G.R. No.
L-18463, October 4, 1922 Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
People v. Perfecto
"The important question is here squarely presented of whether
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by
. . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown
or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition
of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate
investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that
"the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron
safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain
Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted
by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the
editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal
court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUEs: Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was
abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the
President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the
latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private
rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of
crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in
force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with
the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.
Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of
the American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United
States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this
article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its
terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment
for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government
based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but
it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting
within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American
system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience
where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place
around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by
mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks."
MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
FACTS
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola,
concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco
Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which
became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This
project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who
assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which
was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to
Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was
sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr.
Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge
Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion
as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed
a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art.
1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was
one of those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he
violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA
3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private
company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was
referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice
recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or
warned in connection with the complaints filed against him.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was
among those properties involved in the partition case.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the
Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he
associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer
HELD
1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices,
judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the
SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge
Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the
partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an
appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was
no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT
buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from
Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The
subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme
to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed
out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record
showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion.
In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and
sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question.
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was
unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have
purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court
and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his
wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations
must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of
the SC, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution
in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or
proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within
the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties.
However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which
was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer
of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be
no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said provision.
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are
considered to have committed corrupt practices, which include
having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or
by any law from having any interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held
liable under said provision because there is no showing that he
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of
the corporation in which he participated has obviously no relation to
his judicial office.
Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does NOT apply to
members of the Judiciary, who are covered under RA 296 (Judiciary
Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of
RA 296, the power to remove or dismiss judges is vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 grounds—
serious misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution,
only the SC can discipline judges of the inferior courts as well as other
personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as
subordinate civil service officers or employees because the
Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary department.
Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified service are
subject to the jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges, however, are not within
this classification, as they are considered to be non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain
from making personal investments in enterprises, which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court. Judge Asuncion and his wife,
however, had withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares
to third parties only 22 days after its incorporation, which indicates
that Judge Asuncion realized that their interest in the corporation
contravenes said Canon. The Court even commended the spouses for
such act.
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent
COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative
of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified
its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act
provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of
the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and
was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of
the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a
candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the
phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by
principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the
statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the
constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be
laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s
constitutional rights.
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic
partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent
a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the
petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that –
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite,
it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land
on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist
that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00
per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local
health system. It was formed in order to provide fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals, secure funding for priority public programs,
promote the development of local health systems and ensure its
effective performance, strengthen the capacities of health regulatory
agencies and expand the National Health Insurance program.
However, the petitioners alleged that the implementation of the
HSRA had resulted in making free medicine and medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. They alleged
that the HSRA is void for being in violation of several constitutional
provisions (e.g. Art III Sec 1, Art II Sec 5, Art II Sec, 9, etc.) EO 102 was
the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department
of health which provided for the changes in the roles functions and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order, DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services
to being a provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic services to local
government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the
Presidential Authority.
Issue:
Whether or Not the HSRA and EO no. 102 are unconstitutional
Ruling:
No, HSRA and EO 102 are not unconstitutional. The HSRA cannot be
nullified based solely on petitioners’ allegations that it violates the
general principles. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the
presidential authority due is without basis. Records are devoid of any
explanation of how HSRA violated the equal protection and due
process clauses that are embodied in the Sec 1 Art III of Consti.
Petitioners failed to substantiate how the constitutional guarantees
were breached and petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the
relevance of this provision to the petition. With the EO 102, the
constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is
among the cabinet level departments enumerated under the Book IV
of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional
distribution of the work of the president.
Aglipay v. Ruiz Digest
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of
Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what he considers
to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of
the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He
alleged that the provisions of Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of
the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the
commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that, ‘No
public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or
used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to
any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.’
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the
principle of separation of church and state
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it
instils into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under
a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No.
4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Sec. of
Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage
stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these
officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the
postage stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail
to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be
filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as
coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny
the petition for a writ of prohibition
BACANI VS NACOCO
G.R. No. L-9657 100 Phil 471 November 29, 1956
Facts:
Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in
Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip
vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the
request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for
the payment of their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of
P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required
the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of
Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For
reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount
of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10
from the salary of Matoto.
Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense
that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted
from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Issues:
Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which
performs certain functions of government, make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines.
Discussions:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted
from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the
term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”. The term
“Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to
the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions
of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute
and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds
of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society,
and are merely optional.
Rulings:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the
better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made
subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue
and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations,
and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
ACCFA v CUGCO Digest
G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
Facts:
ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers'
Association (AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of
the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA.
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to
non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days
later, the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint
against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor
practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the
matter of promotions and refusal to bargain.
ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was
pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA.
Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights
with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was
also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project
Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the
trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was
enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established
to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond
the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is
a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside
from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to
the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law
itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the
formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a
Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that
its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of
doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left
to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development
was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA
under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the
Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function
NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down
to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it
was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern
society have rendered the classification of the governmental
functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental
functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are
absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges
of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic
forces.
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-
appellant.
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in
1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during
the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out
of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a
charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned
the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de
Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands,
through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de
Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from
February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by
the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff
(government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their
heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities
complaint against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the as in any other cases whatever.
money of the intended beneficiaries?
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Discussions:
Facts:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his
being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent
sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child
supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
“parents” of the people the government has the right to take back
hence, Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child.
the money intended for the people.
Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
Rulings: a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor
and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file
terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a
the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the
claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
parties and intended beneficiaries.
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue
of its general superintending authority over the public interests, ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens
where no other person is entrusted with it. patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power YES.

of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as
the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary
the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as
to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of
in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should
charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and
resolve according to the best interest of that person.
justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens
patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as
exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic;
she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed
but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.
called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and
 It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as
an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations
may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the
country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if
the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at
all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot
remain insensible to the validity of her plea.