Canache & Allison 2005

Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies
Author(s): Damarys Canache and Michael E. Allison

Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 91-111
Published by: Distributed by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Center for
Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4490419
Accessed: 10-09-2018 18:24 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press, Center for Latin American Studies at the University of
Miami are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American
Politics and Society
This content downloaded from 38.132.124.59 on Mon, 10 Sep 2018 18:24:59 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Perceptions of Political Corruption
in Latin American Democracies
Damarys Canache
Michael E.Allison
ABSTRACT
Political corruption poses a serious threat to the stability of devel-

oping democracies by eroding the links between citizens and gov-
ernments. Using data on national levels of corruption (Transparency
International 1997 CPI index) and individual opinion (1995-97
World Values Survey), this study finds that Latin Americans are quite
aware of the seriousness of corruption in their countries. The ensu-
ing question is whether citizens can connect their views about cor-
ruption to appraisals of their authorities and institutions and of
democracy more generally. Collectively, the findings suggest that
they can, and that the necessary ingredients for accountability are
present in Latin America. The possible dark side of mass opinion
on corruption is that pervasive misconduct may poison public sen-
timent toward democratic politics. On this score, the analysis found
that this attitude affected only support for specific administrations
and institutions.
Political corruption
nations. At its mostisbasic,
a severe problem
political facing
corruption many the
involves democratic
abuse of
public power for some private benefit. Its existence may distort gov-
ernment outputs because actors involved in corrupt practices gain dis-
proportionate benefits from government. This, in turn, may distort dem-
ocratic procedures, because policies result not from an open clash of
ideas in the marketplace but instead from back-alley deals.
Political corruption is an especially significant problem in Latin Amer-
ica, where corruption scandals tarnished many Latin American govern-
ments in the 1990s. In Brazil, President Fernando Collor de Mello was
forced to resign following a chain of scandals involving an influence-ped-
dling ring during the electoral campaign, redirection of public funds by
his wife, and reports of a lavish private life. In Venezuela, Carlos Andres
P6rez was suspended from the presidency in the midst of impeachment
proceedings that were initiated following news of his misappropriation of
public funds. In Ecuador, the media uncovered evidence that President
Abdali Bucaram stashed away for himself money that had been raised
during a Christmas telethon to help the poor. This triggered a political
process ending with his removal by Congress for "mental incapacity"
(Stapenhurst 2000). In Mexico, the reputation of former president Carlos
91
92 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 47: 3
Salinas de Gortari was severely tarnished larg

now-imprisoned brother Raiil, who was accused
opponent, playing a major role in drug traffickin
$100 million. Carlos Salinas has lived in exile in Ireland since he left the
Mexican presidency. In Nicaragua, former president Arnoldo Alemin has
faced fraud, embezzlement, and money-laundering charges. In Argentina,
President Carlos Menem left office in 1999 following a spate of scandals.
Two years later, he was arrested on charges of illegal arms trafficking and
accepting millions of dollars in bribes.
Much of the research conducted on corruption and its political
impact thus far has examined matters such as the factors that induce cor-
ruption to take root in a nation's political system; its systemic negative
consequences, such as clientelism and cronyism (see, for example, Ban-
field 1958; Johnston 1979; Etzioni-Halevy 1985); its systemic positive
consequences, such as political stability (Huntington 1969; Waterbury
1976; Becquart-Leclerq 1989; Heidenheimer et al. 1989); and its conse-
quences for policymaking, especially for economic policy (Tulchin and
Espach 2000). The focus of this study, in contrast, is the link between
corruption and the perceptions and attitudes of a nation's citizens. In
exploring the significance of corruption for mass politics, this study fol-
lows a path that so far has been traveled by only a relative handful of
scholars (for example, Morris 1991; Shin 1999; Camp et al. 2000; Della
Porta 2000; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002).1
Political corruption raises several issues regarding the relationship
between citizens and their governments. At one level, when the highest
authorities are frequently implicated in electoral manipulation, financial
scandals, or the abuse of public resources to achieve personal benefits,
their bases of authority and legitimacy may be seriously undermined. At
another level, corruption constitutes a violation of the unwritten contract
between citizen and public official. Political corruption "distorts public
demands, increases the cost, reduces quality, and delays the completion
of public works, delays access to public administration for those people
who do not pay bribes and reduces the productivity" of all those
involved with the state (Della Porta 2000). Thus it is no surprise that
some scholars view corruption as a "common and profound obstacle to
the consolidation of new democracies" (Schedler et al. 1999, 1).
A vital step in combating political corruption is that citizens be able
to hold leaders accountable when they engage in malfeasance. For this
"vertical accountability" (O'Donnell 1999) to exist, citizens need to be
able to hold political leaders to some standard and punish them when
they violate that standard. Accountability of this sort entails two addi-
tional requirements. First, citizens must accurately perceive corruption
when it does exist. If citizens simply believe that all politicians are cor-
rupt, this would most likely bode poorly for the fate of democracy, as
CANACHE AND ALLISON: CORRUPTION 93
none of the electoral alternatives would appeal

