1.

Art XVI, sec 3

POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; THE DOCTRINE THAT "THE STATE MAY NOT BE SUED
WITHOUT ITS CONSENT" IS NOT ABSOLUTE. - The Court is not persuaded even as it is
cognizant of the doctrine that "(t)he state may not be sued without its consent," for as the Court
has so stressed in Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, the rule - "x x x is not really absolute for
it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as
correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, 'the state may not be sued without its consent'; its
clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given
either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special
law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in
Act. No. 3083, where the Philippine government 'consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil actions between private parties.' Implied consent, on the other, is conceded when
the State itself commences limitation, thus opening itself to a counter-claim, or when it enters
into a contract."
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
2. Kawanakoa v polybank, 205 u.s. 349
Mr. Sidney M. Ballou for appellants.

[205 U.S. 349, 351] Messrs. Aldis B. Browne, Alexander Britton, and E. A. Douthitt for
appellees. [205 U.S. 349, 352]

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage
executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants
(appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the
mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of
Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the
territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued.
Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made,
the appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to
the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale
were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92.

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage
land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged
premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable
to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which
does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S.
349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19),
and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this court (Damson v.
Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L.
ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).

The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140,
20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have
done so. See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it
did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts
have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its
own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes.
 Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy
d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed.
1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative.
Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.

As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are
sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual
administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which
persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are
subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not
the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from
which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state,
the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that
exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of
certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of
private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But
for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339,
6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See, further, Territory v. Doty,
1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598.

However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the land
is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not
thereby deprived of ability to proceed.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.

3. Syquia v. almeda Lopez, 84 phil. 312

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-1648August 17, 1949 Facts: Plaintiffs, Pedro
Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings
situated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts †“ onefor each of the three
apartments. The period for the three leases was to be †œfor theduration of the war and
six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US.†• Theapartment buildings
were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US ArmedForces stationed in
Manila.Six months after September 2, 1945 †“ when Japan surrendered †“
plaintiffsapproached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and requested
the returnof the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that the
US Armywanted to continue occupying the premises. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate
saidleases, to execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a
reasonablerental higher than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents sent a
letter refusing to execute new leases but advised that the US Army will vacate the
apartmentsbefore February 1, 1947. Not being in conformity with the old lease
agreements,plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the
apartmentson June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of
theassurance that the US Government would vacate the premises before February 1,
1947,the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and
acceptedthe monthly rentals tendered by respondents. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs
served aformal notice to the occupants demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b)
 increase inrentals to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d) release of said
apartmentbuildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to comply with
saiddemands.The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying
with thedemand. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the
form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion
toDismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over
the subject matter of the action because the real party in interest was the
USGovernment and not the individual defendants. Furthermore, the respondent
arguedthat the war between the US and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan
on theother had not yet been terminated and consequently the period of the three leases
hasnot yet expired. Also, a foreign government like the US cannot be sued in the courts
of another state without its consent. That even though the US Government was not
namedas the defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the
partiesnamed are officers of the US Government.The Municiapl Court dismissed the
action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court. Issue: (1)Who is the real
party in interest?(2)Does the court have jurisdiction to hear and try the case? Held:
(1)The Court is convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in theoriginal case
is the US Government. The lessee in each of the three leaseagreements was the United
States of America and the lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by
her officials acting as her agents.The considerations or rentals was always paid by the
US Government. Theoriginal action in the Municiapl Court was brought on the basis of
these threelease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any
backrentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the US Government notonly
because the contracts were entered into by such Government but alsobecause the
premises were used by officers of her armed forces during thewar and immediately after
the terminations of hostilities.(2)It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no
jurisdiction over thepresent case for Unlawful Detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction wasraised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The
USGovernment has not given its consent to the filing of the suit which isessentially
against her, though not in name. Morever, this is not only a caseof a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter†™sconsent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign governmentwithout said government†™s consent, which
renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of this country.

4. De haber v, Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171

In de Haber v. The Queen of Portugal

QUEEN'S BENCH.

Original Printed Version (PDF)

