ISSUE:
ARTICLE 523
EQUATORIAL V. MAYFAIR- Sale of Land
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It
is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with
two 2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila,
and covered by TCT No. 18529.
On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease
with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years. The lease covered a
portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey
building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which
respondent used as Maxim Theater.
Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a
second Lease with Carmelo for another portion of the
latter’s property this time, a part of the second floor of the
two-storey building, and two store spaces on the ground
floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another movie house
known as Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was
likewise for a period of 20 years.
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first
refusal to purchase the subject properties. Sadly, on July
30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject
properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty
Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their
first being offered to Mayfair.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties to
Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific
performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and
Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a
petition questioning the CA decision. What happened is that
the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money
back and asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase
the lots for 11 million bucks.
Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited
with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand withholding) payment
for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after
Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable
compensation for the Mayfair’s continued use of the subject
premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that
Mayfair was still occupying the premises during all this
hullabaloo.
Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject
property and could thus enjoy the fruits and rentals.
HELD:
NO. Article 523 states that possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of the right.
In the case presented possession was never acquired by
the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.
Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to
Equatorial since there was failure to deliver the property to
the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was
even rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that
belonged to the owner of the property producing it by right
of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time
of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission
by final judgment should belong to the owner of the
property during that period.
We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, “one
of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent.”
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer
acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him “in any of the
ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.” This right is
transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or
delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold “is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee.”
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It
is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery
of property or title, and transfer of control or custody to the
buyer.

