Case Digests

For
Civil Procedure

Submitted by: Maria Gladys B. Orlino

Submitted to: Associate Dean Oscar Bernardo

Parischa vs Don Luis Dison Realty 548 SCRA 273

Facts: Petitioners failed to pay rentals starting from July 1992 onwards. Respondents
then filed an ejectment case. Petitioners stated that they did not pay because of the
internal squabble of the personnel of the respondent regarding who should receive the
payments among them. Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the ejectment case but the
Regional Trial Court reversed it.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have justified reasons to not pay rent thereby making
their ejectment invalid.

Ruling: No. Petitioners should have consigned the payment if respondent refused to
accept it and should have filed interpleader in order for respondent company to settle
the issue as to who among its personnel has authority to receive payments. Rule 62 of
the Rules of Court provides Section 1. Interpleader is proper whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against
double vexation in respect of one liability.

Ocampo vs Tirona 455 SCRA 62

Facts: Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of the subject land stating that he bought it
from Rosauro Breton and Tirona is a lessee within the said land. Tirona did not pay
rentals to Ocampo thereby prompting the latter to file an unlawful detainer case. Tirona
stated that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land and it is not registered in his
name. She also stated that Rosauro cannot sell the land because he executed a deed
of conveyance and waiver in favor of his sister Maria Lourdes Breton Mendiola for the
subject land. Therefore Tirona did not pay rentals to Ocampo.
Issue: Whether or not Ocampo may eject Tirona for non payment of rentals.

Ruling: Yes. Tirona violated the lease agreement when she did not pay her rentals to
Ocampo. Tirona should have filed an interpleader when she doubted the ownership of
Ocampo over the subject land due to her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton
Mendiola. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The
action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves,
in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

Makati Development Corporation vs Tanjuatco 27 SCRA 401

Facts: Makati Development Corporation and Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby
tanjuatco will construct a concrete covered water reservoir and office in Forbes park
Makati rizal furnishing with it the necessary materials therefor. Before paying Tanjuatco
Makati Development Corporation inquired the supplier Concrete Aggregates Inc if
Tanjuatco has paid for the supplies already. The supplier answered in the negative and
that Tanjuatco still has to pay it php5,198. Makati Development Corporation then filed
an action to Court of First Instance or CFI of Rizal to compel Tanjuatco and concrete
aggregate to interplead their conflicting claims. Tanjuatco moved for the dismissal of the
case stating that CFI of rizal has no jurisdiction over interpleader case CFI agreed and
dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over interpleader case.

Ruling: No. The present rules of court omits the Rules on Interpleading among
those made applicable to inferior courts. The failure of section 19 of Rule 5 of the
present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior
courts, merely implies that ,the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with
cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable
to ordinary civil action in said courts.

Social Justice Society vs Lina 574 SCRA 462

Facts: Social Justice Society or SJS filed a petition for declaratory relief to the Regional
Trial Court or RTC Manila for the proper construction of sec. 90 ra 7160 which states
that all governors, city and municipal mayors are not allowed to have any other
occupation apart from the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. SJS
stated that actors who were elected for this positions should not be allowed to exercise
their profession since it gives them an advantage over other political opponents by
having more screen time on televisions or movies. The Office of the Solicitor General or
OSG stated that the requirements for the petition of declaratory relief are not met since
SJS is a person whose rights are not affected by the statute, it is not a real party in
interest, there is no judicial controversy and construction is not necessary for the subject
provision. RTC agreed and dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the petition for declaratory relief was proper for this
case.

Ruling: No. SJS failed to satisfy the requirements of declaratory relief in that an action
for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will,
a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute,
an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is
to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a
judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. For the action to
prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination. Also declaratory relief cannot be availed of in this case because
impleaded parties Vilma Santos, Lito Lapid and Joey Marquez already breached the
subject provision.
Reyes vs Ortiz 628 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioners Erlinda Reyes and spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed
the orders of the lower courts for the denial of their motion to suspend proceedings on
their recovery case against the Matienzos in the Regional Trial Court or RTC and
motion for dismissal of the ejectment case against Erlinda Reyes in the Metropolitan
Trial Court or MeTC for the subject land through a petition of declaratory relief which
they filed directly to the Supreme Court.

Issue: whether or not court orders may be subjected to the petition of declaratory relief.

Ruling: No. Court orders or decisions are not included to the written instruments
contemplated by sec. 1 rule 63 of rules of court. Rule 63 includes interest in deed, will,
contract or other written instrument and rights affected by statute, executive order,
Government resolution or ordinance. A person may bring an action for declaratory relief
on this grounds in order to determine the question of validity and construction of the
instrument or statute and have a judicial declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
Court orders or decisions are not subjected to declaratory relief because rules of court
already provided for remedies to challenge ambigous or doubtful decisions orders.
Petitioners should have filed motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari under
rule 65 to question the orders of the MeTC and RTC.

