Torts Oct 2 2018

AFOS, JAN ALDRIN E.
TORTS OCTOBER 2, 2018
ONG VS CA
FACTS:1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the
latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their
wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for
the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out
that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has
been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was
impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their
favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go
said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement,
the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the
wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they
only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong
made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their
honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad
and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact
that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the
sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a
wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and
remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court
was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental
anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered
and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles
2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this
argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract
with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded
in favor of the Ongs.
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AFOS, JAN ALDRIN E. TORTS OCTOBER 2, 2018
Air France Vs. Carrascoso

Facts: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists
en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip
ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the
plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has
a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and
upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was
transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser
who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding
the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was
not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual
and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was
a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract
was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
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The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of
a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers
do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the
purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways

4 SCRA 397
Facts: Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendant’s
plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were
advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes. Plaintiff went
to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon
returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the
flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a discussion with either the
plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they would open his bags
which he refused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they
opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane
and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to leave
Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action
was to recover damages from the defendant.
Issue: WON moral damages may be recovered.
Held: “The records amply establish plaintiffs’ right to recover both moral and
exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the
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hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp (‘What in the
hell do you think you are? Get on that plane’); the menacing attitude of Zentner or
Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags
(‘open your bag’, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, ‘I don’t give a damn’);
the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of
PAN AM’s employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, “will you pull these three
monkeys out of here?”); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to
which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they
were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials’ refusal to
allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his
luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs.
Zulueta’s having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a
result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed
by the conduct of PAN AM’s employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame,
humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the
airport – all these justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby
suffered by plaintiffs”. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages,
Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorney’s fees and Pesos
5,502.85 actual damages.
Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc., G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012

Facts: On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel,
invited her friend, Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel‘s pool. At around
7:00 p.m., the hotel‘s pool attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was
about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to
take a shower and dress up. When they came out of the bathroom, the entire
swimming pool area was already pitch black and there were the only ones there. The
doors were also locked. After some time, Huang saw a phone behind the lifeguard‘s
counter. As she went inside, the wooden countertop fell on her head and knocked her
down almost unconscious. Delia immediately notified the hotel phone operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the
swimming pool area and gave her an icepack. Huang demanded the services of the
hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr. Dalumpines, instead of immediately providing
the needed medical assistance, presented a ―Waiver‖ and demanded that it be signed
by Huang, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any assistance. Huang
refused to do so and left the hotel. There upon, Huang consulted several doctors (7
neuro, 1 optha) because she began experiencing ―on‖ and ―off‖ severe headaches that
caused her three sleepless nights. They all said she had a serious brain injury. In
defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material allegations. According to them, a
sufficient notice on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to
apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open
only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m.
for,
(1) security reasons;
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(2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings;

and
(3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer‘s World Gym, which was open
until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were
turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer‘s World Gym
near it was well- illuminated. Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse) was informed
that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She hurriedly went to the pool
area. Although Huang looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise
on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which
she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical
attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr.
Dalumpines came to check Huang‘s condition. Huang insisted that she was fine and
that the hirudoid cream was enough. Dr. Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a
handwritten certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. An XRay test
was also suggested to Huang but she replied that it was not necessary. She also
refused further medical attention. On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for damages
against respondents. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. On
appeal, Huang belatedly raises the defense on breach of contract. She maintains
that that an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the
hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its services — its patrons and
invitees. The CA affirmed the TC‘s decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for
certiorari under Rule 45. She also avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior are applicable in this case. It was an accident caused by the fact
that the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is
normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door of
the hotel‘s swimming pool area.
Issue: Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.
Held: NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence
but not on any breach of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action can
be based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of the complaint
evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict (negligence).
It is evident from the complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance
was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents, through their
management and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is
incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise,
the former‘s complaint will be dismissed. In a breach of contract, negligence is
presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the
burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of
the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed. It is now too late
to raise the said argument for the first time before the SC without causing injustice.
As Huang‘s cause of action is based on quasidelict, it is incumbent upon her to prove
the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and Dusit can be held
liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
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defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The
burden of proof is upon her. Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed
to prove the alleged negligence of respondents. Other than her self-serving testimony
that all the lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were shut off and the door was
locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding
wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of the
accident inside the hotel‘s swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her
allegations. On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents positively
declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not to put off the
lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings, including the toilets and counters. There is a remote possibility that the
hotel‘s swimming pool area was in complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then
open until 10pm, and the lights radiate to the hotel‘s swimming pool area. Ergo, she
cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not
heed the warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M.
Thus, when the her own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, she then cannot recover damages. Even Huang‘s assertion of negligence on the
part of respondents in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her
own Complaint affirmed that respondents afforded medical assistance to her after she
met the unfortunate accident inside the hotel‘s swimming pool facility. Moreover, the
Hotel shouldered the expenses for the MRI services at the Makati Med. Res Ipsa
Loquitur & Respondeat Superior: With regard to Huang‘s contention that the
principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this
Court holds otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets
out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. The
doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of
negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that respondents‘ staff negligently
turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still
not fall on Huang‘s head had she not lifted the same. Records showed that she lifted
the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head. Doctrine of
respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing that the
employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the CA
found no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents, thus, the latter
cannot also be held liable for negligence. With the foregoing, the following were clearly
established, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in the hotel‘s swimming pool facility beyond its
closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head; and (3) respondents extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence
can be attributed either to or to their staff and/or management. Third element: On the
issue on whether Huang‘s debilitating and permanent injuries were the result of the
accident she suffered at the hotel‘s swimming pool area, the Court holds that there is
no cogent reason to depart from the lower courts‘ findings. (1) Huang had a past
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medical history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury. (2) The
findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995
accident and the brain damage suffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that the
symptoms being experienced might have been due to factors other than the head
trauma she allegedly suffered. (3) Dr. Sanchez‘s testimony was hearsay. (4) Medical
reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner
sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those
who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. All
told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents as well as their
management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the millions of damages
prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it necessarily follows that First Lepanto
cannot also be made liable under the contract of Insurance.
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE

CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, / G.R. No. 179446 /
January 10, 2011
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 82822.
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-
00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric
copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on
board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.
They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the
cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in
turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to
transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan
and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters,
driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the
six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1)
truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its
cargo.
Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.
Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance
indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance
paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
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R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both

Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the
subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to
recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss."
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for
damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim
for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of
appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance
Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by
appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their
liability for the loss of the subject cargo.
RULING:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner

Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation
jointly and severally liable to respondent
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or
goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of
transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as
distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by
special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.
Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. For as
stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.
Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the
transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the
circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the
Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution
which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and
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preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame of this
extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them.
The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally
liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters’ claim that it
was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or
R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense.
For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters
whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for
the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to
ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport
the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable
with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to
its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice
outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a
party who has been at fault or negligent.
Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600

Facts:
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left
Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of
empty beer “Grande” bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand
Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00 o’clock that same morning while the truck
was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan,
Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the
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truck’s right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface
of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left
lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo,
before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on
coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking
the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had
to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels
and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca’s
vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and
climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely
damaged and its two passengers, namely, Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died
instantly. On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an
amended information charging Dunca with reckless imprudence resulting in double
homicide and damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the offended parties filed
with the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue the
criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. On December 15, 1989, respondents withdrew the reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute
the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from
the same act or omission of the accused driver. The RTC held that the driver was
guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint
decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the
private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused, which the lower court
granted.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be
held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal
action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the
offended parties against the employer of the truck driver; and
(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the
criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck
driver.
Held:
(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other words, “the
same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that
is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be
enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
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that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.” In the
instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages
against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who
has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil
action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal
action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of
a separate civil action against the employer. The only issue brought before the trial
court in the criminal action is whether accused Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability
is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the
petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double recovery
requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the
action is brought against the employee or against his employer. The injured party
must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.

BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks
to annul and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order
dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due
course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and
allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the
offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double
homicide and double physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double Homicide and
Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
11
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no.
NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck
in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said
dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following
vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto
Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota
Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in
the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an
automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with
plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the
driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y
Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2
passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr.
sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less
than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991,
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00,
as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the
costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment
became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident
accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by
petitioner Luisito Basilio.
12
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special
Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated
February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and
subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The
motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice
of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course
and dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.[10] The other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the
enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on
February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September
16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned,
and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution
against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not
afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the
accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992,
disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE and
should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect." [13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This
was denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF
4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT
THE PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST
HIM.
13
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN COURT
IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY
RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
"IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by
petitioner against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the
following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and executory
when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil
liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary

injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court
to prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused.
Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an
employee at the time of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall
give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues,
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of
an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is
insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party
to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we
held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this
Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the
same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the
passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the
14
subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of
the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of

an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his
truck that was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company,
with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant
to the stipulations in their contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal
proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced
evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With the convicts application for
probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view
that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due
process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove
that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement
of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the
motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an
opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that
there was no employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the
latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on
December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for
the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13,
1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered
in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6,
1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly
attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil
liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion
for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot
agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we
fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial
court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
15
Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)

Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 am, Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmena Rotunda, following the normal flow of traffic but without a helmet
and goggles, and carrying only a Student‘s Permit to Drive. Abad was a manager of
Castilex, the registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pickup. He drove the company car
out of a parking lot, and made a shortcut against the flow of the traffic. The 2 vehicles
collided, causing severe injuries to Vasquez. Abad brought him to the Southern
Islands Hospital, and later to the Cebu Doctor‘s Hospital. Vasquez died. Abad signed
an acknowledgement of Responsible Party, agreeing to pay hospital, professional, etc.
bills. A Criminal Case (Unspecified) was filed against him, but was dismissed for
failure to prosecute. This Civil Case for damages was initiated against Abad and
Castilex; Cebu Doctor‘s intervened to collect unpaid balances. The RTC held them
solidarily liable. The CA held that Castilex is only vicariously liable. Castilex argues
that the 4th paragraph of Article 2180 should apply, and not the 5th; that even
though he was using a company vehicle, Abad was not acting within the scope of his
duties outside office hours; that the Castilex did not have the burden of proving that
Abad was not acting within the scope of his duties.
Issue: Whether or not CASTILEX is vicariously liable.
Held: NO. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. CASTILEX
presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries
and subsequent death caused by ABAD. CASTILEX contends that the 5th paragraph
of Article 2180 should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in
business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the 4th paragraph
should apply. CASTILEX‘s interpretation of the 5th paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase ―even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry‖ found in
the 5th paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of
his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. A distinction must
be made between the 2 provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions
apply to employers: the 4th PAR, to owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise; and the 5th PAR, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry. The 4th PAR. covers negligent acts of employees committed
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the
5th PAR encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and
acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in
a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of
their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor
on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. This court has
applied the 5th par. to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or
industry such as truck operators and banks. The CA cannot, therefore, be faulted in
16
applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 to this case. It is undisputed that ABAD
was a Production Manager of CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to
whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact,
which the court a quo and the CA resolved in the affirmative. It was enough for
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; it was not
under obligation to prove this negative averment. ABAD, who was presented as a
hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a
companyissued vehicle, registered under the name of CASTILEX. He was then leaving
the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having
done overtime work for the petitioner. However, the mere fact that ABAD was using a
service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
CASTILEX with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. The
following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer‘s liability for the
injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer‘s motor
vehicle: USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or FROM MEALS: It has been held that an
employee who uses his employer‘s vehicle in going from his work to a place where he
intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the
scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to
the employer. Evidence that by using the employer‘s vehicle to go to and from meals,
an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the
performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the
scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or
FROM WORK: In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the
mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the
employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer‘s motor vehicle. The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some
special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer‘s vehicle as when
the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee‘s duties require him to
circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from
his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a
vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the
―special errand‖ or ―roving commission‖ rule, under which it can be found that the
employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his
employment in going to or from work in his employer‘s vehicle, the employer is not
liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the
direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
USE OF VEHICLE OUTSIDE REGULAR WORKING HOURS: An employer who loans his
motor vehicle to an employee for the latter‘s personal use outside of regular working
hours is generally not liable for the employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
17
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where
the employee‘s personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been
held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the
employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. Torts & Damages
2013 Atty. Jess Lopez 61 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, &
Roco 3B The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus
pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive
on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer‘s business or within the
scope of his assigned task. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some
overtime work at the CASTILEX‘s office, which was located in Mandaue City.
Thereafter, he went to Goldie‘s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is
about 7 km away from his place of business. A witness for the Vasquez, a sidewalk
vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a ―lively place‖ even at dawn because Goldie‘s
Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat.
Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. At the Goldie‘s
Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD
was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness
for the respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with
a woman in his car, who then shouted: ―Daddy, Daddy!‖ This woman could not have
been ABAD‘s daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. To the mind of
this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then
about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD‘s
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a ―haven for prostitutes, pimps, and
drug pushers and addicts,‖ had no connection to CASTILEX‘s business; neither had it
any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his
position. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him, CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
18
Filamer Christian Institute vs CA
Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was
assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan
Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s
jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the
students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have
to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning.
Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together.
Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat.
While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to
his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent
civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily
liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based
on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the
employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between
Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence
only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school
janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with
Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause
by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X,
Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance
with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned.
This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code.
The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is
merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a
distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law
in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought
by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person,
against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot
be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.
19
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for

a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s
house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school
transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not
relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN

FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA
1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order
FACTS
Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along

the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by
Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American
Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL
and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint
against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment as
contemplated in NCC 2180.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise” embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage
arose. NO.
RATIO
Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the
context of NCC 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of “employer”. Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the
vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.
20
MERRIT VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor
who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along
Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt
was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so
that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even
earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government
of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver
of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of
the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment
of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
21
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest.”
AMADORA VS CA
FACTS: In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The
stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal,
the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school
appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has
already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended,
his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics
subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under
the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational
schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above
law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools
of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled
that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of
Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not,
should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
22
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should
be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in
non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over
their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on
to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly
liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school
year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long
as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the
school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised
the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school
exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and
there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge
liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason,
the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
This case abandoned fully the cases of Exconde vs Capuno and Mercado vs Court of
Appeals.
NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students
between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over
his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing
with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for
the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his
closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
23
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the

expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of
their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its
present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear
and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
PALISOC VS BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of teachers/heads of
establishments of arts and trades
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio
Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the
Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for
just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of
Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that
eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president
(Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio
Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and
that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180,
they are only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And
that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of
establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students
are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which
Daffon was not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling
in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the
latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the
school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been
avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate
24
supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect
their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.
At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
“(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that
there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and
boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school
may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
Salvosa v. IAC
G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]
Facts of the Case:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an

institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-
vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype
Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive
Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the
AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the
AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was
also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B.
Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
25
the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading

Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .
Issue:
WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.
Ruling of the Case:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent,
in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in
[Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their custodymeans the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been “at attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he
shot NapoleonCastro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.
Universal Aquarius, Inc. and Conchita Tan v. Q.C. Human Resources

Management Corp.
FACTS Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in
Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the name and style of
Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of
chemical products in Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's
chemical plant. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is
engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It supplied Universal with
about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its
chemical plant in Antipolo City. Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general
counsel/national president of the labor organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal
Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike to Universal. Resources informed the
26
Regional Office of DOLE that the officers and members of Obrero Pilipino are its
employees and not employees of Universal. Five days later, however, Copocyan and 36
other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit
of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks
thereby disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined
Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate. Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against
the strikers and Resources before the RTC of Antipolo for breach of contract and
damages suffered due to the disruption of their respective business operations. The
strike ended after the forging of an agreement between Universal and Obrero.
ISSUE WON Universal and Tan has a cause of action against Resources
HELD Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of
action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the
delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary right of the plaintiff. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and 3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief. It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief. The Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against
Resources. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a contract of employment of
temporary workers with Resources; and that Resources violated said contract by
supplying it with unfit, maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its
business operations. Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the
exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have rendered judgment over
the dispute. However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court finds that she
has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the
Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike effected
by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its
employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in
the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the
damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer
or, independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an
employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment.
Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their
own, beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for
damages caused by the strike staged by its employees.
27
Case Title 125 Mercury Drug v. Huang

Fast Facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler
truck with. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent
spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own
the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m.
within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway,
north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City.
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right.
When the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car.
The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and
landed on the opposite lane.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR).
His driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for
reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations,
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires
continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
respondent Stephen Huang’s recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was
driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire.
The trial court found for petitioners and held PLDT and Del Rosario jointly and severally
liable for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
Tortious Act: Collision of a 16 wheeler truck and a Sedan causing paralysis to the driver.
What is it? Quasi-Delict
Legal Basis: Art. 2205
Issue:
Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by Mercury Drug
Held: NO
We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario. Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
28
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests,
and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs.
Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle,
instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor
skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were
also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June
30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before
the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long
trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more
than thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of
any company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against
petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
29
CASE DIGEST
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
388 SCRA 445 (2002)
Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house
cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed
which caused death and injury. Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the
registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin
Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation
(Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the
former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It
also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the
negligent acts.
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the
intention of the parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the
subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the
vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of
Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by
Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently
ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the
lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape
primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the
driver.
30
CIVIL
G.R. No. 174156 June 20, 2012
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent.
DECISION
Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The other car escaped from the scene
of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number.
After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of
the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar.
After sending several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager
Carmen Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car without
response, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor
demanding the amount of P97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his
car.
Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped
Espinas’ car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the
husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the
car was being driven by Atty. Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its
fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar
and Carmen Flor.
ISSUE: Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in
an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.
RULING
Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil
Code
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.Thus, a person
will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by
another. The law, however, provides for exceptions that an employer is made
vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
31
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer
who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made
primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
Filcar is not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on
the blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his
alleged driver, Floresca.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Filcar Transport Services.
Metro Manila Transit Corp vs Cuevas

