Justice Tang - Case Digest - Criminal Law 1

Articles 1 – 10 (RPC) Case Digests 1
Criminal 1 under Justice Amparo Tang
Digests for Crim1 Cases
United States V Ah Sing

G.R. NO 13005; Oct. 10, 1917
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Facts:
The defendant, a Chinamen employed as a fisherman of a steamship named Shun
Chang, docked at a Philippine Port in Cebu. When the authorities discovered that the
defendant brought 8 cans of opium onboard the ship, he confessed that he bought it from
Saigon and that he had no intention of importing it to the Philippine Soil.
Issue:
Whether the defendant has committed a crime of illegal importation of opium into
the Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The general rule indicates that mere possession of illegal drugs, aboard a
foreign vessel, does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of the country, however,
when the vessel has entered into the territory of the country, then a violation arises. It is
important to note that the vessel must be in transit to be exempted from the criminal case.
The Federal Courts of United States have held that the mere act of going to a port without
breaking bulk is prima facie evidence of importation.
It is evident in the case at the bar that the Shun Chang ship boarded at a port in
Cebu, subjecting its vessel itself to the jurisdiction of Philippine laws and courts. Further,
the defendant intends to dock at the Cebu port since this is his final stop. With this, it is
absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth Cebu for mere
pleasure of doing so. It would likewise be impossible for the defendant to consume all
opium in that large amount which logically deduces that the defendant intends to import
the opium into the Philippines. Therefore, the defendant is guilty of illegal possession and
importation of prohibited drugs.
United States V Fowler

No. 496; Dec. 31, 1902
Ponente: Torres, J.
Fact:
The two defendants and appellees, Fowler et al, have been accused of the theft of
sixteen (16) bottles of champagne of the value of $20 on 12 August 1901 while on board
the transport Lawton (US vessel). Lawton was then navigating the high seas. The
prosecutor insisted that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which
the penalty exceeds 6 month’s imprisonment or a fine over $100. The Military General
and Civil Commission admiralty has jurisdiction over all vessels flying the flag of the
United States and the same was vested in the CFI of Manila. However, it was appealed
that the Court of First Instance (CFI) was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged
since the crime was committed on the high seas and not in manila, or within the territory
comprising the Bay of Manila or upon the 3-mile limit, which the jurisdiction extends.
Articles 1 – 10 (RPC) Case Digests
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has the jurisdication to try
crimes committed on the Lawton ship?
Held:
No. According to, ACT.No.400, the Philippines has jurisdiction only with the
crimes committed in a ship registered in the Philippines or those within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Lawton is neither a ship registered in the Philippines nor
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Our courts are without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same
People V Wong Cheng

No. 18924; Oct 19, 1922
Ponente: Romualdez, J.
Facts:
The Apelle was accused of having illegaly smoked opium while onboard the
English Vessel Chanasa while anchored in Manila Bay two and a half mile from the
shores. The Attorney General urges the revocation of the Court of First Instance of
Manila to sustain the demurrer on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction over a foreign vessel
Held:
Yes. There are two fundamental rules governing the issue; first the French rule
stating that actions performed in an foreign vessel should not be prosecuted in the country
od the country within whose territorial jurisdictiom they were committed unless, their
actions affect the peace and security of the territory; second, the English Rule states that
crimes committed within territorial jurisdiction of the country, in general, is triable by the
respective court of the country.
In the case at the bar, the smoking of opium within the 3mile rule subjects the
action to be triable in the Court of Manila. Further, disorders which disturb public peace
maybe be punished by the authorities of the local jurisdiction. The idea of person
smoking opium securely on a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila is an open
defiance of the local authorities, is simply subversive of public order. To smoke opium
within Philippine territory even if aboard a foreign vessel, is certainly a breach of the
public order because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effect within our
territory.
United States V Look Chaw