Cruz vs Leis 327 SCRA 570

Facts: Petitioners alleged that they are the new owner of the subject property and
demanded for the private respondents to vacate the premises of the property. The
private respondents in turn filed an action in Regional Trial Court or RTC Pasig seeking
to nullify the contracts of sale for the said land that was executed by the private
respondents' late mother Gertrudes in favor of the petitioners. RTC ruled in favor of
private respondents stating that the property is subjected to conjugal partnership of
gains since it was bought with the money of Gertrudes' late husband Adriano Lies also.
Therefore there is a co-ownership between Gertrudes and private respondents.
Issue: whether or not there is a co-ownership between Gertrudes and private
respondents.

Ruling: Yes. Gertrudes as the wife of Adriano Lies inherited her share of the property
once he died along with the private respondents getting their shares also as legitimate
heirs. But they failed to repurchase the property within one year which is the period
agreed upon by Gertrudes and petitioners. The latter becomes the owners of the
property although they must record the consolidation of their ownership to the registry of
property in accordanve with Art. 1607 of Civil Code.

Phil Ville Development & Housing Corporation vs Bonifacio 651 SCRA 327

Facts: Euleteria Rivera thinking that she was the heir of the original owner of the
property Maria de la concepcion Vidal filed a motion for partition and segregation of the
property to the Regional Trial Court or RTC of Caloocan city. It was granted and Rivera
became the owner of the property covered by TCT 314537. Phil Ville on the other hand
is the actual owner of the property TCT 148220. Rivera subsequently demanded for Phil
Ville to vacate the property. Phil ville in turn filed a complaint for quieting of title againts
Rivera. The RTC ruled in favor of Phil Ville. The Court of Appeals on the other hand
ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction in hearing a complaint for quieting of title.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for quieting of title was proper in this case.

Ruling: No Phil Ville's property which is covered by TCT 148220 is not within the
property covered by TCT 314537 which is invalidly owned by Rivera since the records
showed that she cannot be a granddaughter of Vidal because Rivera was born on 1901
while Vidal was born on 1903. Quieting of title is a remedy in order to remove clouds
over a person's title to a property caused by another title which seems to be valid but is
in truth invalid and could be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. There was no
overlapping of the partitions of the two properties in this case. The remedy that Phil Ville
is entitled to is declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. A petition for
Declaratory relief may be filed by a person who has an interest in a will, contract or any
written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, ordinance
or regulation. It determines the validity of the statute or the written instrument and
judicially declares the rights and duties of the person arising from said written
instrument or statute.
Heirs of M. Doronio vs Heirs of F. Doronio 541 SCRA 479

Facts: Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the entire subject property due to
the donation done by Simeon Doronio and his spouse to the petitioners' predecessor
Marcelino Doronio. According to the deed of donation the property is adjacent to
Fortunato Doronio's property on the eastern side but the actual title of the subject
property states that Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda are the owners of the
property on the eastern side. Respondents state that petitioners are only entitled to half
of the subject property since the petitioners stated that the owner of the adjacent
property is Fortunato Doronio and not the Najordas. They segregated the possession of
Fortunato Doronio on the easter half adjacent to the subject property. Petitioners then
filed a petition for registration for the deed of donation in the Regional Trial Court or
RTC which granted said petition and issued title to petitioners. Respondents filed a
petition to declare the registration null and void but RTC dismissed the petition stating
that rtc decision has become final and executory.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners own the entire subject property.

Ruling: No. Since the deed of donation was not a public document and it is a settled rule
that if a donation is not done on a public document it is invalid in accordance with the
old civil code sonce it is the law that is applicable to the deed of donation which was
execuyed in 1919. Petitioners cannot use the finality of the decision of the rtc to prevent
the determination of the validity of the deed of donation.

Adlawan vs IAC 170 SCRA 165

Facts: Respondent is the owner of Coliseum cockpit. Due to the PD 449 or the Cock
Fighting Law only one cockpit may be allowed for operation for each municipality.
Question arose as to which cockpit must operate in minglanilla. Respondent owner of
Coliseum cockpit was declared to be allowed to operate but its distance to public
structures was not within the required distance by RA 1224. Therefore Guillera became
the municipal cockpit. Subsequently the municipal council issued a resolution naming
Bagong Bulangan the municipal cockpit of the municipality. Respondents then filed a
petition for declaratory relief to Court of First Instance or CFI of Cebu to judicially
interpret their rights based on the laws pertinent to governing cockpits. CFI ruled in
favor of respondents.

Issue: Whether or not respondent may operate cockpit in accordance with pertinent
laws governing cockpits.

Ruling: Yes. PD 449, RA 1224 and PD 1802 does not mandate that the distance of
cockpits from public structures should be not less than 200 meters. Municipal mayors
are the ones who are authorized to grant permits that would authorize the operation of
cockpits. Municipal council may only ratify the permits granted to cockpits by municipal
mayors. Declaratory relief as a special civil action for declaration of rights or duties does
not have an executory process for affirmative reliefs sought by respondent but Court still
granted the affirmative relief since the allegations in the complaint may make a case for
a specific performance and petitioners who were defendants in the case for declaratory
relief did not question the form of the action filed by respondent.

