G.R. No.

139561 June 10, 2003

SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and ELIADA
GALDIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA VALDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board3 ("DARAB") which reversed the Decision4 of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office ("MARO") in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), Agusan del Sur, to segregate
2,000 square meters from the land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also
awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and Eliada
Galdiano.

The Facts

The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property in Poblacion (formerly
Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.

Atty. Manuel D. Cab ("Cab") is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with
an area of 125,804 square meters ("Cab Property"). The Cab Property is covered by OCT No. P-5638 issued pursuant
to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab Property is traversed by the Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal
building of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the lot occupied by the municipal building. 5

In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel ("Atuel") as administrator of the Cab Property.

Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez ("Valdez") arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the
nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to Valdez. 6 On 9 October 1978,
Cab and Valdez entered into a "Lease of Improved Agricultural Land" under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare
portion of the Cab Property for ₱300.00 per year for two years.

In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel ("Spouses Atuel") and the Spouses George and Eliada
Galdiano ("Spouses Galdiano") to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on this 2,000-square meter lot ("Subject Lot").

On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the town plan of the
Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of the Ministry of
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded that Valdez stop
cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same.

On 2 October 1988, responding to Cab’s letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was
properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated. The MARO added that on
14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to
Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion ("PD 27 Land") of the Cab Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square
meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.

On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdez’s emancipation patent. Cab
claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law lessee, not a
tenant.7Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an investigation
regarding the petition.8

On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ("HLURB") approved the Town Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified the Cab Property as 90 percent
residential, and the remaining portion as institutional and park or open space.

On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez ("Spouses Valdez") filed a complaint 9 for
"Recovery of Possession with Damages" with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
"stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq.
m. more or less." The Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated
demands, refused "to restore possession of the said portion of land" to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez
prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez
possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as well as
unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages.

In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no cause of
action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator of the Cab Property.
The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon Cab’s instruction and consent, they had been
occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab Property in
1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the
Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of.

Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation patent issued to Valdez is null
and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is covered by
the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27. 10

On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision which disposed of as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to segregate the TWO
THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and award the same to the respondents; and hereby ordered
this case dismissed.

SO ORDERED.11

Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office.
The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

(1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the
complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and

(2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned
to assist the parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents for whatever
improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to be paid by the complainants.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review 13 with the Court of
Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses
Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat.14
Hence, the instant petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. The Court of
Appeals held that the DARAB’s decision should be respected because it enjoys the presumption of regularity.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo 15 where this Court held that
upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in the land.

The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v. Macaraeg 16 is applicable. In Teodoro, this
Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. However, "once a
landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said
landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming from his
immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement." Otherwise, the Court
added, "it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting
the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the
landed gentry."17

The Issue

After a review of the issues raised,18 the question boils down to whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek
redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano but on an entirely
different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the present controversy.

The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdez’s complaint for recovery of possession of
the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio
consider the issue of jurisdiction.19 The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the
court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action.20

In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are farmers and
beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez claimed that
despite repeated demands,21 the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession
of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.22 The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.

The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 23 this Court ruled:

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
upon the allegations made in the complaint.

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of the MARO, 24 indicate that
the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The issue to be
resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the
other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and
lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v. Torres,25 this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to
recover possession or accion publiciana, thus:

xxx This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a
regional trial court to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the title. Accion publiciana or
plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court
has jurisdiction. xxx26

For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the parties. 27This
Court held in Morta,28 that in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit:

xxx 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

xxx29 (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the DARAB’s jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al.,30 that:

xxx the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB
has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is defined as
follows:

(d) xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions
of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to be the owners of the
2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim ownership to any other
portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that will bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657. 31 The instant case is similar to Chico v.
CA,32 where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or
agrarian relations between the parties. Since the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should
not have taken cognizance of the Spouses Valdez’s complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion
publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.33 Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property."34 However, if the assessed value of the
real property involved does not exceed ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and ₱20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property. 35 Moreover, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.1âwphi1

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the Spouses Valdez’s complaint
for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as part of their affirmative
defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this
case) cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such
were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 36

Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.37The
active participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as
jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction.
Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 38 The failure
of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the
DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the
whims of the parties.39

In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency
without jurisdiction is a total nullity.40 Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant case is null and
void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This
Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and the
Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MARO’s Decision
dated 4 March 1993, and the DARAB’s Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 144817 March 7, 2002

JOSE OCA, ISABELO OCA, RODOLFO O. GUTLAY, and JOSE ABRAZALDO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This case arose from a dispute concerning tenancy relations over four parcels of fishpond property located in the
province of Pangasinan. Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in the
locality as the "Purong" property, situated in Bolosan, Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees
of another called the "Salayog" property also located at Bolosan. Petitioner Jose Oca, on the other hand, is the
sole and exclusive owner of two fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties, which are
located at Bolosan and Angaldan, Pangasinan, respectively. 1âw phi1.nêt

Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be the "share-tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds. He allegedly
has been performing all the phases of farm work needed for the production of bangus. The only contribution of
petitioners Jose and Isabelo Oca are their lands. Pursuant to the sharing agreement imposed by the petitioners,
all the bangus produced from the above fishponds belong to them, while he gets the sari-sari fishes as his share.
He then asserts that he has been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid fishponds from
the time he received those from the petitioners Oca brothers until the first week of May 1992, when he requested
from them his share of the harvest. Instead of acceding to his request, petitioners demanded that he vacate the
ponds.

A Complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages, with Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory
Order,1 was filed by the respondent against petitioners on July 9, 1999 with the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region I, Lingayen, Pangasinan. It
prayed for, among other things, the Adjudicator to "order the (petitioners) to fix with the (respondent) the lease
rental of the parcels of fishpond, subject of this case, in the amount representing 25% of the average net normal
harvest of Bangus annually."2

In their Answer (with Counterclaim) filed on July 23, 1992, petitioners denied that respondent is a
tenant/caretaker of the fishponds subject of the present controversy. They asserted that as owners or civil law
lessees of the fishponds, they themselves are the cultivators and have not engaged any caretaker or tenant
thereon. From time to time, though, they would hire workers or laborers paid either on a daily or "piece-work"
basis.

Petitioners acknowledged that in 1985, respondent became their industrial partner over the Salayog property.
They insisted, however, that he had already waived his right as such, in consideration of the sum
of P140,000.00. To conclude, they argued that since respondent is not their tenant or caretaker, the case is not
within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator. They prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and payment
of damages.

On September 25, 1992, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator issued a Decision in favor of the respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Plaintiff (herein Respondent) as bona fide tenant of the parcels of fishpond in question.

2. Making permanent the restraining order for the Defendants (herein Petitioners) not to disturbed (sic)
plaintiff’s peaceful possession, work and care of the fishpond in question.

3. Enforcing the right of the plaintiff to become the agricultural lessee in the fishpond in question; and
 4. Ordering the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Mangaldan, Pangasinan to assist the plaintiff and
defendants, Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca, to determine and fix the lease rentals of the fishpond in
question.

