1.
Whether or not the Government waive
STATE LIABILITY
Tuesday, September 25, 2018
3:51PM
 State cannot be sued without
consent.
 Consent of the State to be sued can
manifested through a special law
general law allowing the State to
sued.
Article 2180, Civil Code
The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable
Special Agent - one who receives definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official.
E. Meritt v. Government of Philippine Islands
Facts:
A collision happened between the General
Hospital ambulance and plaintiff who was riding
a motorcycle when the ambulance took a
sudden turn without having sounded any whistle
or horn. Because of the collision, plaintiff was
severely injured.
The trial court maintained that the collision
between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due
solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
Act No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine
Legislature authorizing the plaintiff to bring suit
in the Court of First Instance against the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Issue:
its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff.
2. Whether or not the Government is
its legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom
be Ruling:
or
be The plaintiff was authorized to bring the said
action against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision. The court have
decided that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur who was at that time
an employee of the defendant.
In the United States the rule that the state is not
liable for the torts committed by its officers or
agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment is well settled.
As to the scope of legislative enactments
permitting individuals to sue the state where the
cause of action arises out of either fort or
contract, the rule is that by consenting to be
sued, a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff or create any cause of action in his favor
or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce
a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government’s liability to any cause not
previously recognized.
As to the defendant’s liability for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents and employees, Article
1903 par. 5 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it
acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in
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 which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.
The state is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge
of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in
the appointment of its agents; on the contrary,
we must presuppose all foresight humanly
possible on its part in order that each branch of
service serves the general weal and that of
private persons interested in its operation.
Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil
law can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations.
The responsibility of the state is limited by Article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent who is defined as one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations.
That according to Article 1903 par. 5 of the Civil
Code, in a damage case, the responsibility of the
state is limited to that which it contracts through
a special agent duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives
rise to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law
of civil responsibility.
It is therefore, evidence that the State is only
liable for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of Article 1903 par. 5 and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations:
Philippine National Railways v. IAC
Facts:
PNR train who is a purely government owned
and controlled corporation collided with a
passenger bus of Baliwag Transit. It was alleged
by the defendant alleged that the proximate
cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of the plaintiff PNR and its
locomotive engineer in operating its passenger
train in a busy intersection without any bars,
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman
to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing. The plaintiff
avers that the collision was caused by the
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of
defendant’s bus driver.
On the appeal the issue as to whether or not the
plaintiff enjoys immunity from suit was raised for
the first time. Apart from the fact that the lawyer
of the petitioner agreed to stipulate that the
railroad company had capacity to sue and be
sued.
Respondent court maintained that the laws
governing the creation and rehabilitation of the
PNR were entirely mute on its power to sue and
sued nonetheless such prerogative was implied
from the general power to transact business
pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of
the goals of railroad company under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic
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Act No 6366. The respondent court
characterized the railroad company as a private
entity created not to discharge a governmental
function but among other things to operate a
transport service which is essentially a business
concern and thus barred from invoking immunity
from suit.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff enjoys immunity
from suit.
Ruling:
The State, by virtue of its sovereign nature and
as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is
insulated from suits without its consent.
However, equally conceded is the legal
proposition that the acquiescence of the State to
be sued can be manifested expressly through a
general or special law, or indicated implicitly, as
when the State commences litigation for
asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters
into a contract. When the State participates in a
covenant, it is deemed to have descended from
its superior position to the level of an ordinary
citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial
process.
The Court qualified this form of consent only to
those contracts concluded in a proprietary
capacity and therefore immunity will attach for
those contracts entered in a governmental
capacity.
The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity
when it organized the PNR which is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune
from suit. It did not remove itself from the
operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil
Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government
entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized."
Suits against State agencies with respect to
matters in which they have assumed to act in a
private or nongovernmental capacity are not
suits against the State.
Suits against State agencies with relation to
matters in which they have assumed to act in a
private or nongovernmental capacity, and
various suits against certain corporations
created by the State for public purposes, but to
engage in matters partaking more of the nature
of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own
the stock or property of such a corporation, for
by engaging in business operations through a
corporation the State divests itself so far of its
sovereign character, and by implicating consents
to suits against the corporation.
The point is that when the government enters a
commercial business it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other
private corporation.
Municipal Corporations
Article 2189, Civil Code
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
Republic Act 7160
Section 24: Liability for Damages. - Local
government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property.
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Guilatco v. City of Dagupan
Facts:
Plaintiff while she was about to board a
motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez
Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally
fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk,
thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As
a result, thereof, she had to be hospitalized,
operated on and confined. Defendant admitted
the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk
in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in
front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted
that said manhole is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government.