Fortune Life Insurance Co. vs COA 748 SCRA 286

Facts: Petitioner agreed to cover life insurance of qualified baranggay secretaries of

provincial LGU of Antique with premium payment of 4 million. It was submitted to COA
Antique for pre-audit but the office dismissed it stating that the agreement has no basis
in Local Gov Code RA 7160. Petitioner filed a petition to COA for its money claim but
the latter dismissed the petition stating that only municipal and city local government
units may give group insurances to barangay workers. Petitioner subsequently filed a
petition for certiorari after coa dismissed its motion for reconsideration. The petition for
certiorari was filed on August 12 2014 as the petitioner received the COA decision on
July 14 2014. The petition for certiorari was then dismissed due to late filing, non-
submission of proof of service and verified declaration, failure to show grave abuse of
discretion done by COA.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari in this case is proper.

Ruling: No. Petition for certiorari failed to comply with proof of service stated in Rule 13
of Rules of Court which is affidavit and registry receipt. If service is made by registered
mail proof by affidavit and registry receipt issued by mailing office. The registry return
card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof
the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given
by the postmaster to the addressee. Petitioner filed the petition with only the affidavit
of service. Also petition for certiorari under rule 64 must be filed within 30 days from
receipt of notice of judgement. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014
when he should have filed it on July 14, 2014 since he received the notice of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2014. Petitioner was not able to show how
COA committed grave abuse of discretion since the petitioner's reasons such as delay
of COA for the decision is not whimsical or arbitrary and the terseness of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration is a factor demonstrating abuse of discretion.

Lokin vs COMELEC 621 SCRA 385

Facts: Lokin assails decision made by COMELEC when it ruled on his case that cibac
may replace him with another nominee since it's president has that power in accordance
with CIBAC by-laws. Lokin then filed a petition for certiorari but COMELEC stated that a
petition for certiorari is not proper in this case since the nominee that replaced him was
proclaimed representative and has already assumed office. COMELEC said that Lokin
should have filed election protest.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari is proper in this case.

Ruling: Yes. Since Lokin is seeking to review the resolution issued by COMELEC
concerning his substitution as nominee. Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that final
decisions, judgements and resolution of comelec and coa may be reviewed by a petition
for certiorari under rule 65 which must be filed to the supreme court within 30 days from
the receipt of judgement or final order.

Galicto vs Aquino III 667 SCRA 150

Facts: Galicto as a Phil Health employee questions the legality of Executive Order 7
which provided for the guiding principles to a fixed compensation and classification of
position in GOCC's and GFI's. Galicto stated that the President does not have control
over the fiscal powers of the GOCC's and PD 1587 only require the GOCC's to report
their compensation plans to the Office of the President. The respondents countered that
Galicto has no locus standi to question the executive order because there is no board
resolution coming from Phil Health that it authorized Galicto to question the Executive
order. Galicto questioned the executive order through petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari is proper in the current case.

Ruling: No. A petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus must be filed against a
tribunal acting with a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The respondents in this case did
not issue the executive order in said function and an enabling law is needed in order to
give a board or tribunal authority to adjudicate rights between contending parties. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed against a tribunal,board or officer
exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function, it must have acted with grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that there is no other appeal or
any plain, speedy adequate remedy under the law.

Araullo vs Aquino III 728 SCRA 1

Facts: The petitioners in this case question DAP a program implemented by the
Department Of Budget Management to ramp up spending and expand the economy.
According to the petitioners NBC no. 541 which was used to issue DAP directed the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments from government agencies or offices with low level
obligations both for continuing and current allotments. The petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari prohibition and mandamus for questioning the DAP.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is proper for
questioning DAP in this case.
Ruling: Yes. The Constitution authorizes the Court to determine whether or not the acts
of any government instrumentality are done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Therefore the Court has the power to issue the writ of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to correct or restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction done by any government agency
or office even if it does not exercise a judicial or quasi- judicial function.

Caballes vs Court of Appeals 452 SCRA 312

Facts: Caballes was charged with rape and filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or
certiorari and prohibition against the Regional Trial Court questioning the denial for his
petition for bail The said petition was filed to the Court of Appeals or CA. Then Caballes
changed his petition to being a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to certiorari
if the Court deems it proper to include the latter. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition and Caballes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the petition of Caballes was proper.

Ruling: No. The petitioner should have appealed to the Supreme Court the CA
decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of
his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead of filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not
available where the aggrieved party's remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist
with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of
the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for
certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this case
would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
The City of Manila vs Grecia-Cuerdo 715 SCRA 182

Facts: Petitioner assessed taxes for the taxable period of January to December 2002
against private respondents. This covers the local business taxes that the petitioner is
authorized to collect and the private respondents cannot acquire business permits
without paying said taxes. Respondents then filed complaints against Petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court for the refund of payment of illegally erroneously collected tax. The
respondents then filed a petition for preliminary injunction and the trial Court granted the
same. The petitioner then filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the petition stating that it has no jurisdiction over the appeal. Petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the petition filed by Petitioner was proper

Ruling: The Court allows the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 even though the former is an original and independent
special civil action based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction since the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, errors
of judgment are averred and there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of
the rules. Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that
an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus,
treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

St. Martin Funeral Homes vs National Labor Relations Commission 295 SCRA 494

Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager

of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in
the semi-monthly payroll. He was then dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its
value added tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Petitioner on the other hand
claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. She then discovered
that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees,
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid while the
funeral home was under the management of the private respondent. The private
respondent filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Private
respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission or NLRC. On June
13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision
and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the
present petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petition was proper.

