SriLankan A320 FCTM Sept 2010

MN/TR/05
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL Issue No : 00

Chapter 00
September 2010
INTRODUCTION
Page 1
PREAMBLE
The FCTM is to be presented in such a manner that the reader initially is provided with data and
information on general guidance in aviating. These rules hold true irrelevant of the type of
aircraft, and can be applied parallel to S.O.P’s and abnormal emergency procedures. Most
abnormal emergency procedures upon examination are found to be laid down following the
precepts in aviation detailed in the aforementioned selection.
The normal operations briefings section is intended to familiarize the reader during training with
detailed information which would help broaden his scope of knowledge regarding the S.O.P’s and
thereby help refine the standard with which S.O.P’s are accomplished. Due to standardization of
procedures across the 3 fleets all 3 aircraft types are covered in a single section and where
necessary specific reference is made to different A/C types.
The abnormal operations briefing section deals with a few failures that are commonly exercised in
the simulator and/or are deemed worth making specific mention of. It must be understood that
this section cannot be published to provide briefings on any or all foreseeable failure situations but
is intended to provide the reader with guidance on selected failures which are critical. Separate
chapters are provided for each fleet.
The All Weather Operations section provides background information on the relevant aspects of
operating in Low Visibility and the exercises and standards required in the simulator for training
validation and subsequent checking.
The miscellaneous section provides information related to adverse operating conditions.
The Line Training log is included so the trainee may make himself familiar with the relevant
documentation.
The Take-off Safety Section provides background data, and general guidance on the potential
hazards associated with the Take-off phase of the flight, taking into consideration the possibility of
rejecting the Take-off or continuing it after a failure.
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CHIEF PILOT TRAINING & STANDARD
Revision No. 00 Revision Date

Prepared By Flight Ops Training Approved By CAASL
MN/TR/05
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September 2010
INTRODUCTION
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ISSUE STATUS
 Issue of the manual is identified by numerical order and will be marked on each page of
the manual. This is the first issue of this manual formatted in accordance with ISO
9001:2008.
 This issue will be annotated by REV 00.

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ISSUE STATUS
Date of Issue Issue No. Details

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Chapter Page Date Chapter Page Date

INTRO Page 01 September 2010 Chapter 02 Page 15 September 2010
Chapter 01 Page 01 September 2010 Chapter 03 Page 13 September 2010

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Chapter 11 Page 03 September 2010

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RECORD OF REVISIONS
 Revision to this manual is made as required, to reflect the current training procedures of
the company.
 The organization shall from time to time review the contents of this manual and change its
contents with the due approval of Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka.
 Revisions are made by the replacement of individual applicable pages. A revision number
and date of such revision shall be identified at the foot of each page.
 Revisions are numbered consecutively until such time a new issue is made. Where
changes effect that sections of the manual will be re issued.

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RECORD OF REVISIONS
Date Of Page Revision

Section Details
Revision No. No.

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
Chapter Contents
01. ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL
02. GENERAL INFORMATION
03. NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS
04. ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS –A320
07. BASE TRAINING
08. LINE TRAINING
09. ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS
10. MISCELLENEOUS
11. TAKE-OFF SAFETY

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL Issue No: 00
Chapter 01
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ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL
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CHAPTER - 01
ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

OF THE MANUAL

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1 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL
1.1 INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

1.1.1 Flight Crew Training Manual ………………………………………………………………………… 12
1.1.2 Abbreviation……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13
1.2 SYSTEM OF ISSUANCE AMENDMENTS AND REVISION ………………………………………………. 14

1.2.1 Pagination ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
1.2.2 Change Indicator (Vertical Bar) …………………………………………………………………….. 15
2. GENERAL INFORMATION
2.1 Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
2.2 Operational Philosophy……………………………………………………………………………………… 3
2.3 Training Objectives ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
2.4 Abnormal & Emergency Checklist Philosophy …………………………………………………. 4
2.5 Flight Management …………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
2.6 Operations Golden Rules ………………………………………………………………..………………… 6

2.6.1 General Golden Rules ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 6
2.6.2 Golden Rules for Abnormal & Emergency Conditions…………………………………………………. 11
2.6.3 Create a shared problem mode with other crewmembers by communicating………………. 12
2.6.4 Apply recommended procedures and other agreed actions………………………………………… 12
2.6.5 Summary of Key Points …………………………………………………………………………………………. 12
2.7 Guidelines for Situations beyond the Scope of Emergency

Procedures ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
2.7.1 Basic Aerodynamics & Systems Knowledge ……………………………………………………………… 13
2.7.2 Flight Path Control ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14
2.7.3 ECAM Discipline ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
2.7.4 Communication …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
2.7.5 Damage Assessment & Airplane Handling Evaluation ……………………………………………….. 15
2.7.6 Approach & Landing ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16
3. NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS
3.1 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

3.1.1 Airbus Documentation…………………………………………………………………………..………………... 4
3.1.2 LOFT Briefing…………….…………………………………………………………………..………………………. 10
3.2 Exterior Inspection………………………………….…………………………………………………………. 13

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3.3 Cockpit Preparation……………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
3.4 Take-Off Briefing …………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 18
3.5 Engine Start – Auto or Manual ………………………………….………………………………………. 20
3.6 Taxi ……………………………….…………………………………………………………………………………… 22

3.6.1 Visual Ground Geometry - A340 ………….……………………………………………………………. 24
- A320 …………………………………………………………………….… 25
3.6.2 Supplementary - 180˚ Turn on Runway…………………………………………………………………… 25
3.7 Take-Off …………………………………………………….………………………………………………………. 27

3.7.1 Crosswind or Tailwind …………………………………………………………………………………….……… 29
3.8 Climb …………………………………………………….……………………………..…………………………….. 31
3.9 Cruise Management ……………………………………………………………………..…………………… 33
3.10 Descent and Approach - Preparation and Briefing ………………………………………..…. 36
3.11 Descent and Approach - Procedures and Techniques …………………….………………… 38
3.12 ILS Approach ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41

3.12.1 Standard Approach ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41
3.12.2 Glide Interception from Above ………………………………………………………………………….…… 44
3.12.3 Raw Data Approach …………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 45
3.13 Non Precision Approaches ………………………………………………………………………………… 48
3.14 Visual Approach – Traffic Pattern and Sidestep …………………………………………….… 53

3.14.1 Supplementary - Circling Approach………………………………………………. 55
- Visual Approach…………………………………………………. 56
- Final Approach…………………………………………………… 57
3.15 Landing – Landing and Stopping the A/C ………………………..………………………………. 59

3.15.1 Minimum Visual Ground Segments - A340…..……………………………………………… 62
- A330…………………………………………………… 63
- A320………………………………………………….. 64
3.15.2 IFS Final Approach & Landing Geometry - A340………………………………………………….. 65

- A330…………………………………………………… 66
- A320………………………………………………….. 67
3.15.3 Ground Clearance Diagram - A340………………………………………………….. 68

- A330 …………………………………………………. 69
- A320 ……………………………………………………70

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3.16 Go Around…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 71
3.17 Flight with Gear Down ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 73
3.18 GPWS Warning …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75
3.19 FMGS – Position Updating …………………………………………………………………………………. 77
3.20 Global Position System ……………………………………………………………………………………… 79
3.21 Fuel- Normal/Abnormal Sys Operation …………………………………………………… ……….. 83
3.22 Adverse Weather ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………. 85

3.22.1 Cold/ Hot Weather and High Altitude Runway Operation…………………………………………….. 85
3.22.2 Flight in Severe Turbulence……………………………………………………………………………………… 89
3.22.3 Windshear – Take-off/Approach………………………………………………………………………………. 90
3.23 Performance……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 93
3.23.1 Flight Preparation – Fuel Calculation………………………………………………………………………… 93
3.23.2 Approach Speeds…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 95
3.23.3 Contaminated Runways………………………………………………………………………………………….. 99
3.23.4 Climb and Descent…………………………………………………………………………………………………102
3.23.5 Preflight Planning for One Engine Out………………………………………………………………………103
3.24 Flights Controls – Flight Characteristics……………………………………………………………106
3.25 Flights Director Mode - Reversions………………..………………………………………………….111
3.26 Use of Track/FPA/FPV/FPD……………….…………..………………………………………………….114

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4. ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS – A320
4.1 Operating Techniques …………………………………………………………………………………… 3

4.1.1 Rejected Take- Off………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
4.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire After V1……………………………………………..…………………………………. 5
4.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on Fly-By-Wire Aircraft…………………………………………………………………. 12
4.2 Double FMGEC Failure………………………….…………………………………………………………….. 17
4.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

4.3.1 All Engine Generator Fault…………………….………………………………………………………………… 19
4.4 Smoke ………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………. 22
4.5 Flight Controls ………………………………….……………………………………………………………….. 26

4.5.1 Abnormal Flaps/Slats Configuration……………………………………………………..………………….. 26
4.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall………………..………………………. 29
4.6 Dual Hydraulic Failure.……………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
4.7 ECAM …………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………….. 35

4.7.1 Philosophy and Normal use……………………………………………………………………………………….35
4.7.2 Use in case of Failure……………………………………………………………………………………………… 38
4.8 Navigation…………………………………………….……………………………..…………………………….. 43
4.8.1 IRS/ADR Failure……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 43
4.8.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure…………………………………………………………………………………….. 45
4.9 Power Plant……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47

4.9.1 Engine Failure in cruise…………………………………………………………………………………………… 47
4.9.2 Engine Relight in flight……………………………………………………………………………………………. 51
4.9.3 All Engine Flame out……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53
4.9.4 Thrust Lever Disagree/Fault……………………………………………………………………………………… 55
4.9.5 Engine Abnormal Starts……………………………………………………………………………………………. 57
4.9.6 Engine Tailpipe Fire…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 59
4.10 Emergency Descent ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 61

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5 ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS
5.1 Operating Techniques …………………………………………………………………… …………………. 3
5.1.1 Rejected Take-off…….……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

5.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire after V1………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
5.2 Double FMGEC Failure………………………….……………………………………………………………… 16
5.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 18
5.4 Smoke …………..……………………………………………………………………………..……………………. 21
5.5 Flight Control …………………………………………………….………………………………………………. 25
5.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration………………………………………………………………………… 25

5.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall ………………………………………… 28
5.6 Fuel Jettison – A330 ……………….…………………………………………………………………………. 30
5.7 Dual Hydraulic Failure ………………………………………………………………………………………. 32
5.8 ECAM …………………………………………………….……………………………..………………………….… 35
5.8.1 Philosophy and Normal use ……………………………………………………………………………………. 35

5.8.2 Use in case of failures …………………………………………………………………………………………… 38
5.9 Navigation ………….…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 43
5.9.1 IRS / ADR failures …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 43

5.9.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure …………………………………………………………………………………… 44
5.10 Power Plant ……………………………………………………………….………………………………………. 46
5.10.1 Engine Failure in cruise ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 46

5.10.2 Engine Relight in flight …………………………………………………………………………………………… 49
5.10.3 All Engine Flame out ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 51
5.10.4 Thrust Lever disagree / Fault…………………………………………………………………………………… 53
5.10.5 Engine Abnormal Starts ……………………………………………………………………………………….… 55
5.10.6 Engine Tailpipe Fire ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 56
5.11 Emergency Descent ………………………………………….……………………………………………….. 58

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6 ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS – A340
6.1 Operating Techniques ……………………………………………………………….……………………… 3

6.1.1 Rejected Take-off…….………………………………………………………………………..………………… 3
6.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire after V1………………………………………………………..……………………… 5
6.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on Fly-By-Wire Aircraft………………………………………………………………… 12
6.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 18

6.3.1 All Engine Generator Fault
6.4 Smoke…………..………………………………………………………………………………………..…......... 21
6.5 Flight Control …………………………………………………….……………………………………………... 25

6.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration …………………………………………………………………….… 25
6.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall …………………………………..……. 27
6.6 Fuel Jettison – A340 ……………….………………………………………………………………………… 29
6.7 Dual Hydraulic Failure …………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
6.8 ECAM …………………………………………………….……………………………..……………………………. 33

6.8.2 Use in case of failures ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
6.9 Navigation ………….…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41

6.9.1 IRS / ADR failures ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41
6.9.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure ………………………………………………………………………………….. 42
6.10 Power Plant ……………………………………………………………………………….……………………… 44

6.10.1 Engine Failure in cruise …………………………………………………………………………………………. 44
6.10.2 Two Engine Out Operations …………………………………………………………………………………… 47
6.10.3 Engine Relight in flight………………………………………………………………………………………….. 49
6.10.4 All Engine Flame out …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
6.10.5 Thrust Lever disagree / Fault ………………………………………………………………………………… 53
6.10.6 Engine Abnormal Starts ………………………………………………………………………………………… 55
6.10.7 Engine Tailpipe Fire ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 56
6.11 Emergency Descent ………………………………………….………………………………………………. 58

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7 BASE TRAINING
7.1 Policy Procedures

7.1.1 Training Objective ……………………………………………………………………………………….. ……… 3
7.1.2 Schedule……………………………………………………………….…………………………………………….. 3
7.1.3 Equipment…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 3
7.1.4 Instructor’s Actions…………………………………………………………..………………………………….. 3
7.1.5 Trainee’s Actions …………..…………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
7.1.6 Completion Standards …………..……………………………………………………………………………… 15
7.1.7 Common Errors …………….……………………………………………………………………………………… 15
7.2 a) Circuit Profile for base and FFS Training……………………………………………………………… 16

b) Circuit……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17
8 LINE TRAINING
8.1 Line Training General …………………………………………………………………..………………..…….. 3

8.1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
8.1.2 Use of the Syllabus Form ……………………………………………………………………………………… 3
9 ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS
9.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

9.1.1 general …………………………………………………………………………..................................... 4
9.1.2 A brief history…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
9.1.3 Economic aspects………………………………………………………………………………………….….... 4
9.2 General Concepts………………………………………………..………………………………………………. 5

9.2.1 Category II / III………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
9.2.2 Decision Height and Alert Height ……………………………………………………………………….... 5
9.2.3 Runway Visual Range……………………………………………………………………………………..…… 7
9.2.4 Fail passive autoland system…………………………………………………………………………..……. 8
9.2.5 Fail operation autoland system……………………………………………………………………………… 8
9.2.6 Minimum Break-off Height…………………………………………………………………………………... 8
9.2.7 Concept of minima…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
9.3 Aircraft Requirements……………………………………………………………….……………………… 10

9.3.1 General…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
9.3.2 Aircraft Equipment……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
9.3.3 Automatic Landing Certification…………………………………………………………………………... 11
9.3.4 Category II / III certification……………………………………………………………………………….. 14
9.3.4.1 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 14

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9.4 Airfield Requirements……………………………………………………………………………………….. 15

9.4.1 General ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
9.4.2 Runway characteristics……………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
9.4.3 Visual aids – Runway marks………………………………………………………………………………… 16
9.4.4 Visual aids – Runway lights…………………………………………………………………………………. 17
9.4.5 Visual aids – Approach light system…………………………………………………………………….. 21
9.4.6 Obstacle clearance area……………………………………………………………………………………... 22
9.4.7 ILS facility…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22
9.4.8 Runway Visual Range…………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
9.4.9 Airfield maintenance…………………………………………………………………………………………… 25
9.4.10 ATC procedures. ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 26
9.5 Operational Approval…………………………………………………………………………………………. 27

9.5.1 Required Aircraft Equipment……………………………………………………………………………..... 27
9.5.2 Maintenance Requirements…………………………………………………………………………………. 27
9.5.3 Operating Procedures………………………………………………………………………………………... 28
9.5.4 Flight Crew Training…………………………………………………………………………………………… 28
9.5.5 Aerodrome Requirement…………………………………………………………………………………….. 28
9.6 Low Visibility Takeoff……………………………………………………………………………………….. 30

9.6.1 General…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 30
9.6.2 LVTO with RVR between 400m and 150m……………………………………………………………..31
9.7 Simulator All Weather Operations briefing…………............................................... 31

9.7.1 Training Objective……………………………………………………………………………………………... 31
9.7.2 Schedule…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 31
9.7.3 Equipment ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 31
9.7.4 Instructor’s Action…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32
9.7.5 Trainee’s Action……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32
9.7.6 Flight Preparation…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 33
9.7.7 Approach Preparation……………………………………………………………………………………….. 34
9.7.8 CAT II or CAT III Crew Briefing…………………………………………………………………………… 36
10 MISCELLANEOUS
10.1 Windshear Weather ……………………………………………………………. ……………………………. 3

10.1.(a) the Thunderstorm ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
10.1.(b) The Microburst as a Windshear threat ……………………………………………………………..…….. 6
10.1.1 Measured Microburst ……………………………………………………. ………………………….…………… 9
10.2 Lessons Learned from Windshear Encounters …………………………………………………. 11

10.2.1 Encounter during Take-off-On Runway ……………………………………………………………………. 12
10.2.2 Encounter during Take-off-After Lift off …………………………………………………………………… 14
10.2.3 Encounter on Approach …………………………………………………………………………………………. 17

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10.3 Windshear effects on Airplanes and Systems……………………………………………………. 18

10.3.1 Windshear Effects on Airplanes ……………………………………………………………….…………..…. 18
10.3.2 Windshear Effects on Systems ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22
10.4 Model of Flight Crew Actions …………………………………………………………………………….. 23

10.4.1 Crew Actions ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
(a) Avoidance …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
(b) Precautions – Takeoff ………………………………………………………………………………… 24
(c) Precautions – Approach and Landing …………………………………………………………… 24
.
10.4.2 Follow Established Standard Operating Techniques ………………………………………………….. 25
(a) Crew Awareness ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 26
(b) Crew Co-ordination ……………………………………………………………………………………. 27
10.4.3 Windshear Recovery Technique ……………………………………………………………………………… 28

(a) Encounter During Take-off – On Runway …………………………………………………… 28
(b) In-Flight Recovery Maneuver ……………………………………………………………………. 29
10.4.4 Summery of Crew Actions for Operation in Windshear/Down Burst condition………………. 29

(a) Precautions for Expected Windshear …………………………………………………………. 29
(b) Recovery Technique At Take-off ………………………………………………………………. 30
(c) Recovery Technique At Landing ……………………………………………………………….. 31
10.5 Microburst Windshear probability Guidelines ………………………………………………… 32
11 TAKE OFF SAFETY
11.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………........ 4
11.2 Objectives ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
11.3 (a) Successful versus unsuccessful Go/No Go Decision …………………………………. 4

(b) 'Successful' Go/No Go Decision …………………………………………………………………. 5
11.4 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents ……………………………….……………………………. 5
11.5 Statistics …………………………………………………………………….………………………………………. 6
11.6 Lessons Learned ……………………………………………………………..…………………………………. 8
11.7 Decisions and Procedures - What every pilot should know………………………………. 10
11.8 The Take-off Rules - The Source of the Data …………………………………………………. 10

11.8.1 The "FAR" Take-off Field Length ………………………….…………………………………………… 12
11.8.2 Vi Speed Defined ………………………………………………….….…………………………………..……… 13
11.8.3 Balanced Field Defined ………………………………………………………………………………….…….. 15

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11.9 Transition to the stopping configuration ………………………………………………………….. 15

11.9.1 Flight Test Transitions ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
11.9.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time ……………………..………………………………………….…. 18
11.10 Comparing the 'Stop' and 'Go' Margins ……………………………… ………………….…………. 18

11.10.1 The 'Stop' Margins ……………………………………………………….………………………………………. 18
11.10.2 The "Go" Option …………………………………………………….………………….………………………. 19
11.11 Operational Take-off Calculations ………………………………….……………………………….. 22

11.11.1 The Field Length Limit Weight ……………………………………………….……………………………. 22
11.11.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit Weight ………………………………………………..………………. 23
11.12 Factors that Affect Take-off and RTO Performance …………………………………………. 24

11.12.1 Runway Surface Condition ……………….…………………………………………………..……………… 24
11.12.2 Hydroplaning …………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
11.12.3 The Final Stop …………………………………………………………………………………………… 26
11.12.4 Atmospheric Conditions ………………………………………………………………………….… ……… 26
11.12.5 Airplane Configuration ………………………………………………………………………………… 27
11.12.6 Flaps ………………………………………………………………………….............................. 27
11.12.7 Engine Bleed Air …………………………………………………………..…………………………………… 28
11.12.8 Missing or Inoperative Equipment ………………………………..…………………………..………… 28
11.12.9 Wheels, Tires and Brakes ………………………………………………………………………….………. 29
11.12.10 Worn Brake …………………………………………………………..………………………………………… 32
11.12.11 Residual Brake Energy ………………………………………………..……………………………… 32
11.12.12 Speed Brake Effect On Wheel Braking ……………………………………………..………………… 32
11.12.13 Carbon and Steel Brakes Differences ………………………………................................... 34
11.12.14 High Brake Energy RTO's ………………………………………..……………………………………….. 35
11.12.15 Reverse Thrust Effects …………………………………………..……………………………………..…. 36
11.12.16 Runway Parameters ……………………………………………..…………………………………………. 37
11.12.17 Take-offs Using Reduced Thrust …………………………………………………………………….. 38
11.12.18 The Take-off Data The Pilot Sees ………………………………………………………………………. 39
11.13 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins ……………………….……………….………………………. 39

11.13.1 Runway Surface Condition …………...……………………….…………………………………………… 39
11.13.2 Flap Selection …………………………………………………………………………………………… 40
11.13.3 Runway Lineup …………………………………………………….…………………………................... 41
11.13.4 Setting Take-off Thrust …………………………………………………………………………………….. 41
11.13.5 Manual Braking Techniques …………………………………….……………………………………….… 42
11.13.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking Techniques …………………………………………………………….… 43
11.13.7 RTO Auto brakes ……………………………………………………………………………………………..… 43
11.13.8 The Vi Call …………………………………………………………….…………………………………………. 43
11.13.9 Crew Preparedness …………………………………………………………………………………………… 44

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11.14 Crew Resource Management ……………………………………………………………………………… 44

11.14.1 CRM and RTO ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 45
11.14.2 The Take-off Briefing …………………………………………………………………………………. 45
11.14.3 Callouts ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 46
11.14.4 The Use of All Crew Members ………………………….……………………………………………….… 46
11.14.5 Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………….................. 46

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1 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Flight Crew Training Manual
This manual is designed to be used by SriLankan Airlines Flight Crew & will apply to A320, A330 &
A340 fleets. This manual will be used as a training tool & will supplement the other FCOMS &
publications issued by Flight Operations.
A copy of this manual as approved by CAASL is given to all SriLankan Airlines Tech Crew to be
used during training.
A copy of this Manual will be kept at the Flight Operations Training Centre.
The Flight Operations Training Section shall issue the amendments and/or changes.
Chapter 01 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL
Chapter 02 GENERAL INFORMATION
Chapter 03 NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS
Chapter 04 ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS – A320
Chapter 07 BASE TRAINING
Chapter 08 LINE TRAINING
Chapter 09 ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS
Chapter 10 MISCELLENEOUS
Chapter 11 TAKE-OFF SAFETY

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1.1.2 Abbreviations

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1.2 SYSTEM OF ISSUANCE, AMENDMENTS AND REVISION
Chief Pilot Training & Standard is responsible for the issuance of amendments and
revisions to this Manual.
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1.2.1 Pagination
The header of each page contains:
 The name of the manual: FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

 Chapter number
 Page number (within chapter)
 Issue Date
1.2.2 Change Indicator (Vertical Bar)
Located in the left outside margin, are used to highlight the location of revised or deleted
information on a newly published page. With the next revision to the page, previous
change indicators are deleted. Change indicators will be used on contents pages to indicate
the addition of a new title or procedure, or to indicate a renamed procedure. Change will
not indicate format or page number change.

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2 GENERAL INFORMATION
2.1 Preface ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
2.2 Operational Philosophy……………………………………………………………………………………… 3
2.3 Training Objectives ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
2.4 Abnormal & Emergency Checklist Philosophy …………………………………………………. 4
2.5 Flight Management …………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
2.6 Operations Golden Rules ………………………………………………………………..………………… 6
2.6.1 General Golden Rules ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 6

2.6.2 Golden Rules for Abnormal & Emergency Conditions…………………………………………………. 11
2.6.3 Create a shared problem mode with other crewmembers by communicating………………. 12
2.6.4 Apply recommended procedures and other agreed actions………………………………………… 12
2.6.5 Summary of Key Points …………………………………………………………………………………………. 12
2.7 Guidelines for Situations beyond the Scope of Emergency

Procedures ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
2.7.1 Basic Aerodynamics & Systems Knowledge ……………………………………………………………… 13

2.7.2 Flight Path Control ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14
2.7.3 ECAM Discipline ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
2.7.4 Communication …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
2.7.5 Damage Assessment & Airplane Handling Evaluation ……………………………………………….. 15
2.7.6 Approach & Landing ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16

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2.1 Preface
The purpose of FCTM is to present more information about procedures, manoeuvres or

techniques and to provide a basis for standardization.
The flight profile illustrations represent the recommended method for accomplishing
certain flight manoeuvres. These conform with the standard operating procedures (SOP)
and enhance effective communication and crew coordination. Conditions beyond the
control of the flight crew may preclude following an illustrated manoeuvre exactly. These
illustrations are not intended to replace good judgment and logic.
All performance data depicted in figures or tables are for training purposes only and should
not be used to compute actual operational data.
Where there are substantial write-ups for particular exercises or manoeuvres in other
manuals, they will not be repeated in the FCTM but references will be mentioned.
The FCTM is supplementary to the FCOM and will be revised periodically. Where there is a
difference in information, procedures or techniques, the FCOM which provides the primary
reference for all normal, abnormal and emergency procedures shall always prevail.
2.2 Operational Philosophy:
Operational procedures are classified under 3 categories viz. Normal procedures (Standard
Operating Procedures – SOP), Abnormal Procedures and Emergency Procedures.
SOPs are the actions that are the performed routinely on every normal flight. These
procedure sequences follow a definitive panel scan pattern, in so far as practical. Each
crew member is assigned a cockpit area to initiate actions in accordance with the Normal
Procedures. The Normal Checklists are initiated by the PF after the completion of the
check list actions.
Some SOP which are non-routine in nature are contained in the “Supplementary
Techniques” and “Special Operations” sections of the FCOM.
The abnormal and Emergency procedures comprise the actions or drills that are applied
subsequent to failures or malfunctions in order to continue the flight safety.
The majority of the Abnormal and Emergency procedures are monitored by ECAM. These
procedures are applied through the use of the ECAM, QRH, FCOM, or a combination of all.
The QRH contains some specific procedures which are not displayed on ECAM. As a
general rule, the procedures displayed on ECAM are not provided in QRH.
The drills are initiated by the PF and accomplished following the “Read and Do” principle.

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When ECAM actions have been performed and ECAM STATUS has been reviewed, review
OEB’s & reset computers A if time permits. (where applicable) The crew may refer to
FCOM procedure (3.02) for supplementary information.
Abnormal procedures include ECAM Advisory Conditions where recommended actions are
given for certain parameter drifts outside normal range (refer to……….. FCOM 3.02.80
under MISCELLANEOUS). The ECAM will display the parameter to alert the crew to
monitor it closely.
Refer to FCOM 3.02.01 for a detailed description of Airbus documentation concerning the
operations.
2.3 Training Objectives:
The flight training programme prepares the trainee for Airplane Qualification and the CAA
rating check ride. Flight safety, passenger comfort and operational efficiency are
emphasised during training.
An evaluation/ skills test will be given by a CAA nominated instructor at the end of the
simulator training phase. An aircraft Base check / training will be conducted after the
evaluation in the simulator. An aircraft base flight will be provided to transfer the
knowledge obtained during the Base Check in the simulator to the actual aircraft.
Thereafter line training will be conducted in the aircraft for a specific amount of sectors,
after which a line check will be carried out.
Throughout the manoeuvres prescribed, command ability, crew resource management,

and good judgment commensurate with a high level of safety, must be demonstrated. In
determining whether such judgment has been shown, criteria such as adherence to
approved procedures, actions based on the analysis of situations, crew co-ordination,
degree of care and prudence in selecting the course of action, will be considered.
2.4 Abnormal and Emergency Checklist Philosophy:
Procedures to apply in event of a failure are displayed on ECAM or found in the QRH.
Emergency and Abnormal procedures are carried out on a “Read and Do” basis.
Abnormal and Emergency checklist procedures precede normal checks.
ECAM procedures may be modified by OEBs. When this is applicable the crew needs to
refer to the QRH for the amended procedure.
FCOM 3.02 presents a more comprehensive format compared to that of ECAM. Apart from
ECAM actions, the expanded format provides:
1. Identification of a particular failure
2. Explanation for actions and
3. Additional back ground information
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The “INTRODUCTION” section in FCOM 03.02 explains the proper usage of the Abnormal
and Emergency Procedures.
When a malfunction is not detected by ECAM (e.g. FLAP –LEVER signals loss), crew will
have to use their own initiative to locate the appropriate checklist procedure in FCOM 3.02
for the failure condition or situation.
2.5 Flight Management:
The commander should always decide on who performs the PF or PNF role for a given
flight.
It may happen that the PF and PNF roles need to be switched over during flight because of
failures on PFD or ND displays. The commander will, after he has ascertained that the
flight is under control, announce that change over of PF/PNF roles.
The Auto flight and Auto thrust system should be used to the maximum extent possible,
particularly during abnormal conditions.
ECAM synoptic displays are invaluable in monitoring and tracking the performance of
aircraft systems.
Adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs), effective communication and

effective task-sharing all contribute towards better flight management. Maintain cockpit
discipline and avoid causal conversation during critical phases of flight.
All crew members must stay in the operating loop. Control inputs to the auto flight system
and FMGS must be announced and, where applicable, confirmed on the FMA.
All FMA changes should be announced and acknowledged.
Adhere to all standard call-outs required by the SOP.
Manually flying should be practiced when conditions are favourable to maintain handling
skill. In simulator training, manual flying is required to demonstrate handling proficiency.
In LOFT training, auto flight system should be used as in line operation.
With the auto flight engaged, Flight Control Unit (FCU) selections and MCDU selections that
affect the flight path should be made by the PF. Do not allow the auto flight system to fly
the airplane without pilot monitoring.
In manual flight, these selections should be made by the PNF at the command of the PF.
Heading and altitude changes to comply with ATC clearances and speed selections
associated with slats/ flaps position changes may be initiated by the PNF. However, these
selections should be clearly announced by the PNF.
PF should announce when engaging &/or disengaging the auto flight system.
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MCDU manipulation should be accomplished prior to high workload periods such as

departure, arrival or holding. During such periods, using AP/FD basic modes eg. HDG, V/S,
OP DES, ALT or SELECTED speed may be more efficient than entering complex
modifications through the MCDU.
The FMGS must not be relied upon as the sole means of navigation when GPS PRIMARY is
not available. Operating crew should utilize applicable navigational aids (eg. NDB, VOR,
DME) in conjunction with the FMGS to ensure safer and accurate navigation, especially
when within the terminal area. Be wary of map shifts.
2.6 Operations Golden Rules:
Golden Rules have always guided human activities.
In early aviation days, the Golden Rules defined the basic principles of airmanship.
With the development of technology in modern aircraft and with research on man-
machine-interface and crew- coordination, Golden Rules have been broadened to
encompass the principles of interaction with automation and crew resources management
(CRM)
The operations Golden Rules defined by Airbus Industry assist in maintaining their basic
airmanship even as they progress to integrated and automated aircraft models.
These rules apply little modification to all Airbus models.
Although developed for trainees, the Golden Rules are equally useful for experienced line
pilots.
Golden Rules address aspects that are considered frequent casual factors in approach and
landing accidents:
Inadequate situational/ positional awareness:

Incorrect interaction with automation:
Over reliance on automation: and
Ineffective crew crosscheck and mutual backup.
2.6.1 General Golden Rules:
The following eight Golden Rules applicable in normal conditions and more importantly, in
any unanticipated or abnormal /emergency condition.
Automated aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft:
To promote this rule, each trainee should be given the opportunity to fly the aircraft just
using the stick, rudder and throttles.

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The use of flight director (FD), autopilot (AP), autothrust (A/THR) and flight management
system (FMS) should be introduced progressively, as defined by the applicable training
syllabus.
Practice of hand flying will illustrate that the pilot flying (PF) always retains the authority
and capability to adopt:
A more direct level of automation; or revert to manual flight.

Directly controlling the aircraft trajectory and energy,
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and Manage – in that order
Task sharing should be adapted to the prevailing situation (i.e. task sharing for hand flying
or with AP engaged, task sharing for normal operation or for abnormal/ emergency
conditions, as defined in FCOM) and tasks should be accomplished in accordance with the
following priorities:
Aviate
PF must concentrate on flying the aircraft (i.e. by controlling and /or

monitoring the pitch attitude, bank angle, airspeed, thrust, sideslip,
heading…….) to capture and maintain the desired targets, vertical flight
path and lateral flight path.
PNF must backup the PF by monitoring flight parameters and by calling any
excessive deviation.
Navigate
Select the desired modes for vertical navigation and lateral navigation (i.e.
selected modes or FMS – managed navigation), being aware of surrounding
terrain and minimum safe altitude.
The rule can be summarized by the following three “know where….”

Situational awareness items:
- Know where you are:

- Know where you should be; and
- Know where the terrain and obstacles are

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Communicate
Effective crew communication involves communications between flight

crewmembers and communications between flight crew and cabin crew.
In an abnormal or emergency condition, after a stable flight path has been

regained and the abnormal or emergency condition has been identified, the
PF should inform the ATC of the prevailing condition and of his/ her
intentions.
To attract the controller’s attention use the following standard phraseology,

as applicable:
- Pan- Pan, Pan-Pan, Pan-Pan (URGENCY) AMSER LAND ASAP ON

ECAM
- Mayday – Mayday – Mayday (DISTRESS) RED LAND ASAP ON ECAM
Manage
Managing the continuation of the flight is the next priority, this includes:
Performing applicable emergency and/or abnormal procedure(s).

Specific Golden Rules to assist flight crew in their decision-making and
management process are provided in the second part of this Briefing Note.
The design of glass-cockpit aircraft fully supports the above four-step strategy,
as summarized in Table 1.
Golden Rule Display Unit

Aviate PFD
Navigate ND
RMP/ACP,DCDU (Digital Control
Communicate
& Display Unit)
Manage ECAM
Table 1
Glass – cockpit Design Supports Golden Rules
Practice Task sharing and back-up each other
Task sharing, effective cross check and backup should be practiced in all phases of
ground and flight operation, in normal operation or in abnormal/ emergency
conditions.

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Emergency, abnormal and normal procedures (i.e. normal checklist) should be performed as
directed by ECAM and/or QRH, e.g.
In case of an emergency condition:

- Emergency procedure:
- Resume abnormal procedures.
- Normal checklist (as applicable); and
- Abnormal procedure(s) down to STATUS
In case of an abnormal condition:

- Abnormal procedure down to STATUS:
- Normal checklist (as applicable); and
- Resume abnormal procedure
These actions should be accomplished in accordance with the published task sharing, crew
co-ordination principles and phraseology.
Critical or irreversible actions such as selecting an engine fuel lever/ master switch OFF &
all guarded switches should be accomplished by the PNF but require prior confirmation by
the PF (i.e. confirmation loop).
Know your FMA guidance at all times
The FCU and FMS CDU and keyboard are the prime interfaces for the crew to communicate
with aircraft systems (i.e. to arm modes or engage modes and to set targets)
The PFD (particularly the FMA and target symbols on speed scale and altitude) and ND are
the prime interfaces for the aircraft to communicate with crew, to confirm that the aircraft
systems have correctly accepted the flight crew” mode selections and target entries.
Any action of FCU or on FMS keyboard and line-select keys should be confirmed by
crosschecking the corresponding annunciation or data on PFD and / or ND.
At all times, the PF and PNF should be aware of:
Mode armed or engaged:

Guidance targets set; and
Mode transitions or reversions
Cross check the accuracy of the FMS with raw data
When within navaids coverage areas, FMS navigation accuracy should be crosschecked
against navaids raw data (unless aircraft is GPS – equipped and GPS PRIMARY is
available).

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FMS navigation accuracy can be checked by:
Entering a tuned VOR-DME in the bearing/ distance (BRG/DIST TO) field of the
PROG page;
Comparing the resulting FMS DIST TO reading with the DME distance read on the
RMI ( or on ND, as applicable);
Checking the difference between FMS DIS TO and DMS distance against the criteria
applicable for the flight phase (as defined in SOPs)
If the required FMS navigation accuracy criteria are not achieved, revert from NAV mode to
selected heading mode with reference to navaids raw-data.
Select PF ND to ARC or ROSE mode. If no map shift is observed, PNF may keep ND in ARC
mode, with display of speed constrains and/or altitude constraints, for enhanced horizontal
and critical situational awareness.
One head up at all times:
Significant changes to FMS flight plan should be performed by PNF and cross-checked by PF after
transfer of controls, in order to maintaining one head up at all times for supervising the process of
the flight and aircraft systems.
When things don’t go as expected, Take Over
If the aircraft does not follow the desired vertical flight path/ lateral flight path or the selected
targets, and time does not permit analyzing and solving the observed behaviour, revert without
delay from:
FMS guidance to selected guidance: or from
Selected guidance to hand flying
Use the correct level of automation for the task
On highly automated and integrated aircraft, several levels of automation are available to perform
a given task:
FMS modes and guidance ; or

Selected modes and guidance
The correct level of automation depends on:
The task to be performed:

- Short-term (tactical) task; or
- Long-term (strategic) task
The flight phase:

- Enroute;
- Terminal area; or
- Approach; and landing
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The time available

- Normal selection or entry; or
- Last-minute change
The correct level of automation often is the one the pilot feels the most comfortable with,
depending on his knowledge and experience of the aircraft systems.
Revision to hand-flying and manual thrust-control may be the correct level of automation, for the
prevailing conditions.
In summary the general GOLDEN RULES are:
1. The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft.

2. Aviate, navigate, communicate – in that order
3. One head up at all times
4. Cross check the accuracy of the FMS
5. Know your FMA at all times
6. When things don’t go as expected – TAKE OVER
7. Use the proper level of automation for the task
8. Practice task sharing and back-up each other
2.6.2 Golden Rules for Abnormal and Emergency Conditions
The following additional rules may assist flight crew in their decision making when in an
abnormal or emergency condition, but also if being faced with a condition or circumstances
that is not covered by the published procedures.
Understand the prevailing condition before acting
Incorrect decisions often are the result of an incorrect recognition and identification of the
actual prevailing condition.
Assess risks and time pressures
Take time to make time, by:
Delaying actions, when possible (e.g. during takeoff and final approach); and/or,
Requesting entering a holding pattern or requesting delaying vectors (as
appropriate)
Review and evaluate the available options
Consider weather conditions, crew preparedness, type of operation, airport proximity and
self – confidence when selecting the preferred option.