No. 5887; Dec 16, 1910
Ponente: Arellano, J.
Facts:
A steamship Erroll of English nationality anchored at the port of Cebu. The
defendant, Look Chaw, carried, kept and possessed 96 kilos of opium and that he had
been surprised in the act of selling of 1000Php worth of opium. The defense presented a
demurrer, which was sustained thus this case was concerned only in the unlawful
possession of opium. The evidence illustrated that Messrs. Jack, chief of department of
the port of Cebu, and Milliron, Internal Revenue agent of Cebu, inspected the cargo and
found two sacks containing opium. The defendant admitted his ownership of the opium
and explained that he bought them in Hongkong with the purpose of selling it as
contrabands in Mexico or Vera cruz. The defense moved for a dismissal on the grounds
that the courts has no jurisdiction and that the facts concerned did not constitute a crime.
Issue:
Whether the local court has jurisdiction over the steamship Erroll.
Held:
Yes. It is a well-founded principle that although the mere possession of a thing
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports,
does not constitute a crime triable by this court, on account of such vessel is an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon Philippines soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of
the land.
People V Avila
G.R. No. 84612; March 11, 1992
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Facts:
Diosdado Avila, AgapitoAgrabio and Aurelio Silvosa were accused of murdering
Governor Gregorio P. Murillo. The Governor, while inside a car, was allegedly shot at
the head by a .45 Caliber gun, which his death ensued instantly. The trial court find the
accused Avula and Agrabio guilty of murder while Silvosa was absolved of criminal
liability. The two filed a motion for an appeal, subsequently, the trial court amended its
decision, instead of murder the two were found guilty of rebellion on the grounds that
they were, first, a member of the National’s People Army, second, they were instructed
by their to commander to “liquidate” the governor, lastly, with the reasoning for being
corrupt.
Issue:
Whether the accused are guilty of rebellion.
Held:
Yes. The evidence show that the accused were on a mission to kill to the
Governor which they successfully accomplished. It was disclosed that at the time they
committed the crime, they were members of the NPA and that they were ordered to do so
by their commanding officer. The Killing of the Governor by the accused appears
therefore to be politically motivated and tainted. Hence, this Court view the accused to
have committed the crime of simple rebellion and not murder under the amended (by
P.D. 1834) Articles of 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
U. S. Vs. Bull
G. R. No. 5270 January 15, 1910
Elliott, J.
Facts:
Appellant H. N. Bull is the master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippine Islands. On or about the 2d day of December, 1908, appellant Bull did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and
city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and
seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the said animals. As a result of the aforesaid failure of the accused, many of the animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised,
and killed. The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275 which provides that :
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means
for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading
cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without
cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon
or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to
the thorns."
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a
foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
The court held that no court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils,
Le Droit Int., sec 490et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political
agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she
came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and
as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while he vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming
that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every
element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters.
The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. The
offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the
objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. The United States has adhered
consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to
the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall said- When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of
trade, in would be obviously in convenient and dangerous to society and would subject
the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the
jurisdiction of the country.
Hence, The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and
fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Evangelista V People
G.R. No.163267; May 5, 2010
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Teofilo Evangelista was detained by the Dubai Police Authorities for the illegal
possession of the following firearms, a) 1 Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel, b) 1 Unit Mini
– Uzi 9mm Israel, Machine gun, with 2 magazines and c) 19 9mm bullets. In the morning
of Jan. 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto Jr., a customs police, were advised that a Filipino
passenger was carrying the aforementioned firearms. The Customs Police proceeded to
the tube area where they met the accused. During the investigation, the accused admitted
that he bought the firearms in Angola but were confiscated in Dubai. It was then turned
over to the Captain Nadurata of PAL, so that the accused can leave Dubai. The court
ruled that Evangelista was in violcation of Section 1 od Presidential Decree 1866 and
sentenced him to imprisonment. The accused petitioned a motion and was granted by
RTC. In that trial, the accused admitted that he was forced to take ownership of the gun
because it was the only way for him to leave the premises of Dubai. He insistently denied
ownership but with futile efforts, he then forcefully admitted he was the owner of the
firearms, which was given custody to the Captain for and on behalf of Evangelista. RTC
affirmed the decision but modified the sentence. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the same decision.
This is a petition for review because the accused claimed that he was never in
possession of the firearms when entered the premises of the Philippines, that it was in fact
in the custody of the Captain. Further, the crime was also committed within Dubai and
not in the Philippines therefore, devolving Philippine courts to have jurisdiction with the
said crime.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
Whether the crime committed was under Philippine jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. The appellant is in constructive possession of the firearm with animus
possidendi or intention to possess. The possession of Captain Nadurata of the firearms
was a conditional custody on and behalf of Evangelista so that the latter may be allowed
to leave Dubai. Apellant also claims that the Revised Penal Code does not apply to the
case at the bar because the crime is committed in Dubai and Dubai is outside of
Philippine jurisdiction, hence, the crime was outside of Philippine premises. Contrary to
the argument, the accomplishment of the petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form
upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of
the subject firearms in the Philippines. And more than mere possession, the prosecution
was able to ascertain the he has no license or authority to possess. It is beyond reasonable
doubt, that the crime was perpetrated and completed in no other place except the
Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
information. In this case, the information specifically alleged that the appellant was in
possession of the firearms at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Even more, since
there is no pending case in Dubai, it stands to reason there was no crime committed in
Dubai. Therefore, the appellant is guilty of the crime and that he is sentence of a penalty
of Prision mayor.
People V Silvestre and Atienza