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs. REYNALDO CUEVAS
G.R. No. 167797, June 15, 2015
FACTS: Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and Mina’s Transit Corporation
(Mina’s Transit) entered into an agreement to sell dated August 31, 1990, whereby the
latter bought several bus units from the former at a stipulated price. They agreed that
MMTC would retain the ownership of the buses until certain conditions were met, but
in the meantime Mina’s Transit could operate the buses within Metro Manila.
On October 14, 1994, one of the buses subject of the agreement to sell hit and
damaged a Honda Motorcycle owned by Reynaldo and driven by Junnel. Reynaldo and
Junnel sued MMTC and Mina’s Transit for damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
MMTC denied liability claiming that although it retained the ownership of the bus, the
actual operator and employer of the bus driver was Mina’s Transit; and that, in
support of its cross-claim against Mina’s Transit, a provision in the agreement to sell
mandated Mina’s Transport to hold it free from liability arising from the use and
operation of the bus units.
ISSUE1: Whether or not MMTC is liable considering that it was not the actual operator
and employer of the bus driver
HELD1: YES. In view of MMTC’s admission in its pleadings that it had remained the
registered owner of the bus at the time of the incident, it could not escape liability for
the personal injuries and property damage suffered by the Cuevases. This is because
of the registered-owner rule, whereby the registered owner of the motor vehicle
involved in a vehicular accident could be held liable for the consequences.
32
The Court has reiterated the registered-owner rule in other rulings, like in Filcar
Transport Services v. Espinas, to wit:
x x x It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made
primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, we ruled that in so far as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent
driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
MMTC could not evade liability by passing the buck to Mina’s Transit. The stipulation
in the agreement to sell did not bind third parties like the Cuevases, who were
expected to simply rely on the data contained in the registration certificate of the
erring bus.
ISSUE2: May MMTC recover from Mina’s Transit (the actual employer of the negligent
driver)?
HELD2: YES. Although the registered-owner rule might seem to be unjust towards
MMTC, the law did not leave it without any remedy or recourse. According to Filcar
Transport Services v. Espinas, MMTC could recover from Mina’s Transit, the actual
employer of the negligent driver, under the principle of unjust enrichment, by means
of a cross-claim seeking reimbursement of all the amounts that it could be required to
pay as damages arising from the driver’s negligence. A cross-claim is a claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein, and may include a
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-
claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
STEPHEN CANG AND GEORGE NARDO Y JOSOL v. HERMINIA CULLEN

G.R. No. 163078, 25 November 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.
Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that circumstances justly demand.
Facts:
Nardo was operating a taxi when Saycon, who was travelling on a motorcycle
without protective headgear, veered into his lane and bumped him. After the impact,
Nardo drove back to help Saycon, two traffic enforcers ordered Nardo to take Saycon to
the hospital. No sketch of the accident was done by the enforcers. Saycon claims that
it was Nardo that sideswept him and that Nardo tried to speed away until he was
flagged down by peace officers. Cullen, the employer of Saycon, shouldered the
hospital expenses of Saycon and is now claiming damages from Nardo and Cang, the
33
owner of the taxi. The RTC dismissed the case stating that Cullen is not entitled to
damages. The CA reversed the RTC decision claiming that the RTC did not give credit
to a witness’ account of the accident.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to respondent
Ruling:
YES.Saycon was operating the motor vehicle as a student-driver without being
accompanied by a duly licensed driver. Article 2185 provides that it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk
of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that circumstances justly demand.
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, the Supreme

Court laid down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence.Saycon was negligent since he should not have been driving alone. The
law requires that the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be accompanied by a
duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, he was not wearing a
helmet and he was speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.
Neither can Cullen as Saycon’s employer be entitled to claim damages. Cullen
was negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee. When an employee
causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The fact that Saycon
was driving alone is proof enough that Cullen was negligent. Either she did not know
that he only had a student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this
deficiency.
SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against
respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a
shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City.
Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales
agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which
killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for
repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he
34
left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the
gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun,
the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The
latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young
Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
“accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the
instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization
and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision
reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under
Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based
on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may
opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case,
instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against
Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP
Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a
person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition
35
must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little
or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms
safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that
all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that
it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a
vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure
that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he
has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure
that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was
not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good
father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with
dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
36

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AFOS, JAN ALDRIN E.

TORTS OCTOBER 2, 2018

Air France Vs. Carrascoso

Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc., G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012

(2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings;

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner

Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600

LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.

II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN

(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of

Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)

Filamer Christian Institute vs CA

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN

Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along

MERRIT VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the

G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]

Facts of the Case:

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading

WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling of the Case:

Universal Aquarius, Inc. and Conchita Tan v. Q.C. Human Resources

Case Title 125 Mercury Drug v. Huang

Metro Manila Transit Corp vs Cuevas

STEPHEN CANG AND GEORGE NARDO Y JOSOL v. HERMINIA CULLEN

To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, the Supreme

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