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court were eliminated, the legislative intended that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances the
Court have noted could have been an involuntary error because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the
special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals. While to indulge in the assumption that appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would
subvert, the intention of Congress.

Quarto vs Ombudsman Marcelo 658 SCRA 580

Facts: The petitioner as Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division,
Bureau of Equipment in the Department of Public Works and Highways in the Port
Area of Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate
Team of the DPWH. The other respondents are members of the SIT. DPWH
Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged
anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of
DPWH service vehicles in 2001. The DPWH-IAS the investigating committee
discovered that several of the emergency repairs or purchase of spare parts that were
approved by the government did not take place resulting to Php 143 million loss to the
government. Petitioner was accused of dishonesty and grave misconduct for the
approval of four job orders for repairs and purchase of spare parts. The other
respondents aside from the petitioner were granted with immunity from prosecution by
the resolution of the Ombudsman. Petitioner questions the said resolution through a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the petition was proper.

Ruling: No. The petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary
course of law As extraordinary writs, both certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this
case the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the
assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this
present petition. Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the
respondents in the informations before filing the present petition.The petitioner
bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present
petition. Similarly, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition
with this Court within the sixty-day reglementary period from notice of the assailed
Ombudsman’s resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he initially and
erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan. The Court stated that
the remedy from the Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court.

National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs Mario Abayari 602 SCRA 242

Facts: Petitioner, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation or NHMFC is

a government-owned and controlled corporation created under the authority of
Presidential Decree No. 1267 for the primary purpose of developing and providing
a secondary market for home mortgages granted by public and/or private home-
financing institutions. In its employ were respondents, mostly rank-and-file
employees, who all profess as having been hired after June 30, 1989. The
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 directed that all allowances
– namely representation and transportation allowance, clothing and laundry
allowance, subsistence allowance, hazard pay and other allowances as may be
determined by the budget department – enjoyed by covered employees should be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates prescribed therein. The
respondents filed a petition for mandamus against petitioner in order to compel it to give
them meal, rice, children, optical allowances and longevity pay. The petition was
granted by the Regional Trial Court or RTC of Makati and petitioner questioned the said
decision through a petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the granting of the petition for mandamus was proper.

Ruling: No. A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of

competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance
of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of
the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a
discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. Petitioner is only a GOCC which has a limited authority
based on its charter. The Commission on Audit is the one who has authority to grant
money claims based on the The Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Therefore the respondents cannot claim their allowances from petitioner.

MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay 574 SCRA 661

Facts: Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before

the Regional Trial Court or RTC in Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case
No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. The case
was filed in the RTC of Imus Cavite. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents and
ordered the petitioners to clean Manila Bay. Petitioners appealed the decision to the CA
and stated that the cleaning of Manila Bay cannot be compelled with mandamus.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean Manila
Bay.

Ruling: Yes. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial

duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. MMDA has
the duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition in accordance with RA 7924.

Fortuno vs Palma 156 SCRA 691

Facts: Petitioner Salvio B. Fortuno and respondent Joel David S. Abante were
candidates for the position of director to represent District V of the Camarines Sur II
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II) at the elections of February 9, 1985. On
January 30, 1985, Abante filed with the National Electrification Administration or NEA a
petition to disqualify Fortuno as candidate alleging that he is not a resident of the area
coverage of District V as required by the By-laws of the corporation. The NEA directed
the CASURECO Board of Directors to take appropriate action on the petition in
accordance with the By-laws and Election Code. On February 9, 1985, the election
was held as a result of which Fortuno obtained 1,429 votes while Abante
received 637 votes. Accordingly, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected
director for District V. On February 10, 1985, a quo warranto petition with prayer
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was filed by Abante in
the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. The RTC ruled in favor of Abante and Fortuno
appealed the said decision stating that the RTC has no jurisdiction to the quo warranty
case filed by Abante.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to the quo warranty case.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Court have concurrent
jurisdiction over quo warranty cases. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court a quo
warranto proceeding maybe instituted to determine the right to the use or exercise
of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where
the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be
ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action. The Supreme Court
has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with the Regional Trial
Court in the province in which the defendant or one of the defendants reside, or
when defendant is a corporation, in the province in which it is domiciled or has
a place of business. From the foregoing the conclusion is inescapable that the quo
warranto proceeding filed in the RTC of Naga City questioning the qualification of
petitioner Fortuno is within the jurisdiction of said Court. Nowhere in the law can
We find any provision that excepts the electric cooperatives from its coverage.