G.R. No. 35748; Dec 14, 1931
Ponente: Villa-Real, J;
Facts:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Jaoquin by second marriage, co-habitated
with Martin Atienza in the barrio of Masocol, Bulacana. The husband filed a complaint
against his wife of adultery. The two defendats begged the Municipal President,
Francisco Suerte Felipe, to convinced Joaquin to withdraw the complaint. The two
defendants promised to discontinue cohabitation and leave the barrio of Masocol in
exchange for the withdrawal. Joaquin filed a motion for a dismissal of his complaint.
Subsequently, the case was dismissed and the bonds were released and the two
defendants left the barrio. About November 20, 1930, the accused Silvestre met her son
by her former marriage, Nicolas dela Cruz, in the barrio of Sto. Niño and under the
pretext of asking nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained
there. Atienza followed Silvestre in Mosocol and lives in the house of dela Cruz. While
they were gathered for supper, Mosocol told dela Cruz to take their furniture out because
he was to set fire to the house. Mosocol wanted to take revenge upon the people of
Masocol due to the adultery charges. Atienza armed with a pistol so no one dared say
anything not even Silvestre. The couple left the house and went to the Barrio Lieutenant.
The fire already started when they turned theur back. The fire destroyed about
forty eight houses. It was established that Atienza was guilty of Arson beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal by direct participation. Silvestre was guilty of arson as an accomplice
on the grounds that she did not raise a protest and did not give alarm when the fire
started.
Issue:
Whether Silvestre is guilty of arson as an accomplice.
Held:
No. The complicity which is penalized requires a certain cooperation, whether
moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material through external acts. In
the case of the accused Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation
and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Here mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not
appear that they encourage or nerved Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her
failure to alarm that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Hence, Silvestre is liable for damages but absolved of criminal liability of arson.
People V Tulin
 March 2, 1991- M/t tabanco, cargo vessel, owned by pnoc shipping and transport
sailed off with a cargo of 2k barrels of kerosene 2.6k barrels of regular gasoline,
4k barrels of diesel oil, with a value of 40M
 Has 21 crew members
o Was boarded by 7 armed men with m16,.45 and .38 caliber hand gun and
bolas.
o Detained crew and took control of vessel
o Accussed ordered three crew members to repaint the ship as “galilee”
o Tulin, Loyola, and infant jr as accused appalete here
o Galilee, of san Lorenzo, bounduras registry, sailed to singapor
 March 28, 1991- sailed and anchored about to 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore shopre line were they met another vessel navi pride of whom they were
forced to trade cargo
o Accused Emilio chanco ordered the transfer, and cheong sai hiang
supervised
o Transfer was completed march 30
 April 8-10, 1991- galilee arrived at calatagan and crew members were released in
3 batches
o First batch was fetched by cecilio chanco brother of Emilio chanco.
o They were given 20k to return home
o April 10 midnight- second batch was released
 April 12- report of the incident to pnoc and the Philippine coast guard and nbi
 May 19 tulin arrested in batangas
 Date not mentioned infant and Loyola were captured at Aguinaldo highway
 May 20 hiang and chanco arrested in the lobby of alpha hotel
 Oct 24 filing of information, they were charged with piracy and violation of pd
532.
 Defense of accused tulin- defense of denial and disputed the charges.
o Their version of the story
o March 2- while on the beach they were recruited by liboon and torradha to
join a ship.
 3k compensation a month and additional compensation for longer
o They were dismissed march 21
 Chamco- april 10, alibi, sleeping at home
 Accused found guilty of piracy, hence this appeal.
Issue: accused hiong contests that he can no longer be tried for piracy in Philippine
waters, can he still be?
Held:
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of
its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659,
the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in
1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not,
a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the
law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with
the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No.
532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree
No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified
piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
People vs Macalisang
No. L-24546
Laws Applicable: Art. 3
FACTS
Isaias Macalisang was the Chief of Police of Sinacban, Misamis Occidental. On