there would be nothing left to explain if citiz
viewed their democratic leaders as either all be
rupt at all. We find that possibility unlikely.
Second, citizens need to adjust their opinion
ers (or institutions) accordingly. Thus, when cit
corruption and they adjust their opinions of t
better able to hold that leader accountable through democratic
processes (elections, judicial procedures, protest, and so on). Positive
consequences can result when citizens identify certain leaders or polit-
ical institutions as corrupt and they are able to hold them accountable
through various forms of sanction. When political leaders are thought to
be corrupt and the legislature or citizens hold the leader accountable,
this is an example of democracy in action. However, if citizens misplace
blame, it is possible that corruption can have a destabilizing affect on
democratic political systems. For instance, if citizens believe that cor-
ruption is an inherent component of a democratic regime and not
merely attributable to an individual political leader or institution, this
may weaken support for democracy as a form of governance, thereby
increasing the risk that an alternate regime will emerge. Therefore, it is
critically important to identify whether citizens can accurately assess the
level of corruption in their nation and whether perceptions of corrup-
tion affect their support for the incumbent government, the political
system and democracy as a system of governance.
This article tries to disentangle the relationship between political
corruption and public opinion in several Latin American nations using
data from the 1995-97 World Values Survey. The World Values Survey is
a worldwide survey project that investigates social, cultural, and politi-
cal attitudes. The third wave of this project, conducted from 1995
through 1997, was performed in national representative samples of 54
independent nations. Specifically, it assesses the characteristics of citi-
zens' perceptions of corruption and considers whether those percep-
tions affect support for incumbent political officials, political institutions,
and democracy itself, broadly speaking. The analyses begin with a brief
review of the nature of corruption in Latin America.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRUPTION

IN LATIN AMERICA
Over the last several years, political events in both North and South have
brought a renewed vigor to the study of political corruption. In the
advanced industrial democracies, corruption scandals have brought down
several prominent political figures in Italy (the "clean hands" investiga-
tion), Germany (Helmut Kohl), the United States (Rep. James Traficant, D-
Ohio), and Great Britain (Peter Mandelson). A

undoubtedly undermined citizen trust and conf
they have not destroyed the democratic syst
sations and incidents of political corruption
trast, have shaken many new democratic reg
Recent history in Latin America illustrate
ruption at the national level and the difficu
the early 1990s, nine Latin American presid
have faced judicial proceedings or have been
charges.2 One indicator of the severity of co
provided by Transparency International's C
(CPI). Table 1 depicts CPI scores from 1997
Latin American nations and advanced democracies. The 1997 data con-
tributed to this study's multivariate analyses involving the 1995-97
World Values Survey. The 2003 data are the most recent indicators avail-
able; and comparison of 1997 and 2003 scores reveals that CPI scores
for a given nation typically vary little in the short run.
As coded here, scores on the CPI range from zero (least corrupt) to
10 (most corrupt). In the advanced democracies, the mean CPI score in
both years is under 2.0.3 Although moderately high corruption is indi-
cated in nations such as Belgium and Italy, the news in the advanced
democracies is quite good overall. A starkly different story emerges in
Latin America. Among Latin American nations, the mean CPI value
exceeds 6.0 in both 1997 and 2003, and only Chile receives CPI scores
that would be inconspicuous in advanced democracies.
A few words are in order concerning the measure of corruption
used in table 1 and throughout the following analyses. The CPI is a joint
initiative of Gbttingen University and Transparency International, and
has become a popular measure in cross-national statistical analyses over
the last several years. The CPI is an attempt to assess the level of cor-
ruption in a country by compiling a "poll of polls" based on the per-
ceptions of both national and foreign business leaders and risk analysts
working for multinational firms and institutions in each country. Trans-
parency International defines corruption as the "misuse of public power
for private benefits; for example, the bribing of public officials, taking
kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzling public funds" (Graf
Lambsdorff 2003). It uses this definition of corruption to seek out polls
asking comparable questions in countries around the world. Trans-
parency International calculates CPI scores for a nation if data from a
minimum of four surveys are available.
Although there is no purely objective measure of corruption, the
CPI scores provided by Transparency International offer a relatively
accurate depiction of the level of corruption in each country. The
responses of business people and risk analysts, whose job it is to take
Table 1. Corruption Levels in Selected Dem
Advanced Democracies Latin American Democracies
1997 2003 1997 2003
Austria 2.4 2.0 Argentina 7.2 7.5

