METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN ISLAM AND

CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Masyhudi Muqorobin
Department of Economics, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY), Indonesia
Islamic Economic Forum for Indonesian Development (ISEFID)

Introduction
Methodology is an ambiguous term as to be a synonym for methods, because it
deals with methods. Although some methodologists have repeatedly reminded,
confusion remains to arise in the sense that it is frequently viewed as technical
procedures, which should be referred to as methods.1 However, tendency of
exaggerating one’s own opinion on methods, and moreover on nature and scope, has led
to controversies in methodology.2 Methodology can be defined as a

“…study of the principles that guide students of any field of knowledge, and
especially of any branch of higher learning (science) in deciding whether to accept
or reject certain propositions as a part of the body of ordered knowledge in general
or of their own discipline (science).”3

It also is worth to add that methodology deals with “an investigation of the concepts,
theories, and basic principles of reasoning of a subject.” The presence of methodology of
economics is to investigate from outside4 the nature, scope and performance of
economics as will be discussed below. Such investigation necessitates that methodology
has criteria, rules and procedures.
In relation to different position between secular or conventional5 economics and
Islam on the subject, controversy arises primarily due to different worldviews from
which the nature, scope and principles of methodology emanate. Methodology is of the
topics that Muslim economists’ attention cannot take evasive action. Despite some
pioneering efforts have been presented, the paper realizes the needs for further
deliberation of it, from both viewpoints, because its scope is wide and possible for
expansion. Among the significant differences that warrant a closer look are first, the
different process of their development; and second, different belief and philosophical
bases underlying the methodology. There are further debates on certain issues related to
these basic differences that necessitate enumeration and hence deserve further
discussion.
To cover these issues the paper will be spread over numerous sections. The
extent to which general comparison of both secular and Islamic economics takes place
will be discussed in “the role of worldview”, discussing philosophical bases underlying
it. Thereafter, the paper divides the work into two parts, under which all issues
mentioned above sufficiently require attention: first, conventional position to the above
issues; and second, Islamic alternative to it. Nonetheless, similar emphases may not be
necessary because of their different nature and scope.

The Role of Worldview

Worldview plays a pivotal role in determining the direction of any system of
science and of social system. A worldview is an evolutionary concept originated in the
West.6 It gradually evolves along with the development of a society in response to

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realities in the world, which encompass the existence of God and of His creatures – i.e.
nature and man. There is a “gigantic invisible power” instituted by three elements –
epistemology, worldview and reality – working simultaneously to generate
interdependence among them. Epistemology or theory of (scientific) knowledge in a
wider sense is centered in this interconnecting power. Epistemology also defines the
knowledge, determines its spirit and character, points out its sources, specifies its nature,
and limits its criteria. “What we can know” and “how to know” are among the basic
questions of epistemology, to which the answers can determine the right scope and
method of economics, and are greatly influential in every aspect of human activities.
Generally speaking, epistemology determines the way, and the type of, the knowledge to
be produced. Its influence over the framework of sciences, technology, way of life and
of interpreting the religion into activities, etc. develops further realities.7 Simultaneously,
epistemology, if treated to have a nearly equal meaning to philosophy of science,8
becomes the interpreter of sciences and organizes their results into a worldview.9
Islam adheres the position that God (Allah) is Supreme, above all things and
creatures, and there is nothing like unto Him.10 He is the Reality itself from Whom
knowledge (ilm) emanates to man.11 To acquire the knowledge, man is equipped with
free-will (iradah), intellect or reason (‘aql) operating within the boundary of the
Greatness of His Will and Sovereignty.12 Therefore, man can open his ‘aql and qalb
simultaneously to observe the realities of God, man himself and the universe under the
guidance of the Divine Revelation, which is gradually instilled into human mind and
heart.13 The gradual process of revelation makes the formation of the Islamic worldview
attains to its maturity.14 In this sense the worldview in principle remains unchanged as it
is firmly anchored to the Islamic Shari’ah, though human perception to it may change,
subject to time and space constraints.
The main point which makes Islam diverges from secular worldview is the
treatment of God. Such a divergence, however, leads to differences in the whole
structure of the two. Secular worldview reduces significantly the position of God
becoming a “clock-maker” of “Newtonian world machine”.15 This worldview that has
been dominating the world for about three centuries is a result of a long-period process
of the Aufklarung, as a serial accumulation of intellectual exercises of the great Western
thinkers. Bacon, for instance, laid down the foundation of research method using
inductive approach, in response to the authorities of the Church and Aristotelian
deductive logic.16 Descartes vindicated through building the knowledge on the
foundation of radical doubt,17 though his doubt did not necessarily imply an extreme
opposition to revealed religion.18 When Newton came, he invigorated the body of
knowledge by developing reductionism, an explanatory system about the motion of
particle in space with its natural laws governing the gravity.19 Furthermore, the thinkers
became more radical in opposition to religion or rather more hostile20 until the era the
economics and other social sciences came. Locke, Smith, among others, then applied the
principles of natural sciences into those of social. In 1895, such a worldview achieved
the victory via the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, reinforcing the
development of knowledge with his theory of evolution. It is natural that every organism
involves in “the struggle for its existence” against any other organism without
compassion and pity, in order for “the survival of the fittest”. Application of Darwin’s
theory to social sciences, consequently, makes the mechanistic assumptions of natural
order completely suitable for human being (social order). Therefore, dependence of the
social sciences including economics on those of natural has invariably reached its peak.

