that the case then was dismissed, and
that Wilfredo is a dangerous man having recently killed his uncle Rexinol Brigido.

Rommel elaborated further that he was ten (10) meters away from Wilfredo and also of the same distance to Leodegario.

Rommel declared that Palti was on a stump of a chainsawed coconut tree and about six (6) meters away from Wilfredo (t.s.n.,
p. 13, August 23, 1995).

Palti did not [run] away (t.s.n., p. 15, supra).

When asked what was Wilfredo doing after the shooting of Leodegario, Rommel said that Wilfredo was going around,
"pointing his gun and firing out, causing people to scamper away (t.s.n., p. 5, August 25, 1995).

On clarificatory questions of the Court, Rommel admitted that "it was only Wilfredo who pointed a gun towards Leodegario,
although Palti was also holding a gun but pointed downward."

Gloria Valentin Capispisan, 34 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon, the second witness for the
Prosecution testified thus –

She know(s) Wilfredo since childhood and that the victim Leodegario is her father-in-law.

At about six o’clock in the evening of April 19, 1987 she was near the house of Porferio after coming from the political caucus
at the house of Romy Roldan who was then the OIC Mayor of San Jose, and a supporter of Natalio Beltran, Jr.

She was in the company of Themestocles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos, Roberto Capispisan, Leodegario
Capispisan and two others, and that she is the wife of Roberto Capispisan.

While negotiating the way home she saw Wilfredo seated on a bench along the road about ten (10) meters away from her
and demonstrated that Wilfredo’s hands were on his lap, the left covered by a handkerchief and the right over the
handkerchief.
Wilfredo, according to witness, suddenly stood up and pointed his gun towards Leodegario and "I heard two shots" with
Leodegario falling to the ground on his back (t.s.n. p. 6, 8/24/95).

She attempted to approach Leodegario, her father-in-law but "she saw Palti with a gun" so she ran away (t.s.n. p. 8, supra).

On question of the private prosecutor whether she saw the gun while Wilfredo was sitting, she replied that she could not see
it because it was covered by a handkerchief.

Asked as to the possible reasons why Wilfredo shot Leodegario, Gloria hinted that her father-in-law left the SAKADA and
secondly, because of politics, the victim being the supporter of Natalio Beltran, Jr., while Wilfredo was for Manuel Martinez,
candidates then for Congressmen.

Likewise, she testified that the case against Wilfredo relative to the incident of 1987 where Leodegario was the victim was
dismissed because of settlement, the accused and Lilia Capispisan, the wife of the victim, are first cousins.

Queried as to whether the agreed settlement came about, Gloria said that the accused was able to produce only one-half of
the monetary consideration, and that the condition that Wilfredo will not stay in San Jose, Romblon was not complied with
because the latter even ran as barangay captain and that accused shot and killed the nephew of her father-in-law, Rexinol
Brigido and even pointed the gun to her husband for two (2) times (t.s.n. p. 11, 8/24/95).

In the course of the cross-examination of Gloria she admitted having seen the affidavit of waiver and desistance (Exh. "2" for
the defense).

Gloria testified that before the shooting, she "saw Palti Umambong having a gun" (t.s.n. p. 14, Ibid).

In the hearing of August 25, 1995, Gloria admitted that she saw Palti when Leodegario was already dead and that "he chased
us."

After the shooting, Gloria testified that she saw Wilfredo [run] after her companions, firing a gun (t.s.n. p. 7, supra)

Elaborating further, Gloria testified that she "saw Palti who had a gun" and Palti chased her with a gun on his hand (t.s.n. p.
17, supra) and that Palti was near Leodegario lying on the ground, about three (3) meters.

On additional cross-examination of Gloria, she admitted that she executed an affidavit, regarding the incident on May 5, 1987
(Exh. "2" and "2-A" for the defense), while the signatures of the witnesses on the first and second pages were marked as
Exhibit "2-B" and "2-C".

Relative to her affidavit, Gloria narrated in her sworn affidavit that "without any reason he just shot my father-in-law."

As to why she did not include the name Rommel in her affidavit, she said it was because Rommel was the companion of
Wilfredo (t.s.n. p. 10, 1/12/98)

To establish the presence of Rommel during the incident, Gloria categorically stated that Rommel was at the side of Wilfredo.

xxxx

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

Palti Umambong, 53 years old, married, farmer, and resident of Hinulogan, San Jose, Romblon narrated thus –

That it was him who shot and killed Leodegario.

On April 19, 1987, he was in the cockpit of San Jose, and that his fighting cock was pitted against that being handled by
Leodegario.

He bet ₱100.00 and referee Pedro Venus declared his cock as the winner. He demanded his winning from the one listing the
bets but was told that the bettor on the losing side did not pay, and when he demanded from Leodegario his winning bet, he
was told by the latter that he will not pay because the decision of the referee was unfair (t.s.n., p. 6, 7/17/98).

Leodegario stood up and swung his right arm forward with a clenched fist and because of this Palti got angry prompting him
to go home, but passed by the house of Porferio.

Near the house of Porferio he shot Leodegario because the latter did not pay him.

When he reached the road fronting that of Porferio, he stopped because he was called by Wilfredo who was seated on a
bench beside the road and asked as to what happened in the cockpit and told the latter that he won except that he was not
paid by Leodegario (t.s.n., pp. 11 and 12, supra).

Later on, as witness testified, Leodegario passed by near the house of Porferio and Palti accosted him and demanded payment,
but Leodegario retreated two steps backward and was getting something from his waist as if drawing a gun and then he shot
the victim twice resulting to Leodegario falling down on his back (t.s.n., pp. 3-4, supra).

After the shooting he walked towards his house, and told his wife that he’d done something wrong, that is, that he killed a
person – a certain Leodegario and that he (witness) will go away. He looked for a sailboat and found one at Pinamihagan. He
hired the sailboat and reached Aklan (t.s.n., pp. 16, 17, supra).

He stayed in Aklan for three years.

Palti, on redirect and recross examination, testified that he hid his gun before proceeding to the cockpit and retrieved the
same on his way from the cockpit and before he met Wilfredo (t.s.n., p. 34, 8/24/98).

xxxx

Wilfredo Cawaling, 56 years old, married, a resident of Nabas, Aklan, and the accused in this case testified as follows:

He testified that noontime of April 19, 1987 he was at Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon at the residence of his sister, Heide
Casimero where he took his lunch.

Thereafter, accused went to his parents[’] house at Hinulugan, Busay, San Jose, in the company of Rommel and Rudy de Villa,
and that while walking towards Hinulugan they passed by the house of Porferio where he bought "tuba." All the time, he was
with Rommel except for Rudy de Villa who proceeded to Busay.