Lucy Marie-Torres Gomez vs Codilla 668 SCRA 600

Facts: Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute for
the position of representative of the Fourth Congressional District for the Province
of Leyte for Richard Gomez, her husband. On May 6, 2010, Juntilla filed a Counter-
Manifestation with the COMELEC En Banc. and he wrote a letter to Atty.
Ferdinand T. Rafanan, Director of the Law Department of the COMELEC, alleging
the invalidity of the proposed substitution of Gomez by petitioner. On May 8, 2010,
the COMELEC En Banc allowed petitioner as a substitute candidate for Gomez
for representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte. May 1, 2010, private
respondent Codilla filed a Petition with public respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal or HRET against petitioner. In an Order issued by public
respondent HRET, the instant case was set for preliminary conference on
September 2, 2010. On September 1, 2010, unsatisfied with the Order of the HRET,
petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, persistent in her position that
Codilla's Election Protest should be dismissed based on the grounds raised in
her Verified Answer. She also prayed for the deferment of the preliminary
conference until after the resolution of the said motion on 9 September 2010, the
HRET denied the respondent's motion for deferment of the preliminary conference
scheduled on September 2, 2010. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the petition was proper.

Ruling: No. The petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the HRET. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This
exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority
to hear and determine the controversy presented; and the right to decide whether
there exists that state of facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters
arising from the case legitimately before it. The foregoing considered, the issues
raised in Codilla's Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is within
the jurisdiction of the HRET.

Municipality of Biñan vs Garcia 180 SCRA 576

Facts: Municipality of Biñan sought to expropriate land of private respondents for it to be

used as a public market. The complaint for expropriation was filed the Regional Trial
Court or RTC of Laguna and City of San Pablo. Private respondents Erlinda Francisco
filed a separate action stating that she has a vested right via a pre-existing approved
Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C. Until this clearance was revoked, the
Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the lots in
question," it was premature for it to file a case for expropriation. The RTC ruled in
favor of Francisco. The Municipality filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC
dismissed the motion stating that it was filed after the fifteen day period from the notice
of final order of the Court which was on July 27, 1984 and the motion for
reconsideration was filed on August 24, 1984.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality filed the motion for reconsideration after the
reglementary period.

Ruling: Yes. The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in
actions for partition, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period
for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice of order
and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general in
accordance with conformably with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 and Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty days, a record of appeal
being required. The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17,
1984 was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down
by law therefore.

Republic of the Philippines vs Gingoyon 478 SCRA 474

Facts: On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation
with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court or RTC together with an Application for
Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government
sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Regional Trial Court or RTC ruled that the government should first release the
amount of US$62 million to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as
that which the Government specifically made available for the purpose of this
expropriation and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just
compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. The
Government was also directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of
Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation
before it could acquire NAIA 3. The Government questioned the decision stating that it
should only pay Php.3 billion to PIATCO.

Issue: Whether or not the Government should pay PIATCO 62 million US dollars to
PIATCO.

Ruling: No. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to offer
US$62.3 Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the wording of the
Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the
consistent position of the Government on that aspect. In any event, for the RTC to
be able to justify the payment of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and not ₱3 Billion
Pesos, he would have to establish that the higher amount represents the
valuation of the structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the
land wherein NAIA 3 is built. The Order dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish
such integral fact, and in the absence of contravening proof, the proffered value
of ₱3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should prevail. Once the
Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of ₱3 Billion, it will
be entitled to the Writ of Possession.

Yujuico vs Atienza 472 SCRA 463

Facts: The City of Manila authorized its City Mayor to expropriate the land owned by
petitioner in order to build a school upon it. The complaint for eminent domain was then
filed to the Regional Trial Court or RTC of Manila. The Court ordered the release of the
Php.31 million payment for the land to the petitioner. The City then stated that the City
School Board or CSB which has the authority to pass a resolution allocating funds
for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby
given thirty (30) days from receipt of the Court order to pass the necessary
resolution for the payments of the remaining balance to the petitioner. The petitioner
then filed a petition for contempt to the Court against the respondents since the CSB
has not acted on the payment for her land.

Issue: Whether or not the CSB should have acted on releasing the compensation due to
the petitioner

Ruling: Yes. The Court recognizes the power of LGU to expropriate private property
for public use, it will not stand idly by while the expropriating authority maneuvers
to evade the payment of just compensation of property already in its possession.
Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his

loss.

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation 321 SCRA 659

Facts: Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA or BANTSA is an international banking

and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines while
private respondent American Realty Corporation or ARC is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited BAIL, on the other hand, is a limited
liability company organized and existing under the laws of England. BANTSA and
BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million US Dollar loans to the
following corporate borrowers Liberian Transport Navigation, El Challenger and
Eshley Compania Naviera all of which are foreign affiliates of private respondent.
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, ARC as third party
mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages. Due to the default of the borrowers
in their loan amortizations BANTSA filed civil actions before foreign courts for the
collection of the principal loan. In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts,
private respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private not impleaded
as party-defendant. Petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial Court an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially
the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts
for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's filing a collection suit against the principal
debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts waives the remedy of
foreclosure.