Australia 1.1 1.2 Bolivia 8.0 7.7
Belgium 4.8 2.4 Brazil 6.4 6.1
Canada 0.9 1.3 Chile 3.9 2.6
Denmark 0.1 0.5 Colombia 7.8 6.3
Finland 0.5 0.5 Costa Rica 3.5 5.7
France 3.3 3.1 Ecuador 7.8
Germany 1.8 2.3 El Salvador 6.3
Italy 5.0 4.7 Guatemala - 7.6
Japan 3.4 3.0 Honduras 7.7
Luxembourg 1.4 1.3 Mexico 7.3 6.4
Netherlands 1.0 1.1 Nicaragua 7.4
New Zealand 0.8 0.5 Panama 6.6
Norway 1.1 1.2 Paraguay 8.5
Sweden 0.6 0.3 Peru 6.3
Switzerland 1.4 1.2 Uruguay 5.6 4.5
United Kingdom 1.8 1.3 Venezuela 7.2 7.6
United States 2.2 2.5
Average 1.9 1.8 Average 6.3 6.6
Source: Transparency International 1997, 2003.
into consideration the level of corruptio

whether and how much to invest in the c
ure that is mostly the result of inform
index is widely used by economists assess
macroeconomic variables, and "it is no d
of national levels of corruption worl
Indeed, we believe that this is a more ac
than other potential sources. Corruption
ries or judicial proceedings are in many w
tigative journalism, freedom of the pre
pendent judiciary than an indication of t
CPI scores do retain an element of subjec
able indicators for our purposes.4
The CPI data reported in table 1 revea
widespread in most Latin American nat
nations are viewed in the context of advanced democracies. This claim
will be unsurprising for even casual observers of the region. But w
connection exists between corruption in Latin

political perceptions? Two central questions m
do mass perceptions of corruption share the cri
CPI data? Second, to the extent that citizens d
corruption in Latin America, whom do they ho
nificantly, do they blame the various institutions
or do they blame democracy itself
PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
If citizens are to hold leaders accountable for political corruption, the

initial step is to recognize the severity of the problem. Before citizens
decide to engage in popular protest or to punish corrupt leaders and
institutions at the ballot box, they first must characterize the degree of
corruption in their nation accurately.
CPI data indicate that the expert view holds that corruption is rela-
tively high in most Latin American nations, although corruption is only
moderately severe in Costa Rica and Uruguay and comparatively minor
in Chile. In exploring the relationship between corruption and mass
opinion, this study initially looks at how much mass perceptions of cor-
ruption mirror the elite view indicated by the CPI. It answers this ques-
tion with data from the 1995-97 World Values Survey (WVS) and the
1997 Transparency International CPI.5
The WVS includes data from seven Latin American nations: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Collectively,
1997 CPI scores from these countries encompass nearly 40 percent of the
CPI's theoretical range. In 1997, corruption as reported on the CPI was
moderately low in Chile (3.9), moderate to moderately high in Uruguay
and Brazil, and high in Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and especially
Colombia (7.8). Thus, if citizens' perceptions resemble those of the
experts whose views contribute to CPI scores, then opinion regarding the
severity of corruption should vary noticeably across these nations.
We can assess the nature of citizens' perceptions at both the aggre-
gate level and the individual level using the CPI scores as the basis of
comparison. At the aggregate level, we include CPI and WVS data from
both the seven Latin American nations and eight advanced democracies.
If aggregate mass perceptions are accurate, then the advanced democ-
racies should have low mean levels of perceived corruption; medium
levels of perceived corruption should be found in Chile and Uruguay;
and high levels of perceived corruption should be found in the other
five Latin American nations.
The WVS measures perceived corruption with data from the item
"How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this
country?" Respondents were presented with four choice options, rang-
Figure. 1. Correlation Between Country-lev

(Transparency International-CPI) and Perce
10
Colombia
c 8
SVenezuela exico
Argentina Br
. 6 Uruguay
Spain
I" ~Chile
4 4
USA
. 2 BritaIn Switzerland 00
Norway O Germany
Finland Australia
0 0 Sweden
2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6
Perceived Corruption
Source: Transparency International; Wo
ing from "almost no public offi

public officials are engaged in it."
with scale values ranging from 1
Figure 1 illustrates that aggreg
align closely with the expert view
relation between CPI values and
0.91, suggesting a high level of
the Latin American cases, those
range of corruption according t
lectively perceive the level of co
the other hand, those countries
measure (Argentina, Brazil, Co
perceived as quite corrupt by the
evidence that there is a great dea
ceptions of levels of corruption a
tion provided by the CPI scale.
We also can assess the distribut
the corruption item. Of interest
what might be hesitantly labeled
might reasonably conclude that C
virtually all officials in their natio
Table 2. Perception of the Extent of C

in Seven Latin American Countries (p
Public Officials Engaged in C

Almost Almost
all Most A few none
Argentina (N = 1,032) 37.27 41.18 18.50 3.07

Brazil (N = 1,096) 58.94 23.54 16.79 0.73
Chile (N = 949) 17.24 27.47 50.91 4.38
Colombia (N = 2,910) 44.40 32.96 19.79 2.85
Mexico (N = 1,396) 44.13 30.87 20.63 4.37
Uruguay (N = 906) 14.37 30.07 52.34 3.23
Venezuela (N = 1,106) 44.03 30.74 22.88 2.85
Source: World Values Survey, 1995-97.
we might also look askance at Colombians who believe