While waiting for the "tuba," Rommel went to the back of the house of Porferio where he played volleyball together with
Ricky and the latters['] brothers.

At the time he was waiting for the "tuba" he saw Palti walking along the road towards the house of Porferio. Thereafter, he
beckoned Palti to come to him and asked him about the cockfight. Palti informed him that the latter’s fighting cock won but
that he was not paid his wining bet (t.s.n., p. 8, 10/24/98).

That while he was conversing with Palti, he saw Leodegario on the road walking towards them in the company of Leon.
Immediately, Palti turned his back and faced Leodegario and demanded again his winnings (t.s.n., p. 18, 10/14/98). Thereafter,
he heard, Leodegario shouting "bakit ka makulit" and Palti retort[ed] by saying, "manloloko ka." At this point in time, with Palti
pointing his three fingers to Leodegario, the latter retreated two steps backward and acted as if to draw something from his
right waist which prompted Palti to raise his t-shirt and draw a revolver and fired at the victim. (t.s.n., p. 19, supra). As a result
of which the victim fell down on his back. Leon who was in the company of the victim ran away after the shooting incident.

And that Rommel who was at the back of the house of Porferio also ran away (t.s.n., p. 22, 10/14/98).

After the incident he stayed in his parents[’] residence at sitio Hinulugan and the following day the 23rd of May, he returned
to Nabas, Aklan where he resides.

Failing to get his visa for Saudi Arabia, accused looked for a job in Manila, and finally worked at a logging company in Baler,
Quezon where he was the operations manager. He worked in that logging company for almost two years, and after his work
was terminated he went back to Nabas, Aklan.

In 1998 he returned again to Manila. While in the city he received a letter from his father informing him that he together with
Palti were charged of murder before this Court and that there will be a hearing of their case and so he attended the same.

The case against him was dismissed [in] February 1991 (Exhibit "2") because the complainant, the wife of the victim, executed
an affidavit of waiver (Exhibit "1").

After the dismissal of the case, accused went to Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in 1992 he ran and was elected as
barangay captain of Busay, San Jose, Romblon.

In 1995 he ran for mayor but lost the election to Mayor Filipino Tandog. He then filed an election protest in this Court. On the
scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and upon inquiry with the arresting officer he was told that the dismissed
case was refiled, by the same prosecutor who dismissed the original case.

Accused denied the assertion of Rommel that he shot the victim contending this witness was at the back portion of the house
of Porferio at the time of the incident (t.s.n., p. 30, 10/14/98).

That when Palti confronted Leodegario about the former’s winning bet in the cockfight he was five (5) meters distant from
them and that he not only heard Palti saying "manloloko ka" but pointed his fingers to the victim.

At that instant, witness continued, the victim withdrew by about two (2) steps and appeared to be pulling out something.

Thereafter, Palti raised his t-shirt, drew his gun and shot the victim (t.s.n., p. 6, 11/4/98).

Accused could determine the distance of Palti from where he was but Palti’s back was facing towards him and Leodegario was
in front of Palti.

Thereafter, he saw Palti [run] towards Busay and found himself running too in the direction of his father’s house, also in
Busay.4

On the other hand, the findings of fact of the CA are set forth, as follows:

The version of the prosecution is narrated in good detail in the People’s Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General:

At about six o’clock in the evening of April 19, 1987, at Hinulugan, San Jose, Romblon while on their way home from the town
proper, Wilfredo Cawaling, Palti Umambong and Rommel Brigido passed-by (sic) the house of Porferia Vina to have a drink of
tuba. While drinking tuba, Leodegario Capispisan, Gloria Capispisan, Roberto Capispisan, Leon Barrientos, Themosticles Sulat,
Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio and two others came heading toward their direction (pp. 2-4, tsn, August 23, 1995). When Leodegario
Capispisan was about two meters near appellant, who was seated on the bench by the road, appellant stood up, pointed his
gun to (sic) Leodegario and taunted the latter for his bravery. Thereafter, two (2) gun shots were heard (p. 4, tsn, August 23,
1995). All the while, Brigido was seated on the table fronting the road drinking tuba with the others. He was about ten (10)
meters from the talisay tree where appellant was seated. Palti Umambong, on the other hand, was standing on the stump of
the coconut tree at about six (6) meters distance from appellant (pp. 7-8, tsn, August 23, 1995). From said distance, he saw
Leodegario step back by about one (1) meter, raising his hand in surrender. Brigido then heard two (2) gunshots. Brigido also
saw Palti Umambong holding a gun but the same was pointed downward (p. 4, Records; pp. 23-24, tsn, August 23, 1995).

Upon hearing the shots, the people scampered away, including Brigido and Gloria, who also panicked and ran, leaving
appellant and Umambong behind Leodegario Capispisan sprawled on the ground dead (p. 25, tsn, August 23, 1995; see also
pp. 3-8, tsn, August 24, 1995).

The defendant, for his part, understandably presented a different version.

Accused claimed that about four o’clock in the afternoon of April 19, 1987, he left his sister’s house to go to Barangay Busay
together with Rommel Brigido and Rudy de Villa who happened to pass by his sister’s house on their way to Hinulugan where
they also reside; that on their way to Hinulugan he and Brigido stopped to buy tuba at the house of Porfiria Bina while Rudy
de Villa continued on his way home; that while he was sitting in front of the house of Porfirio Bina, Palti Umambong came
walking along the road and he asked Palti about the cockfight that afternoon; that Palti told him that he was not paid his
winning bet of ₱100.00 by Leodegario when his (Palti’s) cock won; that Leodegario refused to pay him alleging that the
decision of the referee was unfair; that when he insisted to collect from Leodegario the amount he won, Leodegario got angry
at him and wanted to punch him.

Appellant at this time saw Leodegario and Lean Barrientos walking along the road towards their direction. When the two came
upon them, Palti stopped Leodegario and asked him again to pay him what he won; that Leodegario remarked "bakit ka
makulit?"; that Palti reacted by shouting "manloloko ka" at the same time pointing a finger at Leodegario.

At this point, Leodegario moved two steps backward and acted as if to draw something from his waist which prompted Palti
to fire his revolver at the victim.

Leodegario then fell down on his back.

The widow and the children of Leodegario Capispisan executed an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance dated January 24, 1991
signed by Lilia M. Capispisan and her eight (8) children praying the authorities concerned "to consider the investigation of the
criminal case against Wilfredo Cawaling, et al., terminated or caused to be terminated."

Accordingly, Judge Cezar R. Maravilla issued the Order dated February 4, 1991 dismissing the case against Wilfredo Cawaling
without cost.

Four (4) years later, an Information charging Cawaling with murder was refiled.