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Include all flight crewmembers, cabin crew, ATC and company maintenance, as required,
in this evaluation.
Consider all implications before deciding and plan for contingencies.
Consider all aspects of the continuation of the flight until landing and reaching a complete
stop.
Match the response to the situation.
An emergency condition requires an immediate action (this does not mean a rushed
action) whereas abnormal conditions may tolerate a delayed action.
Manage workload
Adhere to the defined task sharing for abnormal/ emergency conditions to reduce workload
and optimize flight crew resources.
Use AP-A/THR, if available, to alleviate the PF workload and circumstances.
2.6.3 Create a shared problem model with other crewmembers by communicating
Communicate with other crewmember to create a shared understanding of:
Prevailing conditions; and

Planned actions
Creating a shared model allows crewmembers to work with a common goal towards a
common and well-understood objective.
2.6.4 Apply recommend procedures and other agreed actions
Understand the reasons and implications of any action before acting and check the
result(s) of each action before proceeding with the next step.
Beware of irreversible actions (i.e. apply strict confirmation and crosscheck before acting)
2.6.5 Summary of Key Points
Golden Rules constitute a set of key points for safe operation under normal, abnormal and
emergency conditions.
If only one lesson were to be learned from the set of Golden Rules, the following is
proposed:
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Whatever the prevailing conditions, always ensure that one pilot is controlling and
monitoring the flight path of the aircraft.
2.7 Guidelines for Situations beyond the Scope of the Non-Normal

Procedures
It is rare in-flight failures or events occur which are beyond the scope of the recommended
abnormal & emergency procedures. These rare events are usually the result of some
catastrophic condition such as a mid air collision, bomb explosion, structural failure, or
other major malfunction.
In these situations the flight crew may be required to accomplish multiple non-normal
checklists, selected elements of several different checklists applied as necessary to fit the
situation, or be faced with little or no guidance except their own judgment and experience.
Fortunately, these occurrences are extremely remote and the vast majority of pilots will
not experience such an event.
Because of the highly infrequent nature of these occurrences, it is not practical or possible
for ECAM or FCOM procedures to cover all events.
The following guidelines may aid the flight crew in determining the proper course of action
should an in-flight failure or event of this type be encountered. Although these guidelines
represent what might be called “conventional wisdom”, circumstances determine the
course of action the crew perceives will conclude the flight in the safest manner.
2.7.1 Basic Aerodynamics and Systems Knowledge
Knowledge of basic aerodynamic principles and airplane handling characteristics and

comprehensive system knowledge can be key factors in situations of this type.
Basic aerodynamic principles are known and understood by all pilots. Although not a
complete comprehensive system list, following are a brief review of some basic
aerodynamic principles and airplane systems information relevant to such situation:
 If aileron control is affected, rudder inputs can assist in countering unwanted

roll tendencies. The reverse is also true if rudder control is affected.
 If both aileron and rudder control are affected, the use of asymmetrical engine
thrust may aid roll and directional control.

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 If elevator control is affected, manual pitch trim and thrust can be used to control
pitch and airplane attitude. To do this effectively, engine thrust and airspeed must
be co-ordinated with manual pitch trim inputs. Increasing thrust without a
corresponding manual pitch trim change results in an increase in airplane pitch to
seek a speed consistent with the pitch trim setting. Flight crews should be aware
of the airplane’s natural tendency to oscillate in the pitch axis if the stable pitch
attitude is upset. These oscillations are normally self-damping, but to ensure
proper control, it may be desirable to use thrust to hasten damping and return to a
stable condition.
Airplane with wing-mounted engines exhibit a pitch up when thrust is increased and
a pitch down when thrust is decreased.
Use caution when attempting to dampen pitch oscillations by use of engine thrust
so that applications of thrust are timed correctly and diverging pitch oscillations do
not develop.
 Stall speed increases with angle of bank and increasing load factors. Therefore, it
is prudent to limit bank to 15 degrees. Increasing speed above the normal
flap/speed schedule but staying within flap placard limits provides the margin for
higher angles of bank.
 If airspeed indications are unreliable or suspect, charts located in the FCOM Vol 3
or QRH to be referred.
2.7.2 Flight Path Control
When an event of the type described above occurs, the flight crew’s consideration should
be to maintain or regain full control of the airplane and re-establish an acceptable flight
path. This may require use of unusual techniques such as application of full aileron or
rudder or in an asymmetrical thrust situation, reduction of power on the operating
engine(s) to regain lateral control. This may also require trading altitude for airspeed or
vice versa. The objective is to take whatever action is necessary to control the airplane
and maintain a safer flight path. Even in a worst-case condition where it is not possible to
keep the airplane flying and ground contact is imminent, a “controlled crash” is a far better
alternative than uncontrolled flight into terrain.
Fuel jettison should be a primary consideration if airplane performance is critical. In

certain cases, this may also have a positive effect on lateral controllability.
As a general rule, flap position should not be changed unless it appears performance
immediately requires such action. Consideration should be given to the possible effects
on airplane control if an asymmetrical flap condition should occur if flap position is
changed. If landing distance is not critical, landing should be made with actual flap
configuration.

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2.7.3 ECAM Discipline
After flight path control has been established, analyse the failures and carry out
appropriate ECAM actions.
The emphasis at this point should be on containment of the problem and not on
configuring the airplane for an immediate landing.
Review and analyse status. Exercise common sense and caution when accomplishing
multiple procedures with differing direction. The intended course of action should be
consistent with the damage assessment and handling evaluation.
2.7.4 Communications
Establish flight deck communications as soon as possible. This may require use of the
flight deck interphone system or in extreme cases of high noise levels, hand signals and
gestures to communicate effectively.
Declare an emergency with Air Traffic Control (ATC), to assure priority handling and
emergency services upon landing. Formulate an initial plan of action and inform ATC. If
possible, request a discrete radio frequency to minimize distractions and frequency
changes. If unable to establish radio communication with ATC, squawk 7700 and proceed
as circumstances dictate.
Communications with the cabin crew and with company ground stations are important, but
should be accomplished as time permits. If an immediate landing is required, inform the
cabin crew as soon as possible.
2.7.5 Damage Assessment and Airplane handling Evaluation
The assessment should start with an examination of flight deck indications to assess
damage. Consideration should be given to the potential cumulative affect of the damage.
If structural damage is suspected, attempt to assess the magnitude of the damage by

direct visual observation from the flight deck and/or passenger compartment. While only a
small portion of the airplane is visible to the flight crew from the flight deck, any visual
observation data could be used to gain maximum knowledge of airplane configuration and
status and could be valuable in determining subsequent actions.
The flight crew should consider contacting the company to inform them of the situation
and may request useful information. In addition to current and forecast weather, airfield
conditions and similar routine but essential information, it may be possible to obtain
technical information and recommendations from expert sources. These expert sources
are available from within the company as well as from the airplane manufacturer.

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Unless circumstances such as imminent airplane break-u or loss of control dictate other
wise, the crew should take time to assess the effects of the damage and/or the failures
before attempting to land. If flaps have to be extended, use caution when slowing to
lower flap. Make configuration and airspeed changes slowly until a damage and
controllability assessment has been accomplished and it is certain lower airspeeds can be
safely utilized. If controllability is in question, consider performing a check of the airplane
handling characteristics. The purpose of this check is to determine minimum safe speeds
and appropriate configuration for landing. Limit bank to 15 degrees and avoid rapid thrust
and airspeed changes, which might adversely affect controllability. Accomplished this
check by slowly and methodically reducing speed and lowering the flaps; lower the gear
only if available thrust permits. As a starting point, use the flap/ speed schedule. If initial
stall buffet or unexpected rolls are encountered at or before reaching the associated flap
speed, increase speed to a safe level and consider this speed to be the minimum approach
speed for the established configuration.
If airplane performance is a concern, use of the alternate gear extension system may
dictate the configuration portion of this check to be accomplished coincident with the
actual approach. Configuration changes made by the alternate extension system may not
be reversible. The crew must exercise extreme caution on final approach with special
emphasis on minimum safe speeds and proper airplane configuration.
If possible, conduct this assessment and handling evaluation at an altitude providing a safe
margin for recovery should flight path control be inadvertently compromised. It is
necessary for the flight crew to use good judgment in consideration of the existing
conditions and circumstances to determine an appropriate altitude for this evaluation.
After the damage assessment and handling characteristics are evaluated, the crew should
formulate a sequential plan for the completion of the flight.
2.7.6 Approach and Landing:
The following items should be considered when selecting an airport for landing.
1. Weather conditions (VMC preferred)

2. Enroute time
3. Length of runway available (longest possible runway preferred, wind permitting)
4. Emergency services available
5. Flight crew familiarity
6. Other factors specifically dictated by the specific situation
Plan an extended straight-in approach with time allotted for the completion of any lengthy
abnormal or emergency procedures such as the loss of two hydraulic systems. Arm auto
brakes and speed brakes if available.
If possible fly a normal approach profile, and attempt to land in the normal touchdown
zone. After landing, use available deceleration measures to bring the airplane to a
complete stop on the runway.
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CHAPTER - 03

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3 NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS
3.1 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
3.1.1 Airbus Documentation…………………………………………………………………………..………………... 4

3.1.2 LOFT Briefing…………….…………………………………………………………………..………………………. 10
3.2 Exterior Inspection………………………………….…………………………………………………………. 13
3.3 Cockpit Preparation……………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
3.4 Take-Off Briefing …………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 18
3.5 Engine Start – Auto or Manual ………………………………….………………………………………. 20
3.6 Taxi ……………………………….…………………………………………………………………………………… 22
3.6.1 Visual Ground Geometry - A340 ………….……………………………………………………………. 24

- A320 …………………………………………………………………….… 25
3.6.2 Supplementary - 180˚ Turn on Runway…………………………………………………………………… 25
3.7 Take-Off …………………………………………………….………………………………………………………. 27
3.7.1 Crosswind or Tailwind …………………………………………………………………………………….……… 29
3.8 Climb …………………………………………………….……………………………..…………………………….. 31
3.9 Cruise Management ……………………………………………………………………..…………………… 33
3.10 Descent and Approach - Preparation and Briefing ………………………………………..…. 36
3.11 Descent and Approach - Procedures and Techniques …………………….………………… 38
3.12 ILS Approach ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41
3.12.1 Standard Approach ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41

3.12.2 Glide Interception from Above ………………………………………………………………………….…… 44
3.12.3 Raw Data Approach …………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 45
3.13 Non Precision Approaches ………………………………………………………………………………… 48
3.14 Visual Approach – Traffic Pattern and Sidestep …………………………………………….… 53

3.14.1 Supplementary - Circling Approach………………………………………………. 55
- Visual Approach…………………………………………………. 56
- Final Approach…………………………………………………… 57

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3.15 Landing – Landing and Stopping the A/C ………………………..………………………………. 59
3.15.1 Minimum Visual Ground Segments - A340…..……………………………………………… 62

- A330…………………………………………………… 63
- A320………………………………………………….. 64
3.15.2 ILS Final Approach & Landing Geometry - A340………………………………………………….. 65

- A330…………………………………………………… 66
- A320………………………………………………….. 67
3.15.3 Ground Clearance Diagram - A340………………………………………………….. 68

- A330 …………………………………………………. 69
- A320 ……………………………………………………70
3.16 Go Around…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 71
3.17 Flight with Gear Down ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 73
3.18 GPWS Warning …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75
3.19 FMGS – Position Updating …………………………………………………………………………………. 77
3.20 Global Position System ……………………………………………………………………………………… 79
3.21 Fuel- Normal/Abnormal Sys Operation …………………………………………………… ……….. 83
3.22 Adverse Weather ……………………………………………………………………………………… ………. 85
3.22.1 Cold/ Hot Weather and High Altitude Runway Operation…………………………………………….. 85

3.22.2 Flight in Severe Turbulence……………………………………………………………………………………… 89
3.22.3 Windshear – Take-off/Approach………………………………………………………………………………. 90
3.23 Performance……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 93
3.23.1 Flight Preparation – Fuel Calculation………………………………………………………………………… 93

3.23.2 Approach Speeds…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 95
3.23.3 Contaminated Runways………………………………………………………………………………………….. 99
3.23.4 Climb and Descent………………………………………………………………………………………………… 102
3.23.5 Preflight Planning for One Engine Out……………………………………………………………………… 103
3.24 Flights Controls – Flight Characteristics……………………………………………………………106
3.25 Flights Director Mode - Reversions………………..………………………………………………….111
3.26 Use of Track/FPA/FPV/FPD……………….…………..………………………………………………….114

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3.1 General
3.1.1 Airbus Documentation
 Training
To use the Airbus documentation, effectively, during the course and in subsequent airline
operations.
 Schedule
Briefing duration : 1:00
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM Volumes 1 to 4
QRH
MEL
COMPANY SOPS
 Instructor’s Actions
Briefing of the following key points
MAIN
ATA Chapters
FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) Volumes 1 to 4
QRH
MEL & CDL use
SECONDARY
FCOM revisions
OEBs and FCOM Bulletins
 Trainee’s Actions
The FCOM consists of Volumes 1 to 4 and the QRH. The information contained in the FCOM is
a compromise between the following two contradictory requests from airlines:
The FCOM should contain a full and in depth description of the aircraft technical systems and
associated procedures.
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Consequently the information may seem too comprehensive for some operators and too
superficial for others. At the beginning of each of the Volumes 1 to 4 there is a contents page
followed by a small section which describes the organization of the manual.
Due to the fact that the modification standard of aircraft within an airline‟s fleet may vary,
each page will identify the aircraft to which is applicable. This is done by printing a
registration or manufacturer serial, number (MSN) at the foot of the page. A decode of MSNs
and registrations are included in each FCOM volume. This section also contains some
information on revising the manual with temporary and permanent revisions.
The purpose of this briefing is not to give additional information on the use and applicability of
each volume. Volume 1 to 4, QRH and MEL will be described in turn.
FCOM Volume 1
This manual contains a technical description of the aircraft systems. A list of abbreviations and
symbols used in all FCOMs, FCTM and QRH is included at the beginning of the manual. At the
beginning of each chapter there is a contents list. Each chapter covers a specific system. The
main components, controls and indications are described. The cautions and warnings
associated with each system and include in each chapter, as is the electric bus distribution.
In volume 1 the chapter numbers correspond to the ATA (Air Transport Association) 100
BREAKDOWN chapter numbers. This represents the official reference for the classification of
airplane systems and/or functions. The ATA breakdown consists of six digits, the first two of
which refer to a particular aircraft system. The full six digits are used in the MEL and the
MMEL. The list below details the ATA chapter numbers used in FCOM Vol 1.
Chapter System
21 AIR CONDITIONING, PRESSURIZATION & VENTILATION

22 AUTO FLIGHT
23 COMMUNICATIONS
24 ELECTRICAL
25 EQUIPMENT
26 FIRE PROTECTION
27 FLIGHT CONTROLS
28 FUEL
29 HYDRAULIC
30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
31 INDICATING/ RECORDING SYSTEMS
32 LANDING GEAR
33 LIGHTS
34 NAVIGATION SYSTEM
35 OXYGEN
36 PHEUMATIC
38 WATER & WASTE SYSTEM

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45 ON BOARD MAINTENANCE SYSTEM

49 AUXILIARY POWER UNIT
52 DOORS
70 POWER PLANT
The classification of the systems is in alphabetical order apart from the last four systems.
This volume will be of use in the ground phase of the course to reinforce and compliment the
lessons learnt on CBT. However the CBT should be considered the prime source of technical
information. Once the CBT phase is successfully completed and upon completion of training,
FCOM Vol.1 will become the prime source of information on aircraft systems.
FCOM Volume 2
This manual contains information on loading, performance and pre-flight planning. Also
included is performance information for special operations (contaminated runway, ETOPS, etc)
This volume is of use during the performance course, and during Line Orientated Flight
Training (LOFT) exercise. It will continue to be of use in line operations.
FCOM Volume 3
This volume contains chapters on operating limitation, abnormal/emergency procedures,

standard operating procedures (SOPs), supplementary techniques, in-flight performance
engine/s inoperative procedure.
Operating Limitations:
This chapter includes limitations required by the regulating authority and contained in the
flight manual.
Abnormal and Emergency Procedures:
The contents to this chapter constitute a complete list of all the ECAM failure messages
and other failures requiring the use of the QRH. Each section in the main body of this
chapter corresponds to the relevant ATA chapter number. In the chapter introduction there
is information on Abnormal Procedure Presentation and Principles, ECAM use and task
sharing. The section on operating techniques contains information on such topics as
rejected take-off, engine failure etc. Within each ECAM procedure there are notes, which
amplify and clarify the procedure. These do not appear on ECAM and it is not necessary to
consult this volume during ECAM procedures. However it is prudent to refer to the
manuals paper procedure once all ECAM and Abnormal Procedures are completed, when
time permits. Finally the miscellaneous section provides procedures for which an ECAM
warning is not trigged, data which are of assistance to crew in handling abnormal
procedures and evacuation procedures.

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Normal Procedures:
This chapter contains all information on SOPs and techniques required for the conduct of a
normal flight.
Supplementary Techniques
This chapter contains normal procedures which are non-routing and begins with a
definition of operating speeds such as green dot „S‟ speed etc. The rest of the chapter
contains valuable information concerning systems and operational situations. Most of the
sections conform to the ATA 100 breakdown.
In-flight Performance
Contains graphic and tabulated information on performance for use in flight
One Engine Out Operations
This chapter details the three strategies possible following an engine failure in flight.
Performance data is provided to be used for the conduct and monitoring of the flight
following an engine failure.
Two Engines Out Operations (A340)
This chapter defines the strategy to use following the second engine failure. Performance
data is provided to be used for the conduct and monitoring of flight following the failure of
a second engine.
OEBs
These are used as the fastest way to advise operators of revised or significant new
technical information, flight crew procedures or changes to limitations. OEBs are not
approved by the airworthiness authorities and will be superseded by a modification or
service bulletin. Some OEBs may have an impact on the safe conduct of flight operations
and these are reproduced in the QRH.
FCOM Bulletins
Are used to provide supplementary operational information, which normally falls outside
the content of the FCOM. Each bulletin may deal with one or more subjects. Only
bulletins applicable to the aircraft in service with SriLankan Airlines will be issued.

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The limitations will be introduced during the Ground School phase. The remainder of the
volume is mainly of use from the CPT phase onwards, although there will be separate
introduction to standard operating procedures. (SOPs)
FCOM Volume 4
This volume provides in depth information about the FMGS principles, procedures and
interface. It may sometimes duplicate the information already contained in Volumes 1 and 3,
however the aim is to have all the information regarding the FMGS in one book.
FMGS principles and procedures will be introduced during the FMGS Trainer Exercises. As the
course progresses, an increasing knowledge of the FMGS is required and the volume becomes
more useful.
FCOM Revisions
There are two types of revision to the FCOM : normal and temporary.
The normal revisions are issued periodically by Airbus Industry and are of a non-urgent
nature. Normal revisions are accompanied by filing instructions and an updated list of
effective pages.
Temporary revisions cover urgent matters arising between normal revisions, are printed on
yellow paper and are accompanied by filing instructions.
The filing instructions accompanying the revisions contain a list of pages to be inserted,
removed or replaced. Bear in mind that the manual may contain more than two pages with
the same page number, as the two pages will refer to aircraft different modification states.
The MSN or registration of the aircraft, within a fleet, to which a page applies, will be clearly
marked. Follow the filing instructions carefully in order to avoid removing pages, which are
still valid. The list of effective pages will allow confirmation that the contents of the FCOM are
complete and valid for a particular airline‟s fleet.
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)
Most emergency and abnormal procedures are presented to the crew on ECAM. The QRH
contains checklist which cannot be presented on ECAM and additional emergency and
abnormal procedures which may be required by ECAM. (e.g. SMOKE/ TOXIC FUMES
REMOVAL). In the QRH there is an important note concerning task sharing and ECAM
procedures.
Normal procedures and task sharing are detailed. Also included are in flight performance,
operational data and OEBs.
The QRH is required for the FBS and FFS phases.

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Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) & Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
The main purpose of the MEL is to permit aircraft dispatch when items of equipment or
functions are inoperative, to avoid delays and cancellations.
The MEL is the operators own version of the MMEL. The MMEL is produced by Airbus
Industrie. The MMEL cannot be used as a substitute for the MEL. The MEL is necessarily
more restrictive than the MMEL.
The MEL contains the following basic information:

A list of equipment or functions which may be inoperative for dispatch
Associated operational procedures
Associated maintenance procedures (A320 only)
List of ECAM warning, associated with the corresponding dispatch conditions
When a failure is detected or identified, the crew must enter the MEL to determine if dispatch is
possible, and limitations or conditions. The MEL is organized using the ATA 100 breakdown (as
described earlier). The full six figures of this breakdown are used in the MEL. For example 21-52-
01: the 21 refers to the air conditioning system, 52 to the air cooling system and 01 to the air
conditioning pack. Items not listed in this section indicate NO DISPATCH. A list of ECAM
messages is given along with the MEL reference for each message.
If an (O) is associated with an item, then dispatch may be possible following an operational
procedure. Operational procedures are contained within the MEL document. If an (M) is
associated, then maintenance procedure must be applied. Maintenance procedures are generally
to be found in maintenance manuals, available on board.
Further guidance on the use of the manuals and the abbreviations therein is contained in the front
of the MEL.
 Completion Standards
Not applicable
 Common Errors
Lack of understanding of the FCOM structure

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3.1.2 LOFT Briefing :
 Training Objective
The meaning of “L.OF.T.” is Line Oriented Flight Training.
This session has been developed for self evaluation. The objective is to enable the crew, to
assist their assimilation of the course content. The session is also to demonstrate a real time
flight with real time problems.
It is designed to facilitate the training of two (2) pilots and ensure that each does some flying
from their normal crew position.
Additionally, the exercises provide opportunities for the trainees to practice applying Crew
Resource Management (CRM) techniques to optimize their solutions to the problems with
which they are presented.
 Schedule
Regular course LOFT Briefing duration :01 hr 15 mts

Briefing should finish 15 mts prior to the simulator start time, leaving the crew with time to
prepare the flight as they would on the line, before going to the aircraft.
 Schedule
Full Flight Simulator
MAIN
Rules
The instructor will present dispatch release documents to trainees in the briefing room and
give a general briefing on the conduct of the loft session. At this stage, he will answer
questions and clarify any questions trainees may have regarding documentation.
Although LOFT exercises are part of the training course, trainees gain the maximum benefit
from the flights when there should be no direct instruction. When inputs are necessary, it
should be made within role play e.g. with the instructor acting as cabin crew, ATC etc.
The instructor role is that of facilitator. LOFT flights are training exercises and only as a last
resort, should direct instruction be given. If this is necessary, the instructor must seriously
consider recommending that the exercise is repeated as it implies a lack of basic knowledge,
serious flaws in technique or a complete breakdown in intra-crew communication.

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The value of a LOFT exercise is greatly increased by realistic and timely role play by the
facilitator. For example, ATC communication with “other” aircraft (where applicable) or cabin
crew input can be used to set or enhance part, or all, of a scenario. Additionally, different
crews are likely to reach alternative solutions to the same problem and the facilitator must be
flexible in his role within the exercise.
Briefing and Preparation :
Prior to the briefing, the trainees should have access to a minimum of information only.
Therefore, their FCTM will detail the exercise as LOFT from – (departure airport) to ----
(destination airport) with little supporting documentation.
The briefing should emphasize:
LOFT is a real time flight with events and incidents to produce a busy environment, but
not one, which should overload the trainees.
Scenarios are designed to exercised basic operating techniques and require good use
of CRM for the trainees to achieve the optimum solution.
The instructor is present as facilitator and will pay roles within the scenario but will not
act as an instructor.
Trainees must play the exercise for real and aim to solve any problems they encounter
as they were on a line flight.
Trainees must avoid turning around and addressing the instructor. Questions may not
be asked directly to the instructor once the exercise has begun.
Limited flight documentation may be provided.
Flight Segment:
Instructor should be able to both observe and perform ancillary roles. They should be trained
in observing both technical and CRM skills. The instructor should also be trained in proper
pacing, proper introduction of abnormal/emergency procedures, and methods of handling
unforeseen crew actions.
Failure:
The failures introduced must not be too excessive. The crew workload should be consistent as
to be expected on a very busy flight, not more.
Assessment:
The instructor may, with the consent of the crew, video tape the session if required and use it
for debriefing. Any recording made will be erased immediately after the debriefing and in the
presence of the trainees. The debriefing sequence should be initiated by the crew followed by
the instructor who will amplify (if necessary) the crew input, and conclude with his general
debriefing.

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Debriefing and Critique:
Instructor should provide both positive and negative feedback during critiques of individual
and crew performance. Prior to the instructor‟s critiques, crewmembers should be encouraged
to critique themselves. Instructors will provide feedback to the crew to encourage the
changes needed for improved performance. Instructors should also provide specific
recommendations to improve individual crewmembers performance.
Demonstrates correct application of standard procedures.

Takes safe, correct action in case of failure.
Solve problem and makes an appropriate decision.
Ensures good communication and applies CRM skills.
 Common Errors
Insufficient assessment and planning in abnormal situation.

Incorrect or inappropriate decision.
Use of back up or alternate system not considered.
Poor CRM.

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3.2 Exterior Inspection
To perform a standard exterior inspection.
 Schedule
Briefing duration :5minutes
 Equipment
CBT Video
DOC Reference
QRH 3.01 (Normal Procedures)
FCOM 3.03.04 (Preliminary cockpit preparation)
FCOM 3.03.05 (Exterior inspection)
FCOM 3.04.91 (Adverse Weather)
Briefing of the following key points.
MAIN
Safety exterior inspection.

Preliminary cockpit preparation items.
Walk around pattern.
Tire wear limitations.
SECONDARY
Break wear indicators.

APU fire extinguisher overpressure indicator.
Crew oxygen overboard discharge indicator.
Importance of safety exterior inspection and preliminary cockpit inspection particularly if it is

first flight of the day.

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Detail brake and tire wear limits and note that the brakes must be on for the brake wear
indicators to be checked. This can be confirmed from the parking brake light on the gear
assembly.
If only one ground power available, connect to EXT PWR A, as the APU cannot be used
simultaneously with EXT PWR B. further, the EXT PWR A permits the GND/FLT buses to be
energized without powering t he entire aircraft network.
Makes a systematic, methodical and complete inspection.
 Common Errors
Inspection not conducted during transit stop.

Preliminary cockpit inspection forgotten.

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3.3 Cockpit Preparation
To perform and transit cockpit preparation in accordance with standard procedures.
 Schedule
Briefing duration : 20 minutes
 Equipment
Doc reference :
QRH 3.01 & 3.02 (Normal Procedures)

FCOM 3.03.01 to 3.03.07 (SOP‟s)
FCOM 3.04.91 (Adverse weather – Cold weather)
FCOM 4.03.20 (FMGS Pilot Interface)
FCOM 4.04.20 (FMGS – How to use)
FCOM 4.05.10 (FMGS procedures)
MAIN
Safety check before power connected to aircraft.

Push button and “lights-out” philosophy.
Preliminary inspection
Exterior inspection
Overhead panel scan
FMGS initialization
Remainder of scan
Briefing
SECONDARY
Cockpit preparation adapted for special conditions e.g. cold weather.

Performance calculations take into account actual conditions (weather/aircraft).

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On ECAM a check of hydraulic fluid and engine oil levels should be made. Additionally press
RCL pb (more than 3 sec) in order to check any warnings that have been cancelled and refer
to MEL if necessary.
Pattern of scan depends on whether the pilot is PF, PNF, CM1 or CM2, with differing areas of
responsibility (FCOM 3 chapter 03 [SOPs – cockpit preparation])
A useful mnemonic for cockpit preparation is:
S - Scan (Overhead panel scan and area of responsibility)

P - Program (Program the FMGS with data)
I - Instruments (Check flight instruments)
T - Take off briefing (Done before engine start)
Again. A mnemonic may be helpful to programe the FMGS in the following order. Remember
to fill in all the amber boxes. Enter other information as time allows.
D - Data
I - INIT A page
F - F-PLN page
S - SEC F-PLN
R - RAD NAV page
I - INIT B page
P - PERF page
P - PROG page
Consider using the secondary flight plan to have available one or more of the following
alternatives: an alternate runway, departure routing, return to the departure airfield or routing
to take off alternate.
PNF should cross check all data entries in FMGS.

Special procedure for alignment of IRS if above 73° N.
Once the completed load sheet has been received, the FMGS INIT B page may be filled
in with relevant information.
Take-off briefing to be accomplished prior to engine start.
Once scan is complete there should be no white lights on the overhead panel, making
it easy to verify that all items have been done.
Completion of Before Start checklist above and below the line.
Completes all actions in correct sequence in a timely manner (30 minutes normal
preparation, 20 minutes for transit preparation).
Respects task sharing and areas of responsibility.
Ensures good crew communication and mutual crosschecking.
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 Common Errors
Correct sequence and areas of responsibility not respected.

MCDU preparation incomplete or in wrong sequence.
Take-off briefing not completed before push back/engine start.
APU not started.
NORTH REF pb, blue TRUE light not extinguished.

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3.4 Take-off Briefing
To conduct an effective and comprehensive take-off briefing.
 Schedule
Briefing duration :10 minutes
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 3.02 (Normal procedures)

FCOM 3.03.06 (Cockpit preparation)
MAIN
Confirmation of task allocation (PF/PNF).

Take-off briefing conducted at the right time (prior to before start checklist).
EFIS and MCDU used as main reference during briefing
Application NOTAMs mentioned.
All items covered in a logical sequence.
Re-briefs in case of late changes.
SECONDARY
Importance of ensuring that he briefing is fully understood by PNF.
The take-off brief should be a clear and comprehensive statement of intended courses of
action covering the normal and abnormal cases. It should be given at a time when the
workload is low, so that both pilot may concentrate on its content. Due regard should be taken
of the actual weather conditions. It should occur at then end of the cockpit preparation, prior
to the engine start. Maximum use should be made of the FMGS MCDU and EFIS as the prime
reference for the departure briefing.
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All items should be covered in a logical manner, and a check of the PNF‟s understanding done
at an appropriate stage.
If items such as runway changes are anticipated, then the brief should be updated accordingly
e.g. V speeds.
For typical brief contents see FCOM 3.03.06 (SOPs- Cockpit Preparation)
Special attention should be paid to actual conditions affecting the take-off (runway
characteristics, restriction of any kind, difficult SID, weather etc.) rather than merely giving a
generalized take-off briefing.
Performs a briefing that is clear and covers all required items, according to actual
circumstances.
Confirms that the briefing is fully understood by all crew members.
 Common errors
Take-off briefing not carried out before engine start.

Real weather conditions not taken into account.
PF does not confirm that all aspects are fully understood by PNF.
Logical briefing sequence not respected.
Briefing excessive in length and/or contents.
EFIS, ECAM, MCDU, not used to confirm briefing data.

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3.5 Engine Start – AUTO or Manual
To perform normal engine start.

To recognize the need to use manual engine start procedure
To carry out manual engine start procedure
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 3.03 (Engine Start)

FCOM 1.70.80 (Ignition and starting)
FCOM 3.03.08 (Engine Start Auto)
FCOM 3.04.70 (Engine Start Manual)
MAIN
FADEC power check complete before setting ENG MASTER sw ON.

Check of bleed pressure on lower ECAM.
Correct monitoring of parameters during starting sequence (for manual start).
Hand on Master switch (for manual start)
Use of CHRONO during manual start – Engine limitations.
SECONDARY
Significant of maximum motoring speed (manual start).

Abort of manual start.
The normal engine start procedure is the AUTO START procedure; the MANUAL START
procedure is to be used in exceptional cases.

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A340
In all cases, it is recommended to start engines 1 and 2 first (2 for manual start) as the
parking brake system is pressurized by the blue HYD system from engine 2. Both engines are
started at the same time. Once these are running, start engines 3 and 4 simultaneously.
A330
In all cases, it is recommended to start engines 1 first as the parking brake system is
pressurized by the blue HYD system from engine 1.
A320
In all cases, it is recommended to start engines 2 first (2 for manual start) as the parking
brake system is pressurized by the yellow HYD system from engine 2.
Determines and applies appropriate engine start procedure (Auto or manual).

Monitors engine parameters on ECAM during the starting sequence.
 Common Errors
Thrust lever(s) not at idle.

IGN/START not selected before ENG MASTER sw ON.
Bleed pressure not checked.
APU Bleed not on.
Hand not on the ENG MASTER sw (manual start).
Stopwatch not used or not started at ENG MASTER sw ON (manual start)
ENG MASTER sw ON below maximum motoring speed (manual start)
ENG START sel left at IGN/ START after start completion.

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3.6 Taxi
To taxi safely using correct nose wheel steering and braking techniques.
To perform the required procedures during taxi.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 3.03 & 0.04 (Taxi and before take off)

FCOM 1.32.20 (Nose wheel steering)
FCOM 3.03.10 (SOPs)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Supplementary Techniques)
FCOM 4.05.20 (FMGS procedures - Taxi)
MAIN
Technique for use of “Taxi by Wire” nose wheel steering.

Control of Ground speed.
Task sharing during flight controls check and final briefing.
Confirmation of final data using EFIS, ECAM and MCDU.
SECONDARY
Location of related items.

Antiskid and nose wheel steering switch.
Brake and ACCU PRESS Indicator.
Brake temperature.
Ground speed.
Packs off policy and procedure
Two engine taxi

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Release the parking brake. When the A/C is moving, apply pressure on brake pedals. Check
brake pressure reads zero, indicating a successful hydraulic power changeover then release
the brakes. If the paring brake hydraulic accumulator leaks or has a low pressure with parking
brake set to ON, and the aircraft moves forward after or during engine start, release the
parking brake and press on the pedals so as to stop the aircraft. At lightweights no power is
needed for the airplane to start moving. At heavy weights apply minimum power smoothly to
get the aircraft moving, thereafter little power is required to maintain motion. On the A340 be
careful when using only the inboard engines for taxi, as there is the tendency to use more
thrust than necessary, causing jet blast for brakes check during taxi refer to FCOM 3.03.10.
Avoid high power settings due to the risk of FOD (Foreign Object Damage). Maintain suitable
ground speed with reference to the ND. Maximum taxi speeds of 30 kt (in a straight line) and
10 kt. (for sharp turns) Do not ride the brakes. Allow aircraft to accelerate, brake, then
accelerate again. This reduces brake wear. On carbon brakes, brake wear is a function of
number of brake applications not the pressure applied nor the duration of the braking. Brake
wear is greatest when the brakes are cold. Carbon brakes do not “fade” at high brake
temperature.
If brakes fail during taxi, select A/SKID & N/W STRG sw to “off” modulating brake pressure
with pedals. Pedals should be released when switching A/SKID to “off”. Steering is then
achieved through differential braking. Only in an extreme emergency should the aircraft be
stopped with parking brake, as full pressure is immediately applied.
Nose wheel steering is “fly by wire” with no mechanical connection between the tiller and nose
wheel. The relationship between tiller deflection and nose wheel angle is not linear. Forces
relight and care is necessary to make gentle movements on the tiller to avoid unnecessary
high rate turns. As the nose wheel is behind the pilots seat, there is a need to judge turns
carefully. Very tight turns may be made, but over controlling may be noticeable. When turning
at low speed, maintain chosen tiller position and if necessary, accept a tighter turn radius than
intended to achieved a smooth turn. On very wet runways, tight turns could lead to jerkyness.
This is uncomfortable for the passengers.
On the A340 if the crew wishes to taxi on 2 engines, engines 1 and 4 should be preferably
used. Maximum turning rate for nose wheel is 12 sec. Therefore, to return from full deflection
to neutral takes some 7 seconds. The sensitivity of nose wheel steering responses to inputs
from rudder pedals or hand wheels reduces as speed increases.
(FCOM 1.32.20 [Landing Gear – Nose wheel Steering])

Nose wheel steering will not be effective above 100 kt.
According to SOPs, flight control checks may be made. The F/CTL page is automatically
displayed on movement of the controls.
ATC clearance may then be received or confirmed. The FMGS and briefing should be modified
if there are any changes. When a packs off take-off is planned the packs should be switched
off just prior to completing the before take off checklist below the line.
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Complete the before take-off checklist.
Monitors and controls ground speed using correct technique.

Does not exceed maximum taxi speed of 30 kts in a straight line or 10 kts in a sharp
turn.
Makes smooth progressive use of nose wheel steering.
Strict application of task-sharing requirements.
 Common Errors
Excessive thrust application after break release.

Taxiing too fast.
Riding the brakes.
PF distracted by control check.
Over controlling on the tiller in a turn leading to scuffing of nose wheel tire.
3.6.1 Visual Ground Geometry:

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3.6.2 Supplementary
180° Turn On Runway
A standard runway is 45 meters wide. Due to the 72° nose wheel steering limitation, a
180° turn required 45 meters for an A340-300.
The following procedure is recommended for making a turn in the most efficient way.
1. For the CM1
Taxi on the right hand side of the runway and turn left, maintaining 20°
(check on PFD) divergence fro the runway axis.
When the CM1 is physically over the runway edge, he turns the nose wheel
65° right.
The limitation of 65° can be exceeded up to 78° steering angle by

overriding (breaking) the physical stop of the hand wheel.
If an exceedance of the 65 degrees nose wheel steering limitation has

occurred, once of the physical stops of the commanding hand wheel is
broken and a technical log entry is required. To continue the operation of
the aircraft after such an exceedance, the flight crew should use the
remaining hand wheel whish is still equipped with the unbroken physical
stops. A maintenance action of the main landing gear is due within the next
four flight cycles.

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Do not apply dual hand wheel inputs, or hand wheel inputs combined with
rudder pedal inputs in the same direction.
Do not use differential braking during taxiing or turning at speeds below 20

knots.
Asymmetric thrust may be used during turns at high NWS angles in order to
initiate the turn and to keep the aircraft moving during the turn, but should
not be used to tighten the turn.
2. For the CM2
The procedure is symmetrical. (Taxi on the left hand side of the runway).

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3.7 Take-Off
To perform a take-off initial climb to acceleration altitude in accordance with standard

procedures.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:

FCOM 3.02.70 (Thrust lever faults)
FCOM 3.03.12 (SOPs)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Flight controls – Take of modes)
FCOM 4.05.30 (FMGS – Take –off)
FCOM Bulletin (Tail strike)
MAIN

PNF : check of take-off power.
Pack operation.
SECONDARY
Rolling take-off recommended.

No flap retraction until acceleration altitude speed trend positive and speed target
above current airspeed.
Pack operation.

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While turning onto the runway, it is important not to waste any runway available, and a rolling
take-off is recommended. In normal conditions i.e. no strong crosswind or very aft CG, apply
half forward stick. This should be progressively reduced to neutral between 80 kt. Start the
CHRONO as the take-off roll is started.
Set the power in two stages, allowing engines to stabilize at approximately 50% N1, before
setting FLEX or TOGA power. The engine page will be automatically displayed on the SD. A
thrust disagree warning will be triggered if the FADECs select a different thrust take-off mode
on the ground.
Ensure FMA annunciations are called a check of the FM position update is performed (on ND,
airplane symbol is centerline with rudder pedals, the stick remaining neutral (unless very
strong crosswinds or very aft CG/ tailwinds). This is because any side stick displacement will
cause the spoiler to deploy. By 100 kt, the connection between nose wheel steering and
rudder pedals is removed, and more rudder input will gradually be required to prevent the
aircraft turning into wind.
At VR, rotate the aircraft smoothly at 3° / sec to aim initially at 12.5° nose up, thereafter
follow SRS. If FD is not available rotate to a pitch attitude of 12.5°. During this time the
control laws will change to flight mode. Above 100 ft autopilot is available.
A positive rate of climb should be confirmed with altimeter, VSI and RA before requesting
retraction of the undercarriage.
Good technique is required in order to avoid tail strike. Early rotation, over rotation and
excessive pitch rate (or any combination) may all cause a tail strike on take-off (refer to FCOM
bulletin). In the event of a tail strike, flight at high altitude is not recommended and an
immediate return should be considered.
At thrust reduction altitude, reduce aircraft pitch attitude, and with a positive speed trend,
reduce thrust to the climb gate. Check FMA annunciation‟s and retract flaps on schedule. The F
and S speeds are minimum speeds for flap retraction and not speeds at which retraction is
essential. Ensure a positive speed trend before flap retraction. When accelerating through
200kt for 330/340 and 210ktsfr A320 with CONF 1+F selected, the flaps will automatically
retrace to CONF 1, well before VFE of 215kt. Flaps will not automatically re-extend if speed
drops below 200kt (FCOM 1 chapter 27[Flight Controls-Flaps and Slats]). Complete after take-
off items and then the after take-off check list.
If a packs off take-off was carried out. PACK 1 should be selected on at thrust reduction and
PACK 2 when the flaps have been retracted.

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Line up on the centerline.

Confirms FMA modes and check the FMGS position update.
Makes standards call-outs on schedule.
Rotates at correct rate (3˚/Sec) to initial pitch target (12.5˚)
Accurately follows flight director commands.
Maintains speed between V2 and V2+20kt during initial climb
Ensure landing gear and flap retraction according to standard procedures.
Follows published SID or ATC clearance.
Respects task sharing requirements.
3.7.1 Crosswind or Tailwind
To apply correct techniques for take-off in a strong crosswind or tailwind.
 Schedule
Briefing duration: 5 minutes.
 Equipment
DOC reference
FCOM 3.03.12 (procedure)
 Instructor’s Action
MAIN
Stick/Thrust lever procedure.