Original Citation: (1851-1852) 17 QB 196

English Reports Citation: 117 E.R. 1255

April 16 th
 [196] In De Haber v. The Queen of Portugal Sir F. Thesiger, in last term (April 16th),
obtained a rule calling on the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London, upon notice of
the rule, to be given to the registrar, or his deputy, of the Court after mentioned, and on
Maurice de Haber, upon notice, &c., to shew cause why a writ of prohibition should not
issue to the court, &o. called the lord mayor's court of London, to prohibit the said court,
and also the said mayor and aldermen, from holding plea or further proceeding in the
action entered in the said lord mayor's court by the said M. de Haber against Her Most
Faithful Majesty Dofia Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, therein described as " Her
Most Faithful Majesty Dofia Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, as reigning Sovereign
and supreme head of the nation of Portugal;" and from further proceeding with two
foreign attachments issued out of the said court in the said action, and made in the
hands of Senhor Guilherne Candida Xavier de Brito and Messrs. William Miller Christy,
George Holgate Forster, George Scholefleld, William Shadbolt, John Timothy Oxley and
George Tayler, respectively ; and to restrain M. de Haber from further proceeding with
the same or either of them.
The rule waa obtained upon an affidavit, in which it was deposed that, on 5th of July
1850, Maurice de Haber entered an action in the mayor's court of London against Her
Most Faithful Majesty Dona Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, and issued an
attachment in the same court against the moneys, &c. which were or should come iuto
the hands of Senhor Guilherne Candida Xavier de Brito. The deponent stated that he
had been [197] informed and believed "that the claim of the said Maurice de Haber
against Her said Most Faithful Majesty (if any such be has) arises for money equivalent
in sterling money to the sum of 12,1361., or thereabouts, which the said Maurice de
Haber alleged that he had in tbe hands of one Francisco Ferreiri of Lisbon in tbe
kingdom of Portugal, banker, at the period when Don Miguel was driven out of Portugal;
and which was, by the said Francisco Ferreiri, paid over to the Government of Portugal
under the decree of some Court in Portugal;" and " that the cause of action (if any there
be) arose in the kingdom of Portugal, and not within the City of London." On this
attachment the garnishee obtained a verdict and judgment in the mayor's court (see pp.
208, 9, post). On 28th March, 1851, De Haber entered another action in the same court
against " Her Most Faithful Majesty Doua Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, as
reigning Sovereign, and as supreme bead of the
1256 DE HABER V. THE QUEEN OF PORTUGAL 17Q. B. 198.
nation of Portugal;" and, on the same day, issued an attachment in the same court
againat the moneys, &c. which were or should come into the bands of De Brito. The
attachment issued on an affidavit, sworn by De Haber in the mayor's court, wherein be
deposed: "That Her Most Faithful Majesty Dofia Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, as
reigning Sovereign and as supreme head of the nation of Portugal, is justly and truly
indebted to him, this deponent, in the sum of 12,1361. for money had and received by
Her said Majesty Dofia Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, for and on behalf of the said
nation of Portugal, for the use of this deponent, [198] and for money taken by Her said
Majesty Dona Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, by and on behalf of the said nation of
Portugal, from this deponent's banker; with interest thereon."
The notice of attachment (a)1 to De Brito referred to the action, describing the defendant
and her character as in the last mentioned affidavit, and attached all such moneys, &c.,
as the garnishee then bad, or which might thereafter come into his hands or custody, "of
the said defendant, to answer the said plaintiff in the plea aforesaid."
The affidavit on which the present rule was obtained further stated that deponent had
been informed and believed that the last mentioned claim of De Haber arose upon the
same cause of action as that in the first action ; and it repeated, as to this last action, the
facts already mentioned to have been deposed to as to the first.
The affidavit also stated that another attachment issued in each action against Christy,
Forster, Scholefield, Shadbolt, Oxley and Tayler, the trustees of the London Joint Stock
Bank, as to which the circumstances did not differ from those of the attachments first
mentioned.
In answer, on the part of De Haber, an affidavit by the deputy registrar of the mayor's
court was put in, which stated the custom of London as to foreign attachments. It stated,
further, that the affidavit on which the mayor's court granted the attachment " is not
considered in the nature of an affidavit to hold to bail, and is not tested by the rules
applicable to such affidavits, but is taken as a protection to the court and suitors, [199]
that no attachment should be made without any real debt existing between the plaintiff
and defendant; and that such affidavit forms no part of the issue between the plaintiff
and garnishee." "That, if upon such affidavit there should appear any patent defect in the
statement or consideration of the plaintiff's debt, or such a debt as will not sustain any
attachment, the court will permit a motion to be made to dissolve the attachment upon
such grounds : but such defect must appear upon the face of such affidavit; and the
practice had been not to allow any question affecting merits to be entered into upon such
summary proceeding; but that the said garnishee may, at any time, make an application
to the court to dissolve an attachment on special grounds. That no plea upon the trial of
an attachment can be entered on behalf of a defendant, because such defendant is not
in court and therefore cannot be a party to the issue; but, under the garnishee's usual
plea of nil habet, the court is accustomed to give great latitude to all defences: but that
the garnishee is not restricted to such plea, but may plead any special matter."
In last Easter term (a)2,
Borthwick, for De Haber, shewed cause. It is true that a foreign Sovereign, sued in
respect of transactions entered into exclusively in the character of Sovereign, cannot be
compelled to appear in an English Court of Justice. But the privilege may be waived ;
and it is waived if it is not properly pleaded. That clearly ap-[200]-pears from Lord
Langdale's judgment in The Duke of BruntswitJe v. The King of Hanover (a)3. The case
is somewhat analogous to that of an action brought against the governor of a foreign
possession of the Crown for an act done in such foreign possession ; the governor, if he
insists upon his right to do the act in his character of governor, must plead the matter
specially; Mostyn v. Fatrigas (b). The Queen of Portugal, by not
(a)1 Set out at length in the judgment, post, p. 205.
(a)2 May 10, 1851. Before Lord Campbell C.J., Patteson, Wightman, and Erie Js.
(a)3 6 Beav. 1, in the Eolls. S. C. in Dora. Proc., affirming the above decree, 2 H. L. Ca.
1.
(b) 1 Cowp. 161, 172, 3. See note to S. C. in 1 Smith's Lead. Ca. 363, 368 b. c. (3d ed.).
170. B. an. DE HABBB V. THE QUBEN OF PORTUGAL 1257
pleading to the jurisdiction, has submitted to it. But, further, the present question is not
between the plaintiff and the Queen of Portugal, but between the plaintiff and the
garnishee. The defendant cannot have a prohibition, for want of jurisdiction, before
appearing in the Inferior Court; and the garnishee, to take advantage of the objection,
should plead it there; Cook v. Licence (1 Ld. Kaym. 346), 6 Bac. Abr. 589, (7th ed.), tit.
Prohibition (K). The prohibition will then go, if the Inferior Court refuse the plea so as to
shew unequivocally an intention to exceed the jurisdiction. If the garuishee had pleaded
only nil habet, the lord mayor's court would unquestion¡ably have had the right to try an
issue on that plea. He might have pleaded to the jurisdiction; for he can plead whatever
the defendant can ; Musters v. Lewis (i Ld. Kaym. 56). Even if the Queen of this realm
had chosen, as she might, to sue as an individual (e), she must have answered to a bill
of discovery touching the matter of the suit. Where an objection ia taken to the
jurisdiction [201] of a County Court, the party becomes entitled to the writ of prohibition
by appearing and shewing the matter before the Judge, who, if he then proceed, may be
prohibited ; Thompson v. Ingharn (14 Q. B. 710). How can the plaintiff' here know in
what character the Queen of Portugal opposes the attachment 1 [Lord Campbell C.J.
Your affidavit in the lord mayor's court, upon which your attachment is founded, states
that she is sued as reigning Sovereign of Portugal,] That is not properly before the Court;
nor is the affidavit really the foundation of the attachment: it is merely required to protect
th& court below from acting on a frivolous suggestion. The fact of the oath need not be
averred in a plea of foreign attachment; Banks v. Self(b)1. There is at least enough
doubt to induce the Court not to prohibit without requiring a declaration in prohibition.
Sir F. Thesiger and Bovill, for the Queen of Portugal, contra. This ia a stronger case than
Wadsworth v. Queen of Spain (ante, p. 171), because it appears that here the original
cause of action arose entirely in Portugal; the money, in respect of which the plaintiff
aues, never was in England. [Lord Campbell C.J. The fund attached would appear to
belong to the Queen of Portugal in the same character as that in which she is a debtor, if
at all.] That is undoubtedly so. Assuming, on the grounds urged in Wadsworth v. Queen
of Spain (ante, p. 171), that the action does not lie against the Queen of Portugal, it does
appear that the lord mayor's court has ex-[202]-ceeded its jurisdiction. The object of the
attachment is to compel a party to appear in a cause which is not within the competence
of that court. It ia said that the garnishee ought to have pleaded to the jurisdiction : but,
even if that were so, the Court will not, on account of his not having so pleaded, allow
this action to go on against the Queen of Portugal. And, further, he was not bound to
plead to the jurisdiction: as regards himself, the only question is whether he is indebted
to the-defendant: he may be entirely ignorant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim on the
defendant. It may be questionable whether the dictum in Masters v. Lewis (1 Ld. Raym.
56), be correct, that "garnishment cannot be, but where the garnishee is liable to the
action of the defendant; for the garnisbee may plead all things that the defendant might
