1. Rule 40 (MTC to RTC)
Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. 160406, June 26, 2006
Petitioners : Spouses Dolores Miranda Provost
Respondents: CA ; Spouses Victor Ramos ; FE A. Ramos
FACTS :
Private respondents are owners of a parcel of land (Camiguin). The lot was donated to them by Yap
adjacent to the land owned by the petitioner. The petitioner constructed a fence separating the two lots. The
respondents, believing that the petitioners encroaches area but the latter refused. The respondents thus
had a relocation survey and the relocation showed that the fence was indeed on their land.
Petitioners denied alleging that the survey plan used had been disapproved by the DENR Regional Office
for being defective and was replaced with a correction survey. Upon request of petitioners, another
relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey. The survey showed that the fence was
within petitioner’s property.
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages and a prayer for
preliminary injunction before the MTC. They alleged that petitioners encroached on 314 sq. meters of their
lot. MTC DENIED and held that the respondents failed to prove their ownership and possession.
On appeal, RTC AFFIRMED MTC’s decision saying that the respondent’s claim is only based on
disapproved survey plan.
Respondents appealed to CA. CA REVERSED RTC’s decision and ordered petitioners to vacate area, pay
damages, remove fence.
At the outset, we not that this case involves an error of judgment and NOT in jurisdiction. Petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is NOT PROPER. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as
one proper for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE :
W/N RTC can decide cases brought on appeal from MTC even without jurisdiction over subject matter.
HELD :
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion reinvindicatoria.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nonetheless allows RTC to decide the case brought on
appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over subject matter, may decide case on merits.
In the instant case, the MTC Mambajao, should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction
but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of MTC.
Encarnacion vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006
G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot consisting of 100 square meters and
another Lot consisting of 607 square meters located at Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part
of Lot No. 2121, owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan. Mallapitan sold the
land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed
an Affidavit of Waiver waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner,
Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots and the
issuance of titles in his name
Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property without the
permission of the owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Petitioner demanded that the respondent vacate the
subject property.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M.
ENCARNACION.
On appeal, the RTC ruled that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, it (RTC) Court
acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof.
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA which promulgated
the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court.
Issue
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Held
The RTC should have not dismissed the case.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken
from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case
on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for
further proceedings.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide
the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the
amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
2. Rule 41 (RTC to CA)
Manila Memorial Park vs. CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2001)
Neypes vs. CA, 469 SCRA 633 (2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before RTC Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely,
Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
Both petitioners and respondents: filed various motions with the trial court
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and
(2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
TC: presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows:
(1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper;
(2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirsof del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
Respondent heirs: filed MR of the order denying their MTD on the ground that the TC could very well
resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
TC: dated February 12, 1998, dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed MR; On July 1, 1998, TC issued another order dismissing
the MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. CTEaDc
Court a quo: On August 4, 1998, denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed MR but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.
Petitioners: Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before CA
Petitioners claim: that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal arguing that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their MR; When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
CA: On September 16, 1999, dismissed the petition ruling that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It
held further that “petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such
legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory”
Petitioners: filed MR of the aforementioned decision.
CA: denied on January 6, 2000.
Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
ISSUE:
Period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
HELD:ESAIT
Right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail
of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the
loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however,
that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from. . . .
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15
days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review
the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases
with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final
order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receiptof the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only
if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
Petition GRANTED and CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Other important details:
PERIOD TO APPEAL; ORDER OR JUDGMENT WHEN DEEMED FINAL. — An appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication
on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES THE FINAL
ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CASE; CASE AT BAR. — In the
recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to
set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice
of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed — for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial
of the motion for reconsideration ofan order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of
Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the
aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED. — In National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. ThisCourt has
on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and
that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule,
periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances,
a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the
delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside
technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just
and proper disposition of his cause.
15-DAY APPEAL PERIOD COUNTED FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF JUDGMENT OR FROM
RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. — We thus hold that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt
of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence,
the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to However, on August 26 and 27, l996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was
rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately forwarded to the secretary
days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that same day, respondents thru
remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes counsel filed their notice of appeal.