The Rise of (Conventional) Economics and Its Methodology

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 Economics as a body of doctrine explaining economic behavior of a society
obtained the most significant historical empowerment via the enlightenment and
scientific revolution. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed the “birth” of
the economics through Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nation. However, methodological
vindication started to reinforce it in the beginning of the twentieth century, when
economics also started to deserve an autonomous status. The earlier development of
economic methodology involved some eminent writers such as Senior, Mill, Cairnes,
and Bagehot in a proponent group of positive economics, as opposed to more normative
economics approach that has been developed by German historical school.21
Being a modern discipline, economics, as other sciences, initially was known as a
branch of philosophy, the source of all modern sciences. Adam Smith, David Hume,
Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, and J.B. Say, among others, had laid down the foundation by
formulating the equilibrium of the market with its relatively more matured mechanism.22
They came after natural sciences, especially physics, from which certain principles are
applied to economics as Smith confessed, have been relatively established.23
Among the notable thinkers in physics whose works left an imprint on the mind
of economists were Newton and Einstein. Newton had defined the harmony of the
universe in an absolutely separated space and time dimensions embodying particular
laws and procedures. Likewise, Smith24 transformed the space and time concepts into
market and money respectively to define the social harmony within the Euclidean
space,25 where each individual is to maximize his pursuit of self-interest. Satisfaction of
all individual interest will accordingly imply to that of social well being.
This process is explained by the Newtonian reductionism that posits the gravity
as a driving force to produce velocity of mass and particle according to their positions,
and to eventually generate the laws of motion. Hence, every particular (individual) is
defined as a component of the whole, and the whole is nothing more than the sum of its
components. The time measures the velocity and motion of a particle in space defined
according to the Cartesian-coordinate system. Similarly, Smith views the society as
nothing more than summation of individuals, being analogous to particles, defined
uniquely with respect to origin. The pursuit of self-interest is a driving force of
individual to generate economic behavior.
Newton’s and Smith’s theories came under fire. Again, parallelism emerged by
the time J.M. Keynes wrote the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money to
curb the “absoluteness of the space” of classical market into a very limited role, and the
“absolute distinction” between market and money, through the concepts of effective
demand and liquidity preference. He “emulates” Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity,
it is observed, to firmly advocate that time, space and motion are interrelated. Einstein
maintains that the universe is more easily and correctly understood by looking at the
whole and placing the parts therein. Similarly, Keynes dismisses the classical labor
market, which insists that unemployed people would always find a job by cutting the
wage (the ”natural”26 price of labor), to suggest that the fact tell, otherwise, involuntary
unemployment. So as to speak, economics methodologically relies on natural sciences.
Hence, the history of science opened an episode when the natural sciences permeated
economics commencing in the eighteenth century, largely attributed to Smith. This was
the momentous age that “moral distortion” secured its scientific empowerment so as to
overidentify the world of people similarly as that of physics.27 Consequently, human
being has been accorded the equal status as of other creatures, or rather of non-living
qualities.
Regarding with some basic methodological aspects of economics, though Smith
and his contemporaries such as Ricardo, Malthus, etc. already discussed, their
pronouncements were not spelt out in a clear manner. Therefore, methodology of

3
economics is a posterior development to formalize the economists’ observation. Despite
there might be an objection,28 establishment of methodology initially came into
existence commencing with the publications of Nassau Senior’s Introductory Lecture on
Political Economy (1827) and J.S. Mill’s On the Definition of Political Economy
(1836),29 fifty years after the “birth” of economics.

Economic Methodology: the Route towards Maturity

As mentioned in the above, the earlier development of methodology contained
the controversy of is and ought, or positive versus normative economics. It was Keynes
who cried to reconcile such a controversy, though his conclusion is said to vindicate the
former, the abstract-deductive view of the old (English) school.30 In 1932, the hope of
methodological convergence was also challenged by Robbins in his Nature and
Significance of Economics Science, bringing back the “entire” domination of the
“orthodox” (or also called, the “received”) view.31 He argues that economics is neutral
with respect to the objective of economic policy. Nonetheless, as Blaug32 observes
whatever their differences in arguments, the methodologists in the earlier development
(the nineteenth century) can notably be grouped under one, verificationists, as opposed
to the twentieth century falsificationists he accentuates and belongs to which he
classifies himself. Among the categorical differences: the former starts with observations
while the latter with problems; the former is to prove the “truth” of a statement whereas
the latter is to prove its “falsity”. In response to verifiability of knowledge, Machlup33
airs another polemical issue by categorizing the methodologists and economists into two,
“a priorists” and “ultra-empiricist”. The former includes von Mises, Knight, Weber and
certain earlier methodologists like Mill, Senior and Cairnes; while Hutchison is an
example of the latter par excellence.
However, irrespective of this controversy, it seems that the significant impact
influencing the establishment of economic methodology started in the beginning of
“logical positivists” movement attributed, to a greater extent, to the “Vienna Circle”.34
The Circle, having mixed members of academicians from various disciplines was
established in the middle of 1920s, led by a physicist, Moritz Schilck. Regular
discussion for about eleven years gave birth of logical positivism,35 with its most
influential view: “…. that knowledge is grounded in experience and that meaningful
statements are verifiable by observation and experiment.”36 Verifiability remained in the
use as a criterion primarily to exclude metaphysical statements, though a member of the
Circle, Rudolh Carnap, proposed the use of confirmability to avoid confusion from
August Comte’s positivism.37 Confirmability also indicates the possible derivation of
true propositions from the statements. The Circle aimed at formalizing all problems in
logic, and all-encompassing science should be joined by one method: logical method of
analysis. The eventual methodological outcome of the Circle was the unity of science
concept, through the publication of the Scientific World-View, in 1929. To invigorate the
concept, the Circle established the journal Erkenntnis (1930-1939) that was replaced by
the Journal of Unified Science, and established the Institute for the Unity of Science in
1936 in The Hague that later moved to Boston.
Even though positivism since the beginning has taken the form of intellectual
movement, nonetheless, its tendency towards elimination of ideological and
metaphysical elements of science made its movement confronted with some political
difficulties. Consequently, during the World War II, under the Nazi occupation the
Circle’s members faced assassination after Schilck was murdered by an insane student.
This led to “diaspora” of logical positivists to get the their movement internationally
accepted, however.38 This positivist movement took the more moderate but more

4
matured and, or rather most,39 sophisticated form in 1950s under the so-called logical
empiricism.
In economics, as Redman40 notifies, the influence of logical positivism/
empiricism enables the subject evolves gradually from “political economy” into
“economics” and then into its current form, “positive economics.” She mentions the
economists Mark Blaug and Bruce Caldwell, and the philosopher Daniel Hausman to
explicate the remarkable union of these two enterprises. After bringing the ideas of
logical positivism/empiricism in economics by Hutchison, an attempt to show that the
subject satisfies the positive methodological standard (using a priori basis) is also
pronounced by Friedman41 in his Methodology of Positive Economics.