have pleaded." [Lord Campbell C.J. It is the dictum of no less a Judge than Lord Holt.
Wightmau J. And it seems very reasonable. Lord Campbell C.J. The garnisbee may in
some cases know what the plaintiff's claim is. Wightmau J. It is said that the garnishee
may plead that he has no money of defendant in hand, "or other special matter" (b)'2.]
Supposing him to have that right, his abstaining from the exercise of it cannot oust the
original debtor from the rigbt of denying the jurisdiction. Again, the Court, even on the
suggestion of a stranger, will prohibit the Inferior Court from exceeding its jurisdiction ;
Com. Dig. Prohibition (E), 2 Inat. 607. It is true that, in ordinary cases, a party sued
appears, before applying for a prohibition ; Sparks v. Wood (6 Mod. 146): and a plea to
the jurisdiction may be generally proper; Lucking v. Denning (1 Salk. 201): but an ap-
[203]-pearance and plea would be absurd and contradictory in the present case, where
the objection is that the defendant cannot be called upon to appear at all. In a plea to the
jurisdiction, the defendant must appear in person ; 6 Bac. Abr. 235 (7th ed.), tit. Pleas
and Pleadings (E), 2 ; now where the party ia not bound to appear, this Court will prohibit
the enforcing process to compel appearance ; Vaughan v. Evans
(e) See 16 Vin. Ab. 536, tit. Prerogative of the King (Q, 4). (6)1 Note to Harington v.
Macmorris, 5 Taunt. 234. (&)2 Bohun's Privilegia Londini, 256 (3d ed.).
K. B. xtvi.-40*
1258 DE HABER V, THE QUEEN OB1 PORTUGAL, 17 Q. B. 204.
(2 Ld. Eaym. 1408). Ib is true that, by instituting proceedings in an English Court, the
Queen of Portugal might make herself liable to answer a bill relating to those
proceedings: even so, however, she would not be liable to answer another party in a
different matter; The Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover (6 Beav. 1, 38; 2 H. L.
Ca. 1), But, in fact, she has never been a party to this proceeding at all. The privilege of
a foreign Sovereign, like that of ambassadors, rests on the law of nations ; stat. 7 Arm. c.
12, was only declaratory, and was passed to conciliate the Czar; Triquet v. Bath (3 Burr.
1478, 1480). Suppose the Queen instituted proceedings against the garnishee in
Portugal for the debt: could he set up the English attachment as a defence 1 [Lord
Campbell C.J. That is a question which we cannot answer.]
Lord Campbell C.J. We will take time to consider our judgment. But, without prejudice to
any point which has been argued in this case, I must express very great regret that the
action should have been brought. I have no hesitation in saying that such actions do not
lie; and I am very sorry to find that this has been persisted in. The only question is as to
[204] the proper mode of stopping it, whether by a plea in the Court below or by
prohibition.
Cur. adv. vult.
Lord Campbell C.J., in this terra (May 28th), delivered the judgment of the Court in both
oases.
De Haber against The Queen of Portugal.
We are of opinion that the rule for a prohibition in this case ought to be made absolute.
The plaintiff has commenced an action of debt in the court of the Lord Mayor of London
against " Her Most Faithful Majesty Dona Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, as
reigning Sovereign and supreme head of the nation of Portugal:" and, by an affidavit laid
before us, it appears that the plaintiff's alleged cause of action is in respect of a sum of
Portuguese money equivalent to 12,1361. sterling, which he had in the hands of one
Francisco Ferreiri of Lisbon, banker, at the period when Don Miguel, pretending to the
Crown of Portugal, was driven out of that country, and which was by the said Franeiso
Ferreiri paid over to the Portuguese Government now represented by the Royal
defendant. The plaintiff, having entered his plaint, proceeded according to the custom of
foreign attachment in the City of London, as if the defendant were subject to the
jurisdiction of the lord mayor's court and the cause of action had arisen within that
jurisdiction ; and he sued out a summons for the defendant to appear and answer the
plaintiff in the plea aforesaid. A return being made by the serjeant at mace, that the said
defendant had nothing within the said city or liberties thereof, whereby [205] she can be
summoned, nor was to be found within the same (a), the plaintiff swore an affidavit, in
which he stated that the defen¡dant, "aa reigning Sovereign and as supreme head of the
nation of Portugal, is justly and truly indebted to him" "in the sum of 12,1361., for money
had and received by Her said Majesty, Dona Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, for and
on behalf of the said nation of Portugal, for the use of this deponent, arid for money
taken by Her said Majesty Doiia Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, by and on behalf of
the said nation of Portugal, from the deponent's banker, with interest thereon."
The defendant being solemnly called, and not appearing before the lord mayor, the
plaintiff alleged, by hia attorney, that Senhor Guilherne Candida Xavier de Brito, of the
City of London, the garnishee, had money, goods and effects of the defendant in his
hands, and prayed process according to the said custom to attach the said defendant by
the said money, goods and effects in the hands of the garnishee as afore¡said, so that
the defendant may appear in the lord mayor's court to answer the plaintiff in the plea
aforesaid. Thereupon the Judge presiding in the Court awarded an attachment against
the defendant as prayed, directed to the serjeant at mace, which that officer immediately
executed, leaving with the garnishee a notice in the terms following.
(a) The proceedings in the lord mayor's court (except the affidavits of debt in the two
suits, and the notices of attachment in the last) were not expressly deposed to: but it was
assumed in the argument that the regular course of foreign attachment had been
pursued.
17Q. B.201/2. DE HABER V. THE QUEEN OF PORTUGAL 1259
"Senhor Guilherne Candida Xavier de Brito. " 28th March, 1851.
[206] " Take notice that, by virtue of an action entered in the lord mayor's court, London,
against Her Moat Faithful Majesty Dona Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, as reigning
Sovereign and as supreme head of the nation of Portugal, defendant, at the suit of
Maurice de Haber, plaintiff, in a plea of a debt upon demand of 24,0001., I do attach all
such moneys, gooda and effects as you now have, or which hereafter shall come into
your hands or custody, of the said defendant, to answer the said plaintiff in the plea
aforesaid : and that you are not to part with auch moneys, goods or effects without
licence of the said Court.
"G. T. E. eeynal, Plaintiffs Attorney, Lord
Mayor's Court Office, Old Jewry. " J. Z, gokb, Serjeant at Mace."
On the second day of Easter terra this rule for a prohibition was applied for and obtained
on behalf of the Queen of Portugal.
Cause being shewn against this rule and a similar rule in a similar action brought against
Her Most Faithful Majesty the Queen of Spain, various questions respecting foreign
attachment were discussed, which we do not feel it necessary to determine, as we think
that, upon simple and clear grounds, there has been an excess of jurisdiction by the
court of the Lord Mayor of London, against which we are bound to grant a prohibition at
the prayer of the defendant.
In the first place, it is quite certain, upon general principles, and upon the authority of the
case of The [207] Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover (a), recently decided in the
House of Lords, that an action cannot be maintained in any English Court against a
foreign potentate, for anything done or omitted to be done by him in his public capacity
as representative of the nation of which he ia the head; and that no English Court has
jurisdiction to entertain any complaints against him in that capacity. Kedress for sach
complaints affecting a British subject is only to be obtained by the laws and tribunals of
the country which the foreign potentate rules, or by the repre¡sentations, remonstrances
or acts of the British Government. To cite a foreign potentate in a municipal court, for
any complaint against him in his public capacity, is contrary to the law of nations, and an
insult which he is entitled to resent.
The statute 7 Ann. c. 12, passed on the arrest of the Russian Ambassador, to appease
the Czar, has always been said to be merely declaratory of the law of nations,
recognised and enforced by our municipal law; and it provides (sect. 3) that all process,
whereby the person of any ambassador, or of bis domestic servant, may be arrested, on
his goods distrained or seized, shall be utterly null and void. On the occasion of the
outrage which gave rise to the statute, Lord Holt was present as a Privy Councillor to
advise the Government as to the fit steps to be taken ; and, with bis sanction, seventeen
persons, who had been concerned in arresting the ambassador, were committed to
prison that they might be prosecuted by information at the suit of the Attorney General.
Can we doubt that, in the [208] opinion of that great Judge, the Sovereign himself would
have been considered entitled to the same protection, immunity and privilege as the
minister who represents him 1
Let us see then what has been done by the Lord Mayor of London. On a plaint being
entered in his court against "Dona Maria da Gloria, as reigning Sovereign and supreme
head of the nation of Portugal," for what she bad done "for and on behalf of the said
nation," he summons her to appear before him ; and, she being solemnly called and
making default, he, with full knowledge that she was so sued, issues an attachment
against her for this default, to compel her to appear. Under this attach¡ment, all her
money, goods and effects within the City and liberties of London are ordered to be
seized; if she does not obey the mandate within a year and a day, these funds are to be
confiscated or applied to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's demand, without any proof of its
being justly due; and she can only get rid of the attachment by giving bail, to pay the
sum which the plaintiff may recover, or to render herself to prison that she may be
committed to the Poultry or Giltspur Street eompter. The attachment applies, not only to
all the moneys, goods and effects of the Queen of Portugal then in the hands of the
garnishee, but to all that shall thereafter come into
(a) 2 H. L. Ca. 1, affirming the decree of the Master of the Kolls in S. C. 6 Beav. 1.
1260 DE HABER V, THE QUBEN OF PORTUGAL 17Q.B.209.
his hands. The process is studiously framed to be applicable to property of the Queen as
"supreme head of" the Portuguese nation. It appears from the affidavit that the plaintiff
had entered a former plaint against the Queen of Portugal, which, he suggested, was