Plaintiff filed a case against City of Dagupan.
Lower court maintained that no evidence was
presented by the plaintiff to prove that the City
of Dagupan had control or supervision over the
Perez Boulevard. The appellate court reversed
the lower court findings.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where
the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national
road that is not under the control or supervision
of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should
attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the
Ministry of Public Highways that has control or
supervision through the Highway Engineer
which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently
by the same person who is also the City Engineer
of Dagupan.
Issue:
Whether or not control or supervision over a
national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in
effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is
provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that
the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated
by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision
and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the
city not liable for damages or injuries sustained
by persons or property due to the failure of any
city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the city, as in
the case at bar.
The charter only lays down general rules
regulating the liability of the city. On the other
hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the
liability arising from "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works."
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Municipality of San Juan v. CA
Facts:
Under a “Contract For Water Service
Connections” entered into by and between the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of
K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC, for
short), the former engaged the services of the
latter to install water service connections.
KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector
Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and
Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a
national road, for the laying of water pipes and
tapping of water to the respective houses of
water concessionaires.
That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its
workers to conduct the digging operations in the
specified place. At that time, only 3/4 of the job
was finished in view of the fact that the workers
were still required to re-excavate that particular
portion for the tapping of pipes for the water
connections to the concessionaires.
One Priscilla Chan was driving her car on the said
road. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell
on a manhole where the workers of KC had
earlier made excavations. As a result, the
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-
awa, passenger of Priscilla Chan, was fractured.
According to the police officer who conducted an
investigation, he did not see any barricades at
the scene when he arrived less than an hour
later.
Biglang-awa filed before the RTC a complaint
against MWSS, Municipality of San Juan, a
number of San Juan municipal officials and KC.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa.
The decision was appealed to CA, which affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injuries
sustained by Biglang-awa.
Ruling:
Jurisprudence7 teaches that for liability to arise
under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership
of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings
and other public works, is not a controlling
factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control or supervision thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either
“control or supervision” over said street or road.
Petitioner contends that under Section 149(1)(z)
of the Local Government Code, petitioner has
control or supervision only over municipal and
not national roads, like Santolan Road. Sadly,
petitioner failed to take note of the other
provisions of Section 149 of the same Code,
more particularly the following: Section 149.
Powers and Duties.—(1) The sangguniang bayan
shall:
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and
other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers, drains and other similar structures;
erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs
and gutters therein, and adopt measures to
ensure public safety against open canals,
manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to
life and property, and provide just compensation
or relief for persons suffering from them;
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality
of San Juan can “regulate” the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
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water, sewer, and other pipes within its to undertake the necessary precautionary
territorial jurisdiction. measures to avert accidents and insure the
safety of pedestrians and commuters: x x x The
Doubtless, the term “regulate” found in the
[petitioner] cannot validly shirk from its
aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only
obligation to maintain and insure the safe
mean that petitioner municipality exercises the
condition of the road merely because the permit
power of control, or, at the very least,
for the excavation may have been issued by a
supervision over all excavations for the laying of
government entity or unit other than the
gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its
Appellant San Juan or that the excavation may
territory.
have been done by a contractor under contract
We must emphasize that under paragraph with a public entity like the Appellee MWSS.
[1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local
Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability
Government Code, the phrases “regulate the
based on its purported lack of knowledge of the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the
excavation and the condition of the road during
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,” and
the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30,
“adopt measures to ensure public safety against
1988 when the accident occurred. It must be
open canals, manholes, live wires and other
borne in mind that the obligation of the
similar hazards to life and property,” are not
[petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the
modified by the term “municipal road.” And
road within its territory is a continuing one which
neither can it be fairly inferred from the same
is not suspended while a street is being repaired
provision of Section 149 that petitioner’s power
Knowledge of the condition of the road and the
of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein
defects and/or obstructions on the road may be
mentioned applies only in cases where such
actual or constructive. It is enough that the
activities are to be performed in municipal roads.
authorities should have known of the aforesaid
To our mind, the municipality’s liability for
circumstances in the exercise of ordinary care. In
injuries caused by its failure to regulate the
the present recourse, Santolan Road and the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the
Greenhills area coming from Ortigas Avenue
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,
going to Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila is
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or
a busy thoroughfare. The gaping hole in the
excavation is made on a national or municipal
middle of the road of Santolan Road could not
road, for as long as the same is within its
have been missed by the authorities concerned.
territorial jurisdiction.