On December 15, 1999, following the submission of the case for decision, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Odiongan,
Romblon, rendered judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, WILFREDO CAWALING is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice
to the offense of homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision
mayor medium as maximum there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, or, from 4 years and 2 months to 8
years and 1 day with all its accessory penalties.

The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code on preventive imprisonment.

Accused, in case of appeal of the Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended.

With costs.
SO ORDERED.5

Consistent with paragraph 2,6 Section 13 of Rule 124, the CA certified the case and elevated the records to us for review.

Cawaling, in his Appellant’s Brief, posits the following assignment of errors:

1. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it convicted the herein accused-appellant of Murder without
sufficient and credible evidence.

2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it disregarded the findings of the trial court on the aspect of the
credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and their testimonies, despite well-established jurisprudence on the
matter.7

As the assigned errors are intertwined, we shall discuss and resolve both simultaneously.

Cawaling maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof in criminal cases because the
eyewitness testimony of Rommel Brigido, as corroborated by Gloria Capispisan, is not credible. He asserts that the RTC’s
findings on the credibility of the witnesses should not have been disregarded by the CA. Specifically, Cawaling points out that,
as held by the RTC, the testimony of Palti Umambong, the self-confessed killer of the victim, was more worthy of credence.
As such, Cawaling prays that the decision of the CA be reversed and set aside, and a new one issued, acquitting and
exonerating him of the crime charged.

Conversely, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the RTC overlooked facts and circumstances when it found
Cawaling liable merely as an accomplice to the crime of homicide. The OSG avers that the delay in the execution of Rommel
Brigido’s affidavit and the failure of the witnesses to identify the gun used by Cawaling do not diminish their credibility. In all,
the OSG insists that the CA’s reversal of the RTC decision was warranted.

Consequently, we juxtapose the conflicting findings of the two lower courts.

The RTC’s findings zero in on Rommel Brigido’s belated execution of an affidavit which, for the lower court, completely
diminished his credibility, to wit:

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

On the third issue, the Court painstakingly perused the record of the case with objectivity and an open mind, probing and
analyzing the pros and cons so as to arrive at a definitive conclusion thus eliminating the possibility of error and misjudgment.

In the testimony of Rommel in 1995 during the hearing of the petition for bail, the following incidents came into light.

Rommel asseverated that he was the companion of Wilfredo and Palti when they came from the town of San Jose, Romblon.

When Leodegario got near the bench where Wilfredo was seated, the latter "pointed his gun towards Leodegario and two
shots rang out" and that there was a handkerchief covering the gun (t.s.n., p. 4, 9/28).

When he saw Wilfredo pointing his gun towards Leodegario, he also "saw Palti holding a gun pointing downward."

By a simple process of mathematical computation Rommel who initially testified in 1995 at age 29 was only 20 or 21 at the
time of the incident in 1987. For one to remember the minutest details of events that happened eight years ago, merits the
Court’s attention why it is so.
When the witness testified that the gun which Wilfredo was holding was covered with a handkerchief, it is crystal clear that
he did not see the gun itself but probably the likeness of a gun, or, after the death of Leodegario his mind had been conditioned
to conclude that what was covered by the handkerchief was a gun.

By testifying that he saw "Palti holding a gun" at the time that Wilfredo was pointing his gun towards Leodegario, a disquieting
poser comes up: Why was Palti holding a gun? Did he fire his gun? Or did he not?

Although Rommel said Palti did not fire his gun, it cannot be the gospel truth. It does not mean that Palti did not fire his gun,
those critical moments of April 19, 1987.

Remember that Rommel categorically stated that he was ten (10) meters distant from Wilfredo when the incident happened.
Six o’clock in the afternoon, the beginning of nighttime and the end of daytime, is "nag-aagaw ang liwanag at dilim." And with
the distance mentioned by Rommel it is hard to say with definiteness as to whose gun the shot came from, unless there is
only one person in the vicinity. It could be from the gun of Palti who was visibly seen by Gloria and Rommel as holding a gun
and not Wilfredo because his hand allegedly with a gun was covered by a handkerchief thus impairing their vision of the
firearm.

The squeezing of a trigger requires only a fraction of a second, without unnecessary movement of body. For one to say he
saw someone pulling the trigger of a gun at a distance of ten (10) meters and at a semi-darkness of the day is stretching the
mind too far. One may hear the report of a gun but not the pulling of the trigger at the distance aforestated.

A presumption thus arises that a person allegedly holding a gun covered by a handkerchief, if said person is the only one in
the premises, the report of a gun could be attributed to him.

But what if there were two persons? As in this case?

As to the credibility of Rommel, it may be stated that when the case originally filed against Wilfredo and Palti on June 24, 1987
and docketed as OD-275, Rommel was not listed as a witness for the prosecution. It was only in 1995 when the case was
revived that he gave his testimony for the prosecution. So, it took him eight (8) years after 1987 to air his side of the incident.
Like in the case filed in 1987 Rommel was also not listed in the information filed in 1995 as a witness for the prosecution. This
creates a [sic] serious doubts in the mind of the Court.

A surprise witness.

The explanation for the delay was because the case was dismissed. Yes, the explanation seems plausible but one cannot
disregard the fact that Rommel never did execute an affidavit or sworn statement inculpating Wilfredo as the assailant of
Leodegario from 1987 to the early part of 1995.

He only surfaced in 1995.

Whatever is in the mind of Rommel, is beyond this Court’s comprehension, although such state of mind and the forces at
work can be reasonably inferred from the acts and submission of the witness.

What, therefore, prompted Rommel to come out of his self-imposed silence for eight years and [give] his testimony in this
case?

First of all, as the record would show Rommel was more or less, an "alalay" or friend of Wilfredo. For short, they are in good
terms with one another. In 1987 and prior to that.

This harmonious relationship may have ended when Rommel was not taken in as a candidate for vice mayor by Wilfredo when
the latter ran for mayor.
As things go by, Rommel instead ran for vice mayor as an independent, but lost. With this, it means a break-up in their personal
relationship.

Politics had taken a toll.

Finally, Rommel emerged as a winner in the last political exercise where he was elected to the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose,
under another political patronage.

The testimony of Rommel, therefore, remains suspect considering that he testified that (a) Wilfredo is a dangerous man and
had killed his uncle Rexinel Brigido, (b) he saw a gun in the hand of Wilfredo "but covered by handkerchief, (c) he saw Palti at
that critical moment holding a gun, (d) the long delay in giving his testimony, and (e) the supervening events after 1987.