November 14, 1949, the incumbent Mayor Sofronio Avanceña along with his two
companions, Macalisang and Dominguez (Patrolman) was on foot to attend a wedding,
when the defeated candidate Victoriano Simbajon offered the former a ride since both
were invited to the said wedding. However, Avanceña politely declined. Simbajon and
his party left leading to the highway. Sometime later, there was a burst of gunshots which
mortally wounded Mayor Avanceña, and critically wounded his companions. Minutes
after the incident, Fr. William Bourke, town parish priest, who heard the shots, came
upon the scene of the crime together with his houseboy, Benjamin Lopez, in the former's
jeep. They brought Macalisang to Hospital. While the jeep was negotiating a curve,
Macalisang pointed his gun at Francisco Dano and fired which caused his death. But
appellant pleads that he was unconscious or under shock at the time the act was
committed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the criminal act of Macalisang is voluntary
HELD
Appellant's testimony falls far short of convincing the court that he did not deliberately
fire atDano. He was, indeed, conscious at that time. When placed on the jeep, he took the
precautionof placing his service revolver on his lap. Lopez saw him take that gun and fire
at Dano. Thepriest, upon hearing the shot, saw appellant with the gun still pointed at the
side of the road. Theversion of Captain Benjamin Rafols, who interviewed appellant in
the hospital furnishes theclincher. Appellant admitted to the captain, "I was the one who
shot Mr. Dano." This statement isdefinite, although the captain stated that Macalisang
was confused as to the shooting incidentthat occurred earlier in the morning. A criminal
act is presumed to be voluntary. Court cannot seize upon speculation or guesswork to
overturn this presumption.
UNITED STATES VS. VALDEZ
Article 6 Consummated, Frustrated, Attempted felonies

