LABOR LAW REVIEW 2016 – 2017

ASSIGNMENT:

These three (3) cited cases are very important in your Labor Law Review
Subject. You are required to read and understand these cases.

GR 211145 - Right to Self – Organization

Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers'

association and labor management councils.

More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism.

Workers, however, can also form and join a workers' association as well as
labor – management councils (LMC). Expressed in the highest law of the
land is the right of all workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law.

And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.

In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work.

As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-
organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose
for their mutual aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the State
to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends

two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint
which guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may,
as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.

In view of the revered right of every worker to self – organization, the law
expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor organizations.
A labor organization is defined as "any union or association of employees
which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." A
labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain collectively and (2) to
deal with the employer concerning terms and conditions of employment. To
bargain collectively is a right given to a union once it registers itself with the
DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the other hand, is a generic
description of interaction between employer and employees concerning
grievances, wages, work hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, even if the employees' group is not registered with the DOLE.

A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for
collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers'
association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining.

Many associations or groups of employees, or even combinations of only

several persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of
constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor organization,
not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is one of
organization, composition and operation.
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee participation.
Despite so much interest in and the promotion of collective bargaining, it is
incorrect to say that it is the device and no other, which secures industrial
democracy. It is equally misleading to say that collective bargaining is the
end – goal of employee representation. Rather, the real aim is employee
participation in whatever form it may appear, bargaining or no bargaining,
union or no union. Any labor organization which may or may not be a union
may deal with the employer. This explains why a workers' association or
organization does not always have to be a labor union and why employer-
employee collective interactions are not always collective bargaining.

To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255 (now 261) of the

Labor Code mandates that workers shall have the right to participate in
policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits
and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form LMCs.

A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common element between

unionism and the formation of LMCs is the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Where neither party is an employer nor an employee
of the other, no duty to bargain collectively would exist. In the same manner,
expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such workers be
employed in the establishment before they can participate in policy and
decision making processes.

In contrast, the existence of employer – employee relationship is not

mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What the law simply
requires is that the members of the workers' association, at the very least,
share the same interest. The very definition of a workers' association speaks
of "mutual aid and protection."

Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association

belongs to workers themselves

In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of the CA that
Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of collective bargaining
instead of a workers' association because the choice belonged to it. The right
to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or
refrain from exercising the said right. It is self – evident that just as no one
should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one
should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent in the
right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for
purposes of collective bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection.

The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain limitations as

provided by law. For instance, the Labor Code specifically disallows
managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming any labor union.
Meanwhile, supervisory employees, while eligible for membership in labor
organizations, are proscribed from joining the collective bargaining unit of
the rank and file employees. Even government employees have the right to
self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as existing or available for
purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and
protection of their interests.

Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers, hence,
they should have formed a union instead of a workers' association. The
Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that
employees with definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.

The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position that Samahan's

members cannot form the association because they are not covered by the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249), to wit:

Article 243. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All persons employed
in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical,
or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Further, Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of Department
Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, which provides:

RULE II
COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Section 1. Policy. — It is the policy of the State to promote the free and responsible
exercise of the right to self-organization through the establishment of a simplified
mechanism for the speedy registration of labor unions and workers associations,
determination of representation status and resolution of inter/intra-union and other related
labor relations disputes. Only legitimate or registered labor unions shall have the right to
represent their members for collective bargaining and other purposes. Workers'
associations shall have the right to represent their members for purposes other than
collective bargaining.
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. — All persons
employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of
government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under
the Corporation Code, as well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or
educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining:
provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor
unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any
labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working
permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join or
assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country
which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or
not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any
labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed,
rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for
their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective
bargaining.

Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules which provides

that workers, with definite employers, cannot form or join a workers'
association for mutual aid and protection. Section 2 thereof even broadens
the coverage of workers who can form or join a workers' association. Thus,
the Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to form a workers'
association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers.
The option to form or join a union or a workers' association lies with the
workers themselves, and whether they have definite employers or not.

No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of

registration

In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not because its members
were prohibited from forming a workers' association but because they
allegedly committed misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang
mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard."
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of registration of a labor
organization, is committed "in connection with the adoption, or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, and those in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list
of voters, . . ."

In Takata Corporation v. Bureau of Relations, the DOLE Regional Director

granted the petition for the cancellation of certificate of registration of
Samahang Lakas Manggagawa sa Takata (Salamat) after finding that the
employees who attended the organizational meeting fell short of the 20%
union registration requirement. The BLR, however, reversed the ruling of
the DOLE Regional Director, stating that petitioner Takata Corporation
(Takata) failed to prove deliberate and malicious misrepresentation on the
part of respondent Salamat. Although Takata claimed that in the list of
members, there was an employee whose name appeared twice and another
was merely a project employee, such facts were not considered
misrepresentations in the absence of showing that the respondent
deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing their union membership.
The Court ruled in favor of Salamat.

In S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, the petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration was denied. The Court wrote:

If the union's application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities,

especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union
should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these
considerations, the issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-
02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities. Another factor
which militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the
lack of particularities on how, when and where respondent union perpetrated the alleged
fraud on each member. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation of
union registration on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be
established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the complaining
employees-members of their right to choose.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a

ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done
maliciously and deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the
application or attachments must be grave or refer to significant matters. The
details as to how the alleged fraud was committed must also be indubitably
shown.