Departures from Positivism and the Unity of Science Doctrine

Further development of methodology has also witnessed some departures from
the positivist movement as found in Popperian (falsification) school to which Lakatos
and Feyerabend belong.42 Karl Popper advanced falsification theory, initially, in the face
of the Vienna Circle’s positivism. Regardless of the dispute over his involvement in, and
also his attack to the Circle, Popper shares much of his view with its members and in
fact both sides are empiricists.43 Falsification obtained a more subtle form in Lakatos’s
works. The great reliance of Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs
(MSRP), on Popper’s falsification is undeniable, though he restricts the Popper’s so as to
be labeled as “naïve falsification” in face of his “sophisticated falsification.”
Feyerabend’s efforts are sometimes also categorized under Popperian, however,
differences seem to be more explicit, in the sense that he claims himself as an
epistemological anarchist. He opposes every commitment, not only to positivism, but
also again to any method or methodology so that individual freedoms and creativity face
no constraints.
Also the departure is found in Kuhn’s works, especially in his Structure of
Scientific Revolution as clearly stated in its introduction to challenge the positivists’
problem of the growth of science. It is a question of the history rather than empirical
ground; and science is not only rational but also a continuous and cumulative activity.
He introduces a concept of paradigm of which the existence is necessary for developing
normal science based on the prior scientific achievements.44 Discontinuity, if so, may be
defined in terms of “paradigm shift” enabling the presence of scientific revolution.
Paradigm concept is said to be “ambiguous” because he uses it in at least 21 different
senses.45 Later on disciplinary matrix and exemplars replace the concept of paradigm.
The heritage of Kuhn, combined with that of Popper clearly appears in Lakatos’s MSRP
“legacy”, as Caldwell46 views, as a final vision of history, philosophy and methodology.
Despite the differences among themselves and from positivism are methodologically
clear, nonetheless, their defense of the “truth” of the unity of science is irrefutable.
Rather, it obtained more invigoration from Popper and later supported by Blaug with
their doctrine of methodological monism.47 Throughout the history, conventional
methodology is handicap of taking evasive action from its “truth”. As elsewhere in their
efforts are characterized by this doctrine, therefore, it remains to be the centrifugal force.
In spite of the solid insistence on the unity of science doctrine, it has also been
challenged. Weber48 maintains that social sciences should provide an “understanding
from inside”, or in the German term Verstehen, it thus entails elements of subjectivity.
This subjectivity is primarily assigned by intuition and empathy, as opposed to
“understanding from without” by means of observation and calculation mainly referring
to objectivity. To Polanyi, Logical positivists have emphatically developed some
rationales and arguments for impersonal knowledge of positivism that implies its
objectivity to become the “received view”. He in contrast insists on personal knowledge

5
that entails subjectivity, though he does not convey that the former necessarily implies
the latter. Therefore, Weber and Polanyi maintain, as also emphasized by Machlup,
methodology of social sciences including economics should differ from that of natural,
though in this sense Machlup prefers to take more moderate position, arguing that the
different should not be in principle.
Among the recent works, Pheby49 seems to agree with this group, especially with
respect to falsification as accepted widely by statistician and econometricians after
vindication by Hutchison and Blaug. He asserts, application of the falsification to
econometrics leads to possible rejection of a true hypothesis (Type I error) and
acceptance of a false hypothesis (Type II error). He suggests in his conclusion that
economists should develop their own methodology independent of natural sciences.

Recent Development and Debates

Current debate since 1980s has offered new dimensions in methodological
discourses, generating a number of mushrooming alternatives After the decline of
positivism, the debate greatly stems from the Popperian falsificationism.50 First before
going into details, the dismissal of the inductive approach of reasoning by falsification is
mainly due to the conclusion of the approach, which is drawn from the limited
information contained in certain premises. Suppose:
Swan X is white.
Swan Y is white.
Therefore all swan are white.
This conclusion is false as black swans (as a problem) are found in Australia,51 and thus
deduction can easily be drawn that the universal statement that “All swans are white” is
false.52 He starts and ends with problems, following a scheme:
problem ! tentative theory ! error elimination ! new problems
This is the foundation upon which the body of falsification theory stands.
The debate has in general grouped the methodologists/economists into three or
rather four, of which two take diametric positions to one another, for and against. While
one group articulates its disagreement in a more moderate ways, and there is also one
group whose position is not clear.53 Nonetheless, these differences, despite running on
their own paths, are tied in one similarity that falsificationism requires alternatives.54
The first two inherit the positions of Hutchison and Machlup. Previously, Hutchison,
among others, had preceded the support to Popper’s view of falsification. It can be seen,
for instance, in his notable debate with Machlup on verification.55 In 1980, Blaug (The
Methodology of Economics) began to insist on falsificationism, and later confessed to be
an unrepentant Popperian (not falsificationists).56 However, as falsification is considered
the significant part of Popper’s teachings, such confession warrants Blaug’s insistence.
On the opposite pole, Hausman, Redman and Rosenberg,57 among others, take
the stance that falsification fails to do its jobs. Redman58 representing this group
suggests four reasons to score the debate. Generally speaking, economics is not
falsifiable or put differently, falsification is not applicable to economics. The same
objection but more politely presented also comes from the “more moderate”
methodologists like Caldwell Boland, and Backhouse, among others as confessed by
Blaug. There are a number of alternatives to falsificationism that have been developed
since 1980s, among such as: Caldwell’s methodological pluralism, McClosky’s rhetoric
of economics and constructivism, and sociological approach to methodology.
Among the interest of the paper to continue the discussion is that the new
dimensions generated in the debate has widely opened to Islamic interpretation to both
conventional methodology and the economics itself. This is marked by the possible
deviation from several elements of the subject especially falsification and other related

6
notions, the unity of science, which both constitute a dominant part of the “economic
belief.”