These circumstances have created doubts in the mind of the Court.

xxxx

The undisputed assertion of Gloria and Rommel that Palti was holding a gun pointed downward (Rommel) and that she saw
before the shooting Palti holding a gun (Gloria) are proof enough that Palti was holding a gun before, during and after the
killing of Leodegario. Coupled by the admission in open Court by Palti that it was him who shot the victim, these pieces of
evidence bear the earmarks of truth, no evidence to the contrary having been proved and established by the prosecution.

Why was Palti holding a gun at the crucial minutes of the incident? Did he or did not fire his gun?

What had motivated Palti to shoot Leodegario as alleged by him? What possible reason would it be?

Remember that he was not paid his winning bet of ₱100.00 by Leodegario despite his repeated demands. The words
"manloloko" (Palti) and "makulit ka" (Leodegario) are expletives bordering on violence.

What did the prosecution witnesses say about Palti? As pointed out by this court Palti’s participation was downgraded to the
point that Palti was merely "holding a gun." The heat was on Wilfredo not Palti. It is understandable because it would be an
exercise in futility to pin down Palti in the killing because he cannot anymore be proceeded against in view of the double
jeopardy rule.

These circumstances amply suffice [to support] the Court’s findings that Palti committed the offense.

xxxx

Be that as it may, circumstances are aplenty – by Palti’s admission and the testimony of Rommel and Gloria that he (Palti) was
holding a gun – that if put on the dock Palti would have been found culpable for homicide and not murder. The lesser offense
of homicide because the prosecution failed to establish and prove that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
existed in the commission of the offense. Three requisites must be duly proved before evident premeditation may be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, namely: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such a
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The killing of Leodegario was at the spur of the moment. An unpremeditated killing.

xxxx

The question to be asked: Could an accomplice be convicted even if the principal has not been tried and convicted? The
answer is yes. If principal is at large, still an accomplice can be convicted so long as the crime is fully established and the
requisites for conviction as an accomplice are present.
Again, reliance on the autopsy report of Dr. Edmundo Reloj (Exh. "A") is necessary if only to determine the number of bullet
wounds the victim sustained. The doctor mentioned of two (2) wounds, entrance and exit. In other words, only one bullet
entered the body of the victim, resulting however to two (2) wounds, the entrance and the exit. Therefore, there as only one
assailant, contrary to the allegation in the information that the victim suffered "serious and mortal gunshot wounds in
different part[s] of his body" and the testimony of Rommel and Gloria that "two shots rang out."

xxxx

Wilfredo, on the other hand, cannot be faulted for the killing of Leodegario, but is found, on the basis of the evidence, as an
accomplice in that Wilfredo according to Rommel was "going around pointing his gun to different directions," and Gloria
testifying that "Wilfredo ran after her companions, firing a gun."

The case of People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 where the accused prevented others in helping the victim by scaring them away
is deemed an accomplice only.

In case of doubt the Court must lean to the milder form of penalty, that of an accomplice. (People v. Manlangit, 73 SCRA 49).8

Cawaling took exception to the portion of the RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to homicide, and appealed to
the CA. But as previously mentioned, the CA reversed the RTC decision, convicted Cawaling of murder, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua. The CA found that:

Scrutinizing the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has successfully overthrown the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

Primarily, the appellant questions the credibility of Gloria Capispisan and prosecution rebuttal witness Rommel Brigido who
were present at the time of the commission of the offense. We find no reason, however, why they would lie to implicate the
accused. We find their testimonies straightforward, unhesitating and sincere. Between the self-serving testimonies of the
accused and the positive identification of the assailant made by prosecution witnesses, the latter deserves greater credence.

As correctly pointed out by the appellee, herein appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one
who shot the victim, as follows:

Testimony of Rommel Brigido

Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was seated on the bench by the road, what
happen? (sic)

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan saying: "Who is brave",
and two shots rung out.

Q: You have demonstrated that the gun came from the lap of Wilfredo Cawaling, what if any covers that gun?

A: There was a handkerchief covering that gun.

Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired against Leodegario
Capispisan?

A: Witness pointing at the door with a distance of six (6) meters.

Q: What happen (sic) to Leodegario Capispisan when two shots rung out?

A: He fall (sic) down.

 Q: Under this set up, was there an opportunity for Leodegario Capispisan to be avoiding (sic) the hit?

A: No, sir, because he has no chance to avoid that incident, he raised his two hands, (witness demonstrating
by raising his right and left hands) and moreover the other side of the road is a cliff.

xxxx

Q: What did the accused Cawaling do, the first time that you saw Capispisan approaching on April 19, 1987?

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun and two shots rung out.

xxxx

Testimony of Gloria Capispisan

Q: Mrs. Capispisan, do you know the accused, Wilfredo Cawaling in this case?

A: Yes, sir, I know.

Q: Since when have you known him?

A: I know him since I was a child, since childhood because he was engage (sic) in buying fish.

Q: Where were you residing at the time when you knew Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Sta. Fe, Romblon.

Q: And where was he buying fish during your younger days?

A: He is buying fish from the fishermen at Cabalian, Sta. Fe, Romblon.

Q: Now, since you have known Wilfredo Cawaling for long, please look around and point to him if he is in the
courtroom this morning?

A: I can see him (witness pointing to somebody in the courtroom who when asked his name, replied that he is
Wilfredo Cawaling).

Q: Do you know Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How are you related to the late Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Leodegario Capispisan is my father-in-law.

Q: And where is Leodegario Capispisan now?

A: He is already dead, he was shot by Wilfredo Cawaling.

Q: On April 19, 1987, about six o’clock in the evening, where were you?

A: We were near Porferio Vina.

Q: Where did you come from?

A: We came from the caucus of Romy Roldan.

xxxx

Q: According to you, you attended a caucus in the house of Romy Roldan, who were your companions in going
home from there?

A: My companions were: Themosticles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos, Roberto Capispisan,
Leodegario Capispisan and two other tagalogs and myself.

xxxx

Q: Now, who was ahead while you were on your way home?

A: We were ahead.

Q: When you reached near the place of Porferio Vina, do you know where was Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: I saw him sir.

Q: Where was he?

A: He is sitting in the bench near the street.

Q: Why were you passing the street?

A: That is the only road that we will be passing to Busay.

Q: You claimed that you saw Wilfredo Cawaling seated on a bench, how was he seated, will you demonstrate
that to this Honorable Court?

A: (Witness demonstrating by putting her two hands over her lap with her hand covered by her handkerchief
and the right hand over the handkerchief).

Q: About how far were you from Wilfredo Cawaling when you noticed his sitting in a manner you have
portrayed?

A: About ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Now, when you were near the place already where he was sitting, what happened?

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and he pointed his gun and saying who is brave, by dropping the
handkerchief.