ARTICLE 524
G.R. No. 94490 August 6, 1992
JOSE DE LUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G.
MALIWANAG, RTC EXECUTIVE JUDGE, BRANCH 71, IBA,
ZAMBALES; JUAN DIMAANO, JR. and GERINO
DOBLE, respondents.
FACTS:
This was a petition for review on certiorari by petitioner
Jose de Luna from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 12922 1 which affirmed the reversal made by the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. In his complaint filed on
February 7, 1972 before the Municipal Trial Court, petitioner
alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land
with an area of 30,856 square meters, located in Babon San
Juan, Botolan, Zambales, since 1938. That on December 18
and 19, 1971, defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and
private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble
entered the land and began plowing it; and that said defendants
fenced the land with barbed wire on January 15 and 16, 1972
and began planting sugar cane on February 5 and 6, 1972,
despite his objections. Petitioners prayed that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45.00
monthly per hectare until possession thereof would be
transferred to him, with litigation expenses and costs. For his
part, defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and
affirmative defense that petitioner was not the owner of the
property, alleging instead that the owner thereof was Agustin
Dequiña, Jr., Dimaano, Jr. contended that the property was
originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who had declared the
property in his name for taxation purposes in 1906 was
succeeded by his son Agustin Dequiña, Jr. when the same was
leased to defendant Dimaano, Jr.
The trial court was rendered decision in favor of petitioner,
ordering the defendant to pay the petitioner the amounts of
P12,312.00 representing actual damages and P5,000.00 as
costs of the suit. But this was reversed by Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales.
Hence appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Agustin Dequina Jr was the real owner in
possession of an unregistered parcel of land.
Held:
No. Petitioner has shown that he had prior
possession of the property. The prior possession of
petitioner was established by the testimony of his
witnesses, notably of his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor
dela Cruz. While petitioner admitted that he declared the
property for taxation purposes only in 1957, he had
possessed the property beginning 1953 at the very latest,
when he leased the same to Epigenio Dilag, who in turn
possessed the same until respondent Dimaano, Jr. entered
upon the property in 1972. The possession of the property
by Dilag since 1953 redounds to the benefit of petitioner,
since Article 524 of the CC provides that possession may
be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
On the other hand, respondent Dimaano, Jr. had
failed to prove that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. possessed the
property prior to his possession, much less the ownership
of the latter over said property. While Agustin Dequiña, Jr.
testified that he is a co-owner of the disputed property,
there is nothing to support this self-serving claim; neither
does his testimony support the defense's theory that he had
prior possession of the property. The mere fact that Agustin
Dequiña, Sr. had declared the subject for taxation purposes
from 1908 up to 1945 did not constitute possession
thereof, 7 nor is it proof of ownership
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the owner of the disputed
property since there is no evidence whatsoever to support
such a conclusion.
[G.R. No. 127608. September 30, 1999]
GUADALUPE S. REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and JUANITA L. RAYMUNDO, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes sold to respondent
Juanita L. Raymundo on 21 June 1967 one-half (1/2) of a
300 - square meter lot located at No. 4-F Calderon St.,
Project 4, Quezon City, denominated as Lot 8-B,
for P10,000.00. Consequently, a new title, TCT No.
119205, was issued for the whole lot in the name of original
owner Guadalupe S. Reyes and vendee Juanita L.
Raymundo in equal shares. On 24 September 1969
petitioner sold her remaining interest in the property to
respondent for P15,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale, Exh. "E,"[1] and TCT No. 149036 was issued
in the name of respondent in lieu of TCT No. 119205. Since
1967 the house standing on the property subject of the
second sale was being leased by the spouses Mario
Palacios and Zenaida Palacios from petitioner. In
December 1984 petitioner allegedly refused to receive the
rentals thus prompting the Palacios spouses to file on 13
March 1985 a petition for consignation before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. However, the
Palacioses ejected from the premises but managed
somehow to return. A contempt case was filed by petitioner
against her lessees, respondent intervened and claimed
ownership of the entire 300 - square meter property as well
as the existence of a lease contract between her and the
Palacios spouses supposedly dated 17 March 1987 but
retroactive to 1 January 1987. On 23 August 1987
petitioner filed a complaint against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for cancellation of TCT
No. 149036 and reconveyance with damages.
The trial court found that the second deed of sale
was indeed simulated as it held that since the date of its
execution respondent allowed petitioner to exercise
ownership over the property by collecting rentals from the
lessees until December 1986. It was only in 1987 when
respondent intervened in the contempt case that she
asserted ownership thereof. Likewise, the trial court
sustained petitioner's claim that she was only prevailed
upon to transfer the title to the whole lot to respondent in
order to obtain a loan from the GSIS which, after all, did not
materialize.
Respondent Court of Appeals however held
otherwise. It ruled that as between a notarized deed of sale
earlier executed and the agreement of 10 January 1970
contained in a private writing, the former prevailed. It also
found that petitioners cause of action had prescribed since
the complaint should have been filed either within ten (10)
years from 1969 as an action to recover title to real
property, or within ten (10) years from 1970 as an action
based on a written contract. The appellate court further
found that petitioners cause of action was barred by laches
having allowed respondent to stay in possession of the lot
in question for eighteen (18) years after the execution of the
second deed of sale.
Hence this appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the property remained to be in actual
possession of Guadalupe Reyes.
Held:
Yes. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as
those a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.[7] It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of
land should himself occupy the property as someone in his
name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is
physically in occupation of the property, or when another
person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such
occupancy.[8] This declaration is conformably with Art. 524
of the Civil Code providing that possession may be
exercised in ones own name or in the name another.
An example of actual possession of real property
by an owner through another is a lease agreement whereby
the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased.[9] The Palacios spouses have
been the lessees of petitioner since 1967 occupying the
house erected on the property subject of the second
sale. Petitioner was in actual possession of the property
through the Palacioses and remained so even after the
execution of the second deed of sale. It was only in 1987 -
when respondent asserted ownership over the property and
showed a lease contract between her and the Palacioses
dated 17 March 1987 but effective 1 January 1987 - that
petitioners possession was disturbed. Moreover, the fact
that respondent was able to secure a title in her name did
not operate to vest ownership upon her of the property.
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals of 19 July 1996 ordering the
dismissal of the complaint of petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes
and the Resolution of 22 October 1996 denying
reconsideration are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, of 29 May
1992 cancelling and declaring null and void TCT No.
149036, as well as the second deed of sale dated 24
September 1969 between petitioner and private respondent
Juanita L. Raymundo, ordering the latter to reconvey the
property subject of the second deed of sale to petitioner,
and further ordering private respondent to pay
petitioner P25,000.00 as actual and exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the
costs, is REINSTATED and ADOPTED.
CHAN SUI BI, JOHNNY C. ONG, BOBBY C. ONG,
PHILLIP C. ONG, HOMER C. ONG, DAVID C. ONG,
HELEN C. ONG-MAYPA, AND GLENN C. ONG, as
substituted widow and children of the late Jose C. Ong
in his personal capacity, ROBSON ONG, and DAVID C.
ONG, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estates
of Uy Hian and Ong Chuan, RTC-Iloilo Sp. Procs. Nos.
2647 and 2370*, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOFIA DALIPE, ROLANDO D.
ONG, SPOUSES LORENZO D. ONG AND VILMA TAN-
ONG, SPOUSES EDDIE D. ONG AND LIZA TE-ONG,
HENRY D. ONG, YELSON D. ONG, WILSON D. ONG,
ASUNCION ONG-JARDIOLIN, MA. LOURDES ONG, LAS
TRES ESTRELLAS TEXTILES CO., GOLDEN GATE
REALTY CORPORATION, AND GOLDEN PORTALS
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
Facts:
G.R. No. L-27976 December 7, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-27977 December 7, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
German G. Vilgera for defendant-appellant.
Facts: Facts: Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho, a Chinese, his
wife AnselmaAvengoza and the latter's mother
GavinaAvengoza, were charged in Criminal Case No. 6201
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, in
the information which reads:
"That during the period comprised between July 19, 1954
and April 1957, in the Municipalities of Libmanan and
Sipocot, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
AnselmaAvengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho,
being Chinese citizens, who as such are barred from
acquiring private agricultural lands in the Philippines and
with deliberate intent to defraud, mislead, and for the
evident purpose of evading Section 5 of Article XIII of the
Philippine Constitution did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and for their own bene-fits and
for profits, utilize as a dummy their co-accused
GavinaAvengoza, a Filipino citizen, who in turn deliberately
allowed and permitted herself to be used as such dummy in
the acquisition and sale of private agricultural land
described as follows, to wit:
'Six parcels of land situated in the municipality of Sipocot,
province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, embraced in and
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 3105, 3323, 3338, 3348,
3621 and 3223 of the said municipality.
'One (1) parcel of land situated in the municipality of
Libmanan, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines,
embraced in and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6979 of
said municipality.'
by making it appear in the instruments of conveyance that
the said GavinaAvengoza was the real purchaser, when in
truth and in fact, the true vendees are the alien-accused
AnselmaAvengoza and Go Gam, as a result of which the
latter were able to possess and own real properties and
have profited themselves by the aid of their co-accused
GavinaAvengoza.
In Criminal Case No. 6643 of the same court,
AnselmaAvengoza was charged together with Rafaela
Alfante of violation of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
108 in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 12th day of February 1950 in the
municipality of Sipocot, province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Rafaela Alfante, who is a Filipina citizen
and being then the owner of a private agricultural land
registered under original certificate of Title No. 289 situated
in said municipality and the ownership of which is expressly
reserved by the Constitution or the laws to the citizens of
the Philippines, did, then and there knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cede, transfer and convey by
way of deed of sale said property to accused
AnselmaAvengoza, a Chinese citizen and who, knowingly
aids, assists or abets in the consummation or per-petration
of the aforementioned sale, then an alien by reason of
lawful marriage with Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho, a
Chinese citizen, who as such is barred from acquiring
private agri-cultural lands in the Philippines.
All the accused pleaded not guilty and the two cases were
tried jointly.
While the cases were pending in the lower court, the
accused GavinaAvengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro
Sancho died; thus trial continued only as regard
AnselmaAvengoza and Rafaela Alfante.
Counsel for the said accused subsequently filed a motion
for leave to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to be
permitted to file a motion to quash, alleging that accused
AnselmaAvengoza had reacquired her Philippine
citizenship by repatriation, by reason whereof the criminal
liability of said accused and that of the remaining defendant
Rafaela Alfante, if any, was thereby extinguished; and that
the issue in the criminal cases had thus been rendered
moot and academic.
The trial court allowed defendants to withdraw their plea,
admitted and found defendants' motion to quash
meritorious, and ordered the dismissal of the two cases,
with costs de oficio. Reason for the dismissal is principally
predicated on the trial court's opinion that defendant
AnselmaAvengoza has validly reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.
From the said order, the plaintiff appealed to this Court and
claimed that the trial court has committed the following
errors:
"I.
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACCUSED, ANSELMA AVENGOZA, BY EXECUTING AN
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND REGIS-TERING IT WITH THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRY OF SIPOCOT, CAMARINES SUR HAD
LEGALLY REPATRIATED HERSELF AND THEREBY
RE-ACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
"II.
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT,
HAVING REACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY REPATRIATION, ANSELMA AVENGOZA"S TITLE
OVER THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS PURCHASED BY
GAVINA AVENGOZA FOR HER AND HER HUSBAND,
BECAME LAWFUL AND VALID AS OF THE DATE OF
THEIR CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER TO HER AND
HER ALIEN HUSBAND; AND IN CONCLUDING THAT AS
A RESULT OF SAID REPATRIATION THE CRIMINAL
ACTS COMMITTED BY HER AND HER HUSBAND, AND
THOSE WHO AIDED THEM TO POSSESS THOSE
LANDS, HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED."
We find merit in this appeal. Records show that defendant
AnselmaAvengoza merely executed an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Republic, filed it with the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Sipocot, Camarines Sur on October
18, 1966, and the trial court considered it sufficient for her
to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation. Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 63 provides that would-be repatriate
should show by con-clusive evidence that he or she has the
qualifications to be so repatriated. Without such conclusive
proof, he or she has to file with the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for repatriation.
Issue: Whether or not Avengoza who reacquired Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation may acquire a possession of the
land
No.
Pertinent sections of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:
"Section 2. How Citizenship may be reacquired:
"2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air
Corps: Provided That a woman who lost her citizen-ship by
reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in
accordance with this Act after the termination of the marital
status:
"Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth (now
Republic) of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry.
"Sec. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary
regulations for the proper enforcement of this Act."
And, the Rules and Regulations issued by the Depart-ment
of Justice on July 1, 1937, pursuant to Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 governing the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, provide:
"Rule 3. Any person who has lost his or her Philippine
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
'1. By having been declared, by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air corps in time
of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted; and
'2. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.'
"Anyone wishing to reacquire his or her Philippine
citizenship by repatriation under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, shall file an application with any
Court of First Instance setting forth his name and surname;
his present and former places of residences; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single
or married, in the case of deserter of the Army, Navy, or Air
Corps, and if married, the name, age, and birth place, and
residence of his wife and each of the children. In the case
of a woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of
her marriage to an alien, the applicant shall state the date
and place of her marriage, the nationality of her former
husband, and the cause of the dissolution of the marriage.
The petition must be supported by the affidavit of at least
two persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippine
Islands, and that said peti-tioner, in their opinion, has all the
qualifications necessary to be re-patriated. If after the
hearing the court believes in view of the evidence taken
that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by
Commonwealth Act No. 63, it shall require the peti-tioner to
take in open court the follow-ing oath of allegiance: x xx
'and shall order the registration of such oath in the proper
civil registry through the clerk of court."
Defendant Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support
her repatriation is her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. No evidence has been presented to show
conclusively that she has the right to be repatriated under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63. As aptly stated by
the Solicitor General in his brief, "to sustain the findings of
the trial court on this point would establish a very
dangerous precedent as any alien woman married to a
Chinese citizen can easily 'acquire' Philippine citizenship
upon the death of her Chinese husband by merely
executing an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing
the same with the local civil registry even if she does not
possess the required citizenship." Defendant
AnselmaAvengoza became an alien by reason of her lawful
marriage to a Chinese citizen; however, this does not
necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen previous to
such marriage. Thus, she should first prove her citizenship
previous to her marriage and as there is no conclusive
proof of this matter on record, this question must be
judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.
Further, even Filipino citizens can be criminally liable under
the anti-dummy law; and, aliens violating said law are not
exempted from criminal liability upon becoming a Filipino
citizen.
Finally, the sales in favor of alien AnselmaAvengoza,
through a dummy, of various parcels of land are void for
being contrary to public policy. And, like an alien who
became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation did
not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law.
[G.R. No. 95815. March 10, 1999]
SERVANDO MANGAHAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SIMEON
and LEONORA CAYME, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dated May 25,
1990[2] and the Court of Appeals Resolution of October 12,
1990,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
An agricultural land with an area of 15.0871
hectares possessed by spouses Rodil whom the latter sold
the said parcel of land to the spouses, Pablo Simeon and
Leonora Cayme, for Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos,
as evidenced by the affidavit[7] executed by the former in
favor of the latter in the presence of the herein petitioner,
Servando Mangahas. the spouses Rodil had already
applied for subject tract of land with the Bureau of Lands
which application was not acted upon even until the
aforesaid sale. It was also shown that petitioner, Servando
Mangahas, had been in possession thereof by virtue of the
agreement between him and the spouses Rodil, allowing
him (petitioner) to occupy and cultivate the said parcel of
land.[11] For allowing him to occupy and cultivate the same,
petitioner Servando Mangahas paid the amount
of P7,000.00 to the Rodils, as mentioned in the Kasulatan
ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi[12] Twelve (12)hectares of the
property were then developed into a fishpond,
two (2) hectares planted to rice and one (1) hectare used
as tumana with a house erected thereon.
Petitioner was permitted by the private
respondents to continue possessing and working on the
same land, even after the sale, upon the request of the
private respondents themselves because they were then
busy in their palay business.
In due time, the parties went to trial which culminated
in the rendition by the court a quo of its decision of
November 14, 1986, in favor of the plaintiffs (now the
private respondents), disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the absolute and registered
owners of the land in question covered by and described in
OCT No. P-6924 (Free Patent NO. 576411) of the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Occidental
Mindoro;
(b) Ordering defendant and all persons claiming under him
to remove their respective houses constructed thereon, and
to deliver the possession of the land in question together
with all the improvements thereon unto the plaintiffs;
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5, 000. 00 as and for attorneys fees; and
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Cayme was the real
owner in possession of the agricultural land.
Held:
Yes. The defendant-appellants grantor or
predecessor in interest (Severo Rodil) took possession of
the property, subject matter of the litigation, on April 1955
(Exhibit F for the plaintiff-appellees and exhibit 5 for the
defendant). Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed
on February 25, 1985,[23] the requirement of at least thirty
years continuous possession has not been complied with
even if We were to tack Rodils period of possession. xxx[24]
As found by the lower court below, petitioner had
admitted,[25] contrary to his disclaimer, that the possession
of the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his
supposed title, commenced only in April 1955. Petitioner
can not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission
which he has resolutely repudiated in his present
petition.[26] Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of petitioners
submission that subject land has ipso jure become his
private property.
The court has found that the petitioner is a person
whose credibility is much in doubt. On the other hand, the
respondents Leonora and Simeon Cayme to be
straightforward and credible. She has convincingly shown
to this court, through her testimony and the supporting
documentary evidence, that she is in fact the rightful owner
of the property in dispute.
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA
ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT,
MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG,
LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO
MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA
MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO, respondents.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under
partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to
them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
allotted to another party.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession and damages alleging that they are the owners
of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639
which was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas
and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to
subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted. Then in
1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying
rentals therefore. They likewise built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped
paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and
that the respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-
owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in 1946
and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from
questioning the title to partition.
HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected
to take under partition, and who took possession of the
portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the
title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents
already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch
plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed.
They cannot now be heard to question the possession and
ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive
possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch
plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents'
possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner
thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges
in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the
time the present action was commenced. Petition was
granted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by Romeo T. Acosta
(formerly Jose D. Malvas),
Director of Forest Management
Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources,
Petitioners,
-versus-
HON. NORMELITO J.
BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge,
Branch 41,
Regional Trial Court,
Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro and DANILO
REYES,
Respondents.
FACTS: Danilo Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500
sq.m. at Brgy Banus, Pimanalayan, Oriental Mindoro from
Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced
improvements and planted Mangoes, Mandarin citrus, and
Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land transferred in his
name. Unfortunately, It turned out that the subject land is
part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and therefore,
not subject to any disposition or acquisition under any
existing law and is not transferable.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of
petitioner, filed a complaint for “ Cancellation of Title and/or
Revision” that the issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
is spurious, fictitious, and irregularly issued on account of
the subject title was part of the Timberland of Oriental
Mindoro per Bureau of Forest Department (BFD) Land
Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the
140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No.
175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte; that the subject land
cannot be subject of any disposition or acquisition under
the law.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that Reyes TCT No.
45238 are null and void and ordered to surrender the
owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the
premises. Reyes then appealed the RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeal (CA), apparently, Motion for
Reconsideration was DENIED.
Thus, on February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion[11] to
Remove Improvements Introduced by Defendant Danilo D.
Reyes on the Property which is the Subject of Execution in
Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (motion).[12] There he
averred that: he occupied in good faith the subject land for
around thirty years; he had already spent millions of pesos
in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and he employed
many workers who regularly took care of the trees and
other plants.
RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed
Joint Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39,
Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the Republic should pay Reyes the
value of the Improvements he introduced on the property.
Held: Danilo Reyes was in possession of the land since
1970. Article 524 states that possession may be exercised
in one’s own name or in that of another. And Reyes made
improvements thereon which must be given the opportunity
to enjoy the fruits of his labor on the land which he honestly
believes was legally his. He was not aware that his
certificate of title which was derived from OCT No. P-2388
issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of
Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he
would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of
being ejected from the land and losing all improvements
thereon. Any way, if the court will grant the motion for the
defendants (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements
on the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto
Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it, he will immensely
[benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
Petition DENIED and DIRECTED the RTC to
determines the actual improvements introduced on the
subject land, their current value and the amount of the
expenses actually spent by Reyes and DIRECTED the
DENR-BFD to pay private respondent the value of such
actual improvements he introduced on the subject land.
G.R. No. 194538 November 27, 2013
MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights
and interests under him, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the
registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the
Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
City.[7] The property has a total land area of 156 hectares
and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name
of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007)
15807.[8] The lot that Moreto Millarosa (petitioner) presently
occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles
above-mentioned.
On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D.
293),[10] which invalidated the titles of respondent and
declared them open for disposition to the members of the
Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).
Memorandum Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this
Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab
initio.
On 29 January 1988, P.D. 293 declared to be
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts citing the
case of Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-
in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National
Treasurer[14] (Tuason). On 17 February 1988, the Register
of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on
respondent's title,[15] eventually restoring respondent's
ownership of the entire property.
Issue:
Whether or not Moreto Millarosa was not in
possession of the land and is not a builder of good faith.
Held:
Yes. With the determination of who was the lawful
and registered owner of the property in question, the owner
necessarily enjoyed or had a better right to the possession
and enjoyment there.[34] Hence, petitioner had no right to
the continued possession of the property.[35] Neither could
he be considered a builder in good faith who could avail
himself of the benefits under Article 448 of the Civil
Code.[36] From the moment P.D. 293 was declared
unconstitutional and the title to the property restored to
respondent, petitioner could no longer claim good
faith.[37] Thus, as provided under Article 449, petitioner
loses what he would be building, planting, or sowing without
right of indemnity from that time. Upon perusal of the
records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in
good faith. A builder in good faith is "one who builds with
the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by
some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant
of any defect or flaw in his title."[67] Since petitioner only
started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his
predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor),
or about seven years after Tuason Ruling was
promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding
effect of that ruling Furthermore, Respondent Carmel
Development Inc. retained its ownership over the said land.
G.R. No. L-13343 December 29, 1962
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SOFRONIO FRANCISCO as Administrator of the Estate
of MAXIMO FRANCISCO, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Exequiel Ampil, now deceased, was the registered
owner of the land in question under Original Certificate of
Title No. 2497 issued way back on May 25, 1918, Exhibit B-
1. On March 24, 1924, Exequiel Ampil executed a deed of
sale covering the land in favor of defendant Maximo
Francisco for the sum of P1,500, Exhibit 4. Sometime
thereafter, the defendant took possession of the premises
which, upon his death, was continued by his heirs up to the
present, publicly and in the concept of owner.
October 21, 1933, Exequiel Ampil was indebted to
various creditors, to wit: (1) China Banking Corporation —
P11,995.00, (2) Philippine National Bank — P9,000.00, (3)
Don Wenceslao Trinidad — P10,000.00, total —
P31,395.00. The payment of this indebtedness was
guaranteed by the plaintiff Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., on the
date Exequiel Ampil executed a document entitled "Venta
Condicional", Exhibit D-1 which was the conveyance to be
absolute upon the fulfillment of certain conditions specified
therein.
On December 10, 1936, plaintiff filed an affidavit
consolidating ownership over the land in question together
with five other parcels by virtue of the fact that the
conditional sale of October 21, 1933 between him and
Ampil had become absolute (Exhibits C and C-1).
Issue: Whether or not Sofronio Francisco has not acted in
bad faith in taking a possession over the said land.
Held:
The trial court adjudged plaintiff the rightful owner
of the disputed land and ordered defendant to deliver its
possession to him, but found defendant to be a possessor
in good faith and hence free from liability for damages.
Francisco was then and for a long time had been in
possession of the land, and there can be no question that
for purposes of such possession the deed of sale marked
Exhibit 4 was a good and sufficient title. It appears that in
spite of the consolidation of ownership in appellant and the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title in his name in 1937,
he never attempted to exercise possessory rights over the
property or paid taxes thereon, nor did he demand its
possession from appellee. The judgment appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendant-appellee, as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Maximo
Francisco, is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
P200.00 yearly, starting from 1951 until the restoration of
the possession of the land to said appellant.
[G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES
TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S.
PIEDA, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent spouses Pieda (PIEDAS) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 11-14-1-14)
situated at barangay Astorga Dumarao, Capiz containing
an area of 238,406 square meters, more or less, and
covered by Homestead Patent No. 0844 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1930. On March 7, 1972, the
PIEDAS mortgaged the above described parcel of land to
petitioner, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to
secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00.
The PIEDAS failed to comply with the terms and conditions
of the mortgage compelling DBP to extrajudicially foreclose
on February 2, 1977. The PIEDAS offered to redeem the
foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 as partial
redemption payment and this amount was accepted by
DBP. DBP sent the PIEDAS another letter informing them
that pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer to redeem and/or
repurchase the subject property could not be favorably
considered for the reason that said property was tenanted.
However, Acting Register of Deeds of Capiz through
Ramon Buenaflor ordering DBP to cancel and restore the
title in the name of the PIEDAS.
On December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed the
instant complaint against DBP for cancellation of certificate
of title and/or specific performance, accounting and
damages. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS
stating that DBP violated the stipulation in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale which provided that the redemption
period is five (5) years from the registration thereof in
consonance with Section 119[9] of CA No. 141[10]. DBP
should therefore assume liability for the fruits that said
property produced from said land considering that it
prematurely took possession thereof.
DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not DBP was a possessor in good faith.
Held: Yes. DBP also alleges that the mere fact that DBP
took possession and administration of the property does not
warrant a finding that DBP was in bad faith. First, records
show that the PIEDAS consented to and approved the
takeover of DBP. Second, Sec. 7[17] of Act No.
3135[18] allows the mortgagee-buyer to take possession of
the mortgaged property even during the redemption
period. Third, DBPs act of consolidating the title of the
property in its name does not constitute bad faith as there is
no law which prohibits the purchaser at public auction from
consolidating title in its name after the expiration of the one
(1) year redemption period reckoned from the time the
Certificate of Sale was registered; and neither is there any
law or jurisprudence which prohibits the PIEDAS from
exercising their right of redemption over said property within
five (5) years even if title is consolidated in the name of the
purchaser. DBP also could not have been in bad faith when
it denied the PIEDAS offer to redeem the property since the
denial was premised on Opinion No. 92 of the Minister of
Justice series of 1978 which stated that said land was
covered under P.D. 27 and could not be the subject of
foreclosure proceedings.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw,
which invalidates it.[23] Good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof.[24] It was therefore incumbent on
the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its
title i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure. This, they failed to do.
Citing the case of Maneclang vs. Baun,[34] the court held
that when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is
entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it held
the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor
ceases when an action to recover possession of the
property is filed against him and he is served summons
therefore.[35] In the present case, DBP was served
summons on June 30, 1982.[36] By that time, it was no
longer in possession of the disputed land as possession
thereof was given back to the PIEDAS after the foreclosure
of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982.
G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL.,
defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died
intestate, leaving several parcels of land containing 7,401
square meters more or less. She was survived by her
husband Severo Maneclang and 9 children. On July 30,
1947, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by
Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with
the Court of First Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan. At
the time of the filing of the petition, 7 of her 9 children were
below the age of 18 but no guardian ad litem was appointed
by the court for the minor children.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the
administrator of the intestate estate filed a petition asking
the court to give him the authority to dispose of so much of
the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated
in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the
surviving spouse, SeveroManeclang, through his
counsel, Atty. TeofiloGuadiz, no such notice was sent
to the heirs of Margarita.
On September 9, 1949, despite the absence of notice to the
heirs, the intestate court issued an Order granted
Feliciano’s petition.
Following the order Oscar Maneclang, the new
administrator executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of
Dagupan, represented by its mayor, a portion consisting of
4,415 square meters of the lot. This sale was approved by
the intestate court on 15 March 1954.
The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the
land and constructed thereon a public market. It has been
in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property
since the construction of the market. Some other parcels of
land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
administrator pursuant of the same authority previously
granted.
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administrator of
the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of
the late Margarita filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales
made by the previous administrator pursuant to the
order cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and
damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and
AmparoBaun, etc and the City of Dagupan.
Issue: Whether or not City of Dagupan was a
possessor in good faith and may retain its possession
over the said land.
Held:
Yes, but only until to recover the the amounts of
P100,000.00 (the cost of Perez Public Market) and
P6,493.05 (5/9 of the purchase price of the property). It was
not incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out
if indeed there was a valid motion for authority to sell.
Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied upon by the
parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in
good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it;
furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith. Accordingly, its
possession in good faith must be considered to have lasted
up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled
to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation
to pay rental to the intestate of Margarita for the use
thereof.
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City
of Dagupan may retain possession of the property until it
shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the building in
the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price
amounting to P6,493.05
ARTICLE 528
G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991
IGNACIO WONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL
MERCADO, respondents.