Its Inadequacy and Islamic Alternative

The unchallenged agreement with the doctrine of the unity of science has
indicated the degradation of human existence that accord the ‘best creature’ of Allah,59
falling into asfala safilin whose status is even lower than animal.60 This is because,
when the very existence of God is doubtful, or at least carries no significant meaning for
human existence, there would be some fatal consequences. First, man places himself in
the position of God as ”superman”; and second, there would be no ultimate purposes of
human life, and thus the question of continuity and accountability of worldly life obtains
its significance. Islam clearly demarcates between Qur’anic thought and thought which
is based on radical doubt, and prohibits the use of the latter.
The “superman” has declared firstly in the history of science in the simple words
cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), and so has crowned human reason as powerful
having the absolute sovereign for himself in place of God’s ordains and revelation, and
moreover of faith and intuition. A “gigantic invisible power” as discussed earlier
generated from the elements of worldview, epistemology and reality, operates through
accidental variations in a self-designed and self-propelled evolution,61 creating inevitable
mechanistic consequences in the laws of universe as well as of human nature.
Eventually, the higher scientific and methodological breakthroughs in physics and
natural sciences in general permeate economics and elsewhere in social sciences. This
leads to mechanical explanation of human soul and its equal treatment as other creature
or even lower, non-living qualities.
So, the Western unity of science doctrine is entirely rejected in Islam not only
because of its equal treatment of man and other creature, but to a greater extent of
philosophical bases underlying it. Consequently, secular objection to this doctrine that
methodology of natural sciences is not applicable to economics is also rejected, because
of their similar foundation.
Positivism, in any form, denies the existence of substances or forces, which are
neither observable nor verifiable. Since the existence of God falls under this deniable
category, therefore, there would be no accountability and responsibility before Him in
the hereafter. This is explicated by Robbins62 that means–ends relationship relating to
the purpose of human life is a merely a question of worldly affairs. Hence, it is devoid of
ethical values.63 Islam in contrast suggests the more important life in the hereafter as the
ends of human life.64 It is worth underlining the above explanation that methodology
came after economics had been relatively established, to justify its existence and
empirical practices. Thus, daily economic life that always changes becomes the basis of
economic methodology, which currently shows the more matured form of its
development. Consequently, inevitable fundamental changes in global economy would
lead the economists as well as methodologists to seek a new methodological justification
in conformity with such changes, or otherwise if methodology fails to provide the
answers, the economic consequences would be unpredictable.
To end this section, one worth example is illustrated as also spelt in Hasan.65 In
the absence of ethical values, secular economics whose backbone is perfectly
competitive market is self-propelling into the trap of self-liquidating process, because
the tendency towards evasive action from laissez faire has been creating global
phenomena of market imperfection. It defines its own values on the basis of materialistic
worldview, and restrictive of ethics intervention from outside. It is claimed that firms
only seek “normal profit” as seen in the point of tangency between marginal costs (MC)
and average costs (AC) at which the prices (P) are set up enabling MC to equal P. Firms

7
would assume profit maximization by production increases and thus create propensity to
monopolize both factor and product markets, leading to violation of the laws of perfect
competition. If secular economics and its methodology are not restrictive of Islamic
values, the solution is definitely attainable. Therefore, Islamic suggestion to overcome
this problem deserves some sort of elaboration hereafter.

The Fiqh and Its Methodology (the Usul al-Fiqh)

Development of Islamic methodology, again, takes the opposite direction from
that one in conventional sciences. Methodology precedes the emergence of the Islamic
science in general and thus Islamic economics. The difference in the process of how
methodology has (been) evolved firmly relates to different points of departure between
secular and the Islamic viewpoints. Hence, unlike its counterpart in conventional
position that builds the theories on the foundation of man-made doctrines, which
predominantly rely on men’s doubt and presumptions, Islamic economics emanates from
the light of revelation. Consequently, while methodology in secular approach justifies
the economic phenomena and how economists observe, in Islam it gives purpose,
direction and guidelines for economics to adequately operate within the boundary of the
Shariah.
While secular economic methodology has evolved, and developed on the bases
of human interpretation about the empirical realities, Islam in contrast develops its
methodology on the bases of the Divine reality of God (Allah) and “interpretation” of
Allah Himself about universal realities that He has created. While sovereignty of man in
secular methodology is attributed to reason, the faculty of human intellect in Islam
places the highest rank over all properties of the creatures, but within the boundary of
the sovereignty of Allah.
He, the Divine reality Himself is the source of knowledge.66 To express the Will
of the Divine reality, a medium of transformation is required in the form of the Divine
revelation (wahy). Therefore, the Divine revelation becomes the primary Islamic sources
of methodology to guide criteria determination, based on halal-haram principles.
Divinity in Islam obtains the highest priority as the basic principles of the belief
that deserves methodological elaboration, or rather debates on its interpretations.
However, limitations of the paper does not warrant inclusion of hundred or even
thousand works of Muslim scholars except a small number of them. The most legendary
intellectual exchanges that the Islamic history witnesses was that, to name a few, the
polemics in philosophical, methodological and scientific discourses between al-Ghazali
on the one hand, and Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd on the other, concerning interpretations of
the Divinity. Al-Ghazali representing the group of the mutakallimun (the scientists of
kalam/speech) criticized the group of philosophers to which Ibn Sina, among the primary
target belong, in the Tahafut al-Falasifah (Breakdown of the Philosopher). Al-Ghazali’s
contemporary who also is a philosopher, Ibn Rushd defended the philosophers side with
his works, Tahafut al-Tahafut (Breakdown of the Breakdown).67
While debating the Islamic acceptance of Greek philosophy, both are in the
agreement with its logic. However, they did not run away from recognition of the
existence of the Divine reality being the primary source of their idea exchanges. It is
unanimous that Islamic tradition on methodological inquiry always posits such the
Divine reality above all, as Allah Himself says:

“O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged
with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to
Allah and His Messenger, if you do believe in Allah and the Day of Judgement.
That is best, and most suitable for final determination.”68