officials there have experienced the taint of corruptio
the relevant data. Although few respondents see almost
their respective nations, responses are divided relative
the other three response categories. In no country did
respondents who claimed that "almost no public offici
it" rise above 5 percent, and only in Chile and Urugu
region's three most corruption-free states, did the perc
dents finding that few or no public officials are engag
exceed 50 percent. On the other hand, over 70 percent
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela bel
almost all public officials are corrupt. As for perceptual er
ative handful of respondents are too generous in their
the flip side, the question of whether respondents are
that some people in Uruguay, and especially Chile, perc
in their respective nations as being much worse than t
What explains the variance in the range of perceiv
seen in table 2? Three paths warrant consideration. Firs
characteristics of WVS respondents may be associated
position to view corruption as high or low. Variables
account for sex, age, education, social class, life satisf
sonal trust, and interest in politics. Second, variance in
ditions in each nation may affect respondents' percept
CPI data as a surrogate to capture cross-national varian
we are interested in whether Latin Americans' indivi
ments correspond with the CPI. Third, if a link betwe
mass perceptions of corruption is identified at the ind
expect that the strength of this connection will be va
Table 3. Factors Affecting Level of Perceiv

in Six Latin American Countries
(ordered logistic regression estimates)
Interactive
Main Effect Model Effect Model
Robust Robust
Standard Standard
Coefficient Error' Coefficient Errora
Sex 0.137* 0.064 0.137* 0.063

Age -0.012** 0.004 -0.012** 0.004
Education 0.033 0.028 0.050 0.127
Social class --0.119** 0.044 -0.121** 0.043
Satisfaction with life 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003
Interpersonal trust -0.527** 0.154 -0.527** 0.171
Political Interest -0.187*** 0.043 -0.692*** 0.192
Transparency International
Score (nation's
corruption level) 0.423*** 0.055 0.292** 0.101
Score*Education -0.003 0.020
Score*Political Interest 0.079* 0.031
Number of Observations 5,967 5,967

Model X2 679.7 691.46
***p < .001 **p <.01 *p < .05 #p < .10

aAdjusted for clustering on country.
Dependent variable: "level of perceived cor
Notes: For tables 3-5, data from Argent
Venezuela. See appendix for wording and d
Source: World Values Survey, 1995-97; Tran
the CPI is an elite-level indicator, w

between CPI scores and mass perc
respondents who are highly inter
highest levels of education.
Because our dependent variable is a
we assess the determinants of perce
tic regression. Two models are repor
individual-level predictors, along w
The second adds CPI X political inte
tion terms to test whether the simi
perceptions of corruption peaks f
cross-national analyses such as this, data are

nation in that they are gathered in separate
of several countries. Failure to account for t
unduly small standard errors and produce t
tests for coefficient estimates. To avoid this
quent models are estimated using robust stan
the national-level clustering in these data.
Results in table 3's initial model reveal that several individual-level
variables correspond with the perception of corruption. Specifically,
women, older respondents, and respondents who lack interpersonal
trust and political interest all tend to perceive higher rather than lower
levels of political corruption. Even after controlling for the impact of
these variables, though, an extremely strong effect is found for the CPI
variable. The coefficient on the Transparency International indicator is
nearly eight times the size of its standard error, reaching the highest
level of statistical significance. Citizens' views of corruption in Latin
America apparently are neither unfocused nor unfounded. To the con-
trary, there is a high degree of correspondence between expert judg-
ments and the views of the person on the street.
To be clear, it is not our claim that the typical citizen learns of the
CPI and uses those data to inform perceptions about levels of corrup-
tion. Instead, we use CPI scores to approximate variance in actual levels
of corruption in the six nations under consideration. From this perspec-
tive, the large and statistically significant coefficient on the CPI variable
suggests that the "reality" of political conditions (as captured by elite
perceptions) in these nations resonates with the mass public. Students
of political behavior often are concerned about the consequences that
emerge when citizens are less than fully informed about politics.
Although it is admittedly a stretch to argue that the CPI data measure
actual levels of political corruption, these data do at least indicate cor-
ruption as perceived by attentive, well-informed observers. From this
perspective, the significant effect for the CPI variable reveals that mass
opinion about corruption is neither haphazard nor baseless.
Although the initial model in table 3 demonstrates that mass judg-
ments regarding levels of corruption vary in response to levels of cor-
ruption as indicated by the CPI, a limitation of this specification is that
it fails to recognize possible variance among mass judgments. We have
speculated that the connection between CPI data and mass perceptions
should be strongest for those citizens who have the resources and
capacity to monitor the political scene most closely. In other words,
some citizens may be better positioned than others to perceive corrup-
tion accurately. This hypothesis is tested by determining whether the
impact of corruption as indicated by CPI data is moderated by two fac-
tors critical to political engagement: education and interest in politics.
Figure 2. Moderating Impact of Politica