SO ORDERED."3

The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The Board on April 18, 1996 affirmed in toto the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.4

Petitioners then sought relief with the Court of Appeals. They filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, "pursuant
to Section 54 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in relation to Section 1, Rule XIV of the Revised Rules
of Procedure of the DARAB."5 They grounded the petition on the alleged errors in the Board’s finding of facts
and conclusion of law, which caused them grave and irreparable damages. On August 18, 2000, the Court of
Appeals promulgated the presently assailed Decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"However, the Court takes exception to the finding of public respondent (DARAB) that private respondent
(herein respondent) is a tenant with regard to the "Salayog" property. As per "Agreement" dated October
5, 1985, petitioners (herein petitioners) and private respondent became civil law co-lessees with respect
to said properties... And having sold his share and interest on the "Salayog" property, private respondent
consequently waived any interests he had thereon.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Consequently, private
respondent is declared as bonafide tenant only with regard to the parcels of fishpond property
exclusively owned by petitioner Jose Oca, and that co-owned by petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca.
In all other respects, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED."6

Petitioners elevated the case before us and filed the instant petition. They advanced a new argument assailing
the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator over the subject matter of the action. They raised
the following issues:

"1. Are fishponds, like the subject matter of this case, covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, such that controversies relative to production or tillage therein come under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board?

2. Does the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board have jurisdiction over cases involving
fishponds?

3. Did the Honorable Court of Appeals err in upholding or affirming the Decision of the DARAB in this
case?

4. Could the issue of jurisdiction be raised for the first time on Appeal in the Supreme Court, when the
same has not been raised in the DARAB, nor in the Court of Appeals?"7

The petition is bereft of merit.

We begin where petitioners ended. The jugular issue is can they be permitted to impugn for the first time the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case.

The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the Constitution
and the law.8 It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired
through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of
the court.9 Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter
being legislative in character.10

An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance,11 as the lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action.12 This kind of defense can be invoked even for the
first time on appeal13 or after final judgment.14 Such is understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is
statutorily determined.15

This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, estoppel or
waiver may operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this form of defense. Thus, we have
held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy16 that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from
invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea.17 We defined laches as "failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it."18

In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they never disputed the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the
DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages
of this case to contest the adjudicator’s exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest.
Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction during the eight years this case
was under litigation.19

Instead, petitioners diligently participated in the litigation below. This is evidenced by the fact that they have
tendered responsive pleadings, attended conferences participated in the hearings and appealed adverse
decisions against them. By their conduct, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the adjudicator.
Consequently, they must not be allowed to deny his jurisdiction after submitting to it. The rule is that the active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.20

It also bears emphasis that petitioners instituted a counterclaim against the respondent. They prayed not only for
the dismissal of the case but likewise asked for the payment of damages based on the latter’s purported bad
faith. By filing a counterclaim, they recognized and expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator. They cannot now insist the want of it only after an unfavorable decision was issued against them. It
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief (by advancing a counterclaim), to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.21 The party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid but
because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.22

But this is not all. In their petition before us, petitioners only impugn the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator
without arguing a single issue in respect of the merits of his Decision, as well as the Decisions of the DARAB
and the Court of Appeals, which upheld it in succession. They failed to question their findings of facts or
conclusions of law. The shift of stance in attacking solely the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the adjudicator is a
flimsy ruse or excuse to delay, if not totally avoid, compliance with what apparently is an inevitable legal
obligation.

The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant’s right by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean rendering useless all the proceedings held below. A great
deal of time, effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the litigants and of the State. This is
especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted litigation.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify the assailed Decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. Cost against the petitioners. 1âwphi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO
ABAJON, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner
and the private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent as not proper for trial.

The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:

The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters x 3
meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding is
part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu.
The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the
other members of the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property
in favor of the petitioner.

In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The
landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be
shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In
1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the
P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.

Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told
Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on
the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate
the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation
before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted
by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.

On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she
reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for
malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all
the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30,
1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the
case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between
the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1
983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:

That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is
devoted to bananas;

That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which act is
prohibited by law; and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR. Acting on said
appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its
Order 2 of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land involved is a
residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within
the industrial zone of the town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay,
Cebu."

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister, herein
respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous
Order 3dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed to harass the accused into vacating
his tillage.

In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes, testified that
Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation. The grandson of
Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former, stating that he received said share
from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the present owners received in his presence a bunch of
bananas from the accused representing ½ or 50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had
acquired the property. 4

From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former owner,
who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10
of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are legally
bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting
merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters."6

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating
only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner.

II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and hearing by
the court. 7

We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To invest
him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers,
owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and,
as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;

xxx xxx xxx

RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient use
of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance
for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in
income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty
square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square
meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm
family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land
because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought to be reviewed
is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.

The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner, Andrea
Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the
petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A.
3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).

We disagree.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of
one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.10

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This
is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor
received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area
tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the
private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a
tenant of the said portion.

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private
respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the
criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.

Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold that the remand
of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice.
Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of justice at all, nor is it necessary,
because this High Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public
interest, and towards the expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of
the case with finality. 11

The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for allegedly cutting
down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to
the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the private respondent will have to
incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below
were to resume. Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and
the consequent costs of such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle,
Impoverished that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can only interpret as
harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the
Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If justice
can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a
mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its
final termination.

As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit stating that after
she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth about P50.00.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed an affidavit to
the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana trees.12

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of
another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious
mischief."13

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:

1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.

After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case against the
private respondent be dismissed.

The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees
because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said
crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith
because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private
respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners. Consequently,
whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the
landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused
to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No.
4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for
appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129572. June 26, 2000]

PHILBANCOR FINANCE, INC. AND VICENTE HIZON, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), ALFREDO PARE,
PABLO GALANG and AMADO VIE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition
for review of the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board sustaining the ruling of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of San Fernando, Pampanga allowing the legal redemption by private
respondents of two parcels of land mortgaged to and acquired by petitioner Philbancor at public auction.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"Private respondents Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang and Amado Vie, as plaintiffs, filed with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a complaint for maintenance of possession with
redemption and tenancy right of pre-emption against petitioners Philbancor Finance, Inc. and Vicente
Hizon, Jr. Private respondents alleged, inter alia, that petitioner Vicente Hizon, Jr. is the owner of the
disputed agricultural lands covered by TCT Nos. 48320 and 48323 located in Balite, San Fernando,
Pampanga and that they (private respondents) are the legitimate and bonfide tenants thereof; that on
October 13, 1983, petitioner Hizon, without their knowledge, mortgaged the disputed lots to petitioner
Philbancor Finance, Inc.; that petitioner Hizon failed to pay his obligations to petitioner Philbancor,
which eventually led to the sale of the mortgaged lots to the latter; that they came to know of the
transaction only when they were notified by petitioner Philbancor to vacate the lots; that they have
been tenants on the lots for more than fifty (50) years; that petitioner Philbancor threatened to take
from them the actual or physical possession of the agricultural lots; that unless the threatened acts of
petitioner are restrained, they will suffer substantial and irreparable injury (Complaint, Rollo, pp. 51-
55).