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Kamali69 identifies four sources of Islamic methodology apparent in this verse referring
to first, Allah and second, His Messenger as clearly stated. While the third is the
“authority holders” referring to ijma or consensus of opinions, or political and
administrative leadership70 depending upon the nature of the problems. Fourth, the
inferences (istinbath) using various methods of ijtihad especially qiyas or deductive
analogy revealed from the primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, obtain the
philosophical ground from this injunction. These constitute the foundation of
methodology compulsory for developing Islamic knowledge and sciences, natural and
social as well. However, the way the methodology of social sciences is developed is
differed from those of natural.
In principle, both natural and social sciences have the same reliance upon this
Divine existence. Similarities also exist in the sense that they are developed on the basis
of Islamic belief, which is empirically hard to be verifiable. Different methodology
comes into existence when the treatment of human being is differed from that of nature
because of their different behavior. While the universe conforms a universal law namely
sunnatullah,71 the signs of Allah, human being should obey the rule of the Shari’ah.
The relatively complete form of methodology of social sciences in Islam is found
in usul al-fiqh. It is firmly tied up in the depth of the Divine revelation. Kamali72 says,
usul al-fiqh is the science of the sources and methodology of the law, in the sense that
the Qur’an and the Sunnah constitute the sources as well as the subject matter to which
the methodology of usul al-fiqh is applied. It “refers to methods of reasoning such as
analogy (qiyas), juristic preference (istihsan), presumptions of continuity (istishab) and
the rules of interpretation and deduction. …. all serve an aid to understanding of the
sources and ijtihad.”73 It is aimed at helping the scholars to deduce an adequate
knowledge of the two sources of the Shari’ah.
Usul a-fiqh as a body of doctrine was primarily developed in a more
sophisticated form that is in a coherent body of knowledge after the second century of
Islam, especially by al-Shafi’e in his al-Risalah.74 In this sense, as the fiqh practices have
existed since the beginning of Islamic dissemination, it is accurate to say, as Kamali75
suggests, that the fiqh precedes the usul al-fiqh. Nonetheless, since the usul al-fiqh as a
substance (not a name) had already existed simultaneously with the Divine revelation, as
also mentioned by Kamali, it is entirely true to say that usul al-fiqh precedes the fiqh.
The former is hence concerned with the methods that are applied in the deduction of the
rules from their sources, while the latter is the detailed rules of Islamic law in its various
branches. This relationship is illustrated by Kamali as to resemble that of the rules of
grammar and the languages of the logic (mantic) and philosophy.
The sources of the Shari'ah are various. However, all are deduced from the
Divine revelation which is referred to as the main sources of Islamic legislation
attributed to the Qur’an and further elaborated by the Sunnah, as the first and the second
sources respectively. From these two there emerge the two other sources namely ijma’ or
consensus of opinions and qiyas or analogy. In addition, there are other sources peculiar
to certain schools such as juristic preference (istihsan), presumptions of continuity
(istishab), public interest (istislah), etc. as also mentioned above.
The approach that has been used since the earlier Islamic inquiries are in general
categorized under two: theoretical and deductive approaches. The different is not in its
substance but rather lies mainly on its orientation. The former is more concerned on
exposition of theoretical doctrines and of principles, whereas the latter on formulation of
theory and on developing a synthesis between the principles and empirical facts. The
ulama from Shafi’e school and Mutakallimun – including Mu’tazili school and/or to a
certain extent Islamic philosophers76 – are known as to employ the theoretical approach,
which is also known as Usul al-Shafi’iyyah or tariqah al-mutakallimin, named after

9
Shafi’e and the mutakallimun school respectively. They are inclined to engage in various
complex issues of philosophical character irrespective of whether or not these issues
would contribute to developing practical rules of fiqh. Among the works on this
approach of the scholars written in the eleventh and twelve centuries are Abu Husayn al-
Basri’s al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, of the Mu’tazili schools; Imam al-Haramayn al-
Juwayni’s Kitab al-Burhan and al-Mustashfa by Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, both of
the Shafiite. In contrast, the ulama from other schools mostly of the Hanafi school and
those who categorized under the term fuqaha mostly adopt the second approach, which
is also called Usul al-Hanafiyyah or tariqah al-fuqaha. Among the examples of the
Hanafi school are: Kitab fi al-Usul by Abu Hasan al-Kharki and Usul al-Sarakhsi by
Shams al-Din al-Sharakhsi in the tenth and eleven centuries respectively.77 However,
endeavors to combined both into an integrated method have also been attempted by later
scholars from various schools. In fourteenth century, to name only a few for the sake of
limitations, Muzaffar al-Din al-Sa’ati (died in 694 Hijriyyah) presented a significant
work whose title is Badi’ al-Nizham al-Jami’ bayn Usul al-Badzawi wa al-Ihkam. This
is a combined approach used in the Usul al-Badzawi by Fakhr al-Islam al-Badzawi al-
Hanafi (d. 490 H.) and a Shafi’ite scholar’s work of the thirteenth century, Sayf al-Din
al-Amidi’s al-Ihkam fi al-Usul al-Ahkam.

Methodology in Modern Islamic Economics

Irrespective of the approach used in earlier Islamic discourses in social fields
under the category of the fiqh, there has been agreement that the fiqh has several
categories of knowledge: fiqh al-‘ibadat (law of worship), fiqh al-muamalat (law of
transactions), fiqh al-munakahat, (law of marriage), and fiqh al-siyasat (politics), etc.
Although the fiqh in general reflects more legal contents of the Muslim problems, there
are some sort of analyses that can be developed to obtain a more sophisticated form of
theories, and major economic thought and analyses is classified under the fiqh al-
mu’amalat.78 On the other hand, the mufassirin, those involve in the Qur’anic exegesis,
and other types of Islamic scholars (ulama, in general; fuqaha; mutakallimun; etc.) have
explained the ideal economic norms and values, and also historical application and
analyses.79
In modern development of the subject, Islamic ethical values remain to largely
influence the science of Islamic economics as emphasized by all Muslim economists
mentioned here. In the face of modern economic phenomena, there has been an
agreement to elaborate new methodology,80 though worries or even objections from
outside the economics field still happen about the way of developing it.81 This
methodology is developed on the foundation of Islamic values incorporating the
heritages of Islamic methodology of Usul al-fiqh in combination with the modern
economic tools of analysis, as seen elsewhere in many works. The role of values that
enter any economic study, as Zarqa82 mentions, may involve: the choice of presumption,
the choice of topics for analysis, the choice of variables, and the choice of methods and
criteria for verification of hypotheses. On the other hand, integrative analysis of values
and the empirical facts of human life, whatever the methods used, is also illustrated as
interaction between the Shari’ah law and the hukm tabi’i emerging from human desires
and wants.83
Therefore, of the consequences in this sense, controversy about “ought to” and
“is” finds a way out for minimization, since they are closely interrelated.84 The positive-
normative dichotomy should not be exaggerated in Islamic economics as the Islamic
teaching provides the bridge, especially as pronounced in the Qur’an and Sunnah. Islam
at least theoretically never allows dichotomizing them except for explanatory reasons,
since in Islam consistency between concept and practice, and between theory and policy,