The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to commit

misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use of such words "KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to
warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of registration. Hanjin
failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation. Neither was there any showing that the alleged
misrepresentation was serious in character. Misrepresentation is a devious
charge that cannot simply be entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented themselves
as employees or workers of Hanjin, said misrepresentation does not relate to
the adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to the election
of its officers.

Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association's name,

however, does not infringe on Samahan's right to self-organization

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be
removed in the name of the association. A legitimate workers' association
refers to an association of workers organized for mutual aid and protection
of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining
registered with the DOLE. Having been granted a certificate of registration,
Samahan's association is now recognized by law as a legitimate workers'
association.

According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to self-organization is

its right to name its own organization. It seems to equate the dropping of
words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name as a restraint in its exercise of the
right to self-organization. Hanjin, on the other hand, invokes that "Hanjin
Shipyard" is a registered trade name and, thus, it is within their right to
prohibit its use.

As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of
name by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code,
which governs the names of juridical persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission if the proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly
similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing
laws. When a change in the corporate name is approved, the Commission
shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation under the amended name.
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the registration
of a corporate name which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly
similar" to that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive"
or "patently confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of
fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with the entity
concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of
difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.

For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to
use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give the wrong impression that
all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
Further, Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of 2003 explicitly
states:

The change of name of a labor organization shall not affect its legal personality. All the
rights and obligations of a labor organization under its old name shall continue to be
exercised by the labor organization under its new name.

Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words "Hanjin Shipyard," no
abridgement of Samahan's right to self-organization was committed.

GR 161006

The order issued on July 25, 2001 by the Voluntary Arbitrator, albeit
directing the execution of the award or decision of January 13, 1999, was a
final order, as contrasted from a merely interlocutory order, because its
issuance left nothing more to be done or taken by the Voluntary Arbitrator in
the case. It thus completely disposed of what the reinstatement of the
petitioner as ordered by the Voluntary Arbitrator in the award or decision of
January 13, 1999 signified.
The proper remedy from such order was to appeal to the CA by petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, whose Section 1 specifically
provides:

Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Boards of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulation Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by
law.

The period of appeal was 10 days from receipt of the copy of the order of
July 25, 2001 by the parties. It is true that Section 4 of Rule 43 stipulates
that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. However, Article 262-
A of the Labor Code, the relevant portion of which follows, expressly states
that the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties, viz.:

Art. 262-A. Procedures. —

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Upon
motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or
incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for any reason,
may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular
courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement
to execute the final decision, order or award.

On account of Article 262-A of the Labor Code, the period to appeal was
necessarily 10 days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators; otherwise, the order
of July 25, 2001 would become final and immutable, because only a timely
appeal or motion for reconsideration could prevent the award or decision
from attaining finality and immutability.

Yet, HIDECO filed the petition for certiorari, not a petition for review under
Rule 43, and the CA liberally treated the petition for certiorari as a petition
for review under Rule 43.

We hold that such treatment by the CA was procedurally unwarranted.

To begin with, even if the error sought to be reviewed concerned grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was
an appeal in due course by filing the petition for review within 10 days from
notice of the award or decision. This was because certiorari, as an
extraordinary remedy, was available only when there was no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In other
words, the justification for HIDECO's resort to the extraordinary equitable
remedy of certiorari did not exist due to the availability of appeal, or other
ordinary remedies in law to which HIDECO as the aggrieved party could
resort.

Although it is true that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, and
that either remedy was not an alternative of the other, we have at times
permitted the resort to certiorari despite the availability of appeal, or of any
plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in
exceptional situations, such as: (1) when the remedy of certiorari is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (2) where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (3) where
there may be danger of a failure of justice; (4) where appeal would be slow,
inadequate and insufficient; (5) where the issue raised is one purely of law;
(6) where public interest is involved; and (7) in case of urgency. 31 Verily,
as pointed out in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, the availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate
remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient; for it is inadequacy, not
the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari. It is nonetheless necessary in such exceptional situations for the
petitioner to make a strong showing in such situations that the respondent
judicial or quasi-judicial official or tribunal lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

HIDECO did not establish that its case came within any of the aforestated
exceptional situations.

And, secondly, HIDECO filed the petition for certiorari on October 2, 2001.
Even assuming, as the CA held, that the petition for certiorari contained the
matters required by Rule 43, such filing was not timely because days had
already lapsed from HIDECO's receipt of the denial by the Voluntary
Arbitrator of the motion for reconsideration. In short, HIDECO had thereby
forfeited its right to appeal. We have always emphasized the nature of appeal
as a merely statutory right for the aggrieved litigant, and such nature requires
the strict observance of all the rules and regulations as to the manner of its
perfection and as to the time of its taking. Whenever appeal is belatedly
resorted to, therefore, the litigant forfeits the right to appeal, and the higher
court ipso facto loses the authority to review, reverse, modify or otherwise
alter the judgment. The loss of such authority is jurisdictional, and renders
the adverse judgment both final and immutable.