Perception of Corruption
c Low Interest
0
0.5
CD High Interest
4-
0
0)
3.5 8
Count
(Trans
Statistic
X educa
of the h
In colum
interact
expectat
attuned
ruption
impact
figure d
or most
corrupt
constan
on the C
in their
that are
even to
It is in
nations
appears to matter the most. Respondents who

tics have a 50-50 chance of saying that all or
versus a mark of less than 20 percent for re
interested in politics. What this suggests is that
to permit incumbent officials from standing
example, Chileans with high levels of politic
likely than their politically disinterested cou
Chile is not suffering from a widespread epidem
Collectively, these results demonstrate th
indeed recognize corruption in their nations
thing, corruption is overstated by politically d
nations where corruption is not so severe. Th
that corrupt leaders aren't fooling anyone. C
the problem. This is the first step toward a
step is for citizens to link their perceptions
regarding incumbent officials and the politi
second step occurs is the next question.
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION AS A DETERMINANT

OF SUPPORT FOR INCUMBENTS AND INSTITUTIONS
This study adopts a hierarchical approach to the study of political sup-

port in which each level of support represents a higher level of gener-
alization than its immediate predecessor (Canache 2002). Political sup-
port is treated as a multidimensional construct incorporating
components at three different levels of generalization. At the least gen-
eral level, citizens assess the performance of incumbent officials,
whereas at the most general level, evaluations center on the type of
regime operating in the nation-democracy, in the case of the nations
currently under consideration. At the intermediate level, citizens form
opinions regarding the political institutions of the regime, such as the
courts, the military, the police, and the bureaucracy.
Perceptions of corruption may influence any or all of the three levels
of political support. The wisdom of linking views on corruption to other
political evaluations arguably varies, however, depending on the judg-
ment at hand. If incumbent officials are corrupt, it makes perfect sense
for citizens to evaluate them negatively. Likewise, if a nation's govern-
ment institutions are riddled with corruption or if political procedures
facilitate corrupt practices, citizens are right to take a critical view. Mat-
ters differ, however, when we come to the question of regime support.
High levels of political corruption are not endemic to democracy. After
all, corruption is much less severe in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay than
in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, and corruption is virtually nonex-
istent in nations such as Finland and New Zealand. If the perception of
high levels of corruption leads citizens to form n

racy itself, then we would have something of
water" phenomenon. Corruption would impose a
izens to view democratic governance with indiff
The assessment of the political consequences
by exploring whether the perceptions discussed
of support for incumbent officials and a nation
evidence already suggests that citizens do link
about political actors. Specifically, Morris (1991)
between Mexicans' perceptions of corruption and
government. Seligson (2002), using a measure o
corruption, reports strong relationships between
and system support in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nic
In the analyses for this study, citizen support fo
ernment is measured with data from a four-cat
asked respondents to indicate how satisfied they
national government is addressing the country's
for the political system is operationalized using
structed with data from a series of questions on
asked to rate their confidence in several politica
system, the government, the police, the parliament
Support for the incumbent government is mode
tic regression, whereas an OLS model is estimate
The primary independent variable is the four-
ceived political corruption; but the models also
tional predictors. Among these are various socio
(sex, age, education, and social class), sociocultur
isfaction and financial satisfaction), and politic
interest, views on paternalism and government
to construct these variables are reported in the
each variable's descriptive statistics.
The regression results depicted in table 4 reve
control variables exert significant effects on politi
interest, of course, is the impact of perceived
significant coefficients are obtained for the cor
models. These results establish that the second half of the accountabil-
ity equation is in place. When citizens in Latin America perceive ram
pant political corruption, those views translate directly into a down
grading of opinion for both incumbent officials and political institutions.
When elected officials engage in corrupt practices, they do so at th
own political peril.
Again, it is all to the good if people correctly perceive corruptio
and then transfer those perceptions into negative evaluations of incu
bent officials and even features of a nation's political system, but it
Table 4. Effects of Perceived Corruption o
Support for
Incumbent Support for
Government Political
(ordered logistic System (OLS
regression estimates) regression estimates)
Robust Robust
Standard Standard
Coefficient Errora Coefficient Errora
Sex -0.058 0.087 0.057 0.063

Age 0.009* 0.004 0.010 0.010
Education -0.046# 0.026 -0.116* 0.033
Social class 0.100 0.068 0.114 0.080
Satisfaction with life 0.008# 0.004 0.007 0.006
Satisfaction with financial
situation 0.083*** 0.023 0.150* 0.041
Political interest 0.167* 0.075 0.543** 0.116
Views on paternalism -0.051# 0.028 -0.046* 0.017
Evaluation of poverty
situation -0.560*** 0.127 -0.335 0.170
Evaluation of government
action toward poverty 0.819*** 0.164 1.023** 0.217
Perceived corruption -0.344** 0.122 -0.816** 0.184
Constant 10.996*** 0.694
Number of observations 5,203 5,127