10
is encouraged with respect to integrated mixture of iman (faith), ‘ilm (knowledge and
science), and ‘amal (practice).85
Application of the Islamic heritages found in compilation of the usul al-fiqh and
the fiqh to modern economics, the use of various methods of inquiries such as qiyas,
istihsan, and istislah seem to be very meaningful, though disagreement either in their use
or in emphasis remains to exist. For example, the Shafiite accept the qiyas as their fourth
source provided the ‘illah (effective cause) can be clearly identified,86 it is aimed at
avoiding haphazard and abused deduction of law.87 Nonetheless, the Mu’tazilite and
Shiite (especially Zaidiyah) are candidly against its use.88 While for Imam Hanbali
(Ahmad ibn Hanbal), the use of the hadith mursal or rather dhaif89 is even better than
that of qiyas,90 many of his followers open to the use of Hanafite’s istihsan, as another
variance of qiyas.91 This idea, as adhered by al-Sharakhsi al-Hanafi, emerges from the
fact that the Shari’ah is revealed to ease and to facilitate the Muslim to avoid difficulties
(daf’u al-haraj). If the clear ‘illah (qiyas jalli) is inadequate to meet the requirement to
overcome the problems, therefore, hidden ‘illah (‘illah khafi) is sufficient to protect the
people from possible harms and to raise the benefits and justice.92
If the above sources are inadequate of overcoming any solution to economic and
commercial problems, economists may use another alternative, istislah or masalih al-
mursalah, which is well-known as public interest method of deduction introduced by
Imam Malik, and popularized by Imam al-Shatibi of the Maliki school. This theory also,
to a greater extent, is accepted by some Shafiite like al-Tufi, al-Ghazali, and al-Amidi.93
Since the paper’s limitations do not warrant exploration of wide discussions of
the methods used in Islamic jurisprudence, which is open to economics interpretation,
therefore, to underline, suffice it to say that these particularly two methods, istihsan and
of istislah, play the significant roles in developing modern economic analysis. Kamali
exemplifies the istihsan use. Suppose A and B establish a partnership in trading the
installment properties using profit sharing system. There is another party, say, C buying
a house with his advance payment of USD 5,000 to A on behalf of the partnership.
Suddenly, the money looses. Therefore, using the method of qiyas (jalli), A and B
should share this loss. Nevertheless, istihsan method may suggest that A is the only one
who is responsible for it because B is basically under no obligation to have his portion
from A.94 Meanwhile, istislah method is almost similar in application to the theory of
public utility in modern secular economics. Also from these, particularly two, sources
Islamic legal maxims (qa’idah) has been derived by the earlier Muslim scholars
incorporating some economic aspects, rather the nineteenth-century Ottoman Turk
issued the Majallah, a compilation of about hundred Islamic legal maxims, to facilitate
public interest.95
Up to here, Muslim scholars from any types of educational background are
seemingly unanimously in agreement. However, other problems remain in awaiting, of
which modern economics has been firmly developed on the basis of materialistic-
oriented paradigm and restrictive of value interference. In this case, how to derive
modern Islamic economics from the Shari’ah?.

Islamization of Economics: A Recommended Shortcut?

Again, limitations of the paper do not permit lengthy discussion of this topic.
Nevertheless, since incorporation of it seems to be necessary to wind up the discussion,
though not sufficient condition in any methodological discourse of modern Islamic
sciences, taking account the fact that ubiquitous influence of the secular Western
methodology is inevitable therein. So, the paper does consider its inclusion sufficiently.
There have been controversies in “Islamization of knowledge project” led by two
groups, the proponent group of “Islamization of discipline” and its opponent. The Late

11
Dr. Ismail Faruqi and the International Institute of Islamic Thought are among the
proponent, and Ziauddin Sardar with his circle “Ijmali” is of the opponent.96 So, to
Sardar, Islamization of knowledge does not necessarily imply Islamization of economics
or of other disciplines, since the structure of discipline itself is of Western secular origin,
and “outsider is not welcome unless he or she conforms to the dominant paradigm.”97 In
Hasan’s98 notion, though may not be entirely true, Faruqi’s side represents a “step-by-
step” or “evolutionary” approach, in contrast with Sardar’s “all-or-nothing” or “pure”
approach.
There is nothing best for all situations. Each approach is useful for only its own
objectives and targets. Therefore, the paper is due to limitations confined not to further
discuss this debate, rather to seek the possible introductory way of deducing the
Shari’ah norms into economics, a field (or discipline, whatever the definition may be)
that necessitates Islamization. Even if following Sardar, Islamization in this sense may
not be the best way, because the models stemming from it, as Hasan99 also maintains,
remain reflective of the worldview, norms and methodology of the parent structures.
Still, it provides a better shortcut as an alternative in transitional period towards fully
Islamized economics. The term shortcut implies, the paper maintains, that the ultimate
objective of Islamization is to generate a pure Islamic (or purely Islamized) economics,
but the road is quite “long”.
In developing model, the borrowing of secular modern tools of economic
analysis is of necessary conditions, again, but not sufficient. Arif’s100 suggestion of
incorporating Lakatosian approach using methodology of scientific research program
(MSRP) is also useful provided that the great reliance on natural sciences can be
eliminated or at least reduced. On the other hand, an attempt by Rosly101 concerning
equity base investment with regression model, at least as an earlier step, seems to be
sufficient. One thing that the paper feels necessary to emphasize that mathematical and
econometric expositions can be neutral or value-free, however, reasons behind these are
in contrast full of ideological contents.

Concluding Remarks
A comparative discussion of methodology of Islamic economics and that of
conventional, as elsewhere in any topics, indicates the different ethical values
respectively imbued or otherwise therein. Methodology of conventional economics or
rather of other sciences is devoid of any ethical values. It has been succinctly developed
on the foundation of materialistic worldview and thus paradigm for centuries, getting
some momentous events and vindication throughout the history, which reached its peak
via Aufklarung. The “Vienna Circle” invigorated it in with the methodological precept of
the unity of science, which is also named by Popper and Blaug as methodological
monism, enabling the methodology of natural sciences to pervasively permeate into
those of social especially economics. This is so by equal treatment of human being and
nature or even non-living qualities.
However, the glide of secular economic methodology shows its posterior
development, coming initially after economics had been relatively established for a half
of century, and obtained a wide recognition the following century. In contrast, Islamic
methodology referring, to the usul al-fiqh, had been established evolving simultaneously
with the establishment of any subject of the fiqh, since the beginning of Islamic
dissemination. Islamic one is value laden. Some eminent Muslim scholars from various
schools of thought have made use of the methodology relevant to their time, and it
becomes invaluable heritage for the current intellectual and scientific discourses from
which developing the new methodological ideas may take forms of Islamization.
Therefore, studies of Islamic history are thought imperative.