Use of into wind aileron.
 Trainees Action
Small inputs on the side stick laterally may be made, although too large an input will cause
spoiler deployment. During rotation, the stick should be centralized so that the aircraft
gets airborne with zero roll rate.
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Knows and applies correct technique.
 Common Errors
Stick not forward

Too much into wind aileron causing spoiler activation.
Aircraft deviation from centerline.

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3.8 Climb
 Trainee Objective
To perform a climb to cruising altitude in accordance with standard operating procedures.
 Schedule
Briefing duration: 5 minutes
DOC references:
QRH 3.04 & 3.05 (Normal procedure)

FCOM 1.22.30 (Auto Flight)
FCOM 3.03.13 & 3.03.14 (SOPs)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Flight Controls)
FCOM 3.04.91 (Adverse weather)
FCOM 4.05.40 (FMGS-Climb)
Briefing of the follow key points.
MAIN
Use of managed speed for normal climb with CLB or OP CLB.

Use of V/S or selected speed for improved climb rates.
Correct setting of altimeters at transition altitude.
SECONDARY
Turbulence speeds in climb.

Presetting climb speed (MCDU PERF CLB page) and canceling.
Climb predictions and constraints (MCDU PROG page)

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At an appropriate time in the climb the following the following action should be
accomplished:
Above transition altitude, check all altimeters set to standard setting.

Copy active flight plan into secondary, to ensure that secondary sequences with primary.
Clear the manually tuned navaids on RAD NAV page to allow auto tuning.
Carry out a check of navigation accuracy (may be left until in cruise)
Switch off seat belt sings (according to airline policy)
The best speed for climb is the FMS managed speed profile. However the selected speed
may be used, among others, in following cases:
Preselect Green Dot speed on PERF CLB before take off.
-If the PFLN includes an early turn (∆HDG>110˚)

-If high angle of climb is required after take off (obstacle, noise abatement……)
Preselect ATC specific speed on PERF CLB before take-off if so required
Select speed on FCU while in climb if:
- So cleared by ATC
- Turbulence is expected.
- Higher rate of climb is required; in this case a lower speed is selected (Down to
Green Dot if FL<250)
When normal climb is resumed MANAGED SPD shall be engaged.
When selected speed is engaged, the predictions on the FPLN page assume the selected
speed till the next planned speed auto change (e.g. SPD LIM<SPD CSTR……) or the Top of
Climb.
If turbulence is forecasted, or experienced in the climb use turbulence speed as per QRH.
Demonstrate the ability to use the various climb techniques available.

Maintain speed within +/-10Kt of target.
Follows SOP‟s.
 Common Errors
Omitting to set BARO REF to STD

Not monitoring the speed when using V/S.
Disconnecting A/THR when in turbulence in the climb.
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3.9 Cruise Management
 Training Objectives
To efficiently manage the cruise phase.
 Schedule
DOC references:
QRH 3.05 & 4.08 to 4.10 (OPS data)
FCOM 1.22.20 & 30 (Auto Flight)
FCOM 3.03.15 (SOP‟s)
FCOM 3.05.15 (Cruise)
FCOM 3.05.20 (FMGS Procedure)
Normal Briefing Notes- “Global Positioning Systems” and FMGS Position updating.
Briefing of the following.
MAIN
Maximum flight level.

Optimum flight level.
SECONDARY
Long range cruise.

Atmosphere influence
Step climb.
Insertion of forecast winds in F-PLN page VERT REV page and of STEP ALTITUDE on VERT
REV STEP ALT page if not done during preflight preparation.
 Trainees’ Actions
At the top of climb, and periodically throughout the cruise, conduct a check of the ECAM
system pages. Navigation accuracy should be checked regularly and monitored using raw data
as required if FMGS navigation using raw data. See also briefing notes-“Global Positioning
System” and “FMGS Position Updating”
Selection of cruise altitude and speed will depend on several factors including the overall
sector length, cost index and aircraft weight.
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Cost index is a number which takes account of fuel costs and aircraft operating cost to allow
the FMGS to compute an optimum cruise speed taking into consideration headwind, or
tailwind, component. For example low fuel cost and high operating cost will lead to a high cost
index and fast cruise speed. Cost index will also affect climb and decent speeds.
In order for the FMGS to enter the cruise phase and the F-PLN page predictions of fuel on
arrival (destination and alternate) to be correct, it is necessary to ensure that the cruise phase
altitude entered in the PROG page and the actual cruise altitude are the same. Forecast winds
and temperatures should also be entered in the F-PLN at appropriate points along the route so
that accurate predictions will be calculated. Additionally any step climbs should be included in
the F-PLN.
Should these predictions indicate that the aircraft will arrive below minimum fuel or late, then
manipulation of the cost index may allow the target to be achieved. Selection of C1 of O will
select maximum range and CI of 999 will select minimum time in the FMGS predictions and
managed speeds.
If actual cruise altitude is less than entered in PROG page the FMA will indicate ALT. to enable
engagement of ALT CRZ (soft altitude mode) the actual altitude must be entered in the PROG
page. Selection of higher attitude on the FCU than that entered in PROG will automatically
update PROG page with a new cruise altitude.
For short sector lengths the most economic cruise altitude is not necessarily the maximum,
which can be achieved. See FCOM 3.05.15 (In Flight Performance-Cruise) for a graph, which
enables selection of the best cruise altitude on short sectors.
Optimum altitude (OPT) is the attitude at which the aircraft covers the maximum distance per
kilogram of fuel. It is computed from aircraft current GW, CI, deviation from ISA, winds at
different levels and a minimum of 15 minutes in the cruise. Recommended Maximum (REC
MAX) altitude ensures a 0.3g buffet margin, a minimum rate of climb at MAX CL thrust and
level flight at MAX CRZ thrust, limited to FL 410. (FCOM 2.05.20 [Flight Planning- Cruise
Level]).
In order to fly at maximum range, an aircraft must operate continuously at optimum altitude.
This would mean that the aircraft would have to climb continuously in order to remain at
optimum altitude (Cruise Climb). Usually this is not possible so the most fuel-efficient way is to
step climb to an altitude that is slightly above optimum. As gross weight decreases the
optimum altitude will increases and another step climb is required.

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The diagram below demonstrates the ideal flight path given the constraint of maintaining
given cruising altitude:
The FMGS PROG page gives an optimum altitude and a recommended maximum altitude.
Recommended maximum altitude is limited to FL 410 on A 320. Selecting a cruise altitude not
more than 2000 ft above optimum will maintain fuel efficiency and a sensible maneuver
margin.
QRH 4.08 provides graphs for use in flight to determine maximum altitudes.
Correctly determines optimum cruising altitude using FMGS and QRH.

Maintains cruise altitude +/-100ft and sped +/-0.01 mach.
Adjusts cruise parameters according to flight circumstances.
 Common Errors
Atmospheric influence not taken it to accounts.

Speed/ mach change not considered to improve fuel economy.
Wrong cruise altitude in PROG page.

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3.10 Decent and Approach - Preparation and Briefing
To carry out a complete and comprehensive preparation for descent and approach.
To carry out a new briefing, in a timely manner, covering all aspects of the decent and
approach.
 Schedule
Briefing duration
DOC references:
QRH 3.05 (Task Sharing)

QRH chapter 4 (In flight performances)
FCM 4.05.60 (FMGS Procedures)
Briefing note-Performance (Climb and descent)
Briefing of the following points.
MAIN
Descent and approach preparation carried out in good time before top of descent.
Procedure of data entry into MCDU must be methodical.
All data entries cross-checked by other crew members.
Briefing conducted with maximum use of EFIS and MCDU displayed data.
SECONDARY
Navigation accuracy and Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA) check before beginning decent.
 Trainee’s Action
At a suitable time prior to descent, the PNF should obtain the latest destination airport
weather. Other pertinent information such as runway in use, it‟s condition, and airport
NOTAMS should be obtained at this time.

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The FCGS should then be programmed using the most up to date information, following the
“FRPPS‟‟ format:
F : fight plan modification (check that TOD is at a reasonable position)

R : Radio aid selection, turning, and course selection
P : Performance, descent winds, destination airfield weather and landing flap selection
P : Progress-Check accuracy
S : Secondary flight plan to cover contingencies e.g. runway change.
The fuel predictions (fuel at destination, alternate and extra fuel) on the FUEL PRED page will
only be accurate if the F-PLN is constructed correctly with arrival routing, go around routing
and routing to alternate.
The descent and approach briefing should be given at a time of low workload so that both
pilots may concentrate on its content. Approximately ten minutes before the start of descent
point, the briefing should begin, allowing time to complete a thorough brief, use the EFIS and
MCDU to brief routes and procedures. (Items to be covered are listed in FCOM 3.03.16
[SOPs-Descent preparation]). As for the before-take off briefing, it is important that actual
conditions are briefed rather than merely repeating a standard brief.
Emphasis must be placed on Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA), and safe altitudes near
destination airport. Other items, such as special requirements (anti-ice, failure cases), descent
strategy or other constraints should be mentioned.
All data entries must be cross-checked by both pilots and any ambiguities resolved. Prior to
commencing the descent or 50 NM from destination at the latest, a navigational accuracy
check should be carried out. Throughout the descent, only one “head down” at any time.
Obtained valid information for the destination airport.

Carry out all items required to prepare the aircraft for the descent and arrival procedure.
Conducts a comprehensive descent and approach briefing as detailed in FCOM 3.03.16
(SOPs) and includes any special requirements.
 Common Error
Late, and therefore, rushed descent and approach preparation and briefing leading to
important items being omitted.
Data entries not checked by both crew members.
Distraction, leading to “two heads down” situation.
NAV accuracy not timely checked.

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3.11 Descent and Approach - Procedure and techniques
 Training Objectives
To understand and implement the correct descent entry according to aircraft position and
required descent path.
To use all information and symbols available from MCDU and EFIS to properly monitor
descent progress.
To use the appropriate method to adjust descent rate as necessary to regain required path
 Schedule
DOC reference
QRH 3.05 (Task sharing)

QRH 4.10 (OPS Data)
FCOM 3.03.17 (Standard Procedure)
FCOM 4.02.30 (Flight Guidance)
FCOM 4.05.60 (Procedure)
MAIN
Technique for initiating descent.

FMA/AP and A/THR descent modes.
MCDU and EFIS descent information and symbols.
Techniques for adjusting descent rate.
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
GPWS warnings and required reactions.
SECONDARY
Descent planning “rules of thumb”

Engine Anti-ice requirements.
Radar tilt angles.
Lever-off techniques.

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The calculated top of descent point is only valid for the routing entered in the F-PLN page.
Ensure that the F-PLN page contains the routing you expect to fly.
Managed Descent
The normal method of initiating a descent is to select DES mode at the FMGS calculated top
of descent point. However, if an early descent is required by ATC, engaging descent mode
will give 1000 fmp rate of descent until regaining the computed profile. If descent is delayed,
a DECELERATE massage appears in amber. To regain the optimum descent profile, a
descent mode is used to “catch up” with the ideal profile, when cleared for descent.
In DES mode, there is a target speed with high low speed brackets. Speed will vary between
these brackets to maintain the airplane on the required descent path. The speed will vary
because the actual conditions (wind, temperature, use of anti ice etc) will differ from the
assumptions made by the FMGS. If the speed decays towards the lower bracket, power will
be applied to maintain the programmed path and MACH (SPEED) is annunciated in the FMA.
Should the speed rise to the upper bracket, and it is computed that the required profile will
not be regained, a white “EXTEND SPEED BRAKE” message is displayed. The PROG page and
on the ND, the level symbol should be used to monitor progress in the descent. At lower
altitudes the energy circle is useful.
Under normal circumstances, thrust will be idle. However, if a slow descent is required, or
the speed has decayed then the thrust mode changes to speed. Similarly, if a speed increase
is required (may be due to ATC) then using a selected speed in excess of optimum will
command the auto thrust to speed mode, as the aircraft applies power to keep on profile.
If an increased rate of descent is required, OPEN DES must be selected and speedbrakes
used as appropriate. Selecting only speedbrakes in DES mode will not achieve an increase in
rate of descent, as power will be applied to maintain the airplane on profile and at target
speed.
Open Descent
An alternative to the managed descent is the OPEN DES made. This will give a descent with
thrust at idle, and retains the option of using a managed speed or a pilot selected speed.
Speedbrake is very effective in increasing descent rate. If the aircraft is not in managed
navigation, i.e. in HDG mode, then managed descent mode is not available. The aircraft will
not follow a descent path but will merely descent at an idle thrust setting, at a set speed. By
monitoring the ND the level off point can be found and the PROG page a deviation from
planned profile.
Use the correct method to initiate descent.

Monitors descent according to expected navigation.
Maintains headings +/-5˚ and speed +/-510Kt.
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Adjust descent rate using appropriate methods bearing in mind aircraft limitations and
passenger comfort.
Complies with all ATC clearance and minimum safe altitudes.
 Common Errors
ND not used effectively to monitor descent progress.

Inappropriate methods used to adjust descent rate (power used against speed brake)
VMO/MMO exceedance due to high cost index descent speed range.
Inaccurate descent routing, thereby in validating descent predictions.
Approach phase activation when high on profile.

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3.12 ILS Approach
3.12.1 Standard Approach
To perform an ILS approach safely and accurately in accordance with standard

procedures.
 Schedule
 Equipment
FMGS Free play trainer.
DOC reference

FCOM 4.02.30 (Flight Guidance Principles)
FCOM 4.05.70 (ILS approach)
Briefing of the key points.
MAIN
Correct FMGS approach presentation.

Approach phase activation
Aircraft configuration planning
Landing gear extension before CONF 2, if declaration is low.

Procedure at Decision altitude.
SECONDARY
Starting of the declaration sequence according to glide-slope capture altitude ( above or

below 2000 ft AGF)
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Correct FMGS preparation prior to descent will ease the workload during the approach phase.
Should a runway change or expeditious routing be anticipated then programming the
secondary flight plan accordingly will allow changes to be made quickly and easily. It is
recommended that the active FLPN be programmed with the anticipated arrival routing and
runway (radar pattern or a particular procedure) and the secondary FPLN be programmed with
an alternate (full procedural pattern or an alternative runway). Programme the FMGS with the
routing you expect.
Both ILS pb‟s should be pressed prior to the intermediate approach phase and all navigation
aids should be identified, and displayed as necessary. If the ILS pb‟s are not pressed, the ILS
will be displayed when APP pb is pressed on A330 and A340 only. The use of ND in NAV
modes and relevant range scales, with the ILS displayed on the PFD, will aid situational
awareness. As always the FMGS position should be checked against raw data.
Two useful guides in descent are 250 kt at 9000 ft AAL 40 NM from touch down and 250 kt at
3000 ft AAL, 15 NM from touchdown. From 250 kt in level flight deceleration to S speed with
extension of CONF 1 will take approximately 5 NM. At average weights and neglectable head/
tail winds. The energy circle is an useful indication of distance required to touchdown.
Aviation of the approach phase will allow the use of the managed speed during the approach.
Automatic activation will occur at the deceleration point. If an early deceleration is required
then approach phase can be activated on the PERF page. When flying the intermediate
approach in select speed, don‟t forget to check that the approach has been activated before
resuming managed speed, otherwise target speed will be descent speed. At very light weights
the use of managed speed may produce speeds slower than desirable in radar or procedural
pattern in which case the use of selected speed is recommended.
When cleared for the ILS the APPR pushbutton should be pressed and G/S and LOC modes will
be armed. Engagement of LOC* and LOC modes should always be monitored carefully by the
crew and that the inbound course is correct.
After glide slope capture, set missed approach altitude, and check that a blue go –around
procedure is displayed on the ND. If there is no go-around procedure displayed, or an
incorrect procedure displayed, the FPLN may be incorrectly sequenced or the go-around will
have to be flown using selected modes. A check of the TO waypoint will indicate that the FPLN
is correctly sequenced.
The normal approach is a decelerated approach with glide slope interception occurring at S
speed and flight continuing to 2000 ft AAL (minimum ) at this speed, at which point the
aircraft will be configured for landing in accordance with SOP‟S (FCOM 3.03.18 [SOPs- ILS
approach]). In certain circumstances (e.g. tail wind, steep glide slope, or high weights) the
aircraft may accelerate to faster than S speed in which case the landing gear should be
lowered before selection of CONF 2. Speed brake can be used in certain circumstances
(inhibited in CONF FULL) but be careful of VLS and high sink rates.

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During flap extension it is important that PNF monitors aircraft IAS and VFE for the flap setting
called for. If flaps are selected above VFE NEXT, flap load relief will occur on A330 and A340.
If the IAS is great enough, high-speed warning will be triggered.
Should the glide slope be intercepted in level flight below 2000 ft AAL (1500 ft minimum) then
CONF 2 should be selected at one dot below the glide slope and thereafter standard approach
procedures followed.
PNF should monitor closely the aircraft flight path during the final approach phase and be
ready to call out V/S greater than 1000 fpm, airspeed deviation of +10 kt or -5kt, GS deviation
of more than 1 dot, LOC deviation ½ DOT, pitch attitude >10° 02 < 0°.
The final approach phase is one in which pilot incapacitation is both more likely and more
critical, therefore PNF should closely monitor the performance of PF and be ready to take
control if necessary.
The aircraft should be stabilized in the approach configuration by 1000 ft AAL or a go around
should be carried out.
When the autopilot is disconnected avoid the temptation to make inputs on the sidestick. The
aircraft will be stabilized and tracking towards the runway. Avoid the tendency to turn towards
the runway in a crosswind or to “duck under” the glide slope.
Initiate deceleration at appropriate moment.

Configures aircraft in accordance with standard procedures.
Maintains aircraft within one dot deflection on localizer and glide slope.
Maintains airplane speed within + 10kt/-5kt of VAPP.
Makes correct decision at Decision Altitude to land or go around and executes decision
correctly.
Ensures visual segment flown smoothly and landing made within touchdown zone.
Ensure task sharing requirements and good crew communications.
 Common Errors
Misuse of flight plan.

Approach phase not activated or speed not managed.
Go around altitude not set.
Centerline and/or glideslope not maintained during visual segment.
Confusion between memo display and landing memo.
Landing configuration not stabilized by 1000 ft AGL.
Calling for flap at VFE NEXT.

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3.12.2 Glide slope Interception from above
To intercept the ILS glide slope from above.

To correctly manage aircraft speed and configuration.
 Schedule
Briefing duration : 15 minutes.
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.22.30 (Flight Guidance).

FCOM 3.03.18 (SOPs)
FCOM 4.05.70 (Approach procedures)
MAIN
How to achieve desired descent rate (Speed/ Drag)

Importance of PF intentions being clearly understood by PNF.
SECONDARY
Envelope protection.
To intercept the glide slope from above the following method should be used:
APRP…………………………………………………………………………………………………….when LOC
captures
FCU altitude…………………………………………………………………………………..set above aircraft
altitude (to prevent undesired ALT*)
V/S …………………………………………………………………………………………….set 1500 fpm down
When G/S engages………………………………………………………………………..set go around altitude
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It is vital to use V/S rather than OPEN DES in order that the ATHR is in SPEED mode not IDLE
mode.
Maximum descent path is obtained with CONF FULL, gear down at VMAX. Nevertheless, the
rate of descent should be carefully monitored to avoid exceedance of speed limits and with
respect CFIT precautions.
Like a standard approach, the aircraft must be stabilization in landing configuration by 1000 ft
AAL.
Recognized degree of vertical deviation and determines appropriate method to achieve

interception.
Achieve glide slope capture by FAF and ensures stabilization in landing configuration by
1000 ft AAL.
 Common Errors
Lack of situational awareness.

Using OPEN DES.
Alt set below current altitude.
APPR mode not armed.
Use of managed speed when selected speed is more appropriate.
Exceedance of speed limitations (Vmax).
Go around altitude not selected.
Go around not immediately initiated if not stabilized at 1000 ft AAL.
3.12.3 Raw Data Approach : ILS Approach without FD Guidance (RAW DATA)
To smoothly and accurately carry out a manually flown ILS approach without FD.
To apply correct task sharing procedures for manual flight.
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 3.06 (Task sharing)

FCOM 1.22.30 (A/THR)
FCOM 3.04.31 (Use of FPV)
Briefing Note – Use of FPV
Briefing of the following key point.
MAIN
Pitch attitude and power settings.
Significance of specific indications on the PFD (FPV…Speed trend, selected track index, ILS
deviation scales..)
Early preparation for the approach and anticipation of LOC interception.
Small, smooth corrections in pitch and bank to maintain FPV in desired position.
SECONDARY
FDs must be selected off to view blue track index on PFD.

ILS pb must be selected early to display deviation scales in order to allow interception of
LOC.
INITIAL APPROACH
Select FPV as flying reference
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
Select TRK to ILS course in order to display the blue track index on the PFD horizon line.
Decelerate so as to reach FAF, CONF FULL – VAPP
For interception of the LOC use the ND information (DIR TO INTCPT RADIAL, XTR…)
When established on LOC, fly the FPV to the blue TRK index on the horizon.

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FINAL APPROACH
When ½ dot below GS, initiate the interception of the GS by flying the FPV smoothly down
to the GS flight path angle (-3%)
Monitor the raw data:
- If LOC index starts to deviate, fly the FPV in the direction of the LOC index relative
to the blue TRK index on the horizon.
- Once on LOC, fly the FPV back to the blue TRK index on the horizon
- If GS index starts to deviate, fly the FPV 1° up(down) to recover. Once
reestablished, fly the FPV back to the GS flight path target.
Only CAT I approaches can be flown with such a technique.

If ATHR is not used for the approach, the speed trend arrow is an excellent aid in
maintaining the correct approach speed.
GO AROUND:
If go around is required, push thrust levers to TOGA and proceed as usual (FCOM 3.03.23
[SOPs – Go around] ). The FPD will come up automatically. In order to get the attitude
reference and FD bars, ask PNF to select HDG, V/S mode on FCU.
NOTES : - For aircraft not modified, HDG – V/S must be selected if TRK/FP selected during
approach.
Aircraft configuration correctly controlled.

Maintains airplane speed within +10kt/ -5kt of VAPP.
Remains within half deflection on localizer and glide slope.
Ensures strict application of task sharing procedures and callouts.
Makes correct decision at Decision Alt to land or go-around and executes decision
correctly.
 Common Errors
Over controlling in pitch and roll.

Use of FPV as “primary” reference for pitch corrections.
Failure to follow instrument flying techniques common to all aircraft.

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3.13 Non-Precision Approach
To safely perform all types of non-precision approaches using managed and/or selected
guidance as determined by system availability and/or environmental circumstances.
 Schedule
 Equipment
FMGS Free play Trainer
DOC references:
QRH 3.07.3.08 (Normal procedures)

FCOM 1.22.30 (Flight guidance)
FCOM 4.02.30 (FMGS principles)
FCOM 4.05.70 (Approach procedures)
Briefing Note – Use of FPV
MAIN
Criteria for determining type of guidance to be used.

Correct FMGS Approach preparation.
Full approach briefing including intended guidance modes.
Meaning and significance of all relevant PFD and ND symbols.
Use of LOC and APPR modes.
Aircraft configuration planning.
Technique/ monitoring of descent initiation of trajectory.
Procedures at MDA.
SECONDARY
Knowledge of trajectory symbols on ND.

Relationship of FPD/ FPV and wind correction.

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When an approach other than ILS is expected, it is important that a navigational accuracy
check is carried out. Consider also whether to use a managed or selected approach.
Managed approach is only available if it is in the FMGS database and NAV ACCY check is
positive. A positive NAV ACCY check can be confirmed even if LOW accuracy is indicated on
the PROG page, see [FCOM 3.03 (SOPs-Non-Precision Approach)]. Otherwise an approach in
selected mode (TRK/FPA) is necessary.
A fully managed approach is recommended, with the objective of being fully stabilized, at
VAPP and in landing configuration at the final approach fix. By following FCOM 3 chapter 3
(SOP‟s – Non Precision Approach) techniques, a safe approach to MDA can be flown.
A non-precision approach will typically take longer to set up than an ILS approach, so allow
sufficient time for preparation, briefing. The FMGS must then be programmed correctly for the
type of approach to be flown.
Brief accordingly, with specific reference to task sharing procedures and the importance of
crosschecking, especially the intended guidance modes (TRK/FPA, NAV/FPA or fully managed).
Ensure the correct navigational aids are tuned to facilitate the approach course settings if
applicable.
Managed Approach
Follow the guidelines outlined below for a managed non-precision approach.
Prior to approach:
Insertion of correct approach in MCDU.

Set VAPP as a constraint at FAF.
Check all constraints in FPLN match the approach charts.
Navigational accuracy check.
Selection and identification of radio aids for approach.
Approach briefing and cross check of minima.
Intermediate approach:
Check deceleration occurs at decal pseudo waypoint or activate approach phase 10 NM

prior to FAF.
Select FPD.
Ensure raw data is correctly displayed.
Verify accuracy is HIGH on PROG page or NAV ACCY positive. (GPS Primary)
Complete approach checks when passing 1000 AGL.

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Final approach:
Ensure landing configuration achieved prior to FAF.

Start CHRONO at FAF to check FAF to MAP time.
Crosscheck altitudes and distance with those published on the approach chart if applicable.
Monitor raw data and FMA, callout mode changes
Set go around altitude.
At MDA:
If visual, disconnect autopilot and continue visually (FDs OFF) or perform a go around if
insufficient visual references.
Note : In “Final Approach” Mode the autopilot will disconnect at MDA – 50 ft or MAP,
whichever is reached earlier.
The knowledge of symbols and guidance information must be sound, and is detailed in FCOM
1.22.30 (Auto Flight – Flight Guidance). The FMGS guidance principles are contained in FCOM
4.02.30 (FMGS Principles Flight Guidance Principles)
Raw data must be used a cross check throughout the approach.
If managed guidance does not correspond with the raw data then use of selected guidance to
follow raw data is mandatory.
Selected Approach:
Follow the guidelines outlined below for a selected non-precision approach:
Prior to approach:
Keep A/THR engaged.

Select TRK/ FPA as the autopilot guidance mode.
Use managed speed.
Intermediate approach:
Crosscheck FPD approach track with approach plates.

Ensure raw data is correctly displayed.
Select FPA 0.3 NM ( recommended 0.3 NM depending on circumstances) prior to reaching
the published descent point (allowing time for the aircraft to react)

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Final approach:
Start time at FAF.

Ensure landing configuration is achieved prior to FAF.
Monitor raw data and FMA, callout mode changes
Set go around altitude.
At MDA:
If visual, disconnect autopilot and continue visually or if insufficient visual references

perform a go around.
This selected non-precision approach procedure is necessary when the non ILS approach is
not in the database or the NAV ACCURACY check is negative (see FCOM 3.03.20 [SOPs – Non
Precision Approach])
When planning for a circling approach, the landing runway should be inserted in the SEC FPLN.
Once downwind, having completed the instrument approach, activate the SEC FPLN enabling
use of managed speed with its associated GS MINI function. Additionally, the landing runway
will be shown on the PFD to assist positioning into final approach. Once the SEC FPLN is
activated the go-around procedure for the instrument approach just carried out will be
removed. Therefore, if visual reference is lost during the circling approach, the go-around will
have to be flown using selected guidance [SOPs – Non Precision Approach]
The landing is achieved by autopilot disconnect and visual positioning. Remember the effect of
wind on your ground track as you “go visual”. Be aware that the possibility of a go-around and
the procedures to be followed should have been mentioned in the approach brief. The go-
around should be autopilot controlled. The approach and go-around patterns are in FCOM
4.05.70 (FMGS Procedures – Approach).
Makes correct choice of managed and/or selected guidance.

Ensure standard task sharing procedures applied.
Ensures aircraft configured in accordance with the procedure corresponding to the type of
approach flown.
Ensures approach flown within 5° of the required track.
Maintains speed within +10kt/ -5kt of target.
At MDA, makes correct decision to continue, land or go around and executes decision
correctly.
Flies visual segment smoothly and lands within touchdown zone. Performs correct go
around procedure if necessary.
Conforms with task sharing requirements and ensures good crew communication.

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 Common Errors
Raw data information not monitored closely throughout approach.

Confusion between managed and selected.
NAV accuracy not confirmed or checked.
TO waypoint validity not checked on ND.
Misuse of flight plan.
Navigation aids not:
- forced tuned and course not inserted
- checked for approach.
A/C not in LDG CONFIG at VAPP by FAF.
Incomplete briefing.
TRACK/FPA selected late.
Aircraft descent preparation late.
Poor radial tracking in selected mode.
Go around altitude not set.
Going below of MDA.

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3.14 Visual Approach
Traffic Pattern and Sidestep
To safely perform a visual traffic pattern, approach and landing.

To perform a “side-step” maneuver during an approach.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 3.03.20 (Visual approach)

FCOM 4.05.70 (Visual approach)
MAIN
Visual pattern description.

Altitude/ distance to run/ configuration “clues”.
Importance of maintaining visual contract with runway and other traffic.
Use of all available aids in conjunction with FPV to maintain slope angle and centerline.
Use of FPV and A/THR.
Side-step maneuver.
Minimum stabilization requirements.
SECONDARY
Use of FPV to maintain altitude and track downwind.

Effects of crosswind on base leg.

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When arriving in the downwind position, be aware of the height/ distance to run and configure
accordingly. The energy circle when available is of use in determining distance required to
land (provided landing runway is selected).
On commencement of the visual approach, disconnect auto pilot, select FDs to “off”, select
FPV and check A/THR active. Activate approach to recover the use of managed speed. The
FPV is very useful for maintaining altitude and positioning on downwind leg.
In case of cross wind, and the base leg is flown in headwind, expect thrust and IAS target to
increase if speed is managed and A/THR active.
Ensure an even workload, so that PF can keep eyes out of cockpit, maintaining visual contact
with runway and any traffic.
The full visual pattern is found in FCOM 3.03.20 (SOPs – Visual Approach).
Aim to be in landing configuration, stabilized on correct approach path (hands on THR levers),
at VAPP by 1000 ft AGL, at the latest. If not stabilized, a go-around must be considered
executed or carried out.
If a late side-step is required, smooth application of controls will remove the tendency to over
bank and destabilize the approach. Do not “duck under” in the late stages of approach.
Ensures aircraft is positioned and configured appropriately with regard distance to run and
pattern constrains.
Performs smooth “side-step” maneuver.
Maintains airplane speed within +10kt/ -5kt of VAPP.
Ensures that airplane is in landing configuration at VAPP, with engines at approach power,
at or above 1000 ft AAL or performs a go around.
Ensures correct task sharing and good crew communications throughout.
 Common Errors
Insufficient planning for altitude/ distance to run.

Late disconnection of autopilot.
FDs not selected off (at appropriate moment).
One FD left on.
Over banking or „fly through‟ during side-step.
High sink rate, shallow approach angle or “ducking under” on late final approach.
Approach not stabilized at or above 1000 ft AAL and late decisions to go around.
Hands not on THR levers.

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3.14.1 Supplementary
The recommended indications for the various visual guidance systems as follows:
3-bar VASI - fly lower 2 bars white and upper bar red
T-VASI - fly 1 light “fly down”
PAPI - fly 2 reds and 2 whites
Circling Approach :
A circling approach is accomplished when the runway in use has no instrument approach and
the conditions are such that a straight-in visual approach is not possible. Runways, which have
circling approaches approved, will have the circling minima published. Refer AOC for Company
circling minimas.
The approach is made on the reciprocal runway which has the instrument approach (ILS or
NON-PRECISION). Configure the aircraft and reduce speed accordingly as for the Stabilized
Approach or Non-Precision Approach. However, when intercepting the glide slope or FAF
inbound, select FLAPS 3 with landing gear down instead of FLAPS FULL. Descend on the glide
slope or appropriate gradient till visual with the runway or circling minimum altitude,
whichever comes first. Approach must be discontinued if not visual with the runway by missed
approach point (MAP).
Maintain level flight when visual with the runway and commence circling procedure as
described above. Select FLAPS FULL and reduce to VAPP when turning onto finals for landing.
Descend on the visual glide slope.
It is difficult to judge the aircraft‟s radius of turn at low altitude. Turn earlier than usual and
reduce bank angle as necessary during the turn to finals whilst aiming for the touchdown
point. Be aware of the tendency to over bank of overshooting the extended centerline on
finals.
Low Visibility Circling Approach:

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Missed Approach while circling:
If visual reference is lost while circling to land from an instrument app, the missed app
specified for the particular procedure must be followed. It is expected that the pilot will make
an initial climbing turn towards the landing runway & overhead the airfield where the pilot will
establish the A/C climbing on the missed app trk. Inasmuch as the circling maneuver may be
accomplished in more than one direction, different patterns will be required to establish th A/C
on the prescribed missed app course depending on its position at the time visual reference is
lost.
Visual Approach :
The use of the FPV and ATHR with managed speed is recommended for making visual
approaches. Flight directors are not to be used. Although visual cues remain the primary
reference, use of the FPV and ND can assist greatly in flying the visual pattern and final
approach.
Visual Traffic Pattern:

Plan to join downwind at an altitude of 1500‟-2000‟ above the runway elevation. Place the FPV
symbol on the horizon to establish the aircraft in level flight.
Position the aircraft on downwind about 2-2 ½ nm from the runway. To assist in this, select
the ND to ROSE NAV or ARC and the 10nm scale. Select also the downwind track on the FCU
TRK window. When the aircraft is at the correct distance away from the runway, fly a heading
that will align the vertical bar of the FPV symbol with the blue track index. This will ensure
that the correct drift is laid off on downwind.
Refer to FCOM 03.03.20 for the VISUAL APPROACH pattern. Start the time passing abeam the
threshold. After 30 secs, select flaps 2/ gear down. Reduce to F speed. Initiate the turn to
base after 45 secs + 1 sec/KT of wind.

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Final Approach :
Before the turn to finals, take not of the wind direction and speed and initiate the turn
accordingly, anticipating to level off with a heading into the wind on final approach.
Laterally, the FPV gives an indication of the aircraft track and drift angle. It has the same
displacement as the drift diamond on the heading scale and thus will appear directly above it.
When the aircraft is lined up with the runway, turn to heading that will keep the vertical bar of
the FPV just under the track, as shown in the diagram below.
The correct drift will thus be laid off as long as the vertical bar of the FPV remains aligned with
the track index. If the aircraft has drifted off, the extended centerline will have to be regained
before re-applying the above tracking technique. Bear in mind however, that the primary
visual cues are outside while the FPV is just an aid in maintaining a stable approach path.
When on the final approach, the FPV is placed 3° below the horizon to establish the aircraft on
a normal descent angle. If this results in the aircraft being below the desired approach path
the descent angle should be reduced by raising the FPV to a shallower descent angle. As soon
as the aircraft regains the correct descent path, the FPV should again be brought back to
minus 3°. Putting the base of the FPV symbol on minus 5° on the PFD pitch scale would
approximate a descent angle of 3° below the horizon. When flying the FPV at a 3° descent
angle, the rate of decent is taken care of, regardless of a headwind on tailwind component.

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The visual aim point or touchdown point should remain constant in position on the windshield
when the approach is stabilized on “slot”.
The VASI, T-VASI or PAPI (Precision Approach Path Indicator) are used in conjunction with the
visual aiming point for visual glide path guidance. However, the accuracy of guidance below
200 ft is limited and the indications should be treated with caution. Therefore, at 200-300 ft
above the threshold elevation, the pilot should transfer completely from using the VASI or
PAPI, to focusing on the visual aim point.
The PIC should request as to the missed app procedure in the event a go-around is performed
following a visual app.

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3.15 Landing
Landing and Stopping the A/C
To land the aircraft in a safe manner.

To decelerate the aircraft after landing using appropriate combination of reverse thrust
and manual or auto wheel brakes.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
FCOM 1.32.30 (Brakes and anti-skid)

FCOM 1.70.70 (Thrust reverser system)
FCOM 3.01.40 (Limitations)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Supplementary techniques)
MAIN
Flare at correct height.

Crosswind landing technique.
Awareness of possible tail strike.
Selection of idle thrust and standard use of reverse thrust.
Normal use of autobrake system and related indications.
Manual braking and directional control techniques.
Brake and reverser limitations.
Action in case of abnormal braking behavior.
Conditions for spoiler deployment.
Derotation technique.

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SECONDARY
Flight controls flare mode.

Possible pitch up with spoiler deployment.
Brake and anti-skid indications on SD WHEEL page.
Recommendations for use of autobrakes.
As a basic rule for all approaches, not later than 1000 ft AGL, the PF should have one hand on
the THRUST LEVERS and the other one on the sidestick.
During the final visual segment of the approach it is very important not to over control with
the side stick. The aircraft will maintain pitch and roll attitudes resisting any atmospheric
disturbance. At 100 ft flare LAW becomes active (FCOM 3.04.27 [Supplementary Techniques –
Flight Controls]). Flare mode is only a pitch mode a roll control is the same as normal law until
the wheels are on the ground.
At approximately 30 ft the aircraft should be progressively flared and the thrust lever selected
to idle. Due to the engagement of landing mode in pitch it is necessary to make a progressive
pull on the sidestick in order to increase the pitch angle in the flare. The „Retard‟ call at 20
(manual landing)/ 10 (auto land) ft is a reminder to retard the thrust levers to idle if they have
not already been retarded.
Tail strike occurs at 14° or 10° (landing gear compressed A340, A330, A320) so pitch attitude
should be monitored in the flare (FCOM 3.03.22 for pitch and roll limits).
Derotation should be commenced as soon as the main wheels have touched. The aircraft has
a tendency to nose down naturally as the aft stick applied for the flare is relaxed towards
neutral. A comfortable nose wheel touchdown will be achieved if the stick is maintained just
aft of neutral during derotation.
For crosswind landing techniques read the briefing given in SOP
At touch down the ground spoilers will deploy automatically which may give a slight pitch up.
Automatic ground spoiler deployment will occur with both main landing gear compressed or
with one MLG on the ground and revers thrust selected (FCOM 1.27.10 [Flight Controls –
Ground Spoiler Control]). Ground spoiler deployment will enable autobrake operation (if
selected). The green DECEL light on the AUTO/BRK panel enable the crew to monitor whether
the selected rate of deceleration is achieved.
To disconnect autobrake pressure needs to be applied to one brake pedal only. However the
normal method of disarming the autobrake is by even pressure on both brake pedals. The
auto brake may also be disconnected by action on the respective AUTO/BRK pb (not
recommended as both pilots should be heads up during the landing roll) or by pushing down
the speedbrake control lever. Autobrake should be disconnected before 20 kts is reached.

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Manual brakes may be used as an alternative to auto brakes. The A340, A330, A320 are fitted
with carbon brakes and their wear is a function of the number of applications, not the amount
of pressure applied. Further, brake wear is greatly increased when brakes are cold. The tires
are equipped with fusible plugs which protect against tire burst in the event of overheat.
Reverse should be selected immediately after main gear touchdown, and when REV green is
indicated, MAX REV may be selected. Reduce reverse thrust to idle by 70 kts. Idle reverse
thrust may remain selected until the airplane is at taxi speed.
PNF should monitor spoiler deployment (ECAM WHEEL page), operations of reverse thrust
(E/WD) and the operation of autobrake (green DECEL light on AUTO/BRK panel) and notify PF
of any non-normal indications.
Awareness of landing limitations

Use of correct landing technique and execution of standard landing.
Employs correct technique for use of reverse thrust and manual braking or properly
monitors autobrake deceleration.
Avoid significant deviation from runway centerline.
 Common Errors
Over controlling in pitch and roll.

Flaring to high.
Failure to flare or flaring too late.
Not selecting idle thrust for landing.
Delayed selection of reverse thrust.
Failure to monitor SD WHEEL page and/or AUTO/BRK panel during deceleration.
Maximum reverse thrust maintained below 70kt or reverse stowed before taxi speed.
Differential braking used during roll out.