Model X2 1,203.33
Model R2 0.146
***p < .001 **p <.01 *p

aAdjusted for clustering
Dependent variables: "su
nal measurement; and "
See notes to table 3.
Sources: World Values Survey 1995-97; Transparency International.
would be troubling if views on corruption caused citizens to turn their

backs on democracy. All the countries in our sample can be character-
ized to a certain extent as "fragile democracies." In such nations,
although formal democratic procedures may have been installed, dem-
ocratic roots are not well entrenched, and therefore significant levels of
uncertainty about the sustainability of democracy exist (Canache 2002,
6). Although corruption in advanced democracies is unlikely severely to
erode public support for democracy as the most desirable form of gov-
Table 5. Effect of Perceived Corruption on Su

(OLS regression estimates)
Robust
Coefficient Standard Errora
Sex -0.035 0.035

Age -0.007# 0.003
Education -0.048* 0.017
Social class -0.024 0.051
Satisfaction with life 0.001 0.008
Satisfaction with financial situation 0.011 0.014
Political interest -0.081 0.045
Views on paternalism -0.003 0.008
Evaluation of poverty situation in
the country -0.067 0.067
Evaluation of government action
toward poverty 0.201* 0.054
Perceived corruption 0.029 0.035
Constant 4.067*** 0.129
Number of observations 4,932

Model R2 0.029
***p < .001 **p <.01 *p <.05 #

aAdjusted for clustering on co
Dependent variable: "Support
table 3.
Sources: World Values Survey
ernment, there is less r

ment to democracy in t
more and more Latin Am
democracy as a form of
Latinbar6metro show th
whole was only 56 perce
opposition to democracy
both support for politic
alternatives. Thus, the ver
in Latin America poses a
Data from two items ar
for democracy, yielding
port) to 8. This scale is
regression results revea
undermine support for d
tant null result speaks to an element of ratio

appraisals, especially when viewed in the con
effects reported in table 4 for this same vari
zens make a critical evaluative distinction. W
corruption to be widespread, they lash out at
and national political institutions, but, at least t
draw the line. Perceptions of political corr
undermine support for democracy as a form
CONCLUSIONS
Mass opinion potentially offers one check on corruption in that a

nation's citizens could demand higher standards of integrity from public
officials. For this sort of accountability to occur, however, citizens must
recognize corruption when it exists, and evidence of corruption must
influence citizens' judgments regarding the culpable parties. The central
objective in this article has been to determine whether accountability of
this form does indeed take place in Latin America. A secondary objec-
tive involved ascertaining whether perceptions of corruption cause citi-
zens to look critically at all aspects of democratic politics, thereby con-
tributing to an erosion in support for democracy in the region.
Drawing on Transparency International's corruption index (CPI)
and World Values Survey (WVS) data from several Latin American
nations, we have tested a series of empirical relationships regarding per-
ceptions of corruption and political attitudes. Collectively, these findings
suggest that the necessary ingredients for accountability are present in
Latin America. Citizens perceive corruption, and they connect those per-
ceptions to their judgments of incumbent leaders and political institu-
tions. Whether mass opinion alone can offer a sufficient check on cor-
ruption is, of course, highly questionable. At a minimum, however, it
surely is better to have accountability of the sort identified here than to
see corruption flourish unhampered by public criticism.
The possible dark side of mass opinion regarding corruption is that
pervasive and often burgeoning misconduct may poison public senti-
ment toward democratic politics in general. On this score, these analy-
ses speak somewhat to the vitality of democracy in the region, at least
in the short term. Although many Latin American systems are rife with
corruption, this situation only seems to affect support for specific admin-
istrations and institutions. This analysis identified no evidence that per-
ceptions of corruption have soured mass opinion on democracy as a
form of government. Unfortunately, it would be perilous to assume that
this state of affairs can continue indefinitely. Like Seligson 2002, this
study found that corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments
in Latin America; and like Seligson, we suspect that democracy in the
region, as a consequence, may be racing again

the region apparently do not currently view
feature of democratic governance, but there is n
ceptual link will not emerge in future years
unabated. Given that democracy already is on
Latin American nations, concern is warranted th
ruption eventually may add to the allure of n
APPENDIX: WORDING AND DESCRIPT

STATISTICS
Table 6. Wording and Descriptive Statistics of Survey Questionnaire
Variable Scale (lowest-highest) Statistics

Sex 1 = male; 2 = female Mode = 2
Age Years (18-91) Mean = 39.01

SD = 15.03
Education 1 = no formal Mean = 5.04

"What is the highest educa- education SD = 2.26
tional level you have attained?" 9 = university degree
Social Class 1 = lower class Mean = 2.55

