G.R. No.

11039 September 13, 1916

FELISA TORIBIO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOLORES FOZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Vicente Foz for appellants.

Eugenio Testa for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

FACTS

On August 22, 1914, counsel for Felisa Toribio filed a complaint in the said court
alleging as a cause of action, that the plaintiff sold to the defendant Dolores Foz and to
her husband Buenaventura Toribio his rights to redemption and lease in the property
having certificate of title No. 2263, issued by the register of deeds of the city of Manila,
for the sum of P2,200, less that of P700 which the plaintiff owed to the defendant
spouses.

The record shows, it to have been duly proven that the plaintiff, Felisa Toribio, was the
owner of a parcel of urban property situated at the intersection of Calles Raon and
Sales of the district of Santa Cruz, Manila, having certificate of title No. 2263; that said
parcel was sold under right of repurchase to Carlos Rodriguez Pomar, the plaintiff
retaining, however, the right to continue to occupy the house thereon on the condition of
her paying to the purchaser sa monthly rental of P38 and, of course, on that of her
redeeming the property.

The plaintiff admitted that the defendant Dolores Foz had paid P307 on account, as
proven by the receipt in defendant’s possession signed by the plaintiff on April 18, 1914,
but she denied that she had received the price of the sale, P2,200, as set forth in the
instrument Exhibit 2, signed by herself on June 30, 1914.

The defendants, however, swore that they paid the whole of the said amount of P2,200
before the deed of sale, Exhibit 2, was made out; that this is shown by the plaintiff’s own
statement contained therein of having received to her entire satisfaction from the
defendant Buenaventura Toribio the price of the sale P2,200. Dolores Foz also testified
that, after deducting the P700 which the plaintiff owed her, the remainder still due for the
purchase of the rights in the property in question was only P1,500, which entire sum
was paid prior to the execution of the proper deed of sale in the following manner: P307
on April 18, 1914, according to the receipt issued by the plaintiff and marked as Exhibit
1; P693 on a subsequently date; and finally, the additional sum of P500, which she
delivered the plaintiff before the execution of the said deed of sale, Exhibit 2. The
defendant Dolores Foz further testified that as the said partial payments were made to
the plaintiff in the presence of the notary Ramon Muyot, she, Dolores, being in a hurry,
forgot to require receipts for the sums delivered, and also through thoughtlessness she
failed to require the return of her certificate of indebtedness of the P1,500 that she had
delivered to the plaintiff on January 26, 1914. However, the notary Ramon Muyot,
having been called to the stand for the purpose of explaining the point in controversy,
denied having seen the defendant Dolores Foz made any payment of money to the
plaintiff Feliza Toribio.

ISSUE

Whether the sum of P1,500, which the defendant spouses owed to the plaintiff from
January 26, 1914, was or was not wholly paid to her.

HELD

The defendants, in view of the certainty of the debt mentioned in the receipt of January
26, 1914, were in duty bound to prove that not only had they paid P307 on account on
April 18th of the same year as they did by Exhibit 1, but also that they had paid the
whole of the balance of the amount claimed by presenting the receipt or receipts of the
payments made, which they did not do, when it was their strict duty to furnish such
proof. (Sec. 297, Code of Civ. Proc.; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin, 5 Phil. Rep., 660;
and Miller, Sloss & Scott vs. Jones, 9 Phil. Rep., 648.)

If it is true that the whole sum specified in the said certificate of indebtedness was paid,
no explanation has been offered why the receipt of January 26, 1914, remained in
possession of the creditor and was not canceled in the deed of sale, if the debt, as well
as the price of the sale, was really paid. The existence in the hands of the creditor of an
instrument of credit, is evidence that the debt is still unpaid, unless the contrary be fully
proven. (Sec. 334, No. 8, Code of Civ. Proc.; Bantug vs. Del Rosario, 11 Phil. Rep.,
511; Ramos vs. Ledesma, 12 Phil. Rep., 656; and Ormachea Tin-Congco vs. Trillana,
13 Phil. Rep., 194.)

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned by the appellants to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, we hereby affirm the said judgment with the
costs against the defendant-appellant. So ordered.