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3.15.1 Minimum Visual Ground Segments (Flare Phase)
CAT III CAT II

0 ft 15 ft 50 ft 100 ft
(H)
(⍬ = 8° 4) (⍬ = 2° 9) (⍬ = 2° 1) (⍬ = 2° 1)
Visual segment 60m (197 ft) 120m (394 ft)
(A) 38 ft 44 ft 77 ft 127 ft
Obscured
56m (185 ft) 44m (143 ft) 73m (238 ft) 120m (394 ft)
(B)
Minimum RVR 116m (382 ft) 104m (341 ft) 133m (436 ft) 240m (788 ft)
Note : This drawing shows that for a CAT III landing (60 meters minimum visual segment)
the minimum RVR is 104 meters at 15 feet.

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CAT III CAT II

0 ft 15 ft 50 ft 100 ft
(H)
(⍬ = 10° 4) (⍬ = 5° 1) (⍬ = 5°) (⍬ = 5° )
Visual segment 60m (197 ft) 120m (394 ft)
(A) 40 ft 47 ft 82 ft 132 ft
Obscured
72m (236ft) 54m (177 ft) 93m (306 ft) 150m (493 ft)
(B)
Minimum RVR 132m (433 ft) 114m (374 ft) 153m (503 ft) 270m (887 ft)

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A320 :
CAT III CAT II

15 ft 50 ft 100 ft
(H)
(⍬ = 10° 4) (⍬ = 4° 7) (⍬ = 4.7° )
Visual segment 60 m (197 ft) 120m (394 ft)
(A) 36 ft 71 ft 121 ft
Obscured
43m (140ft) 79m (259 ft) 134m (442 ft)
(B)
Minimum RVR 103m (337 ft) 139m (456 ft) 254m (836 ft)
Note : This drawing shows that for a CAT III landing (60 meters minimum visual
segment), the minimum RVR is 103 meters at 15 feet.

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3.15.2 ILS Final Approach and Landing Geometry:
Conditions : Glide Path G/S Trans Touchdown

(B)
- Flaps Full (°) (A) Point (c)
- ILS Antenna
348 m 153 m 195 m
At 50 ft 2° 5
1142 ft 50 ft 640 ft
At Threshold
- No Flare 291 m 132 m 159 m
3°
- Pitch Angle: 3.7° 955 m 433 ft 522 ft

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A330:

(B)
- ILS Antenna
349 m 161 m 185 m
At 50 ft 2° 5
1145 ft 530 ft 615 ft
At Threshold
- No Flare 291 m 140 m 152 m
3°
- Pitch Angle: 5° 954 m 457 ft 497 ft

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(B)
- ILS Antenna
348 m 112 m 236 m
At 50 ft 2° 5
1145 ft 366 ft 779 ft
At Threshold
- No Flare 291 m 93 m 198 m
3°
- Pitch Angle: 4° 954 m 306 ft 648 ft

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3.15.3 Ground Clearance Diagram:

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3.16 Go Around
To perform a safe go around in accordance with standard procedures.
 Schedule
 Equipment
FMGS Free play Trainer.
DOC references:

FCOM 4.03.20 (MCDU Page description)
FCOM 4.05.80 (FMGS procedures)
MAIN
Situational awareness.
Correct announcement/ crew actions.
Pitch control.
Navigation.
SECONDARY
Engine out.
Reject Landing.
Go around without FD.
The go-around mode is engaged by setting the thrust levers to the TOGA gate, provided at
least CONF 1 is selected. Monitor FMA annunciations for correct operation. Speed target is
the memorized approach speed or the speed at engagement of go around.

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If going around from a visual approach (FDs off), set thrust levers to TOGA, and the FDs will
automatically engage or should be selected by PNF on PF‟s command.
Lateral navigation will stay in GA TRACK mode until the heading selector knob is pulled or
pushed to engage HDG or NAV mode. The go-around can be flown with two autopilots
engaged, but when another lateral or vertical mode is selected, one autopilot drops out.
Speed target will be green dot when GA ACCEL ALT is reached, as the FMGS assumes another
approach will be flown, following the go-around.
The previously flown approach will be automatically strung back in the F-PLAN at the end of
the missed approach procedure. The approach must be activated if another approach is
planned. If proceeding to an alternate, switching from FMGS GO AROUND phase to CLIMB
phase is achieved by selecting on ALTN or inserting NEW DEST and CRZ FL. Either of these
actions will switch the FMGS flight phase to CLIMB (FCOM 4.02.20 [FMGS Principles – Flight
Phases]). Be mindful that the ALT constraints will not be met during missed app.
Be very careful when going-around with FPV selected, as it is easy to over rotate. The pitch
reference symbol should be used to rotate the aircraft to 12.5° not the FPV.
In the event of low altitude capture and engine failure whilst in ALT* mode, monitor the speed
carefully as there is no low speed protection in ALT* mode.
Initiates go-around at +50 ft/-0 ft of decision altitude/ height.

Initiates go-around at +100 ft/-0 ft of minimum descent altitude / height.
Immediate application of TOGA and positive rotation to required pitch angle.
Follows SRS and maintains target speed +/ - 10kts (minimum VREF)
Follows published missed approach procedures or maintains ATC heading +/-5°.
Ensure application of task sharing requirements and good crew communications.
 Common Errors
Incomplete or missed callouts.

Rotation too slow and /or delayed.
Pitch/speed/thrust control.
Flap retraction completed before acceleration altitude.
Wrong or no selection of lateral mode.
When FPD/FPV selected confusion between pitch angle and FPV.

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3.17 Flight with Gear Down
To be familiar with and apply special requirements for dispatch with gear down.
To be able to compute Take-off and Go around performance data.
To calculate a valid fuel plan.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
FCOM 2.04.25 (Special Operations)

FCOM 3.05.35 Go Around)
Briefing of the following key point.
MAIN
Knowledge of limitations (speed, icing)

Take-off performance computation.
Recommended speeds (climb, cruise, descent : refer to FCOM 2.04 [Special Operations])
Go around.
SECONDARY
Disregard FMGS fuel predictions.
Revenue flight is permitted with the landing gear in the down position and the gear doors
closed, subject to certain limitations contained in FCOM 2.04.25 (Special Operations – Flight
with Gear Down). The MEL must also be consulted before planning a flight with gear down.
Note : Special procedures for emergency electrical generation in all generators

Failed case.

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Performance is severely degraded and special attention must be paid to weight and fuel
consumption calculations. Should the gear fail to retract after take-off, FCOM 2.04.25 (Special
Operations – Flight with Gear Down) will be of use in deciding whether flight can continue to
destination or another airport enroute. This is one of the few occasions when FCOM Vol 2 is
used in flight.
Consider the effect of terrain on the planned departure route and the go around due to poor
climb performance.
Examined the planned route carefully as drift down level off is very much lower than with gear
retracted. Terrain clearance is a concern.
Applies special operating procedures.

Determines correct Take-off and Go around performance.
Accurate fuel plan.
 Common Errors
Lack of awareness of severe performance limitations.

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3.18 GPWS Warning
To take required action in the event of any GPWS warning.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH chapter 1 (GPWS warning)

FCOM 1.34.70 (GPWS)
FCOM 3.02.34 (GPWS warning)
MAIN
Immediate reaction (explanation as stated in QRH).

GPWS modifies profile at certain airports)
Configuration requirements below VLS.
Description of GPWS modes.
SECONDARY
Awareness of the active flight control law and how it will affect the escape manoeuver.
Reaction adapted to type of warning (Emergency pull up or go around).
Inhibition or cancelling possibilities (configuration selection pb‟s on overhead panel).
The airbus fly-by-wire family is equipped with flight envelope protection, which provides
effective response to GPWS recovery maneuvers. If a warning is received, IMMEDIATE action
must be taken unless operating in daylight VMC and the cause of the warning can be positively
identified.

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Full back stick if recommended. Care must be taken when operating on one engine,
inoperative with flaps extended and at light weight as in this configuration directional control
may be difficult. The drill must be carried out positively, with clear announcement of intent,
positive control action and the control input retained until clear of danger.
In certain situations, nuisance warnings may be inhibited by action on the GPWS panel and
may be required by ECAM. When landing CONF 3 prompt is pressed on the MCDU PERF page
to avoid nuisance warnings.
Remember to retract spoilers, if in use, to permit maximum climb performance. Speedbrakes

will retract automatically if speed is reduced below ALPHA PROT.
Reacts immediately to warning.

Applies correct emergency pull-up procedure.
 Common Errors
Delayed reactions due to hesitation.

Mistrust of warnings.
Stick not maintained in full back position during emergency pull up.
Configuration modified with speed below VLS.
Decision not clearly announced.

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3.19 FMGS - Position Updating
To identify the circumstances requiring a FMGS position update.

To correctly update the FMGS position.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 4.02.20 (Flight management principles)

FCOM 4.03.20 (Progress page)
FCOM 4.04.30 (Update)
MAIN
Situation requiring position correction.

Procedure for updating position.
SECONDARY
Understanding of position computation.

Understanding of radio updating.

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This procedure is a very rough way of correcting gross errors in the FMGS computed position
and should only be used when a major position error is apparent or when a CHK A/C
POSITION message occurs along with an obvious position error.
When such a position error occurs it is important that the aircraft is navigated using raw data
until an update can be done. The position error may have occurred due to either the FMGS
incorrectly identifying a VOR (new VOR frequency or position changed NOTAM but not yet
included in FMGS database) or interruption of a VOR signal (e.g. in war zones). Careful
checking of NOTAMS will allow the crew to deselect a suspect VOR (FCOM 4.03.20 [Pilot
interface – Page Description]). Pilots must also be aware of the possibilities of aircraft
equipment failure.
To update the FMGS position follow the procedure given in FCOM 4.04.30 (How to use).
Makes correct decision to update position.

Performs an accurate update of FMGS position.
 Common Errors
Updates confirmed without check or using NAV display instead of raw data indications.
Unintentional updating.
Unnecessary updating.

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3.20 Global Position System
To be able to use the GPA for navigation and non precision approaches.
To understand the limits on the use of the GPS.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.34.15 (GPS)

FCOM 3.02.34 (Abnormal Procedures)
FCOM 4.02.20 (Flight Management Principles)
FCOM 4.03.20 (MCDU Page Description)
FCOM 4.05.70 (Approach)
MAIN
GPWS PRIMARY, an operational concept

FMGS position calculation
MCDU pages associated with GPS
GPS overlay approach

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SECONDARY
GPS deselection
Check of NOTAMs for satellite availability, prior to flight
The GPS is a satellite based radio navigation aid. GPS PRIMARY is an Airbus term defining an
operational concept. It means that adequate GPS accuracy and integrity are provided and that
GPS is available as the basis for the FM position. The GPS fitted to the Airbus family of
aircraft, monitor the integrity of the position information provided, and give indications of
when this position information cannot be relied upon.
The position calculated by the twin GPS receivers is added to the IRS calculated position
producing a GPIRS position. This is then fed to the FMGSs will use the GPIRS position as the
FM position so long as GPS PRIMARY is indicated on the MCDU PROG page.
Reasonableness tests on the GPIRS and IRS positions are carried out and any unreasonable
position is disregarded for the purpose of FM position calculation. The table below
summarized how FM position is derived with and without GPS PRIMARY.
FM POSITION
Without GPS With GPS
On ground before T.O. Mix IRS position GPIRS
At T.O. Runway threshold (+T/O shift) GPIRS
MIX IRS & Radio Position
Flight GPIRS
(Tending towards Radio Position)
Flight without GPS or Radio MIX IRS position + Last memorized FM position gradually
Position update tending towards IRS position.
FCOM section 1.22.20 FCOM 4.02.20 (FMGS Principles – Navigation) provides a full description
of FMGS position computation.
During flight preparation GPS PRIMARY will be indicated on the MCDU PROG page and the ND.
This message should be cleared using the CLR pb. This is a positive confirmation to the crew
that GPS is accurate.
The GPS workings are transparent to the crew and will only require attention in the case of a
fault or a downgrading of the position information e.g. GPS PRIMARY LOST or GPS 1 (2)
FAULT. If the GPS status changes, a message will be displayed on the MCDU and ND (GPS
PRIMARY [white] or GPS PRIMARY LOST [amber on ND]. The amber GPS PRIMARY LOST
cannot be cleared from the ND and is to remind the pilots that GPS is not available.
Navigation accuracy up or downgrade will be shown in the same way as already used for non-
GPS navigation.
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The following is a list of MCDU pages associated with the use of GPS and a brief description of
their use.
MCDU PAGE FUNCTION

SELECTED NAVAIDS Allows deselection or selection of GPS.
GPS MONITOR Display of GPS positions and other GPS derived
information.
IRS 1 (2) (3) GPIRS Position for each IRS
When GPS PRIMARY is shown, indicates that
PROG GPIRS is used for FM position calculation.
Navigation accuracy is shown.
Displays information about the predicted
PREDICTIVE GPS* availability of GPS at destination ETA or at a
particular waypoint.(where installed)
ARRIVALS Allows selection of GPS approach.
Full description of the above pages can be found in FCOM 4.03.20 (Pilots Interface – MCDU
Page Description).
The full GPS standard will permit predictions to be made regarding the feasibility of a GPS
approach at destination. The calculation involved relies on the number of, and the position of
the satellites at ETA. The “time window” is pilot modifiable.
The current status of GPS permits approaches to CAT I limits at best. Individual certification
authorities are discussing GPS accuracy reliability and so forth. Thus, the minima and
acceptance of GPS in each country must be checked before using GPS as a prime means of
navigation in the approach phase.
There are two types of GPS approach.
A. GPS Overlay Approach
The aircraft performs a managed approach along the trajectory of a published non-
precision approach using GPS position information in GPS PRIMARY navigation mode.
Before beginning the approach a check of GPS PRIMARY and HIGH accuracy must be
made which replaces the navigation accuracy check. Additionally, before the FAF check
GPS PRIMARY and HIGH accuracy with a RNP of 0.3 NM or less. Raw data must be
displayed and monitored at all times. FCOM 4.05.70 (FMGS Procedures) details the
procedures to be used. If raw data indicates that the aircraft is not on the required flight
path the pilot must use HDG, V/S or TRK/FPA to correct the flight path.

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B. GPS Stand Alone Approach
The aircraft is guided along the trajectory of an approach the waypoints of which are not
referenced to any ground base navigation aid. As yet, only a few GPS stand-along
approaches are published and they require an operational approval.
If GPS PRIMARY is lost during a non precision approach, a GPS PRIMARY LOST message in
amber will be displayed accompanied by a triple click. If this occurs or there is a navigation
accuracy downgrade, the approach may only be continued in managed navigation as long
as raw data continue to indicate satisfactory guidance.
Good awareness of how GPS aids navigation.

Accuracy check carried out before FAF during GPS approach.
 Common Errors
No check on NOTAMs relevant to satellites prior to flight.

On GPS overlay approach, raw data is not displayed and /or monitored.
Lack of knowledge of correct procedure in failure cases.
NOTE
GPS is not available on A320 aircraft.

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3.21 Fuel - Normal/ Abnormal System Operation
To understand the operation of the fuel system in normal and abnormal situations.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 2.07, 2.08 (Abnormal procedures)

FCOM 1.28 (Fuel system description)
FCOM 2.01.30 (Refueling)
FCOM 3.02.28 (ABN and EMER procedures)
FCOM 3.03.15 (SOPs)
FCOM 3.04.28 (Fuel cross feed in flight)
FCOM 4.03.20 (FUEL PRED page)
FCOM 4.04.40 (Fuel Planning)
MAIN
Refueling logic and operation.

Fuel imbalance procedure.
SECONDARY
Fuel system architecture.

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NORMAL OPERATION
In flight, fuel tanks are normally emptied in the following sequence:
Center tank.
Inner tanks.
Trim tank (fuel transferred into the inner tanks)
Outer tanks (fuel transferred into the inner tanks)
The sequence is fully automatic, with (usually) only one aft fuel transfer occurring during
each flight. Fuel may be transferred forward a number of times. The standby pumps
remain off until a fault develops with one of the main pumps, or one or more of the main
pumps is switched off. (A330/A340)
ABNORMAL OPERATION
If an ECAM caution FUEL WING X FEED FAULT is received, it may be necessary to apply
the FUEL IMBALANCE PROC (QRH 2.09). The procedure does not appear on ECAM. For
transferring fuel forward (under gravity with the FWD XFR PUMP failed), it is necessary to
level off and have a pitch attitude of less than 3. (A330/A340)
Dependent on the particular failure associated with FUEL TANK XFR FAULT, the ECAM will
require slightly different procedures. Follow ECAM procedures closely (FCOM 34.02.28
[ABN and EMER PROCEDURES – FUEL]). The fuel burn must be increased if a procedure
has required the fuel to be transferred forward.
If the TRIM TANK FUEL UNUSABLE caution appears on ECAM, flight time is limited to a
further four hours, (shown on ECAM) because the CG moves rewards as fuel is burned.
(A330/A340)
REFUELLING
All information concerning refueling is contained in FCOM 2.01.30 (Loading).
Demonstrate a good level of knowledge of the fuel system.
 Common Errors
Confusion between T. TANK MODE pb and T. TANK FEED sel. (A330/A340)

Lack of knowledge with regard system indications.

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3.22 Adverse Weather
3.22.1 Hot/Cold Weather and High Altitude Runway Operation :
To operate the aircraft according to recommended procedures in adverse weather.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
FCOM 1.30 (Ice and rain protection).

FCOM 1.34.60 (Weather radar)
FCOM 1.36 (Pneumatic system)
FCOM 3.04.30 (Ice and Rain Protection)
FCOM 3.04.34 (Weather Radar)
FCOM 3.04.91 (Adverse Weather)
Briefing notes on adverse weather operations
MAIN
Aircraft preparation in adverse weather.

Correct procedure for de-icing.
Operations in icing conditions.
Performance considerations in “hot and high” conditions.
SECONDARY
Recognition of conditions requiring the use of anti icing.

Use of weather radar.

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The A340 is certificated for operations in the temperature range of -54°C up to +55°C (at sea
level). The environmental envelope is shown in FCOM 3.01.20 (Operating Limitations). The
APU envelope is similar.
Cold Weather
The A340 and A330 are certified for flight in icing conditions. Icing conditions may be
expected when OAT (on ground) is below +10°C and there is visible moisture in the air (such
as clouds, fog with low visibility, rain, snow, sleet, ice crystals) or standing water, slush, ice or
snow is present on the taxiways or runway. Furthermore, preparation and ground operation
of the aircraft following a cold soak may require procedures which are additional to the normal
operating procedures. FCOM 3.04.91 (Supplementary Techniques – Cold Weather).
The normal preliminary cockpit inspection should be carried out. If the weather radar is
unserviceable the MMEL/ MEL may contain restrictions on the flight. Thereafter, a full exterior
inspection should be done including the extra items listed in FCOM 3.04 (Adverse Weather).
Probe/window heat may be used. When selected ON, the system provides a low level of
heating to clear cockpit transparencies and ensures adequate probe heating. The level of
heating changes automatically to high, once airborne. The TAT probe is not heated on the
ground.
At temperatures below -15°C, the ECAM and EFIS Display may not be available until cabin
conditioning has warmed the avionics compartment and cockpit. Also, at this temperature, IRS
alignment takes up to 15 minutes.
When conducting the external inspection, take care to inspect all critical surfaces to ensure
that they are clear of snow, frost and ice. Also ensure that all inlets, drains, probes etc are
clear of contamination. If they are not, the airplane must be de-iced. (A thin film, maximum
of 3 mm, of frost is acceptable on the underside of the wing tank area)
There are two main types of de-icing fluid: Type I and II. They are both based on a mixture of
glycol and water. The more modern Type II fluids have greater holdover times and flow off
the aircraft better than the Type I fluids, thereby negating any performance penalties. The
holdover time is the estimated time anti-icing fluid will prevent the formation of frost or ice
and the accumulation of snow on the protected surfaces of the airplane, under average
weather conditions mentioned in the guideline table.
Note that any airplane which has been anti-iced can not receive a further coating of anti-ice
fluid on top of the existing film. In continuing precipitation, the original anti-icing coat will be
diluted at the end of the holdover time and refreezing could begin. In this case the airplane
must be de-iced and then anti-iced using either a one step or a two step process FCOM 3.04
(Adverse weather).

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Before commencement of spraying, a procedure must be carried out which minimizes the
ingress of de-icing fluid into the cabin. This procedure is listed in FCOM 3.04 (Adverse
weather).
It is recommended to wait 60 seconds after the completion of spraying before selecting APU
bleed ON. If engines were running during the spraying operation, they should be run up to
60% N1 for 10-15 seconds to eliminate any residual fluids. Note that a visual inspection of the
sprayed areas is essential before completing the technical log.
The minimum fuel temperature is -47°C, for JET A1, and slightly higher for other commonly
available fuels. If the fuel is colder than this, it may be possible to add warn fuel to raise its
temperature. The minimum oil temperature or pressure must be checked in FCOM 3.01.70.
When taxing in slush, delay flap extension until reaching the holding point ready for departure.
Do not use reverse thrust, even at idle (except in emergency ) as it may cause re-circulation of
snow covered areas, which can result in engine flame out or roll back. When engine anti-icing
is in use, ground idle thrust is increased and greater care must be taken on slippery surfaces.
When the engines have been cold soaked and to avoid thermal shock, they should be
operated at or near idle for a minimum of 5 minutes before take-off power is applied. (Time
spent taxiing may be included as part of this). Before take-off, the engines should be run at
50% N1 for 10 seconds to shed away ice that may have accumulated.
If moderate or severe turbulence is expected after take-off, place the engine start selector to
IGN. The use of weather radar for departure is outlined in FCOM 3.03.10 (SOPs – Taxi).
The engines are supplied with hot air from the pneumatic system to provide anti-icing and de-
icing. If the electrical supply fails, the valve remains open. External lights shine on wing
leading edge and engine intake enabling visual inspection of any ice build up. Wing anti icing
is provided for the outer portion of the wing leading edge and in the event of electrical power
supply failure, the valves close.
Use the criteria of visible moisture and temperature as the primary means for assessing when
to use the engine anti-icing system. Do not wait for ice to build up.
The use of engine anti-ice has a marked effect on the descent profile. The FMGS calculates
that anti-ice will be used for third of the descent and adjusts descent point accordingly.
However, if the anti-ice usage is prolonged, an increase in descent speed or a brake selection
may be required to remain on profile.
Landing distances for contaminated runways are given in FCOM 2.03.10. special notice should
be taken of the runway condition. A slippery runway is the most common reason for overrun
at landing. As far as possible, avoid landing on a contaminated runway with any significant
failure. Company regulations may prohibit landing on runways with particular braking actions.
Do not retract flaps after landing until after engine shutdown, and they have visually inspected
to be clear of ice, slush or other obstructions.
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If the airplane is to be left in conditions likely to produce a cold soak, follow the procedure for
securing the aircraft in FCOM 3.04 (Adverse Weather). In severe conditions, it may be
necessary to remove the APU battery. Even in quite mild conditions, it is advisable to drain the
water system to prevent freezing and possibility of split pipes. This procedure is given FCOM
3.04 (Adverse Weather).
Hot Weather & High Altitude Runway Operations
Maximum fuel temperature is +55°C, for most fuels (+49°C for JP4 and JET B). There are
additional altitude restrictions if the fuel (JP4 or JET B) is still warm when reaching cruising
altitude (FCOM 3.01 [Limitations]). The maximum brake temperature for take off is 300C,
and if the brakes are above this, the brake fans (if fitted) should be used to aid cooling. Both
fuel temperature and brake temperature are monitored by ECAM and the crew informed when
temperatures approach or exceed a limit.
The minimum flight crew oxygen requirement increases with increasing temperature (FCOM
3.01 [Limitations]).
If the aircraft has been parked for a prolonged period (in excess of six hours) in hot weather
and at high weight, “square wheel effect” may be noticed when taxiing.
It is prohibited to use conditioned air from packs and LP ground units simultaneously.
Performance will be noticeably worse in hot and high conditions, and care must be taken when
calculating MTOW, any thrust reduction and V1, VR & V2 speeds.
The SOPs and ABN & EMER procedures remain applicable for high altitude airfields. These
airfields are defined as being above 8000 ft and up to 12500 ft. This is towards the upper
limit of the environmental envelope and care must be taken when calculating performance.
Specific procedures regarding pressurization and hydraulics are contained in FCOM 2.04.30
(Special Operations – High Altitude Operation).
Demonstrates a clear knowledge of procedures and documentation associated with

adverse weather operations.
 Common Errors
Lack of knowledge of documentation and its location.

Poor knowledge of relevant procedures.

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3.22.2 Flight in Severe Turbulence :
To be aware of circumstances likely to give rise to severe turbulence.

To take the correct actions if severe turbulence is encountered.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 5.01 (Ops data)

FCOM 01.34.60 (Weather radar)
FCOM 03.04.91 (Flight in turbulence)
MAIN
Turbulence penetration speed/ mach, actions and handling consequences.
SECONDARY
Air mass characteristics leading to possible severe turbulence.

Use of documentation : temperature and wind gradient on computer flight plan.
The best advice is to avoid areas of severe turbulence either by use of the weather radar
(for thunderstorms etc), at the pre-flight planning (clear air turbulence forecast in met
briefing) or by a change of flight level if turbulence is reported by preceding aircraft inform
ATC.
For turbulence speeds refer QRH.

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Follow FCOM 3.04.34 (Supplementary Techniques – Navigation) for the use of the weather
radar and FCOM 3.04.91 (Supplementary Techniques – Adverse Weather) for procedures
should severe turbulence be encountered. Also refer to QRH 5.01 for speed and thrust
settings recommended for turbulence.
Cruise levels a close to maximum level should not be used when turbulence is anticipated,
as there will be much smaller margin between VMAX and VLS leading to the increased risk
of over speed warnings or activation of low speed protections.
Takes appropriate measures to avoid areas of known severe turbulence (altitude and /or
navigation adjustments).
Takes correct actions in the event of severe turbulence penetration.
 Common Errors
Late decision to apply turbulence procedures.

Partial application only of possible actions to reduce the effects of turbulence.
3.22.3 Windshear – Take-off Approach:
To recognize windshear and recover using techniques and guidance unique to Airbus fly-
by-wire aircraft.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:

FCOM 1.22.40 (Windshear detection)
FCOM 3.02.22 (Windshear)
FCOM 3.04.91 (Operation in windshear/ downburst conditions)

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MAIN
Ground speed mini computations.

Recovery actions when windshear/ microburst is identified or warning is triggered.
PFD indications (pitch and V/S )
FD commands ad stick handling implications.
Crew co-ordination and callouts.
Configuration requirements.
SECONDARY
Weather conditions and indications of possible windshear/ microburst.

Monitoring PFD and ND (Speed trend, Ground Speed, Wind).
Knowledge of flight control laws.
The best defense against a windshear encounter is to avoid it in the first place. Use your
knowledge and experience combined with weather reports to assess the possibility of
windshear and plan accordingly. If it is possible, delay take-off or landing, or plan a course
of action to avoid the worst of the weather. The use of the groundspeed mini function will
give added protection in strong winds.
The protection envelope is from lift-off to 1300 ft on take-off, and 1300 ft down to 50 ft for
landing. In both cases, at least CONF 1 must be selected. If windshear is suspected for
landing, use CONF 3 and VAPP should be increased to VLS +15 kts.
Aural and visual warnings are generated when the airplane‟s predicted energy level falls
below a predicted minimum energy threshold. This is expressed as a function of angle of
attack.
Know the indications and the correct response.
Apply full power and do not change configuration and follow SRS orders closely until well
clear of the windshear. When following SRS orders, be positive but smooth with your
actions on the side stick. Monitor V/S and pitch as together are good indicators of the
airplane‟s energy. If FDs are not available, target pitch attitude up to 12.5° may be used.
Full back stick is always available. This might trigger alpha floor.

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Is aware of conditions in which windshear can be expected.

Recognized windshear condition and immediately takes the required actions.
 Common Errors
Early symptoms disregarded.

Incorrect and/or late GO/NO GO decision.
Maximum thrust not used.
SRS bars not followed.
Configuration changed whilst still in windshear conditions.

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3.23 Performance
3.23.1 Flight Preparation Fuel Calculation:
To make correct calculation of fuel requirements.

To be aware specific company requirements regarding fuel minima.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC reference:
FCOM 2.05.10 to 60 (Flight planning)

FCOM 3.03.02 (Flight Preparation
MAIN
Weather briefing
Notams : destination and alternate.
Aircraft Status
Loading
Fuel calculation.
Flight Planning.
SECONDARY
Flight level effect (cruise level).

Weather effects : wind, anti-ice.
Minimum fuel requirements
Extra weight effects.
En route alternates (weather, notams).
Fuel tankering.

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One of the most important aspects of flight planning is the calculation of fuel requirements.
If no computer produced fuel plan is available, calculations can be made using the
information contained in FCOM 2.05.10 to 60 (Flight planning).
Other factors to be taken into considerations are:
Weather conditions at destination and alternate (more fuel required due to

holding/delays), and en-route requiring weather avoidance and anti-ice.
Notams affecting navigation equipment for the flight.
Aircraft status and if the MMEL/MEL indicates increased fuel consumption in particular
cases.
Expected passenger/ cargo load and distribution.
Whether the optimum flight level will be available (a level 4000 ft below optimum will
increase fuel burn by 5% and a level 8000 ft below optimum increases fuel burn by more
than 10%)
Note also that flight above the optimum flight level will increase fuel burn by up to 4%.
Fuel tanking requirements and its effect on fuel burn and optimum flight levels.
During preflight preparation a comparison should be made between the paper flight plan
and the FMGS calculated burn off. In order that the predictions are valid, the following
items must be inserted:
Initial cruise altitude in the INIT A page

Forecast winds and temperatures along the route in F-PLN B page
Expected steps in F-PLN A page
Block fuel in INIT B page
If the predictions show that there will be insufficient fuel at destination, a modification to
cruising flight level may help, or more fuel may have to be loaded.
Makes valid fuel requirements calculation and ensures correct quantity loaded before
engine start.
 Common Errors
Weak knowledge of national and company regulations for fuel minima and alternate
airports.

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3.23.2 Approach Speeds :
To determine the correct approach speed for normal and abnormal landing configurations.
To understand the “Ground Speed Mini Function”.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC reference:
QRH 2.20 to 2.24

QRH 4.01
FCOM 3.04.10 (Operating speeds definition)
FCOM 4 chapter 03 (MCDU Page Description)
FCOM 4 chapter 04 (VAPP determination)
MAIN
Minimum ground speed function

Normal approach speed
Approach speed for auto land
Approach speed in failure cases
SECONDARY
Landing distance increments in case of failures

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NORMAL CONFIGURATION
The VAPP displayed on the MCDU PERF APPR page is calculated using the following
formula:
VLS + 5kt
VAPP = the greater of or
VLS + 1/3 of the headwind (excluding gust) component
MAX 15kts
NOTES :
 VAPP is limited to VLS + 15 Kt

 Head wind component is computed from the wind inserted in the PERF
APPR page.
 VLS is the VLS of the landing configuration (3 or FULL) selected on the PERF
APPR page.
However the pilot may overwrite the VAPP according to the following formula:
VLS
or
VAPP = the greater of VLS + 5 kt*
or
VLS + wind correction
NOTES :
 The 5kt* correction is an airworthiness requirement for auto land with

A/THR, or approaches with A/THR active or ice accretion.
 Wind correction is 1/3 of headwind component of reported tower wind,
limited to 15kt. Use the reported steady wind not the gust.
 If downburst is expected add a maximum of 15kt to the MCDU displayed
VLS.
 When there is gusty crosswind greater than 20 kt, add 5kt to VAPP (VAPP
may now be up to VLS + 15 kt)
Approaches with one engine inoperative and overweight landings where CONF 3 is used
should be considered as normal approaches in terms of approach speed calculation. In
both these cases the CONF 3 prompt on the PERF APPR page should be pressed.
The VLS on the PERF APPR page will change to VLS CONF 3. VAPP should then be
determined in the normal manner and managed speed used for the approach.
For any ABNORMALITY REF QH for VAPP and LDG DIST calculation as directed by ECAM
STS PAGE (EG: LDG DIST procedures apply)

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GROUND SPEED MINI FUNCTION
This function will compute a VAPP target on approach in order to maintain a minimum
aircraft energy level. The minimum energy level is an FMGS computed minimum ground
speed (GS mini). This GS mini is not displayed to the crew but is used by the FMGS to
calculate the VAPP target on approach with managed speed. The relationship between
VAPP, GS mini and approach VAPP target is shown below.
VAPP = calculated in the manner described above and displayed or

overwritten on MCDU PERF APPR page.
GS mini = VAPP -- Tower headwind component.
The headwind is counted as a positive value with a minimum value of 10 kt. For example if
the headwind is less than 10 kt or there is a tailwind, GS mini = VAPP – 10 kt. The
headwind component calculation uses the FMGS landing runway.
IAS target = Maximum of VAPP

Or GS mini + Current Headwind Component
Current Headwind is counted positively and tailwind negatively.
The following extreme example should demonstrate how this function affects target
speed:
- Approach to Runway 15R

- Tower wind in PERF APPR page : 150°/30 kt
- VLS = 130 kt
From the first two formula above we get the following speeds:
- VAPP = 140 kt (130 KT + maximum of 5 kt or 1/3 of 30 kt)

- GS mini = 110 kt (140 kt – 30 kt)
Altitude Current wind GS mini VAPP IAS target

1500 ft 150°/ 60kt 110 kt 140 kt 170 kt
1000 ft 330°/10 kt 110 kt 140 kt 140 kt
500 ft 150°/60 kt 110 kt 140 kt 160 kt
Runway 150°/30 kt 110 kt 140 kt 140 kt

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The effect of this GS mini function as far as the pilot is concerned is that the VAPP target
(with managed speed) will vary, sometimes considerably, on approach depending on the
actual wind. It is recommended that all normal approaches be flown using managed
speed to take advantage of this function. When there are large variation in VAPP target the
use of A/THR will allow accurate speed control. In certain circumstances the VAPP target
may be greater than the CONF FULL limiting IAS, in which case it will be necessary to use
selected speed so that CONF FULL can be used.
ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION
When carrying out an approach in any abnormal slats/ flaps configuration it is

recommended that selected speed is used. The approach should be flown using the
configuration shown on ECAM and with the PERF APPR page CONF FULL prompt pushed.
VLS, if visible, will always be accurate as the value is derived from the actual flap and slat
position not he Flap lever position.
There are two cases to consider :
VLS is displayed on the PFD – in this VAPP is the indicated VLS unless a VLS
increment is required by ECAM. In this case VAPP is VLS + increment. Use
selected speed.
VLS is not displayed on the PFD – in this case VAPP is calculated by adding an
approach speed increment from QRH VREF CONF FULL, and applying any
wind correction. The formula used in QRH chapter 2 should be used. Use
selected speed.
Notes :
VREF is VREF FULL from MCDU PERF page or QRH.

CONF CORRECTION is determined from QRH chapter 2
WIND CORRECTION is 1/3 headwind component
If CONF CORRECTION is 20 kt or greater do not apply WIND CORRECTION
If CONF CORRECTION is less than 20 kt then CONF CORRECTION + WIND
CORRECTION should be limited to 20 kt.
See QRH chapter 2 (Abnormal Procedures) for how to determine approach speed when
there are multiple failures. Remember, use selected speed in abnormal or emergency
configurations.
Landing distance increments are necessary because of increased approach speeds, braking
malfunctions or unserviceability of some ground spoilers. The increments to be used and
how to apply them are detailed in QRH chapter 2.

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Correctly calculates approach speed

Understands logic of Mini ground speed function
Correctly applies landing distance increments when required.
 Common Errors
Confusion over wind correction.

Not using selected speed when appropriate.
3.23.3 Contaminated Runways :
To be aware of circumstances defined as “special operations”.

To locate and use the appropriate documentation.
To be able to compute Take-off and/or landing parameters.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 4.03 (Ops data).

FCOM 2.03.10 (Landing Performance).
FCOM 2.03.20 (Use of autobrake).
FCOM 2.04.10 (Fluid contaminated runway)
MAIN
Aircraft operational requirement.

Runway contaminant definitions.
Use of charts.
Specific limitations (Crosswind….)
Specific operations for Taxi and Take-off.
Landing operations.

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SECONDARY
Wet runways.
The information required for operations from contaminated runways is contained in FCOM
2.04.10 (Special Operations – Fluid Contaminated Runway), including definitions of terms
used in the fluid contaminated runway performance. When operating from a damp runway
there is no performance penalty. The safest policy, if possible, is to delay departure until
the runway has been cleared to an acceptable standard.
Do not take off on an icy runway. (FCOM 2.04.10 [Special Operations – Definitions])
When contaminated runway operations are anticipated, it will be necessary to take extra
time in flight planning, and to bear in mind that runway conditions can change rapidly,
thereby necessitating a recalculation of take-off data.
It is vital that the correct chart is used for the calculation of the data. All retardation
devices (antiskid, spoilers and reverse thrust) must be fully serviceable when operating
from contaminated runways. There are additional crosswind limits to be considered (FCOM
2.04.10 [Special Operators – Fluid Contaminated Runway])
When a runway is contaminated it may also be necessary to use de-icing fluids and apply
procedures for winter operations (see briefing note on cold weather operations).
Note that a FLEX power take-off is not permissible from a contaminated runway. It is
SriLankan Airlines policy that maximum power is used for take-off from a contaminated
runway.
If APU bleed is to be used e.g. packs on take-off, wing anti-ice must not be used.
When taxiing, avoid high thrust settings and taxi at low speed. The anti-skid does not
operate at low speeds, so allow sufficient room for turning and stopping. Do not select
flap until at the holding point and ready for departure.
Carrying out an RTO, even at low speeds, on a contaminated runway may cause
directional control difficulties. Ensure that the take off briefing is modified to take account
of runway conditions. Directional control during the take off roll should be maintained with
rudder. Do not attempt to get nose wheel airborne before VR to avoid spray as this would
increase aerodynamic drag. Complete the take off in the normal manner.
Landing performance and recommendations are contained in FCOM 2.03.10 (Landing

Performance – Landing) and should be studied if the destination airfield runway is forecast
to be contaminated or icy.

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Landing on contaminated runways without anti-skid should be avoided. A positive

touchdown is recommended, without a prolonged flare. Do not hold the nose off the
ground and select maximum reverse thrust as soon as possible. If necessary, max reverse
can be maintained until the airplane is fully stopped. Be aware that visibility may be
impaired by blowing snow if reverse thrust is kept to a low speed.
On completion of the landing roll, do not retract flaps. Taxi in and shut down as normal,
and after a visual inspection of the flaps/ slats, they may be selected up. This is to reduce
the possibility of damage to the flaps occurring due to any contaminated accretion. Special
procedures for securing the aircraft are discussed in the cold weather-briefing note.
Correct application of Special Operations requirements.

Ensures crew crosscheck of calculated data.
 Common Errors
Use of inappropriate charts.

Lack of parameters cross-check.
Take-off data not updated in case of unexpected change in runway status.
3.23.4 Climb and Descent:
To be aware of aircraft climb performance (CFIT).

To be aware of aircraft descent performance.
To make full use of FMGS capabilities (constraints……)
 Schedule
 Equipment
FMGS Freeplay trainer
DOC references:
QRH Chapter 4.
FCOM 3.05.10/30
FCOM Bulletin – A340 Performance

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MAIN
Aircraft climb gradient according to weight.

Verification of top of descent point.
Control of aircraft descent profile.
Use of PROG Page.
Use of PERF Page.
Approach planning.
SECONDARY
Use of FMGS constrains for planning.

Knowledge of descent/ deceleration performance.
CLIMB
In the managed climb, the aircraft climbs with thrust levers set at the climb gate, producing
climb thrust, maintaining a speed/ Mach number computed dependant on the cost index. The
higher the cost index, the higher the speed. Speed control is via elevator and will give varying
rates of climb to maintain a set speed.
A similar situation is true in OPEN CLB.
Selected speed may be used to increase/ decrease climb rate, with thrust remaining at climb
power.
Be careful when leaving an altitude and selecting climb, that you allow the aircraft to begin
climbing with power before selecting a lower speed than target, or the aircraft may reduce
power initially to follow speed rather than beginning the climb. At all times, the aircraft will try
to maintain speed, thus if a lower speed is selected too quickly, thrust will be reduced to
achieve this.
If a set rate of climb is required, V/S mode may be used. Be very careful to watch the speed if
high rates of climb are selected. Thrust will vary to maintain the speed and V/S. However, if
V/S is too great, speed will begin to decay, and care must be taken not to end up in a slow
speed, low energy situation, despite having full climb thrust.
If a low V/S is specified, thrust will vary to maintain both climb rate and the chosen speed.