against her in her individual capacity ; that, upon an attachment, the garnishee pleaded
nil habet; and that upon this issue the [209] jury found a verdict for the garnishee,
because all the funds in the hands of the garuishee were proved to belong to the
defendant in her public capacity as Sovereign of the dominions which she governs.
Were the defendant now to plead nil habet, the verdict must be against him; for the
funds which he holds belong to the defendant in the capacity in which she is sued. While
this attachment stands, should any money raised by loan, or any munitions of war,
purchased for the use of the Portuguese Government, be found within the City of
London or the liberties thereof, they are all liable to be seized for the benefit of the
plaintiff.
It may be right that we should mention two authorities which we have met with in our
researches upon this subject, although they were not referred to in the argument, as
they seem at variance with the opinion we have formed. Bynkershoek, in hia treatise De
Foro Legatorum, ch. iv.(a), discussing the question whether the goods of a sovereign
prince in a foreign State are liable to be judicially arrested or attached, says : " In causa
civil! cum id inter privates obtineat, ubicunque arresta frequentautur, ego nullus
animadverto, cur non idem obtinere oporteat quod ad bona externorum Principum. Si ab
arresto Principis temperemus ob sanctitatem persoiiEe, quis bona Principis in alieno
imperio asque sancta esse dixerit? usu gentium invaluit, ut bona, quse Princeps in
alterius ditione sibi comparavit, sive hsereclitatis, vel quo alio titulo acquisivit, perinde
habeantur, ac boua privatorum, nee minus, quarn hsec, subjiciantur oneribus et tributis."
But this author, who is well known to have an antipathy to crowned heads and to
monarchical government, admits that other jurists differ from [210] him; and he goes on
to cite a decision in his own country which completely overturns his doctrine. "In the year
1668, certain private creditors of the King of Spain arrested three ships of war of that
kingdom, which had entered the port of Flushing, that the pursuers might thus obtain
satisfaction for their debt, the King of Spain being cited to appear at a certain day before
the Judges of the Court of Flushing : but, upon the remonstrance of the Spanish
Ambassador, the States General, by a decree of 12th December 1668, ordered the
authorities of the province of Zealaud to liberate the Spanish ships of war, and to allow
them freely to depart, at the same time directing a representation to be made to the
Spanish Government to do justice to the Dutch citizens, lest it should be necessary to
resort to reprisals." And there-can be no doubt that, according to the law of nations,
reprisals would be the appropriate remedy, not a judicial citation before a municipal
court, to be enforced by seizure of national property.
In Selden's Table Talk (Singer's edition, p. 108 (tit. Law, § 3)), there are the following
words, supposed to be spoken by that profound lawyer himself.
" The King of Spain was outlawed in Westminster Hall, I being of counsel against him. A
merchant had recovered costs against him in a suit, which because he could1 not get,
we advised to have him outlawed for not appearing, and so he was. As soon as
Gondomar heard that he presently sent the money, by reason, if his master had been
outlawed, he could not have the benefit of the law, which would have been very
prejudicial, there being then many suits depending betwixt the King of Spain, and our
English merchants."
[211] The fact here stated seems to have been credited by Lord Chancellor Thurlow,
who, in Nabob of the Carnatic, v. East India Company (1 Ves. jun. 371, 386, note (64)), "
observed, that the King of Spain had been once outlawed by Selden's advice to prevent
him from taking advantage of his suit." But he adds : " The outlawry was bad enough."
Others have doubted whether the King of Spain ever was outlawed in the manner
supposed. Legge, in his Law of Outlawry (London, 1779), p. 12, alluding to it, says: "
This was a very strange case, if for costs only, as it does not seem to be warrantable by
law."
Such an extract from an amusing book of anecdotes cannot be considered any authority
for the position that a sovereign prince may be sued as such in our municipal courts, and
that property belonging to him in his public capacity may be seized to
(a) Opera, vol. 2, p. 151. Leyden, 1767, fol.
17 Q. B.S12. DE HABER V. THE QUEEN OP PORTUGAL 1261
compel an appearance. The statement is in no way authenticated by Selden himself,
arid is merely a loose report of what is supposed to have fallen from him in conversation.
It cannot be accurate; as the outlawry is first supposed to have been for non-payment of
coats, and, secondly, for not appearing: and, according to the usual practice, it could not
have been in Westminster Hall. We have caused search to be made for the record; but it
is not forthcoming. There may de facto be judgment of outlawry against any sovereign
prince who does not appear after being proclaimed the requisite number of times at the
County Court or Court of Hustings, no inquiry being made whether the defendant be an
alien or a natural born Englishman, an emperor or a peasant: but this proceeding is
clearly irregular ; and all concerned in it [212] would be liable to punishment. Till stat. 2 &
3 W. 4, c. 39 (sect. 5), there could have been no outlawry except upon a capias, which
could not be lawfully sued out against a peer or member of the House of Commons,
much less against a sovereign prince. After outlawry, the outlaw is to be seized
wherever he can be found, and imprisoned in salvi et arcta custodia; all his personal
property is forfeited to the Queen of England; and she is entitled to the profits of all his
lands. Such a proceeding is manifestly inapplicable to a foreign Sovereign, who must be
supposed to be in bis own dominions, and, if he were in England, could not be so sued
without a breach of the law of nations and of our municipal law. The suits alleged to have
been pending between the King of Spain and the English merchants, if there were any,
were probably actions brought by him on bills of exchange, or arising out of some of the
commercial transactions in which His Majesty was then engaged. For such matters a
foreign Sovereign might and may still sue in our Courts of Justice : but no authority can
be found for bis being sued here as a Sovereign.
In the case of the " Prince Frederick," before Lord Stowell as Judge of the Admiralty, the
same view of the subject was taken by that greatest of jurists, although, from a
cqmproraiae, no formal judgment was pronounced. There a Dutch ship of war had been
savtd from shipwreck by English sailors, who libelled her for the salvage. Objection
being made that the Court had no jurisdiction, a distinction was attempted, that the
Salvors were not suing the King of the Netherlands, and that, being in posses¡sion of,
and having a [213] lien upon, a ship which they had saved, the proceeding might be
considered in rem. But Lord Stowell saw such insuperable difficulties in judicially
assessing the amount of salvage, the payment of which was to be enforced by sale, that
he caused a representation to be made on the subject to the Dutch Govern¡ment, who
very honourably consented to his disposing of the matter as an arbitrator. The case of
the "Prince Frederick "is not in print; but we had an account of it from the Queen'*
advocate.
Notwithstanding the dictum of Bynkershoek, and the outlawry of the King of Spain,
supposed to be related by Selden, we cannot doubt that the awarding of the attachment
in the present case by the lord mayor's court was an excess of jurisdiction, on the
ground that the defendant is sued as a foreign potentate.
Therefore, the circumstance that the cause of action, if there were any, arose out of the
jurisdiction of the lord mayor's court, need not be relied upon. Nevertheless, after the
strong assertions at the Bar that this is immaterial where the defendant does not appear,
we think it right to say that, having examined the authorities, we enter¡tain no doubt that
the process of foreign attachment can only be duly resorted to where the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the Court from which it issues. The garnishee is safe by
paying under the judgment of the Court: but the objection that the cause of action did not
arise within the jurisdiction of the Court, if properly taken, must prevail. No agreement of
counsel to abstain from making the objection can alter the law of the land, which says
that an Inferior Court can only hold plea where the cause of action [214] arises within the
local limits to which its jurisdiction by charter or custom is confined.
We have now to consider whether we can grant the prohibition on the application of the
Queen of Portugal before she appears in the lord mayor's court. The plaintiff's counsel
 argue that, before she can be heard, she must appear and put in bail, in the alternative,
to pay or to render. It would be very much to be lamented if, before doing justice to her,
we were obliged to impose a condition upon her which would be a further indignity, and
a further violation of the law of nations. If the rule were that the application for a
prohibition can only be by the defendant after appearance, we should have had little
scruple in making this an exception to the rule. But we find
1262 WAD8WORTH V. THE QUEEN OF SPAIN 17 Q. B. 215.
it laid down in books of the highest authority that, where the Court to which the
prohibition is to go has no jurisdiction, a prohibition may be granted upon the request of
a stranger, as well as of the defendant himself; 2 Inst. 607, Com. Dig. Prohibition (E).
The reason is that, where an Inferior Court exceeds its jurisdiction, it is charge¡able with
a contempt of the Crown as well as a grievance to the party ; Ede v. Jackson (Fort. 345).
Therefore this Court, vested with the power of preventing all Inferior Courts from
exceeding their jurisdiction to the prejudice of the Queen or her subjects, is bound to
interfere when duly informed of such an excess of jurisdiction. What has been done in
this case by the lord mayor's court must be considered as peculiarly in contempt of the
Crown, it being an insult to an independent Sovereign, giving that Sovereign just cause
of complaint to the British Government, and having a [215] tendency to bring about a
misunderstanding between our own Gracious Sovereign and her ally the Queen of
Portugal.
Therefore, upon the information and complaint of the Queen of Portugal, either as the
party grieved, or as a stranger, we think we are bound to correct the excess of
jurisdiction brought to our notice, and to prohibit the lord mayor's court from pro¡ceeding
further in this suit.
Rule absolute (a).