"In his answer, petitioner Hizon admitted that private respondents are his bonafide and legitimate
tenants but he averred, by way of affirmative defenses, that he is not threatening to take possession
of the disputed lots as he is no longer the owner thereof after said lots were foreclosed by petitioner
Philbancor; that private respondents were aware when he mortgaged the lots as they were with him
when he tried to negotiate for payment of his loan to petitioner Philbancor (CA Rollo, p. 29).

"In its answer, petitioner Philbancor alleged, among others, that it has no tenancy or agricultural
relationship with private respondents considering that it acquired ownership over the disputed lots by
virtue of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale pursuant to Act 3135, as amended; that it is not an
agricultural lessor as contemplated in Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended; that
assuming private respondents have the right to redeem the lots in question, such right has already
expired in accordance with Section 12 of R. A. 3844, which states that the right of redemption may be
exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the sale (CA Rollo, pp. 30-31).

"In a Decision dated September 17, 1993, Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

"1. Ordering the redemption by the plaintiffs of the land in question at the price of P201,182.92;

"2. Ordering the defendant, Philbamcor Finance, Inc., to execute the necessary Deed of Redemption
in favor of the plaintiffs; and
 "3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pampanga to cause the registration of the land
in question to be conveyed to and redeemed by the plaintiffs;

"The counterclaim of the defendant Philbancor Finance, Inc. is hereby dismissed." (Ibid., pp. 81-90)

"Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Provincial Adjudicator
(CA Rollo, pp. 108-109). On appeal, public respondent Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) affirmed in toto the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator in a Decision dated March 8,
1996 (Ibid., pp. 26-35).

"Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent DARAB in a Resolution (Ibid., pp.
36-38) dated July 22, 1996, x x x."[2]

On August 14, 1996, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the decision of the DARAB. [3]

After due proceedings, on March 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. [4]

On April 18, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision; however, on
May 19, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. [5]

Hence, this appeal.[6]

The petition raises three issues; however, the last issue raised is decisive, hence, only this issue is herein resolved,
that is, whether or not the private respondents could still exercise their right of redemption of the parcels of land sold
at public auction due to foreclosure of the mortgages thereon considering that they invoked their right to redeem only
on July 14, 1992, seven years after the date of registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.

We grant the petition.

Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides as follows:

"In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. Provided, that
the entire landholding sold must be redeemed. Provided further, that where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this section may be exercised within
two (2) years from the registration of the sale and shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption."[7]

In this case, the certificate of sale of the subject property, which was sold at public auction, was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga on July 31, 1985.[8] The two-year redemption period thus expired on July 31, 1987.
The complaint for redemption was filed by respondents only on July 14, 1992, [9] five (5) years after expiration of the
redemption period prescribed by law.

Nonetheless, private respondents may continue in possession and enjoyment of the land in question as legitimate
tenants[10] because the right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. [11] The leasehold relation is not
extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. [12]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint for redemption filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga. This is without prejudice to the right of the private
respondents to continue as agricultural tenants in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by them.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

 [G.R. No. 128177. August 15, 2001]

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA
ABALOS, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of
tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] dated September 20, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution[2] dated January 15, 1997, denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit

The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of 24,550 square meters,
more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters; fishpond with an area of 14,000
square meters; and residential land with an area of 1,740 square meters, more or less. Bounded
on the N, by river and Filemon Anselmo; on the South by Alejandro Soriano and Filemon
Anselmo; and on the West by Fortunata Soriano.

Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-described property
passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for
a period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman Soriano, one of the children of
Adriano Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease. After
executing an extra judicial settlement among themselves, the heirs of Adriano Soriano
subsequently subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot
No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was
assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold by
Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-
fourths shares in Lot No. 8459 also to petitioners.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and appointed
Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter, Roman Soriano filed CAR Case
No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. The agrarian
court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on appeal, the decision was reversed by
the Court of Appeals, which decision became final and executory. However, prior to the
execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the
de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the
lease in 1982. In an Order dated December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was
approved by the agrarian court.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths
(3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed as LRC Case No. N-3405. Said application for
registration was granted by the trial court, acting as a land registration court, per Decision dated
June 27, 1983. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the land registration
court. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court by Roman Soriano docketed as G.R.
70842, was denied for lack of merit and entry of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of the land registration
courts decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio and Librada Soriano, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 37, and against petitioners, an action for annulment of
document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 159568 (sic;
should be 15958). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, pendency
of another action, laches, misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the
trial court.

Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the post-decisional
agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera in CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for
reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution
of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The
motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the subject property, jointly with
Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Romans property to answer for the use and occupation
by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property. On October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to
suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, which, however, was denied by the
agrarian court. The agrarian court likewise authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by
petitioners. Sorianos motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case
No. 159568 (sic) for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was
amended to substitute Sorianos heirs, herein private respondents, as party-plaintiffs. The
complaint was again amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having
allegedly purchased part of the disputed property from petitioners. On motion of petitioners, the
re-amended complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the re-amended
complaint altered the cause of action. Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and
petitioners were ordered to file their Answer, in view of which petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A. GR SP No. 22149.

On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman Soriano (substituted
by private respondents) impugning the denial of their motion to suspend hearing on the rental
demanded by petitioners, and authorizing the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners,
on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the agrarian court. Thus,
private respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed
as G.R. 93401.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR SP No. 22149, also denied
the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners, ruling that the land registration
court committed no error when it refused to adhere to the rule of res judicata. Petitioners then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. 99843.

On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in G.R. 93401, and granted the
petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
petition of private respondents was set aside, and the motion for execution filed by petitioners
in CAR Case No. 1724-P-48 was denied.

On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, in G.R. 99843, reversed and set aside the denial of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. GR SP No. 22149, and consequently, Civil Case No. 15958 for
annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered dismissed.

On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication
Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo
Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as DARAB Case No. 528-P-93.

Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. N-
3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee on Partition per Order dated
March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land registration court approved the partition of Lot No.
8459, with Lot No. 8459-A assigned to private respondent, and Lot No. 8459-B assigned to
petitioners. For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T. No. 22670 was issued in the name of petitioners; for Lot
No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No. 22687 was issued, also in the name of petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-
A, O.C.T. No. 22686 was issued in the name of Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said partition,
private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 119497. The
appellate court affirmed the partition but reversed the order of the land registration court
directing the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No.
15958.