After all, the [petitioner] San Juan is mandated
While it may be true that the Department of to effect a constant and unabated monitoring of
Public Works and Highways may have issued the the conditions of the roads to insure the safety
requisite permit to the Appellee KC and/or of motorists. Persuasive authority has it that:
concessionaires for the excavation on said road,
It is the duty of the municipal authorities to
the Appellant San Juan is not thereby relieved of
exercise an active vigilance over the streets; to
its liability to [Biglang-awa] for its own gross
see that they are kept in a reasonably safe
negligence. Indeed, Evangeline Alfonso, the
condition for public travel. They cannot foldtheir
witness for the Appellant San Juan unabashedly
arms and shut their eyes and say they have no
[sic] admitted, when she testified in the Court a
notice. (Todd versus City of Troy, 61 New York
quo, that even if the Department of Public Works
506). (Words in bracket supplied). Nor can
and Highways failed to effect the requisite
petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of Ordinance
refilling, the Appellant San Juan was mandated

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82-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Concededly, Section 8 of the Ordinance makes
the permittee/excavator liable for death, injury
and/or damages caused by the non-completion
of works and/or failure of the one undertaking
the works to adopt the required precautionary
measures for the protection of the general
public. Significantly, however, nowhere can it be
found in said Ordinance any provision exempting
municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities
caused by their own negligent acts.
Quezon City Gov’t v. Fulgencio Dacara
Facts:
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara,
Sr. and owner of Toyota Corolla 4-door while
driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St.,
Quezon City, which was then being repaired by
the Quezon City government. As a result,
Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries
and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it
turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his
minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages
against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir
Tiamzon, as defendants
Defendants claimed that they exercised due care
by providing the area of the diggings all
necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence,
the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the
diggings was precisely because of the latters
negligence and failure to exercise due care. They
maintained that they had observed due diligence
and care in installing preventive warning devices,
and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed
to exercise prudence by driving too fast to avoid
the diggings.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s son, Fulgencio
Dacara Jr. was negligent at the time of the
incident?
Ruling:
As to negligence: QC gov’t was negligent.
That the negligence of QC gov’t was the
proximate cause of the accident. Contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense that
there were signs, gasera which was buried so
that its light could not be blown off by the wind
and barricade, none was ever presented to
stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik
Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how
then could it be explained that according to the
report even of the policeman which for clarity is
quoted again, none was found at the scene of
the accident.
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil
Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of
roads and bridges since it exercises the control
and supervision over the same. Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se which renders
the City government liable. Harsh application of
the law ensues as a result thereof but the state
assumed the responsibility for the maintenance
and repair of the roads and bridges and neither
exception nor exculpation from liability would
deem just and equitable.
Public Officers
Public officers who are guilty of tortious conduct
are personally liable for their actions. They
cannot raise the defense that the State is
immune from suits. It is a well settled principle
of law that a public official may be held liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever
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damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice, bad faith or gross negligence or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987
provides the basic rules on the liability of public
officers and employees:
Section 38: Liability of Superior Officers. —
(1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for
acts done in the performance of his official
duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause,
neglects to perform a duty within a period fixed
by law or regulation, or within a reasonable
period if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages
to the private party concerned without prejudice
to such other liability as may be prescribed by
law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer
shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts,
omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of
his subordinates, unless he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or
misconduct complained of.
Section 39: Liability of Subordinate Officers. —
No subordinate officer or employee shall be
civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in
the performance of his duties. However, he shall
be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him
which are contrary to law, morals, public policy
and good customs even if he acted under orders
or instructions of his superiors.
Jose E. Genson v. Sps. Eduardo Adarle
Facts:
Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was hired as
a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away
scrap iron from the said compound of the
Highway District Engineer’s Office of Roxas City.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the
morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day,
while the private respondent was tying a cable to
a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside
the premises of the compound, and while the
bucket of the payloader was being raised, the
bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right
back portion of his head just below the nape.
Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital,
Roxas City. According to the medical certificate
issued by the attending physician, the private
respondent was reported to be able to defecate
2 months after surgery. He is paralyzed from the
knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel
chair
While still in the hospital, the private respondent
instituted the action below for damages against
Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader
operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil
engineer; and Jose Genson, the Highway District
Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put
up the defense that he had no knowledge of or
participation in the accident and that, when it
happened, he was not present in the
government compound. Apart from the fact that
it was a Saturday and a non-working day, he was
in Iloilo.
The petitioner contends that the appellate court
erred in not holding that the suit against the
petitioner was, in effect, a suit against the
government and, therefore, should be dismissed
under the principle of non-suability of the state.