Possession in good faith ceases once defects in title are
made known to the possessor by extraneous evidence or
by suit for recovery by the owner; interruption takes place
upon service of summons.
FACTS:
Mr. Giger sold to Plaintiff Mr. Mercado a piece of property
(situated at Colongan, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) for the
price of P3,500 under the terms of a pacto de retro.
Mr.Mercado paid land taxes and planted coconut trees but
failed to erect signs of occupancy, nor did he establish a
hut. He spent much of his time away at his place of
business where he ran a store. He visited the land
occasionally only to make copra. Other than this, the place
resembled a ghost town.
Mr Wong happened to chance upon the land, and finding
no one occupying the same, purchased the property from
Mr. Giger. Thereupon, he obtained a TCT, established a
hut, populated the place with laborers and fenced the
property.
Mr. Mercado returned to the property and was dismayed to
find his land occupied. He had the incident blottered and
filed for forcible entry against Mr. Wong. He also demanded
rentals. Unfortunately, the MTC ruled in favor of Mr. Wong,
stating that the latter was in open, actual, prior and
continuous possession. On appeal, the CFI reversed and
ruled for Mr. Mercado stating that he had taken possession
of the property much earlier and that Mr. Wong is the actual
intruder. Mr. Wong took the case to the CA which ruled
against him.
(interesting note: Wong says Mercado was a mere laborer
who was tolerated to gather fruits. How thick faced is that?)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ignacio Wong was a possessor in good
faith.
HELD:No.
It is clear that possession passed from vendor William
Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of
the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later
sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass
the possession of the property because there is an
impediment — the possession exercised by private
respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. It should be noted that possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in
the case and from the moment facts exist which show that
the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code). Possession
in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title
are made known to the possessors, by extraneous
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it
can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the
defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be
considered sufficient to show bad faith.
A perusal of the records of the case shows that
petitioner received private respondent's complaint for
forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo,
p. 46). His good faith therefore ceased on November
29,1976. Accordingly, the computation of the payment of
monthly rental should start from December, 1976, instead
of August, 1976.
G.R. No. L-32531 August 31, 1977
JOSE O. BARRIOS (deceased) (substituted by son
Joselito Barrios), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HERACLEO B. VILLACIN, JR.
and VICENTE B. VILLACIN, respondents.
Facts: A certain Lorenzo Montano was the original
registered owner of a large tract of land with an area of
188,212 sq. meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Mabini
Cadiz, Negros Occidental. However, prior to March 25,
1960, the area in controversy was part of the forestal zone
andon the same day was released from the forestal zone
and declared part of the disposable patrimony of the State.
A certain Graciano Lamis entered the same and from then
on, was known to be in continuous and uninterrupted
possession and occupation thereof, continuing the
cultivation of the land begun by the Alegres (defendants in
Civil Case No. 223).
On September 6, 1962, Lorenzo Montano sold her
land to the petitioner herein as a consequence of which her
Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33012 was issued in the
name of petitioner, Jose O. Barrios, by the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental. On the other hand, Lamis also
sold all his rights and interests in the controverted area and
all the improvements found therein to respondents Villacins,
the sale being unsupported by any kind of evidence of title
of the vendor, Lamis.
Petitioner received information that his land was
being sold by one Valentine Botas, whom he erroneously
thought to be the vendor, to Mayor Heracleo Villacin, Sr. of
Cadiz City and the father of herein respondents. Petitioner
thru his lawyer, sent a letter to Mayor Villacin informing the
later of the true ownership of the land.
There being non-compliance with said demand,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 472 before the Municipal
Court against the Mayor for forcible entry. The inferior Court
dismissed the complaint upon agreement of the parties and
for the purpose of filing the proper pleading before the
competent court. Hence, this appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in in holding the
respondent buyers and possessors in good faith of the land
in dispute.
Held: Several facts, as disclosed by the records and taken
together, are reasonably suspicious to have put the
respondents Villacins in inquiry as to the alleged rights of
the vendor, Lamis, over the area in controversy.
Firstly, when respondents bought the land from Lamis, the
latter could not and did not at any time produce any title or
application to said land.
Well settled is the rule that,
The law protects to a greater degree a
purchaser who buys from the registered
owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a
higher degree of prudence from one who
buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered.
While one who buys from the registered
owner does not have to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one
who is not the registered owner is
expected to examine not only the
Certificate of Title bull all factual
circumstances necessary, for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the
title of the transferor, or in his capacity to
transfer the land.
Secondly, petitioner sent letters to the father of the
respondents informing him of the true ownership of the
aforesaid land.
Thirdly, respondents herein knew of the case of forcible
entry brought by petitioner against their father, Mayor
Villacin, Sr., under the impression that the latter was the
vendee, such knowledge was a warning to them.
Considering these facts, We are constrained to hold that
the respondents cannot now come to this Court claiming
the benefit of being purchasers of registered land in good
faith. Article 528 is clear: Possession acquired in good faith
does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.
the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and another one is entered declaring the Villacins to be
purchasers s and possessors n bad faith without tight to
limit to that built planted or sown by them on the land,
further ordering said respondents to restore, possession of
the land to the petitioner and to pay to the petitioner
liquidated damages in the amount of P18,000.00 per year
beginning 1964 until the time same is restored to the
possession of the respondent's Villacin's shall also pay the
petitioner the amount of P3,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees plus costs.
G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: Facts: That on or about August132004, or prior
thereto, in Las PiñasCity, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with each other,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY
YU by applying a credit card from METROBANK CARD
CORPORATION, using the name of complainant Henry
C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently
obtained from him, and which credit card in the name
of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to
said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of
Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry
Yu.The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484 (Access Device
Regulation Act of 1998).On appeal,the CA affirmed
petitioner’s conviction.Petitioner assails the validity of the
Information and claims that he was not informed of the
accusation against him. He explains that though he was
charged with “possession of an access device fraudulently
applied for,” the act of “possession,” which is the gravamen
of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
Issue: Whether or not the Information is valid
considering the act of “possession,” which is the gravamen
of the offense, was not alleged in the Information
Held:In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly
stated that the accused is petitioner “Mark Soledad y
Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur.” It was also specified in
the preamble of the Information that he was being
charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e)
for possessing a counterfeit access device or access
device fraudulently applied for. In the accusatory portion
thereof, the acts constituting the offense were clearly
narrated in that “*petitioner+, together with other persons*,+
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private
complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access
device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank
Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry
C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained
from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry
Yu was successfully issued, and delivered tosaid
accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry
Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.”
Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was
private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was
committed on or about the 13th day of August 2004 in the
City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained
all the necessary details of the offense committed,
sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by
respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, although the word “possession”
was not used in the accusatory portion of the Information,
the word “possessing” appeared in its preamble or the first
paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, he was apprised that he was being charged
with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e)
thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently
applied for.
Even if the word “possession” was not repeated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, the acts
constituting it were clearly described in the statement “*that
the+ credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully
issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious
identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu.” Without a doubt, petitioner
was given the necessary data as to why he was being
prosecuted.

SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA
RUMARATE; deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is
represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely,
ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA
RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO
RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE, MERLINDA
RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA
RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ,
SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ,
LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA
HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO, RODRIGOHERNANDEZ,
BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES HERNANDEZ-
CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-
CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
Facts: Spouses Rumarate filed an action for re-
conveyance of real property and quieting of title against the
Heirs of Spouses Hernandez. Rumarate averred that
Santiago Guerrero orally bequeathed his rights over a lot to
him in 1929. Thereafter, took possession of the land, built a
house and planted on it. A quitclaim was also executed by
Santiago in their favor in 1960. In 1970, Rumarate
discovered that Spouses Hernandez were able to obtain a
title over the disputed lot but he did not file a case
immediately. The respondent Heirs of Hernandez claimed
that Santiago sold the lot to them in 1964 but were not able
to take possession of the land
G.R. No. 147549 October 23, 2003
JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA
ROSA, petitioners,
vs.
SANTIAGO CARLOS and TEOFILA
PACHECO, respondents.
Facts:
Dela Rosa filed a complaint for forcible entry, alleging that
they are the owners of a house and lot in Bulacan by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Dela Rosa
and Carlos. They also asserted that they renovated the
house and occupied it from 1996 to present, and that they
built a fence to separate the property from the road.
Subsequently however, Carlos built a house of strong
materials on a vacant lot of the property through stealth and
without their knowledge and consent. On the other hand,
respondents averred that they had been occupying the lot
in the concept of a co- owner since birth.
Issue:
Whether or not Dela Rosa were in possession of property
notwithstanding their absence from the same.
Held.
Yes, Dela Rosa were in possession of property. In a
forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere
physical or material possession (possession de facto) and
not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership
of the property involved.
In the case at bar, Dela Rosa continued visiting the
property even if they resided in Manila, and that constitutes
maintenance of possession. Improving the house were also
acts of dominion indicating possession
[G.R. No. 128177. August 15, 2001]
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA
ABALOS, respondents.
Facts: · Adriano Soriano originally owned a 24,550 square
meter land in Pangasinan. Such property was leased to
Spouses de Vera for 15 years and Adriano†™s son,
Roman was caretaker thereof. · When Adriano died, his
heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement which subdivided
the land into two lots: Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot
No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs
of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca,
Librada, Elocadio and Roman. · In 1971, Spouses Abalos
acquired Lot 60052 (sold by Lourdes, Candido and the
heirs of Dionisia) and ¾ of Lot/ 8459 (sold by Elocadio,
Francisca and Librada). · In 1968, the de Vera spouses
ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker. Roman then filed a
case with the agrarian court for reinstatement and
reliquidation; however, the agrarian court approved his
ejectment. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, agrarian
court†™s decision was reversed. · But prior to the
execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a
post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the
termination of the lease in 1982. The agrarian court
approved such agreement. · In 1976, Spouses Abalos
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan
an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052
and three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459. The
trial court granted their application. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. On petition for review filed with the
Supreme Court by Roman Soriano, it was denied for lack of
merit. · On July 15, 1983, Roman filed with the RTC an
action for annulment of document and/or redemption,
ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
159568. Spouses Abalos moved to dismiss on the grounds
of red judicata among others but was denied. · In 1984,
11 years after the approval of the post-decisional
agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de
Vera, Spouses Abalos (substituting Spouses de Vera) filed
with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-
decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to
sub-lease the property. Roman moved to suspend but was
denied. Roman filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. · Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985
and he was represented by his heirs. · Civil Case No.
159568 was amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-
defendant for having purchased part of the property from
Spouses Abalos. But the amended complaint was
dismissed as such altered the cause of action. Upon
reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and Spouses
Abalos were ordered to file their Answer. Spouses filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals docketed as C.A. GR SP No. 22149. · Court of
Appeals denied Roman†™s petition for certiorari. His
heirs then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. 93401. · In 1990, the
Court of Appeals also denied the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Spouses Abalos, ruling the land
registration court did not err to refuse the rule of res
judicata. Spouses Abalos then filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. 99843.
· In 1991, the Supreme Court held in G.R. 93401to grant
the petition filed by the Heirs of Roman. · On June 22,
1993, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the denial
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR SP No. 22149, and
consequently, Civil Case No. 15958Â for annulment of
document and/or redemption, ownership and damages,
was ordered dismissed. · On October 18, 1993, Heirs of
Roman filed with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication
Board DARAB cases for †œSecurity of Tenure with
prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary
Injunction†•. · The decision of the land registration
court was partially executed: Lot No. 8459-A assigned to
Heirs of Roman, and Lots No. 60052 and 8459-B assigned
to Spouses Abalos. Heirs of Roman appealed to CA. CA
affirmed the partition but reversed order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of pendency
of Civil Case No. 15958. · On November 15, 1993, the
trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 99843, dismissed Civil Case No. 15958.
Spouses Abalos then moved for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in
possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. However,
said motion was held in abeyance until and after DARAB
Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer for
status quo, has been resolved.
Issue: Whether Spouses Abalos having won the land
registration case can effectively eject Heirs of Roman who
are possessors thereof, whose security of tenure rights are
still pending determination before the DARAB?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that a judgment in a
land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are
still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case
cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being
occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant,
pending a declaration that the latter†™s occupancy was
unlawful. While the issue of ownership of the subject land
has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land
registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet,
controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the
security of tenure case filed by Heirs of Roman before the
DARAB. Although private respondents have been declared
titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights
of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed
by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation.
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and
they have the right to work on their respective landholdings
once the leasehold relationship is established. The exercise
of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the
rights of an agricultural tenant. However, the status as
tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping
with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether
petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited
by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the
right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other
persons from possession thereof. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled
to possession. The possession may be in the hands of
another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have
improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived
without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to
resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership,
therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident.
[G.R. No. 82680. August 13, 1994.]
NICANOR SOMODIO, Petitioner, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA and FELOMINO
AYCO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a
Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mangubat, the
possession of a residential lot located at General Santos
City. Nicanor Somodio, petitioner, contributed one-half of
the purchase price. Mabugat then executed an Affidavit of
Trust expressly recognizing the right of Somodio over ½
undivided portion of the lot.
Somodio and Mabugat partitioned the property into two
portions, with the former taking the western part. After the
partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and
planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees, and other fruit
bearing trees.