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in On August 29, l996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial court contending that its decision
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error ofjudgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and dated May 22, l996 had become final and executory since respondents failed to make a timely appeal and
to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In praying for the issuance of an order granting the writ of execution. On the other hand, respondents filed an
this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should opposition thereto alleging therein that the cause of their failure to make a timely appeal was due to
be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" unforeseeable oversight and accident on the part of their employee who was unable to report for work
appealed from (July 22, 1998). because of illness. On September 9, l996 petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. On September 11, l996
NEW 15-DAY PERIOD MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY WHEN EITHER A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR respondents counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the motion for execution attaching thereto the
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED; CASE AT BAR. — To recapitulate, a party litigant may affidavit of Lapuz. Finally, on September 18, l996, respondents filed their rejoinder to said reply.
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for RTC's RULING:
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed ofonly if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, On September 13, l996, the trial court issued an order denying respondents notice of appeal and granting
Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order the motion for execution filed by petitioner.
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice ofappeal was well within the
fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
DOCTRINE: On September 20, l996, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning
FRESH PERIOD RULE. — The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid order on the ground that the denial of their notice of appeal was
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and on the basis of a mere technicality and that the writ of execution should not have been issued since there
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and are strong considerations which militate the strict application of the rules on procedure. Petitioner
to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based corporation filed its comment to the petition dated September 25, l996 claiming that the event which
on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may happened in respondents office does not amount to an honest mistake nor an unavoidable accident that
consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford would legally excuse their neglect.
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of CA's RULING:
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh
period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the The CA granted the petition and annulled the order of the RTC. The RTC was ordered to give due course to
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of petitioners appeal.
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Courtof Appeals and Rule 45 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner corporation was denied for lack of merit.
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, ISSUE:
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction
Trans International vs. CA, 285 SCRA 49 (1998) when it gave due course to the petition of respondents considering their admission that the notice of appeal
TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; NATIONAL POWER was belatedly filed before the trial court.
CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO PASTORAL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N SC's RULING:
MARTINEZ, J.:
NO. The general rule holds that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be
FACTS: exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by
the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal. The party who seeks
Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent National Power Corporation to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
(NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a contract for the lost. In fact, it has been long recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for
supply and delivery of woodpoles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Civil Case No. Q-94-20960.
Nonetheless, the court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case of Toledo, et al.
On May 22, l996, the trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner. A copy of the vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the Court allowed the filing of an appeal where a stringent
aforesaid decision was received by respondents on June 6, l996. On June 19, l996, respondents filed their application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of
motion for reconsideration alleging in the main that certain facts were overlooked, ignored or wrongly substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a party to seek exception for its
appreciated by the trial court. An opposition to said motion was filed by petitioner on July 11, l996. On failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons
August 2, l996, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of the such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to
aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCORS office on August 23, l996 (Friday) and warrant the Courts suspension of the rules.[21] Indeed, the court is confronted with the need to balance
was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General Counsel. stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to
relax said rules based on equity and justice.
Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table.
The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the aforequoted rule. If respondents right to
appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that they had belatedly filed their notice of
appeal, then the Court as the final arbiter of justice would be deserting its avowed objective, that is to
dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not on a mere technicality.
In this case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the
receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR. The delay was
properly explained and sufficiently justified; considerations of substantial justice and equity strongly argue
against a rigid enforcement of the technical rules of procedure, considering not only that the delay was only
for one day, and the petitioners have pleaded an unforeseeable oversight and illness on the part of the
receiving clerk, as an excuse. To insist that the one-day delay in filing the appeal despite the plausible
reason adduced therefor is a fatal mistake due alone to the negligence of counsel is to insist on a rigid
application of the rules, which as repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme court, should help secure, not
override substantial justice. In essence, the court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity
considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the perfection
of their appeal. Considering the factual and legal milieu obtaining in the case at bench, the petition must be
denied.