Issue:
The issue before us is subsidiary liability for tort
comitted by a government employee who is
moonlighting on a non-working day…
Ruling:
Examining the allegations of the complaint and
reviewing the evidence, it would indeed be
8
correct to say that petitioner was sued in his
official capacity, and that the most that was
imputed to him is act of culpable neglect,
inefficiency and gross indifference in the
performance of his official duties. Verily, this is
not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what
is more was not convincingly proven.
Genson and Buensalido divested themselves of
their public positions and privileges to
accomodate an acquaintance or probably for
inordinate gain.
There is no showing from the records that
Genson received anything which could be called
"inordinate gain." It is possible that he permitted
work on a Saturday to accommodate an
acquaintance but it is more plausible that he
simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and
the best time for the winning bidder to do it was
on a non-working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross
negligence on the part of Genson to hold him
liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
Pedro Ty Belizar v. Florencio Brazas, et. al
Facts:
On April 21, 1959, Pedro Ty Belizar filed a
complaint against Florencio Brazas, Felix Hilario,
Lucio Baldonilo alleging that he is operating the
Samar Express Transit; that defendants are being
used in their capacity as employees (of the
Bureau of Public Highways); that due to their
gross negligence in not providing the ferry boat
with safety devices, one of his auto-trucks, while
being transported from one bank of the Taft
River, to the other, fell into the river and was
submerged in water for over 30 hours; that as a
consequence thereof, he suffered actual and
moral damages and had to hire counsel to
prosecute this action.
On May 14, 1959, defendant Felix Hilario, on his
own behalf, alleged as special defense that he is
working only under the instructions of his
superiors. On May 19, 1959, defendants Lucio
Baldonilo, Felix Balato, Teodoro Balato and
Todesco Cebuano filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the complaint states no cause
of action and that they are not the real parties in
interest. On May 20, 1959, defendant Florencio
Brazas filed another motion to dismiss, claiming
that the plaintiff has no cause of action against
the defendants because they are being sued in
their official capacities and therefore the claim
for damages should be directed against the
State.
Acting upon the motions to dismiss, the lower
court on June 6, 1959, dismissed the complaint,
and against this order, the plaintiff has
prosecuted this appeal directly to this Court.
Issue:
The only issue before this Court is the
correctness of the order appealed from.
Ruling:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides for the
liability of an employer for the tortuous acts of
his employees. This, however, does not exempt
the employees from personal liability, especially
if there are no persons having direct supervision
over them, or if there is proof of the existence of
negligence on their part. So the injured party can
bring an action directly against the author of the
negligent act or omission, although he may sue
as joint defendants such author and the person
responsible for him.
The fact that the duties and positions of the
defendants are indicated does not mean that
they are being sued in their official capacities,
especially as the present action is not one
against the Government.
9
Eduardo Varela v. Ma. Daisy Revalez, et. al
Facts:
Varela was the mayor of Cadiz City. On 22
September 1998, he submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City the
committees Proposed Reorganizational
Structure and Staffing Pattern of Cadiz City. On
the same day, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
approved without modification and without
hearing the proposal. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 98-112
authorizing and appropriating funds for the
reorganization of the city government.
Resolution No. 98-112 declared all positions in
the city government vacant, except elective
positions and positions in the city and assistant
city treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela
signed Resolution No. 98-112.
On 10 November 1998, Varela gave notices of
termination to the city government employees,
informing them that their employment would
end at the close of business hours on 31
December 1998. The employees opposed and
questioned the legality of Resolution No. 98-112.
Varela ignored them.
Around half of the 101 employees of the city
health department were laid off. Those laid off
were the same ones who filed a case, involving
the magna carta for health workers, against
Varela. They were also perceived not to have
voted for Varela as mayor.
Issue:
Varela raises the issue whether or not he was
sued in his official and not in his personal
capacity.
Ruling:
Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in
his official capacity. In the complaint, the
employees stated that, due to the illegal acts of
the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture
and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation.
The State can never be the author of illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the
mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state
that Varela was being sued in his official capacity.
The identification and mention of Varela as the
mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically
transform the action into one against Varela in
his official capacity. The allegations in the
complaint determine the nature of the cause of
action.
Alzua vs Johnson
The complaint charges the defendant, an
associate justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, with corruption and
misconduct in office of the gravest character.