Facts:
Noon, on Nov. 29, 1919,while the inter-island streamer Vigan was anchored in the
Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river
debouches into Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of
this boat consisted of the Accused Calixto Quiri, the one in charge, and six others and
among whom was the DECEASED Venancio Gargantel.
It took time to raise the anchor and did not satisfy the accused so he abused the men
and insulted them. The deceased remonstrated and the accused took it as a display of
insubordination. The accused move towards to the deceased and threatening to stab the
deceased with a knife. Then the deceased jump into the waters and drowned. Two of the
witnesses was told by the accused to keep quite or they will be killed. For this reason no
rescue for the deceased was executed, and the deceased was never found again. So
Calixto Quiri was sentenced of Frustrated Homicide and damages amounting to 500 peso
on Feb. 9 1920.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calixto Quiri is liable of frustrated homicide.
HELD:
No, for there was no evidence that Venancio Gargantel is dead. There are still
possibilities of him to survive after jumping to the water. He may have risen to the
surface at some place and embarked on some vessel or out of the bay and had gone
abroad, or to some provinces of these Islands. There was no necessary investigation has
been made in order to determine beyond reasonable doubt that it was and is impossible to
find said person or determine his whereabouts.
The Supreme Court disallowing the following doctrine: " Even though the death of the
injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very
grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a
hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was
placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his
adversary . . ."
Furthermore, there is no presumption "juris tantum" that he had died. According to
section 334 of the code of civil procedure, "there must be no information about him
should have been receive for seven years from his disappearance upon his throwing
himself to the river, which occured on Nov. 29, 1919 that is only about one year and four
months ago.
Urbano V CA
No. L-72964; Jan. 7, 1988
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr., J.;
Facts:
In the morning of October 23, 1980, Urbano, the petitioner, found his palay
destroyed with water coming from the irrigation canal. He went to the elevated portion of
the Canal to see what happened. He saw Javier and Erfe cutting grass, and then he
inquired who was the one responsible for opening the gates of the irrigation dam. Urbano
got angry and demanded payment from Javier which a quarrel ensued between them.
Subsequently, Urbano hacked Jaview with his bolo hitting him on the right palm of his
hand. Javier ran away but Urbano was able to hacked him again this time hitting him on
the left leg. Urbano was halted when his daughter embraced. The incident was reported to
the police station, where the two eventually settled into an agreement, avoiding any
criminal case against Urbano. On Novermber 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital due to
convulsions and lockedjaw. Dr. Edmundo Exconde, diagnosed that the serious condition
was caused by tetanus toxin. Javier died the following day.
Urbano was found guilty of homicide although Javier did not die immediately due
to the wounds from Urbano’s hacked. It was medically concluded that the tetanus only
can enter through the healing wound from the hacked done by Urbano, therefore making
it a proximate cause. Urbano filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial basing it
on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain. He stated that when a storm came and he
checked on the irrigation gates of the dam he saw Javier fishing in the shallow irrigation
canals.
Issue:
Whether wounds from Urbano’s hack was the proximate cause of Javier’s death,
making him criminally liable.
Held:
No. The case at the bar involves matter of proximate cause and criminal liability.
A proximate cause is defined as the cause, which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. When a proximate cause has been established then
criminal liability arises as stated in Article 4 of RPC, “Criminal liability shall be incurred:
(1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be done
different from which he intended.”
Applying it to the case, the tetanus is the proximate cause of the death. Medically
speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man’s body depends on the incubation
period of the disease. The incident happened on Oct 23, after 22 days Javier suffered the
symptoms of Tetanus, which his death ensued the following day. It is more medically
probable the Javier should have been infected with only a mild tetanus because the
symptoms appeared on the 22nd day after hacking. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier however died on the second day from the onset time.
Leading to a conclusion that the tetanus was not yet present when the wound was
inflicted. Therefore, Urbano is not guilty of homicide because the tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause, which resulted in his death and not the hacking. The infection is
distinct and foreign to this crime.
People V Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Facts:
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were
charged with murder for the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a witness, the
victim answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house where they
were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and later they heard the
victim shouting for help and when they ran towards the scene he saw the accused on top
of the victim and stabbing the latter with along bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and
Garcia brought the victim to a well and dropped him and placed stones into the well. The
trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed
averring that the trial court erred in holding them criminally liable because at the time the
victim was dropped into the well, he was still alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the
victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and
logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious
than that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as
follows:
1. the intended act is felonious.
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony
3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon with the
crime of theft:
On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 pm, petitioner and Calderon were sighted
outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along
North Edsa by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the
open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),’ hauling a push
cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide”brand. Petitioner unloaded these
cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned
inside the supermarket, and ater five minutes, emerged with ore cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in an open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and boarded a taxi and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the carton of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago.
The latter proceeded to stop the taxi and asked the petitioner for the receipt of the
merchandise. However, the latter reacted by fleeting on foot which compelled lago to fire
a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards.
The filched items seized were:
1. Four cases of Tide Ultramatic
2. One case of Ultra 25 grams
3. Three additional cases of detergent
The abovementioned goods have an aggregate value of P 12, 090.00.
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 90 decision promulgated on February 1, 2000 –
petitioner Valenzuela and Celderon are convicted for the crime of consummated theft.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose of the articles stolen. Petitioner cited the case of People vs Dino and People vs
Flores as they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and
involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.
HELD:
THEFT CANNOT HAVE A FRUSTRATED STAGE. The moment petitioner
obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart,
such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without the need to inflict violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent
of the SM Super Sales Club, the crime of theft has been consummated. As petitioner has
latched the success of his appeal on the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the Dino and
Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for the Supreme Court decline to adopt such
rulings in their jurisdiction.
PEOPLE VS CABALLERO
Article 8 Conspiracy and Proposal to commit felony
FACTS:
In the afternoon of Aug. 3 1994, Armando, Robito and Marciano Caballero were
having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon
Compound in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Eugene Tayactac and Arnold
Barcuma arrived to have dinner in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which was across
the Mondragon Compound. After eating Arnold went to the house of Susana, Eugene's
Girlfriend, for a chat. Then Armando went to the store and asked Eugene in an angry
tone: "Gene, will you buy?" And Eugene replied: "what is this all about? We have no
quarrel between us" then Armando left and Ricardo and Robito joined him. Both was
armed with knife and when Wilma said she was closing the store Eugene stood up and
left the store on his way to Susana's house. Myrna Bawin call out her brother and told
him to go home already but he still went to the house of his girlfriend. When he was at
the gate of the Mondragon Compound, the Caballero brothers assaulted him. Ricardo and
Robito stabbed him three times. Arnold came for the aid of his friend but he was stabbed
by Armando in his left and the other two stabbed his forehand and fled for his life. Then
Leonilo came also for the aid of Eugene but suddenly Roberto stabbed him in the chest so
he retreated to ask for help from his uncle. The commotion stopped when Terisito
Mondragon arrived and pacify the Caballero brothers and went inside the compound.
Caballero brothers was sentenced for frustrated murder with conspiracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is conspiracy between the Caballero brothers
HELD:
Yes, there is Conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit felony and
decide to commit it. It is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists
primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. It can be proven through the collective acts of
the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming
at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the
attainment of the same objectives. The overt acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist moral assistance
to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.
Conspiracy should be proven and must always be founded on facts, now on mere
inference, conjectures, and presumptions. Without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional
participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common objectives and
purpose.
Ingal vs People of the Philippines