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On the ND, the top of climb point is displayed and can be monitored to comply with ATC or
other requirements. This point will be the level off point of the current selected altitude. The
FMGS however, will always give the top of climb point of the altitude specified in the F-PLN
(shown on PROG page). Also useful is the PERF page, which will give predictions to the
selected altitude.
DESCENT
The descent may be in OPEN DES mode, managed DES mode or V/S.
In DES mode, the aircraft will calculate an ideal profile and will try to fly it. Its progress can
be monitored on the PROG and PERF pages. Speed varies to match the required descent path.
In OPEN DES, the thrust is at idle and a set speed is flown. Again, progress can be monitored
on both PROG and PERF page.
In step descent, the thrust is idle and the managed speed target is just short of Vmo/Mmo.
Very high rates of descent can be achieved and careful monitoring is vital. Mentally checking
that the aircraft will arrive at is descent windows is useful so that the approach is not rushed,
nor fuel burned needlessly.
Has sound knowledge of aircraft performance.

Demonstrates understanding of FMGS capabilities and limitations.
 Common Errors
No cross check of descent profile.

No anticipation of possible navigation changes (DIR to, HDG……..)
3.23.5 Preflight Planning for one Engine Out:
To correctly use appropriate FCOM information.

To choose the appropriate strategy.
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 404 – 07
FCOM 3.06 (Single engine operations)
FCOM 4.04.30 (Engines out in cruise phase)
FCOM 4.05.50 (Engine failure in cruise).
MAIN
Gross ceiling.
Standard strategy in cruise.
Obstacle strategy in cruise.
Descent.
Holding.
SECONDARY
Effects of bleeds.
Effects of temperature.
This supplementary information will deal with the pre-flight planning and in flight performance
determination following an engine failure. Procedures for dealing with an engine failure in the
cruise and landing on one engine are dealt with in the abnormal operations sections of this
manual.
At the pre-flight planning stage, should the flight be over mountainous terrain, then it is
important to consider the calculation of a point of no return (PNR) and aircraft net flight path.
This is detailed in FCOM 2.04.35 (Special Operations – Flight Over Mountainous Area) and the
aircraft flight manual.
Performance for the three strategies of standard strategy (no obstacles), obstacle strategy is
detailed in FCOM 3.06. In flight gross ceiling at drift down speed and at long range cruise
speed can be determined from QRH 4.04. Also gross flight path at drift down speed, fuel
consumption at long range cruise speed and quick check of fuel and time to landing are
available in QRH 4.05 to 4.07. These tables are very useful but require a little bit of studying in
order to fully appreciate the information contained in them.

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Demonstrates good knowledge of documentation.

Makes valid use of information.
 Common Errors
Not disconnecting ATHR following engine failure in the cruise.

Misreading QRH tables.
Lack of proper planning.

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3.24 Flight Control - Flight Characteristics
To handle the aircraft using basic skills without FD and A/THR.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 1.22.30 (Auto Flight)

FCOM 1.27 (Flight Controls)
FCOM 3.02.80 (Flight with unreliable speed indication)
FCOM 3.04.27(Flight Controls)
MAIN
Flight path stability

Pitch attitude/ Power setting characteristics
SECONDARY
Pitch attitude/ Power setting for all flight phases.
This briefing will provide an overview of the flight control laws on the fly by wire aircraft and
the protections provided to the pilot. It will not provide a full description of the flight control
system which is available in FCOM 1.27 (Flight Controls) and excellent guide to the flight
control laws is provided in FCOM 304.29 (Supplementary Techniques – Flight Controls).
The aircraft can be flown in normal law, alternate law (1 and 2) (A330, A340), direct law and
mechanical back up.

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NORMAL LAW
There are three modes of normal law; ground mode, flight mode and flare mode.
Ground Mode
Direct control of elevator, spoiler, ailerons and rudder. This is progressively blended out
when airborne so that flight mode becomes effective.
Flight Mode
Side-stick movement in the pitch axis commands a change in “g”. Zero displacement is a
positive command for 1g flight. 1g flight means no change in flight path. So once the
correct flight path has been established, in the short term it will be maintained, despite any
changes to thrust or speed. Hence there is no need to trim.
Sides-stick movement in the roll axis commands a given rate of roll. Zero displacement is
positive command for zero roll rate flight. Once the required bank angle has been
established, release the side-stick to neutral and it will be maintained.
Resist the temptation to “over control” the aircraft. Make a small input then gently release
to neutral and leave the stick alone unless a further adjustment is required. All turns may
require some side-stick and power adjustments.
Flare mode (A330,A340)
A change in pitch control below 100 ft only, requiring a gentle pull on the side stick during
the flare in order to maintain a progressive flare.
Flare mode (A320)
A change in pitch control below 50 ft only, requiring a gentle pull on the sidestick during
flare in order to maintain a progressive flare.
Protections
Full flight envelope protection is provided in normal law using the following individual
protections.
Load factor limitation

Attitude protection (Pitch and Bank)
High angle of attack protection (between VPROT and VMAX the sidestick demands angle of
attack up to MAX and the aircraft does not stall)
High speed protection.

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ALTERNATE LAW
Depending on the particular failure that causes the degrading of the flight control laws, ECAM
will indicate whether Alternate Law with or without protections is active. The indications will
be ALTN LAW (=Alternate Law 1) or ALTN LAW : PROT LOST (=Alternate Law 2). The main
differences between two laws and normal law are detailed below.
Alternate Law 1:
In alternate law 1 pitch control is similar to normal law with some changes in the protections
available. Auto trim is still available.
Roll control is the same as direct law with the sidestick demanding roll rate.
Protections:
Load factor limitation…………………………………………………………………… same as normal law

Pitch attitude protection……………………………………………………………… not provided
High angle of attack protection ………………………………………………………Changed to low speed
Stability (PFD display
Also Changes, VSW is
shown and stall warning
is provided)
High speed protection…………………………………………………………………… changed to alternate
high speed stability
Bank angle protection…………………………………………………………………… same as normal law
Alternate Law 2:
In alternate law 2 pitch c control is similar to normal law with some changes in the protections
available. Auto trim is still available.
Roll control is the same direct law with the sidestick demanding aileron deflection rather than
roll rate.
Yaw authority is reduced.
Protections:
Load factor limitation…………………………………………………………………… same as normal law

Pitch attitude protection………………………………………………………………… Not provided
High angle of attack protection……………………………………………………… lost-changed to low
Speed Stability
High Speed protection………………………………………………………………….. lost-changed to high
speed stability
bank angle protection…………………………………………………………………... not provided

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DIRECT LAW
ECAM will indicate to the crew when direct law is the active flight control law and USE MAN
PITCH TRIM will displayed on the PFD as a reminder.
In direct law, the sidestick is coupled directly to the controls, without any stabilization
feedback. In effect, it becomes like a conventional aircraft. Manual pitch trim must be used.
No protections are available.
LAW
ALTERNATE 1 ALTERNATE 2 ALTERNATE 3

PITCH Alternate Alternate Direct
Roll direct/ Yaw Roll direct/ Yaw
LATERAL Normal
alternate alternate
PROTECTIONS:
Load factor Yes Yes Lost
Pitch attitude Lost Lost Lost
High alpha Alternate Lost Lost
High speed Alternate Lost Lost
Bank angle Yes Lost Lost
Auto Pilot Lost* Lost* Lost
* May be available depending on the particular failure
MECHANICAL BACK-UP
In the unlikely event of certain multiple failures, pitch trim and rudder can be used to control
the aircraft by mechanically controlling the associated hydraulic motors. If it is necessary to
use the pitch trim wheel to control the aircraft in pitch, MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY will be
displayed in red on the PFD. There is no turn co-ordination and no protections are operative
however dutch roll damping is provided by the back up roll damping is provided by the back
up yaw damper unit (BYDU).
ALPHA FLOOR
Alpha floor is an autothrust mode, however it is also a part of the flight envelope protection. at
high angles of attack TOGA thrust is commanded by the autothrust system. Alpha floor is
available from lift off until 100 ft RA on approach. It provides protection against stall and
windshear and has priority over all other protections. (FCOM 1.27.20 & 1.22.40). Alpha floor is
only available in normal law. It is inhibited in some cases (FCOM 1 chapter 27).

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LOW ENERGY WARNING
In normal law, a warning is included to alert the pilot to a low energy situation. It is not a
protection, and occurs before ALPHA floor operates (FCOM 1.27.40 [Auto Flight – Flight
Augmentation]). This warning is only available below 2000 ft radio altitude and in CONF 2,3
or FULL.
ALPHA LOCK
This protection prevents the retraction of flap from CONF 1 to zero, if speed is too low or AOA
is too high (FCOM 1.27.50 [Flight Controls – Flaps and Slats]).
AUTOMATIC RETRACTION SYSTEM (A330/A340)
When accelerating through 200 kt with CONF 1 +F selected (A330/A340), 210 kts (A320), the
flaps will automatically retract, well before VFE of 215 kt. Flaps will not automatically re-
extend if speed drops below 200 kt (FCOM 1 Chapter 27).
MANUEUVER LOAD ALLEVIATION
In normal and alternate laws only, maneuver load alleviation (MAL) is available to reduce wing
bending moments (FCOM 1.27.20)
FLAP LOAD RELIEF SYSTEM (A330 / A340)
This is only available in CONF 2, 3 or FULL and retracts the flaps by only one stage if IAS
exceeds VFE +2.5 kt. Flaps will be extended to the selected position when speed is reduced
below VFE-5kt (FCOM 1.27.50)
Safe, accurate and confident handling.

In normal and alternate laws, maintains heading +/-5°, height+/-100 ft and speed +/-10
kt.
In direct law maintains heading +/-10°, height +/-200 ft and speed within +/- 15 kt.
 Common Errors
Basic scan too slow.

Excessive control inputs (including thrust)

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3.25 Flight Director Mode
Revisions
To understand the various guidance modes and flight director reversions.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:

FCOM 4.02.30 (Flight Guidance Principles)
MAIN
FMA annunciations
Crew co-ordination
Reason for reversion modes
SECONDARY
Flight Guidance Principles

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Reversion Due to FCU Altitude Change
This reversion is caused when there is pilot action on the ALT selector knob while the aircraft
is climbing or descending. It applies equally whether the aircraft is being hand flown or if the
autopilot is engaged.
CONDITION EVENT CONSEQUENCE

OP CLB engaged, CLB FCU selected V/S – FPA engages on
engaged ALT set below a/c altitude current V/S – FPA*
OP DES engaged, DES FCU selected V/S – FPA engages on
engaged ALT set above a/c altitude current V/S – FPA*
FCU selected ALT V/S – FPA engages on
ALT* active
Modification (>250 ft) current V/S – FPA*
Reversion Due to Loss of NAV Mode
This reversion is caused by loss of NAV mode, for example selecting a HDG, or when entering
a discontinuity. Again, this applies whether the aircraft is being hand flown or through the
autopilot.

Loss of the lateral managed
CLB engaged OP CLB engages*
mode : NAV
Loss of the lateral managed
DES engaged V/S engages*
mode : NAV
* On airplane equipped with new STD of FMGS (L7) DMC (V510) and FWC (K3), a triple click
will be triggered 5” after the reversion.

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Reversion When FD orders are not Followed
These reversions occur when the aircraft is in manual fight and the pilot fails to follow the FD
bars.

Automatic engagement of
FD engaged
SPD mode on A/THR FD bars
AP Off
When a/c speed = VLS are removed. Thrust is
A/THR active (IDLE thrust)
increased, speed target is
DES, OP DES engaged
regained.
When a/c speed = VMAX* Automatic engagement of
FD engaged [*VMAX = VMO/MMO when SPD mode on A/THR, and FD
AP Off in clean configuration bars are removed.
A/THR active (CL thrust) Other conf: VMAX = VFE, Thrust is decreased, speed
CLB or OP CLB engaged VLE whichever is applicable] target is regained.
The reversions with autopilot engaged can be demonstrated using the FMGS Freeplay Trainer.
Reversions are recongnized by monitoring the FMA
Demonstrates a thorough knowledge and understanding of flight guidance and the various
reversion modes.
 Common Errors
Lack of appreciation of flight guidance reversions.

Incorrect procedure following reversions.

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3.26 Use of Track/FPA/ FPV/ FPD
To understand the philosophy of the FPV and FPD.

To correctly interpret the information given by the FPV.
Uses FPV to achieve desired flight path.
 Schedule
 Equipment
FMS Freeplay Trainer
DOC references:
FCOM 1.22.10 (FCU)

FCOM 1.22.30 (FPD)
FCOM 1.31.40 (PFD)
FCOM 3.04.31 (Use of FPV)
MAIN
Use of HDG/ VS – TRK-FPA pushbutton and associated FCU indications, FMA modes and
PFD/ND changes.
Differences in trajectory between HDG and TRK, VS and FPA.
Information provided by FPV (lateral and vertical).
How to follow PFD demands in manual flight.
SECONDARY
Caution regarding use of FPV during go around.

Use of FPV and selected TRK index to maintain a radial or an approach course in raw data.

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When selecting HDG/VS – TRK/FPA push-button, note the changes on FCU, FMA modes
nad ND/PFD displays.
FPD is commanding a trajectory. If followed it will give a required trajectory that is

stabilized by reference to the ground. FPV is an indicator of performance, and is not itself a
director or a command.
However it is very useful in a non-precision approach. HDG/VS on the other hand is

referenced to the air mass.
The FPV shows the present lateral track and present flight path angle relative to you. It is
dynamic and indicates where we will be if all else remains the same. If any changes are
introduced, the FPV will show the result of these changes. There is a slight lag in
response.
Great care must be taken to remember which mode is in operation, especially in

differentiating between VS (i.e. feet per minute) and FPA (an angle relative to the ground).
This is determined by monitoring the FMA.
When flying a go-around, remember to use the aircraft attitude as the primary reference.
It should be noted that when using FPV, the aircraft attitude symbol is dimmed. The use
of the FPV is not recommended for high dynamic maneuvers such as take-off and go-
around.
The FPV, managed speed target on approach and the speed trend are efficient indications
to the crew of wind variation and windshear.
The accuracy of the FPV is directly lined to the accuracy of the IRS speeds. For example,
an error of 5 kt in ground speed may cause an error of up to 2.5° in track on the approach.
Therefore, during even short turnarounds, it is recommended to realign the IRS when
ground speed reaches 5 kt.
Wings level, change of FD mode gives current TRK on current HDG.

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The diagram illustrates the relationship between : heading and track – pitch attitude and
FPA.
Green drift diamond showing actual track
Makes correct selection of FPV, with FPD as appropriate, and used the information
provided to achieve the desired flight path.
 Common Errors
Information provided by FPV not understood (e.g. relationship between heading and
track).
Confusion between FPV and pitch angle required (e.g. during go around).

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ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS – A320
Page 1
CHAPTER - 04

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4.1 Operating Techniques …………………………………………………………………………………… 3
4.1.1 Rejected Take- Off………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

4.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire After V1……………………………………………..…………………………………. 5
4.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 19
4.3.1 All Engine Generator Fault…………………….………………………………………………………………… 19
4.4 Smoke ………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………. 22
4.5 Flight Controls ………………………………….……………………………………………………………….. 26
4.5.1 Abnormal Flaps/Slats Configuration……………………………………………………..………………….. 26

4.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall………………..………………………. 29
4.6 Dual Hydraulic Failure.……………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
4.7 ECAM …………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………….. 35
4.7.1 Philosophy and Normal use……………………………………………………………………………………….35

4.7.2 Use in case of Failure……………………………………………………………………………………………… 38
4.8 Navigation…………………………………………….……………………………..…………………………….. 43
4.8.1 IRS/ADR Failure……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 43

4.8.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure…………………………………………………………………………………….. 45
4.9 Power Plant……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
4.9.1 Engine Failure in cruise…………………………………………………………………………………………… 47

4.9.2 Engine Relight in flight……………………………………………………………………………………………. 51
4.9.3 All Engine Flame out……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53
4.9.4 Thrust Lever Disagree/Fault……………………………………………………………………………………… 55
4.9.5 Engine Abnormal Starts……………………………………………………………………………………………. 57
4.9.6 Engine Tailpipe Fire…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 59
4.10 Emergency Descent ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 61

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4.1 Operating Techniques
4.1.1 Rejected Take-off
To recognize circumstances requiring a RTO.

To take correct actions in the event of RTO.
 Schedule
Briefing duration : 15 minutes + 45 minutes for video
 Equipment
DOC references :
FCOM 3.02.10 (RTO Procedure)
MAIN
• Failure identification (crew communication)

• Decision and call out (STOP, GO and V1)
• Deceleration actions and control.
• Task sharing.
• ECAM actions (if appropriate)
• Notify ATC.
SECONDARY
• Review of non inhibited warning.

• Complementary actions and check-list.
• Specific engine fire on ground check list.
• Decision with tire problems or windshear.
The action of rejecting a take-off can be hazardous, and the time available to make the
correct decision is limited. To assist with this, the ECAM inhibits warnings which are not of
paramount importance between 80kts and, 1500ft or 2 minutes after lift off, whichever
occurs first. Therefore, any warning received in this period should be carefully considered.
To assist decision making, the take-off is divided into low and high speed regimes.

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100kt is chosen as the dividing line. There is no significance to 100kts merely that it divides
the take-off phase into low and high speed phases.
- Below 100kt, it is possible to reject for any reason.

- Above 100kt, and approaching V1, be “go-minded” unless major failures or
ECAM warnings occur.
- Once above V1, the take-off must be continued as it may be impossible to
stop the aircraft on the runway remaining.
Remember to bring the airplane to a complete stop, not slowed, and then stopped. Set
the Parking Brake. When the airplane has been stopped, identify/confirm the failure.
When evacuation is considered, use the ON GROUND EMER/EVAC check list. There is
sometimes confusion between the use of the ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION checklist
and the ENG FIRE ON ECAM procedure. The ENG FIRE ON GROUND procedure includes
the possibility of emergency evacuation. But it does not list in detail the items associated
with the evacuation as is done in the ON GROUND/EMER EVACUATION C/L ie Δp, cabin
crew notify etc.
Use ATC, fire service and cabin staff to gain as much information as possible to assist in
making a decision on whether to evacuate or not. Remember that the simplest way to
confirm an engine fire, on the ground, is to open the cockpit window and look out.
If no evacuation is necessary, make a PA to cabin crew, saying “CABIN CREW AND

PASSENGERS REMAIN SEATED”. This is vital to ensure that there is no undesirable
reaction from the crew or passengers. Clear the runway if possible when it is safe to do
so. Brief the purser and make a PA to the passengers.
• Makes appropriate decision before V1.

• Carries out correct actions to ensure a safe stop on runway centerline.
 Common Errors
• Disarming of auto brake due to instinctive manual braking.

• ATC and/or cabin crew not informed.
• Reversers remain engaged after aircraft stop.
• Omitting selection of parking brake on.
• Non adherence of task-sharing during emergency procedure.
• Confusion over use of ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION.
• Inability to use mechanical seat controls.

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4.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire after V1
• To recognize Engine failure and/or fire warning.

• Take correct actions and maintain a safe trajectory.
• To perform correct engine fail or fire procedure after V1.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
• QRH chapter 2 (Engine stall – Overweight landing)

• FCOM 1.27.20 (Sideslip target)
• FCOM 3.02.10 (Operating techniques)
• FCOM 3.02.26 (Engine fire)
• FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine fail)
• FCOM 3.04.27 (Abnormal ops engine failure)
• FCOM 3.04.70 (Engine failure)
• FCOM 4.04.30 (EOSID) if applicable.
• FCOM 4.05.30 (Engine out procedure)
 Instructors actions
MAIN
• GO/STOP decision making

• Aircraft control on the ground and at rotation
• Roll control, sideslip target and “fly by wire” characteristics.
• Pitch attitude and speed control.
• Specific task sharing procedures.
• Confirmation of non-reversible or guarded items with ECAM action.
• Engine-out profile and managed speed logic.
SECONDARY
• A/P engagement/rudder trim.

• EOSID activation.
• Availability and use of TOGA.
• FD roll limit below green dot speed.
• EO CLR prompt.
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 Trainee’s actions
A) Engine failure
After detecting an engine failure, PNF is to call “engine failure” without identifying which
engine has failed.
TOGA power is available, but should only be applied when required by PF. This is because
the increase in power may cause directional control difficulties when at light weights and
low speeds close to VMCG (in particular above 100kt, after inhibition of NW steering)
PF should maintain runway centerline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD
yaw bar (if available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5° nose up and centralize blue …….
target (see below for explanatory note) with rudder. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor
speed trend arrow (minimum speed V2) until SRS has stabilized. The change over from
yellow side slip index to blue ….. target may not occur instantaneously. Use rudder trim to
neutralize rudder pedal pressure. When a positive climb has been achieved, call for
retraction of the gear. Use the autopilot if it is available.
PNF should closely monitor the aircraft‟s flight path, cancel warnings and identify the
failure when appropriate. Note when a positive climb has been established an announced
accordingly. Retract gear on command.
Once well clear of the ground, minimum 400ft, the ECAM actions may be started. It is not
necessary to rush into doing the ECAM drills and 400ft is the MINIMUM altitude at which
commencement of ECAM drills should be considered. The priority is to ensure that the
aircraft is climbing, stabilized and is flying in a safe direction. Do not get too distracted
with the ECAM. Furthermore, ECAM actions may be interrupted when necessary to allow
both pilots to monitor level-off, configuration changes etc.
It is important to determine whether the engine has suffered a flameout or has structural
damage. The action of putting the start switch to ignition confirms the relight attempt
being made by the FADEC. If a flameout has occurred, then a relight (QRH chapter 2)
may be considered at a later stage when aircraft has been cleaned up and a safe flight
path is established and after the “After take off” checklist is carried out. After the clarify
engine relight attempt (at status page if unsuccessful or normal operation if successful).
There must be no movement of thrust lever, master switch or fire pb without positive
confirmation from both pilots.

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CLIMB AFTER LIFT-OFF
ICAO Take-off flight path area
SriLankan Airlines use the ICAO take-off flight path area that identifies the area of
accountability for engine inoperative take-offs. Many common terms are used to identify
the flight path area. They include zone, splay, corridor, funnel and cone. The FAA
accountability area is considerably narrower than the ICAO standard. All the following
refer to the ICAO standard.
Straight Departure
A straight departure is one in which the initial departure track is within 15° of the
alignment of the runway center line.
Track guidance may be provided by a suitably located facility (VOR or NDB) or by RNAV.
Area for straight departure with track guidance.

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Turning Departure
When a departure route requires a turn of more than 15º a turning area is constructed.
Turns may be specified at an altitude/height, at a fix, and at a facility. Straight flight is
assumed until reaching an altitude/height of at least 120m (394ft), above the elevation of
the departure end of runway. No provision is made in this document for turning
departures requiring a turn below 120m (394ft), above the elevation of the departure end
of runway (DER), where the location and/or height of obstacles precludes the construction
of turning departures which satisfy the minimum turn height criterion. Departure
procedures should be developed on a local basis in consultation with the operators
concerned.
Turn areas at a facility or DME distance are constructed in the same manner, and using the
same parameters as for the missed approach, except that the speeds employed are the
final missed approach speeds increased by 10 per cent to account for increased aeroplane
mass in departure see below. In exceptional cases, where acceptable terrain clearances
cannot otherwise be provided, turning departure routes are constructed with maximum
speeds as low as the intermediate missed approach speed increased by 10 per cent, in
such cases the procedure is annotated with a cautionary note.

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Maximum speeds for Turning Departures.
Aero plane Category Maximum Speed km/h (kt)

A 225 (120)
B 305 (165)
C 490 (265)
D 540 (290)
E 560 (300)
B) Engine Fire
Should an engine fire develop, follow the general series of actions previously described.
However, the ECAM drill should be commenced as soon as practicable (though not below
400ft) be aware that the engine may still be developing a significant amount of thrust until
the engine master switch is placed to off.
Considerer the use of autopilot to reduce workload. The ECAM will count down the
seconds to initial agent discharge and the time period between discharges.
Do not attempt to restart an engine which has been shut down due to fire.
The ECAM notes that a landing should be carried out as soon as possible. Bear in mind the
prevailing weather conditions, but an engine fire, which will not extinguish is a very serious
matter.
Following engine shutdown, consider all affected systems and their impact on the approach
and landing.
C) ECAM Procedure
ECAM procedures should be started not below 400ft. At this height, only immediate
actions to secure an engine should be carried out as shown below. ECAM actions may be
interrupted at any stage for the PNF to assist PF (e.g. flap retraction). Do not allow ECAM
actions to interfere with monitoring of the flight path.
Whenever stopped, ECAM procedures should be recommenced as soon as possible.

Complete ECAM until STATUS page appears then carry out the after take-off C/L before
reading STATUS.
D) FMGS Procedures
The two FMGS procedures which are worthy of note are the use of the EOSID prompt and
EO CLR prompt. The in depth explanation of both these functions are contained in FCOM
4.04.30 (How to Use – Other Functions)

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The use of EOSID routing is dependent on there being an EOSID defined in the database
for that particular runway. If an engine failure occurs before the point at which the EOSID
differs from the planned SID (DP : Diversion point) then the EOSID will appear as a TMPY
F-PLN. To follow the EOSID all the crew has to do is to insert this as the active F-PLAN.
Therefore the first leg of the active F/PLN should be a common leg in database.
If the engine failure occurs beyond the point at which the two SIDs differ there will be no
TMPY F-PLN created although the EOSID will be shown in yellow on the ND. To follow an
EOSID in this case the crew can perform a DIR TO one of the EOSID waypoints and then
modify the F-PLN or, more simply follow the EOSID, which is displayed as a yellow line on
the ND, using HDG mode.
When an engine failure is detected the FMGS procedures, predictions are based on single
engine performance. Additionally the bank angle commanded by the FD is limited to 15
when speed is below maneuvering speed of the current configuration (F,S,O). The EO CLR
prompt on the active PERF page returns the FMGS predictions to 2 engine predictions and
removes this bank angle limit.
The EO CLR prompt should be pressed ONLY in the event of a successful relight on a failed
engine or in the event of wrong detection or FADEC fault. Holding may be performed in
managed NAV, if speed is selected and is just greater then Green Dot Speed. This will
ensure the aircraft stays within the protected holding area. Appropriate action should be
taken, if any speed – and/or bank variation occur.
E) One Engine out Approach and Landing
If an engine failure/fire has occurred on take-off, the overweight landing checklist may be
required (QRH chapter 2).
Auto land (CAT 3 SINGLE) is available on one engine (as shown on ECAM).
Maximum use should be made of the autopilot to reduce crew work load. In manual flight
an engine out landing is essentially conventional. Good trimming is beneficial in keeping
the indication centered. Consider the use of manual thrust when the autopilot is off, as it
is easier to anticipate and coordinate rudder and trim inputs as and when the thrust varies.
The approach should be carried out in CONF 3 as directed by ECAM (config. Full on A320).
Do not select the landing gear down too early, the power requirement for level flight at
hot/high altitude airports and/or high weight will be large.
Rudder trim may be reset to zero on short finals at 500, to make the landing run easier.
Refer to QRH for Vapp & landing distance calculations.

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F) One Engine out Go-around
The go-around is essentially the same as on 2 engines, the pitch target is now 12 5. Apply
rudder to compensate for the increase in thrust and keep the β target centered. FMA will
indicate GA TRK, BEAR IN MIND aircraft navigation with respect to terrain.
Flap retraction and acceleration will take place in level flight at EO acceleration altitude
(when ALT ph pressed). As this is go-around, the target speed is the memorized approach
speed or the speed at engagement of go-around, becoming green dot at acceleration
altitude.
G) β Target
The side slip indicator (yellow) gives the same indications as traditional slip ball. The β
Target (blue) replaces the side slip indicator on the PFD when there is engine power
asymmetry and CONF 1, 2 or 3 is set (see FCOM 1.27.20 (Flight Controls – Normal law).
When the β target is centered total drag is minimized even through there is a small
amount of side slip.
The calculation of β target is trade off between drag produced by deflection of control
surfaces, and airframe drag produced by a slight side slip. Centering the β target produces
less total drag than centering a traditional ball as ruder deflection, aileron deflection,
spoiler deployment and aircraft body angle are all taken into in count.
• Makes correct decision to continue the take-off.

• Ensures minimum deviation from runway centerline.
• Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and β target centered.
• Accurately follows flight director and ensures correct FCU selections.
• Maintains speed, V2+5 kt/-0kt during second segment.
• Adheres to engine-out vertical profile maintaining acceleration altitude +200 ft/-0ft.
• Follows EOSID, emergency turn procedures, ATC instructions or required heading
+/-10.
• Respects task sharing.
 Common Errors
• Over rotation to high pitch attitude on takeoff.

• β target not fully centered.
• Non-reversible ECAM actions carried out without proper crew confirmation.
• SID, EOSID or ATC instructions not accurately followed.
• Poor maintenance and monitoring of required track.
• Lack of task sharing discipline during manual flight (FCU actions)
• Not trimming the rudder.
• Not rotating to the correct pitch attitude on go-around.
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4.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on Fly-By-Wire
• To recognize engine failure/or fire warning.

• Take correct actions to maintain a safe trajectory.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 2.18 (Engine stall)
FCOM 1.27.20 (Sideslip target)
FCOM 1.31.40 (Side slip Index)
FCOM 3.02.10 (Operating techniques)
FCOM 3.02.26 (Engine Fire)
FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine Fire)
FCOM 4.05.30 (Engine Out Procedure)
MAIN
Roll control, sideslip target and “Fly by Wire” characteristics.

Pitch attitude and speed control.
SECONDARY
A/P engagement/Rudder trim.

Availability and use of TOGA.
THEORY OF ASYMMETRIC FLIGHT
Engine Failure
The Beta Target is yellow as long as N1 is less than 80% per cent. (On A320)

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Use rudder trim to neutralize rudder pedal pressure. When a positive climb has been
achieved, call for retraction of the gear. Use autopilot if it is available.
It is really a question of controlling the following parameters:

- airspeed
- asymmetric thrust moment from the engine(s), plus lateral and directional
control (sideslip and bank angle).
Airspeed is relevant because the aerodynamic power of the flight control surfaces varies:
where the asymmetric thrust moment from the engines is relatively constant with airspeed.
Therefore, handling problems with asymmetric control only occur at low speed.
The asymmetric thrust moment varies according to engine regime; the moment is greater
at high thrust than at low thrust. Thus, handling problems with asymmetric flight are
greater at high thrust – ie. The minimum control speeds are higher with TOGA than with a
Flex thrust.
The efficiency of the control surfaces varies with airspeed; therefore larger control inputs
are needed to counter roll or sideslip at low IAS. Control deflections are limited, and when
the controls reach their stops, there is nothing to stop the sideslip or roll increasing, unless
either the engine thrust is reduced or the speed is increased.
Usually the rudder stops are reached first, and the minimum control speed (VMCA) is
defined by full rudder, 5 of bank towards the live engine, and straight flight. If flight is
continued below this speed the sideslip will increase and the limits of lateral control may
also be reached.
Control may be lost either due to excessive sideslip or insufficient roll control.
Crew Technique
On an Airbus FBW aircraft, the result of an engine failure, without pilot reaction, is a semi-
stabilized condition.
- As the aircraft yaws in response to the engine failure, the roll order seeks to
reduce roll rate to zero.
- The yaw order seeks to reduce yaw rate.
- The aircraft will stabilize itself in some quasi-steady state of constant bank
angle and sideslip.
- The heading will be slowly divergent towards the dead engine.
This is a natural consequence of the normal functioning of the control laws and does not
depend on any extra sensor of engine failure. Crew action on rudder pedals and stick is
required to bring the aircraft to a steady heading.

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If only lateral control is used, the aircraft can be stabilized on a steady heading using the
aircraft weight vector to counter the thrust moment; but large bank angles are needed,
which produces large sideslip angles. This is not recommended, therefore some rudder
must be used.
This means, simply applying sufficient rudder to centralize the sideslip indicator (the ball on
old instruments) together with lateral control to hold the wings level. It applied to FBW
aircraft when in clean and full configurations, and at low asymmetric thrust levels, using
the sideslip index on the PFD (yellow display). This is not the most efficient technique
from a climb performance point of view.
Beta target is available in all take-off configurations when significant asymmetric thrust
exists.
• It calculates the sideslip required for ailerons neutral, in straight flight.

• It shifts the sideslip index by a small amount, so that this condition is achieved
when the index (blue) is centered by applying rudder.
When it is centered, the aircraft is close to the zero aileron position (best drag
position).
The amount of sideslip required varies with speed; thus the amount of shift that is applied
to the index also varies with speed.
If the rudder stop is reached before the beta target is satisfied, the speed is too low;
therefore the speed must be increased until it is possible to center the index.
The A320 has minimum control speeds (VMC) which limit the minimum operational speeds
(V2 & VREF), at weights, which are within the operational range.
The engine failure compensation implemented in the flight control laws of the Airbus FBW
aircraft eliminates the immediate risk of a loss of lateral/directional control while retaining
all the conventional cues (bank angle and sideslip with which flight crews are familiar) to
detect the failure.
SPEED AWARENESS:
VLS displayed on the PFD is in all flight phases, limited by a value equal to or slightly
greater than VMC.
During one engine inoperative operations at lightweights, speed excursions below VLS
should be avoided.
The recommended speed for flap retraction during take-off (F speed) is limited (on the low
speed side) to VMC + 5.

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During a one engine inoperative take-off, “F” provides a minimum speed at which the flaps
can be retracted while providing adequate maneuvering capability and margin relative to
VMC.
The recommended speed with flaps extended during an approach (F speed) provides a
comfortable margin (10 – 15kts) relative to VMC.
SIDE-SLIP AWARENESS
In the current airworthiness Regulations (FAR and JAR) the minimum approach speed
(VREF) must not be lower than VMCL (“L” Landing configuration). If a Go-Around is
performed, the full power may safely be applied at a speed, at least, equal to the minimum
control speed.
Therefore, when a one engine inoperative Go-Around is initiated at the minimum approach
speed (i.e. at low weights) large rudder inputs (close to full rudder) are to be expected
since, by definition, the aircraft will be flying at a speed close to its VMCL.
As a general rule the lower the speed the more rudder is required to zero the Beta Target.
The need for more and more rudder to zero the Beta Target must be seen as an
unmistakable sign of approaching the minimum control speed.
If at low weights or low speeds Beta Target cannot be zeroed even with full rudder.
There is only one thing to do : ACCELERATE
A non-zeroed Beta Target with full rudder is an un-mistakable sign of flight close to or
below VMCL.
The calculation of the Beta target is a trade off between drag produced by deflection of
control surfaces, and airframe drag produced by a slight sideslip. Centering the target
produces less total drag than centering a traditional ball, as rudder deflection, aileron
deflection, spoiler deployment and aircraft body angle are all taken into account.
LATERAL CONTROL
On one engine inoperative flight at low speed, large bank angles will inevitably lead to
large sideslip angles.
Rapid roll entries will also to generate large sideslip variations, which will require large
rudder inputs to maintain Beta Target centered.
All of these statements are valid whatever the airspeed, but the effects are more
pronounced at low speeds close to the minimum control speeds.

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• Ensures minimum deviation from runway centerline.

• Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and target centered.
 Common Errors
• Over Rotation to high pitch altitude.

• Beta Target not fully centered.
• Poor maintenance and monitoring of required track.
• Not trimming the rudder.
• Not rotating to correct pitch attitude on go-around.

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4.2 Double FMGC Failure
• To recognize, and correctly deal with, a double FMGC failure.
 Schedule
• To recognize, and correctly deal with, a double FMGC failure.
 Equipment
DOC references:
• FCOM 1.22 (Auto flight)

• FCOM 3.02.22 (Auto flight)
• FCOM 4.04.30 (How to use)
• FCOM 4.06.20 (Abnormal procedures)
Briefing of the following key points:
MAIN
• Four functions of FMGCs (FM, FG, FE and FIDS)

• Possibility of partial or total failure of FMGCs.
• Systems lost with failure.
• Back up navigation function.
SECONDARY
• Loss of some characteristic speeds.

• Loss of LANDING ELEV AUTO.
Each FMGC has four separate parts; Flight Management, Flight Guidance, Flight Envelop
and Fault Identification and Display Systems. Only the first three functions concern the
flight crew in flight.

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The relevant function of the parts of the FMGEC are as follows:
A) Flight Management:
• Navigation
• Flight Planning.
• Performance.
B) Secondary:
• FD
• AP
• A/THR
Parts of each FMGEC may fail or the FMGC may fail completely. When there is a complete
failure of both FMGCs the following will be the main items lost and are details on ECAM:
• AP 1+2
• FD1+2.
• A/THR
The FPV will be available. To regain the blue track index it is necessary to switch off the
FDs. Tuning of navaids will have to be done through the RMP.
• Correct completion of required drills.
 Common Errors
• Not using FPV or deselecting FDs.

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4.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG
• To ensure continued safe flight following loss of all engine generators.

• To carry out ECAM procedure strictly respecting task sharing requirements.
• To perform a safe approach and landing using raw data information and degraded
flight control laws.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• QRH chapter 1 (Systems remaining)

• QRH chapter 2 (Fuel gravity feeding)
• FCOM 03.02.24 (Elec emerg CONF)
• Briefing note – ILS raw data approach.
• Briefing note – Use of FPV.
MAIN
• EFIS, ECAM, AUTO FLIGHT and FMGS availability following failure.

• ECAM procedure (one ECAM DU lost) and status page APPR PROC considerations
(RAT, direct law……)
• Navigation Aid tuning by RMP.
• QRH use of approach and landing data.
• Task sharing and communications.
SECONDARY
• Communication (ATC, Cabin, ……..)

• Raw data approach (reminder)
• Direct law approach and landing (reminder)
• Fuel gravity feeding considerations.
• Cockpit lighting.
• Use of APU generator in some specific cases.
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When all engine driven generators have been lost, the workload is immediately greatly
increased. It is important that task-sharing procedures are understood and adhere to.
Remember one of the golden rules: fly the aircraft.
Autopilot is not immediately available and CM 1 must take control as only the following
equipment is available. It assumes the EMER GEN operates in High speed (Greed HYD
system available) :
• CM 1 PFD (FD normally available)

• CM 1 ND
• Upper ECAM
• CM1 MCDU and FMGC 1
• FCU
If the FPV has to be selected in order to be displayed on the CM1 PFD. It is important to
deselect the FDs so that the blue track index is indicated on the PFD, assisting
heading/track keeping.
Once a safe flight path is established and the aircraft under control, the focus can shift to
the next priority – navigation.
Although to ECAM advises a landing as soon as possible, it would be unwise to attempt an

approach at a poorly equipped airfield in marginal weather. Prolonged flight in this
configuration is not recommended.
Communication can be of great help here, ATC may be able to give radar headings to the
nearest suitable airfield, once informed of your problem. This is a serious emergency and
ATC should be notified using appropriate phraseology (MAYDAY) so that greater separation
between you and other traffic can be arranged.
It is important to identify the failure that has occurred – it is possible for pilots to confuse
emergency electrical configuration with an all engine failure. Therefore, read the title of
ECAM failure. The ECAM drill may then be started. It is a lengthy and complicated
procedure, as only one display is available. Consider carefully the feasibility of starting the
APU. If a simultaneous engine generator failure has occurred, the probability of coupling
the A.P.U. generator will be low.
If prolonged flight is necessary, ensure that any fuel imbalance is dealt with (QRH 2.08 –
Fuel Imbalance).
Allow sufficient time to plan and discuss the approach and landing.
When the gear is extended, the aircraft reverts to Direct law, manual pitch trim must be
used. It also causes the loss of APU.