Q: Now, when Wilfredo Cawaling pointed his gun, to whom was it pointed?

A: To Leodegario Capispisan, sir.

Q: When Wilfredo said who is brave, what did he do with his gun which he was pointing to Leodegario
Capispisan?
 A: It was pointed to Leodegario Capispisan and simultaneously I heard two shots.

Q: Did he fell (sic) down with his back or his stomach?

A: He fell down on his back with blood oozing from his breast.

xxxx

Q: What did Wilfredo Cawaling do after firing his gun and after Leodegario Capispisan fell?

A: He pointed his gun towards me.

Q: What else?

A: After telling him that I did not know this man, referring to my father-in-law, he ran after my companions
firing his gun.9

From the foregoing contradictory findings, it is obvious that the resolution of this case hinges on which version of the case is
more worthy of credence. In other words, we must rule on whether the prosecution’s belatedly proffered eyewitness
testimony of Rommel Brigido trumps the similarly belated testimony of Palti Umambong who now claims authorship of the
crime.

It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who has the direct opportunity and
unique advantage to observe at close range their conduct and deportment on the witness stand.10 The general rule is that
findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if not conclusive
effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored, misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.11

This principle notwithstanding, we hold that the appellate court did not err in reversing the trial court and convicting Cawaling
of murder, as we fully agree with the argument of the OSG that –

In this case, the judge who rendered the appealed decision, Judge Francisco F. Fanlo Jr., is not the same judge who heard the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Rommel Brigido, who testified on August 23, 1995 and Gloria Capispisan, who testified on
August 24, and 25, 1995. When these two witnesses testified in 1995 the presiding Judge was Judge Cesar Maravilla. It was
only on January 12, 1998 or three years later when Judge Fanlo, Jr. took over the case and heard these witnesses for additional
cross-examination. The additional cross-examination centered on the affidavits executed by these witnesses after the incident
and not on the incident itself. The rule on the weight to be given to the findings of the trial court does not unqualifiedly apply,
when the judge who rendered the decision did not hear the principal evidence of the prosecution. For in such, case, his
evaluation of the evidence is based on the transcript of stenographic notes, which also forms the basis for the Court of Appeals
to review the trial court’s decision and render its own decision.12

Moreover, Rommel Brigido’s belated execution of an affidavit does not detract from or diminish the weight of his direct and
positive testimony that Cawaling shot Leodegario, viz:

Q: Do you know Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Since when have you known him?

A: Since I was born because we were neighbor[s].

xxxx

Q: In the afternoon of April 19, 1987, did you see Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where for the first time did you see him that afternoon of April 19, 1987?

A: In sitio Hinulugan, Brgy. Busay.

Q: Where did you come from that afternoon?

A: We came from the town.

Q: The town of what?

A: San Jose.

Q: Aside from Wilfredo Cawaling, do you have any companion in going to the town of San Jose, Romblon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were your companion (sic)?

A: Palti Umambong.

xxxx

Q: Now, on your way home, where did you go?

A: We passed by Porferia Vina coming from the town.

Q: What did you do in the place of Porferia Vina?

A: We were together in drinking two (2) balls of tuba.

xxxx

Q: Now, while drinking tube, what happen[ed]?

A: While our drinking is not yet finished, I saw Wilfredo Cawaling sitting along the other side of the road.

xxxx

Q: How far was Wilfredo Cawaling sitting on the bench from the road where Leodegario Capispisan and his
group were passing?

A: It was near, because the bench was just along the side of the road.

Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was [seated] on the bench by the road,
what happen[ed]?
 A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan saying: "Who is brave,"
and two shots [rang] out.

xxxx

Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired against Leodegario
Capispisan?

A: Witness pointing at the door, with a distance of six (6) meters.13

We have had occasion to hold that delay in making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.14 In this case, Rommel Brigido, on cross
examination, explained, thus:

Q: Why did it take you so long to execute this affidavit where the incident took place way back on April [19]
1987 and you only executed your affidavit in support of this information on July 27, 1995?

A: Because that case was dismissed and [Wilfredo] Cawaling was at large at that time and I was asked to execute
an affidavit.

xxxx

Q: Why did you say that [Cawaling] is a dangerous man?

A: He killed so many people and recently also shot my uncle, Rexinol Brigido.15

Gloria Capispisan likewise satisfactorily explained her failure to include the name of Rommel Brigido in her earlier account of
the killing in April 1987, as the latter was the companion of Cawaling. Subsequent thereto, Gloria categorically testified that
Rommel was at the side of Cawaling during the incident.

The RTC erred in convicting Cawaling merely as an accomplice to homicide, and in giving full faith and credence to Palti
Umambong’s testimony that he was the one who shot the victim.

We have gone through the trial court’s lengthy disquisition and tried to find a rational explanation why Palti, who previously
pled not guilty to the crime, will now accept responsibility for the murder of Leodegario. Obviously, it is because the case
against him had already been dismissed, and he can no longer be successfully prosecuted for the offense without breaching
the rule on double jeopardy. Thus, with Palti securely shielded from punishment by the principle of double jeopardy, he was
at liberty to own authorship of the crime. Accordingly, Palti’s credibility as a witness directly debunking Rommel’s testimony
is tainted by a serious cloud of doubt.

Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, in his treatise on Evidence, writes: "the credibility of a witness depends as much upon himself as
upon his testimony, upon his interest as upon his mental cultivation, his conduct before and at the trial, the consistency of his
behavior from the time he became aware of the fact to the time he relates it."16 Not surprisingly, Palti is now motivated to
confess to a crime for which he can no longer be held liable because of our rule on double jeopardy.17

We note that it was only Palti who was arraigned and who pled not guilty to the initial Information for murder. At that time,
Cawaling was at large. After the case against Palti was dismissed, and now no longer in peril of punishment, he acknowledges
commission of the crime and conveniently absolves Cawaling who had remained at large. We perceive a brazen conspiracy to
escape criminal liability for murder.

Justice Francisco, in the same book, states that when there is conflicting evidence, the court is compelled to examine closely
the motives of the witnesses for telling the truth or for falsely testifying.18 As between Rommel and Palti, there is, in the
former, an absence of proof, except for the defense’s bare allegations of political motivations, of an improper motive that
would have impelled him to testify for the prosecution and accuse his former friend and companion, Cawaling, of murder.19
As no improper motive can be imputed to Rommel, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credence.

One other thing has sealed the conviction of Cawaling. We note that he jumped bail and fled. On this score, jurisprudence has
consistently held that flight of an accused is indicative of his guilt.20

As to the propriety of Cawaling’s conviction for murder, the CA correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.21 We
quote with favor the appellate court’s ruling thereon:

The Solicitor General submits that the commission of the crime in the present case was attended by treachery as clearly
established by Rommel Brigido and Gloria Capispisan, who testified that they saw appellant stand up from where he was
seated and without warning, pointed his gun at Leodegario and instantaneously fired the same, thus killing Leodegario on the
spot.