On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 99843, dismissed Civil Case No. 15958, in view of which, petitioner, on November
25, 1993, in LRC Case No. N-3405, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or
writ of possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. Per
Resolution dated January 21, 1994, said motion was held in abeyance by the land registration
court until and after DARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer for status
quo, has been resolved.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984, petitioners interposed an
appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. 115073. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1994
issued by the Supreme Court, petitioners appeal, which was treated as a petition for certiorari,
was referred to this Court [of Appeals] for determination and disposition. [3]

The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration court and ordered
instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor of private respondents. With the denial
of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are now before us raising the following grounds:
 1. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF TENANT-CARETAKER.
2. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD EARLIER
PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR PETITION.[4]
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of
others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and
the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner
and possession of a holder.[5] A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The
possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements
thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist
surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident.[6]
There is no dispute that private respondents (petitioners below) title over the land under litigation has
been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration pertains only to ownership and
does not automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case where there is a third party
occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land
registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue
in the security of tenure case filed by petitioners (private respondents below) before the DARAB.
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject
land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law.[7] The
Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have
the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.[8]The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
However, petitioners status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping with judicial
order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property.As
ratiocinated in Nona v. Plan[9]

It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the recent Presidential
Decrees which are impressed with an even more solicitous concern for the rights of the
tenants. If, therefore, as he pointed out in his order granting the writ of possession, there is
a pending case between the parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations, ordinary
prudence, let alone the letter of the law, ought to have cautioned him against granting the
plea of private respondents that they be placed in possession of the land in controversy. x x
x. At the time the challenged orders were issued, without any showing of how the tenancy
controversy in the Court of Agrarian Relations was disposed of, respondent Judge could not by
himself and with due observance of the restraints that cabin and confine his jurisdiction pass
upon the question of tenancy. (Emphasis ours)
 In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of finality of judgments. It
applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become final, the issuance of a writ of execution becomes
ministerial. The appellate court held that petitioners situation does not fall under any of the exceptions to this
rule since his occupation of the subject land did not transpire after the land registration courts adjudication
became final.
In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioners claim of possession as
a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to protection against dispossession.
Private respondents argue that petitioners tenancy claim is barred by res judicata, having been ruled upon
in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue in the case before us, this question should properly
be resolved in DARAB Case No. 528-P-93. To restate, the only issue before us is whether or not a winning
party in a land registration case can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are
still pending determination before the DARAB.
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose
security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing
party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one
claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latters occupancy was unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996, as well as its Resolution dated January
15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in LRC Case
No. N-3405 dated January 21, 1994 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37736. February 23, 1988.]

ANTONIO EVANGELISTA Y LISING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUZ CASTAÑEDA and HEIRS OF
BENEDICTO SANCHEZ, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; AGRICULTURAL LESSEE DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL LESSEE. — A share tenant
(under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act No. 3844) is entitled to security of tenure over the
landholding he works at. Not even the expiration of any term or period fixed in the leasehold contract, in the case of an
agricultural lessee, will cause the lessee’s ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of
civil lease, does not enjoy security of tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee can be ejected from the
land after the expiration of the term provided for in the contract.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, GENERALLY FINDING AND CONCLUSIVE.
— The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land in
question, which are based on the evidence on record, is final and conclusive. The salient characteristic which would make
the relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by
the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, is absent in the case at bar. As cited in the decision of
the respondent court, petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that petitioner used to hire many plowers,
harrowers and planters as well as farm laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang) helped the
appellee work on the land for 3 years. This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners, as a way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of
their relationship. But in the case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of the respondent court indicate that the
contracts entered into were bona fide civil lease in nature, and that they were entered into by the petitioner voluntarily.

3. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; TENANCY; PERSONAL CULTIVATION, INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. — As held in
Carag v. Court of Appeals, absent the requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can
be said to exist between him and the landowner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee. He has
not personally or by his farm household, cultivated the land in question.

4. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; LEASE; LESSEE WHO ENTERED INTO THREE CONTRACTS OF LEASE CANNOT LATER BE
HEARD TO CLAIM THAT HE IS AN AGRICULTURAL LESSEE. — A person who signed for three consecutive times a contract
of lease (Kasulatang Option and Kasulatan ng Buwisan), with the intent of establishing a civil lease contract, cannot later
be heard to claim that he is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision ** of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 August 1973, in CA G.R. No.
00033-R, entitled "Antonio Evangelista, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luz Castañeda, Et Al., defendants-appellants" which
reversed the decision *** of the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated 29 October 1970, in CAR Case No. 1182-Bulacan ‘65,
which found petitioner to be an agricultural lessee of the landholding of the private respondents.

Rosario Mendoza Sanchez (Sanchez, for short), the private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 5 hectares, more or less, situated at Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6870 of the Land Records of Bulacan.

On 24 May 1965, the petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement, with damages, in the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) in Bulacan against Sanchez and Felipe Domingo, on the strength of his claim that he was the occupant of the
landholding of Sanchez.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that since 1953, he was the tenant of Sanchez over the aforesaid landholding, until he
was illegally ejected from the same on 15 April 1965, for having informed Sanchez of his desire to fix the amount of the
rental in accordance with Republic Act No. 3844 as amended, otherwise known as the Land Reform Code. 1

The private respondents denied the alleged forcible eviction of the petitioner from the landholding. They claimed that
petitioner occupied the land in question as a lessee under a contract of civil lease, and not as an agricultural lessee under
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended: and that he (petitioner) voluntarily surrendered the land to them (private
respondents) sometime in March, 1965. 2

The defense of the private respondents was anchored on three (3) written contracts executed by Sanchez and the
petitioner, one entitled "Kasulatang Option" 3 and the other two, "Kasulatan ng Buwisan." 4

The contract entitled "Kasulatang Option," executed on 14 June 1956, contained the following terms and conditions: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

KASULATANG "OPTION"

MALAMAN NG LAHAT: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Na akong si ROSARIO M. SANCHEZ, Pilipino may sapat na gulang, kasal kay G. Juan J. Sanchez at nananahanan sa
Calumpit, Bulacan, ay.

Pinagtitibay:
chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Na ako ang tunay at tanging may-ari ng isang sukat na lupa gaya ng nasasaad sa "Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
6870" ng "Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, "at lalong makikilala gaya ng mga sumusunod: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x"

Na sa lupang nabanggit ay lima (5) hektarea ay nasa buwisan sa kasalukuyan kay Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may
sapat na gulang, binata at nananahanan sa Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan na matatapos sa taong anihan 1956-1957;

Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang P2,000.000 na ibibigay sa akin ng nasabing Antonio Evangelista (at ang pagtanggap
ng nasabing halaga ay patutunayan ng recibo) dito ay binibigyan ko siya ng pangunang pagkakataon (option) sa muling
pagpapabuwis ng nasabing pangkat na lupa. Ang panibagong kasunduan sa buwisan ay gagawin namin sa buwan ng
Enero, 1957;

Na ang halagang P2,000.00 ay bilang utang sa panibagong buwisan, datapuwa’t hanggang hindi umiiral ang panibagong
buwisan, ang nasabing halaga ay ituturing na pautang at magkakaroon ng patubo na 12%.

Na akong si Antonio Evangelista, ang naba-banggit sa itaas, ay sangayon sa lahat ng mga mababasa sa itaas.