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• Maintains flight path in accordance with ATC clearance.

• Performs ECAM actions accurately and without undue delay.
• Makes sound decision to continue or divert according to circumstances.
• Performance safe, accurate approach and landing, taking into account degraded
systems and flight control laws, within half sale defection of localizer and glide
slope <O>.
• Adheres strictly to task sharing requirements at all times and ensures good crew
and ATC communications.
 Common Errors
• Confusion with all engine fail.

• Lack of task sharing discipline during ECAM procedure.
• FD not selected OFF to regain blue track index when FMGS not available.
• Early extension of landing gear.

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4.4 Smoke
• To demonstrate effective handling of smoke warnings with or without apparent

smoke.
• To correctly complete ECAM actions if displayed.
• To correctly apply the QRH smoke procedure.
• To correctly apply the QRH Smoke/Toxic Fumes Removal procedure.
• To practice the application of CRM and task sharing throughout.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC References :
QRH 1.03 SMOKE/AVNCS SMOKE

FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke/Avncs Smoke
FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke/Toxic Fumes Removal
FCOM Vol. 1 System Bus Equipment Lists
FCOM 1.35.20 Oxygen
FCOM 3.01.35 Limitations – Cockpit Oxygen System
FCOM 1.23.20 Intercommunication system
FCOM 1.21.30 Ventilation
FCOM 1.21.40 Cargo
Brief the following key points.
MAIN
• The importance of donning the oxygen with correct selections.

• The application of each of the procedural actions.
• The recognition of air conditioning smoke.
• The isolation of electrical buses and remaining equipment
• Application of task sharing.

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SECONDARY
• Use of the full face oxygen mask.

• Cabin communications.
• Communications with oxygen masks on.
• Smoke detector positions in the aircraft.
• Avionics and cargo ventilation.
 Trainees Actions
Fire on board an aircraft has resulted in some of aviation‟s most tragic accidents. With the
increased use of electronics on aircraft and the consequent thirst for electrical power,
modern aircraft are more than ever a target for fire on board. Recent accidents have
indicated that flight crew and aircraft systems can be completely overwhelmed very
quickly. The flight crew must action promptly and decisively to ensure the safety of the
aircraft.
Smoke/ AVNCS Smoke Procedure
„This procedure is applicable in case of suspected smoke from the avionics compartment,
air conditioning, or cabin equipment. The flight crew should apply this procedure, if smoke
is detected with or without “AVIONICS VENT SMOKE” ECAM warning activation.‟
The above quote and the remaining small print in the FCOM should be well known. There
will be little time to reach the small FCOM print, if indeed, the crew is able to see it. The
essential items of the procedure have therefore been printed in large font in the QRH.
Initial actions
The initial procedure actions are designed to reduce smoke intensity, eliminate one of the
most common smoke causes and prevent pilot smoke inhalation. Pilots should develop
some tactile indicators for finding these push buttons in dense smoke.
Oxygen use and Communication
The use of headsets and avoiding the continuous use of inter phone by both pilots, will
enable the PF to receive ATC instructions clearly. Pilots should be familiar with the position
of the 100% switch and knob on the full-face mask when donned. 100% oxygen must be
used. The emergency knob should be used to clear smoke from the mask. Do not leave
this function on, as oxygen supply could be depleted quickly. Refer FCOM 3.01.35.

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Isolation of faulty equipment
At this stage aggressive efforts must be made to determine the smoke source utilizing all
crew. Some degree of fault analysis may be required at this stage.
FCOM procedure gives some guidelines. The CB panels can be checked, any previous
malfunctions may be an indicator. The initial location of the smoke is of primary
importance as shortly after the initial appearance of the smoke other smoke alarms will be
activated as the aircraft ventilation system will move the smoke quickly around the aircraft.
Crew Resource Management
It is important to maintain a good flow of information between pilots and from cabin crew,
however, the PF should not be distracted from the primary task. The Captain requires
good prioritization and management of tasks. If smoke is confirmed, do sot hesitate to
declare an emergency, immediately descend and commence diversion to the nearest
practicable airport. If dense smoke is evident or reported the QRH procedure requires
descent for the smoke removal procedure and establishment of the Emergency Electrical
Configuration as described at the end of the procedure. CM 1 will become PF.
Air conditioning Smoke
The next step in the procedure deals with air conditioning smoke if suspected. This should
be evident by smoke initially coming out of the ventilation outlets.
Cabin Equipment Fault
The note referring to cargo air isolation in the previous procedure could also apply to the
next step where a commercial facility such as cabin lights or entertainment equipment may
be faulty.
If smoke still persists
The bus shedding procedure next will shed the primary AC bus 1, then, if this does not
stop the smoke AC bus 1 is re-energised and AC2 is shed. The auto pilot will remain
engaged, ECAM SD switching is required and before isolating AC bus 2 the CM 2 (if PF) will
need to hand over control to CM1.
During pre study the trainee should review briefly the Bus Equipment List at the end of
each Vol 1 section and assess the equipment lost with each AC bus. The flight control
computers are all DC powered, no attempt should be made to isolate any other business.

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Smoke Removal
If the fire is confirmed to be extinguished, efficient smoke removal is obtained with pack
flow „HI‟, cruise thrust and Vent Extract PB selected to overboard. However, if dense
smoke, toxic fumes, or if smoke generation cannot be stopped use the Smoke Removal
procedure.
This may become a very busy time for the PNF as he could be confronted with several
checklists as well as ECAM and information coming from the cabin. It is important to
establish the priority of removing dense smoke from the aircraft.
The smoke/toxic fumes removal procedure will require prompt descent to 10,000 ft or
MEA. The emergency descent initiation technique should be applied as necessary. The
LDG ELEV selector may need to be set to that altitude before this course of action is
decided as it may take several minutes to depressurize to 1 psi depending on the cabin
altitude. Note the speed limitation for opening the cockpit windows.
• Demonstrates correct application of the procedure.

• Takes action to ensure the aircraft flight path is safe throughout.
• Demonstrates the correct use of the full face mask and oxygen.
• Maintains communication with ATC, the cabin and other crew members.
• Knows the position of system switches required.
 Common Errors
• Rushing the procedure.

• Omitting or not completing steps of the procedure.
• Insufficient attention to Flight path and navigation resulting in errors.
• Lack of crew communication and task sharing.

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4.5 Flight Control
4.5.1 Abnormal Flap/Slat Configuration
• To perform the correct procedure to configure the aircraft for approach and
landing.
• To carry out actions required ECAM/QRH procedure.
• To handle the aircraft smoothly during approach and landing complying with
published procedure for configurations and speeds.
• To respect task sharing requirements throughout.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• QRH chapter 2 (Landing with abnormal Slats/Flaps)

• QRH chapter 2 (Approach Speeds and Landing distance)
• FCOM 1.27.50 (Flaps & Slats)
• FCOM 3.02.10 (Operating techniques)
• FCOM 3.02.27 (slats and/or Flaps fault/locked)
• FCOM 3.03.22 (Ground clearance diagram)
A) Main
• Task sharing and crew coordination.
• Use selected speed.
• ECAM procedure and STS page “APPR. PROC”
• Approach speed and landing distance calculations.
• Speed control for no flaps/no slats approach.
• Approach briefing and abnormal configuration procedure use.
B) Secondary
• A/THR management
• Pitch angle (tail-strike) at landing if no flaps.
• Use of auto brake according to landing distance available.
• Go around procedure and briefing.

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• CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for correct VAPP calculation.
Should this problem arise when in the intermediate approach phase, a delay in starting the
approach should be considered.
The landing distance factors are available in QRH along with approach speed increments.
Approach speed will be VLS as indicated on the PFD. The approach speed increments in
the QRH should be used for information on the use of wind correction in failure cases.
The use of selected speed and the use of auto thrust is recommended for most cases.
There are two cases to consider:
• Flaps/slats locked with the wing tip brake on when selecting a difference flap
setting – In this case do not recycle flap lever.
• Flaps/slats fail to move with movement of the flap lever – in which case the flap
lever can be recycled.
If the fault cannot be cleared apply the appropriate QRH procedure.
QRH 2.05 needs a little amplification although the ECAM will say “FOR GO AROUND –S/F
JAMMED PROCEDURE……………. APPLY”. By this the QRH provides guidance if a diversion
is decided upon the configuration this can be selected and appropriate limitations.
If a circuit is decided upon, immediate return to same airfield then the configuration that
should be selected and appropriate limitations. It must be borne in mind that for an
eventual approach and landing, this procedure must be applied for the start to configure
the aircraft.
• When CONF 1 is selected slats lock (WTB on) between 0 and 1.

• Take control of the aircraft speed – use selected speed for the rest of the approach.
Managed speed will aim for S speed which is the wrong speed at this stage, and
may be below VLS. At this stage select an appropriate speed depending on aircraft
position and intentions.
• Follow ECAM drill and then when ready for CONF 2 select VFE NEXT – 5kt as shown
on the PFD. It is preferable to reduce speed and change configuration in non
maneuvering flight.
• Do not go below VLS – at high gross weights VLS may be greater than VFE NEXT in
which case decelerate to VLS, select the flap lever one step down and progressively
select slower speeds as the surfaces extend.
• Repeat until landing configuration is reached.
Consider fuel available and the quantity that may be required if a diversion is necessary
with flaps and/or slats jammed. The autopilot may be available but monitor its operation
closely as it is only authorized for use in normal configuration. However, do not use the
autopilot below 500 ft AGL.

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No flap no slat Landing
No flap no slat landing is a fairly simple procedure, however more distance is required for
maneuvering. The flap handle should be placed into CONF 1 position as required by QRH
in order to engage the go-around modes in the event a go-around has to be performed.
During approach the aircraft pitch attitude will be almost normal. Therefore, with correct
aircraft handling a tail strike is less of concern. Nevertheless long and high flare should be
avoided. Consider high-speed touchdown. Use of medium auto brake is recommended.
It is pertinent to bear in mind the flap speed limitation in high gross weight situations with
large ∆ VREF increments.
• Correctly responds to failure ensuring a safe flight path and speed.

• Performs ECAM actions and QRH procedures in a methodical manner.
• Makes correct adjustments to VAPP and selects appropriate configuration.
• Makes smooth and accurate approach and lands within the touchdown zone at the
correct speed (+10/-0 kt).
 Common Errors
• Rushing procedure.
• Starting approach before completing all procedures.
• Selected speed not used immediately at failure recognition.
• Wrong VAPP selection on MCDU.
• Rough handling.
• Use of managed speed on final approach.
• Incorrect go around procedure.

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4.5.2 Reconfiguration Laws – Recovery from approach to stall
• To recognize the indications of an impending stall.

• To take immediate and appropriate actions to recover to controlled flight.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• FCOM 1.27.30 (Abnormal control laws)

• FCOM 3.04.27 (Supplementary Techniques – Flight Controls)
MAIN
• Stall possible only in Alternate and Direct laws (“Fly-by wire” aircraft.)
• Speed scale symbols change (VSW) and aural warning.
• Recovery technique according to altitude and configuration.
SECONDARY
• Control of pitch
• Risk of secondary stall.
This conventional stall is only possible in alternate and direct control laws, because of the
protections provided in normal law. Alternate or direct law will be indicated by ECAM and
the changes on the PFD; bank angle and pitch limitation replaced by amber X, low speed
protection indications change from alpha prot. to VSW. VSW is load factor dependant and
will increase with higher in pitch up rates or bank angles.
An aural warning is produced on entering the stall regime. This aural warning is produced
by the FWC, not the flight envelope calculation. It is possible to experience “false
warnings” if pitch control is rough during the recovery from the stall. VSW indications are
always correct as these are generated by the PRIM.
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AURAL WARNING…………………………………………………………..”STALL, STALL, STALL” CRC

THRUST LEVERS…………………………………………………………………..TOGA
At the same time:

PITCH ATTITUDE……………………………………………………………..REDUCE
BANK ANGLE…………………………………………………………………….ROLL WINGS LEVEL
SPD BRAKES…………………………………………………………………….CHECK RETRACTED
If a danger of ground contact exists, reduce pitch attitude no more than necessary for air
speed to increase.
After initial recovery, maintain speed close to VSW until it is safe to accelerate.
If below 20,000ft, and in clean configuration, select CONF 1.

Out of stall above VLS when there is no threat of ground contact:
Announce ……………………… Go around flap
Flaps ……………………….retract 1 step
When positive climb established
LANDING GEAR ……………………………………….UP
Recover to normal speed and retract flaps are required.

In case of engine inoperative, use power and rudder with care.
Be prepared for a strong pitch up due to power application and the need for large manual
pitch trim changes in DIRECT law.
Care must be exercised not to re-enter the stall regime and set off another warning. With
prompt action, very little height is lost.
• Takes immediate action at first indication of impending stall.

• Employs correct recovery technique and ensures minimum altitude loss.
 Common Errors
• Recovery not initiated immediately.

• Insufficient pitch control at desired attitude.
• Stall re-entry due to uncontrolled high pitch attitude.
• Use of manual trim below VLS.
• Clean up before acceleration above VLS.

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4.6 Dual Hydraulic Failure
• To manually control the aircraft in abnormal flight control laws.

• To carry out ECAM and QRH procedures respecting task sharing requirements.
• To Safely perform approach and landing in abnormal configuration.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• Q QRH 1 HYD (B+Y) (B+G) (Y+G) LO PR Summary.

• QRH 4 (In Flight Performance)
• FCOM 1.27 (Flight Controls)
• FCOM 1.29 (Hydraulic)
• FCOM 3.02.29 (Procedure)
• Briefing note – Abnormal Flaps/Slats configuration
MAIN
• Control of flight path and navigation.

• Importance of good crew communication and co-ordination as autopilot is
inoperative.
• Coordination with ATC.
• Correct prioritization of tasks and usage of the applicable summary.
• Use of selected speed.
• Accurate following of FD and the necessity for smooth control inputs.
SECONDARY
• Flight control system architecture (QRH 5.03)

• Landing distance.
• CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for VAPP calculation from MCDU.

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When a dual hydraulic failure is recognized, the autopilot will not be available. It is vital to
control the aircraft and ensure a safe flight path. Task sharing is important, as procedures
are lengthy. It is necessary that the approach briefing is comprehensive and is vital that
crew co-ordination is good.
The golden rule of ‘AVIATE’, ‘NAVIGATE’ and ‘COMMUNICATE’ applies.
As there are usually many tasks to fulfill, establish clear priorities. Bear in mind that if
sufficient fuel remains, taking time to plan and brief properly is time well spent. Remember
that flight controls will be in ALTERNATE law (PROT LOST).
In a HYD B + Y failure, there is no hydraulic power available to move the stabilizer. In

effect, it is frozen. Alternate law is active and auto trim is available. This is achieved by
displacement of the elevators which can be moved over the full range.
With HYD G + Y or G + B failure, auto brakes are inoperative. With either of these failures
flaps or slats will respectively be lost.
When HYD G + B or G + Y failed, flight will continue on single elevator. With a G + Y

failure, use a long runway as few retardation devices are serviceable (spoilers 3 and
accumulator brake pressure only).
There is no need to memorize the above points as the ECAM will give sufficient information
concerning inoperative systems.
As with most abnormal procedures, the approach speed will be VLS plus any increment
required by the ECAM. Depending on flap and/or slat position and the particular
combination of flight control failures (caused by the hydraulic failures) there may be a 10kt
(or more) increment required by ECAM. The increased speed allows more control due to
loss of elevators or horizontal stabilizer.
In summary the STATUS page may appear complex but there are only 5 main
considerations:
1. Gear
2. Brakes
3. Flaps/Slats
4. VAPP Calculation
5. Landing Distance
In case of a dual hydraulic failure:

The ECAM should be applied first.
This includes both the procedure, and the STATUS section.
Only after announcing “ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED”, should the PNF refer to the
corresponding QRH summary.
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When the failure occurs, and after performing the ECAM actions, the PNF should refer to the
“CRUISE” portion of the summary, in order to determine the landing distance coefficient.
Since normal landing distances are also given on this page, the PNF will be able to compute
the landing distance taking failure(s) into account, in order for the pilot to decide whether to
divert or not.
Approach Preparation
As always, approach preparation includes a review of the ECAM STATUS.
After reviewing the STATUS, the PNF should refer to the “CRUISE” portion of the summary,
to determine the VREF correction, and compute the VAPP.
A VREF table is provided in the summary, for failure cases leading to the loss of the MCDU.
The LANDING and GO-AROUND portions of the summary should be used for the approach
briefing.
Approach
The APPR PROC actions should be performed by reading the APPROACH portion of the
summary.
The PNF should then review the ECAM STATUS, and check that all the APPR PROC
actions have been completed.
• Maintains safe flight path.

• Ensures strict application of task sharing requirements.
• Ensures correct applications of ECAM, QRH and FMGS procedures.
• Handles the aircraft smoothly without major deviations from required trajectory
(+/-200 ft; +/- 100 , +/-10 kt).
• Makes correct determination of VAPP and landing distance.
• Performs accurate approach within standard limits for instrument approach.
• Lands within the landing zone and uses correct braking technique.
• Abnormal configuration approach procedure.
• Specific approach and go around briefing.
• Ensures any special requirements are communicated to ATC and cabin crew.

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 Common Errors
• No emergency declared to ATC.

• Incorrect use of selected speed.
• Incorrect prioritization of tasks.
• Incomplete approach and go around briefing for abnormal configuration.
• FD not followed precisely due to over controlling.
• Confusion between VAPP/VREF/VLS for corrected speed.
• Approach initiated before completion of all necessary tasks.
• Not using QRH or ECAM for gravity gear extension.

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4.7 ECAM
4.7.1 Philosophy and Normal use
• To fully understand the philosophy and normal use of the ECAM.

• To understand ECAM use for abnormal and emergency operations.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• FCOM 1.31.10 to 1.31.30 (ECAM Description)

• FCOM 3.02.01 (ABN and EMER PROCEDURES)
MAIN
• Warning levels and associated master lights.

• ECAM control panel.
• Switching.
• ECAM display philosophy.
• MEMO display.
SECONDARY
• Use of RCL and EMER CANC.

• Flight phases and associated displays.
The Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system monitors and displays all
information concerning aircraft systems and system failures. It is a system which, through
text and graphic displays, enables the crew to do most things from ensuring passenger
comfort by monitoring cabin temperature to dealing with multiple system failures without the
need for paper checklists.
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Essentially the ECAM provides the following :
• System indications – temperatures, pressures etc.

• System monitoring – display of system failure, level 1 to 3 or advisory.
• Memo – displays use of systems by the crew e.g. anti-ice and also take off and
landing memo.
• Crew Actions – in case of failures the E/WD indicates crew action necessary to deal
with the failure, replacing the traditional QRH.
• Status – the status page provides the crew with an operational summary of the
aircraft systems at any stage of the flight. If STS is displayed on E/WD, when
CONF 1is selected or when QNH (QFE) is set, the STATUS page is automatically
displayed.
Display of system failures and take off/landing memo is flight phase sensitive. Take off
and landing memo are only displayed at the appropriate time. Before announcing “no
blue”, ensure that the take-off or landing memo is displayed by reference to the memo
title, as it is possible to mistakenly assume 3-4 green ECAM memo messages as the
landing memo.
Take off or Landing
Some warnings and cautions are suppressed at critical phases of flight, however failures
critical to particular phase of flight will always be displayed. Note that these flight phases
are different from the flight phases used by the FMGS. On the SD some pages are phase-
selected i.e. the WHEEL page is automatically displayed after engine start. The cruise
page is not selectable, but is continuously displayed from 1500 ft after take-off to landing
gear extension unless a warning/caution is displayed, or a system page has been manually
selected. (FCOM 1.31.20 – indicating/recording systems – Indications on SD)
There are three levels of warning/caution – Level 3 being the highest (FCOM 1.31.10 –
Indicating/recording systems – ECAM description):
• Level 3 is associated with a master warning and is displayed in red on the E/WD.
• Level 2 is associated with a master caution and is displayed in amber on the E/WD.
• Level 1 is displayed in amber on the E/WD, however there is no master caution
associated with Level 1.
In addition to the three levels of warning/caution, ECAM also differentiates between

Independent Failures, Primary Failures and Secondary Failures as follows:
A) Independent Failures
A failure that does not affect other systems. The system title is underlined on the
E/WD.
B) Primary Failure
A failure that affects other systems and causes secondary failures. The failure title
is boxed on the E/WD.
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C) Secondary Failure
A failure that is caused by a primary failure and not unserviceability of that

particular system. Secondary failures are in amber preceded by an asterisk on the
bottom right hand side of the E/WD.
In the event of multiple failures there is a hierarchy which determines which

failures are displayed on the E/WD i.e. level 3 takes priority over level 2.
furthermore there is hierarchy within each of the three levels to ensure that the
most important failures are displayed to the pilots first. Details of how failures are
dealt with are given in the following briefing note.
All screens are identical, providing the option of multiple redundancy, and simple
switching. The various options to allow switching of screens in the event of screen
failure are detailed in FCOM 1.31.05 (Indicating/Recording Systems – EIS General).
ECAM failure modes are also dealt with in the following briefing note.
The ECAM control panel is described in FCOM 1.31.30 (Indicating/Recording

Systems – ECAM Controls), however the operational use of the RCL and EMER
CANC pb‟s requires a little explanation. The EMER CANC pb may be used by the
crew to cancel any cautions or warnings that are spurious or intermittent, and are
effectively nuisance warnings. The RCL pb is used to either recover cancelled
cautions suppressed by the EMER CANC pb or to review cautions or warnings which
have been cleared using the CLR pb.
• Knowledge and correct use of the ECAM system.
 Common Errors
• No deselection of manually selected system page.

• Landing “no blue” call made before landing memo displayed.
• Memo display not included in normal instrument scan.

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4.7.2 Use in case of failures
• To use ECAM procedures effectively and correctly.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• QRH 0.00 (task sharing)

• FCOM 1.24.10 & 20 (Electrical)
• FCOM 1.31.10 to 1.31.30 (ECAM Description)
• FCOM 3.02.01 (Procedure)
MAIN
• Task sharing.
• Identification of the failure.
• Co-ordinated ECAM actions and application of procedures.
SECONDARY
• Advisory information.
• Flight phase inhibition.
• Priority of warnings.
• Abnormal ECAM configurations.
• OEBs application.
When the ECAM displays a warning or caution it is of primary importance that task sharing is
respected and secondly, to remember not to rush. The first priority, as always, is to ensure
a safe flight path. Task sharing is important but ensure that monitoring and cross checking
procedures are maintained.

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FCOM 3.02.01 (Abnormal and Emergency Procedures – Introduction details procedures for
the use of ECAM in the event of a failure, however the key points are:
• PF – aviate, navigate and communicate – in that order (golden rule).

• PNF – To read aloud the ECAM failure.
• PNF – deal with the failure on command of PF.
• Both pilots to identify failure and confirm by reference to SD, E/WD.
• PNF to request clear, PF to confirm before CLR is pressed.
In addition remember the following points:
• In the case of multiple failures complete all required actions (blue) associate with
the first red or amber title. Request clearance to press CLR and then deal with next
failure. The second drill is then carried out until its red/amber title can be cleared,
before starting on the third etc. Don‟t leave the red or amber title on the E/WD
when all actions associated with that failure have been completed. Clear each one
as it is dealt with. When all necessary actions are complete there will be no amber
or red displayed on the lower part of the E/WD.
• Read the ECAM carefully, as it is possible to misread drills particularly the

countdown for fire bottle discharge.
• Although A320 overhead panels are uncluttered, misidentification of switches or

pb‟s is possible. When action on overhead panel pb‟s switches is required by
ECAM, identification of the correct panel is aided by reference to the white writing
on the side of each system panel.
• When carrying out system pb selection, verify on SD that the required action has
occurred e.g. switching off an hydraulic pump changes the indications on the SD.
• Cross check by both pilots before movement of any controls like THR lever, engine
master switch, fire PB or IRs, to prevent the crew from carrying out inadvertent
irreversible actions.
• When reviewing secondary failures (FCOM 1.31.25 – indicating/recording systems –

ECAM sequence) follow the same discipline of request and confirmation before
action on CLR pb.
• Certain procedures may be modified by OEB. When applicable, it has to be

checked before reading and analyzing status. The status page is then reviewed by
both pilots. A green overflow arrow indicates further pages of status messages.
Status page can be recalled at any time and is very useful as an aid for descent and
approach planning. Don‟t be in too much of a hurry to clear it.
• Following certain failures, or after multiple failures, the STATUS page may contain
an excess of information. In order to extract the information essential for landing
the aircraft safely use of the following guide:

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CONFIG - flap/slat setting, approach speed increment, landing distance

factor and control law for landing.
GEAR - When to lower gear and whether normal or gravity

extension.
BRAKES - normal, alternate or alternate without anti-skid (1000 psi max

brake pressure, accumulator provides pressure).
REVERSE - availability.
(NOTE : If a reverser is inoperative on status page, do not select that

reverser on LDG; as the reverser will not deploy but reverse idle is
selected. This is Higher than modulated idle and will produce
increased forward thrust)
When dealing with failures in mono ECAM display the same principles discussed
above are valid but disciplines use of the ECAM control panel is even more
important.
• There is no automatic display of SD associated with the failure – confirmation of

the failure reviewing secondary failures.
• STATUS page is only displayed when STS pb is pressed and held. In order to view
page two or three of status messages the STS pb must be released for less than 2
seconds and then pressed and held again.
Dealing with failures when in mono ECAM display requires discipline and practice. In the
case of single ECAM display or when there is a failure of the DMC ECAM channel, the
engine parameters may be monitored through the Engine stand-by page. This is displayed
on the ND by selection on the EFIS control panel. Remember that, except in EMER ELEC
CONF it may be possible to transfer the SD to the PNF‟s ND.
ECAM advisory mode (FCOM 1.31.20 – Indicating/Recording Systems – Indications on SD)

requires the crew to monitor a parameter and does not necessarily require action. FCOM
3.02.80 (Abnormal and Emergency Procedures – Miscellaneous) contains recommended
actions in the event of certain advisory conditions.
OEBs (FCOM Vol 3) are issued by Airbus and contain information which may have
implications for crew actions in the event of system failures. The most important OEBs are
reproduced in the QRH. Depending on the software status of the particular aircraft, there
may be an OEB reminder function within the ECAM system. This OEB reminder function
will replace the actions required by ECAM, associated with a system failure, with a
message directing the crew to consult a relevant OEB.

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If time permits consider consulting FCOM Vol 3 after ECAM actions have been completed.
It may contain additional notes or information not displayed on ECAM (electrical failure).
However do not prolong the flight for the sole purpose of consulting this volume.
• Applies correct crew co-ordination and task sharing at all times.

• Performs ECAM procedure correctly, accurately without undue delay.
 Common Errors
• PF distracted from primary duties.

• Clear action without cross-check.
• Non application of STATUS approach procedure.
• STATUS page (s) reviewed at the wrong time.
• During mono ECAM procedure, SD pages and STS page not reviewed.
• Green overflow arrow ignored.

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4.8 Navigation
4.8.1 IRS/ADR Failures
• To recognize and successfully deal with multiple IRS or ADR failure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
• QRH chapter 2 (Dual ADR failure).

• FCOM 1.34.10 (ADIRS)
• FCOM 3.02.34 (Navigation)
MAIN
• Use of IRS in ATT mode.

• Flight control laws
• Use of standby instruments
• Separate ADR and IRS parts of ADRS
SECONDARY
NIL
Each ADIRS has two parts (ADR and IRS, which may fail independently of each other.
Additionally the IRS part may fail totally or may be available in ATT mode.
Single ADR or IRS failures are simply dealt with and only require action on the switching
panel as indicated by ECAM.

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Follow ECAM action with regard to switching. By using the EFIS DMC selector the
crewmember on the affected side can recover attitude, airspeed and altitude information.
This action would mean that both pilots cross-check attitude and air data with the standby
instruments.
Dual IRS or ADR failures will cause the loss of A/P and A/THR.
A triple IRS or ADR failure is very unlikely. Triple failures will not be displayed (i.e. ADR
1+2 FAULT and ADR 2+3 FAULT). Following ECAM actions would give conflicting
instructions. Follow the procedure for ADR 1+2+3 failure contained in QRH chapter 2).
This is one of the few where the crew will not follow ECAM.
There is no procedure for IRS 1+2+3 failure but the ECAM status page will give approach
procedure and inoperative systems. In this unlikely eventuality, standby instruments are
the only attitude, altitude, speed and heading reference.
Carries out required ECAM drills in accordance with SOPs.

Recognizes triple ADR failure and uses QRH for drill.
When flying on standby instruments achieves a reasonable level of accuracy.
 Common Errors
Fails to recongnize triple ADR or IRS failure.

Poor flying accuracy when using standby instruments.

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4.8.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure
To be aware of approach and landing capabilities.

To understand effects on autopilot
To carry out instrument or visual approach and landing in flare law.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.34.40 (Radio altimeter)

FCOM 1.22.30 (Auto flight)
FCOM 3.02.27 (Direct law procedure)
FCOM 3.02.34 (RA 1+2 fault procedure)
Briefing Note – ILS raw data approach
MAIN
Effects of failure/ gear position on auto-pilot, FD, approach mode and flight controls.
Raw data approach (reminder)
Landing in FLARE LAW
Loss of CAT 2/ CAT 3 capabilities
Loss of AUTO CALL OUT and LDG MEMO
SECONDARY
Flight Controls Logic.

Use of TRK/FPA

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GPWS will be inoperative, therefore apply extra caution with regard to terrain clearance.
It should be noted that APP mode push button is inhibited and the flight director will not
be able to capture and track the glide slope (FCOM 1.22.30 [Auto Flight – Flight
Guidance]). How ever be careful of following flight director commands close to the
ground as it will command excessive roll rates. Interception of the localizer may be done
using LOC and the approach can be flown in LOC mode down to 400 ft.
The approach and landing are only to CAT 1 limit, bearing in mind that the aircraft will
revert to Flare law when the gear is lowered and the autopilot is disconnected.
Determines correct approach and landing configuration.

Makes smooth, accurate approach and landing within limits.
 Common Errors
Use of LOC Mode in short final (below 400 ft)

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4.9 Power Plant
4.9.1 Engine Failure in Cruise
To recognize engine failure or fire warnings and take correct actions to maintain a safe
trajectory.
To perform the ECAM actions correctly.
To perform correct descent procedure dependent on circumstances.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 4.04 – 4.07 (Operational data)

FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine Fail), (Engine Relight)
FCOM 3.06.10 (Single Engine Operations)
FCOM 4.04.30 (Engine Failure in Cruise)
MAIN
Strategy and diversion decision making.

Aircraft control and trajectory established.
Specific task sharing procedures.
ECAM actions – Relight envelope consideration.
Subsequent approach planning.
SECONDARY
A/P engagement mode / A/ THR disconnection.

ETOPS (Fixed Speed Strategy) / Mountainous area considerations.
Task sharing, Decision making and Communication.

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If an engine should fail in the cruise, there are three strategies available for dealing with it.
These are the Obstacle, Standard and ETOPS/ fixed speed strategies. Unless a specific
procedure has been established before dispatch (ETOPS, mountainous areas) the
recommended procedure is the Obstacle Strategy initially.
Before descent:
o Set MCT on the remaining engine and disconnect A/THR.

o Start ECAM actions.
o Select green dot speed on the FCU and pull.
o Set a lower altitude in the altitude window and pull for „OPEN DES‟.
o Select a heading on the FCU to turn off the airway, if required, and pull.
o Advise ATC.
When established in the descent, determine the appropriate final strategy and altitude as
below.
Obstacle Strategy (FCOM 3.06.40)
To maintain the highest possible level due to terrain, the drift down procedure must be
adopted. This requires MCT on the remaining engine, the speed target is green dot. As the
thrust is fixed at MCT, the speed is controlled by elevator.
When in the descent, establish from the QRH a cruise flight level for level off. Inform ATC
and set it in the FCU altitude window. As the speed target is green dot, rate and angle of
descent will be lower than other strategies. Carefully consider the aircraft‟s position during the
drift down, as obstacles may still present a problem. At the end of drift down, if clear of
obstacles, return to normal LRC speed, set on FCU and engage A/THR.
Standard Strategy (FCOM 3.06.30)
The descent should be performed at Mach.78/300 kts. When in the descent, establish from
the QRH cruise flight level for level off. Inform ATC and set in the FCU altitude window.
On reaching the new altitude, set speed according to the QRH, and select A/THR on. Continue
flight to destination, or as appropriate, to selected enroute alternate.

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Overview
The descent actions, selecting the thrust lever to MCT and ECAM actions should not be
hurried, as it is important to complete the drill correctly, not in the shortest possible time.
Generally, there is sufficient time to check all actions before rushing into them. However at
high flight levels, close to limiting weights, if an engine fails speed will decay very quickly
requiring prompt crew response. The ECAM only registers the engine failure when „engine
core speed is below idle.
An emergency should be declared to provide additional ATC assistance and alert the
diversionary aerodrome of your impending arrival.
The FMGS PROG page will show the EO MAX REC altitude. Once descent is started the PERF
page shows time to descend, and distance taken. In the QRH there are tables containing
similar details of engine out ceiling, time to descent, distance taken and fuel used. There is
also graph to calculate gross ceiling. Tables are available for long range cruise performance,
an in-flight check of fuel consumed and time to destination.
Once established in the descent, the relevant table can be entered, and the information
assimilated, if required.
Single engine operations will typically use 15% more fuel than with both engines (at the same
flight level). This may become a factor if a long diversion is contemplated.
The control of task sharing is responsibility of the Captain. Good prioritization is required as
well as other CRM and communications skills. The diversion airfield will probably not be in
SriLankan Airlines destination so brief thoroughly an do not allow the operation to be rushed
especially below MSA.
Some considerations may be:
Configuration for manoeuvring on final,

Go around climb limiting weight and fuel jettison.
Overweight landing checklist.
One engine taxi with slopping taxiways, strong wind or wet conditions may make it
safer to have the aircraft towed onto the stand.
Maintains good speed and flight path control.

Makes correct decision on which strategy to use.
Ensures safe terrain clearance.
Respects task sharing and ECAM procedures requirements.
Established correct parameters from QRH.
Follow flight director accurately and ensures correct FCU selections.
Maintains good situational awareness.
Establishes effective communication with ATC and crew members.
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 Common Errors
A/THR not disconnected, for drift down procedure.

Incorrect strategy.
OPEN DES not selected.
Distraction from primary tasks.
Rushed actions.

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4.9.2 Engine Relight in Flight
To make a valid decision to attempt a relight in flight.

To perform correct engine relight procedure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 2.17 (Engine relight in flight checklist)

FCOM 1.70.80 & 95 (ignition and starting)
FCOM 3.01.70 (limitations)
FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine Relight in flight procedure)
FCOM 4.03.20 (MCDU page description)
MAIN
Factors influencing decision to attempt relight.

Engine relight in flight procedure (wind milling and starter assisted).
Relight envelope and limitations (loss of protections).
Task sharing and actions requiring crew confirmation.
SECONDARY
Systems to restore or engine shut down procedure.
Before attempting a relight in flight, gather all relevant information to decide whether a
relight should be attempted. Consider engine damage, icing or volcanic or volcanic ash
encounter and their effects on successful relight. Check for satisfactory indications of
N1/N2 and oil quantity. Further, is there an appropriate time to relight, when workload is
low? It is recommended to attempt a re-light prior to ECAM “status” actions.

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Refer to QRH for ENG RELIGHT (in flight) drill. Auto start is recommended and the FADEC will
determine whether an assisted start or a wind milling start is to be carried out. The relight
envelop will need to be consulted to determine if the cross bleed valve is required open to
provide air to the starter.
The crew must be ready to take appropriate action in case of abnormal start as no start
protections are provided in flight. The chrono should be used to monitor light up after fuel
flow increase. Ensure cross checking of vital controls before moving them: thrust lever, engine
master switch etc.
If an engine has failed in the cruise, the estimated fuel on board and time to destination is
now calculated on single engine performance. The EO CLR prompt should not be used if a
real engine out has been detected. If the EO CLR prompt is pushed, these predictions revert to
two engine predictions and are meaningless, if a successful relight is not achieved.
Uses all available information to make a sound decision to attempt an engine relight in
flight.
Applies correct engine relight procedure and respects all related limitations.
Ensures correct task sharing and good crew communications.

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4.9.3 All Engine Flame Out
To establish a safe flight path.

To recongnize the indications of a dual engine failure.
To carry out correct procedure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 1 (All Engine flame out)

QRH chapter 2 (Engine relight in flight)
FCOM 1.70 (Ignition and starting)
FCOM 3.02.70 (All engine flame out)
MAIN
Monitoring of flight path and parameters.

Choice of optimum speed.
ECAM actions (APU use, relight parameters….)
Relight monitoring and system recovery.
SECONDARY
Aircraft status : systems, F/CTL law…

Minimum RAT speed.
Communications (ATC, transponder, cabin).
Related consequences (Pressurization, forced landing, ditching..)

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Following an all engine failure the flight deck indications change drastically as generators
drop off line, the RAT is deployed and ECAM prioritizes checklist.
Control of the aircraft must be taken immediately by CM1, and a safe flight path
established. It is important at this stage to correctly identify the failure as it can be easily
confused with all engine generators fault. ECAM will prioritize checklists so to avoid
confusion read ECAM carefully to correctly identify the failure. It is vital to establish good
crew communication and to apply efficient task-sharing.
Establish communications with ATC, starting nature of emergency and intentions. VHF2
(VHF3) and ATC2 are not supplied so VHF 1 is the only means of communicating the
emergency to air traffic control. This can be easily seen by looking at the ATC and VHF 2
windows, which will be blank.
The ECAM actions can be commenced, with attention to optimum relight speed. If there is
no relight within 30 sec ECAM will order the engine master switches to be placed off for 30
sec and then on again. This is to permit ventilation of the combustion chamber. Start the
APU once below the altitude which the APU is available for attempting engine start. Below
FL200 optimum speed is green dot.
Maximum gliding range is achieved at green dot speed although this will not be displayed
on the PFD if the APU generator is not available. Think ahead and plan the approach.
Depending on the airplane‟s position, a forced landing or a ditching may be required if the
relight is unsuccessful. Find the relevant QRH page and review the procedure.
The list of affected systems is long and flight controls will be much degraded. If the relight
attempts are successful, consider the options of immediate landing versus continuing the
flight. If the engines failed simultaneously, was there a common cause?
Establishes immediately a safe flight path.

Makes correct analysis and carries out procedure.
Ensures strict application of task-sharing and good crew communications.
Make appropriate decision according to outcome of relight attempt.
 Common Errors
Incorrect speed choice and lack of monitoring.

Confusion with ELEC EMER CONFIG.
APU started too late.
Engine relight not monitored (stopwatch/parameters)
Lack of communication.
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4.9.4 Thrust Lever Disagree/ Fault
To understand the consequences and differences related to thrust lever malfunctions.

To ensure continued safe flight and landing by applying correct procedures.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
FCOM 1.70 (Thrust control)

FCOM 3.02.70 (Abnormal procedure)
MAIN
Differences between “Disagree” and “Fault” and related thrust control consequences.
Importance of PF not being distracted by failure.
Specific approach procedure when auto landing not possible.
SECONDARY
Caution relating to thrust lever fault during take-off (on ground, between V1 and VR:
warning inhibited)
A) Disagree
This failure occurs when the two validated thrust lever angle signals are not in agreement.
Should the failure occur on take-off, TOGA or FLEX thrust is maintained until thrust
reduction, after which maximum available thrust is MCT.
If the failure occurs when the thrust lever is between idle and MCT, FADEC will
automatically select the larger thrust lever angle, limited to MCT. On the ground, thrust is
limited to idle.

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In flight, keep the A/THR engaged (or engage A/THR if not in use) to allow it to manage
thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will reduce to idle thrust. This
is effectively a single engine approach. Note that reverse thrust is available for landing.
B) Fault
If the fault develops, it indicates that a non-valid signal has been received from engine 1
or 2 thrust lever angle.
The fault on the ground freezes thrust to idle, and furthermore commands the reversers to
stow.
In flight, keep the A/THR engaged (or engage A/THR if not in use) to allow it to manage
thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position. A/THR should be engaged
before slat retraction.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will be at idle thrust. The
affected engine reduces to idle power when landing gear is down locked, or at slat
extension. This is not shown on ECAM.
Note that reverse thrust in NOT available for landing.
Maintains safe trajectory in all flight phases.