5. Garcia v. chief of staff, 16 scra 120

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to
collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while
undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed
a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s
Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of
the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the
Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect
January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was
deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the
reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his
disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of
P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000.
The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate
motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause
of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting
on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an
order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for
 reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed
this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.

Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim
against the government. It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber vs.
Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the
government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that
the State can not be sued without its consent.

Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than
those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation….

Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take
an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a private person or
entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative
remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should
not be entertained if superior administrative officer could grant relief is applicable to
this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

5.a Sanders v. veridiano 162 scra 88

10 June 1988 G.R. No. L-56930

FACTS:

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance
proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the
Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and
Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein
petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure
to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
 ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have
been sued for damages.

RULING:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand
in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can
be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that
the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no
question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

6. Ruiz v Cabahug, 54 O.G. 351

Facts: The Secretary of National Defense, defendant Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug, accepted the bidof Allied
Technologists, Inc. on July 31, 1950 for the furnishing of the architectural andengineering services in
the construction of the Veterans Hospital at the price of Php 302,700. The architectural requirements
were submitted by Allied Technologies throughEnrique Ruiz, Jose Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and were
approved by the United StatesVeterans Administration and a contract was signed due to the technical
objection to thecapacity of the said company in the practice of architecture and upon the advice of
theSecretary of Justice. The defendants allegedly took 15% of the sum due to AlliedTechnologies,
Inc. at the time of the payment of the contract price for the reason thatPanlillo asserted that he is the
sole architect of the Veterans Hospital, excluding Ruiz andHerrera, the assertion of which was abetted
by defendant Jimenez (the first cause ofaction). The plaintiffs were to be deprived of their share of
professional services and theirprofessional prestige and standing were to be gravely damaged unless
the defendants areprevented from recognizing Panlillo as the sole architect. Furthermore, the second
causeof action is Title II of the contract where at any time prior to six months after completionand
acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct AlliedTechnologists,
Inc. to do the services stated in said Title II yet nevertheless thecompletion the
government declined to direct the plaintiffs to perform the job. Issue: Whether or not the government
can be sued for withholding the 15% of the sum anddepriving the plaintiffs of their shareHeld: The
case is a not a suit against the government, which could not be sued without itsconsent. It was found
that the government has already allotted the full amount for thecontract price; it was the defendant-
officials which were responsible for the allegation.This was to be directed to the officials alone, where
they are compelled to act inaccordance with the rights established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist
them from payingand recognizing the rights and interests in the funds retained and the credit for the
job finished. The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside and the case was remanded tothe court
a quo for further proceedings with costs against the defendants.
7. Houston v. Hormes, 252 U.S. 569
sterling v constantin 287 u.s. 378

8. Festejo v. Fernando 50 O.G. 1556

Festejo v. Fernando

Fact:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the CFI of
Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff,
and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and
caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage
and prejudice of the plaintiff.

Issue:
w/n this is a suit against the state?

Held:
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff’s land defendant committed
acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon
plaintiff’s land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have
designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as
any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts
outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable
to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself
by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of
the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias
Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According
to said pleading the defendant is “Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works.” Moreover, in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and
systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;
 We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint — of
which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is “in charge” and for which he is
“responsible” as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds,
which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the
construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore,
a property of the Government.

9. U.s.a. v Guinto 182 scra 644

USA v. GUINTO
182 SCRA 644

FACTS:
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607,
private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for
barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust
operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming
that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258,
complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by
plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners immune from suit?

HELD:
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They
cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470,
petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by
Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial
enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity
from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the
alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity
the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

9.a the Holy See v Rosario 238 scra 524

G.R. No. 101949 December 1,1994

THE HOLY SEEvs.

THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of theRegional Trial Court ofMakati,Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALESENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversyover a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in theMunicipality
ofParañaque, Metro Manila andregistered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot5-A is contiguous to Lots5-B
and 5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine RealtyCorporation (PRC). The three lots weresold toRamon
Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.Later, Licupassigned his rights to
the sale toprivate respondent, Starbright Enterprises.The squatters refused tovacate thelots sold to private
respondent so a disputearose as to who of the parties hastheresponsibility of evicting and clearing the
landof squatters occurred. Complicating therelations ofthe parties was the sale bypetitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Propertiesand DevelopmentCorporation (Tropicana).Private respondent filed a complaint
forannulment of the sale of the threeparcels of land, and specific performance and damagesagainst
petitioner, represented by thePapalNuncio, and three other defendants: namely,Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., the PRC andTropicana.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner Holy See isimmune from suit.
HELD:
YES.The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in theregularcourse of
business. If the foreign stateis not engaged regularly in a business or trade,the particularact or transaction
must then betested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of asovereign activity, or anincident thereof, thenit
is an act

jure imperii , especially when it isnot undertaken for gain or profit.Lot5-A was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. Thedonation wasmade not for commercialpurpose, but for the
use of petitioner to construct thereon the official placeof residenceof the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real orpersonal,in a receiving state, necessary for the creationand
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, isrecognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention onDiplomatic
Relations.In Article 31(a) of the Convention,a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from thecivil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receivingstate over any real action relating toprivate immovable property
situated in the territory of thereceiving state which the envoyholds on behalf of the sending state for
thepurposes of the mission. Ifthis immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all themore reason
should immunity berecognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this caseis the Holy See

SALIENT POINTS:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, according to the Supreme Court: (a)Classical
or absolute theory
—
a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in thecourts of another sovereign; and (b)
Restrictive theory
—
the immunity of the sovereign isrecognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acof
a state, but not with regardto private acts or acts jure gestionis.ACTS JURE IMPERII AND JURE GESTIONIS.
- "There are two conflicting concepts of sovereignimmunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, asovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the Courts of another sovereign.According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only withregard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private act or acts juregestionis. x x x Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private partycannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question iswhether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If
the foreignstate is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then
betested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is anact
 jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit." The service contracts referredto by
private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official actsover which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.How does the Philippine government treat the Holy See or Vatican?

The Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, throughits
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippinegovernment since
1957. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.What is the treaty that governs
the sovereign immunity of diplomats and other state agents?

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which was ratified on 18 April 1961, is acodification of
centuries-old customary law affording protection to foreign diplomats. The Conventionlists the classes of
heads of diplomatic missions to include(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,(b)
envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and
(c) charges d’ affairs

accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the “staff of the(diplomatic) mission” are the
diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service
staff.
Par in parem imperium non habet
. An equal has no power over an equal. Jenk. Cent. 174.Example: One of two judges of the same court
cannot commit the other for contempt

10. Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands, 32 phil 311

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance
of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The
legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and
to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held
that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount
of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
 2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special
agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee
of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent
in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs
Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)

NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations
in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
(Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

11. Republic v. Purisima 78 scra 470

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately,
before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation
of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the
motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both
of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order
to quash or dismiss the informations on a commonground – Lack of essential elements to constitute an
offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two
elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as
stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the
preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant
since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate
subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an
essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3)correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are
those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress
those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9
also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine
 what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal
statute.