Sa katunayan ay lumagda kami sa ibaba nito dito sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ngayong ika 14 ng Hunyo, 1956." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The period of the aforesaid agreement was from 14 June 1956 until the agricultural year 1956-57. Pursuant to said
agreement, the petitioner was given by Sanchez the option to renew the lease of the land in question in January, 1957 in
consideration of the sum of P2,000.00. 5

On 13 February 1960, petitioner and Sanchez executed a "Kasulatan ng Buwisan," 6 which contained the following terms
and conditions: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

KASULATAN NG BUWISAN

MALAMAN NANG LAHAT: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

Na akong si ROSARIO MENDOZA, Pilipina, may sapat na gulang, asawa ni Juan Sanchez, at nananahanan sa Calumpit,
Bulacan, na sa kasulatang ito ay tatawagin ding Nagpapabuwis, ay tunay at tanging may-ari ng isang lagay na lupa nasa
nayong Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, at nakatala alinsunod sa Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6870 ng Register of Deeds
for Bulacan, at ang mga hanggahan at takal ay gaya nang mga sumusunod: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x"

Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang ISANG DAAN (100) kabang palay kauri ng inani sa nasabing lupa bawat taon, bilang
upa o buwis na ibibigay sa akin ni Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may sapat na gulang, binata at naninirahan sa nayon
nang Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, na sa kasulatang ito ay tatawagin ding Namumuwisan, ay aking inililipat, isinasalin at
pinabubuwisan sa nasabing namumuwisan ang isang bahagi nang lupang sa itaas ay binabanggit na may sukat na limang
(5) hektarea, humigit, kumulang, at ang hanggahan ay itong mga sumusunod: jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph

"x x x"

Ang mga kasunduan at pasubali ng buwisan ito ay ang mga sumusunod: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

1. TANING NANG BUWISAN: Tatlong (3) taon na sisimulan sa taong anihang ito, 1960-1961, at matatapos sa taong
anihan 1962-1963, buwan ng Pebrero, ngunit ang Namumuwisan ay may pangunang karapatan (option) batay sa
kanyang lagak, upang magpatuloy ng pamumuwisan, kung ang lupa ay pabubuwisan pa;
2. PAGBABAYAD NG BUWIS: Ang 100 kabang palay na buwis ay ibibigay nang Namumuwisan sa nagpapabuwis
pagkatapos nang paggiik, ngunit ang pagbabayad ay hindi lalampas ang Pebrero nang bawat taon nang pamumuwisan:
virtua l 1aw lib rary
chanrob 1es

3. LAGAK: Ang lagak nang Namumuwisan ay P2,500.00 na walang patubo, na ito’y nananagutan kung hindi makatupad
ang Namumuwisan sa kaniyang mga tungkulin sa ilalim nang kasunduang ito, at ang hindi pagkakasaoli nang lagak na
ito, ay hindi magiging dahilan nang hindi pagkatapos nang buwisan;

4. MEJORA: Tungkulin nang Namumuwisan na sikapin at alagaang mabuti ang lupang binubuwisan at isaoli sa
Nagpapabuwis pagkatapos nang buwisan, at iiwanang lahat ang mejorang ilagay niya at dito’y wala siyang karapatang
humingi o sumingil nang ano man;

5. PATUBIG AT BUWIS SA PAMAHALAAN: Ang patubig ay babayaran nang Namumuwisan ang dalawa sa tatlong bahagi
(2/3) at ang ikatlo (1/3) ay ang Nagpapabuwis;

6. PAGSASAKA: Ang pamumuwisang ito ay hindi dapat na ipakahulugan nang sino mang magsaka sa lupa sa panahon
nang pamumuwisan ay naging kasama nang Nagpapabuwis, kaya, pagkatapos nang buwisan, ang posecion ay isasaoli
nang Namumuwisan sa Nagpapabuwis at siya o sino man ay walang ano mang paghahabol sa pagsasaka;

7. PAGPAPATALA: Kung sakali’t ipatatala sa Register of Deeds ang kasulatang ito, ang gugol ay sa Namumuwisan at ang
kasulatan na ring ito ang magiging sapat na pabala sa Register of Deeds, pagkatapos nang buwisang ito, upang
pawalang bisa ang pagkakatala sa titulo nang lupa (cancel on incumbrance on the title) [sic].

Na akong si Antonio Evangelista, ang Namumuwisan sa itaas na nababanggit, ay sangayon sa lahat nang mababasa sa
itaas at katunayan linagdaan namin ito sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ngayong 13th ng Pebrero, 1960, sa harap nang dalawang
saksi sa kasulatan." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

On 11 September 1963, petitioner and Sanchez executed a new "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" 7 which provided for the same
terms and conditions stated in their previous "Kasulatan ng Buwisan, dated 13 February 1960, except as to the period of
the contract and the amounts of rental and deposit. The contract was for a period of one agricultural year, 1963-64, and
expired on February, 1964, The rental for the use of the landholding was reduced to 90 cavans of palay a year. And
petitioner deposited with Sanchez the sum of P2,250.00 without interest, which was to be returned to the petitioner after
the period of the contract shall have expired.

On 30 March 1965, following the expiration of the period provided in the last "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" executed by
petitioner and Sanchez, the latter executed another "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" 8 over the land in question, effective for the
agricultural year 1965-66, with Felipe Domingo.

Hence, the filing of petitioner of the action in the Court of Agrarian Relations which, after hearing, rendered judgment,
the dispositive part of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

1. Declaring the plaintiff to be the agricultural lessee on the land in question with an area of 5 hectares more or less,
situated at Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan;

2. Ordering the defendant Felipe Domingo to vacate said landholding and surrender the possession thereof to the
plaintiff;

3. Ordering defendants Luz S. Castañeda and Benedicto Sanchez to reinstate the plaintiff to said landholding and to
return to the plaintiff the sum of P3,500.00;

4. Dismissing the other claims and counterclaims of the parties.

No pronouncement as to costs." 9

The private respondents appealed the CAR judgment to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, reversed the
decision of the trial court, on the following grounds: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph

"1. That when the appellee, Antonio Evangelista first took possession of the property in 1954, it was by virtue of a lease
contract which he admitted was given to him by the late Rosario Mendoza, but that he lost the same (pp. 15-17. tsn,
Dec. 15, 1956), which was for a term of 3 years and this is confirmed by Exh. C or 3, titled "KASULATANG OPTION"
under a proviso which states —

"Na sa lupang nabanggit ay lima (5) hectarea ay nasa buwisan sa kasalukuyan kay Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may
sapat na gulang, binata, at nananahan sa Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, na matatapos sa taong anihan 1956-1957;

"2. That the two most important conditions of the lease agreement which was renewed by both the appellee Antonio
Evangelista as the lessee, and the late Rosario Mendoza, as shown by Exhibit A or 1, titled "KASULATANG BUWISAN," are
as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"3. LAGAK: Ang lagak ng Namumuwisan ay P2,500.00 na walang patubo, na ito’y nanagutan kung hindi makatupad ang
Namumuwisan sa kanyang mga tungkulin ng kasunduang ito, ay hindi magiging dahilan ng hindi pagkatapos nang
buwisan;

x x x

"6. PAGSASAKA: Ang Namumuwisang ito ay hindi dapat na ipakahulugan nang sino mang magsaka sa lupa sa panahon
nang pamumuwisan ay naging kasama nang Nagpapabuwis, kaya pagkatapos nang buwisan ang posecion ay isasaoli
nang Namumuwisan sa Nagpapabuwis at siya o sino man ay walang ano mang paghahabol sa pagsasaka;

x x x

"3. That herein appellee Antonio Evangelista voluntarily agreed to these two conditions imposed by the late Rosario
Mendoza, as shown by the following portion of the said written agreement —