He also began construction of a structure with a dimension
of 22 by 18 feet on his lot. Due to his work, he was
transferred to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and left the
unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. Somodio
allowed Ayco, respondent to transfer his hut to petitioner’s
lot.
Somodio demanded Ayco to vacate the premises but to no
avail. He then filed an action for unlawful detainer with
damages before the MTC. Another respondent, Purisima
entered the land and constructed a house thereon.
Somodio then filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
latter.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Somodio finding
that Purisima built a house “almost on the spot where
Somodio’s unfinished house” stood through “stealth and
strategy”. The MTC also held that Somodio was the actual
possessor of the lot in question.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. CA on the other
hand, dismissed petition of Somodio and held that the latter
did not “clearly and conclusively established physical, prior
possession over the lot.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property? (only issue in ejectment cases)
RULING:
Anyone who can prove prior possession de facto (physical
possession) may recover such possession even from the
owner himself. This is true regardless of the character of a
party’s possession provided he has in his favor priority of
time entitling him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accrdg. to Art. 531 of NCC, possession is acquired by
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right.
Somodio then enjoyed priority of possession because
Purisima entered the lot only in 1983 which is later than
Somodio’s possession fo the property.
In addition, Somodio’s possession over the property is not
synonymous with his right of ownership over the same.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. The MTC and
RTC’s decision are deemed reinstated.
[G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004]
COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and EDDIE
GUEVARRA, respondents.
Facts:
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo)
paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a
250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon
City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light
materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the
house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent
Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or
agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra
would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the
house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate
the premises on Pajuyos demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his
need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the
house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31
(MTC).
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no
valid title or right of possession over the lot where the
house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set
aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing.
Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to
September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate
with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has
valid title to the lot.
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered
its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the
MTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering
the latter to:
A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the
defendant or any other person or persons
claiming any right under him;
B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as
reasonable compensation for the use of the
premises starting from the last demand;
C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by
way of attorneys fees; and
D) pay the cost of suit.
Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC). the RTC affirmed
the MTC decision. Guevarra received the RTC decision on
29 November 1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December
1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of
filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed
with the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for
extension). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure
questions of law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme
Court received the motion for extension on 13 December
1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
 Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for
review because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was
Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the
certification against forum-shopping.
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Pajuyo has the better right to
possess the disputed property.
Held: Yes. Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior
possession of the lot and ownership of the house built on
it. Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due
execution of the Kasunduan. Based on the Kasunduan,
Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house and lot
free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to maintain
the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to
vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra
broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to
vacate. Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the
sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter.
Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a
contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra
insists that the contract is void.
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even
between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into
the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn
the Kasunduan after he had benefited from
it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of
determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right
to physical possession of the contested
property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of
Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical
possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad
faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different
result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate.
Pajuyos absence did not affect his actual possession
of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.[77] One may acquire possession not only by
physical occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of ones will.[78]Actual or physical
occupation is not always necessary.[79]
[G.R. No. 148191. November 25, 2003]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
Solidbank filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns
reflecting gross receipts amounting to P1,474,693.44. It
alleged that the total included P350,807,875.15
representing gross receipts from passive income which was
already subjected to 20%final withholding tax (FWT).
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held in Asian Ban Corp. v
Commissioner, that the 20% FWT should not form part of
its taxable gross receipts for purposes of computing the tax.
Solidbank, relying on the strength of this decision, filed with
the BIR a letter-request for the refund or tax credit. It also
filed a petition for review with the CTA where the it ordered
the refund.
The CA ruling, however, stated that the 20% FWT did not
form part of the taxable gross receipts because the FWT
was not actually received by the bank but was directly
remitted to the government.
The Commissioner claims that although the FWT was not
actually received by Solidbank, the fact that the amount
redounded to the bank’s benefit makes it part of the taxable
gross receipts in computing the Gross Receipts Tax.
Solidbank says the CA ruling is correct.
Issue:
Whether or not the FWT forms part of the gross receipts
tax.
Held:
Yes. In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer,
the person on whom the tax is imposed. The payor, a
separate entity, acts as no more than an agent of the
government for the collection of tax in order to ensure its
payment. This amount that is used to settle the tax liability
is sourced from the proceeds constitutive of the tax base.
These proceeds are either actual or constructive. Both
parties agree that there is no actual receipt by the bank.
What needs to be determined is if there is constructive
receipt. Since the payee is the real taxpayer, the rule on
constructive receipt can be rationalized.
The Court applied provisions of the Civil Code on actual
and constructive possession. Article 531 of the Civil Code
clearly provides that the acquisition of the right of
possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities
established. The withholding process is one such
act. There may not be actual receipt of the income
withheld; however, as provided for in Article 532,
possession by any person without any power shall be
considered as acquired when ratified by the person in
whose name the act of possession is executed.
In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by
the payor as the withholding agent of the government,
because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for
the government. There is thus constructive receipt.
The processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest
on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes that are
subjected to FWT are tantamount to delivery, receipt or
remittance. Besides, Solidbank admits that its income is
subjected to a tax burden immediately upon “receipt”,
although it claims that it derives no pecuniary benefit or
advantage through the withholding process.
There being constructive receipt, part of which is withheld,
that income is included as part of the tax base on which the
gross receipts tax is imposed.
G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his
Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
Facts: The Facts
On October 30, 2007, petitioner AnacletoMangaser,
represented by his attorney-in-fact, EustaquioDugenia
(petitioner), tiled a complaint for Forcible Entry with
Damages against respondent DionisioUgay (respondent)
before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC).
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the
registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated
in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632
square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-
13787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on
October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent
stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by
constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the
Office of LupongTagapamayapa for conciliation, but no
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action
was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were
sent to respondent but he still refused to vacate the
premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial
remedy.[3]
Respondent denied the material allegations of the
complaint and put up the following defenses, to wit: that he
had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since
birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started
occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta.
Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land
was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union
due to a survey made by the government; that he
introduced more improvements on the property by
cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a
"bahaykubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a fence
made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the
fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments which he
knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's
property; that while he could not locate some of the
monuments, he based the boundaries on his recollection
since he was around when these were installed; that he
knew the boundaries of petitioner's property because he
knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a
company on the said property; that petitioner was never in
actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it
was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the
alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that be
refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite
receipt of the demand letters because in his letter-reply, he
assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the
premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into
petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to
him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him,
petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the
MTC.[4]
MTC Ruling
On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent[5].
It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to
prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot
titled under OCT No. RP-174 ( 13789).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court
of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was raffled to
Branch 33.
In its August 23, 2011 Decision,[8] the RTC reversed the
MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner.
Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Citing Quizon v. Juan,[14] it emphasized that petitioner
must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute. The word
"possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was
not in physical possession despite the presentation of the
OCT No. RP-174( 13789) and his tax declarations.[15] It
reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in
forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or
possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de
jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his
prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that
the RTC misquoted Nuñez v. SLTEAS
PheonixSolutions[16] by giving the wrong notion of what
kind of possession was contemplated in forcible entry
cases. In other words, physical possession was the crux in
forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon
ownership.[17]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] dated July
6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by the CA in a
Resolution,[20] dated December 5, 2012.
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF 0WNERSHIP OF
PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR
POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY BY HEREIN
PETITIONER.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.[22]
Held:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege
and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of
the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession
either by force, intimidation, threat. strategy or stealth; and,
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of the physical possession of the property.[28]
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits
indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure
or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an
ejectment
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are
acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, inscription of
possessory information titles and the like.[33] The reason
for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession.[34] It is sufficient that petitioner was able to
subject the property to the action of his will.[35] Here,
respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these
circumstances. He could not even say that the subject
property was leased to him except that he promised that he
would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the
boundaries of the titled lot.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner
acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act,
specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration
with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.[38]
Before the Court continues any further, it must be
determined first whether the issue of ownership is material
and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The
Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of
possession if the question of possession is intertwined with
the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an
exception and is allowed only in this limited instance to
determine the issue of possession and only if the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership.[39]
This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership
should be provisionally determined in this case. First, the
juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner
arise would be the registration of the free patent and the
issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the
Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second,
respondent also asserts ownership over the land based on
his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive
and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the
property in dispute.[40] Because there are conflicting claims
of ownership, then it is proper to provisionally determine the
issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession de
facto.
Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA
that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax
declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The
issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner
evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession
of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a
person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled
to the possession thereof.[41]
Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax
declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or constructive possession.[42] Together
with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995
onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of
possession over the land before his dispossession on
October 31, 2006 by respondent.
The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v.
Lacaba[43] to support its ruling. In that case, the
respondent tried to prove prior possession, by presenting
only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification tl·om
the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real
property tax from previous years. The Court did not give
credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty
tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. The
situation in the present case differs because aside from
presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted
OCT No. RP-174(13789) which is the best evidence of
ownership from where his right to possession arises.
Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner,
the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand
on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of ownership,
the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of
the subject property.
When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of
respondent over his registered property, he immediately
filed a complaint with the LupongTagapamayapa and
subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands and forcefully
expelling respondent from his property, petitioner
composed himself and followed the established legal
procedure to regain possession of his land.
If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and
disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it
would create an absurd situation. It would be putting
premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title
holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to
register their land, and who religiously paid real property
taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their
properties simply because they have to prove their literal
and physical possession of their property prior to the
controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort
to ordinary civil procedure by filing either an
accionpubliciana or accionreinvidicatoria and undergo
arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders
continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's
land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary
procedure of an action for forcible entry.
The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to
prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to
compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to
the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Ejectment
proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can
speedily settle actions to recover possession because of
the overriding need to quell sociaI disturbances.[44]
As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry,
the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner had
sufficiently complied with them. Petitioner proved that he
was deprived of possession of the property by stealth. The
complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the
one year reglementary period counted from the discovery of
the stealthy entry by respondent to the property on October
31, 2006
[G.R. No. 126863. January 16, 2003]
SPOUSES NAPOLEON L. GAZA and EVELYN GAZA,
SPOUSES RENATO PETIL and MELY PETIL,
BRGY. SEC. VICTORIO A. CONDUCTO and
BRGY. TANOD ARTURO ALAON, petitioners,
vs. RAMON J. LIM and AGNES J.
LIM, respondents.
Facts: On February 20, 1961, Napoleon Gaza purchased a
parcel of land with an area of 5,270 square meters located
in Barangay Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon, from Angeles
Vda. de Urrutia. Thereafter, Napoleon Gaza and his wife
Evelyn engaged in the lumber and copra business. They
padlocked the gates of the property, leaving it to the care of
Numeriano Ernesto. When he died in 1991, spouses Gaza
designated Renato Petil as the new caretaker of the land.
On the other hand, Ramon and Agnes Lim, both
half-siblings of Napoleon Gaza, claimed that they have
used the same lot for their lumber and copra business.
They designated Emilio Herrera as caretaker of the
property.
According to Napoleon Gaza, the siblings Ramon
and Agnes Lim and Emilio Herrera, entered the property by
breaking the lock of the main gate. Thereafter, they
occupied a room on the second floor of the warehouse
without the consent of Renato Petil who was then outside
the premises.
For their part, Ramon and Agnes Lim
maintain that on November 28, 1993, spouses Gaza
detained Emilio Herrera and his daughter inside the
compound and destroyed the padlocks of the gates. On
December 13, 1993, Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauag, Quezon an action
for forcible entry against spouses Napoleon and Evelyn
Gaza. Spouses Gaza filed with the same court their answer
with compulsory counterclaim. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), affirmed the MTC Decision with
modification to dismiss the complaint and counterclaim.
Aggrieved Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review. In its Decision, the
Court of Appeals[4]reversed and set aside the Decision of
the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing
to rule that there was no implied admission on the part of
petitioners that private respondents had been in prior and
actual physical possession of subject property since 1975.
Held: Petitioners possession of the property has been
sufficiently established by evidence. The title to the property
(TCT No. T-47263) is in the name of petitioner Napoleon
Gaza. On record is a deed of sale showing that he bought
the land in 1961 from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Petitioner
also presented receipts of payment of realty taxes. A
disinterested witness, Barangay Secretary Victorio
Conducto of Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon, in his Affidavit
attached to the instant petition,[16] stated that since 1968,
spouses Gaza have been in possession of the property and
that respondents never occupied the property even for
business purposes. Upon the closure of their business,
petitioners designated Numeriano Ernesto and Renato Petil
as caretakers of the lot whom acquired the same
possession Article 532 of the CC states that “possession
may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by
his legal representative, by his agent, or by any person
without any power whatever;”. Where a dispute over
possession arises between two persons, the person first
having actual possession is the one who is entitled to
maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere
usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the
property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered
off, could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible
entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion might
have been.[22]
In this case, evidence clearly shows that the
petitioners are the true owners and, therefore, the lawful
possessors of the land. Verily, respondents allegation of
actual possession and that petitioners deprived them of
such possession by means of force, intimidation and threat
are clearly untenable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 160145
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
PEDRO O. ENCISO, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 11, 2005
Facts: on April 24, 2000, the respondent, alleging to
be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential land
located in Barangay South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales,
filed a petition for land registration before the RTC of Iba,
Zambales. Respondent averred the said property is not
tenanted or occupied by any person other than the
respondent and his family who are in actual physical
possession of the same; and the respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, peaceful,
open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for not less than 30
granting the application despite his failure to prove
years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the registrable title over Lot No. 2278-A.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application on the following grounds: (a) neither the
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and The CA disposed of the appeal on September 26, 2003 and
occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any muniment affirmed the decision of the trial court.
of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to
prove bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or its Issue: Whether or not CA erred a question of law in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and granting respondents petition for registration sans any
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, showing that the subject property was previously declared
1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax declaration alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
adverted to in the application does not appear to be
genuine and the tax declarations indicate such possession
to be of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee Held: Applicants for registration of title must
simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the respondent considering that he failed to therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by
P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of the the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
which is not subject to private appropriation. and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that
the property was declared for taxation purposes in his
name. Took possession of the property and constructed a
house thereon. On March 8, 1969, the Municipality of
and notorious possession and occupation of the same
Masinloc, Zambales passed supplementary Resolution No.
102,[10] which stated that in consideration of the financial
assistance extended by the abutting property owners, and under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
because the government no longer needed the additional
areas for public use, authorizing its mayor to execute a immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that
deed of sale in favor of Honorato Edao. Immediately
thereafter, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales,
represented by its Mayor, P.A. Edao, executed a Deed of the land sought to be registered was originally part of the
Absolute Sale[12] covering a piece of reclaimed land
containing more or less 2,790 square meters in favor of reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of
Honorato Edao. Respondent further narrated that on
December 9, 1980, the spouses Honorato and Esperanza
Edao happened to be the uncle of the respondent sold the Masinloc, Zambales. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed
lot to Vicente B. Enciso for P2,092.50 via a Deed of
Absolute Sale. disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased

and not sold to private parties. Indeed, there is nothing to

The trial court ruled that the respondent

support the respondents claim that the property was

satisfactorily proved his ownership in fee simple, as well as

reclassified as residential already segregated from the

the identity of the land sought to be titled. Likewise, the trial

public domain and assumed the character of private

court found that the respondent, as well as his

ownership. At the
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, peaceful,