"People sometimes describe 5 = upper class SD = 0.88
themselves as belonging to the
working class, the middle class,
or the upper or lower class.
To which would you describe
yourself as belonging?"
Satisfaction with life 1 = completely Mean = 7.24

"All things considered, how dissatisfied SD = 2.48
satisfied are you with your 10 = completely
life as a whole these days?" satisfied
Satisfaction with financial 1 = completely Mean = 5.89

situation dissatisfied SD = 2.77
"How satisfied are you with 10
the financial situation in your s
household?"
Political Interest 1 = not at all Mean = 1.98

"How interested would you interested SD = 0.98
say you are in politics?" 4 = very interested
Table 6. (continued)
Interpersonal Trust 0 = Can't be too Mode = 0

"Generally speaking, would careful
you say that most people can 1 = Most people
be trusted or that you can't be can be trusted
too careful in dealing with
people?"
Views on Paternalism 1 = People should Mean = 6.07
take more responsi- SD = 3.13
bility to provide for
themselves
10 = The government
should take more
responsibility to
ensure that everyone
is provided for
Evaluation of Poverty Situation 1 = a smaller share Mean = 2.62
"Would you say that today a 3 = a larger share SD = 0.65
larger share, about the same,
or a smaller share of the
people in this country are
living in poverty than were
ten years ago?"
Evaluation of Government 1 = too little Mean = 1.29
Action Toward Poverty 3 = too much SD = 0.54
"Do you think that what the
government is doing for
people in poverty in this
country is the right amount,
too much, or too little?"
Transparency International 0 = low-level Mean = 6.54

Score (CPI index) corruption SD = 1.21
10 = high-level of
corruption
Perceived Corruption 1 = Almost no public Mean = 3.02
"How widespread do you officials are engaged SD = 0.88
think bribe taking and corrup- in it
tion are in this country?" 4 = Almost all public
officials are engaged
in it
Table 6. (continued)

Support for the Incumbent 1 = very dissatisfied Mean = 2.12
Government 4 = very satisfied SD = 0.90
"How satisfied are you with
the way the people in national
office are handling the
country's affairs?
Support for the Political System 5 = low level of Mean = 10.99

Scale combining items gauging confidence SD = 3.67
the level of confidence in the 20 = high level of
following institutions: legal confidence
system, government, police,
parliament, civil service
Support for Democracy 2 = low support Mean = 3.52
Scale combining the following for democracy SD = 1.25
items: 8 = high support
for democracy
"Having a democratic system
is a very good, fairly good,
fairly bad, or very bad way of
governing this country?" (1 =
very bad, 4 = very good)
"Democracy may have prob-
lems but it's better than any
other form of government."
(1 = disagree 4 = agree)
Sources: World Values Survey 1995-97; Transpare
NOTES
1. For an excellent review on the economic and political literature on cor-

ruption, see Seligson 2002.
2. These include Alan Garcia (1985-90) in Peru; Fernando Collor de Mello
(1990-92) in Brazil; Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) in Mexico; Abdala
Bucaram (1996-97), Fabian Alarc6n (1997-98), and Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000)
in Ecuador; Ernesto Samper (1994-98) in Colombia; Carlos Menem (1989-99) in
Argentina; and Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) in Peru.
3. The scale of the original CPI index ranges from (0) high corruption to
(10) low corruption. Here the scale is inverted for the sake of comparability and
interpretation of the variable used in subsequent analyses. For further concep-
tual and methodological issues regarding the CPI

2003.
4. For additional discussion of the strengths and limitations of the CPI, see
Seligson 2002. We share many of Seligson's concerns regarding use of CPI data
in individual-level analyses. Like Seligson, however, we also think these data
offer a barometer against which to gauge the alternate measures we devise.
5. Another cross-national survey, the Latinbar6metro 1997, asked respon-
dents to assess corruption in their nations. But the items did not directly meas-
ure respondents' perceptions regarding levels of corruption, and thus they are
not directly useful for the research questions examined here. In our view, the
World Values Survey items provide a more straightforward way to capture how
much corruption the respondents think exists in each country. In 2002, Trans-
parency International launched the Global Corruption Barometer, a new initia-
tive aiming to monitor attitudes and perceptions about corruption on a global
scale. This new effort promises to offer an important reference for future
research on mass perceptions of corruption.
6. Seligson (2002, 421) examines the relationship between Transparency
International data and survey data on corruption experienced by survey respon-
dents in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay and, as this study does,
finds a very high level of correspondence between the CPI and survey-based
indicators.
7. These models include data from only six nations because the items used
for two of the independent variables were not asked in Colombia.
REFERENCES
Banfield, Edward. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Chicago: Free
Press.
Becquart-Leclerq. 1989. Paradox of Political Corruption: A French View. In Hei-

denheimer et al. 1989.
Camp, Roderic Ai, Kenneth M. Coleman, and Charles L. Davis. 2000. Public
Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica, and
Mexico. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the World Association for
Public Opinion Research, Portland, Oregon. May 17-18.
Canache, Damarys. 2002. Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile
Democracy. Coral Gables: North-South Center Press.
Della Porta, Donatella. 2000. Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political
Corruption. In Dissatisfied Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral
Countries? ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 202-28.
Diamond, Larry, Andreas Schedler, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. Introduction. In
Schedler et al. 1999. 1-10.
Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. 1985. Bureaucracy and Democracy. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Graf Lambsdorff, Johann. 2003. Background Paper to the 2003 Corruption Per-
ception Index (Transparency International 2003). <www.transparency.org>
Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, eds. 1989.
Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Ch