12. Amigable v. Cuenca 43 scra 360

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate
of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in
his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it
was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the
recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued,
and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar,
since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff
has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains
the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time
since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due
compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

13. De los Santos v Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71998-99, June 2, 1993
De Los Santos vs. IAC (Consti1)
Emiliano R. De Los Santos, Spouses Norma A. Padilla and Isidoro L. Padilla and the Heirs of Francisco Dayrit,
petitioners, vs. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Judge Cicerro C. Jurado and Edilberto
Cadiente, respondents.

Third Division
Romero, June 2, 1993
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation
Facts:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area: 19,061 sq m)
Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private
contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long
occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land Aside from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and
128.69 meters long was also constructed, occupying an area of 2,906 sq m of their property
 Constructed in a zigzag manner, the creak meandered through their property
Petitioners files two cases which were later consolidated Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both
cases several grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be
maintained without the State's consent The lower court dismissed the petition; petitioners elevated the
case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the cases back to the IAC
IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the State without consent
Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari
Issue:
Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained
Holding:
Yes.
Ratio:
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an action for payment by the owner
The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public
use; no expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the construction of the projects
Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be
reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking
Petition granted. Civil Cases remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits after the Republic of the
Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in both cases.

14. Ministerio v. City of Cebu 40 scra 464

40 scra 464

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927 the
National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it
and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its
price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General
refused to restore its possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of
the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government,
then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot
prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with the consent of said Government. In as much as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner
are entitle
 (Ministerio vs.CFI, 40 SCRA 464)

15. Santiago v. Republic 87 scra 294

Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a
Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry
as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau,
contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property
and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready
for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded
that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos
v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor
of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v
Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground
of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Held: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is
consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be
emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a
Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.

The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set
aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch
II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court.
No cost.

16. Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. G.R. No. l-6060, September 30, 1950
Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000
down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the
purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission.
For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to
the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his
rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded
from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to
do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin
be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing,
 he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin
prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession
of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason
that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of
the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner
of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for
the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the
mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so,
it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a
complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff
to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to
sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state.

17. Lim v Brownell 107 scra 345

Lim, etc. vs. Brownell, Jr., etc.,G.R. No. L-8587FACTS:This is an appeal from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila,dismissing plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property for
lack of jurisdiction overthe subject matter.The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land
situated in Tondo, City ofManila, with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the
last worldwar, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in thename
of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced byTransfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140,On March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of
the Trading withthe Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership
overtwo of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator
(successor of theAlien Property Custodian) under the authority of the same statute issued
asupplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4. On August 3,
1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalfof the President of the United
States) and the President of the Philippines, executed twoformal agreements, one referring to Lots 1
 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, wherebythe said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to
the Republic of the Philippinesupon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all
claims in relationto the property transferred, which claims are payable by the United States of America
orthe Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the United States under the Trading withthe Enemy
Act, as amended, and for all such costs and expenses of administration asmay by law be charged
against the property or proceeds thereof hereby transferred.On November 15, 1948, the latter's son
Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice ofclaim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator On the theory thatthe lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that they were
mortgaged by herto the Mercantile Bank of China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the
propertywas sold at public auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, bymeans of
threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez fromexercising her right
of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to theproperty because he was ineligible
under the Constitution to acquire residential land inthe Philippines by reason of alien age.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property ClaimsCommittee of
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and copy of the decisiondisallowing the claim was
received by claimant's counsel on the 15th of that monthOn November 13, 1950, the claimant
Benito E. Lim, as administrator of theintestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance ofManila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later
substituted by theAttorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question
withback rents. The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) be sued?

HELD:1. No suit or claim for the return of said properties pursuant to Section 9 or 32 (a) ofthe Trading
with the Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from thedate of vesting, the “later” date and
the last on which suit could be brought. Acondition precedent to a suit for the return of property
vested under Trading withthe Enemy Act is that it should be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or within
twoyears from the date of vesting, whichever is later, but in computing the two years,the period during
which there was pending a suitor claim for the return of theproperty of the Act shall be excluded.The
court states that In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar asit dismisses the complaint
with respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damagesagainst the Attorney General of the
United States and the Republic of thePhilippines, is affirmed, but revoked insofar as it dismisses
the complaint withrespect to Lots 3 and 4, as to which the case is hereby remanded to the courtbelow
for further proceedings.

18. Republic v Sandiganbayan 182 scra 911

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
G. R. No. 85284

February 28, 1990

-versus-
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION,
SIMPLICIO A. PALANCA in His Own
Behalf as a Stockholder of BACOLOD
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
[BREDCO] and Other Stockholders
Similarly Situated,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan [Third
Division] dated 3 June 1988 granting the private respondents' motion to intervene in Civil Case No.
0025 and admitting their answer in intervention as well as its resolution dated 25 August 1988, denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration; Prohibition to order the respondent court to cease and
desist from proceeding with the intervention filed with it; and alternatively, Mandamus to compel the
respondent court to dismiss the intervention case.
The antecedents are as follows:
On 29 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, as Plaintiff, through its governmental instrumentality
the Presidential Commission on Good Government [PCGG] filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan
a complaint against Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0025 [PCGG No. 26]. [1] On or about 3 September 1987,
before the said Civil Case No. 0025 could be set for hearing, private respondent Simplicio A. Palanca
in his own behalf as a stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation [BREDCO] and
other stockholders similarly situated, filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a "Motion For Leave To
Intervene" [2] attaching thereto their "Answer in Intervention." [3]
In their motion, private respondents alleged that they be allowed to intervene in the present action
and to file the Answer in intervention hereto attached as Annex "A", the said stockholders having a
legal interest in the matter in litigation and in the disposition of the properties listed in Annex "A" of
the Complaint as BREDCO lots and shares of stock in Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation.
In justification, it is further respectfully alleged that:
1. Close examination of the Complaint, in particular par. 12 thereof under 'V. SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS', makes no mention at all about BREDCO being the subject of any
anomalous transaction engaged in by any of the defendants, in consequence of which the listed
BREDCO lots could have been gotten illegally. It is to be observed, on the other hand, that the titles
mentioned in aforesaid Annex of the complaint covering the lots in question are not registered in the
names of any of the defendants but in the name of Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation.
2. Similarly, the shares of stock in Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation appealing under
Personal Property on page two of Annex "A" of the complaint are carried not in the names of any of
the defendants, but in the name of Marsteel Consolidated Inc. and were acquired under the
circumstances averred more in detail in the accompanying Answer in Intervention by reason of which
detail shares should not be involved in the present action.
3. If intervention is allowed, intervenors are prepared to prove that if ever any of the defendants
through Marsteel Consolidated, Inc. and Marsteel Corporation came to have any interest in Bacolod
Real Estate Development Corporation, it was only by way of accommodation on the part of BREDCO
stockholders who transferred their shareholdings aggregating 70% of the subscribed capital to enable
Marsteel Consolidated to secure adequate financing for the reclamation and port development project
[4]
The foregoing allegations were further expanded and elaborated in the private respondents' Answer
in Intervention.
On 2 December 1987, petitioner filed its Reply [5] to Answer In Intervention, while private respondents
filed a "Rejoinder to Reply With Motion To Release BREDCO Lots [6] and also a "Motion To Calendar
For Hearing" the motion to release BREDCO lots. [7]
On 22 January 1988, respondent court promulgated a Resolution [8] holding in abeyance action on
the private respondents' "Rejoinder to Reply with Motion to Release BREDCO Lots" and set the Motion
for Leave to Intervene for hearing on 2 February 1988.cralaw
On 11 March 1988, respondent court issued an Order [9] giving petitioner fifteen [15] days from 11
March 1988 within which to file its opposition and/or comment on the motion to intervene and giving
the private respondents in turn ten [10] days within which to file their reply thereto.cralaw
On 23 March 1988, petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss "Answer In Intervention," on the grounds that;
[1] respondent court lacks jurisdiction and [2] intervenors have no legal interest in the matter in
litigation, [10] which the private respondents opposed. [11]
On 6 June 1988, respondent court promulgated a Resolution dated 3 June 1988 [12] granting the
private respondents' motion to intervene and admitting their Answer in Intervention. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but this was denied by respondent court in its resolution of 25 August 1989. [13]
Hence, the instant petition.cralaw
The petitioner, through the Solicitor General, contends that in issuing the questioned resolutions
granting the Motion to Intervene and admitting the Answer-in-Intervention, respondent
Sandiganbayan acted in contravention of a national or public policy embodied in Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2, 4 and related issuances, or otherwise acted in a way not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Court, because:
[a] Petitioner, being the sovereign state, cannot be sued without its consent, and the Intervention is,
in legal effect, a suit or counter- suit against the sovereign state, the Republic of the Philippines;
[b] The cause of action of intervenors does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
expressly spelled out in P.D. No. 1606 and Executive Order No. 14;
[c] Intervenors have no legal interest in the matter in litigation, and the subject matter is not in custodia
legis of respondent court; and
[d] Intervenors' claims, as contained in their Motion for Intervention and Answer-in-Intervention, are
claims between and/or among Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their cronies, i.e., "members of their
immediate family close relatives, subordinates, and/or business associates, dummies, agents and
nominees" and are cognizable not by respondent court but by the regular courts or other for a Even if
there would be multiple litigations, as among themselves, the legal effect remains, i.e., that there is
only one case filed by the Republic against the named defendants in Civil Case No. 0025, grounded
on causes of action entirely distinct from any cause of action which intervenors may have against Mr.
Marcos and his cronies.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, generally, to take a cause and apply for relief with the
appellate courts by way of either of two distinct and dissimilar modes through the broad process of
appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal brings up for review errors of judgment
committed by a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject of the suit or the persons of the parties
or any such error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more
than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of
certiorari cannot legally be used for any other purpose. In terms of its function, the writ of certiorari
serves to keep a lower court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts
of courts acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. [14]
Hence, the main issue to be resolved in the present case, which is principally a petition for certiorari to
annul and set aside the questioned resolutions of respondent court is, whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the action for intervention, or if it has, whether respondent court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in rendering the
questioned resolutions.cralaw
In the present case, petitioner merely contends that the cause of action of intervenors does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as expressly spelled out in Presidential Decree No. 1606
and Executive Order No. 14; it does not claim that respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in rendering the questioned resolutions.cralaw
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has already been settled in Presidential Commission on Good
Government vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Penal, etc., et al. [15] where the Court held that:
Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding the funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or I
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees whether civil or criminal,
are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents
arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
[Emphasis supplied].