continuous, public, adverse, and under a bona fide claim of

moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities

ownership. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the

classified the subject as alienable and disposable. It must

case before the CA, contending that the trial court erred in

be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be


presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. The respondents
possession and that of his predecessors-in-interest will not
suffice for purposes of judicial confirmation of title. What is
categorically required by law is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
The evidence on record shows that a house was
constructed on the subject property only in 1991.
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1)
Lot No. 2278-A was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owners since time immemorial, or from
June 12, 1945.
[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000]
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA
MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA
MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. J l
For all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically
ousted is still deemed to be the legal possessor.
FACTS: Before 1954, the land in question was originally
declared for tax purposes under the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930.
Petitioners were daughters of Margarito Mendoza. The tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled, and
subsequently placed the tax declaration under the name of
Margarito. The respondent was the occupant of that land.
During the cadastral survey of the land, the brother of
petitioner and Honorata had a dispute over the ownership
of the property. The trial court said that petitioners are the
lawful owner of the property. However, in a turn of events,
the appellate court held that the probative value of
petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in
comparison with the respondent's proof of ownership of the
disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a
better title under Art. 538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, Honorata had a
better right over the property
HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent was
the preferred possessor under Art. 538 of the Civil Code
because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land since 1985. The
petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came
into possession through force and violence, contrary to Art
536 of the Civil Code. We concede that despite their
dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal
possession because possession cannot be acquired
through force or violence. To all intents and purposes, a
possessor even if physically ousted, is still deemed the
legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove
prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover
such possession. However, possession by the petitioners
does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by
the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also
acquired it before 1985. The records show that the
petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent
and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession
of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied
and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who
was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso
died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and
cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
Possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SIMEON
POLICARPIO SHIPYARD AND SHIPBUILDING
COMPANY, respondents.
Facts: Sometime in 1958, Iluminada Lumen Policarpio,
obtained a loan from Philippine Trust Company (Philtrust,
for short) in the sum of P300,000.00. As security for the
loan, Lumens parents, as sureties, executed a deed of
mortgage to the bank over some parcels of land, including
all the improvements thereon. Upon failure of Lumen
Policarpio to pay the loan when it fell due, Philtrust initiated
foreclosure proceedings before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila. On October 10, 1976, Philtrust filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of said
properties. Meanwhile, on December 29, 1980, the bank
sold the properties to the present owner, Alto Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. In a resolution dated January 11, 1985,
the Court of Appeals granted Philtrusts motion for issuance
of a writ of partial possession of the properties involved
except the portion of 1,000 square meters wherein Lumen
Policarpios house stood.
It was only on November 14, 1990,that Philtrust
was finally placed in possession of the foreclosed
properties, and thirty-one (31) years and two (2) months
from the time the case for foreclosure proceeding was
instituted in the Court of First Instance on September 29,
1959. Thereafter, Simeon Policarpio, Modesta Reyes and
Iluminada Lumen Policarpio filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in ordering the premature implementation of
the second alias writ of possession dated October 15,
1990.
On November 11, 1992, herein private respondent
Simeon Policarpio Shipyard and Shipbuilding Corporation
(SPSSC for short) filed a complaint for Damages,
Injunction, and Mandamus against petitioner Philtrust and
RTC Malabon Sheriff Augusto Castro and Deputy Gallardo
C. Tolentino, alleging that on November 14, 1990, by virtue
of an alias writ of execution and possession. Petitioner
Philtrust filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and failure on the part of private respondent
SPSSC to state a cause of action. Petitioner alleged that
the issues raised by private respondent involved the same
parties and the same properties which have already been
passed upon by the courts including the Supreme
Court. Petitioner further alleged that the complaint states no
cause of action since the property covered by OCT-R-165
is no longer owned by private respondent but by the Land
Bank of the Philippines. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner Philtrust on the ground that the
doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. On July 30, 1995,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
stating that as far as the parcels of land covered by TCT
234088 and TCT 24182 are concerned, there is identity of
subject matter.
Issue: Whether or not SIMEON POLICARPIO SHIPYARD
AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY was still in possession of
the foreclosed land.
Held: The complaint for damages filed by private
respondent SPSSC with the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 170, on November 19,
1992, however, was predicated on the alleged improper
implementation of the alias writ of execution involving two
parcels of land covered by TCT 234088 and OCT-R-
165. Respondent Court of Appeals noted that TCT 234088
is actually a consolidation of lots sold to Simeon Policarpio
Shipyard and Shipbuilding Corporation by spouses Simeon
Policarpio and Modesta Reyes after title to the properties
subject of foreclosure has already been consolidated in the
name of petitioner Philtrust. Private respondent SPSSC
does not dispute that the parcel of land covered by OCT R-
165 has been mortgaged to the Landbank of the Philippines
to secure a loan in the sum of Four Million Five Hundred
Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (P4,529,000.00) on April 30,
1982. The property was foreclosed as early as April 27,
1987 as evidenced by a certificate of sale issued by the ex-
officio sheriff of Malabon. The certificate of sale was
inscribed in the Register of Deeds on September 21, 1987,
giving private respondent one year to redeem it. Since
private respondent was in possession of the aforesaid
parcel of land when the writ of possession was improperly
implemented by the sheriff, it is not correct therefore to say
that private respondent does not have a cause of action,
simply because it was no longer the owner of the property
in question when the writ of possession was
implemented. It is elementary that a lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to institute an action should he be
disturbed in its enjoyment. Verily, Article 539 of the Civil
Code states that
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be
restored to said possession by the means established by
the laws and rules of court. x x x
The phrase every possessor in the article indicates
that all kinds of possession, from that of the owner to that of
a mere holder, except that which constitutes a crime,
should be respected and protected by the means
established and the laws of procedure.[17] Consequently,
private respondent having been in lawful possession of the
property covered by OCT-R-165 at the time the writ of
possession was implemented, may institute an action for
having been disturbed in its enjoyment.
G.R. No. L-43345 July 29, 1976
JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and
ONG CU, respondents.
Celso Ed. T. Unson for petitioner.
Rolando Magbanua Antiquiera for private respondent.
Facts: Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996
and 1004-B with a total area of 3,107 square meters
located at the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City.
The lots were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen year period
which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974. In view of Ong
Cu's failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements
thereon. Mrs. Laureano filed against him an ejectment suit
in October, 1974 in the city court of Iloilo City.
Ong Cu appealed to the Court of Fist Instance of
Iloilo. Instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the
findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the
city court ex parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the
sum of P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at
P1,200 a month. On November 13 Josefina De lauriano
filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore her to the possession of the
said lots. She also asked for immediate execution of the
city court's judgment on the ground that Ong Cu's
supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he had failed
to deposit the sum of P12,428 monthly. Ong Cu opposed
the two motions. The lower court in its order of December
9, 1975 upheld the city court's order fixing the supersedeas
bond and the amount to be deposited by Ong Cu.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court whether the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs.
Laureano's motions for execution and a mandatory
injunction.
Held:Yes. The immediate possession to be granted to Mrs.
Laureano under the writ of mandatory injunction would
embrace the portions of the two lots not occupied by Ong
Cu's improvements. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 1674. In ejectment cases where an
appeal is taken the remedy granted in
article 539, second paragraph, shall also
apply, if the higher court is satisfied that
the lessee's appeal is frivolous or dilatory,
or that the lessor's appeal is prima
facie meritorious. The period of ten days
referred to in said article shall be counted
from the time the appeal is perfected. (n)
Article 1674 is reproduced in section 9 of Rule 70. Article
539 of the Civil Code in its second paragraph grants to the
possessor, who was deprived of the possession of his real
property through forcible entry, the right to secure from an
inferior court in the action for forcible entry a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession.
There is no question that Mrs. Laureano is the registered
owner of the two lots and that they were leased to Ong Cu
for a fifteen year period counted from September 1, 1959
and expiring on August 31, 1974. Ong Cu in his answer to
the ejectment complaint unmistakably admitted that the
lease expired on that date. He alleged that there were
negotiations for his purchase of the two lots. The lower
court assumed that Ong Cu in constructing his building on
the leased lots is a possessor in good faith entitled to
reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses
incurred by him and with a right of retention. That
assumption is erroneous. As a lessee, who constructed a
building on the leased land, Ong Cu cannot be
characterized as a builder in good faith. Under article 448 of
the Civil Code the owner of the land on which anything has
been built in good faith may appropriate the building after
payment of the indemnity provided in articles 546 and 548
of the Civil Code. In filing the ejectment suit Mrs. Laureano
opted not to reimburse Ong Cu for his improvements.
G.R. No. L-40511 July 25, 1975
MARA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTINIANO C. ESTRELLA, City Judge of
Quezon City, Branch V, and JOSE DE
LEON, respondents.
FACTS:
 Mara, Inc. filed in the City Court of QC a complaint for
forcible entry against Jose de Leon.
o De Leon through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy and stealth occupied Lots 7, 9, 11 and 13,
located at G. Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Santol, QC registered in the
name of Mara, Inc. as shown in TCT Nos. 127719,
127720, 127721 and 127722 of the QC Registry of
Deeds.
o It was further alleged that it had prior possession
of the 4 lots.
 4 days after the filing of the complaint, Mara, Inc.
asked the City Court to issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the purpose of restoring to it
the possession of the said lots.
 De Leon opposed the motion on the grounds that
Mara, Inc. was never in possession of the lots;
o Mara Inc.’s titles were derived from OCT No. 735
which was allegedly void, and that the said lots
were covered by OCT No. 56 which was being
reconstituted in the CFI of Rizal, QC Branch IX
and which is in the name of the Sps. Blas Fajardo
and Pantaleona Santiago.
 After Judge Estrella's attention was called to the SC’s
decision in Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason,
and Pili vs. Tuason, L, which upheld the validity and
incontestability of TCT No. 735, to which the titles of
Mara, Inc. to the 4 lots could be traced, he granted the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on condition
that Mara, Inc. should file a bond in the sum of
P10,000.
 Mara, Inc. filed its bond for P10,000. Thereafter, Judge
Estrella issued the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
o De Leon filed a motion for the dissolution of the
injunction. He manifested that he was willing to file
a counterbond in the same amount.
 Judge Estrella in his order granted the motion for the
dissolution of the injunction provided that De Leon filed
"a surety bond in the sum of P10,000 to answer for all
damages which the plaintiff (Mara Inc.) may suffer".
 Hence, Mara, Inc. instituted in this Court the instant
special civil action of certiorari for the purpose of
annulling Judge Estrella's order dissolving the
injunction.
 De Leon’s Contention: He had a right to occupy the
four lots because of OCT No. 56 which allegedly was
issued earlier than OCT No. 735.
o NOTE that this was the same defense which he
had pleaded in his answer to the ejectment suit
and which was eroded by the SC’s decision in the
Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases upholding the
validity of TCT No. 735 from which the titles of
Mara, Inc. were derived.
ISSUE: WON Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to recover possession of the 4 lots
during the pendency of the ejectment suit? (and thus, the
City Court acted with GAD in dissolving the injunction). –
YES (YES).
RATIO: (reasons for the ruling)
#1 THERE WAS NO COUNTER-BOND FILED
 This court (the SC) first denied Mara Inc.’s petition for
certiorari on the assumption that De Leon had posted
the surety bond required in Judge Estrella's order. But,
it turned out that he did not file any such bond. He
merely submitted a check for that amount. Then he
later filed a motion that he be allowed to substitute
cash for the said check.
 Section 8, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a
copy of the bond for the dissolution of the injunction
should be served on the other party. That requirement,
which is intended to enable the opposing party to
object to the sufficiency of the bond, was NOT
observed in this case.
o Thus, the City Court acted with GAD in dissolving
the injunction and in suspending its
implementation on the basis of De Leon's
insufficient bond.
#2 WRIT OF INJUCTION DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN
EJECTMENT SUIT
 Art. 539 of Civil Code provides that “A possessor
deprived of his possession through forcible entry may
within ten days from the filing of the complaint
present a motion to secure from the competent
court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion
within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.”
 Mara, Inc. based its petition for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on the provision above which was
incorporated as the Rule 70 Section 3 par. 2 of the
ROC dealing with forcible entry and detainer.
o The urgency of the remedy of injunction is
underscored by the fact that the court is given only
30 days within which to decide the motion. It is
deplorable that in this case it took the City Court
more than 19 months to decide the motion of
Mara, Inc.
 The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an
exception to the general rule that the writ of
 injunction is not proper where its purpose is to
take property out of the possession or control of
one person and place it in the hands of another
whose title has not clearly been established by law.
G.R. No. 166854 December 6, 2006
SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA
MINING CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs.
HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON.
ANTONIO BANTOLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Culasi,
Antique, respondents
FACTS:
(P) Semirara Mining Corporation is a grantee by the
Department of Energy (DOE) of a Coal Operating Contract
under PD No. 972over the entire Island of Semirara,
Antique, which contains an area of 5,500 hectares more or
less.
(PR) HGL Development Corporation is a grantee of Forest
Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No. 184 by the
then Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, over
367 hectares of land located at the barrios of Bobog and
Pontod, Semirara, Caluya, Antique. The FLGLA No. 184
was issued on September 28, 1984for a term of 25 years,
to end on December 31, 2009. Since its grant, HGL has
been grazing cattle on the subject property.
Sometime in 1999: Petitioner requested Private
Respondent to allow their trucks and other equipment to
pass through the property covered by the FLGLA. PR said
yes as long as P wouldn’t violate the FLGLA in any way.
But then they did. P’s violations:
1. Erected several buildings for their administrative
offices and employees' residences without HGL's
permission;
2. Conducted blasting and excavation;
3. Constructed an access road to petitioner's minesite in
the Panaan Coal Reserve, Semirara;
4. Maintained a stockyard for the coal it extracted from
its mines.
***(dahil dito, nasira ung land ni HGL and madaming cows
na namatay.)
September 22, 1999: HGL wrote Semirara demanding
full disclosureof their activities on the subject land and
saying that they can’t contruct/ make improvements
without PR’s consent. P: Deadma lang. Continued with
their activities.
December 6, 2000: DENR cancelled HGL’s FLGLA and
ordered PR to vacate. (Di kasi sila nakabayad ng renta and
surcharges and magbigay ng grazing reports.)MRs to
DENR were all denied. November 17, 2003, HGL filed a
complaint against the DENR for specific performance and
damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Caloocan RTC
enjoining the DENR from enforcing its December 6, 2000
Order of Cancellation.
November 17, 2003: HGL had also filed on, a complaint
against Semirara for Recovery of Possession and
Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with the Culasi RTC.
September 16, 2004: RTC granted the prayer for issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Petitioner did
not move for reconsideration of the order. The Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was accordingly issued by
the trial court on October 6, 2004.The writ restrained
petitioner or its agents from encroaching on the subject
land or conducting any activities in it, and commanded
petitioner to restore possession of the subject land to HGL
or its agents.CA: Petition for certiorari DENIED.
ISSUE: WON the CA seriously erred or committed GAD in
affirming the Antique RTC granting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction
HELD:No.
NCC 539: “a lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in
his possession and any disturbance of possession is a
ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore the possession.” ->Thus, P’s claim that
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction is improper because the instant case is
allegedly one for accion publiciana deserves no
consideration.
Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al. Prior to the NCC, it
was deemed improper to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken
complete material possession of the property involved.
However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff is
now allowed to avail of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore him in his possession during the
pendency of his action to recover possession.
A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing
that:
1. the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
2. the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and
3. there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.
Here, it’s obvious that HGL, holding the FLGLA No. 184,
has a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the
subject property. Thus, being the lawful possessor, HGL is
entitled to protection of its possession of the subject
property and any disturbance of its possession is a valid
ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in its favor.-> Semirara even confirmed this right
when it sought permission from HGL to use its property