The damages which plaintiff Alzua seeks to
recover in this section are alleged to have
resulted from the entry by the court of an alleged
erroneous judgment in a former action to which
Alzua was a party defendant. The error which is
alleged was committed by the court in entering
that judgment, is attributed to the alleged false
and misleading statement of the facts of the case
which is set out in the written opinion upon
which the judgment of the court was based. The
complaint specifically charges the defendant,
the writer of that opinion, with having willfully,
maliciously, and in bad faith, perverted and
misstated the facts set out therein for the
purpose of deceiving the other members of the
court to whom the opinion was submitted for
signature; and is further changed, that this was
but one of series of malicious and wrongful acts
whereby the defendant succeeded in deceiving
his associates, and induced them to sign the
order directing the entry of the alleged
erroneous judgment. As necessary corollary to
the surmises, conjectures, and specific charges
of wrongdoing set out in the complaint, if these
surmises, conjectures, and specific charges are
well founded, the four members of this court
10
whose signatures are attached to that opinion
together with that of the defendant, must have
signed the opinion with no personal knowledge
of the contents of the record submitted to them
for adjudication, and without having read the
briefs of counsel, relying wholly upon the alleged
false and misleading statement of the facts
prepared by the defendant as the basis for the
judgment which it is alleged was erroneously
entered by the court.
In support of the proposition that defendant is
not liable to respond in a civil action for the
damages alleged in the complaint, we might,
perhaps, rely upon the reasoning of the
concurring opinion in the case of Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco (16 Phil. Rep., 534), wherein the
writer undertakes to establish that "whenever
and wherever a judge of a court of superior
jurisdiction exercises judicial functions, he will
not personally liable in civil damages for the
result of the actions," and that "the test of
judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such
liability depends wholly upon the nature of the
question which is being determined when the
error complained of is committed by the court. If
such question is one of determination of which
requires the exercise of judicial functions, the
judge is not liable, even though there is in reality
an absolute failure of jurisdiction over the
subject matter." Applying this test to the
allegations contained in the complaint, there
could be no question as to the nonliability of the
defendant to respond in this action for the
alleged damages. We shall not, however, rest
our decision in this case upon the doctrine thus
enunciated, nor shall we in any wise rely upon
the reasoning or the conclusions contained in
the concurring opinion in the Forbes case. The
doctrine as to nonliability of judges therein set
forth has not been uniformly and
unquestioningly accepted by all the courts which
have been called upon to consider the principles
involved; and indeed, the writer of that opinion
carefully directs attention to the fact that the
doctrine a to nonliability of judge therein
announced is, if not a step in advance of the
doctrine generally recognized in English and
American courts, at least a statement of the
doctrine in a form which has not yet received
universal judicial recognition and acceptance.
We prefer, therefore, since the facts in this case
permit us to do so, to rest our conclusion upon a
much narrower and more restricted proposition
touching the liability of judicial officers, which
have never been seriously questioned by any
court of last resort in England or the United
States; merely observing in passing, that the rule
of judicial liability on which we propose to rely is
not in conflict with the doctrine laid down in the
occuring opinion in the Forbes case, but is
included therein, so that the grounds of public
policy on which the broader doctrine rests
necessarily sustain the more restricted
statement of the rule upon which we purpose to
rely.
We hold that under the law as it now exists in
these Islands judges of superior and general
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil
action for damages for what they may do in the
exercise of their judicial functions when acting
within their legal powers and jurisdiction.
The grounds of public policy upon which these
proposition rests have been held by the very
highest authority to protect judges, even when
acting in excess of jurisdiction; and with much
reason many authorities have held that upon the
same grounds of public policy the protecting
mantle of this rule should be thrown around
judges with inferior jurisdiction as well as those
of superior jurisdiction. So the writer of the
concurring opinion in the Forbes case, supra, in
carrying the reasoning on which this rule rests to
what the conceives to be its legal conclusion, lays
down the still broader rule above cited. But for
the purposes of this decision we desire to limit
ourselves to the restricted statement of the rule
as just laid down, because as we believe and will
11
undertake hereinafter to establish, there can be
no question that whatever may have been the
motives of the defendant, the allegation of the
complaint disclose that in doing each and all of
the acts complained of, he was acting "as a
judge," in the exercise of the judicial functions,
and that in doing these acts he was clearly and
undoubtedly acting within his legal powers and
jurisdiction.
The exemption of judges of courts of superior or
general authority from liability in a civil action for
acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions is a principle essentially inherent in the
various judicial systems upon which system
under organized Act No. 136 is modeled. The
grounds of Public policy and the reasoning upon
which the doctrine is based are not less forceful
and imperative in these Islands than in the
countries from which the new judicial system
was borrowed; and an examination of the
reasons assigned by the Supreme Court of the
United States and by Mr. Cooley in his work on
Torts for the universal recognition of the rule in
the United States, as set out in the margin (Notes
C and D5) leaves no room for doubt that a failure
to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial
system would materially impair its usefulness,
and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for
which it was established. Indeed, upon the
authority of the reasoning in the case of Bradley
vs. Fisher, it may safely be asserted that an
attempt to inforce any rule of law in conflict with
the doctrine would be utterly subversive of the
system jurisprudence established in these
Islands under and by virtue of the authority of
Congress of the Unite States:
For it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequence to himself. Liability to
answer to everyone who might fell himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without
which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful. As observed by a distinguished English
judge, it would establish the weakness of judicial
authority in a degrading responsibility.