"Na akong si Antonio Evengelista, ang Namumuwisan sa itaas na nabanggit, ay sangayon sa lahat nang mababasa sa
itaas at katunayan linagdaan namin ito sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ngayong ika-13 ng Pebrero, 1960, sa harap ng dalawang
saksi sa kasulatan."cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

"4. That this lease agreement was again renewed as shown by Exhibits B or 2, incorporating the same above-stated
conditions, and that all these questioned lease agreements were all duly acknowledged before a Notary Public; and were
worded in Tagalog the dialect prevailing in Bulacan province, and is therefore clearly understood by the appellee Antonio
Evangelista;

"5. That even prior to 1954 when appellee first took possession of the landholding in question, the same has been
previously leased to one Macario Domingo, wayback in 1945, as disclosed by Exh. 6-B, which is an annotation at the
back of the title of the questioned property, and such lease agreement was finally cancelled only in 1954, Exh. 6-C, all of
which are found in Exhibit 6-A, at the lapse of which the appellee herein took over from said Macario Domingo, and all
these are confirmed by the latter who declared that he was the lessee of the same land from 1946-1954; that it expired
in March, 1954; and the appellee took over from him in April, 1954; that he also pays a rental of 90 cavans like the
appellee, irrespective of the harvest of the land; that the other lessee before him were — Jose Albania, Urbano Lopez and
Pablo Caluag (tsn. pp. 17-26, Dec. 9, 1969);

"6. That the appellee’s original status. therefore in 1954 was that of a lessee, is also confirmed by his own Exhibit D,
captioned "Patalastas", the pertinent parts of which read —

CONDISION SA PARTIHAN NG ANI: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Buwisan ng 90 cavans isang taon.

x x x

"(1) Pagbabago ng pagsasamahan na ang dati na Buisan ay mahalinhan ng samahang Buisan na batay sa batas . . ." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

x x x

all of which reveal that the herein appellee started working for the first time in 1954 as a lessee, and not as tenant,
furthermore his very own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that herein appellee used to hire many plowers, harrowers
and planters and also farm laborers, who are paid by him (tsn, pp. 60-62, Sept. 26, 1969); that he himself helped the
appellee worked on the land for 3 years (tsn., p. 53, id)

"7. That the herein appellee Antonio Evangelista is a Rice Dealer, with a total net worth of about P17,112.10, as shown
clearly by a "Profit and Loss Statement," (Exh. 4) duly attested by a Certified Public Accountant, executed in appellee’s
favor by a law and accounting firm of Santos A. Avenir & Associates, on January 22, 1963;

"8. That he is the owner of two (2) duly licensed guns — namely — One (1) .22 Cal. Rifle; and one (1) .22 Cal. Revolver,
as shown by Exhs. 4-Land 4-D (sic);

"9. That there is no express provisions of any existing law, particularly under Republic Act 1199, as amended, or under
Republic Act 3844, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Reform Code, which prohibits the parties from entering
into a contract of civil lease of an agricultural land, under the New Civil Code, for a limited period of time, as in fact this
latter law, Republic Act 3844, as amended, impliedly recognizes the existence of a civil law lessee, as this is distinguished
from an agricultural lessee, as may be found under Sec. 166, (2) which reads —
"(2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land, belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of
production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in
the Civil Code of the Philippines."
cralaw virtu a1aw lib rary

implying in effect that if the lessee does not personally cultivate the landholding, the agreement becomes a civil law lease
under the Civil Code.

"10. That as may be observed from the terms and conditions of the questioned lease agreements, particularly under the
common conditions found in par. (6) thereof, the appellee-lessee, is in fact authorized to hire plowers, harrowers and
other farm laborers or workers, but that this does not authorize them to later on claim that they are the tenants of the
lessor therein, the late Rosario Mendoza Sanchez, over the said landholding." cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

"Consonant to the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the herein appellee Antonio Evangelista, had
not worked personally or could (not) have worked on the land holding in question by himself, and with the aid of the
members of his immediate farm household, consequently he could not therefore be considered either as a share tenant,
or a lease-hold tenant, contemplated by Republic Act 1199, as amended, or as an agricultural lessee, as defined by
Republic Act 3844, as amended, also known as the Land Reform Code, who is entitled to a security of tenure, as provided
therein, under and pursuant to the questioned lease agreements, for these covenants clearly fall under the provisions of
the New Civil Code whereby one of the parties, binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of his property for
a price certain, and for a definite period specified therein. (Art. 1643, New Civil Code)." 10

Hence, the petitioner’s present recourse to this Court.

The only issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Rep. Act No. 3844, and therefore
entitled to security of tenure over the landholding, in question, or a mere civil law lessee, who does not enjoy security of
tenure in the sense that he may he ejected from the landholding upon the expiration of the term provided in the contract
of lease.

A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act No. 3844) is entitled to security of
tenure over the landholding he works at. Not even the expiration of any term or period fixed in the leasehold contract, in
the case of an agricultural lessee, will cause the lessee’s ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil lessee,
under a contract of civil lease, 11 does not enjoy security of tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee can
be ejected from the land after the expiration of the term provided for in the contract.

The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land in question,
which are based on the evidence on record, is final and conclusive. 12 The salient characteristic which would make the
relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by the
petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, is absent in the case at bar. As cited in the decision of the
respondent court, petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that petitioner used to hire many plowers,
harrowers and planters as well as farm laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang) helped the
appellee work on the land for 3 years. Even the decision of the trial court showed that petitioner did not personally
cultivate the land in question. It held that: jgc:chanrobles .com.p h

"Nicolas Maclang declared that he saw plaintiff (Evangelista) work on the land in question from 1962 to 1965; . . .; that
he (Maclang) helped the plaintiff work the land in question by plowing and harrowing the same for 3 years under the
suyuan system; that the Plaintiff used his 2 carabaos and own farm implements in the cultivation of the land in question
and that the plaintiff had other companions in plowing and harrowing the landholding under the suyuan system (tsn,
hearing of September 26, 1969, pp. 47-60). Defendant Domingo declared that during the time he was working the land
of his mother which is adjacent to the land in question, he saw Nicolas Maclang, Pedro Caparas and Felipe Bernardino
plowing and harrowing the landholding in question and cleaning the dikes thereon (tsn., hearing of January 8, 1970 pp.
22-23)." 13 [Emphasis supplied]

As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, 14 absent the requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no tenancy
relationship can be said to exist between him and the landowner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be an
agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by his farm household, cultivated the land in question.

The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the land holding should be personally
cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, indicates the intent of the parties to
establish only a civil lease relationship.

A person who signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease (Kasulatang Option and Kasulatan ng Buwisan), with
the intent of establishing a civil lease contract, cannot later be heard to claim that he is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.