back in 1999. P’S possession therefore only a mere
tolerance of PR.
The issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is necessary
for HGL stands to suffer material and substantial injury as a
result of petitioner's continuous intrusion into the subject
property. Like:
1) HGL of the use and possession of the subject property;
2) HGL's business operations. (P’s occupation happened
when HGL still had the right to the use and possession of
the property for another 10 years.) At the very least, the
failure of HGL to operate its cattle-grazing business is
perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the
demands of its customers and sows doubts in HGL's
capacity to continue doing business. This damage to HGL's
business standing is irreparable injury because no fair and
reasonable redress can be had by HGL insofar as the
damage to its goodwill and business reputation is
concerned.
P’s contention that the FLGLA had already been cancelled
by the DENR is without merit. The CA correctly held that
the alleged cancellation through a unilateral act of the
DENR does not automatically render the FLGLA invalid
since the unilateral cancellation is subject of a separate
case which is still pending before the Caloocan RTC.
Notably, said court has issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the DENR from enforcing its order of
cancellation of FLGLA No. 184.
The CA was correct when it found that PR’s construction
and activities were done without the consent of HGL, but in
blatant violation of its rights as the lessee of the subject
property. Thus, these unauthorized activities were
detrimental to the business of HGL and will undeniably
work injustice to HGL. Thus, the CA correctly upheld the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in
favor of HGL.
ARTICLE 540
HEIRS OF GAMOS V HEIRS OF FRANDO
FACTS:
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel
of agricultural land located in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
Juliana Frando, respondents predecessor-in-interest,
was in possession of the above-described property. Since
1925, she had planted several trees and other plants
thereon, including coconuts, pili,bananas and
cacao.[6] Sometime in 1946, the property was traversed by
a national road that effectively divided it into two portions,
denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855, respectively.[7] The
latter, Lot No. 1855, is the subject of the present
controversy.
Evident from certified copies of existing records of the
Bureau of Lands introduced in evidence is the fact that on
February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular Government
Property Sales (IGPS) Application No. 162 for the parcel in
question. Pursuant thereto, a representative of the Bureau
of Lands inspected the area and found it to be inside an
agricultural zone, free from private claims and conflicts.
After the secretary of agriculture appraised the
property at P240, a notice calling for bids was published. At
the auction sale conducted on April 22, 1955, the only
bidder was Frando. On even date she deposited P24,
which represented 10 percent of the appraised value, as
evidenced by Official Receipt (OR) No. 9654851 dated April
22, 1955.
Full payment of the purchase price was effected
approximately a year later, on April 6, 1956, when Frando
paid the balance of P216 as evidenced by OR No. A-
2675530. On the same day, an Order/Award was made in
her favor by Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo.[8] Apparent
from a survey plan executed pursuant to an Order of the
Bureau was the fact that the property awarded to her
covered both Lots 7 and 1855 with an aggregate area of
4.000 hectares.
One of her two children, Salvacion Gallanosa who
was married to Abdon Gimpes, continued possession of the
property. Sometime in 1940, the couple constructed their
house on the southwestern portion thereof.
The other child of Frando, Paciencia Gallanosa-
Fuellas, chose to settle in Manila. The Gimpes spouses
helped her in the administration of the land. Their children --
particularly Respondents Rodolfo, Neri, Juan and Antonio --
were born on the property, where they also grew up. After
their parents death, they continued possession of the land;
and harvested and received the fruits of the improvements
for themselves and on behalf of their grandmother, Juliana
Frando, even after her death in 1971.[9]
Purportedly unknown to private respondents, a
cadastral survey of the Municipality of Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon, was conducted in 1958. According to the Bureau
of Lands, during the said survey, Lot No. 1855 became the
subject of Case No. P1s-611-D, Sta. Magdalena Public
Land Subdivision; as a result, Free Patent No.
459501[10] dated July 24, 1969 was awarded to Defendant
Cerila Gamos on October 27, 1969. Allegedly, the free
patent became the basis for the issuance of OCT No. P-
10548 in her name.
Private respondents claimed to be unaware of these
developments, as neither she nor her heirs had taken
possession of the disputed portion until 1981. In that year,
Ambrocio Guatno and the other petitioners, who had joined
him later, entered the property, gathered its produce and
built their houses thereon.
On August 3, 1988, the heirs of Juliana Frando filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint against
Cerila Gamos and the director of the Bureau of Lands. The
complainants challenged the validity of Free Patent No.
459501 and OCT No. P-10548. As the plaintiffs therein,
they alleged that the Bureau of Lands had no authority to
award the patent covering an area it had earlier awarded to
Frando. They further alleged that fraud had attended the
issuance of the subject OCT when Miguel Fungo, an
employee of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Sorsogon, purportedly forged the signature of Cerila
Gamos in all the documents. Those documents were used
in the transfer of the Tax Declaration to her name, as well
as in the application for the issuance of Free Patent No.
459501 and OCT No. P-10548.
In their Answer, Cerila Gamos and her co-defendants
alleged that they had been in actual and open possession
of the land as early as 1952; and that the Bureau of Lands
October 27, 1969 issuance in their favor of a free patent
title, which subsequently became the basis of OCT No. P-
10548, was valid and lawful. They pointed out that
respondents suit to contest a title nineteen years after its
issuance was already barred by prescription.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the order award given to Juliana Frando has
been perfected
II
Whether or not action of the heirs of Juliana Frando has
already been barred by laches/prescription
I. Given the full payment of the purchase price
as well as the compliance with all the
requirements for the grant of a sales patent,
the Bureau had no reason to deny the
issuance of such patent to Frando. Her
compliance with all the requirements
effectively vested in her and her successors-
in-interest an equitable title to the property
applied for.
Thus, when the cadastral survey was
subsequently conducted in Sta. Magdalena in
1958, the disputed property -- already held in
private ownership -- was no longer part of the
public domain. The director of lands had no
more authority to grant to a third person a
patent covering the same tract that had
already passed to private ownership.[21] Thus,
the issuance of the free patent to Cerila
Gamos, insofar as it encroached the portion
already granted to Frando, had no legal basis
at all.
The denial of the sales patent
notwithstanding, Juliana Frando is deemed to
have acquired equitable title to the property,
because private respondents adequately
proved during trial her open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Introduced in evidence was a Declaration of
Real Property covering the same tract of land.
The Declaration had been issued to Basilio
Frando, father of Juliana Frando, sometime in
1906.[22]Witness accounts[23] of long time
residents of the adjoining properties
confirmed her possession for a period not
later than 1925; and her introduction thereon
of various trees and other plants, including
bananas, cacao, pili and coconuts.
They also attested to the continued
possession of the property by Frandos
daughter, Salvacion Gimpes; and
subsequently by her children, herein private
respondents. Aside from showing the
Order/Award, the children bolstered their
claim by introducing in evidence several Tax
Declarations, sketch plans, survey returns
and the reports of the court-appointed
commissioner.
While asserting possession of the property as
early as 1952, petitioners have not presented
any document or witness to prove their bare
claim. Moreover, Ambrosio Guatno -- one of
herein petitioners -- testified that he had
entered the property upon the permission of
Ricardo Galag, an heir of Gamos; later, he
admitted that its true owner was Juliana
Frando.
II. As testified to by the Gilda Bongais -- one of
Juliana Frandos heirs -- when petitioners first
invaded the property in 1979 by constructing
a house thereon, her aunt (Paciencia
Gallenosa) filed an action contesting such
intrusion. The action was later dropped due to
the financial burdens of the litigation, definitely
not because of any concession of rights by
private respondents. Thus, the legal inaction
on their part was due, not to their lack of
vigilance, but merely to their lack of resources
to defend their property.
On the witness stand, Guatno himself
recognized Juliana Frando and her heirs as
the true owners of the property, even as he
admitted that it was Galag -- one of herein
petitioners -- who had given him permission to
erect a house on the land in 1980. Petitioners
possession of the disputed property, based as
it was on mere tolerance, could neither ripen
into ownership nor operate to bar any action
by private respondents to recover absolute
possession thereof
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C.
RECTO, represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip
Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an application for
registration of title over a 23,209 square meter
lot,[4] designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San
Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. They also
prayed in the alternative that their petition for registration be
granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or
the Public Land Act.
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they
purchased Lot 806 from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra
and Maria Medrana Torres for the amount of
P6,943,534.40.[6] The two, in turn, inherited the lot from
their deceased parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana.
Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945,
her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became
aware of her fathers possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age.
The possession of the subject lot by the Medrana family
prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita,[7]who testified
that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came
to know that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The
sisters added that during the lifetime of Vicente, he planted
rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After
his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through
hired farmers.
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that
petitioners failed to (1) offer in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the
period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption
that subject property forms part of the public domain. [19]
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court on the sole ground of failure to
offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the
land.[20]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that in view of their compliance with all the substantive and
procedural requirements for registration, save for the
submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be remanded
to the trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth
plan. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed
no objection to petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22]Hence, the instant
petition praying for the remand of the case before the trial
court.
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners, categorically
testified that they, and prior to them their father, had been
cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of
owners. Maria, having been born on October 22, 1917, and
Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age when
they became aware of their familys possession of Lot 806
in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were
undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive their
fathers possession of Lot 806 in the concept of owner.
Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be
worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge
below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue,
having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying, her findings
deserve the highest respect.[25]
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the
subject lot was for the year 1948 will not militate against
petitioners. Note that said 1948 Tax Declaration cancels a
previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472),[26] thus
substantiating petitioners possession of Lot 806 through
their predecessor-in-interest even prior to said date. At any
rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that the
belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not
necessarily mean that possession by the previous owners
thereof did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the
testimony supporting possession for the required period is
credible, the court will grant the petition for registration.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable
land of the public domain having been released and
certified as such on December 31, 1925. As further certified
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an
agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone;
not within a reservation area nor within a forest zone; and
does not encroach upon an established watershed,
riverbed, and riverbank protection.[28]Petitioners were thus
able to successfully meet the requisite for original
registration of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court granting the petition for
registration on the ground of petitioners failure to submit in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed,
the submission of the tracing cloth is a mandatory
requirement for registration.[29]However, it was held that
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from
the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification.
In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified
by the blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit R)[33] and the
technical description (Exhibit S)[34] thereof both approved by
Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the
Land Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806,
Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of
San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously
approved isolated survey.[35] Petitioners also submitted
before the Court of Appeals a certified true copy[36] of the
original tracing cloth plan as well as a certification [37] from
the Land Registration Authority attesting to the fact that the
original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester film
is on file with their office. Under the circumstances,
therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
decision of the trial court solely on the ground that
petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.
Having met all the requirements for registration of title
including the presentation of sufficient evidence to identify
the land sought to be registered, there is no more need to
remand the case before the trial court for the presentation
of the tracing cloth plan.
ARTICLE 541
TITONG v. CA
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the
requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be complied with
meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title.
Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment,
forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion reivindicatoria or
accion publiciana.
FACTS:
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio
Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being disputed in
this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants,
however legal title over the property can only be given to
one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed
by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in
favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles
Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered
parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared
for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate
occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly
entered a portion of the land containing an approximate
area of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps
denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part
of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo
Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner
asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them
for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The
boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what
remained of Titong’s property was the old Bugsayon river.
When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the
latter to change the course of the old river and direct the
flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of
Titong’s property, thus converting the old river into a
Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s,
saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior
to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first
declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the
land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the
north by the B. River; on the east by property under
ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property
owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold
property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property
pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for
4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a
part of the estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina
Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an “Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale” whereby the
5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property
remained exactly the same as those appearing in the name
of Titong’s.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the
property. First survey was made by Titong, while the
second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower
court. Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced.
Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he was actually claiming
5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A
and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosa’s was left
with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
hectares sold by Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest
before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a
case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC,
proceedings of which were suspended because of instant
case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of
his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs
adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of
the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by
Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by
the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful
share in the extrajud settlement, Titong’s share bloated to
2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong
encroached upon his property and declared it as part of his
inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was
bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong,
on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong.
Laurio also denied that Titong diverted course of the B.
river after he had repurchased the land from Verano
because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject
property
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it
says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or
preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground
for filing a complaint for quieting title must be “instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an
instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through
his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his
title were Laurio’s alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action
for forcible entry and not quieting title.
In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary
dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong
sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and
possession ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its
sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract
transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold.
Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as
ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
ARTICLE 546
Jose L. Chua v. CA [G.R. No. 109840. January 21, 1999.]
Jose L. Chua and Co Sio Eng were lessees of a
commercial unit at in Baclaran, Parañaque for 5 years.
Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties discussed
the possibility of renewing it. They exchanged
proposal and counterproposal, but they failed to reach
agreement. On 24 July 1990, Ramon Ibarra filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners in the
MTC Parañaque, Metro Manila, which rendered a decision,
giving a period of 2 years extension of occupancy to the
petitioner and Sio ordering them to pay Ibarra back rentals
and a monthly rental of P10,000.00 thereafter until the
expiration of extension of their occupancy or until the
subject premises is actually vacated.
On appeal by both parties, the RTC Makati ruled that the