The principal, therefore, which exempts judges
of courts of superior or general authority from
liability in a civil action for acts done by them in
the exercise of their judicial functions, obtains in
all countries where there is any well-ordered
system of jurisprudence. It has been the settled
doctrine of the English courts for many
centuries, and has never been denied, that we
are of, in the courts of this country. (Bradley vs.
Fisher, supra.)
We venture to assert, therefore, that the rule of
liability of judicial officers, as laid down in the old
Spanish law, is not in substantial conflict with
that recognized by the American authorities
upon which we rely. Both judicial systems
recognize the liability of these officers for
wrongs committed in the performance of purely
ministerial functions; and the Spanish rule that
liability is not incurred unless the act done is so
manifestly contrary to the law as to negative the
possibility that it was done in the exercise of
judicial functions, though a broader rule than the
rule on which we rely, that is to say that "judges
of courts of superior and general jurisdiction are
not liable for acts done in the exercise of their
judicial functions and within their legal power
and jurisdiction," is manifestly not in conflict
therewith.
Furthermore it is to be remembered that in
disposing of this large volume of business, this
court, unlike the appellate courts of the United
States generally, is required, in all criminal cases
and in ninety per cent of the civil cases, to review
the evidence (which is not required by law to be
printed and comes up in the original transcript of
the stenographer's notes) so as to ascertain
12
whether the judgment of the lower court are
"sustained by the weight of the evidence." This
is a consequence of the absence of the jury
system in the Philippines. Then, too, an unusual
number of difficult and doubtful questions
present themselves in this jurisdiction, arising
out of the conflict of laws resulting from the
introduction of new laws and new institutions
under American sovereignty, which must be
interpreted and construed with due regard to
the jurisprudence of both the old and the new
sovereign. And finally, the mere mechanical
difficulties, and in some cases the delays,
involved in the preparation, submission,
discussion and publication of the decisions of the
court are notably increased by the fact that the
official language of the courts in the Philippines
is Spanish, while four of the members of this
court are Americans, whose knowledge of that
language has for the most part been acquired
since coming to the Islands.
Cadiz vs Presiding Judge
On February 23, 2003 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors, then composed
of petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Leonard S.
De Vera, Romulo A. Rivera, Dante G. Ilaya, Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago, Rosario T. Setias-Reyes,
Jose Vicente B. Salazar, Manuel M. Monzon,
Immanuel L. Sodusta, and Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
(the IBP Board), received an administrative
complaint[1] filed by Lilia T. Ventura and
Concepcion Tabang against respondent Atty.
Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit,
and gross dishonesty. The IBP Board designated
petitioner Lydia A. Navarro (Navarro) as
Commissioner to investigate the case.
Commissioner Navarro summoned the parties
to a mandatory conference and required them
afterwards to submit their position papers.
Based on these, Navarro submitted her Report
and Recommendation to the IBP Board for its
approval. Commissioner Navarro was herself a
member of the IBP Board. After deliberation, the
IBP Board adopted Commissioner Navarros
findings but increased the recommended
penalty of six months suspension from the
practice of law to disbarment. The IBP Board
then transmitted their report to this Court.
On September 29, 2004, however, the Court
remanded the case to the IBP Board for further
proceedings in order to give the parties the
chance to fully present their case.[2] The Court
said the investigating commissioner should have
subpoenaed and examined the witnesses of the
parties considering the gravity of the charge
against Atty. Gacott. Navarro rendered her
report based solely on the position papers and
affidavits of the witnesses.
While the IBP Board was complying with the
Courts directive, Atty. Gacott filed a complaint
for damages against the boards sitting members
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan. Answering the
complaint, the IBP Board raised the affirmative
defense of failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and filed a motion to dismiss the
case on that ground. On March 9, 2006 the trial
court denied the motion, prompting the IBP
Board to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) on special civil action for certiorari.
On December 29, 2006 the CA denied the
petition, pointing out that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. The IBP Board
had other plain and speedy remedy, like
proceeding to trial in the case and appealing in
the event of failure of the RTC to dismiss the
action. The CA denied in its Resolution dated July
12, 2007 the IBP Boards motion for
reconsideration, thus causing them to file the
present petition.
The key issue in this case is whether or not the
CA erred in failing to rule that the Supreme
Courts remand of the disbarment case to the IBP
Board for examination of the witnesses,
considering the gravity of the charge against
13
Atty. Gacott, cannot serve as basis for the latters
complaint for damages against the members of
that board.