DOCTRINE:
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of procedure are
used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. The emerging trend in the rulings of the Court is
to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the appeal
beyond the prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such as fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening casualty, without fault of the appellant,
which the court may deem sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his failure to comply
strictly with the law. In such case the appeal is deemed taken and perfected on time, and the appellate
court acquires appellate jurisdiction.
3. Rule 42 (RTC to CA)
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005
Macawiwili Gold Mining and Devt. Co, Inc. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 602 (1998)
Facts: Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold
Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation. It was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet
Based on 53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners mining areas
where the latters Macawiwili claims are located. Philex Mining likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas sought to
be expropriated.
RTC denied the complaint of respondent and the writ of preliminary injunction.
In Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia, the SC, recognized the possessory rights of defendants
Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims.
Nevertheless, Philex asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and separate from the rights of
Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme Court decision, anchoring said right on Section 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 which states:
SEC. 59. Eminent Domain. - When the claim owner or an occupant or owner of private lands
refuses to grant to another claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or install any of the facilities
mentioned in the next preceding section, the claim owner or lessee may prosecute an action for eminent
domain under the Rules of Court in the Court of First Instance of the province where the mining claims
involved are situated. In the determination of the just compensation due the claim owner or owner or
occupant of the land, the court shall appoint at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist to be
recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners.
SC:Expropriation demands that the land be private land. When the Supreme Court awarded the
possessory rights over the land subject of this case to defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped
said land of its private character and gave its private character and gave it its public character, that is, to be
utilized for mining operations. Although property already devoted to public use is still or under a specific
grant of authority to the delegate (Constitutional Law by subject to expropriation, this must be done directly
by the national legislature Isagani Cruz, 1989 edition, page 64). Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463
is not a specific grant of authority given to plaintiff but a mere general authority which will not suffice to allow
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved and,
therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court denied petitioners
motion in a resolution. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari.
Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner should have filed
a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to correct itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss
Appeal.
Ruling: YES,
Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the
Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law.
The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of law or
of fact.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of
law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.
The respondents arguments may be summarized as follows:
(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants respondent the
right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons once the conditions
justifying expropriation are present. The power of eminent domain expressly granted under Sections 58 and
59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to the possessory right of other claimowners. [12]
2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to another
mining company. Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic,[13] land
covered by mining claims may be the subject of expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the power of
eminent domain only means that the court may inquire into the necessity of the expropriation. [14]
(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme Courts decision in
Poe Mining v. Garcia.[15] Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious suits, is not resorted
to in the present case since respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners mining areas, not as operator of
the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada mining claims.[16]
(4) Respondents expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for the reason that
respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have over the 21.9
hectare area.[17]
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondents alternative cause of action, even on the assumption
that respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an alternative statement in a
pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the other alternative statements.[18]
The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has, under
Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where petitioners
mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether the rules on the
allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are
applicable to special civil actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an
examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what
the law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed
a grave error in ruling otherwise.
Doctrine:
Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated
to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the
appellant raises only questions of law.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There
is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or the falsehood
Ditching vs. CA, 263 SCRA 343 (1996)
Petitioner: Cecile San Juan Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani
Respondent: Adriano Motas and Vidal Batalla
PANGANIBAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: (Rule 42 Appeal from RTC to CA) – UNDER THE OLD RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE
● Motions for Extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the expiration or lapse of
the period fixed by law, and if the motion is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be
extended, then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed
from will have become final and executory.
● A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period time left to file and
appeal. The miscalculation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the
same nor precent the finality of the judgment.
● Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement
● The legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the
appellate court – the court is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that it was
filed late inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition does not carry with it any
assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed.
FACTS:
● Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna which was
covered by various TCT.
● 1975– a contract of tenancy - “Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan” was entered into by Motas and
Dr. Eduardo San Juan (predecessor in interest of petitioners)
● 1978– Motas constructed a house in the said lot without the consent of petitioners.
● Upon learning of such construction, petitioners demanded that he vacate the property. The last
demand was made in September 1988.
BARANGAY
● Respondent's refusal to vacate upon the final demand, petitioner filed a complaint at the
barangay level.