Ensures application of ECAM procedures, including specific approach requirements.
Respects task sharing procedures and ensures good crew communications.
 Common Errors
Different reason for “Disagree” and “Fault” not clearly understood. Specific procedure not
applied for approach.

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4.9.5 Engine Manual Start
To carry out the correct ECAM or QRH actions in the event of an abnormal start (auto or
manual).
To know engine start limitations and restrictions.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH Chapter 2 (Tailpipe fire)

FCOM 1.70.80 (Ignition and Starting)
FCOM 3.02.70 (Power Plant)
Briefing Notes – Engine start auto/ manual
MAIN
Auto start fault ECAM procedures.

Engine starter limitations.
Lack of automatic protections during manual start.
Manual operation of start valve.
Tailpipe fire.
SECONDARY
Timing during manual start.

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It is important to have a thorough knowledge of limitation and procedure, particularly

when performing a manual start.
In general, the auto start function will protect the engine, but in manual start it is the
crews responsibility to take any appropriate action.
If a stall condition occurs and N2 is above idle, the warning is not displayed. Consequently,
the must take action to shut the engine down.
Following shut down for any reason, maintenance action may be required, or dry crank
before another start attempt.
Applies correct ECAM or QRH procedure according to fault condition.

Knows starter limitations.
 Common Errors
Instinctive Engine Master switch cut off.

ECAM procedure not followed precisely.
No, or incorrect, timing during manual start.
Starter limitations not known.

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4.9.6 Engine Tailpipe Fire
To recognize and deal correctly with an engine tailpipe fire.

To be aware of possible engine damage due to external fire agents.
To correctly respect task-sharing and establish effective communication.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH Chapter 2 (Eng Tailpipe Fire)
MAIN
Engine tailpipe fire indications.

QRH use.
Task sharing and communications.
SECONDARY
Communications (cabin, ground crew).
The most likely sources of information concerning an engine tailpipe fire are the ground
crew or cabin staff. The procedure for dealing with a tailpipe fire is contained in QRH
chapter 2. It is important to establish which engine is on fire and react accordingly.
Establishing good communications between the cockpit and ground crew or cabin staff to
establish which engine is on fire, and consider opening the cockpit window to confirm.
The engine must be cranked which enables the engine to be ventilated to remove fuel
vapors after the unsuccessful start attempt.

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If the burning has not stopped, consider the use of external fire extinguishers (Note that
they can cause severe corrosive damage and should only be considered after the
procedure has been completed.)
Demonstrates knowledge of correct procedure and considerations.

Adheres strictly to task sharing requirements at all times and ensures good crew and ATC
communications.
Calls for checklist.
 Common Errors
Does not know where to find the appropriate procedure.

Poor communication leading to confusion.

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4.10 Emergency Descent
To recognize the circumstances requiring initiation of an emergency descent.

To carry out the correct actions to achieve a safe descent at the maximum appropriate
rate.
To respect minimum safe altitude.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH Chapter 1 (emergency descent)

FCOM 3.05.30 (In flight Procedure)
MAIN
Oxygen mask and crew communication before any other actions.

Do not rush the procedure.
Actions on FCU should be checked on FMA to ensure correct engagement of the desired
mode.
Where structural damage is suspected maintain current IAS.
Be careful of speed brake auto retraction.
ECAM /Check-list actions.
Control and monitoring of descent and level –off.

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The procedures for an emergency descent are de tailed on ECAM, in the QRH and in FCOM
3.02.80 (ABN Procedures – EMER DESCENT).
The use of autopilot and autothrust is recommended for all emergency descent. The
modes used will depend on whether structural damage is assumed or a high speed descent
is required. The following are the two ways in which to use the autopilot and autothrust
depending on which type of descent is required. As per standard ECAM procedures PF flies
the aircraft and PNF carries out ECAM drill. However before initiating descent the crew
must don oxygen masks and establish crew communications.
How to Establish Descent:
a) 1st loop:
Turn altitude selector knob to MEA or FL 100 and pull

Turn heading selector knob and pull
Pull SPD selector knob
Check FMA reads IDLE/ OP DES /HDG
Select speedbrake (see note below)
b) 2nd loop:
Check target altitude and HDG according to clearance

If STRUCTURAL DAMAGE assumed (LOW SPEED DESCENT):
Push speed/ mach pb (target speed for descent at current IAS)
If NO DAMAGE suspected (HIGH SPEED DESCENT)
Increase speed to MMO/VMO.
Make PA to passengers.
Note : At high flight levels, the speedbrake should be extended slowly while
Monitoring ∞ prot, so that angle of attack protection does not become
active thereby causing speedbrake retraction. Use caution when using
speedbrake if structural damage exists.
Procedure for Level off:
2000 ft above retract speed brake.

Select a lower speed for cruise
When cabin altitudes becomes green (cab alt 9550 or below) consider removing
oxygen masks and reset oxygen mask box flaps to enable the Headset microphones
use.

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Request purser to the cockpit and establish the conditions of PAX and cabin.
Decide on the course of action, diversion airport and advise ATC and PAX.
Dons oxygen mask within 5 seconds and crew communications established immediately.
Initiates descent without delay using correct technique, according to circumstances.
Monitors flight path throughout descent.
Monitors aircraft systems during descent.
Establishes ATC communications.
Employs correct level-off technique at selected altitude.
Remember to reset the boom set microphone after removing the oxygen mask.
 Common Errors
Rushed initiation of descent leading to incorrect speed selection.

Headset not used.
Recommended sequence of FCU actions not respected.
Initial altitude selection not below current altitude.
ALT knob pulled and turned at the same time.
FMA not checked and announced after each FCU selection.
Incorrect speed brake selection sequence.
Lack of speed control during descent in manual flight.
Lack of ATC communication/ transponder code.
Leveling off at high speed.
Incorrect level-off technique.

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Chapter 05
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CHAPTER - 05
ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS - A330

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5.1 Operating Techniques …………………………………………………………………… …………………. 3
5.1.1 Rejected Take-off…….……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

5.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire after V1………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
5.2 Double FMGEC Failure………………………….……………………………………………………………… 16
5.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 18
5.4 Smoke …………..……………………………………………………………………………..……………………. 21
5.5 Flight Control …………………………………………………….………………………………………………. 25
5.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration………………………………………………………………………… 25

5.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall ………………………………………… 28
5.6 Fuel Jettison – A330 ……………….…………………………………………………………………………. 30
5.7 Dual Hydraulic Failure ………………………………………………………………………………………. 32
5.8 ECAM …………………………………………………….……………………………..………………………….… 35

5.8.2 Use in case of failures …………………………………………………………………………………………… 38
5.9 Navigation ………….…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 43
5.9.1 IRS / ADR failures …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 43

5.9.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure …………………………………………………………………………………… 44
5.10 Power Plant ……………………………………………………………….………………………………………. 46
5.10.1 Engine Failure in cruise ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 46

5.10.2 Engine Relight in flight …………………………………………………………………………………………… 49
5.10.3 All Engine Flame out ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 51
5.10.4 Thrust Lever disagree / Fault…………………………………………………………………………………… 53
5.10.5 Engine Abnormal Starts ……………………………………………………………………………………….… 55
5.10.6 Engine Tailpipe Fire ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 56
5.11 Emergency Descent ………………………………………….……………………………………………….. 58

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To take correct actions in the event of RTO
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
MAIN
Failure identification (crew communication)

Decision and call out (STOP, GO and V1)
Deceleration actions and control.
Task sharing.
ECAM actions (if appropriate).
Notify ATC.
SECONDARY
Review of none inhibited warnings.

Complementary actions and check-list.
Specific engine fire on ground check list.
Decision with ire problems or windshear.

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„The action of rejecting a take-off can be hazardous, and the time available to make the correct
decision is limited. To assist with this, the ECAM inhibits warnings which are not a paramount
importance between 80 kt and, 1500 fl or 2 minutes after lift off, whichever occurs first.
Therefore, any warning received in this period should be carefully considered. To assist
decision making, the take-off is divided into low and high speed regimes. 100 kt is chosen as
the dividing line. There is no significance to 100 kt merely that it divides the take-off phase into
low and high speed phases.
- Below 100 kt, it is possible to reject for any reason.

- Above 100 kt, and approaching V1, be “go-minded” unless major failures or ECAM warnings
occur.
- Once above V1, the take-off must be continued as it may be impossible to stop the aircraft
on the aircraft on the runway remaining.
Remember to bring the airplane to a complete stop, not slowed, and then stopped. Set the
Parking Brake. When the airplane has been stopped, identify / confirm the failure. When
evacuation is considered, use the ON GROUND EMER / EVAC checklist. There is sometimes
confusion between the use of the ON GROUND EMER / EVACUATION checklist and the ENG
FIRE ON ECAM procedure. The ENG FIRE ON GROUND procedure includes the possibility of
emergency evacuation. But it does not list in detail, the items associated with the evacuation as
is done in the “ON GROUND EMER EVAC” C/L. ie. P. cabin crew notify etc.,
Use ATC, fire service and cabin staff to gain as much information as possible to assist in making
a decision on whether to evacuate or not. Remember that the simplest way to confirm an
engine fire, on the ground, is to open the cockpit window and look out.

PASSENGERS REMAIN SEATED‟. This is vital to ensure that there is no undesirable reaction
from the crew or passengers. Clear the runway if possible and it is safe to do so. Brief the
purser and make a PA to the passengers.
 Completion standards
Makes appropriate decision before V1.

Carries out correct actions to ensure a safe stop on runway centerline.
 Common Errors
Disarming of autobrake due to instinctive manual braking.

ATC and / or Cabin crew not informed.
Reversers remain engaged after aircraft stop.
Omitting selection of parking brake on.
Non adherence of task-sharing during emergency procedure.
Confusion over use of ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION.
Inability to use mechanical seat controls.
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To recognize Engine failure and / or fire warning.

Take correct actions to maintain a safe trajectory.
To perform correct engine fail or fire procedure after V1.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Engine stall – Overweight landing)
FCOM 3.02.26 (Engine fire)
FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine fail)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Abnormal ops engine failure)
FCOM 3.04.70 (Engine failure)
FCOM 4.04.30 (EOSID) if applicable
MAIN
Go / STOP decision making.

Aircraft control on the ground and at rotation.
Roll control, sideslip target and “Fly by wire” characteristics.
Confirmation of non-reversible or guarded items with ECAM actions.
Engine-out profile and managed speed logic.

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SECONDARY
A/P engagement / Rudder trim.

EOSID activation.
FD roll limit below green dot speed.
EO CLR prompt.
A. Engine Failure
After detecting an engine failure, PNF is to call “engine failure”, without identifying which
engine has failed.
low speeds close to VMCG (in particular above 100 kt, after inhibition of NW steering).
PF should maintain runway centerline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD yaw
bar (if available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5% nose up and centralize blue β target (see
below for explanatory note) with rudder. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor speed trend
arrow (minimum speed V2) until SRS has stabilized. The change over from yellow side slip
index to blue β target may not occur instantaneously. Use rudder trim to neutralize rudder
pedal pressure. When a positive climb has been achieved, call for retraction of the gear.
Use the autopilot if it is available.
PNF should closely monitor the aircraft‟s flight path, cancel warnings and identify the failure
when appropriate. Note when a positive climb has been established and announced
When the aircraft is under control ensure that ICAO engine out flight path is being
maintained.
Once well clear of the ground, minimum 400 ft, the ECAM actions may be started. It is not
necessary to rush into doing the ECAM drills and 400ft is the MINIMUM altitude at which
aircraft is climbing stabilized and is flying in a safe direction. Do not get too distracted with
the ECAM. Furthermore, ECAM actions may be interrupted when necessary to allow both
pilots to monitor level-off, configuration changes etc.
It is important to determine whether the engine has suffered a flameout or has structural
damage. The action of putting the start switch to ignition confirms the relight attempt being
made by the FADEC. If a flameout has occurred, then a relight (QRH chapter 2) may be
considered at a later stage when aircraft has been cleaned up and a safe flight path is
established. The “After Take off” checklist being carried out after the engine relight attempt
(at status page if unsuccessful or normal operation if successful).

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confirmation from the both pilots.
FLIGHT PATH AFTER LIFT-OFF
ICAO Take-off Flight Path Area
SriLankan Airlines use the ICAO take-off flight path area that identifies the areas of accountability
for engine inoperative take-offs. Many common terms are used to identify the flight path area.
They include zone, splay, corridor, funnel and cone. The FAA accountability are is considerably
narrower than the ICAO standard. All the following refer to the ICAO standard.
Straight Departure
A straight departure is one in which the initial departure track is within 150 of the alignment of the
runway center line.
Area for straight departure with track guidance

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Turning Departures
When a departure route requires a turn of more than 150 a turning area is constructed.
Turns may be specified at an altitude / height, at a fix, and at a facility. Straight flight is
assumed until reaching an altitude / height of at least 120m (394‟), above the elevation of
the departure end of runway. No provision is made in this document for turning departures
requiring a turn below 120 m (394‟), above the elevation of the departure end of runway
(DER), where the location and / or height of obstacles precludes the construction of turning
departures which satisfy the minimum turn height criterion. Departure procedures should be
developed on a local basis in consultation with the operators concerned.
Turn areas at a facility or DME distance are constructed in the same manner, and using the
same parameters as for the missed approach, except that the speeds employed are the final
missed approach speeds increased by 10 per cent to account for increased aeroplane mass
in departure see below. In exceptional cases, where acceptable terrain clearances cannot
otherwise be provided, turning departure routes are constructed with maximum speeds as
low as the intermediate missed approach speed increased by 10 per cent, in such cases the
procedure is annotated with a cautionary note.
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Maximum Speeds for Turning Departures
Aero plane Category Maximum Speed km/h (kt)
A 225(120)
B 305(165)
C 490(265)
C 540(290)
E 560(399)
B. Engine Fire
However, the ECAM drill should be commenced as soon as is practicable (though not below
400ft). be ware that the engine may still be developing a significant amount of thrust until
Consider the use of autopilot to reduce workload. The ECAM will count down the seconds to
initial agent discharge and the time period between discharges.
matter.
and landing.
C. ECAM Procedure
ECAM procedures should be started not below 400ft. At this height, only immediate actions
to secure an engine should be carried out as shown below. ECAM actions may be

reading STATUS.

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D. FMGS Procedures
The two FMGS procedures which are worthy of note are the use of the EO SID prompt and
the EO CLR prompt. The in depth explanation of both these functions are contained in
FCOM 4.04.30 (How to Use – Other Functions).
The use of EOSID routing is dependent on there being an EOSID defined in the database
differ from the planned SID (DP: Diversion point) then the EOSID will appear as a TMPY F-
PLN. To follow the EOSID all the crew has to do is to insert this as the active F-PLAN.
Therefore the first leg of the active F/PLN should be a common leg in database. If the
engine failure occurs beyond the point at which the two SIDs differ there will be no TMPY F-
PLN created although the EOSID will be shown in yellow on the ND. To follow an EOSID in
this case the crew can perform a DIR TO one of the EOSID waypoints and then modify the
F-PLN or, more simply follow the EOSID, which is displayed as a yellow line on the ND, using
HDG mode.
When an engine failure is detected the FMGS procedures, predictions are based on single
engine performance. Additionally the bank angle commanded by the FD is limited to 15
when speed is below maneuvering speed of the current configuration (F,S,O). The EO CLR
removes this bank angle limit.
But the EO CLR prompt should be pressed ONLY in the event of a successful relight on a
failed engine or in the event of wrong detection or FADEC fault. Holding may be performed
in managed NAV, if speed is selected and is just greater then Green Dot Speed. This will
taken, if any speed – and/or bank variation occur.
E. One Engine out Approach and Landing
The fuel Jettison checklist may be required as the SriLankan Airlines procedure recommend
all landings to be below max landing weight in failure cases (Refer Sup. SOP)
Autoland (CAT 3 SINGLE) is available on one engine (as shown on ECAM).
Maximum use should be made of the autopilot to reduce crew workload. In manual flight an
engine out landing is essentially conventional. Good trimming is beneficial in keeping the
indication centered. Consider the use of manual thrust when the autopilot is off, as it is
easier to anticipate and coordinate rudder and trim inputs as and when the thrust varies.
The approach should be carried out in CONF 3 as directed by ECAM. Do not select the
landing gear down too early, the power requirement for level flight at hot/high altitude
airports and/or high weight will be large.
Rudder trim may be reset to zero on short finals at 500‟, to make the landing run easier, by
giving symmetrical forces about the zero rudder position.

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F. One Engine out Go-around
The go-around is essentially the same as on 2 engines, the pitch target is now 12.50. Apply
Rudder to compensate for the increase in thrust and keep the β target entered. FMA will
(when ALT pb pressed). As this is a g-around, the target speed is the memorized approach
speed or the speed at engagement of go-around, becoming green dot at acceleration
altitude.
G. β Target
target (blue) replaces the side slip indicator on the PFD when there is engine power
asymmetry and CONF 1,2 or 3 is set [see FCOM 1.27.20 (Flight Controls – Normal law)].
When the β target is centered, total drag is minimized even though there is a small amount
of side slip.
surfaces, and airframe drag produced by a slight side slip. Centering the β target produces
less total drag than centering a traditional ball as rudder deflection, aileron deflection,
spoiler deployment and aircraft body angle are all taken into in count.
Makes correct decision to continue the take-off.

Ensures minimum deviation from runway centerline.
Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and β target centered.
Accurately follows flight director and ensures correct FCU selections.
Maintains speed, V2+5kt / -0kt during second segment.
Adheres to engine-out vertical profile maintaining acceleration altitude +200 flt/-0ft.
Follows EOSID, emergency turn procedures, ATC instructions or required heading ±100.
Respects task sharing.
 Common Errors
Over rotation to high pitch attitude on takeoff.

β target not fully centered.
Non-reversible ECAM actions carried out without proper crew confirmation.
SID, EOSID or ATC instructions not accurately followed.
Poor maintenance and monitoring of required track.
Lack of task sharing discipline during manual flight (FCU actions).
Not trimming the rudder.
Not rotating to the correct pitch attitude on go-around.
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5.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on FLY-By-Wire
To recognize engine failure / or fire warning.

 Schedule
Briefing Duration : 10 minutes.
 Equipment
DOC references:

FCOM 1.31.40 (Side slip Index)
MAIN
Theory of asymmetric flight

SECONDARY
A/P engagement / Rudder trim


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Engine Failure
PF should maintain runway centerline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD yaw
bar (if available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5 nose up and centralize blue target (see
below for explanatory note) with rudder. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor speed trend
arrow (minimum speed V2) until SRS has stabilized. The change over from yellow sideslip
index to blue target may not occur instantaneously; it is yellow as long as EPR is less than
1.3 on the live engine.
- airspeed
- asymmetric thrust moment from the engine(s), plus lateral and directional control (sideslip
and bank angle)
Airspeed is relevant because the aerodynamic power of the flight control surfaces varies;
where the asymmetric thrust moment from the engines is relatively constant with airspeed.
Therefore, handling problems with asymmetric control only occur at low speed.
The asymmetric thrust moment varies according to engine regime; the moment is greater at
high thrust than at low thrust. Thus, handling problems with asymmetric flight are greater
at high thrust – ie. the minimum control speeds are higher with TOGA than with a flex
thrust.
The efficiency of the control surfaces varies with airspeed; therefore larger control inputs
are needed to counter roll or sideslip at low IAS. Control deflections are limited, and when
the controls reach their stops, there is nothing to stop the sideslip or roll increasing, unless
either the engine thrust is reduced or the speed is increased.
Usually the rudder stops are reached first, and the minimum control speed (VMCA) is
defined by full rudder, 50 of bank towards the live engine, and straight flight. If flight is
continued below this speed the sideslip will increase and the limits of lateral control may
also be reached.

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Crew Techniques
On an Airbus FBW aircraft, the result of an engine failure, without pilot reaction, is a semi-
stabilized condition.
- as the aircraft yaws in response to the engine failure, the roll order seeks to
reduce roll rate to zero.
angle and sideslip.
This is a natural consequence of the normal functioning of the control laws and does not
depend on any extra sensor of engine failure. Crew action on rudder pedals and stick is
required to bring the aircraft to a steady heading.
If only lateral control is used, the aircraft can be stabilized on a steady heading using the
aircraft weight vector to counter the thrust moment; but large bank angles are needed,
which produces large sideslip angles. This is not recommended, therefore some rudder
must be used.
This means, simply applying sufficient rudder to centralize the sideslip indicator (the ball on
old instruments) together with lateral control to hold the wings level. It applies to FBW
aircraft when in clean and config Full configurations, and at low asymmetric thrust levels,
using the sideslip index on the PFD (yellow display). This is not the most efficient technique
from a climb performance point of view.
Beta Target is available in all take-off configurations when significant asymmetric thrust
exists.
 It calculates the sideslip required for ailerons neutral, in straight flight.

 It shifts the sideslip index by a small amount, so that this condition is achieved
when the index (blue) is centered by applying rudder. When it is centered, the
aircraft is close to the zero aileron position (best drag position).
The amount of sideslip required varies with speed; thus the amount of shift that is
applied to the index also varies with speed.
If the rudder stop is reached before the beta target is satisfied, the speed is too low;
therefore the speed must be increased until it is possible to center the index.
The A330 has minimum control speeds (VMC) which limit the minimum operational
speeds (V2 and VREF), at weights, which are within the operational range.
The engine failure compensation implemented in the flight control laws of the Airbus
FBW aircraft eliminates the immediate risk of a loss of lateral / directional control
while retaining all the conventional cues (bank angle and sideslip with which flight
crews are familiar) to detect the failure.
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SPEED AWARENESS:
VLS displayed on the PFD is in all flight phases, limited by a value equal to or slightly
greater than VMC.
During one engine inoperative operations at lightweights, speed excursions below VLS
should be avoided.
The recommended speed for flap retraction during take-off (“F speed) is limited (on the low
speed side ) to VMC+5.
During a one engine inoperative take-off, “F” provides a minimum speed at which the flaps
can be retracted while providing adequate maneuvering capability and margin relative to
VMC.
SIDE-SLIP AWARENESS:
In the current airworthiness Regulations (FAR and JAR) the minimum approach speed (VREF)
must not be lower than VMCL (“L” Landing configuration). If a Go-Around is performed, the
full power may safely be applied at a speed, at least, equal to the minimum control speed.
Therefore, when a one engine inoperative Go-Around is initiated at the minimum approach
speed (ie. at low weights) large rudder inputs (close to full rudder) are to be expected since,
by definition, the aircraft will be flying at a speed close to its VMCL.
As a general rule the lower the speed the more rudder is required to zero the Beta Target.
The need for more and more rudder to zero the Beta Target must be seen as an
unmistakable sign of approaching the minimum control speed.
If at low weights or low speeds Beta Target cannot be zeroed even with full rudder.
There is only one thing to do : ACCELERATE
A non-zeroed Beta Target with full rudder is an un-mistakable sign of flight close to or below
VMCL.
The calculation of the Beta Target is a trade off between drag produced by deflection of
control surfaces, and airframe drag produced by a slight sideslip. Centering the target
produces less total drag than centering a traditional ball, as rudder deflection, aileron

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LATERAL CONTROL
On one engine inoperative flight at low speed, large bank angles will inevitably lead to large
sideslip angles.
Rapid roll entries will also generate large sideslip variations, which will require large rudder
inputs to maintain Beta Target centered.
All of these statements are valid whatever the airspeed, but the effects are more
pronounced at low speeds close to the minimum control speeds.

Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and target centered.
 Common Errors
Over rotation to high pitch altitude.

Beta Target not fully centered.
Not rotating to correct pitch attitude on go-around.
5.2 Dual FMGC Failure
To recognize, and correctly deal with, a dual FMGC failure.
 Schedule
Briefing Duration : 20 minutes.
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.22 (Auto Flight)

FCOM 4.04.30 (How to use)
FCOM 4.06.20 (Abnormal procedures)
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MAIN
Four functions of FMGCs (FM,FG,FE and FIDS)

Possibility of partial or total feature of FMGC
Systems lost with failure
Back up navigation function
SECONDARY
Loss of some characteristic speeds

Loss of LANDING ELEV AUTO
Each FMGC has four separate parts; Flight Management, Flight Guidance, Flight Envelope
and Fault Identification and Display Systems. Only the first three functions concern the flight
crew in flight.
The relevant functions of the parts of the FMGC are as follows;
A) Flight Management
Navigation
Flight Planning
Performance
B) Flight Guidance Controls
FD
AP
A/THR
C) Flight Envelope
VLS and VMAX computation

Aft CG monitoring
Windshear detection

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Parts of each FMGEC may fail or the FMGC may fail completely. When there is a complete
failure of both FMGECs the following will be the main items lost and are detailed on ECAM.
AP 1 + 2
FD 1 +2
A/THR
VLS & VMAX on PFD
FM functions on MCDU (including landing elevation feed to CPCs)
The FPV will be available. To regain the blue track index it is necessary to switch off the
FDs. Tuning of navaids will have to be done through the RMP.
NAV BACK UP mode is available on the MCDU (FCOM 4.04.40 [how to use – MCDU back UP
Nav]). In this situation reset of the FMGECs may be attempted, consult QRH (reset of
computers).
Correct completion of required drills.

Demonstrates effective use of NAV BACK UP mode.
 Common errors
Not selecting NAV BACK UP mode.

Not using EPV or deselecting FDs
To ensure and control safe flight following loss of all engine generators.
To carry out ECAM procedure strictly respecting tack sharing requirements
To perform a safe approach and landing using raw data information and degraded
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 1 (Systems remaining)

QRH chapter 2 (Fuel gravity feeing)
FCOM 03.02.24 (Elec emerge CONF)
Briefing note – ILS raw data approach
Briefing note – Use of FPV
MAIN
EFIS, ECAM, ATO FLIGHT and FMGS availability following failure.

ECAM procedure (one ECAM DU lost) and status page APPR PROC considerations
(RAT, direct law....)
Navigation aid tuning by RMP.
QRH use for approach and landing data.
SECONDARY
Communications (ATC, Cabin…)

Raw data approach (reminder).
Direct law approach and landing (reminder).
Fuel gravity feeding considerations.
Cockpit lighting.
Use of APU generator in some specific cases.
When all engine driven generators have been lost, the workload is immediately greatly
increased. It is important that task-sharing procedures are understood and adhered to.
Remember one of the golden rules; fly the aircraft.
Autopilot is not immediately available and CM 1 must take control as only the following
equipment is available. It assumes the EMER GEN operates in High speed (Green HYD
system available)
CM 1 PFD (FD normally available)

CM 1 ND
Upper ECAM
CM 1 MCDU and FMGC 1
FCU.
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If the FPV has to be selected in order to be displayed on the CM 1 PFD, it is important to

deselect the FDs so that the blue track index is indicated on the PFD, assigning heading /
track keeping.
Once a safe flight path is established and the aircraft is under control, the focus can shift to
Although the ECAM advices a landing as soon as possible, it would be unwise to attempt an
approach at a poorly equipped airfield in marginal weather. Prolonged flight in this
nearest suitable airfield, once informed of your problem. This is a serious emergency and
ATC should be notified using appropriate phraseology (MAYDAY) so that greater separation
emergency electrical configuration with an all engine failure. Therefore, read the title of
ECAM failure. The ECAM drill may then be started. It is a lengthy and complicated
procedure, as only one display is available. Consider carefully the feasibility of standing the
APU. If a simultaneous engine generator failure has occurred, the probability of coupling will
be low.
In ELEC EMER CONFIG only one fuel pump will be powered, until land recover is pressed. If
prolonged flight is necessary, ensure that any fuel imbalance is dealt with (QRH 2.08 [fuel
Imbalance]).
When the gear is extended, the aircraft reverts to Direct law, manual pitch trim must be
use. Prior to commencing the approach it is necessary to select the LAND RECOVREY pb on
so that additional equipment including ILS1, LGCIU1, WHC1 and SFCC1 are available. It also
causes the loss of APU.
Maintains flight path in accordance with ATC clearance.

Performed ECAM actions accurately and without undue delay.
Makes sound decision to continue or divert according to circumstances.
Preformed ECAM actions accurately and without undue delay.
Make sound decision to continue or divert according to circumstance.
Preformed safe, accurate approach and landing, taking into account degraded systems
and flight control laws, within half scale deflection of localizer and glide slope.<o>

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 Common Errors
Confusion with all engine fail.

Lack of task sharing discipline during ECAM procedure.
FD not selected OFF to regain blue track index when FMGS not available.
Early extension of landing gear.
Selecting LAND RECOVERY pb on, too late in the descent
5.4 SMOKE
 Training objectives
To demonstrate effective handling of smoke warnings with or without apparent smoke.

To correctly complete the ECAM actions if displayed.
To correctly complete the QRH Smoke procedure.
To correctly apply the QRH Smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal procedure.
To practice the application of CRM and task sharing throughout.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 1.03 SMOKE / AVNCS SMOKE.
FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke / Avncs Smoke.
FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal.
FCOM Vol. 1 System Bus Equipment Lists
FCOM 1.35.20 Oxygen
FCOM 3.01.35 Limitations – Cockpit Oxygen System.
FCOM 1.23.20 Intercommunication system.
FCOM 1.21.10 Air conditioning.
FCOM 1.21.30 Ventilation.
FCOM 1.21.40 Cargo.
 Instructors Actions

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MAIN
The importance of donning the oxygen mask with correct selections.

The application of each of the procedures actions.
The recognition of air conditioning smoke.
The isolation of electrical buses and remaining equipment.
Application of task shearing.
SECONDARY
Use of the full face oxygen mask, cabin communications, communications with
oxygen mask on.
Smoke detector positions in the aircraft.
Avionics and cargo ventilation.
increased use of electronics on aircraft and the consequent thirst for electrical power,
modern aircraft are more than ever a target for fire on board. Recent accidents have
indicated that flight crew and aircraft systems can be completely overwhelmed very quickly.
The flight crew must act promptly and decisively to ensure the safety of the aircraft.
SMOKE / AVNCS SMOKE PROCEDURE
“This procedure is applicable in case of suspected smoke from the avionics compartment, air
conditioning, or cabin equipment. The flight crew should apply this procedure, if smoke is
detected with or without “AVIONICS VENT SMKOE” ECAM warning activation”.
The above quote and the remaining small print in the FCOM should be well known. There
will be little time to read the small FCOM print, if indeed, the crew is able to see it. The
essential item of the procedure have therefore been printed in large font in the QRH.
Initial actions
The initial procedure actions are designed to reduce smoke intensity, eliminates one of the
most common smoke causes and prevent pilot smoke inhalation. Pilots should develop some
tactile indicators for finding these push buttons in dense smoke.

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Oxygen use and communication
The use of headsets and avoiding the use of interphone by both pilots, will enable the PF to
receive ATC instructions clearly. Pilots should be familiar with the position of the 100%
switch and emergency knob on the full-face mask when donned. 100% oxygen must be
used. The emergency knob should be used to clear smoke from the mask. Do not leave this
function on, as oxygen supply could be depleted quickly. Refer FCOM 3.01.35.
At this stage aggressive efforts must be made to determine the smoke source utilizing all
crew. Some degree of fault analysis may be required at this stage.
FCOM procedure gives some guidelines. In addition, the ECAM RCL list may be consulted;
any previous malfunctions may be an indicator. The initial location of the smoke is of
primary importance as shortly after the initial appearance of the smoke other smoke alarms
will be activated as the aircraft ventilation system will move the smoke quickly around the
aircraft.
Crew Resources Management
It is important to maintain a good flow of information between pilots and from cabin crew;
however, the PF should not be discharged form the primary task. The Captain requires good
prioritization and management of tasks. If smoke is confirmed, do not hesitate to declare an
emergency, immediately descend and commence diversion to the nearest practicable
airport. If dense smoke is evident or reported the QRH procedure requires descent for the
smoke removal procedure and establishment of the Emergency Electrical Configuration as
described at the end of the procedure. CM 1 will become PF.
The next step in the procedure deals with air conditioning smoke if suspected. This should
be evident by smoke initially coming out of the ventilation outlets.
The note referring to cargo air isolation in the pervious procedure could also apply to the
next step where a commercial facility such as cabin lights or entertainment equipment may
be faulty.
Refer to FCOM 1.24.20 – Commercial Pb. This should be deactivated or selected “OFF” for
any cabin equipment smoke. The relevant faulty equipment can then be isolated by the CBs
located in the cockpit entry ceiling, or, the aft galley ceiling. Refer FCOM OEB. At the
discretion of the Captain the Commercial power could then be reinstated.

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The bus shedding procedure will shed the primary AC bus 1, then, if this dose not stops the
smoke AC bus 1 re-energies and AC 2 is shed. The auto pilot will remain engaged, ECAM SD
switching is required and before isolating AC bus 2 the CM 2 (if PF) will need to hand over
control to CM 1.
During pre study the trainee should review briefly the Bus Equipment List at the end of each
Vol. 1 section and assess the equipment lost with each AC bus. The flight control computers
are all DC powered, no attempt should be made to isolate any other business.
SMOKE REMOVAL
If the fire is confirmed to be extinguished, good smoke removal is obtained with pack flow
„HI‟, cruise thrust and Vent Extract overboard. However, if dense smoke, toxic fumes or if
smoke generation can not be stooped use the Smoke Removal procedure.
checklists as well as ECAM and information coming from the cabin. It is important to
establish the priority of removing dense smoke from the aircraft.
The smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal procedure will require prompt descent to 10,000 ft or
MEA. The emergency descent initiation technique should be applied as necessary. The LDG
ELEV selector may need to be sent to that altitude before this course of action is decided as
it may take several minutes to depressurize to 1 psi depending on the cabin altitude. Note
the speed limitation for cockpit windows open.
Demonstrates correct application of the procedure.

Takes action to ensure the aircraft flight path is safe throughout.
Demonstrate the correct use of the full face mask and oxygen
Maintains communication with ATC, the cabin and other crew member.
Knows the positions of system switches required
 Common Errors
Rushing the procedure.

Jumping or not completing steps of the procedure
Insufficient attention to Flight path and navigation requesting in errors.
Lack of crew communication and task sharing.

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5.5 Flight Control
5.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration
To perform the correct procedure to configure the aircraft for approach and landing
To carry out actions required by ECAM / QRH procedure
To handle the aircraft smoothly during approach and landing complying with published
procedure for configurations and speeds.
To respect task sharing requirements throughout
 Schedule
Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Landing with abnormal Slats / Flaps)

QRH chapter 2 (Approach Speeds and Landing distance)
FCOM 1.27.50 (Flaps and Slats)
FCOM 3.02.27 (slats and / or Flaps fault / locked)
FCOM 3.02.22 (Ground Clearance Diagram)
MAIN
Task sharing and crew coordination

Use selected speed
ECAM procedure and STS page “APPR. PROC”.
Approach speed and landing distance calculations.
Speed control for no flaps / no slats approach
Approach briefing and abnormal configuration procedure use.

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SECONDARY
A / THR management
Pitch angle (tail-strike) at landing if no flaps.
Use of autobrake according to landing distance available.
Go around procedure briefing.
CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for VAPP calculation.
The landing distance factors are available in QRH along with approach speed increments.
Approach speed will be VLS as indicated on the PFD. The approach speed increments in the
QRH should be used as information for wind corrections in failure cases.
The use of selected speed and of auto thrust is recommended for most cases.
Flaps / slats locked with the wing tip brake selecting a different flap setting – In this
case do not recycle flap lever.
Flaps / slats fail to move with movement of the flap lever – recycle the flap lever in
which case the flap lever can be recycled.
If the fault cannot be cleared apply the appropriate QRH procedure.
QRH needs a little amplification although the ECAM will say “FOR GO AROUND – S/F
JAMMED PROCEDURE………. APPLY”. By this the QRH provides guidance if a diversion is
decided upon the configuration this can be selected and appropriate limitations.
If a circuit is decided upon (immediate return to same airfield then the configuration that
should be selected and appropriate limitations. It must be borne in mind that for an eventual
approach and landing, this procedure must be applied for the start to configure the aircraft.
When CONF 1 is selected slats lock (WTB on) between 0 and 1.

Take control of the aircraft speed – use selected speed for the rest of he approach.
Managed speed will aim for S speed which is the wrong speed at this stage, and may
be below VLS. At this stage select an appropriate speed depending in aircraft
position and intentions.
Follow ECAM drill and then when ready for CONF 2 select VFE NEXT -5kt as shown
on the PFD. It is preferable to reduce speed and change configuration in non
maneuvering flight.

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Do not go below VLS – at high gross weights VLS may be greater than VFE NEXT in
which case decelerate to VLS, select the flap lever one step down and progressively
select slower speeds as the surfaces extend.
Repeat until landing configuration is reached.
Consider fuel available and the quantity that may be required if a diversion is necessary with
flaps and / or slats jammed. The autopilot may be available but monitor its operation closely
as it is only authorized for use in normal configuration. However, do not use the autopilot
below 500ft AGL.
No flap no slat Landing
No flaps no slat landing is a fairly simple procedure, however more distance is required for
maneuvering. The flap handle should be placed into CONF 1 position as required by QRH in
order to engage the go-around has to be performed. During approach the aircraft pitch
attitude will be almost normal .therefore with correct aircraft handling a tail strike is less of
concern. Nevertheless a long and high flare should be avoided. Consider high-speed
touchdown. Use of medium auto brake is recommended.
It is pertinent to bear in mind the tire speed limitation in high gross weight situations with
large ∆ Vref increments.
Correctly responds to failure ensuring a safe flight path and speed.

Performs ECAM actions and QRH procedures in a methodical manner.
Makes correct adjustments to VAAP and selects appropriate configuration.
Makes smooth and accurate approach and land within the touchdown zone at the
correct speed (+10/-0 kt).
 Common Errors
Rushing procedure.
Starting approach before completing all procedures.
Selected speed not used immediately at failure recognition.
Wrong VAPP selection on MCDU.
Rough handling.
Use of managed speed on final approach.
Incorrect go around procedure.

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5.5.2 Reconfiguration Laws – Recovery form approach to stall
To recognize the indications of an impending stall.

To take immediate and appropriate actions to recover to controlled flight.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.27.30 (Abnormal control laws)

FCOM 3.04.27 (Supplement Techniques – flight controls)
MAIN
Stall possible only in Alternate and Direct laws (“Fly-by-wire” aircraft)

Speed scale symbols change (VSW) and aural warning.
Recovery technique according to altitude and configuration.
SECONDARY
Control of pitch.
Risk of secondary stall.
The conventional stall is only possible in alternate and direct control laws, because of the
protections provided in normal law. Alternate or direct laws will be indicated by ECAM and
the changes on the PFD: bank angle and pitch limitation replaced by amber X, low speed
protection indications change from alpha prot.to VSW. VSW is load factor dependant and will
increase with increase in pitch up rate or bank angle.
An aural warning is produced on entering the stall regime. This aural warring is produced by
the FWC, not the flight envelope calculation. It is possible to experience “false warnings” if
pitch control is rough the recovery from the stall. VSW indications are always correct as
these are generated by the PRIM.

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AURAL WARNING…………………………………………………………………………”STALL, STALL, STALL”

THRUST LEVERS …………………………………………………………………………. TOGA
At the same time:
PITCH ATTITUE …………………………………………………………………………….REDUCE

BANK ANGLE………………………………………………………………………………….ROLL WINGS LEVEL
SPD BRAKES…………………………………………………………………………………..CHEKC RETRACTED
If a danger of ground contract exists, reduce pitch attitude no more than necessary for air
speed to increase.
If below 20,000 ft, and in clean configuration, select CONF 1. Out of stall above VLS when
there is no threat of ground contact:
Announce……………………………………………go around flap.
Flaps………………………….. retract 1 step
When positive climb established.
LANDING GEAR……………………………………………………………………………..UP
Recover to normal speed and retract flaps as required.