12
 Although the influence of the Greek philosophy is inevitable, the Islamic history
suggests that its methodology succeeded, through the hands of Muslim scholars, to
diverge Islamic sciences from the Greeco-Helenic contents. In this sense one should
consult, among others, Ibn Sina’s ‘Ilm al-ttadbiri al-Manzili (the Science of Household
Administration) as an example of direct influence of Aristotle’s Politics (Book I) and to
some extent of a neo-Phitagorean, Bryton. Or else, critical review of them by Yassin.102
To attain the sufficient conditions, which the mastery of Islamic ethical foundations and
of modern methodology of secular economics is necessary as already discussed in the
above, development of modern Islamic economics and its methodology, it is
emphasized, also necessitates historical review of Islamic economic thought. Wallahu
a’lam bissawab.

Notes:
1
Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
XI.
2
John Neville Keynes, “Scope and Method of Political Economy,” in The Philosophy of
Economics: an Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Daniel M. Hausman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), 70-98.
3
Fritz Machlup, Methodology of Economics and Social Sciences, (New York: Academic Press,
1978), 54, saying as having been influenced by Felix Kaufmann, comes to this clear cut definition.
4
Emphasis of the word “outside” is previously given by Zubair Hasan in his “Islamization of
Knowledge in Economics: Issues and Agenda,” IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 6, no. 2
(1998): 17. On the other hand, Subroto Roy, Philosophy of Economics, On the Scope of Reason in
Economic Enquiry, (London: Routledge, 1989), 4, uses the emphasized term in relation to what he calls
“theory of economic knowledge”.
5
The terms secular and conventional in relation to both economics and methodology as well refer
to those coming from the Western point of view. Hence, they are interchangeable.
6
See Hasan, “Islamization”, 5-11.
7
See Masyhudi Muqorobin, “Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) dalam Interaksi Pemikiran
Global,” in Gagasan 21 Menangani Era Globalisasi: Agenda Generasi Muda Serantau, PEPIAT, (Kuala
Lumpur: Jawatan Kuasa Penerbitan dan Penyelidikan Persatuan Pelajar Islam Asia Tenggara (PEPIAT),
1995), 143-160.
8
Machlup, Methodology, 56-60.
9
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Islam and the Philosophy of Science, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC,
1989), 3.
10
The Qur’an, al-Ikhlas (112): 4.
11
al-Baqarah (2): 31; al-‘Alaq (96): 3-5.
12
al-Insan (76): 29-31.
13
Mind and heart are used here to represent more physical intertwined aspects of ‘aql and qalb, but
organize them, respectively. For further comparison and elaboration, see Hasan, Islamization, 11-16, and
Al-Attas, Islam and Phil., 34-35. Using these two faculties, man of understanding can observe the
Greatness of Allah and His Creatures as stated in the Qur’an, Ali ‘Imran/3: 189-190.
14
Hasan, “Islamization”, 7.
15
See, for instance, M. Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, (Leicester, UK: The
Islamic Foundation, 1416/1995), 21.
16
See, among others, John Pheby, Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction,
(Hampshire, UK: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 3.
17
See Hasan, “Islamization”, 19
18
See Chapra, Economic Challenge, 20-24.
19
John K. Galbraith and William Darity, Macroeconomics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1994),
11-16.
20
Chapra, Economic Challenge, 24.
21
See, for instance, J. N. Keynes, “Scope and Method.”
22
A brief elaboration can be seen, for instance in Mas’udul Alam Choudhury and Uzair Abdul
Malik, Foundations of Islamic political economy,( Hampshire: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992).
23
Blaug, Methodology, 57.

13
 24
After sixty years from Newton’s Principia, he confessed to deliberately apply Newtonian method
to economics by laying down “certain principles, primary or proved, in the beginning, from whence we
account for the several phenomena, connecting all together by the same chain,” Ibid, 57.
25
Euclidean space is a three-dimensional empty space void stretching infinitely in all directions.
Galbraith and Darithy, Macroeconomics, 11-16.
26
The natural law of Adam Smith argues that since wage is thought as a natural price of labor,
therefore, it follows market mechanism to vary with its supply and demand. See Kenneth Lux, Adam
Smith Mistakes: How A Moral Philosopher Invented Economics and Ended Morality, (Boston: Shambhala,
1990).
27
Adam Smith himself is initially known as a moral philosopher, identified with his work, The
Theory of Moral Sentiments. The title of this Lux’s work clearly points to such moral distortion.
28
Blaug, Methodology, 56.
29
See excerpts of this work in the Philosophy of Economics, ed. Hausman, 52-68.
30
See Blaug, Methodology, 82.
31
Ibid, 86-91, and excerpts of Robbins’s “Nature and Significance,” in Philosophy of Economics,
ed. Hausman, 83-110.
32
Blaug, Methodology, 55-93.
33
Machlup, Methodology, 137-157. His polemics with Hutchison is also reprinted in Philosophy of
Economics, ed. Hausman, 158-179.
34
See among others, Deborah A. Redman, Economics and the Philosophy of Science, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Caldwell, Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the
Twentieth Century, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); and also Hausman in his work mentioned
above.
35
Caldwell, Ibid., 11.
36
Redman, Ibid., 8.
37
Caldwell, Ibid., 12.
38
Redman, Ibid., 8-9.
39
Caldwell, Ibid., 5.
40
Redman, Ibid., 91-102.
41
Reprinted in, Hausman, Ibid.,180-213.
42
Emphasis of the term risk is given in Redman, Economics and the Philosophy, to consider
differences in this Popperian school, since both of them provide the departure from Popper’s. Therefore,
the failure of Popper’s falsificationism calls for its refinements through their hands, producing Lakatosian
scientific research programs and Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory.
43
Ibid., 27-76.
44
Caldwell, Beyond Positivism, 71.
45
See Redman, Economics and the Philosophy, 16, as quoted from Margareth Masterman, “The
Nature of Paradigm,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 59-89.
46
Caldwell, Beyond Positivism, 70.
47
See Blaug, Methodology, 46-52.
48
Max Weber, “Objectivity and Understanding in Economics,” in the Philosophy of Economics, ed.
Hausman, 69-82.
49
Pheby, Methodology and Economics, 22-36.
50
Rather in this work, Roger E. Backhouse (editor), New Directions in Economic Methodology,
(London: Routledge, 1994), 107-191 provides one part consisting of four chapters on pros and cons in
response to Popperian falsification, while Pheby accommodate only one chapter on it.
51
See Pebhy, Ibid., 2.
52
Redman, Economics and the Philosophy, 31.
53
This classification follows the confession of Blaug in his introduction to “Why I AM A
Constructivist: Confessions of an Unrepentant Popperian,” in New Directions, ed. Backhouse, 109.
54
Ibid., 1-24.
55
See Hausman, the Philosophy of Economics, 157-179.
56
Blaug, “Why I Am Not a Constructivist,” 109-136.
57
Alexander Rosenberg shares his position with this group as appears in “What is the Cognitive
Status of Economic Theory?,” in New Directions, ed. Backhouse, 216-235.
58
Redman, Economics and the Philosophy, 32-35.
59
al-teen (95): 1-4.
60
al-A’raf (7):176,179.
61
See Chapra, Economic Challenge, 21