In reiterating the aforequoted ruling in six [6] subsequent cases [16] which were decided jointly, again,
the Court held that:
The exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the
principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to 'all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to, such cases,' such as the dispute over the sale of the shares, the
propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration
thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum.

Intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.
[17] Hence, the private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case No. 0025, not being an
independent action, is merely incidental to, or related to, the said civil case. Since the respondent
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 0025, it has likewise
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the private respondents' action for intervention therein.
Now, considering that respondent Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction not only over Civil Case No. 0025
but also over the private respondents' action for intervention, any error or irregularity that it may have
committed in rendering its questioned resolutions, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, amounts to an
error of judgment, which is not correctable in the present petition for certiorari but by appeal.
Accordingly, this case may be dismissed outright without the Court having to pass upon the other
issues raised in the petition. However, considering that the litigation below is of great public interest
and involves a matter of public policy, the Court has decided to review the other errors allegedly
committed by respondent court in rendering its questioned resolutions.cralaw
In this jurisdiction, the law on "intervention" is found in the Rules of Court. [18] Thus, a person may,
before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. [19]
The Court is not impressed with the contention of petitioner that the intervenors have no legal interest
in the matter in litigation. In this connection, it would suffice to quote what the respondent court said
in holding that the intervenors have a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Thus:
Has Palanca shown a proper case for intervention by him and his co-stockholders who are similarly
situated as he is?

A narration of the pertinent facts alleged by Palanca and the plaintiff indicates the answer.
In 1961, BREDCO was awarded by Bacolod City, a contract to undertake the reclamation and port
development of the city. As of 1975, a sizeable portion of land had already been reclaimed from the
sea and corresponding torrens titles issued in BREDCO's name. In that year, BREDCO engaged
MARSTEEL as a contractor to complete the project with power to negotiate in its name or jointly and/or
severally with BREDCO for loans to finance the reclamation and port development, and to mortgage
all reclaimed lots and other assets of the project as security. For its services, MARSTEEL shall receive
65% of the excess of all revenues over all disbursements. Accordingly, BREDCO conveyed to MARSTEEL
65% of each lot already reclaimed and that to be reclaimed.cralaw
In 1977, MARSTEEL assigned to MCI, which owned 100% of its capital stock, all its rights, interests,
obligations, and undertakings in the project. To enable MCI to expand its base of negotiation for loans
needed in the reclamation and port development the BREDCO stockholders transferred to MCI their
respective shares of stock amounting to 70% of the capital stock of BREDCO. In return, they 'shall be
entitled to a share of 35% in excess of all revenues over all disbursements of the projects,' it being
understood that payment of the corresponding share shall be due to BREDCO stockholders as owners
of existing interests in the project, regardless of the fact that by implementation of this AGREEMENT,
they ceased to be stockholders of BREDCO.cralaw
In September 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sequestered all assets,
properties, records and documents' of MARSTEEL, MCI, and BREDCO'. In July 1987, the complaint at
bar was filed and expanded in March 1988. The pleadings, original and expanded, allege that the
defendants, acting singly or collectively, amassed ill-gotten wealth listed in Annex 'A' thereof, among
which are the BREDCO lots and shares of stock, and pray that the ill-gotten wealth be reconveyed to
the plaintiff, plus damages. Significantly, however, the bodies of the complaints do not mention
anything about BREDCO, its project, lots, and stocks, nor about MCI.cralaw
Under these alleged facts, Palanca has established a proper case for intervention. Firstly, he and his
co-stockholders have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, namely, their 70% of the capital stock
of BREDCO, which they transferred to MCI by way of alleged accommodation, or its equivalent of 35%
of the excess of all revenues over all disbursements, to which they are entitled "as owners of existing
interests in the project." Section 2, Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court, provides that a person may be
permitted "to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation."
As a general rule, the right to intervene exists in favor of one who claims to be the owner or to have
some interest in the property which is the subject of litigation, and this without particular regard to
the value of the property or the right claimed therein. A third party may intervene in a sequestration
suit involving title to personal property, and have his claims to the possession of the property
vindicated therein. So, in an action for possession of real or personal property, an intervenor may be
admitted on the ground that he is an owner thereof, either to assist in the defense, or to claim the
property for himself, or to obtain some other relief germane to the action. [59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, Sec.
152, p. 585].cralaw
Secondly, the same Section 2, Rule 12 further provides that intervention by a person may be permitted
"when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof." On this point, the Supreme Court observed:
We shall now speak of the case where the stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a
property right in the res, or thing, which is the subject-matter of the ligitation, without becoming a
formal plaintiff or defendant, and without acquiring the control over the course of a litigation, which
is conceded to the main actions (sic) therein. The mode of intervention to which reference is now made
is denominated in equity procedure the intervention pro interesse suo and is somewhat analogous to
the trial of a right of property in an action of law, its purpose being to enable a person whose property
gets into the clutches of a court, in a controversy between others, to go into court and to procure it or
its proceeds to be surrendered to him. It often happens that a person who really owns property, or has
a superior lien or other interest in it, sees a litigation spring up between others who assert rights in or
concerning it. If the court takes possession of the res, or otherwise gets jurisdiction over it in such a
controversy, the real owner is not compelled to stand Idly by and see the property disposed of without
asserting his rights. Though it be granted that the litigation would not be technically binding on him
because of his not being a party, yet it might well happen that complications would ensue whereby
his rights would be materially prejudiced. For instance, the subject matter of the litigation might consist
of a fund to he distributed, and the conditions might be such that if it were turned over to the particular
litigant who should appear to have the better right in the original action, the person really having a
superior title might be left without redress. Accordingly, provision is made whereby persons who have
not been joined as parties in the original proceedings, may intervene and assert a right antagonistic
or superior to that of one or both of the parties. [Bosworth vs. Terminal etc. Assoc. of St. Louis, 174
U.S. 182,187, 43 L. ed., 941, 943]. As regards the right to intervene in this manner, it may be stated that
if the party desiring to intervene shows a legitimate and proper interest in the fund or property in
question, the motion to intervene should be granted, especially if such interest cannot be otherwise
properly protected. [Joaquin v. Herrera, 37 Phil. 705, 722-724].