It is contended that "the attack being sudden and unexpected, Leodegario was not given any chance to retaliate or defend
himself from such attack."

We agree.

Treachery may be appreciated even if the attack was frontal but no less unexpected and sudden, giving the victim no
opportunity, to repel it or offer any defense of his person. Frontal attach can be treachery when it is sudden and unexpected
and the victim was unarmed.22

We likewise agree with the OSG that the heirs of the victim must be awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.23

Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident – the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond and post cash bond in
lieu thereof – filed by bondsperson Margarita Cruz. In this connection, Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled
upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the
judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the judgment of conviction because
of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and
replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is
presented.

We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a relative, obtain provisional
liberty. However, under Section 124 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any
court as required under specified conditions.

It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary liberty, which made it possible,
quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the
property bond cannot be released.1avvphi1
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Wilfredo Cawaling is
found GUILTY of Murder and ordered to pay, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, to the
heirs of the victim. The Manifestation with Motion of Movant Cruz is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Section 23

G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola,
etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set
aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's
finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge
and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July
1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this
Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide
the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988,
(1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be
held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel
can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security,
public safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it
was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been
scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing
only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate
Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28
July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled
and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused
Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of
America;
 2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in
person before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had
been issued against him all for the same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No.
CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on
erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion
to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason
of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right
to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national
security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to
appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any
court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114,
Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court
from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition,
p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant
if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending
(ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts
to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the
right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to
the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.1âwphi1
Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired.

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV,
Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to
wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the
grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section
6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the
condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether
under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-
affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to
appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside
the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders
and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

Section 25
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1850 July 14, 2004

JUDGE LORINDA T. MUPAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Damariñas, Cavite, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a letter-complaint1 dated October 29, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA for brevity),
Judge Lorinda T. Mupas (complainant Judge for brevity) of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite
(MTC for brevity), charges Judge Dolores L. Español, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmariñas, Cavite
(RTC for brevity), in her capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of
Authority.

It appears from the records that on August 23, 2001, private complainants Leonora Bituon, Florencio Cantada,
Anita Mendoza, Rodelia Callo and Cael M. Glorioso (private complainants for brevity) filed three separate
criminal complaints for syndicated estafa against Eva Malihan, Sister Trinidad Sinagbulo, Mely Vargas,
Geraldine Sine Baldovino, Belen Liwanag, Juanita Sanchez and Nelia Tizon before the MTC, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487.2 On August 24, 2001, acting upon a motion of private complainants,3
herein complainant Judge conducted a preliminary investigation.4 On the same day, she issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused and recommended no bail for their provisional liberty.5 On August 28, 2001, private
complainants filed a motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan from the municipal jail to the provincial jail.6 On
August 29, 2001, complainant Judge required the Chief of Police of Dasmariñas, Cavite to comment on the
motion to transfer within five days from receipt of the order.7 Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, accused Eva
Malihan filed an urgent petition for bail.8 On September 3, 2001, the private complainants filed a supplemental
pleading to support their previous motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan.9 Invoking that the Executive Judge
has authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the private complainants sent copies of the motion to transfer
and supplemental pleading to respondent. On September 4, 2001, complainant Judge required the private
complainants in the criminal case to file their comment or opposition to the petition for bail.10 However, on
that same day, respondent issued two orders in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487. The
first Order directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from the Municipal Jail to the Provincial Jail,11
while the second Order directed the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the
departure from the Philippines of the accused Eva Malihan while the cases are pending.12

Complainant Judge alleges that respondent's act of issuing said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases
are pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.

In her Comment13 dated February 4, 2002, respondent claims that the complaint is baseless and retaliatory as
it is founded on intrigue and spite for blowing the whistle concerning complainant's activities that are
pernicious to the judiciary. Respondent states that complainant's involvement in a "scam in the form of
commissions from bail bond applicants" is the main reason why complainant clings dearly to the delegated
authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation of cases filed with her court.
Respondent explains that she was surprised when she was furnished a copy of the two pleadings relating to
cases pending with the MTC, but admits that she acted on the motions as Executive Judge "in order not to
frustrate the administration of justice."

With respect to the transfer order, she claims that under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, she has the authority to supervise all persons in custody.

As regards the hold-departure order, she argues that she is authorized under Supreme Court Circular No. 39-
97, which does not require that the subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a hold-departure
order. She argues further that she issued the questioned hold-departure order based on the allegation of the
complaining witnesses that accused is trying to abscond from prosecution in the criminal case. Furthermore,
she decided to act on the motions because of the fact that complainant chose to ignore said motions to the
prejudice of the complaining witnesses.

Subsequently, in a letter14 dated February 8, 2002, complainant Judge iterates her earlier inquiry in 1999
involving the practice of respondent in granting bail on cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.

On May 15, 2002, the OCA treated complainant's letter as a supplemental complaint and referred it to
respondent for her comment.15

In a letter16 dated July 3, 2002, respondent avers that the matter raised in the supplemental complaint is a
mutation of A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, entitled Judge Dolores L. Español, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas,
pending resolution with the Court along with A.M. No. 01-2-39-RTC, entitled Wilma Go-Amposta and Medy
M. Patricio vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas, and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352, entitled Employees of MTC Dasmariñas,
Cavite vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas. She alleges that the issue raised in said supplemental complaint is one of
complainant's defenses in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Consequently, she submits that this issue should not be
treated as separate and distinct therefrom.

In her comment to the supplemental complaint17 dated July 31, 2002, respondent further maintains that the
issue of granting bail is subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.

She contends that the complaint is frivolous considering that the hold-departure order she issued against Eva
Malihan was sustained by the prosecutor. She claims that it is complainant Judge who should be investigated
on irregularities in approving bail bonds of detention prisoners. She avers further that complainant Judge
falsified her report on detention prisoners and purposely delayed the resolution of preliminary investigation
cases until after a considerable period of time which is a clear instance of complainant Judge's gross abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.

In her Reply18 dated May 29, 2003, complainant Judge brandishes as lies the allegations of respondent in her
Comment. She adds that the issues therein are subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Moreover,
in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352, which was allegedly initiated by employees of her court through an anonymous
letter, she claims that the said employees denied authorship of the anonymous letter. With respect to A.M.
No. 01-2-39-RTC, she alleges that the said complaint has already been dismissed by the court. As regards the
hold-departure order, complainant Judge claims that the case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. Lastly, she claims that respondent continues to defy the rules on bail since she still issues release orders
on detention prisoners whose cases are filed either for preliminary investigation or trial in the MTC.