This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners, as a way of evading the provisions of tenancy laws, to have their
tenants sign contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship. But in the case at bar,
the grounds cited in the decision of the respondent court indicate that the contracts entered into were bona fide civil
lease in nature, and that they were entered into by the petitioner voluntarily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3844

AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE AND TO INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS
IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF TENANCY AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL
INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

TITLE
DECLARATION OF POLICY AND COMPOSITION OF CODE

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;

(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices;

(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity
and higher farm incomes;

(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural wage
earners;

(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land distribution;
and

(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society.

Section 3. Composition of Code - In pursuance of the policy enunciated in Section two, the following are
established under this Code:

(1) An agricultural leasehold system to replace all existing share tenancy systems in agriculture;

(2) A declaration of rights for agricultural labor;

(3) An authority for the acquisition and equitable distribution of agricultural land;

(4) An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of agricultural land;

(5) A machinery to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture;

(6) A machinery to provide marketing, management, and other technical services to agriculture;

(7) A unified administration for formulating and implementing projects of land reform;

(8) An expanded program of land capability survey, classification, and registration; and

(9) A judicial system to decide issues arising under this Code and other related laws and regulations.
 CHAPTER I
AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD SYSTEM

Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy - Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby
declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts
may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the
agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government machineries and
agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such
contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercise his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by
marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate provisions, such as the
organization of cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have been made
to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing
phases of such crops: Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract has ceased to
be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been entered into in violation of the
provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in possession of the land for
cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code, without
prejudice to the right of the landowner and the former tenant to enter into any other lawful contract in relation to
the land formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the security of tenure of the former tenant
under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as provided in this Code, is
not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into prior to the effectivity
of this Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom shall continue to subsist until modified by the parties in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.

Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation shall be
established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or
in writing, expressly or impliedly.

Section 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the
person who personally cultivates the same.

Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall
confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation
is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.

Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation established
under this Code shall be extinguished by:

(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;

(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be
served three months in advance; or

(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or
permanent incapacity of the lessee.

Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties - In case of
death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue
between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the
agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the
surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or
descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that
agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the
periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.

Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. - The agricultural
leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.

Section 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption - In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the
agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions:
Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner
so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: Provided, further, That where there are
two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within ninety days from
notice in writing which shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected.

Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption - In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where these
are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years
from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.

Section 13. Affidavit Required in Sale of Land Subject to Right of Pre-emption - No deed of sale of agricultural
land under cultivation by an agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry of Property unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given the written notice required in Section eleven of this
Chapter or that the land is not worked by an agricultural lessee.

Section 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption Not Applicable to Land to be Converted into Residential,
Industrial and Similar Purposes - The right of pre-emption and redemption granted under Sections eleven and
twelve of this Chapter cannot be exercised over landholdings suitably located which the owner bought or holds
for conversion into residential, commercial, industrial or other similar non-agricultural purposes: Provided,
however, That the conversion be in good faith and is substantially carried out within one year from the date of
sale. Should the owner fail to comply with the above condition, the agricultural lessee shall have the right to
repurchase under reasonable terms and conditions said landholding from said owner within one year after the
aforementioned period for conversion has expired: Provided, however, That the tenure of one year shall cease
to run from the time the agricultural lessee petitions the Land Authority to acquire the land under the provisions
of paragraph 11 of Section fifty-one.

Section 15. Agricultural Leasehold Contract in General - The agricultural lessor and the agricultural lessee shall
be free to enter into any kind of terms, conditions or stipulations in a leasehold contract, as long as they are not
contrary to law, morals or public policy. A term, condition or stipulation in an agricultural leasehold contract is
considered contrary to law, morals or public policy:

(1) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a rental in excess of that which is hereinafter provided for
in this Chapter;

(2) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a consideration in excess of the fair rental value as defined
herein, for the use of work animals and/or farm implements belonging to the agricultural lessor or to any
other person; or

(3) If it is imposed as a condition in the agricultural leasehold contract: (a) that the agricultural lessee is
required to rent work animals or to hire farm implements from the agricultural lessor or a third person, or
to make use of any store or services operated by the agricultural lessor or a third person; or (b) that the
agricultural lessee is required to perform any work or render any service other than his duties and
obligations provided in this Chapter with or without compensation; or (c) that the agricultural lessee is
required to answer for any fine, deductions and/or assessments.
Any contract by which the agricultural lessee is required to accept a loan or to make payment therefor in kind
shall also be contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Section 16. Nature and Continuity of Conditions of Leasehold Contract - In the absence of any agreement as to
the period, the terms and conditions of a leasehold contract shall continue until modified by the parties:
Provided, That in no case shall any modification of its terms and conditions prejudice the right of the agricultural
lessee to the security of his tenure on the landholding: Provided, further, That in case of a contract with a period
an agricultural lessor may not, upon the expiration of the period increase the rental except in accordance with
the provisions of Section thirty-four.

Section 17. Form and Registration of Contract - Should the parties decide to reduce their agreement into
writing, the agricultural leasehold contract shall be drawn in quadruplicate in a language or dialect known to the
agricultural lessee and signed or thumb-marked both by the agricultural lessee personally and by the agricultural
lessor or his authorized representative, before two witnesses, to be chosen by each party. If the agricultural
lessee does not know how to read, the contents of the document shall be read and explained to him by his
witness. The contracting parties shall acknowledge the execution of the contract before the justice of the peace
of the municipality where the land is situated. No fees or stamps of any kind shall be required in the preparation
and acknowledgment of the instrument. Each of the contracting parties shall retain a copy of the contract. The
justice of the peace shall cause the third copy to be delivered to the municipal treasurer of the municipality
where the land is located and the fourth copy to the Office of the Agrarian Counsel.

Except in case of mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, an agricultural contract reduced in
writing and registered as hereinafter provided, shall be conclusive between the contracting parties, if not
denounced or impugned within thirty days after its registration.

Section 18. Registration of Leasehold Contract - The municipal treasurer shall, upon receipt of his copy of the
contract, require the agricultural lessee and agricultural lessor to present their respective copies of the contract,
and shall cause to be annotated thereon the date, time and place of registration as well as its entry or
registration number.

Section 19. Registry of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts - The Municipal Treasurer of the municipality wherein
the land is situated shall keep a record of all such contracts drawn and executed within his jurisdiction, to be
known as "Registry of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts". He shall keep this registry together with a copy of each
contract entered therein, and make annotations on said registry of all subsequent acts relative to each contract,
such as its renewal, novation, cancellation, etc. No registration fees or documentary stamps shall be required in
the registration of said contracts or of any subsequent acts relative thereto.

Section 20. Memorandum of Loans - No obligation to pay money on account of loans including interest thereon
obtained by the agricultural lessee from the agricultural lessor or his representative shall be enforceable unless
the same or a memorandum thereof be in writing in a language or dialect known to the agricultural lessee, and
signed or thumb-marked by him, or by his agent.