14
 62
Robbins, “Nature and Significance.”
63
al-Qasas (28): 77
64
While Robbins and other methodologists refuse any role of ethics, Islam takes it as the absolute
values central to any economic thought and activities. This is also explicitly pronounced elsewhere by
Islamic economists. See for instance, Syed Nawab Heidar Naqvi, Islam, economics, and society (London:
Kegan Paul International, 1994).
65
Zubair Hasan, “Profit Maximization: Secular versus Islamic,” in Readings in Microeconomics:
An Islamic Perspectives, eds. Sayyid Tahir, Aidit Ghazali and Syed Omar Syed Agil, (Kuala Lumpur:
Longman Malaysia, 1992), 239-255.
66
The first batch of verses revealed from Allah is to open the mind of human being to observe
(iqra’) the greatness of Allah, which is partly expressed in reality of the universe, and to learn everything
in the name of Allah. al-‘Alaq (96) 1-5.
67
See, among others, Louay Safi, The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in Islamic
and western Methods of Inquiry, (Petaling Jaya,: International Islamic University Malaysia & International
Institute of Islamic Thought Malaysia, 1996).
68
al-Nisa’ (4): 59.
69
Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia:
Pelanduk Publication (M) Sdn Bhd., 1989), 12-13.
70
This is the popular translation as also appears in Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: English
Translation of the meanings and Commentary, (Madinah al-Munawarah, K.S.A.: The Presidency of
Islamic Researches, Ifta, Call and Guidance; and King Fahd Holy Qur’an Printing Complex, 1410,) 229.
71
There are a lot of verses in the Qur’an talking about this term, for instance in al-Baqarah (2): 164.
However, for more elaboration, see Ibid, in its index in pp. 2076-2077.
72
Kamali, Principles, 1.
73
Ibid, 2.
74
Safi, Foundation of Knowledge.
75
Kamali, Principles, especially stated in p. 5.
76
This is however general categorization, when one specifically discusses the intellectual dispute
over the Kalam’s dilemmas, he may differentiate between Mutakallimun group to which scholars like al-
Ghazali belongs, and (in the face) of al-Mu’atazili school under which most of the philosophers can also
be classified. One of good elaboration is seen in Safi, Foundation of Knowledge.
77
See, Ibid., 1-16.
78
See for instance AbulHasan M. Sadeq and Aidit Ghazali (eds.), Readings in Islamic Economic
Thought, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia, 1992).
79
Sadeq, “Introduction: Islamic Economic Thought, Ibid., 1-13.
80
The need for methodology of Islamic economics has been spelt out by many, see among others
Aidit Ghazali and Syed Omar, Readings in the Concepts of Methodology of Islamic Economics, (Selangor,
Malaysia: Publication (M) Sdn Bhd, 1992).
81
Discussion of this dispute is seen for instance in Safi, Foundation of Knowledge, 9-12.
82
Muhammad Anas Zarqa, “Methodology of Islamic Economics,” in Lectures on Islamic
Economics, eds. Ausaf Ahmad and K.Raza Awan, (Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute, IDB,
1992), 93-100
83
Sayful Azhar Rosly, “Economic Principles in Islam: Some Methodological Issues,” Journal of
Islamic Economics 1, no. 1 (Januari 1995): 59-79.
84
Zarqa, Methodology of Islamic Economics,”
85
Many verses in the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet (Sunnah) discuss this matter. For
instance, al-saff (61): 2-3. For further elaboration to meet the modern requirements in economic field, one
should consult Zarqa, at least, in the above writing.
86
Kamali, Principles, 259.
87
Muhammad Muslehuddin, Filsafat Hukum dan Pemikiran Orientalis: Studi Perbandingan Sistem
Hukum Islam (translation into Bahasa Indonesia by Yudian Wahyu), (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Penerbit
Tiara Wacana, 1991), 111.
88
Kamali, Principles, 250, and Sobhi Mahmassani, Mahmassani, Falsafat Tasyri fi al-Islam, (Shah
Alam: Penerbitan Hizbi, 1987), 79-83.
89
These two types of ahadith are classified to indicate that both fall under the weak category.
90
Mahmassani, Falsafat Tasyri.
91
Kamali, Principles, 311.
92
Ibid., 319-326.
93
Ibid., 351.
94
Ibid., 321.

15
 95
These hundred maxims are vividly elaborated by Mahmassani, Falsafat Tasyri.
96
See Nasim Butt, “Al-Faruqi and Ziauddin Sardar: Islamization of Knowledge or the Social
Construction of New Disciplines?” MAAS Journal of Islamic Sciences 5, no. 2 (July-Dec. 1989/1410 H.):
79-98
97
Ibid., 85.
98
Hasan, “Islamization,” 3-4.
99
Ibid., 4.
100
Muhammad Arif, “The Islamization of Knowledge and Some Methodological Issues in Paradigm
Building: The General Case of Social Sciences with A Special Focus on economics, AJISS 4, no. 1 (1978):
51-71.
101
Rosly, “Economic Principles,"
102
Essid Yassine, A Critique of the Origins of Islamic Economic Thought, (Leiden, Netherland: E.J.
Brill, 1995).

16