On February 28, 2004, complainant Judge filed a supplement19 to her allegations in the letter dated February
8, 2002 regarding the practice of respondent to grant bail in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
She cites nine cases pending with the MTC wherein respondent granted bail and subsequently released the
accused even though the judge where the case is pending is neither absent, unavailable nor even alleged to
be absent or unavailable.
Complainant Judge emphatically submits that without the necessity of a formal investigation on the matter,
the records of the case involved will bear out the culpability of respondent Judge Español and will more than
justify the imposition of the most severe penalty upon her.

In its Memorandum20 dated May 19, 2004, the OCA opines that respondent's order to transfer the accused
from the municipal jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in part:

SEC. 25. Court supervision of detainees. – The court shall exercise supervision over all persons
in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the
Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city and
municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the
number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and examine the
condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from
adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and
strive to eliminate conditions inimical to detainees.

The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in custody for
the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule does not give her the authority to arrogate
upon herself a power vested upon a presiding judge of the court where the case is pending. Instead of issuing
an order transferring the accused, the OCA observes that respondent should have called the attention of the
complainant regarding the motions which allegedly required immediate action; that there was no showing
that she called the attention of complainant Judge on the alleged motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan,
neither was there any indication that the accused in the subject cases was in a situation which requires the
interference of the Executive Judge. The OCA concludes that respondent encroached upon the power of
complaining judge when respondent took cognizance of the motions not pending in her court.

With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that the same cannot be sustained since it is contrary
to the mandates of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 inasmuch as at the time of its issuance, no case has yet
been filed in the RTC. It adds that while Section 1 of said circular states that "Hold-Departure Orders shall be
issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court" the same should be
read that the subject criminal case has been filed and pending with the RTC. In the criminal cases subject of
the present administrative case, there is even no final determination yet of a prima facie case that would
warrant the filing of an information in court. The determination made by an MTC would still be reviewed by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OCA concludes that respondent went against the injunction in
Circular No. 39-97 that judges of the RTC's should be cautious and avoid the indiscriminate issuance of hold-
departure orders as this results in inconvenience to the parties affected and is tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to travel.

With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the OCA opines that the same should be incorporated with A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Español, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358
entitled Wilma Go-Amposta and Medy Particio vs. Judge Lorinda Mupas inasmuch as the issues raised in the
supplemental complaint containing the granting of bail are the same as those raised and taken up in A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1348.

Thus, the OCA recommends to the Court that: (a) respondent be admonished for issuing an order transferring
the accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail; (b) respondent be reprimanded for issuing a hold
departure order in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1435 to 01-1437 considering that it is not within her authority to
issue hold departure orders in cases pending preliminary investigation in the MTC; and (c) the Supplemental
Complaint be incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Español, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda
T. Mupas.21
Respondent compulsorily retired from service on January 9, 2004.

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

Respondent urges that her conduct was nothing more than the zealous fulfillment of her duties as Executive
Judge of the RTC, Dasmariñas, Cavite. However, it is elementary that an Executive Judge only has
administrative supervision over lower courts. Her function relates only to the management of first and second
level courts, within her administrative area with a view to attaining prompt and convenient dispatch of its
business. Acting as such, she cannot unilaterally override the MTC's actions in cases pending with it under the
guise of "administrative supervision," without running afoul of the orderly administration of justice. Only when
her court's jurisdiction is appropriately invoked in an appeal or certiorari and other special civil actions can
respondent judge, in her judicial capacity, override the lower court's judgment.

Although the "Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties,"22 to wit:

SECTION 1. Executive Judges; general powers, prerogatives and duties. – Executive Judges shall,
within their respective area of administrative supervision:

(a) Provide leadership in, and coordinate with the management of the first and second level
courts;

(b) Exercise supervision over the judges and personnel;

(c) Balance the workload among the courts and maintain equitable distribution of cases in
accordance with relevant existing issuances;

(d) Recommend and implement policies concerning court operations;

(e) Identify, address and resolve problems in court administration which do not require any
intervention by the Supreme Court or the Court Administrator.

(f) Direct, through the Clerk of Court, the undertaking of staff support activities to improve
judiciary services in accordance with relevant existing issuances;

(g) Initiate, propose, and supervise the implementation of professional development programs
for judicial personnel that the Philippine Judicial Academy, in coordination with the Office of
the Court Administrator, may undertake;

(h) Exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may be necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration; and

(i) Perform such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court or the
Court Administrator.

the same is a mere reiteration of what has been in effect before said Circular.

Administrative Order No. 6, which took effect on July 1, 1975, narrates the specific power, prerogative and
duties of an executive judge. Portions pertinent to his duties with respect to lower level courts, read as follows:

IV. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties

The specific powers, prerogatives and duties of the Executive Judge are as follows:
 1. To investigate administrative complaints against Municipal and City Judges, and other court
personnel within his administrative area; and to submit his findings and recommendations to
the Supreme Court.

...

10. To visit and inspect municipal and provincial jails and their prisoners as required by Section
1730 of the Revised Administrative Code and by applicable rules and regulations.

...

12. To designate, with immediate notice to the Supreme Court, the municipal judge to try cases
in other municipalities within his area of administrative supervision, in case of absence or
incapacity of the municipal judge concerned, which designation shall be effective immediately,
unless revoked by the Supreme Court.

13. To assign, with the prior approval of the Chief Justice, Municipal and City Judges to hear
and determine cadastral cases as provided by law.

...

the executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of detainees in cases
handled by other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders in cases not
assigned to her sala.

The powers of an executive judge relate only to those necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her
functions in relation to court administration.

Time and again the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be very zealous in the discharge
of their bounden duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy administration of
justice must at all times be exercised with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction or
authority. Respondent's ardent determination to expedite the case and render prompt justice may be a noble
objective but she did so in a manner which took away from the complainant MTC judge the initiative which
by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to her.

The Court agrees with the observations of the OCA that respondent should have conferred with complainant
regarding the criminal cases and relayed her concerns to the latter, rather than precipitately issuing the
assailed orders.

The Court further notes that, contrary to respondent's allegation, complainant did not choose to simply ignore
the pending motion to transfer but, in fact, promptly directed the Chief of Police to comment thereon.

With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.23 Criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must
be pending in the sala of the RTC concerned.