547 SCRA 632
FACTS:
-9pm of March 2, 1987, Rolando N. Domingo (Toto) was eating at the carinderia together
with his female companion. When a man, went up to him and stabbed him and left as if
nothing happened.
-The event was witnessed by Aida Bona (owner of the carinderia), Rosalinda Tan (helper
in the carinderia). They gave a Sinumpaang Salaysay but declined to sign it not unless the
suspects were apprehended. They agreed to be a witness on the case, 7 years after the
crime happened. They said that it was only Joseph Ingal who did the crime.
-Several witnesses claimed that there were actually 4 who were part of the crime. Two,
who are unknown up to this date, one is Ingal and the other one is Ricardo Lidot.
Witnesses claim that Lidot handed the weapon to Ingal. Having 4 suspects is contrary to
the claims of Bona and Tan.
-Ingal’s claim was that he was at his work during the crime delivering fish at Navotas.
-There was conspiracy involved with Ingal, Lidot and two other unknown persons.
However, conspiracy is not an element of crime of murder or homicide. Conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Thus,
if the evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, only those whose
liability can be established can be held liable for the crime charged. It is proven that Ingal
was the one who stabbed Toto. But since conspiracy was not shown in the case, the other
accused cannot be convicted because their respective liabilities were not satisfactorily
proven.
-Treachery attended the killing because of the sudden and unexpected attack.
-premeditation of the crime could not be proved by the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Is Ingal criminally liable for the death of Rolando Domingo? Is there conspiracy? Is Lidot
liable for the crime?
HELD:
1. Yes, it was evident from the witnesses that it was Ingal who stabbed Toto with the
intention to kill him, and he succeeded.
2. Yes, but it could not be proven by the prosecution.
3. Yes, he is liable for the crime. He is guilty without reasonable doubt for the
murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by
treachery. He is to suffer reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
Toto the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages,
P25,000 as temperate damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
People v.Palaganas
G.R. No. 165483
September 12, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Aggravating circumstance
Laws Applicable: Art. 14
FACTS:
• January 16, 1998 8pm: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were on a
drinking spree in their house because Melton visited his brothers in Pangasinan all the
way from San Fernando, La Union.
• January 16, 1998 9:45 pm: The brothers decided to go to Tidbits Videoke bar to
continue their drinking spree and to sing. They were the only customers
• January 16, 1998 10:30 pm: Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio
Bautista arrived and they occupied a different table. When Jaime sang “My Way”,
Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented this, approached the brother and said in
Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys. You are already insulting me in that way."
Jaime struck Servillano’s head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Virgilio Bautista
did not joined in and just left. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar.
Michael was about to pursue him but was stopped by Servillano. They went back to
continue to fight with Jaime. Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar,
arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Since the
brothers could not locate it inside the bar, they went outside. They saw Ferdinand at
them and said to Rujjeric Palaganas "Oraratan paltog mo lara" meaning "They are the
ones, shoot them." Rujjeric shot Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen
penetrating his large intestine and urinary bladder causing him to fall on the ground then
Melton with a fatal shot on the head and on the right thigh. When Servillano noticed that
Melton was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato, bato” and they threw stones at
Rujjeric and Ferdinand. Michael was hit on the right shoulder.
• The police came and took the Ferrer brothers to Manaoag Hospital and later to
Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan.
• Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm
• Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm
• Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm
• Criminal Case No. U-9634: using a caliber .38 without first securing the necessary
permit/license in violation to Comelec Res. 2958
• Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" Upon motion of
Ferdinand, the four cases were consolidated.
• RTC: Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated
Homicide but acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in
relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of
all the charges against him.
• CA Affirmed
• Rujjeric argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant
case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun, he
was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in
fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by
the Ferrer brothers
ISSUE:
W/N Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide
HELD:
YES. AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
• Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm - attempted
homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four
(4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of
prision correccional as maximum period
• Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm - homicide is
reclusion temporal - There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum period
• Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm - frustrated
homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum period.
• petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant
case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that
fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer
brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers
• ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
• 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
• First. Unlawful aggression;
o no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of
petitioner in shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the
videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon
o When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of
actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from
the location of the former. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or
by taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help
• Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
o gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
• Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. x x
x.
• unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. It is an essential and
indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
• As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-
defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution
• 1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution.
• 2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony,
the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the
offender's own spontaneous desistance.
• when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s
sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed
is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
• If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by
the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight
physical injury
• Michal’s wound took six to eight days to heal - attempted homicide
• use of an unlicensed firearm - special aggravating circumstance by Republic Act. No.
8294 on June 6, 1997
• Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as
those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of
the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its
maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must
always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in
order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstance, CANNOT be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAMERTO RESPECIA and