● No amicable settlement was reached
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
● An EJECTMENT CASE filed in July 1989 with the Municipal Trial Court in Calamba, Laguna
by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani, seeking to eject herein private
respondent Motas and another occupant named Vidal Batalla from the lot owned by the
petitioner and her co-owners. Said case was tried under the old Rules on Summary
Procedure.
● The MTC found that there existed a tenancy relationship under Section 24 of RA 3844 (the
Agricultural Reform Code) - (t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity
of (RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold.
● The court held that the house of Motas was within the leasehold hence cannot be ejected and
that since it was a tenancy case it had no jurisdiction.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
● Petitioners APPEALED to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna – affirmed the MTC's
decision
○ Plaintiffs never denied, much less controverted the fact that defendants have occupied
a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo San Juan as tenants of the
latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the defendants' claim that the land in question was a
part and parcel of Dr. Eduardo San Juans land being tenanted by defendants (As
shown by the Contract of Tenancy)
○ There was sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered by defendants that they have
been tenants of Dr. San Juans land since 1972;
○ Having succeeded Dr. Eduardo San Juan on the same property, they are bound to
observe and respect the rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they never
intended defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit.
● MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY PETITIONERS - Judge Eleuterio Guerrero set the
case for clarificatory hearing on August 30, 1991, on which date a representative from the
Register of Deeds of Laguna (Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on the records. The
Motion for Reconsideration was granted and accordingly said Judge ordered: vacation
of the premises and surrender possession of the land, Defendants to pay costs.
● March 9, 1992 – JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO took over JUDGE ELEUTERIO
GUERRERO as presiding judge. Said judge REVERSE THE DECISION of Judge
Eleuterio and ruled that Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial Court mandates that cases
appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceeding had in the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted
by the parties – the setting for clarificatory hearing is beyond the purview of the rule.
Affirmed the MTC's decision.
COURT OF APPEALS
● APRIL 13, 1992 – Petitioner filed a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 15 DAYS from April 18,
1992 up to May 3, 1992 within which to file a PETITION FOR REVIEW because:
○ March 5, 1992 – court issued an order adverse to petitioners
○ March 17, 1992 – petitioner received a copy of said decision
○ March 27, 1992 – Motion for reconsideration was denied
○ April 3, 1992 – order denying Motion for reconsideration was received by petitioners
○ April 13 – 1992 – Petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15 days
○ April 18,1992 – Petitioners have until this day to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari
if the Extension was not granted
● The Court of Appeals granted the extension and they have until May 3, 1992 to file a petition for
review
● Petitioner filed their petition on April 29, 1992 but the CA dismissed said decision because it was
filed late. The CA Stated that 10 days have lapsed from March 17 when petitioner received the
order to March 27 when MR was denied. Another 10 days have lapsed fro April 3 when MR
order was denied to April 13 when petition for extension was denied. A total of 20 days had
already from from the time petitioners received copy of the questioned order up the time they
actually filed on April 13. For this reason, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for review except to dismiss it.
● MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was denied by the CA
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the Court of Appeals notwithstanding its
merit is valid (NO MERIT)
HELD:
● This Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court of Appeals at
fifteen (15) days - If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court,
the movant has only (the) remaining period within which to file a petition for review
● The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the
reglementary period of appeal.
 ● In this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion for extension of
time
● if the motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e., the
reglementary period to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and the
judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.
● The statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by
law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.Perfection of an appeal within the statutory
period is a jurisdictional requirement.
● the delay incurred by petitioners counsel was simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by private
respondent, this Court has already held that (a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is not
excusable error. - the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of
the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment
● Where no timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance
of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court. Further, the
respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that it was filed
late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry with it any
assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed. Under Section 1 (a) Rule 50 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the appellee may dismiss the
appeal for inter alia: (a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was
perfected within the period fixed by these rules.
ISSUE #2:Whether or not respondent Motas is a tenant of the parcel owned by petitioners
HELD:The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on the basis of
evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most
compelling reasons.