Ruling: Yes. A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words,
he may he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies
is complete in itself. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of
the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure
of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Barrido vs Nonato 738 SCRA 510

Facts: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and

petitioner Marietta N. Barrido were able to acquire a property in Eroreco, Bacolod
City. Their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Nonato filed a Complaint
for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities or MTCC of Bacolod City.
Barrido claimed that the subject property had already been sold to their children,
Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Issue: Whether or not the MTCC has jurisdiction over the case of partition.

Ruling: Yes. the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 as amended by RA 7691 provides: Section 33.
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest
therein does not exceed Php.20,000 or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Php.50,000. Provided, That value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. as
amended by R.A. No. 7691. The subject property has an assessed value of Php.8,080
which does not exceed Php.20,000 therefore the case is within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC.
Huerta Alba Resort Inc. vs Court of Appeals 339 SCRA 534

Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure to the Regional Trial
Court or RTC of Makati against petitioner for the latter’s loan of Php.8.5 million. The
RTC granted the foreclosure. Subsequently the private respondent filed a motion for a
writ of execution to the RTC for the execution of the foreclosure. The RTC granted the
motion and the petitioner

questioned the decision stating that it has a 1 year period from the registration of the
sheriff’s certificate of sale to redeem the property.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a 1 year period to redeem the property.

Ruling: No. The foreclosure in this case is a judicial foreclosure and not a extrajudicial
foreclosure. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court state that upon the court’s judgment which
finds that debt must be paid to the creditor-mortgagee, the debtor-mortgagor has 90
days to pay the debt and in default the mortgaged property will then be sold to realize
the debt.

Lacbayan vs Samoy 645 SCRA 677

Facts: During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five
parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in
petitioner and respondent’s names. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties
in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when
petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition of the said properties before the Regional Trial Court or RTC in Quezon
City on May 31, 1999. Petitioner states that the issue of ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case.
Issue: Whether or not the issue of ownership can be separated with partition.

Ruling: No. The complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. But until this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this
case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

Lim and Salanguit vs Ligon 727 SCRA 223

Facts: Lim got the subject property from the spouses Ronulo when they executed an
affidavit of waiver of rights over the property in her favor. While herein plaintiffs
Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon purchased the subject property
from Felicisimo Fernandez. Lim filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
spouses Ligon with the Municipal Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas involving the
subject property. On May 26, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent and ordered petitioners to vacate the subject land. The Ligons
established a beach house in the property while it was still in their possession it was
then demolished when Lim possessed the property. The Ligons filed a complaint for the
demolition of the property. The absence of the defendants and their counsel in the
trial despite due notice, evidence for plaintiffs was presented ex-parte with plaintiff
Danilo Ligon taking the witness stand. The Regional Trial Court or RTC then ruled in
favor of the Ligons. Lim states that the judgement in the ejectment case constitutes to
res judicata in the case for the prior possession of the Ronulos.

Issue: Whether or not the final judgement on the ejectment case resulted in res judicata
with the prior possession of the Ronulos of the subject property.

Ruling: No. For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites must
concur: the former judgment was final, the court that rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties, the judgment was based on the merits
and between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties,
subject matters, and causes of action. Neither bar by prior judgment nor
conclusiveness of judgment applies to the case at bar.

Serdoncillo vs Fidel 297 SCRA 448

Facts: Petitioner was paying rentals to the owner of the property and consigned it to the
Metropolitan Trial Court or MeTC of Pasay City against the said owner of the property.
The owner subsequently sold the property and demanded for petitioner to vacate it but
the latter did not feed the demand and the owner filed a complaint to the Regional Trial
Court or RTC of Pasay City for recovery of possession. The RTC ruled in favor of the
private respondents. Petitioner questioned the decision stating that the MeTC already
ruled in her action for consignation that she was a valid tenant of the property and such
decision is res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata applies in the case.

Ruling: No. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the
following requisites must concur: the former judgment must be final, it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties,
it must be a judgment on the merits and there must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of
action. There is no identity of causes in the action for consignation and ejectment in this
case.

Bañes vs Lutheran Church of the Philippines 475 SCRA 13

Facts: Bañes filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Ladlad for
dispossessing him of the subject property in the Metropolitan Trial Court or MeTC in
Manila The respondents locked the gates of the property with men guarding it to prevent
the petitioner from entering or leaving the property and they also filed a prohibition and
prayer for temporary issuance of temporary restraining order against the MeTC to enjoin
it from hearing the complaint of Bañes. The Regional Trial Court or RTC granted the
decision and Bañes appealed it to the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not there was force as contemplated by Rule 70 in this case.

Ruling: Yes. Though petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their
willingness to voluntarily leave the property since the Court decided that it does not
belong to them since the presence of such men in the subject property restricting
petitioner's mobility constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.

Nuñez vs SLTEAS 618 SCRA 134

Facts: SLTEAS who owns the subject property filed a complaint for forcible entry
against petitioner who was occupying the subject property. The petitioner answered
stating that he is a lessor of the property which according to him was owned by Maria
Sylianteng. The property according to Nunez was also unguarded and he has been in
occupancy since 1999.