lease was for a fixed period of 5 years and that, upon its
Chua’s and Co Sio continued stay in the premises became
illegal. The court ordered Chua and Co Sio Eng to vacate
the premises and to turn over possession thereof. Chua
and Co Sio Eng appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the appellate court erred in ruling the case by
affirming the decision of the lower court?
HELD
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of CA. After the
lease terminated on 1 January 1990 and without the parties
thereafter reaching any agreement for its renewal, Chua
and Co Sio Eng became deforciants subject to ejectment
from the premises. They are not entitled to a reasonable
extension of time to occupy the premises on account of the
fact that the lease contract between the parties has already
expired, as there was no longer any lease to speak of
which could be extended.
Moreover, there is no provision of law which grants the
lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on the
ground that the lessee made repairs and improvements on
the premises. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 546, which provides for full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e. one who builds on a land in the belief that he
is the owner thereof.
ARTICLE 555
Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court
of Appeals, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and Juan Valdez
Facts:
The whole controversy started when the herein petitioner
filed an application for registration of lands 1, 2, 3 and 4 in
La Trinidad, Benguet on September 5, 1962. The heirs of
Juan Valdez and the heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed an
opposition on lots 2 and 3, respectively. On November 17,
1965, the land registration court confirmed the registrable
title of the petitioner. On May 9, 1977, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and dismissed the Vicar’s application.
The heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the
lots be ordered registered under their names. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of sufficient merit. Both
parties then came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court, in a minute resolution, denied both petitions. The
heirs filed the instant cases for the recovery and
possession of the lots.
Respondents argue that the petitioner is barred from setting
up the defense of ownership or long and continuous
possession by the prior judgment of the Court of Appeals
under the principle of res judicata. Petitioner contends that
the principle is not applicable because the dispositive
portion of the judgment merely dismissed the application for
registration.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals constitute
res judicata and therefore bars the petitioner from alleging
ownership over the lots
(2) Whether the petitioner has acquired the lots through
acquisitive prescription
Held:
(1) The Court of Appeals did not positively declare private
respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared
that they were not owners of the land, but it held that the
predecessors of private respondents were possessors of
Lots 2 and 3, with claim of ownership in good faith from
1906 to 1951. Petitioner was in possession as borrower in
commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust by
declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.
When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in
1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only
for eleven years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession for ten years, but always with just title.
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. On
the above findings of facts supported by evidence and
evaluated by the Court of Appeals, affirmed by this Court,
We see no error in respondent appellate court's ruling that
said findings are res judicata between the parties. They can
no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because
those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To
ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the
door to endless litigations by continuous determination of
issues without end.
(2) Private respondents were able to prove that their
predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after
the church and the convent were destroyed. They never
asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its
free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the
petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the
subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean
adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee
held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.
The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it
declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into
title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of
the absence of just title.
Motion for Reconsideration
Issue:
Who is entitled to the possession and ownership of the
land?
Held:
Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the
two lots in question remained part of the public lands. This
is the only logical conclusion when the appellate court
found that neither the petitioner nor private respondents are
entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots.
Hence, the Court finds the contention of petitioner to be
well taken in that the trial court and the appellate court have
no lawful basis in ordering petitioner to return and surrender
possession of said lots to private respondents. Said
property being a public land its disposition is subject to the
provision of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year.But the real right of possession is not
lost till after the lapse of ten years.
It is clear that the real right of possession of private
respondents over the property was lost or no longer exists
after the lapse of 10 years that petitioner had been in
adverse possession thereof. Thus, the action for recover of
possession of said property filed by private respondents
against petitioner must fail. The Court, therefore, finds that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
the private respondents to be entitled to the possession
thereof. Much less can they pretend to be owners thereof.
Said lots are part of the public domain.
JOHN O. YU, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LARA, JUAN PANLILIO, LUCIA RIVERO,
FLORENTINO ROQUE and DOMINGO SAMSON,
This is an ejectment case, decided first by the Justice of the
Peace Court of Caloocan and, on appeal, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch, ordered the defendants "to
vacate the premises in petition, to pay the monthly rental of
P115.00 to begin from the time this action was filed up to
the time they the premises, and to pay the costs."
Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Grace Park subdivision
with an area of 682.5 meters, is the disputed property. It
was originally registered in 1916 (O.C.T. No. 868 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal), subsequently acquired by the
Philippine Realty Corporation (T.C.T. No. 22104) and sold
by it on 28 November 1956 to plaintiff-appellant John O.
Yu, a Filipino citizen, who obtained T.C.T 11267 in his
name. In 1945 several persons settled on the property and
constructed houses thereon without mission from, or
contract with, the Philippine Corporation, then the
registered owner. On various dates thereafter, between
1947 and 1952, appellants here brought the houses of
those settlers and continued in occupancy thereof without
paying any rents to the owner of the land. In February 1957
plaintiff-appellee advised them in writing to vacate within 30
days, and in view of their refusal filed a complaint of
unlawful detainer within the statutory period of one year.
Appellants contend that the Philippine Realty Corporation
had lost possession of the property by abandonment, under
Article 555, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, in failing to take
the action against them and showing them lack of interest
in said property since they started their occupancy.
Issue:
WON Art.555 is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No. The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to
constitute abandonment, which requires not only physical
relinquishment of the thing but also a clear intention not to
reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof. No
possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in favor of
appellants, because they are in fact nothing but squatters,
who settled on the land without any agreement with the
owner paying neither rents to him, nor land taxes to the
government, and who impliedly recognized their squatters'
status by purchasing only the houses built by the original
settlers. Their occupancy of the land was at the owner's
sufference, and their acts were merely tolerated which
could not affect the owner's possession (Arts. 537 and
1119, Civil Code).
ARTICLE 559
Ledesma v. CA
G.R. No. 86051
September 1, 1992.
"ARTICLE 559. The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner
has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith
at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor."
Facts:
On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself to
be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for his father,
Rustico T. Consunji, two brand new motor vehicles (a 1977
Isuzu Gemini and a 1977 Holder Premier) from Citiwide
Motors, Inc. As payment, Jojo gave Citiwide a Manager's
Check of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
dated September 28, 1977 for the amount of P101,000.00.
However, upon deposit of the said check, it was dishonored
by the bank on the ground that it was tampered with, the
correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to
P101,000.00.
Citiwide reported what happened to the police and upon
investigation it was learned that the real identity of the
wrongdoer/impostor (Jojo Consunji) is Armando Suarez
who has a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa
using this similar modus operandi. Eventually, the Holder
premier was found abandoned in QC but the Isuzu Gemini
was found in the possession of a third party, Jaime
Ledesma. In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he
purchased the subject vehicle in good faith from its
registered owner, one Pedro Neyra.
Citiwide then filed a case to recover the vehicle from
Ledesma. The Trial court ruled in favor of Ledesma, while
the CA ruled in favor of Citiwide, under the pretext of article
559. The respondent court applied 559 on the ground that
the car was unlawfully obtained by Suarez since there was
no sale at all because of the alterations on the check.
Issue:
1) W/N Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of the subject
vehicles.
2) W/N article 559 shall apply, allowing Citiwide to recover
the car from the the present possessor, Ledesma.
Held:
1) NO, Citiwide was not unlawfully deprived of the vehicles
and thus, article 559 will NOT apply. There was a perfected
unconditional contract of sale between private respondent
and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the
transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was
represented by someone who used a fictitious name — and
likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the
certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged
representative. Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the
vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of
the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration
which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely
allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance
or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor
for estafa under the RPC.
2) NO, article 559 will not apply and Citiwide cannot recover
the car from Ledesma. The petitioner successfully proved
that he acquired the car in question from his vendor in good
faith and for valuable consideration. Citiwide’s evidence
was not persuasive enough to establish that petitioner had
knowledge that the car was the object of a fraud and a
swindle and that it did not rebut or contradict petitioner's
evidence of acquisition for valuable consideration.
Under article 559, a party who (a) has lost any movable or
(b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired
it in good faith. In this case, Citiwide was not unlawfully
deprived of the vehicle and thus, article 559 finds no
application at all.
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP v.
SANTOS
G.R. No. 80298, 26 April 1990
FACTS:
Jose Cruz ordered 406 books from EDCA through
telephone, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a
personal
check covering the purchase price for the books.
Cruz
sold 120 books to Santos who, upon verifying the seller’s
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him the
purchase price. Upon investigation, EDCA confirmed that
Cruz was an impostor and had no intention of paying the
books ordered (the check issued bounced). Thus,
with
the assistance of police, EDCA forcibly seized the books
from Santos and threatened her with prosecution
for
buying stolen property.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books after demand
for their return was rejected by EDCA. EDCA argued that
pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code, it has the right
to recover the books since it was unlawfully
deprived
thereof
ISSUE:
Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in
payment
therefor was dishonored?
RULING:
NO. There was no unlawful deprivation of
property, which would entitle the petitioner to recover a
property from the person possessing it in good
faith.
Actual delivery of the books having been made,
Cruz
acquired ownership over the books, which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the
title
acquired by the private respondents to the books. Non-
payment only creates a right to demand payment or
to
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in
the
case of bouncing checks. But absent the
stipulation
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it
to another
BPI vs Court of Appeals, 538 SCRA 184, GR No. 123498,
November 23, 2007
Posted by Pius Morados on January 12, 2012
(Negotiable Instruments – Money as a medium of
exchange)
Facts: Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total
amount of P2,000,000.00. The said amount used to open
these accounts is traceable to a check issued by
Tevesteco. The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was
part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMIC’s
account (with a deposit of P100,000,000.00) and credited to
Tevesteco’s account pursuant to an Authority to Debit
which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC.
Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its
account amounting to P37,455,410.54 including the
P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon
presentment for payment due to garnishment of his account
filed by BPI.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which
consisted of part of the money allegedly fraudulently
withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s
account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of
FMIC’s forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI
to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was able to
recover possession of the same when the money was
redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up its
ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts.
Issue: WON the bank has a better right to the deposits in
Franco’s account.
Held: No. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner
who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable
to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor,
BPI simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of
money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly
debited from FMIC’s account and credited to Tevesteco’s,
and subsequently traced to Franco’s account.
Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case
which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry.
Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a
medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.
Money, which had been passed through various
transactions in the general course of banking business,
even if of traceable origin, is no exception.
Aznar Vs. Yapdiangco
Facts:
 Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the
sale of his Ford Fairlane 500.
 After the advertisement, a certain de Dios, claiming
to be the nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the
residence of Santos and expressed his uncle’s
intent to purchase the car.
 Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo (son of
Theodoro) who talked with de Dios. On being
informed, Santos advised his son to see Marella,
which the son did.
 Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car.
A deed of sale was prepared and Irineo was
instructed by his father not to part with the deed and
the car without receiving the purchase price from
Marella.
 Upon arriving at the house of Vicente Marella, he
said that his money was short and that he had to
borrow from his sister.
 Marella then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the
supposed house of the sister to obtain the money
with an unidentified person.
 He also asked Irineo to leave the deed to have his
lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella,
Irineo did as requested.
 Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to
be sister, de Dios and the unidentified person then
disappeared together with the car. Santos reported
the incident to the authorities.
 Thereafter, Marella was able to sell the land to
Aznar. While in possession of the car, police
authorities confiscated the same from him.
  Aznar filed an action for replevin (to recover the
car). Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed
for its delivery to him.
 In the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro
Santos moved and was allowed to intervene by the
lower court.
 Lower court ruled in favor of Teodoro Santos saying
that he has been unlawfully deprived of his car and
he retains ownership of the same.
Issue: Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff-appellant,
Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of
the disputed automobile?
Held: Teodoro Santos
Article 559 is applicable in this case and not Article
1506 which was cited by petitioner Aznar
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title
thereto, but his, title has not been voided at the time of the
sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of
the seller's defect of title.
The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under the
aforequoted provision, it is essential that the seller should
have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable
where, as in this case, the seller (Marella) had no title at all.
Marella did not have a title over the car because it was
never delivered to him
Vicente Marella sought ownership or acquisition of it by
virtue of the contract. Vicente Marella could have acquired
ownership or title to the subject matter thereof only by the
delivery or tradition of the car to him.
contemplated by Article 712 of the Civil Code. For then, it
would be indisputable that he turned it over to the
unidentified companion only so that he may drive Irineo
Santos and De Dios to the said place on Azcarraga and not
to vest the title to the said vehicle to him as agent of
Vicente Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the
act be coupled with the intent of delivering the thing.
Article 559 was applicable in this case (Doctrine of
irrevindicability)
The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the
Civil Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the
effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not
only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third
persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such
finder, thief or robber.
The said article establishes two exceptions to the general
rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost
the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In
these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying any
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a
public sale.
Aznar shall suffer the consequences
The common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the
law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot
be applied in a case which is covered by an express
provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
Between a common law principle and a statutory provision,
the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other

real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and
in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." As
interpreted by this Court in a host of cases, by this
provision, ownership is not transferred by contract merely
but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or
rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while
delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.

Delivery vs. Tradition

So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is
not transferred by contract merely but by delivery.
Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or
acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the
method of accomplishing the same, the title and the method
of acquiring it being different in our law.

The car in question was never delivered to the vendee

by the vendor as to complete or consummate the
transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract
It should be recalled that while there was indeed a contract
of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the
former, as vendee, took possession of the subject matter
thereof by stealing the same while it was in the custody of
the latter's son.

There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether

Irineo Santos voluntarily delivered the key to the car to the
unidentified person who went with him and L. De Dios to
the place on Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly
lived. But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the delivery