4. Rule 43 (Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA)
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 440 (1998)
REGALADO, J:
DOCTRINE:
● Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies
● The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence (reluctant acceptance of something
without protest) as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
● Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in the administrative disciplinary case – it consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30 Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC
● Transfer by the SC, in its rulemaking power of pending cases involving a review of decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the CA which shall now
be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only
FACTS:
● Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business.
● Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED)
● Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those
under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded
for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
● Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so
to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
● She eventually filed an administrative case against him in July 24, 1995.
● The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19,
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
● GRAFT INVESTIGATOR/ DIRECTOR/ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN: On January 31, 1996,
Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
● OMBUDSMAN: in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of
suspension without pay for one year.
● RECONSIDERATION: Ombudsman inhibited himself since the new counsel was a classmate
and close associate
● DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN: case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26,
1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the
administrative charges.
SUPREME COURT
● Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint
Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which
granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative
charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director,
Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 27 RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) together with Sec 7 Rule III of Administrative
Order no 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative cases are valid
HELD:
● This court held Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court
● Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme
Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
● Also, the very provision (Section 5.2 Article 8 of the Constitution) cited by petitioner specifies that
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature
intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No
such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial
system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution. The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours)) This differs from the former Rule
45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals.
● The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition,
with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for
review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or
 supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and
proper.
RATIONALE:
● 2 conflicting laws : legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of
the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to the SC (RA 6770)
1. the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its
Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It
will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this
Court (Supreme Court) in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. - this is being
questioned
2. Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advise and consent.
● we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in
a criminal action.
● Administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private
respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March
18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. Yet
systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the
Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
● Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies .
● Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. Here,
however, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution
of the present case.
● As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck
down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
● DOESN'T IT AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT? REMOVES VESTED RIGHT? a transfer by the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of
Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is
affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to
be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in
a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence
he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
Santos vs. Go, 473 SCRA 350 (2005)
Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998)
Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA 738 (2000)
LAPID VS. CA - G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000
FACTS:
On the basis of an unsigned letter allegedly originating from the "Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng
Pampanga," the NBI initiated an "open probe" on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga & exaction of
exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking
government officials. The NBI report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman.
A complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, with alleged "Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" for allegedly "having conspired
between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in
Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, travel, or other
quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without
issuing receipts for its collection.
The Ombudsman issued an Order suspending petitioner Lapid for a period of six (6) months without pay
pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. The DILG implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid.
On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case finding the Lapid
administratively liable for misconduct. The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the
petitioner and a motion for reconsideration was filed. The Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA praying for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the
Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The TRO was issued by the appellate court.
When the 60-day lifetime of the TRO lapsed without the CA resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with the SC. The SC
issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the CA issued a
resolution denying the petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. The following day, the DILG implemented the
assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga,
Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C. — Governor of the Province of Pampanga.
A Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and the
Supplement to the Petition itself were filed in view of the resolution of the CA denying the petitioner's prayer
for preliminary injunction. The petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the case on
the merits by the CA. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become final and
argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for
prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective comments to the petition
praying for the dismissal thereof:
- The Solicitor-General—maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court and is therefore, immediately executory.
- The Ombudsman—maintain that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the
execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the said law cited by
petition pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its enforcement pending appeal. They also stated
that it has uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative Code that
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.
After oral arguments before the SC, the Resolution subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was
issued. The OSG and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.
HELD:
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states that all provisionary orders of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing
the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary is final and
unappealable. It is clear that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay
for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory.
It is clear that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the
said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory.
An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of
the decision.
In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of
the reglementary period of appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment in the appellate tribunal become final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly
categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a
matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become
final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of
respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies,
the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative
agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending appeal. The
contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions
of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is
immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43
should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be
applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act
which provides for such suppletory application.
The decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately
executory.
5. Rule 45
Nunez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 475 SCRA 305 (2005)
China Road and Bridge Corp. vs. CA, 348 SCRA 401 (2000)
6. Rule 65
Day vs. RTC of Zamboanga City, 191 SCRA 610 (1999)
Romy’s Freight Service vs. Castro, 490 SCRA 165 (2006)
ROMY'S FREIGHT SERVICE, represented by Roman G. Cruz, petitioner, vs. JESUS C. CASTRO,
DOMINADOR VELORIA and the FIRST DIVISION of the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141637. June 8, 2006.]
FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed jointly by private respondents Jesus C.
Castro and Dominador Veloria against petitioner Romy's Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz,
its owner/sole proprietor, with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in Baguio City.
Private respondent Castro was hired by petitioner as a mechanic in April 1975. He was promoted to
supervisor in 1986. On December 31, 1994, he suffered a stroke. On his doctor's advice, he took a leave of
absence from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave several times. While on leave, however,
petitioner Roman G. Cruz sent him several letters first urging him to return to work. The succeeding ones
assumed the nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain why he should not be disciplined for his
prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these,
Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruz's acts
constituted constructive dismissal
Labor Arbiter:
September 15, 1997, executive labor arbiter Jesselito Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal
dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th
month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and
attorney's fees.
NLRC:
NLRC which, in its October 29, 1998 decision, reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's ruling. It found
private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner
CA:
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by petitioner.
On September 9, 1999, the appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor
arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner
failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents,
hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal. The CA rejected petitioner's contention that private respondents
abandoned their work. It held that their failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and that they
had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of the NLRC and reinstated the September 15, 1997 decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the latter's
October 1, 1997 order
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari is valid, despite failure to to file a motion for reconsideration with NLRC
HELD:
NO. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents' petition
for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents
were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC
and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take
cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the
NLRC.
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can
be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule.
Other Issue:
The other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether private respondents were illegally dismissed (as the CA
and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC held) and whether they were entitled to
backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorney's fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari. They involve an inquiry into factual matters.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' has a precise meaning in law, denoting
abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law.
Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties' respective evidence or the
evaluation of their relative weight.
The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court were
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The sole office
of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondent's
evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon
respondent judge directed the plaintiffs to show cause why their complaints should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to PD 957.
In their compliance with the show cause order, the petitioners maintained that it is the trial court, and not the
HLRB, which has jurisdiction over the complaint. They contend that Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal is
inapplicable because in their cases: (1) the title of the developers, the JAREÑOS, had already passed to a
third person, HABACON; (2) their action is for the annulment of the title of a third person; (3) HABACON is
not a developer; and (4) Section 19 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests upon the Regional Trial Court the jurisdiction
to hear and decide all civil actions which involve title to or possession of any real property or any interest
therein, except actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry
RTC- dismissed case for lack of jusridiction because the NHA now the Human Settlement Regulatory
Comission has inclusive jusridiction to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate practices.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA, 334 SCRA 305 (2000) Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari to annul the Orders of the trial court on the
ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
their complaints and that they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has jurisdiction over their complaints
Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232 SCRA 292 (1994)
ISSUE: w/n the remedy of certiorari availed of is correct.
Fajardo v. Bautista
G.R. Nos. 102193-97 HELD:
May 10, 1994 Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
DOCTINE: successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow,
appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or
successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or
appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the
insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or choice of remedies
where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4
lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the October 1991. 35 The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal
choice of remedies. 34||| from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal from the
challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to as a substitute for the
lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of
FACTS: remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be
Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño are the owners and developers of a subdivision dismissed.
known as the Calamba Central Compound. They as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS signed
separate contracts ,CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein stated, they bound
themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase
price and interest, to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of title, free from Luis vs. CA, 184 SCRA 230 (1993)
any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the Contract to Sell||.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development Corporation (hereinafter
FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a
CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell to
Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound Subdivision, and upon full
payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Fajardo.
cdll
It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREÑOS sold the aforesaid lots subject of the different
contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter HABACON) under separate documents
denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan." On 18 February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of the
certificates of title covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.
When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991 separate complaints( RTC OF Calamba)
with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of the new certificates of title
issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to HABACON, and for
accounting and damages.

MOTION TO DISMISS- filed by Habacon on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue
because they were not parties to the “ bilihan”