Issue: Whether or not forcible entry may still apply in this case when the defendant has
been in occupancy since 1999 and it was not physically possessed by owner

Ruling: Yes. One need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of
the property at all times to be considered in possession. Possession can also be
acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g.,
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of
possessory information titles and the like. Also ordinarily reckoned from the date of
actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had been effected
by means of stealth.
Domagas vs Jensen 448 SCRA 663

Facts: Domagas filed a complaint of forcible entry against Jensen to the Municipal Trial
Court or MTC. It rendered a decision without Jensen since the summons for her we're
served to her brother Oscar Layno therefore the said decision is in favor of Domagas.
Jensen filed a complaint to the Regional Trial Court or RTC to dismiss the case. The
RTC granted the dismissal and Domagas filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals or CA
which rendered a decision in favor of Jensen and stated that an action for ejectment is a
quasi in rem.

Issue: Whether or not an action of forcible entry is quasi in rem

Ruling: No. An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in
personam. From the provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature and purpose,
an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant
under Article 539 of the Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the
action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by
way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

Yap vs Cruz 208 SCRA 692

Facts: Cruz was a valid tenant of the subject property and he offered for sale some of
the equipment and goodwill of the vetenirary clinic he operated in the subject property to
Yap. The negotiations of Yap and Cruz never took place but Yap was able to get a
lease to the subject property from the owner. Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible
entry in the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not there was forcible entry in this case.

Ruling: Yes. Since the lease of Cruz was still valid and subsisting when the petitioners
and the landlord executed a new contract of lease. There is no question that Cruz
has not effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in question
in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Also in the
case at bar the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the private
respondent is clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private
respondent continues to be in force and cannot be deemed to have expired as
of the end of the month automatically.

Onquit vs Binamira 297 SCRA 354

Facts: Respondent is the Judge who handled the complaint of the petitioner for focible
entry. Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court of the judge stating that the
subject property is an agricultural land and the case involves tenancy over it therefore
the case falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform or DAR.

Issue: Whether or not this case of forcible entry is under the jurisdiction of DAR.

Ruling: No. The court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the
simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. It is the duty of the court to receive
evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. What determines the
nature of an action and a court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by
the plaintiff. Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint, which
in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court.

Bugarin vs Palisoc 476 SCRA 587

Facts: Palisoc filed a complaint of ejectment against Bugarin in Metropolitan Trial Court
or MeTC. The Court ruled in favor of Palisoc. Subsequently Palisoc filed a motion to
issue a special order of demolition since Bugarin refused to leave the premises. The
MeTC granted the motion and issued a special order of demolition. Bugarin questioned
the decision stating that the issuance of the order of demolition violates RA 7279
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the MeTC of the order of demolition is proper.

Ruling: Yes. A judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory
to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the court's duty to order the
execution is practically ministerial. The instances where a defendant may stay execution
is stated der Section 19, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment
on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice
to a lawful possessor, and the court's duty to order the execution is practically
ministerial. The defendant may stay it only by perfecting an appeal, filing a
supersedeas bond and making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
appeal. Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is
immediately executory without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.

Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs Court of Appeals 410 SCRA 318

Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint of unlawful detainer against Mogar. The
Metropolitan Trial Court or MeTC ruled in favor of respondent and issued an order of
demolition but it was not implemented immediately. Subsequently the other occupants
of the subject property organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood
Association the here in petitioners. They filed an action of preliminary injunction against
the MeTC stating that they cannot be included in the demolition order since they are not
parties to the original unlawful detainer case.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are included in demolition order.

Ruling: Yes. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in

personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding
on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: a trespasser, squatter
or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment, a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
defendant, a transferee pendente lite, a sublessee, a co-lessee or a member of the
family, relative or privy of the defendant. In the case at bar, the records show
that petitioner’s members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right
to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of
the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject
property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs Rodriguez 619 SCRA 176

Facts: A shipment was received in the Subic Area port zone. It was indicated to be an
agricultural product but it was actually rice. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority or SBMA
refused the releasing of the rice. Private respondents then filed an action for injunction
in the Regional Trial Court or RTC which was granted by the RTC and issued an order
to restrain SBMA from acquiring the rice shipment. SBMA did not follow the order and
the private respondents then filed a complaint of indirect contempt and the RTC ruled in
the private respondent's favor.

Issue: Whether or not there was indirect contempt in this case.

Ruling: None. It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot
interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught. The Collector of
Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods.30 Regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC
and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional trial courts
are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Encinas vs National Bookstore 464 SCRA 572

Facts: Encinas and National Bookstore both have titles named under them that
corresponds to the subject property. Encinas' title was by the fire that happened to the
Registry of Deeds and she had her title be reconstituted. While National Bookstore has
an unburned title for the property. National Bookstore then filed a case for quieting of
title to Regional Trial Court or RTC and it ruled in favor of National Bookstore. Encinas
questioned the ruling stating that her reconstituted title was valid.