Atty. Gacott states in his complaint for damages
before the RTC that Supreme Courts remand of
his case to the IBP Board is an affirmation of the
latters arbitrary abuse of its investigatory power.
The IBP Board recommended his disbarment
based on the Commissioners report rendered to
it without the benefit of exhaustive hearing. This
made its members personally liable for actual,
moral, and corrective damages. Essentially,
therefore, Atty. Gacott anchored his complaint
for damages on the result of the Courts
assessment of the IBP Boards report and
recommendation and its remand of the case
against him for further proceedings.
The petitioner IBP Board members are correct in
claiming that Atty. Gacotts complaint states no
cause of action. The IBP Commissioner and
Board of Governors in this case merely exercised
delegated powers to investigate the complaint
against Atty. Gacott and submit their report and
recommendation to the Court. They cannot be
charged for honest errors committed in the
performance of their quasi-judicial function. And
that was what it was in the absence of any
allegation of specific factual circumstances
indicating that they acted maliciously or upon
illicit consideration. If the rule were otherwise, a
great number of lower court justices and judges
whose acts the appellate courts have annulled
on ground of grave abuse of discretion would be
open targets for damage suits.
Parenthetically, Atty. Gacott submitted the
disbarment case against him for resolution
based on the position papers that he and the
complainants presented, without reservation, to
the IBP along with the affidavits of their
witnesses. The IBP Board prepared its report and
recommendation to the Court based on these
papers and documents.
Presumptions:
Article 2184
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former who was in
the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent,
if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable
Article 2185
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic violation
Article 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence
on the part of the defendant if the death or
injury results from his possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and
poison, except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his occupation or
business.
Marikina Autoline vs People
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door
commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line
Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-
operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number
NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as
the regular driver of the bus. At around 2:00 p.m.
on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the
aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias
Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the
14
terrace of the commercial apartment owned by
Valdellon located along Kamuning Road.
Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to
cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The
bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00
settlement which Valdellon refused. Valdellon
filed a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate
civil complaint against Suelto and the bus
company for damages. Suelto maintained that,
in an emergency case, he was not, in law,
negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled
in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule
applies in the case at bar.
RULING:
No. It was the burden of petitioners herein to
prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted
on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the
bus to the right to avoid colliding with a
passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had
overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the
lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was
enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of
Appeals,23 thus: [O]ne who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are
mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the
right side of the road or highway: SEC. 37. Driving
on right side of highway. – Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the
safety and the security of life, person or
property, or because of unreasonable difficulty
of operation in compliance herewith, every
person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-
drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the
right when meeting persons or vehicles coming
toward him, and to the left when overtaking
persons or vehicles going the same direction,
and when turning to the left in going from one
highway to another, every vehicle shall be
conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway. Section 35 of the
law provides, thus: Sec. 35. Restriction as to
speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle
on a highway shall drive the same at a careful
and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is
reasonable and proper, having due regard for
the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any
other condition then and there existing; and no
person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a
highway at such a speed as to endanger the life,
limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle
to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead.In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the
New Civil Code provides that "unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation." By his own
admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code when he
suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby
causing damage to the property of private
respondent. However, the trial court correctly
rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of
his contradictory testimony vis-à-vis his Counter-
Affidavit submitted during the preliminary
investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the
prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the
commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon
sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being
driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable
15
that the said damages were not caused by a
strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to
conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus
was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried
to avoid the passenger jeepney." Such a
conclusion finds support in the decision of the
Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118,
where the Court stated that "physical evidence
is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently
than a hundred witnesses." The pictures
submitted do not lie, having been taken
immediately after the incident. The damages
could not have been caused except by a
speeding bus. Had the accused not been
speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed
and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep.