In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases were only in the preliminary
investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva
Malihan is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial. Complainant Judge's findings had not yet
been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Respondent's issuance of the hold-departure
order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the
precipitate and indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, respondent's claim of good
intention finds no convincing justification.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond
permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.24

Considering the respondent's ten years of service as a judge, her judicial mind should have been tempered
with the delicate intricacies of the law and procedure. Respondent's confusion between her administrative
and judicial functions betrays the degree of her competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic
procedural rules. Respondent ought to have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure
proper administration of justice with due regard to her jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound to discharge
her duties with competence, prudence, caution and attention inasmuch as she is a reflection of the entire
judiciary.

Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand recommended by the OCA to be too lenient.

Besides, the recent cases25 wherein the penalty of reprimand was imposed on erring judges for the issuance
of hold-departure orders beyond the ambit of Circular 39-97 is not applicable because of the different
circumstance in this case where respondent precipitately issued orders in criminal cases still undergoing
preliminary investigation in the MTC.

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices
and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge
which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering that the incident took place on September 4, 2001 which
is before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took effect, the Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is sufficient for unduly
transferring the detainee and arrogating upon herself the authority to issue a hold-departure order.

With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the Court finds the recommendation of the OCA that the same
should be incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 to be well-taken since it refers to an issue subject of said
administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Dolores L. Español is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is FINED
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits due her. With regard to
the supplemental complaint, the same is incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled "Judge Dolores
Español, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas."

SO ORDERED.

Section 26

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August
30, 2007 Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that
affirmed the trial court’s Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas
on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was
raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was
placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.5

After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he was released from detention,
and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.

The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to
re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing
the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation
within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the
first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting
on the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his
application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutor’s
recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner
also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information.11

The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted
the Amended Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of
February 8, 200714 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders
via supplemental petition before the appellate court.

The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE
BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE
RULES OF COURT[;]

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR
VELASCO’S AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR
ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY
2007, WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE
YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]

CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE
BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL
NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT
LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the original omitted)

Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner
refused to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.

Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela16 which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007,17 it
finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to
post bail in the amount of ₱300,000 for his provisional liberty.

The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner
under the Amended Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of
homicide, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an
appeal to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioner’s application
which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot since
the presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded.18

Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the present
case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.

Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the
charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest
under the Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the
arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still
pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him.

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of
or irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner
had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only
proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative
of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible.20

From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to
preclude him from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than its
allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioner’s participation
in the trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on
January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present petition.21

Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s availment of remedies against the trial court’s Orders cannot be
imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioner’s principal prayer. The non-
issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception22
to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution.23 Consequently, the
trial of the case took its course.

The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of judgment.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.24

The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder operates as a
supervening event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground25 to annul the finding of
probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and
retrying the case under the original Information for homicide just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at
the same conviction of homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder,
for proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been established
in that instance.

Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve
the legal issues in order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.26 In the present
case, there is compelling reason to clarify the remedies available before and after the filing of an information
in cases subject of inquest.

After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible
error on the part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial
court Orders.

In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek
from the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends
that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

The contention lacks merit.

Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of
an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may,
within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine.28 As an
exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest
without a warrant29 involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been
conducted.30

Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court
for the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court.31

It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private
complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and
after the filing of a complaint or information in court.

BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of inquest.
Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly
signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since
he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing
of a complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to
the arrested person.

The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against
Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the
arrested person.33 Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.34

Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such
remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.

Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party under such
rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution
Service Rule on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x
x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the
private party should first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the
matter to the DOJ Secretary.

In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through
the regular course of a preliminary investigation.

ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The
Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could
invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.

The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a
party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been
filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of
the case.38 Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal
action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel and with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must "examine the
Information vis-à-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections
or revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and substance."41

x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a
review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge
himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such
error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense
charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute
remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a
wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.43

The prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.44 The standing principle is that once an
information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:

The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the
prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper
thereafter

should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action
of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of
law.

xxxx

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a
cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course
of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.46 (underscoring
supplied)

While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation,
the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion
for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the
drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the
disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present
case, the Court’s holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court:

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis
supplied)

In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.50

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of
plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.51 An
amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.52

Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without leave
of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a
mere superfluity?

It is not.

Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate
modification53 of the charge – is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately
make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a
reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate
motion to be filed in court.

More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information.
Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without
conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is included
in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is
considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary investigation.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and
material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically
deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the
original Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one
of substance with very serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present case consists of
additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the
offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner
should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment
essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the
weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of
the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was
no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information,
as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information.
Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength,
while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the
present case.

Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in
the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information.
There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.60 What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend
himself from the charge of murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the
first motion.

Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the
proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings
and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of
Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity
to controvert the complainant’s evidence was accorded him.62

In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC
Orders despite the pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two
trial court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.

The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.63 The appellate court, by
Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court
thus did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with
the case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order from the
appellate court. Moreover, petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy
that was available after the reinvestigation and which could have suspended the arraignment.661avvphi1

Regarding petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving incidents of the case
is not per se an indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed
to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The
orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard
of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent
with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a
mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of
the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.68

There is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s sudden designation of Senior
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case69 and the
latter’s conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.

In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will conduct the
reinvestigation or preliminary investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the
executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice71 who is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special
prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has
been recognized by jurisprudence.72

As for the trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to the media which aired his
opinion that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed
— the DOJ Secretary reportedly uttered that "the filing of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste
lintek naman eh I told you to watch over that case… there should be a report about the ballistics, about the
paraffin, etc., then that’s not a complete investigation, that’s why you should use that as a ground" — no
abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.

The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the Information even in the
absence of probable cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing
basic investigative reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original Resolution even recognized
that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot be determined based on the evidence obtained "[u]nless
and until a more thorough investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.]" 74

The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of
paraffin test and ballistic examination, and the handling of physical evidence,"75 as rationalized by the
prosecution in its motion, are sufficient circumstances that require further inquiry.

That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the
prior determination of probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial
probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.76

In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing
for judicial determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence
adduced during the reinvestigation.

Petitioner’s argument is specious.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination
of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.77

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.78
Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.

To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor
and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.80

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist
on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judge’s
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require." 83 In
one case, the Court emphatically stated:

The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must
determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should
not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for
determination of probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances exist that would
qualify the crime from homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces of
evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or
evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as
the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not
prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its
findings and the evidence already submitted.85

Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a
petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the
evidence adduced by the parties on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause, as there exists
no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual review.86

In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court
is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to stray at will and
resolve questions and issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The court’s duty in the
pertinent case is confined to determining whether the executive and judicial determination of probable cause
was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is possible that
error may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render the act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.88

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.