SANTIAGO LAGUNAN
G.R. No. L-13569 April 29, 1960
ENDENCIA, J.:
Facts:
Found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Surigao of illegal possession
of dynamite and sentenced each of the appellants to undergo the indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to one (1) year and six (6)
months, prisijon correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P600.00 or serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and not satisfied with the penalty
imposed upon them, they appealed from the decision contending that the trial
court should have applied the penalty provided for in Act 2255 as amended by Act
3023, in its minimum period in accordance with Art. 64, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, which, they allege, is supplementary to special laws.
Issue:
Whether or not offenses which are punishable under the special laws are
subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
The court held that offenses which are punishable under the special laws
are NOT subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Also, in several
cases the court held that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code regarding the
application of the circumstances modifying the criminal liability of the accused are
not applicable to special laws

Justice Tang - Case Digest - Criminal Law 1

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Justice Tang - Case Digest - Criminal Law 1

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Articles 1 – 10 (RPC) Case Digests 1

Criminal 1 under Justice Amparo Tang

Digests for Crim1 Cases

United States V Ah Sing

United States V Fowler

People V Wong Cheng

United States V Look Chaw

People V Silvestre and Atienza

Laws Applicable: Art. 3

Isaias Macalisang was the Chief of Police of Sinacban, Misamis Occidental. On

Whether or not the criminal act of Macalisang is voluntary

UNITED STATES VS. VALDEZ

Article 6 Consummated, Frustrated, Attempted felonies

People V Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Ingal vs People of the Philippines

Lessons Applicable: Aggravating circumstance

Laws Applicable: Art. 14

• Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm

• Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm

• Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAMERTO RESPECIA and

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