Were he more prudent in driving, he could have
avoided the incident or even if he could not
avoid the incident, the damages would have
been les s severe. In addition to this, the accused
has made conflicting statements in his counter-
affidavit and his testimony in court. In the
former, he stated that the reason why he
swerved to the right was because he wanted to
avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that
made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in
court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger
jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking
by occupying his lane. Such glaring
inconsistencies on material points render the
testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter
his credibility. Furthermore, the variance
between testimony and prior statements
renders the witness unreliable. Such
inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility
of the witness and his testimony as to his
prudence and diligence. As already maintained
and concluded, the severe damages sustained
could not have resulted had the accused acted as
a reasonable and prudent man would. The
accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What
is more probable is that the accused had to
swerve to the right and hit the commercial
apartment of the plaintiff because he could not
make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a
usually crowded street. Moreover, if the claim of
petitioners were true, they should have filed a
third-party complaint against the driver of the
offending passenger jeepney and the
owner/operator thereof. Petitioner Suelto’s
reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape
conviction for the crime charged and his civil
liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
Pleyto vs Lomboy
Facts:
At approximately 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995,
PRBL Bus No. 1539, with Plate No. CVD 556,
driven by petitioner Pleyto, was traveling along
MacArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac bound for
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. It was drizzling that morning
and the macadam road was wet. Right in front of
the bus, headed north, was the tricycle with
Plate No. CX 7844, owned and driven by one
Rodolfo Esguerra. According to Rolly Orpilla, a
witness and one of the bus passengers, Pleyto
tried to overtake Esguerras tricycle but hit it
instead. Pleyto then swerved into the left
opposite lane. Coming down the lane, some fifty
meters away, was a southbound Mitsubishi
Lancer car, with Plate No. PRS 941, driven by
Arnulf o Asuncion. The car was headed for
Manila with some passengers. Seated beside
Arnulfo was his brother-in-law, Ricardo Lomboy,
while in the back seat were Ricardos 18-year old
daughter Carmela and her friend, one Rhino
Daba. PRBL Bus No. 1539 smashed head-on the
car, killing Arnulfo and Ricardo instantly.
Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but only
Carmela required hospitalization. In their
Answer, petitioners PRBL and Ernesto Pleyto
both claimed that the bus was running slowly at
the time of the accident. They pointed out that
Bus No. 1539 had been inspected by driver
Pleyto and examined by a mechanic prior to the
trip, in accordance with the companys standard
operating procedure. It was found in good
working condition. Pleyto claimed that while
16
cruising along the highway at Gerona, Tarlac, he
noticed Esguerras tricycle and followed it at a
safe distance after he was unable to overtake it.
Suddenly and without warning, the tricycle
stopped in the middle of the road. Pleyto
stepped on the brakes and the bus lost speed.
But, since it skidded towards the direction of the
tricycle, he swerved the bus to the other lane to
avoid hitting it, only to collide with the Manila-
bound Mitsubishi car.
At the outset, it appears that petitioners call for
this Court to review the factual findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
assail the appellate courts affirmance of the
finding by the trial court that Pleyto was
negligent. The issue of negligence is factual and,
in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.
But it is well established that under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions
of law, not of fact, may be raised before the
Supreme Court. It must be stressed that this
Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its
function to re-examine and weigh anew the
respective evidence of the parties. Factual
findings of the trial court, especially those
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive
on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record. In the present petition, no compelling
reason is shown by petitioners whatsoever for
this Court to reverse those findings.
Indeed, petitioner Pleyto violated traffic rules
and regulations when he overtook the tricycle
despite the presence of an oncoming car in the
other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays
down the presumption that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. As found by both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to
present any convincing proof rebutting such
presumption.
A driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that
the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot
do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is
approaching or rounding a curve, there is special
necessity for keeping to the right side of the road
and the driver does not have the right to drive on
the left hand side relying upon having time to
turn to the right if a car approaching from the
opposite direction comes into view.
The Court of Appeals found PRBL liable for
Pleyto’s negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or an employee, the
master or employer is presumed to be negligent
either in the selection or in the supervision of
that employee. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee.
In fine, when the employee causes damage due
to his own negligence while performing his own
duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family. Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. With respect to
the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
These facts must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
In the present case, petitioners presented
several documents in evidence to show the
various tests and pre-qualification requirements
imposed upon petitioner Pleyto before his hiring
as a driver by PRBL. However, no documentary
evidence was presented to prove that petitioner
17
PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision
of its employees, including Pleyto.

Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses

of the PRBL would impress one to believe that
the PRBL has always exercised the strictest
standard of selecting its employees and of
maintaining its vehicles to avoid injury or
damage to the life and limb of people on the
road whether of its own passengers or
pedestrians or occupants or other vehicles. It has
not however, shown to the satisfaction of the
Court that it has maintained proper supervision
of its employees, especially drivers while in the
actual operation of its buses. While it has a list of
procedures and testing when it comes to
recruitment and another list of what should be
done with its buses before they are allowed to
run on the road, it has no list of procedures and
duties to be followed by a driver while he is
operating a vehicle to prevent injury to persons
and damage to property. Neither has it proved
to the Court that there are people employed by
it to supervise its drivers so that it can be seen to
it that all the safety procedures to prevent
accident or damage to property or injury to
people on the road have been in place. It is in this
aspect of supervising its employees where this
Court has found the defendant PRBL deficient.

18