FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES and VIC TAGLE

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), HON. PATRICIO M. PATAJO

G.R. No. 88384 July 14, 1994

FACTS:

DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran ordered respondent Jaime Torres to vacate a

parcel of land located in Rizal. However, he refused to leave the premises claiming that he had
been in actual possession thereof for more than 30 years.

Torres’ situation had been referred to the Secretary of Justice and decided that Torres
could be ejected therefrom, since, he had not shown any proof that the land had been validly
transferred to him or that his predecessor-in-interest, Carmen Garcia had a title to it.

As a result, DENR formally demanded him to vacate the land but then again, he refused
to leave. Instead, he filed a complaint for injunction before the RTC to enjoin DENR from ejecting
him.

DENR, via its answer, alleged that Torres was squatting on a watershed and forest
reservation. In addition, the said area was increased to 180,000 hectares by P.D. 1396 thereby
embracing the areas both claimed by Torres and Petitioner Federation of Land Reform Farmers
of the Philippines. Since said areas were not included as alienable and disposable, they should be
protected from all kinds of entry, occupation and destruction.

On August 8, 1988, the trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction for August 19, 1988. On August 10, 1988, the trial court, taking
into account the length of time to resolve the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
to prevent the same from becoming moot and academic, issued an order for the maintenance of
the status quo and restrained the defendants from ejecting private respondent.

The FLRFP filed a Motion to Intervene arguing that the land claimed by Torres was
inalienable and that it has entered into a MOA with the DENR for a lease of 500 hectares of land
 However, on November 10, 1988, the trial court, holding that FLRFP’s interest as a lessee
was not direct but merely collateral, denied the Motion to Intervene.

Then On November 12, 1988, FLRFP filed a motion to declare without a force and effect
the restraining order earlier issued by the trial court contending that said order became functus
officio as provided by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO has a lifespan of only 20
days and that its failure to decide whether to grant the writ of preliminary injunction within said
period, the trial court could no longer grant said writ. Such petition was denied.

Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: WON there has been a violation of the Rules of court on the issuance of a TRO with a
lifespan of 20 days.

HELD:

None.

The Instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

Counted from August 8, 1988, the temporary restraining order automatically expired on
August 28, 1988, the end of the twentieth day from its issuance. Thus, when the trial court issued
the Order of August 23, 1988 directing the maintenance of the status quo upon agreement of the
parties, the temporary restraining order was still in full force and effect.

Before the intervention of petitioner FLRFP was allowed, the original parties were private
respondent and DENR. Be it noted that the intervention was first disallowed on the ground that
the interest of petitioner FLRFP as a lessee from DENR of a portion of the land in dispute was
merely collateral. That the intervention was eventually allowed on reconsideration did not alter
the fact that the interest of petitioner FLRFP is collateral.

However, there is no reason to prevent a court from extending the 20-day period when
the parties themselves ask for such extension or for the maintenance of the status quo.
 Clearly then, this Order was issued to maintain the status quo while the committee
ascertained facts necessary in resolving whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should
be issued. By issuing said Order, the trial court should be deemed as merely exercising its
inherent power under Section 5(b), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court "to enforce order in
proceedings before it" in the absence of any showing that it has gravely abused its discretion in
so doing.

While it is true that a restraining order is good for twenty days, however, since the parties
agreed to maintain the status quo before the incident on preliminary injunction could be
resolved by the Court, the maintenance of status quo is likewise necessary since the Court has
still to wait for the result of the relocation survey and ocular inspection which was directed by the
Court in its order dated August 23, 1988.