Section 21. Exemption from Lien and/or Execution - The following shall be exempt from lien and/or execution
against the agricultural lessee:

(1) Twenty-five per centum of the entire produce of the land under cultivation; and

(2) Work animals and farm implements belonging to the agricultural lessee: Provided, That their value
does not exceed one thousand pesos. But no article or species of property mentioned in this Section
shall be exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.

Section 22. Use of Accepted Standards of Weights and Measures - In all transactions entered into between the
agricultural lessee and the agricultural lessor concerning agricultural products the official or, upon agreement of
the parties, the accepted standards of weights and measures shall be used.

Section 23. Rights of Agricultural Lessee in General - It shall be the right of the agricultural lessee:
 (1) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;

(2) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest which conform
to proven farm practices;

(3) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work; and

(4) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and warehouse receipts
for the produce due him.

Section 24. Right to a Home Lot - The agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive
possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall
be considered as included in the leasehold.

Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee shall have the right to be indemnified for
the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the
improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons his landholding for just cause or is ejected
therefrom. In addition, he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of the necessary and useful improvements
made by him on the landholding: Provided, That these improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their
utility at the time of surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at which time their value shall be
determined for the purpose of the indemnity for improvements.

Section 26. Obligations of the Lessee - It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessee:

(1) To cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on the landholding as
a good father of a family and perform all the work therein in accordance with proven farm practices;

(2) To inform the agricultural lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed by third persons
upon the farm, without prejudice to his direct action against the trespasser;

(3) To take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him by the agricultural
lessor and see that they are not used for purposes other than those intended or used by another without
the knowledge and consent of the agricultural lessor: Provided, however, That if said work animals get
lost or die, or said farm implements get lost or are destroyed, through the negligence of the agricultural
lessee, he shall be held responsible and made answerable therefor to the extent of the value of the work
animals and/or farm implements at the time of the loss, death or destruction;

(4) To keep his farm and growing crops attended to during the work season. In case of unjustified
abandonment or neglect of his farm, any or all of his expected produce may, upon order of the Court, be
forfeited in favor of the agricultural lessor to the extent of the damage caused thereby;

(5) To notify the agricultural lessor at least three days before the date of harvesting or, whenever
applicable, of threshing; and

(6) To pay the lease rental to the agricultural lessor when it falls due.

Section 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee - It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessee:

(1) To contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a different agricultural lessor or to acquire
and personally cultivate an economic family-size farm, without the knowledge and consent of the
agricultural lessor with whom he had entered first into household, if the first landholding is of sufficient
size to make him and the members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its cultivation; or

(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That in case of illness or temporary
incapacity he may employ laborers whose services on his landholding shall be on his account.
Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year - The agricultural lessee
may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for any of the following causes:

(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household by the agricultural lessor or his representative with the knowledge and consent of the
lessor;

(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the obligations imposed upon him by
the provisions of this Code or by his contact with the agricultural lessee;

(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household by the
agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not in any way connected with farm work or even
without compulsion if no compensation is paid;

(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against the agricultural lessee
or any member of his immediate farm household; or

(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

Section 29. Rights of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the right of the agricultural lessor:

(1) To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of their contract and
the provisions of this Chapter;

(2) To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes, or in the kind of
crops to be planted: Provided, That in case of disagreement as to the proposed change, the same shall
be settled by the Court according to the best interest of the parties concerned: Provided, further, That in
no case shall an agricultural lessee be ejected as a consequence of the conversion of the land to some
other agricultural purpose or because of a change in the crop to be planted;

(3) To require the agricultural lessee, taking into consideration his financial capacity and the credit
facilities available to him, to adopt in his farm proven farm practices necessary to the conservation of the
land, improvement of its fertility and increase of its productivity: Provided, That in case of disagreement
as to what proven farm practice the lessee shall adopt, the same shall be settled by the Court according
to the best interest of the parties concerned; and

(4) To mortgage expected rentals.

Section 30. Obligations of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessor:

(1) To keep the agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of his landholding; and

(2) To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at the start of the
leasehold relation as irrigation and drainage system and marketing allotments, which in the case of
sugar quotas shall refer both to domestic and export quotas, provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.

Section 31. Prohibitions to the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessor:

(1) To dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon authorization by the Court under
Section thirty-six. Should the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of his landholding without authorization
from the Court, the agricultural lessor shall be liable for damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in
addition to the fine or imprisonment prescribed in this Code for unauthorized dispossession;

(2) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the taxes or part
thereof levied by the government on the landholding;
 (3) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any part of the rent, "canon" or
other consideration which the agricultural lessor is under obligation to pay to third persons for the use of
the land;

(4) To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in cases where the crop
has to be sold in processed form before payment of the rental; or

(5) To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of unions or organizations
of agricultural lessees in his landholding, or to initiate, dominate, assist or interfere in the formation or
administration of any such union or organization.

Section 32. Cost of Irrigation System - The cost of construction of a permanent irrigation system, including
distributory canals, may be borne exclusively by the agricultural lessor who shall be entitled to an increase in
rental proportionate to the resultant increase in production: Provided, That if the agricultural lessor refuses to
bear the expenses of construction the agricultural lessee or lessees may shoulder the same, in which case the
former shall not be entitled to an increase in rental and shall, upon the termination of the relationship, pay the
lessee or his heir the reasonable value of the improvement at the time of the termination: Provided, further, That
if the irrigation system constructed does not work, it shall not be considered as an improvement within the
meaning of this Section.

Section 33. Manner, Time and Place of Rental Payment - The consideration for the lease of the land shall be
paid in an amount certain in money or in produce, or both, payable at the place agreed upon by the parties
immediately after threshing or processing if the consideration is in kind, or within a reasonable time thereafter, if
not in kind.

In no case shall the agricultural lessor require the agricultural lessee to file a bond, make a deposit or pay the
rental in advance, in money or in kind or in both, but a special and preferential lien is hereby created in favor of
the agricultural lessor over such portion of the gross harvest necessary for the payment of the rental due in his
favor.

Section 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands Devoted to Other Crops - The consideration for
the lease of riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent of twenty-five per
centum of the average normal harvest during the three agricultural years immediately preceding the date the
leasehold was established after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing,
loading, hauling and processing, whichever are applicable: Provided, That if the land has been cultivated for a
period of less than three years, the initial consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during the
preceding years when the land was actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first year in the case of newly-
cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal: Provided, further, That after the lapse of the first three normal harvests,
the final consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during these three preceding agricultural
years: Provided, furthermore, That in the absence of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the
maximum allowed herein shall apply: Provided, finally, That if capital improvements are introduced on the farm
not by the lessee to increase its productivity, the rental shall be increased proportionately to the consequent
increase in production due to said improvements. In case of disagreement, the Court shall determine the
reasonable increase in rental.

Section 35. Exemption from Leasehold of Other Kinds of Lands - Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao,
coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, the consideration, as
well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended.

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school
 site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under
Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is
not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be
entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed
against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or
fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of
the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed
or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay
the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section twenty-seven.

Section 37. Burden of Proof - The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of
an agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.

Section 38. Statute of Limitations - An action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if
not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.