Yale University Press.
Johnston. Michael. 1979. Patrons and Clients, Jo
Political Science Review 73: 385-98.
Latinobar6metro. 2002. Press Report: Latinobar6metro 2002 Public Opinion Poll.
<www.latinobarometro.org>
Morris, Stephen D. 1991. Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. In
Schedler et al. 1999. 29-51.
Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Tri-
lateral Democracies. In Dissatisfied Democracies: What's Troubling the Tri-
lateral Countries? ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. 1999. The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner.
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A
Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries. Journal of Politics 64:
408-33.
Shin, Doh C. 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stapenhurst, Rick. 2002. The Media Role in Curbing Corruption. Washington,
DC: World Bank Institute.
Transparency International. 1997. Corruption Perception Index 1997.

<www.transparency. org>
2003. Corruption Perception Index 2003. <www.transparency.org>
Tulchin, Joseph S., and Ralph H. Espach, eds. 2000. Combating Corruption in
Latin America. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Waterbury, John. 1976. Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Com-
parative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco. Government and Opposition
11: 426-45.
Weyland, Kurt. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of
Democracy 9: 108-21.
World Values Survey (WVS). 1995-97. Ann Arbor: ICPSR, University of Michigan.
<nds.umdl.umich.edu>

Canache &amp; Allison 2005

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Canache &amp; Allison 2005

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies

Author(s): Damarys Canache and Michael E. Allison

Political corruption poses a serious threat to the stability of devel-

Salinas de Gortari was severely tarnished larg

none of the electoral alternatives would appeal

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRUPTION

Ohio), and Great Britain (Peter Mandelson). A

Table 1. Corruption Levels in Selected Dem

Advanced Democracies Latin American Democracies

1997 2003 1997 2003

Austria 2.4 2.0 Argentina 7.2 7.5

Average 1.9 1.8 Average 6.3 6.6

Source: Transparency International 1997, 2003.

into consideration the level of corruptio

connection exists between corruption in Latin

If citizens are to hold leaders accountable for political corruption, the

Figure. 1. Correlation Between Country-lev

Source: Transparency International; Wo

ing from "almost no public offi

Table 2. Perception of the Extent of C

Public Officials Engaged in C

Argentina (N = 1,032) 37.27 41.18 18.50 3.07

Source: World Values Survey, 1995-97.

we might also look askance at Colombians who believe

Table 3. Factors Affecting Level of Perceiv

(ordered logistic regression estimates)

Sex 0.137* 0.064 0.137* 0.063

Number of Observations 5,967 5,967

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p < .05 #p < .10

the CPI is an elite-level indicator, w

cross-national analyses such as this, data are

Figure 2. Moderating Impact of Politica

appears to matter the most. Respondents who

PERCEIVED CORRUPTION AS A DETERMINANT

This study adopts a hierarchical approach to the study of political sup-

high levels of corruption leads citizens to form n

Table 4. Effects of Perceived Corruption o

Sex -0.058 0.087 0.057 0.063

Number of observations 5,203 5,127

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p

would be troubling if views on corruption caused citizens to turn their

Table 5. Effect of Perceived Corruption on Su

Sex -0.035 0.035

Number of observations 4,932

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p <.05 #

ernment, there is less r

tant null result speaks to an element of ratio

Mass opinion potentially offers one check on corruption in that a

region, as a consequence, may be racing again

APPENDIX: WORDING AND DESCRIPT

Table 6. Wording and Descriptive Statistics of Survey Questionnaire

Variable Scale (lowest-highest) Statistics

Age Years (18-91) Mean = 39.01

Education 1 = no formal Mean = 5.04

Social Class 1 = lower class Mean = 2.55

Satisfaction with life 1 = completely Mean = 7.24

Satisfaction with financial 1 = completely Mean = 5.89

Political Interest 1 = not at all Mean = 1.98

Variable Scale (lowest-highest) Statistics

Interpersonal Trust 0 = Can't be too Mode = 0

Transparency International 0 = low-level Mean = 6.54

Variable Scale (lowest-highest) Statistics

Support for the Political System 5 = low level of Mean = 10.99

Sources: World Values Survey 1995-97; Transpare

Canache & Allison 2005

Canache & Allison 2005

p < .001 p <.01 p < .05 #p < .10

p < .001 p <.01 p

p < .001 p <.01 p <.05 #