Voluntary Arbitrator's order of reinstatement of the petitioner was

immediately executor

The next query is whether the order of reinstatement of the petitioner by the
Voluntary Arbitrator was immediately executory or not.

We answer the query in the affirmative. Although the timely filing of a

motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the
decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of
the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of
the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal.

The immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been
introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article
223 of the Labor Code, to wit:

SEC. 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:
Art. 223. Appeal. —
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The normal consequences of a finding that an employee was illegally
dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to
his former position without loss of seniority rights; and, secondly, the
payment of wages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up
to the time of actual reinstatement. These two consequences give meaning
and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure.
Reinstatement pending appeal thus affirms the constitutional mandate to
protect labor and to enhance social justice, for, as the Court has said in Aris
(Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:

In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a

Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down
a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the
1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to
express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully
underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the
Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an
indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.

If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is

authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the
discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of
decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases, the
poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their
only means of support for their family their lifeblood. To Us, this special
circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound
discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating
employees, the law itself has determined sufficiently overwhelming reason
for its execution pending appeal.
Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may
authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is
designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in
favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even
the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family.

We also see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the

Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is
ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence
over other dispute settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary arbitration
is mandated by no less than the Philippine Constitution, and is ingrained as a
policy objective of our labor relations law. The reinstatement order by the
Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and effect as that
of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties
to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to
enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of
tenure, and to enhance social justice.
The 2001 Procedural Guidelines in the Execution of Voluntary Arbitration
Awards/Decisions (Guidelines), albeit not explicitly discussing the
executory nature of the reinstatement order, seems to align with the Court's
stance by punishing the noncompliance by a party of the decision or order
for reinstatement. Section 2, Rule III of the Guidelines states:

Sec. 2. Issuance, Form and Contents of a Writ of Execution. —

b) If the execution be for the reinstatement of any person to any position, office or
employment, such writ shall be served by the sheriff upon the losing party or in case of
death of the losing party upon his successor-in-interest, executor or administrator and
such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such decision or order
for reinstatement.
The 2005 NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings also supports this Court's position, for Section 6 of its Rule VIII reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of Filing of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. — The filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution
of the assailed decision unless a temporary restraining order or injunction is issued by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court pending resolution of such petition.

We declare, therefore, that the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary

Arbitrator was immediately executory upon the receipt of the award or
decision by the parties.

GR 178085

As proven by the certification of the IMU President as well as the CBAs

executed between IMU and CCBPI, the 22 employees sought to be
represented by IPTEU are not IMU members and are not included in the
CBAs due to reclassification of their positions. If these documents were
false, the IMU should have manifested its vigorous opposition. In fact, the
Mediator-Arbiter noted:

The most tenacious resistance to the granting of the Petition as well as the holding of the
CE has been Management. On the other hand, the existing unions at CCBPI, especially
the IMU of which most of the IPTEU members were once part (until they were
considered outside the ambit of its existing bargaining unit) never once opposed the
Petition and the Certification election, whether verbally or in written Opposition.

Between Management and IMU, it is the latter which has more to lose, as
the creation of a separate bargaining unit would reduce the scope of IMU's
bargaining unit. Yet through all these proceedings, we take note of the
substantial moral support that has been extended to the Petitioner by the
other Unions of CCBPI, so much so that, until objected to by Management,
they were even willing to be present during the Certification Election of 21
September 2007.

As to whether the 16 voters sought to be excluded from the appropriate

bargaining unit are confidential employees, such query is a question of fact,
which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules. This holds more true in the present case in view of the consistent
findings of the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the CA.

We reiterate that:

The office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by
substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their
respective fields. Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to
assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by
the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the
DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar.
The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and
not to a second analysis of the evidence. . . . Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by
the appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.

The determination of factual issues is vested in the Mediator-Arbiter and the

Department of Labor and Employment. Pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving such controversies
unless the case falls under recognized and well-established exceptions. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

In this case, organizational charts, detailed job descriptions, and training

programs were presented by CCBPI before the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE,
and the CA. Despite these, the Mediator – Arbiter ruled that employees who
encounter or handle trade secrets and financial information are not
automatically classified as confidential employees. It was admitted that the
subject employees encounter and handle financial as well as physical
production data and other information which are considered vital and
important from the business operations' standpoint. Nevertheless, it was
opined that such information is not the kind of information that is relevant to
collective bargaining negotiations and settlement of grievances as would
classify them as confidential employees. The SOLE, which the CA affirmed,
likewise held that the questioned voters do not have access to confidential
labor relations information.

We defer to the findings of fact of the Mediator – Arbiter, the SOLE, and the
CA. Certainly, access to vital labor information is the imperative
consideration. An employee must assist or act in a confidential capacity and
obtain confidential information relating to labor relations policies. Exposure
to internal business operations of the company is not per se a ground for the
exclusion in the bargaining unit.

The Court sees no need to belabor the effects of the unresolved notice of
appeal and motion to suspend proceedings filed by CCBPI in September
2007. Suffice it to say that the substantial merits of the issues raised in said
pleadings are the same as what were already brought to and passed upon by
the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the CA.