Issue: Whether or not Encinas was able to prove the superiority of her title.

Ruling: No. National Bookstore was able to provide more evidence than Encinas.
Preponderance of evidence must be applied in this case meaning that the party who
has greater weight of credible evidence is the rightful owner of the property.

Ladano vs Neri 685 SCRA 134

Facts: Ladano filed a complaint of forcible entry against Neri to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board or DARAB. Neri stated that he was the owner of
the property and proceeded to build a fence around the property and cut down the trees
that were planted by Ladano within the property. DARAB ruled in favor of Ladano.
Ladano subsequently filed a motion for indirect contempt against Neri.

Issue: Whether or not Neri was guilty of indirect contempt.

Ruling: No. A charge for indirect contempt, such as disobedience to a court’s lawful
order is initiated either motu proprio, by order of or a formal charge, by the
offended court, or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified
true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. It cannot be initiated by a mere motion such as the one that
petitioner filed. Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that
respondents violated the TRO.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Listana 408 SCRA 328

Facts: Listana offered to sell his property to the government through the Department of
Agrarian Reform or DAR . DAR valued valued the property at Php.5 million. The Land
Bank refused to release the just compensation of Listana despite receiving the order to
do so from a writ of execution. Listana then filed a motion for contempt to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication or PARAD which was granted by the said Adjudication
board.

Issue: Whether or not there was contempt in this case.

Ruling: None. There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect
contempt, namely through a verified petition and by order or formal charge initiated
by the court motu proprio. In the case at bar, neither of these modes was
adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. More specifically, Rule 71,
Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt
against quasi-judicial entities, provides that contempt against quasi-judicial entities.
Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed
against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or
shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to
authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial
Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have
jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. Quasi-judicial bodies have
no power to try and hear contempt cases.

Robosa vs National Labor Relations Commission 665 SCRA 434

Facts: Respondent was order by the National Labor Relations Commission or the NLRC
to desist from dismissing the petitioners who were officers of the union. The
respondents did not comply with the order and petitioners then filed a motion for
contempt of against the respondents. The NLRC heard the contempt charge but
dismissed it urging the labor arbiter to decide the case on its merits.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC may hear contempt charges

Ruling: Yes. Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters)
may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate
penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either
imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is
against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the
labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the
labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court.
This mode is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers.
As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission
is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt.

Burgos vs Macapagal-Arroyo 653 SCRA 512

Facts: Jose Jonas Burgos was abducted by four men and one woman. His mother Edita
Burgos subsequently filed writ of have as corpus and writ of amparo along with a motion
to declare here in respondents for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the contempt charge

Issue: Whether or not there was contempt in this case.

Ruling: None. Contempt in this case is criminal in nature therefore it follows the rules
and principles of a criminal proceeding, it cannot be presumed and it must be proven.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents has custody of her son therefore the
respondents presumption of innocence remained.

Rosario Textile Mills vs Court of Appeals 409 SCRA 515

Facts: Rosario Textile Mills bought the subject property from GBC Corporation and
demanded for RMC a lessor in the said property to vacate the premises. Rosario Textile
then proceeded to barricade the property and remove the materials and equipment of
RMC within the property. RMC in turn filed a writ of injunction against Rosario Textile to
the Regional Trial Court or RTC in order for the latter to return the missing equipment of
RMC. The RTC granted the writ of injunction. The RTC then ordered Rosario Textile to
return the equipment of RMC within 5 days from notice under the pain of contempt.

Issue: Whether or not contempt is existing in this case.

Ruling: Yes. An injunction duly issued must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of
the court may be, until a higher court overrules such decision. As affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and this Court, the trial court properly issued the injunction order directing
petitioners to return the sewing machines.

Pascua vs Simon 161 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioners did not leave the subject property when a writ of possession has
already been issued by the Court of First Instance or CFI in favor of the private
respondents. The writ of possession was directed at the Sheriff in order for him to give
to the private respondents the possession of the property. Private respondents then
filed a motion for contempt of court against the petitioners for not leaving the property
which the said CFI granted.

Issue: Whether or not the motion for contempt of court was proper in this case.

Ruling: No. The mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of petitioners to

relinquish the properties would not constitute contempt. The contumacious act
punishable under Rule 71, Section 3 is: Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or judge, including the act of a person who after being dispossessed or
ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon
such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession,
or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto. The writ of possession was directed not to petitioners, but to the
sheriff for him to deliver the properties to respondents. As the writ did not
command the petitioners to do anything, they cannot be held guilty of
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court.

Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperation vs Sangguniang Panglungsod of Dumaguete

155 SCRA 421

Facts: The respondents issued contempt to the petitioners for not attending the
investigations for the operations of the petitioners' public utilities. The petitioners were
accused of installing inefficient power lines in the city. The petitioners in turn stated that
the respondent do not have the power of contempt nor the power to investigate the
inefficiency of power lines to conform to the standards since that power belongs to the
National Electrification Administration.

Issue: Whether or not local government units or LGU's have the power of contempt.

Ruling: No. There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting
local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish
for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish
the petitioners for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even
less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.