Here, the BREDCO lots and stocks were sequestered and are now in custodia legis [Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, An Annotated
Text, 1987 Ed., p. 129, Footnote 42]. From the facts averred by Palanca and the plaintiff, it is easy to see that in the event We decide to order the reconveyance
of those assets to the plaintiff, Palanca and his co-stockholders in BREDCO stand to be adversely affected.
And thirdly, the legal interest of Palanca and his co-stockholders in the matter in litigation and the possibility of a judgment ordering reconveyance in favor
of the plaintiff, invest them with legal interest in the success of the defendants, at least insofar as the BREDCO lots and shares are concerned. Section 2, Rule
12, also permits intervention by a person who has legal interest in the success of either of the parties. [20]
The petitioner's contention that the State cannot be sued without its consent and that private respondents' action for intervention is, in legal effect, a suit or
counter-suit against the sovereign is also untenable. The Rules of Court [21] provide that the intervention shall be made by complaint filed and served in
regular form and may be answered as if it were an original complaint; but where the intervenor unites with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff,
the intervention may be made in the form of an answer to the complaint. In order words, a third person who makes himself a party to an existing litigation
may either join the plaintiff in claiming what is sought in the filing a complaint in intervention, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the
plaintiff, by filing an answer in intervention.cralaw
In Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., [22] the plaintiff therein, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. The
Republic of the Philippines intervened by filing a complaint in intervention. Thereafter, the defendant filed its answer to the complaint in intervention and set
up a counterclaim against the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, among
others, that the state is immune from suit. On appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its complaint in
intervention, the Government in effect waived its right to non-suability.cralaw
In another case, Lim vs. Brownell, Jr. and Kagawa, [23] the plaintiff Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Alien Property Administrator [later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States] for the
recovery of four [4] parcels of land [which were subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines] with a prayer for the payment of back rentals.
The Republic of the Philippines intervened in the case. The defendant Attorney General of the United States and the defendant-intervenor Republic of the
Philippines each filed an answer, alleging by way of affirmative defense, among others, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the claim for rentals since
the action in that regard constituted a suit against the Republic to which it had not given its consent. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court affirmed, with the following reasons:
The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines to which it was transferred, likewise, cannot
be maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and
consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government. [Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312; 47 Off. Gaz., 665;
Compania General de Tabacos vs. Govt. of the P.I., 45 Phil., 663]. Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect, waived its
right of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United
States in resisting plaintiffs claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention. Clearly, this is not a case
where the State takes the initiative in an action against a private party by filing a complaint in intervention, thereby surrendering its privileged position and
coming down to the level of the defendants what happened in the case of Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al.-95 Phil. 905 cited by the plaintiff but
one where the State, as one of the defendants merely resisted a claim against it precisely on the ground, among others, of its privileged position which
exempts it from suit. [Emphasis supplied].
In the present case, the private respondents intervened in Civil Case No. 0025 merely to unite with the defendants therein in resisting the claims of petitioner,
as plaintiff, and for that reason asked for no affirmative relief against any party in their answer in intervention. In other words, this is not a case where the
 private respondents take the initiative in an action against petitioner by filing a complaint in intervention or a complaint. As observed by respondent
Sandiganbayan:
In intervening, Palanca and his co-stockholders have for their purpose to exclude the BREDCO lots and stocks or, at least, their 35% interest in the BREDCO
project from any possible judgment directing reconveyance of the alleged ill-gotten wealth to the plaintiff. They do not pray for damages against the latter.
In effect, they occupy a defensive position as regards those shares of stock or interest. The fact that they interjected themselves into his litigation at their own
initiative does not alter the essential nature of their intervention." [24]
Private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case No. 0025 is not, therefore, a suit or counter-suit against petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Having
arrived at the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further discuss the petitioner's pretense that the private respondents' claims are claims as
between and/or among Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al., and that the same is not cognizable by respondent Sandiganbayan but by the regular courts. It
suffices to state that, as already stated, in intervening in Civil Case No. 0025, private respondents merely joined the defendants therein in resisting the claims
of petitioner, as plaintiff, and that they asked no affirmative relief against any party in their answer in intervention. They do not appear to have any controversy
with the defendants, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al.cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the petition in the present case is hereby dismissed.cralaw
SO ORDERED.

19. Santos V. Santos 92 phil 281

Santos v. Santos92 Phil. 281 November 26, 1952

Facts:
An undivided parcel of land
situated in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal with an area of 21,577 square meters was owned by the petitioners and the respondent in the
proportion of 1/7 undivided sharefor Teodora Santos and 1/14 undivided share each for Josefina Santos and Emiliana Santos and 5/7 undividedshare for
Leoncio Santos. Petitioners complained that from 1945 to 1949 Leoncio Santos collected from theArmy of the United States of America rentals for the use
and occupation of a parcel of land and later sold the lotthe Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration on or about 13 May 1949. Petitioners
demand for theaccounting of the payments for the rentals of the lot and to give to the portion of the fruits of the rentalsaccording to their portion of the
said lot. They also prayed to restore to their ownership the portions of the saidland that belongs to them contending that the said contract of sale is null and
void because it is performedwithout their consent and to pay the petitioners for damages and cost. The Administrator of the CivilAeronautics Administration
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of thecomplaint against him. This motion was granted on the ground that the Civil
Aeronautics Administration not being a juridical person has no capacity to sue and be sued and for that reason it cannot come under the jurisdiction of the
court.
Issue:
whether or not the petitioners can sue the Civil Aeronautics Administration who is not a juridical entity.
Held:
An obligation or liability of the state created by statute is enforceable against the officer or agent chargedwith the duty to execute the law. If there should be
anything demandable which had been paid or delivered to or collected by officers or agents of the state without the authority of law, the action would not
be against the state but against the responsible officers or agents who received what was not due the state or made the unauthorizedcollection. Punishable
acts or omissions committed by officers or agents of the state are crimes and violations of law perpetuated by such officers or agents and not by the state.The
same postulate may be applied to torts committed by officers or agents of the state. Nevertheless, if, whereand when the state or its government enters into
a contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of alegitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual
or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter intosuch contract does not provide for
or name the officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the
state itself may be sued even without its consent
, because by entering into a contract thesovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be used is implied from the very actof
entering into such contract. If the dignity of the state, the sacredness of the institution, the respect for thegovernment are to be preserved and the dragging
of its name in a suit to be prevented, the legislative departmentshould name the officer or agent against whom the action may be brought in the event of
breach of the contractentered into under its name and authority. And the omission or failure of the legislative department to do so isno obstacle or
impediment for an individual or citizen, who is aggrieved by the breach of the contract, to bringan action against the state itself for the reasons already
adverted to, to wit; the descent of the sovereign state tothe level of the individual or citizen with whom it entered into a contract and its consent to be sued
impliedfrom the act of entering into such contract.The Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent a party or
partiesfrom enforcing their propriety rights under the cloak or shield of lack of juridical personality, because it took over all the powers and assumed all the
obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into thecontract in question. In
National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro

*
, G.R. No. L-5122, 30 April 1952, we heldthat the Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued and that the principle of
state immunity from suit
doesnot apply to it. The order appealed from dismissing the complaint as to the Civil Aeronautics Administration isreversed and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law. No cost shall be taxed.