Care must be exercised not to re-enter the stall regime and set off another warning. With
Takes immediate action at first indication of impending stall.

Employs correct recovery technique and ensures minimum altitude loss.
 Common Errors
Recovery not initiated immediately.

Insufficient pitch control at attitude.
Stall re-entry due to uncontrolled high pitch attitude.
Use of manual trim below VLS.
Clean up before acceleration above VLS.

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5.6 Fuel Jettison
To know the correct procedures and reasons for fuel jettison.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 2.08A
FCOM 1.28.10 (Jettison)
FCOM 3.04.28 (Fuel Jettison)
FCOM 3.02.28 (Fuel Jettison Not Closed)
FCOM 4.03.20 (Pilot interface with FUEL PRED page)
FCTM 10.81 (Overweight landing)
MAIN
Why the A330 is equipped with a fuel jettison system.

Guidance on when to jettison.
Procedure for fuel jettison.
SECONDARY
Considerations about fuel jettison.

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The decision to jettison fuel is based on consideration of all conditions prevailing at the time.
As a guide, if a red indication. “LAND ASAP” is shown on the ECAM then do not delay the
landing to jettison fuel. If continued safe flight is a concern, an immediate landing is
preferable. Regardless, when runway length, weather conditions or runway state are such
that an overweight landing constitutes a risk, consideration should be given to the
jettisoning of fuel to below the weight limiting the landing weight or below the GO Around
limiting weight in QRH
The jettison procedure is detailed in QRH and this should be consulted as a “read and do”
checklist if fuel jettison is required. Note that FCMC logic permits only a single-shot fuel
jettison operation.
If the crew inadvertently enter a final weight below ZFW, jettison will automatically stop
when inner tanks reach low level. Caution must be exercised, as jettison is possible, even on
the ground.
The rate of jettison is approximately 1000kg a minutes. There is no limit on the use of the
jettison system in terms of speed, flap setting, fire warning or altitude. However, 5000 to
6000ft AGL is required to allow jettisoned fuel to disperse in the atmosphere and it may be
advisable not to circle in descent while jettisoning. Fuel should be jettisoned away from
thunderstorm activity.
Every airport should have a published jettison area to which ATC will direct the aircraft for
the purpose of fuel jettison. It will assist ATC if they are advised of the required jettison
time.
Correctly completes a jettison procedure.

Knows limitations on the use of the jettison system.
 Common Errors
Delaying approach to jettison when it is more appropriate to “LAND ASAP”.

No “JET GW” instead in the MCDU.
Jettison fuel in the wrong area or at too low an altitude.

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5.7 Dual Hydraulic Failure
To manually control the aircraft in abnormal flight control laws.

To carry out ECAM and QRH procedures respecting task sharing requirements.
To safety perform approach and landing in abnormal configuration.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 1 HYD (B+Y)(B+G)(Y+G) LO PR Summary.

QRH 4 (in Flight Performance)
FCOM 1.29 (Hydraulic).
Briefing note – Abnormal Flaps / Slats configuration
MAIN
Control of flight path and navigation.

Importance of good crew communication and co-ordination as autopilot is
inoperative.
Coordination with ATC.
Correct prioritization of tasks.
Use of selected speed.
Accurate following of FD and smooth control inputs.
SECONDARY
Flight Control system architecture (QRH).

Landing distance.
CONF FULL selected on MCDU RERF page for VAPP calculation with MCDU.
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are lengthy. It is necessary that the approach briefing necessary comprehensive and is vital
that crew co-ordination is good.
The golden rule of “AVIATE”, “NAVIGATION” and “COMMUNICATE” applies.
As there are usually many to fulfill, establish clear priorities. Bear in mind that if sufficient fuel
remains, taking time to plan and brief properly and time well spent. Remember that flight controls
will be in ALTERNATE law (PROT LOST).
In a HYD B + Y failure, there is no hydraulic power available to move the stabilizer. In effect, it is
frozen. Alternate law is active and auto trim is available, this is achieved by displacement of the
elevators which can be moved over the full range.
With HYD G +Y or G+B failed, flight will continue on single elevator. With a G+B failure, use a long
runway as few retardation devices are serviceable (spoilers 4+6 and accumulator brake pressure
only)
There is no need to memorize the above points as ECAM will give sufficient information concerning
inoperative systems.
As with most abnormal procedures, approach speed will be VLS plus any increment required by
ECAM. Depending on flap and/or slat position and the particular combination of flight control
failures (caused by the hydraulic failures) there may be a 10kt (or more) increment required by
ECAM. The increased speed allows more control due to loss of elevators or horizontal stabilizer.
In summery the STATUS page may appear complex but there are only 5 main considerations:-
1. Gear
2. Brakes
3. Flaps/Slats
4. VAPP Calculation
5. Landing Distance
In case of a dual hydraulic failure:

The ECAM should be applied first.
This includes both the procedure, and the STATUS section.
Only after announcing “ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED”, should the PNF refer to the corresponding
QRH summary.
When the failure occurs and after performing the ECAM actions, the PNF should refer tom the
“CRUISE” portion of the summery, in order to determine the landing distance coefficient.

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Since normal landing distances are also given on this page, the PNF will be able to compute the
landing distance taking failure(s) into account, in order for the pilot to decide whether to diver or
not.
APPROACH PREPARATION
As always, approach preparation includes a review of the ECAM STATUS.
After reviewing the STATUS, the PNF should refer to the “CRUISE” portion of the summery, to
determine the VREF correction, and compute the VAPP.
A VREF table is provided in the summery, for failure cases leading to the loss of the MCDU.
The LANDING and GO-AROUND portions of the summary should be used for the approach
briefing.
APPROACH
The APPR PROC actions should be performed by reading the APPROACH portion of the summery.
The PNF should then review the ECAM STATUS, and check that all the APPR PROC actions
have been completed.
Maintains safe flight path.

Ensures strict application of task sharing requirements.
Ensures correct application of ECAM, QRH and FMGC procedures.
Handles the aircraft smoothly without major deviations from required trajectory (+ / - 200
ft, +/-100, +/ -0 kt).
Makes correct determination of VAPP and landing distance.
Performs accurate approach within standard limits for instrument approach.
Lands within the landing zone and uses correct braking technique.
Abnormal configuration approach procedure.
Specific approach and go around briefing.
Ensures any special requirements are communicated to ATC and cabin crew.
 Common Errors
No emergency declared to ATC.

Incorrect use of selected speed.
Incorrect prioritization of tasks.
Incomplete approach and go around briefing for abnormal configuration.
FD not followed precisely due to over controlling.
Confusion between VAPP / VREF / VLS for corrected speed.
Not using QRH or ECAM for gravity gear extension.

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5.8 ECAM
5.8.1 Philosophy and Normal use.
To fully understand the philosophy and normal use of the ECAM.

To understand ECAM use for abnormal and emergency operations.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.31.10 to 1.30.30 (ECAM Description)

FCOM 3.02.01(ABN and EMER PROCEDURES)
MAIN
Warning levels and associated master lights

ECAM control panel.
Switching.
ECAM display philosophy.
MEMO display.
SECONDARY
Use of RCL and EMER CANG.

Flight phase and associated displays.

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The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor, (ECAM) monitors and displays all information
concerning aircraft systems and system failures. It is a system which, though text and
graphic displays, enables the crew to do most things from ensuring passenger comfort by
monitoring cabin temperature to dealing with multiple system failures without the need for
paper checklists.
Essentially the ECAM provides the following:
System indications – temperatures, pressures etc.

System monitoring – display of system failure, level 1 to 3 or advisory.
Memo - displays use of systems by the crew. E.g. anti-ice and also take off and
landing memo.
Crew actions – in case of failures the E/WD indicates crew action necessary to deal
Status – the status page provides the crew with an operational summery of the
aircraft systems at any stage of the flight. If STS is not displayed on E/WD, when
CONF 1 is selected or when QNH (QFE) is set, the STATUS page is automatically
displayed.
Display of system failures and take off / landing memo is flight phase sensitive. Take off and
landing memo are only displayed at the appropriate time. Before announcing “no blue”,
ensure that the take-off or landing memo is displayed by reference to the memo title, as it is
possible to mistakenly assume 3-4 green ECAM memo messages as the landing memo.
Take Off or Landing
Some warnings and cautions are suppressed at critical phases of flight; however failures
critical to particular phase of flight will always be displayed. Note that these flight phases are
different from the flight phases used by the FMGS. On the SD some pages are phase
selected i.e. the WHEEL page is automatically displayed after engine start. The cruise page
is not selectable, but is continuously displayed from 1500ft after take-off to landing gear
extension unless a warring / caution is displayed, or a system page has been manually
selected. (FCOM 1.31.20 [indicating / Recording Systems – indications on SD])
There are three levels of warning / caution – level 3 being the highest (FCOM 1.31.10
[indicating / Recording Systems – indications on SD])
Level 3 is associated with a master warring and is displayed in red on the E/WD.
Level 2 is associated with a master caution and is displayed in amber on the E/WD.
Level 1 is displayed in amber on the E/WD, however there is no master caution
In addition to the three levels of warring / caution, ECAM also differentiates between

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A Independent Failures
A failure that dose not affect other systems. The system title is underlined on the E/WD.
B Primary Failure
A failure that affects other systems and causes secondary failures. The failure title is
boxed on the E/WD.
C Secondary Failure
A failure that is caused by a primary failure and not unserviceability of that particular
system. Secondary failures are in amber preceded by an asterisk on the bottom right
hand side of the E/WD.
In the event of multiple failures there is a hierarchy which determines which failure are
displayed on the E/WD. i.e. level 3 takes priority over level 2. furthermore there is
hierarchy within each of the levels to ensure that the most important failures are
displayed to the pilots first. Details of how failures are dealt with are given in the
following briefing note.
failure are detailed in FCOM 1.31.05 (Indicating / Recording Systems – EIS General).
The ECAM control panel is described in FCOM 1.31.30 (Indicating/Recording Systems –

ECAM Controls). However the operational use of the RCL and EMER CANC pb‟s requires
a little explanation. The EMER CANC pb may be used by the crew to cancel any cautions
or warnings that are spurious or intermittent, and are effectively nuisance warnings.
The RCL pb is used to either recover cancelled cautions suppressed by the EMER CANC
pb or to review cautions or warning which have been cleared using the CLR pb.
Knowledge and correct use of the ECAM system.
 Common Errors
No deselection of manually selected system page.

Landing “no blue” call made before landing memo displayed.
Memo display not included in normal instrument scan.

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To use ECAM procedure effective and correctly
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 0.00 (task sharing)

FCOM 1.24.10 & 20 (Electrical)
MAIN
Task sharing
Identification of the failure
Co-coordinated ECAM actions and application of procedures.
SECONDARY
Advisory information
Flight phase inhibition
Priority of warnings
Abnormal ECAM configurations
OEBs application

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When the ECAM displays a warning or caution it is of primary importance that task sharing is
respected and secondly, to remember not to rush. The first priority, as always, is to ensure
a safe flight path. Task sharing is important but ensure that monitoring and cross checking
procedures are maintained.
FCOM 3.02.01 (Abnormal and emergency Procedures – Introduction) details procedures for
the use of ECAM in the failure, however the key points are:
PF-aviate navigate and communicate – in that order (golden rule).

PNF – To read aloud the ECAM failure.
PNF – deal with the failure on command of PF
Both pilots to identify failure and confirm by reference to SD, E/WD.
PNF to request clear, PF to confirm before CLR is pressed.
In additional remember the following points:
In the case of multiple failures complete all required actions (blue) associated with the first
red or amber title. Request clearance to press CLR and then deal with next failure. The
second drill is then carried out until its red/amber title can be cleared, before starting on the
third etc. Don‟t leave the red or amber title on the E/WD when all action associated with
that failure have been completed. Clear each one as it is dealt with. When all necessary
actions are complete there will be no amber or red displayed on the lower part of the E/WD.
Read the ECAM carefully, as it is possible to misread drills particular the countdown for fire
bottle discharge.
Although the A330 overhead panels are uncluttered, misidentification of switches or pb‟s is
possible. When action on overhead panel pb switches is required by ECAM, identification of
the correct panel is aided by reference to the white writing on the side of each system
panel.
When carrying out system pb selection, verify on SD that the required action has occurred
e.g. switching off an hydraulic pump changes the indications on the SD.
Cross check by both pilots before movement of any controls like THR lever, engine master
switch, fire switch or IRs, any guarded p/b to prevent the crew from carrying out
inadvertent irreversible actions.
When reviewing secondary failures (FCOM 1.31.25 [indicating / Recording Systems – ECAM
Sequence]) follow the same discipline of request and confirmation before action on CLR pb.
Certain procedures may be modified by OEB. When applicable, it has to be checked before
reading and analyzing status. The status page is then reviewed by both pilots. A green
overflow arrow indicates further pages of status messages. Status page can be recalled at
any time and is very useful as an aid for descent and approach planning. Don‟t be in too
much of a hurry to clear it.
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Following certain failures, or after failures, the STATUS page may contain an excess of
information. In order to extract the information essential for landing the aircraft safely use
the following guide:
CONFIG - flap / slat setting, approach speed increment, landing distance factor and control
law for landing.
GEAR -when to lower gear and whether normal or gravity extension.
BRAKES - normal, alternate or alternate without anti-skid (1000 psi max brake pressure,
accumulator provides pressure)
(NOTE: If a reverser is inoperative on status page, do not select that reverser on LDG; as the
reverser will not deploy but reverse idle is selected. This is higher than modulated
idle and will produce increased forward thrust)
When dealing with failures ECAM display the same principles discussed above are valid but
disciplines use of the ECAM control panel is even more important.
There is no automatic display of SD associated with the failure – conformation of the failure
reviewing secondary failures.
STATUS page is only displayed when STS pb is pressed and held. In order to view page two
or three of status messages the STS pb must be released for less than 2 seconds and then
pressed and held again.
Dealing with failures when in mono ECAM display requires discipline and practice. In the case of
single ECAM display or when there is a failure of the DMC ECAM channel, the engine parameters
may be monitored through the Engine stand-by page. This is displayed on the ND by selection on
the EFIS control panel. Remember that, except in EMER ELEC CONF it may be possible to transfer
the SD to the PNF‟s ND.
ECAM advisory mode (FCOM1.31.20 [indicating / Recording Systems – Indications on SD]) requires
the crew to monitor a parameter and dose not necessarily require action. FCOM 3.02.80 (Abnormal
and Emergency Procedures – Miscellaneous) contains recommended actions in the event of certain
advisory conditions.
OEBs (FCOM Vol 3) are issued by Aribus and contain information which may have implications for
crew actions in the event of system failures. The most important OEBs are reproduced in the QRH.
Depending on the software status of the particular aircraft, there may be an OEB reminder function
within the ECAM system. This OEB reminder function will replace the actions required by ECAM,
associated with a system failure, with a message directing the crew to consult a relevant OEB.

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If time permits consider consulting FCOM Vol 3 after ECAM actions have been completed. It may
contain additional notes or information not displayed on ECAM (electrical failure). However do not
prolong the flight for the purpose of consulting this volume.
Applies correct crew co-ordination and task sharing at all times.

Performs ECAM procedure correctly, accurately without undue delay.
 Common Errors
PF distracted from primary duties.

Clear action without crosscheck.
Non application of STATUS approach procedure.
SATTUS page(s) reviews at the wrong time.
During mono ECAM procedure, SD pages and STS page not reviewed.
Green overflow arrow ignored.

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5.9 Navigation
5.9.1 IRS / ADR Failures
To recognize and successfully deal with multiple IRS or ADR failure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Dual ADR failure).

FCOM 1.34.10 (ADIRS)
FCOM 3.02.34 (Navigation)
Briefing the following key points
MAIN
Use of IRS in ATT mode.

Flight control laws.
Use of standby instruments.
Separate ADR and IRS parts of ADIRS.
SECONDARY
NIL
Each ADIRS has two parts (ADR and IRS) which may fail independently of each other.
Single ADR or IRS failures are simply dealt with and only require action on the switching

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crewmember on the affected side can recover attitude, airspeed and altitude information
comes from the same source. It is therefore essential that both pilots cross-check attitude
and air data with the standby instruments.
A Triple IRS or ADR failure is very unlikely. Triple failures will not be displayed on ECAM.
Only two double failures will be displayed (i.e. ADR 1+2 FAULT and ADR 2+3 FAULT).
Following ECAM actions would give conflicting instructions. Follow the procedure for ADR
1+2+3 failure contained in QRH chapter 2). This is one of the few cases where the crew will
not follow the EACM.
procedure and inoperative systems. In this unlikely eventuality, standby instruments are the
only attitude, speed and heading reference.

Recognize triple ADR failure and uses QRH for drill
 Common Errors
Fails to recognize triple ADR or IRS failure.

To be aware of approach and landing capabilities

To understand effects on autopilot, FD, approach mode and flight controls.
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:

FCOM 3.02.34 (RA 1 + 2 fault procedure)
Briefing Note – ILS raw data approach.
MAIN
Effects of failure / gear position on auto-pilot, FD, approach mode and flight controls.
Raw data approach.
Loss of CAT 2 / CAT 3 capabilities
Loss of AUTO CALL OUT and LDG MEMO.
SECONDARY
Flight controls logic.

Use of TRK / FPA.
It should be noted that APP mode push button is inhibited and the flight director will not be
able to capture and track the guide slope (FCOM 1.22.30 [Auto Flight – Flight Guidance]).
However be careful of following flight director commands close to the ground as it will
command excessive roll rates. Interception of the localizer may be done using LOC and the
approach can be flown in LOC mode down to 400ft.
The approach and landing are only to CAT 1 limits, bearing in mind that the aircraft will
 Common Standards

Makes smooth, accurate approach and landing limits.

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 Common Errors
Use of LOC Mode in short final (below 400ft)
5.10 Power Plant
5.10.1 Engine Failure in Cruse
trajectory.
To perform the correct descent procedure depending on circumstances.
 Schedule
Briefing duration – 15 mts.
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 4.04 – 4.07 (Operational data)

FCOM 3.02.70 (Engine Fail), (Engine Relight)
FCOM 3.06.10 (Single Engine Operations)
FCOM 4.04.30 (Engine Failure in Cruise)
 Instructor’s Actions.
MAIN

Subsequent approach planning

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SECONDARY
A/P engagement mode, A/THR disconnection.

ETOPS (Fixed Speed Strategy) Mountainous area consideration.
Task Sharing, Decision making and Communication.
These are the Obstacle, Standard and ETOPS / fixed speed strategies. Unless a specific
procedure had been established before dispatch (ETOPS, mountainous areas) the
Before descent:
Set MCT on the remaining engine and disconnect A/THR.

Start ECAM actions.
Select green dot speed on the FCU and pull.
Set a lower attitude in the altitude window and pull for “OPEN DES”
Select a heading on the FCU to turn off the airway, if required, and pull.
Advise ATC.
below.
thrust fixed at MCT, the speed is controlled by elevator.
descent will be lower than other strategies. Carefully consider the aircraft‟s position during
the drift down, as obstacles may still present a problem. At the end of drift down, if clear of
obstacles, return to normal LRC speed, set on FCU and engage A/THR.
The descent should be performed at Match .82/300 kts. When in the descent, establish from
the QRH cruise flight level for level off. Inform ATC and set in the FCU altitude window.
On reaching the new altitude, set speed according to the QRH, and select A/THR on.
Continue flight to destination, or as appropriate to a selected enroute alternate.

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ETOPS Strategy (FCOM 3.06.50) A330 ONLY.
The constraint in ETOPS at planning is time to nearest diversion airport. This is calculated
for average TAS at Ach .82/330kts; however the actual speed may be determined by the
Captain at the time of diversion. Further, the altitude selected should be consistent with the
actual profile or other as established before dispatch and consistent with terrain clearance.
After level off, cruise at 310 kts or LRC, or as determined by the situation and fuel
availability.
Overview
Generally, there is sufficient time to check all actions before rushing in to them. However at
high flight levels, close to limiting weights, if an engine fails speed will decay very quickly
requiring prompt crew response. The ECAM only register the engine failure when „engine
core speed is below idle‟.
After the ECAM actions are commenced the “THR LEVER………… IDLE” and the „L + R INR
TK……..SPLIT‟ will remain blue on the ECAM. This is a normal ECAM with this condition.
The FMGS PROG page will show the EO MAX REC altitude. Once descent is started the PERF
page shows time to descend, and distance taken. In the QRH there are tables containing
similar details of engine out ceiling, time to descent, distance taken and fuel used. There is
also a graph 2 calculate gross ceiling. Tables are available for long rang cruise performance,
an in-flight check of fuel consumed and time to destination.
Single engine operations will typically use 15% more fuel than with both engines (at the
same flight level). This may become a factor if a long diversion is contemplated.
The control of task sharing is responsibility of the Captain. Good prioritization is required as
well as other CRM and communications skills.
The diversion airfield will probably not be an SriLankan Airlines destination so brief
thoroughly and do not allow the operation to be rushed especially below MSA.

Configuration for maneuvering on final,
Go around climb limiting weight and fuel jettison,

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One engine taxi with sloping taxiways, strong and or wet conditions may make it

Respects task sharing and ECAM procedures requirements.
Establishes correct parameters from QRH.
Follows flight director accurately and ensures correct FCU selection.
Maintains good situational awareness.
Establishes effective communication with ATC and crew members.
 Common Errors
A/THR not disconnected for drift down procedure.

Incorrect strategy.
Rushed actions.

To perform correct engine relight procedure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC References:


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MAIN

Engine relight in flight procedure (wind milling and starter assisted)
SECONDARY
Before attempting a relight in flight, gather all relevant information to decide whether a
relight should be attempted. Consider engine damage, icing or volcanic ash encounter and
their effects on successful relight. Check for satisfactory indications of N1 / N2 and oil
quantity. Further, is there an appropriate time to relight, when workload is low?
It is recommended to attempt a re-light prior to ECAM “status” actions.
Refer to QRH for ENG RELIGT (in flight) drill. Auto start is recommended and the FADEC
will determine whether assisted start or a wind milling start is appropriate. The relight
envelop will need to be consulted to determine if the crossfeed valve is required open to
provide air to the starter. If starter air is required the other engine thrust will need to be
increased above idle to provide sufficient air pressure.
The crew must be ready to take appropriate action in case of abnormal start as no start
protections are provided in flight. The chrono should be used to monitor light up after fuel
flow increase. Ensure cross checking of vital controls before moving them: thrust lever,
engine master switch etc.
If an engine has failed in the cruise, the estimated fuel on board and time to destination is
now calculated on single engine performance. The EO CLR prompt should not be used if a
real engine out has been detected. If the EO CLR prompt is pushed, these predictions
revert to two engine predictions and are meaningless, if a successful relight is not achieved.
Uses all available information to make a sound decision to attempt an engine relight
in flight.
Ensures correct task sharing and good crew communications.

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5.10.3 All Engine Flame Out
To establish a safe flight pat.

To recognize the indications of a dual engine failure.
To carry out correct procedure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC Reference:
QRH chapter 1 (All Engine flame out)

QRH chapter 2 (Engine relight in flight)
FCOM 1.70 (Ignition and starting)
MAIN

Choice of optimum speed.
ECAM actions (APU use, relight parameters…)
SECONDARY
Aircraft status: systems, F/CTL Law.

Minimum RAT speed.
Related consequences (Pressurization, forced landing, ditching..)

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Following an All engine failure the flight deck indications change drastically as generators
drop off line, the RAT is deployed and ECAM prioritizes checklists.
Control of the aircraft must be taken immediately by CM1, and a safe flight path established.
It is important at this stage to correctly identify the failure as it can be easily confused wit all
engine generators fault. ECAM will prioritize checklists so to avoid confusion read ECAM
carefully to correctly identify the failure. It is vital to establish good crew communication
and to apply efficient task-sharing.
Establish communications with ATC, stating nature of emergency and intentions. VHF2
(VHF3) and ATC2 are not supplied so VHF 1 is the only means of communicating the
emergency to air traffic control. This can be easily seen by looking at the ATC and VHF 2
windows, which will be blank.
The ECAM actions can be commenced, with attention to optimum relight speed. If there is
no relight within 30 sec ECAM will order the engine master switches to be placed off for 30
sec and then on again. This is to permit ventilation of the combustion chamber. Start the
APU once below the altitude which the APU is available for attempting engine start. Below
FL200 optimum speed is green dot.
Maximum gliding range is achieved at green dot speed although this will not be displayed on
the PFD if the APU generator is not available. Think ahead and plan the approach.
Depending on the airplane‟s position, a forced landing or a ditching may be required if the
relight is unsuccessful. Find the relevant QRH page and review the procedure.
The list of affected systems is ling and flight controls will be much degraded. If the relight
attempts are successful, consider the options of immediate landing versus continuing the
flight. If the engines failed simultaneously, was there a common cause?
At all times, maintain correct speed and situational awareness.

 Common Errors

Engine relight not monitored (stopwatch /parameters)

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5.10.4 Thrust Lever Disagree / Fault
To understand the consequences and differences related to thrust lever

malfunctions.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC Reference:
FCOM 1.70 (Trust control)

FCOM 3.02.70 (abnormal procedure)
MAIN
Differences between “Disagree” and “Fault” and related thrust control consequences.
Specific approach procedure when autolanding not possible.
SECONDARY
Caution relating to thrust lever Fault during take-off (on ground, between V1 and VR:
warning inhibited)

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A. Disagree
This failure occurs when the two validated thrust lever angle signals are not in
agreement. Should the failure occur on take-off. TOGA or FLEX thrust is maintained
until thrust reduction, after which maximum available thrust is MCT.
In flight, keep the A/THR engaged (or engage A/THR if not in use) to allow it to
manage thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will reduce to idle thrust.
Consider a CONF 3 approach, as this is effectively a single engine approach. Note
that reverse thrust is avail able for landing.
B. Fault
If this fault develops, it indicates that a non-valid signal as been received from
engine 1 or 2 thrust lever angle.
The fault on the ground freezes thrust to idle, and furthermore commands the
reversers to stow.
manage thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position. A/THR should
be engaged before slat retraction.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will be at idle trust. It
will be necessary to make the approach wit CONF 3, as the affected engine reduces
to idle power when landing gear is down locked, or at slat extension. This is not
shown on ECAM.
Note that reverse thrust is NOT available for landing.
Maintain s safe trajectory in all flight phases.

Ensures application of ECAM procedures, including specific approach
requirements.
 Common Errors
Direct reason for “Disagree” and “Fault” not clearly understood. Specific procedure
not applied for approach.

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5.10.5 Engine Manual Start
To carry out the correct ECAM or QRH actions in the event of an abnormal start
(auto or manual).
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC Reference:

FCOM 1.70.80 (Ignition and Starting)
FCOM.02.70 (Power Plant)
Briefing Notes – Engine start auto/manual
MAIN
Autostart fault ECAM procedures.

Engine starter limitations.
Tailpipe fire.
SECONDARY

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It is important to have a thorough knowledge of limitation and procedure,

particularly when performing a manual start.
In general, the start function will protect the engine, but in manual start t is the
If a stall condition occurs and N2 (or N3) is above idle, the warning is not displayed.
Consequently, the crew must take action to shut the engine down.
Following shut down for any reason, maintenance action may be required, or dry
crank before another start attempt.

 Common Errors


 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC Reference:
QRH chapter 2 (Eng Tailpipe Fire)
MAIN

QRH use.
SECONDARY
The most likely sources of information concerning an engine tailpipe fire are the
ground crew or cabin staff. The procedure for dealing with a tailpipe fire is
contained in QRH chapter 2. It is important to establish which engine is on fire and
react accordingly. Establishing good communications between the cockpit and
ground crew or cabin staff to establish which engine is on fire, and consider opening
the cockpit window to confirm. The engine must be cranked which enables the
engine to be ventilated to remove fuel vapors after the unsuccessful start attempt.
If the burning has not stopped, consider the use of external fire extinguishers (Note
that they can cause severe corrosive damage and should only be considered after
the procedure as been completed).

Adheres strictly to task sharing requirements at all times and ensures good crew

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 Common Errors
Does not know where to find the appropriate procedure.

5.11 Emergency Descent

To carry out the correct actions to achieve a safe descent at the maximum
appropriate rate.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC Reference:
QRH chapter 1 (emergency descent)

MAIN

Actions on FCU should be checked on FMA to ensure correct engagement of the
desired mode.
Where structural damage is suspected maintain current IAS.
ECAM / Check-list actions.
Control and monitoring of descent and level-off.

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The procedures for an emergency descent are detailed on ECAM, in the QRH and in
FCOM 3.02.80 (ABN and EMER procedures – EMER DESCENT).
The use of autopilot and autothrust is recommended for all emergency descents.
The modes used will depend on whether structural damage is assumed or a high
speed descent is required. The following are the two ways in which to use the
autopilot and autothrust depending on which type of descent is required. As per
standard ECAM procedures PF flies the aircraft and PNF carries out ECAM drill.
However before initiating descent the crew must don oxygen masks and establish
crew communications.
a) 1st loop:

Check FMA reads IDLE / OP DES / HDG
b) 2nd loop:

Push speed / mach pb (target speed for descent is current IAS)
If NO DAMAGE SUSPECTED (HIGH SPEED DESCENT)
Increase speed to MMO / VMO.
NOTE: At high flight levels, the speedbrake should be extended slowly while
monitoring VLS, so that angle of attack protection does not become active
thereby causing speedbrake retraction. Use caution when using speedbrake
if structural damage exists.
2000ft above selected altitude select speed brakes to retract.

9550‟ or below consider removing oxygen masks and reset oxygen mask box
flaps to enable the Headsets microphones use.
1000‟/MSA or below, make a Command & PA as given in SOP
Request purser to the cockpit and establish the condition of PAX and cabin.

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Dons oxygen mask within 5 seconds and crew communications established

immediately.
Initiates descent without delay using correct technique, according to
circumstances.
Remember to reset the boom set microphone after removing the oxygen mask.
 Common Errors

Headset not used.
Lack at ATC communication / transponder code‟
Incorrect level-off technique.

MN/TR/05
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL Issue No :00
Chapter 06
September 2010
Page 1
CHAPTER - 06
ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS - A340

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6.1 Operating Techniques ……………………………………………………………….……………………… 3
6.1.1 Rejected Take-off…….………………………………………………………………………..………………… 3

6.1.2 Engine Failure or Fire after V1………………………………………………………..……………………… 5
6.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on Fly-By-Wire Aircraft………………………………………………………………… 12
6.3 ELEC EMER CONFIG……………………………………………………………………………………………. 18
6.3.1 All Engine Generator Fault ……………………………………………………………………………………… 18
6.4 Smoke…………..………………………………………………………………………………………..…......... 21
6.5 Flight Control …………………………………………………….……………………………………………... 25
6.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration …………………………………………………………………….… 25

6.5.2 Abnormal control Laws – Recovery from Approach to Stall …………………………………..……. 27
6.6 Fuel Jettison – A340 ……………….………………………………………………………………………… 29
6.7 Dual Hydraulic Failure …………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
6.8 ECAM …………………………………………………….……………………………..……………………………. 33

6.8.2 Use in case of failures ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
6.9 Navigation ………….…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41
6.9.1 IRS / ADR failures ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41

6.9.2 Dual Radio Altimeter Failure ………………………………………………………………………………….. 42
6.10 Power Plant ……………………………………………………………………………….……………………… 44
6.10.1 Engine Failure in cruise …………………………………………………………………………………………. 44

6.10.2 Two Engine Out Operations …………………………………………………………………………………… 47
6.10.3 Engine Relight in flight………………………………………………………………………………………….. 49
6.10.4 All Engine Flame out …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
6.10.5 Thrust Lever disagree / Fault ………………………………………………………………………………… 53
6.10.6 Engine Abnormal Starts ………………………………………………………………………………………… 55
6.10.7 Engine Tailpipe Fire ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 56
6.11 Emergency Descent ………………………………………….………………………………………………. 58

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To take correct actions in the event of RTO
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
MAIN
Failure identification (crew communication)

Decision and call out (STOP, GO and V1)
Deceleration actions and control.
Task sharing.
ECAM actions (if appropriate).
Notify ATC.
SECONDARY
Review of non inhibited warnings.

Complementary actions and check-list.
Specific engine fire on ground check list.
Decision with fire problems or windshear.

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The action of rejecting a take-off can be hazardous, and the time available to make the correct
decision is limited. To assist with this, the ECAM inhibits warnings which are not a paramount
importance between 80 kt and, 1500 fl or 2 minutes after lift off, whichever occurs first.
Therefore, any warning received in this period should be carefully considered. To assist
decision making, the take-off is divided into low and high speed regimes. 100 kt is chosen as
the dividing line. There is no significance to 100 kt, merely that it divides the take-off phase
into low and high speed phases.
- Below 100 kt, it is possible to reject for any reason.

- Above 100 kt, and approaching V1, be “go-minded” unless major failures or ECAM
warnings occur.
- Once above V1, the take-off must be continued as it may be impossible to stop the aircraft
on the aircraft on the runway remaining.
Remember to bring the airplane to a complete stop, not slowed, and then stopped. Set the
Parking Brake. When the airplane has been stopped, identify / confirm the failure. When
evacuation is considered, use the ON GROUND EMER / EVAC checklist. There is sometimes
confusion between the use of the ON GROUND EMER / EVACUATION checklist and the ENG
FIRE ON ECAM procedure. The ENG FIRE ON GROUND procedure includes the possibility of
emergency evacuation. But it does not list in detail the items associated with the evacuation
as is done in the “ON GROUND/EMER EVACUATION” C/L. ie - ∆p, cabin crew notify etc.
Use ATC, fire service and cabin staff to gain as much information as possible to assist in
making a decision on whether to evacuate or not. Remember that the simplest way to confirm
an engine fire, on the ground, is to open the cockpit window and look out.

PASSENGERS REMAIN SEATED‟. This is vital to ensure that there is no undesirable reaction
from the crew or passengers. Clear the runway if possible and it is safe to do so. Brief the
purser and make a PA to the passengers.
Makes appropriate decision before V1.

Carries out correct actions to ensure a safe stop on runway centerline.
 Common Errors
Disarming of autobrake due to instinctive manual braking.

ATC and / or Cabin crew not informed.
Reversers remain engaged after aircraft stop.
Omitting selection of parking brake on.
Non adherence of task-sharing during emergency procedure.
Confusion over use of ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION.
Inability to use mechanical seat controls.

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To recognize Engine failure and / or fire warning.

To perform correct engine fail or fire procedure after V1.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Engine stall – Overweight landing)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Abnormal ops engine failure)
FCOM 3.04.70 (Engine failure)
FCOM 4.04.30 (EOSID) if applicable
MAIN
Go / STOP decision making.

Aircraft control on the ground and at rotation.
Roll control, sideslip target and “Fly by wire” characteristics.
Confirmation of non-reversible or guarded items with ECAM actions.
Engine-out profile and managed speed logic.

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SECONDARY

EOSID activation.
FD roll limit below green dot speed.
EO CLR prompt.
A. Engine Failure
After detecting an engine failure, PNF is to call “engine failure”, without identifying which
engine has failed.
low speeds close to VMCG (in particular above 100 kt, after inhibition of NW steering)
PF should maintain runway centerline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD
yaw bar (if available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5% nose up and centralize blue ß
target (see below for explanatory note) with rudder. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor
speed trend arrow (minimum speed V2) until SRS has stabilized. The change over from
yellow side slip index to blue ß target may not occur instantaneously. Use rudder trim to
neutralize rudder pedal pressure. When a positive climb has been achieved, call for
retraction of the gear. Use the autopilot if it is available.
PNF should closely monitor the aircraft‟s flight path, cancel warnings and identify the
failure when appropriate. Note when a positive climb has been established and announced
When the aircraft is under control ensure the ICAO engine out flight path is being
maintained.
Once well clear of the ground, minimum 400‟, the ECAM actions may be started. It is not
necessary to rush into doing the ECAM drills and 400ft is the MINIMUM attitude at which
aircraft is climbing, stabilized and is flying in a safe direction. Do not get too distracted
with the ECAM. Furthermore, ECAM actions may be interrupted when necessary to allow
both pilots to monitor level-off, configuration changes etc.
It is important to determine whether the engine had suffered a flameout or has structural
damage. The action of putting the start switch to ignition confirms the relight attempt
being made by the FADEC. If a flameout has occurred, then a relight (QRH chapter 2) may
be considered at a later stage when aircraft has been cleaned up and a safe flight path is
established. The “After Take off” checklist being carried out after the engine relight
attempt (at status page if unsuccessful).

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confirmation from both pilots.
CLIMB AFTER LIFT-OFF
ICAO Take – off Flight Path Area
SriLankan Airlines use the ICAO take-off flight path area that identifies the rate of
accountability for engine inoperative take-offs. Many common terms are used to identify
the flight path area. They include zone, splay, corridor, funnel and cone. The FAA
accountability area is considerably narrow than the ICAO standard. All the following refer
to the ICAO standard.
Straight Departure
A straight departure is one in which the initial departure track is within 150 of the
alignment of the runway center line.
Area for straight departure with track guidance

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Turning Departure
When a departure route requires a turn of more than 15° a turning area is constructed. Turns
may be specified at an altitude / height, at a fix, and at a facility. Straight flight is assumed until
reaching an attitude / height of at least 120m (394ft), above the elevation of the departure end of
runway. No provision is made in this document for Turing departures requiring a turn below 120m
(394ft), above the elevation of the departure end of runway (DER). Where the location and / or
height of obstacles precludes the construction of turning departures which satisfy the minimum
turn height criterion departure procedures should be developed on a local basis in consultation
with the operators concerned.
Turn areas at a facility or DME distance are constructed in the same manner, and using the same
parameters as for the missed approach, except that the speed employed are the final missed
approach speeds increased by 10 per cent to account for increased aeroplane mass in departure
see below. In exceptional cases, where acceptable terrain clearance cannot otherwise be
provided, turning departure routes are constructed with maximum speeds as low as the
intermediate missed approach speed increased by 20 per cent, in such cases the procedure is
annotated with a cautionary note.

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Maximum Speeds for Turning Departures
Aero plane Maximum Speed km/h

Category (kt)
A 225 (120)
B 305 (165)
C 490 (265)
D 540 (290)
E 560 (300)
B. Engine Fire
However, the ECAM drill should be commenced as soon as practicable (though not below
400ft) be aware that the engine may still be developing a significant amount of thrust until
Consider the use of autopilot to reduce workload. The ECAM will count down the seconds
to initiate agent discharge and the time period between discharges.
matter.
and landing.
C. ECAM Procedures
ECAM procedures should be started not below 400ft. at this height, only immediate actions
to secure an engine should be carried out as shown below. ECAM actions may be

reading STATUS.

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D. FMGS Procedures
The two FMGS procedures which are worthy of note are the use of the EOSID prompt and
the EO CLR prompt. The in depth explanation of both these functions are contained in
FCOM 1.04.30(How to use – Other Functions).
The use of EOSID routing is dependant on there being an EOSID defined in the database
differs from the planned SID (DP: Diversion point) then the EOSID will appear as a TMPY
F-PLN. To follow the EOSID all the crew has to do is to insert this as the active F-PLAN.
Therefore the first leg of the active F-PLAN should be a common leg in database.
If the engine failure occurs beyond the point at which the two SIDs differ there will by no
TMPY F-PLAN created although the EOSID will be shown in yellow on the ND. To follow an
EOSID in this case the crew can perform a DIR TO on of the EOSID waypoints and then
modify the F-PLAN or, more simply follow the EOSID, which is displayed as a yellow line on
the ND, using HDG mode.
When an engine failure is detected the FMGS predictions are based on single engine
performance. Additionally the bank angle commanded by the FD is limited to 15 when
speed is below maneuvering speed of the current configuration (F,S,O). The EO CLR
remove this bank angle limit.
The EO CLR prompt should be pressed ONLY in the event of a successful relight on a failed
engine or in the event of wrong detection or FADEC fault. Holding may be performed in
managed NAV, if speed is selected and is just greater than Green Dot Speed. This will
taken, if any speed – and / or bank variation occur.
E. One Engine out Approach and Landing
The fuel Jettison checklist may be required as the SriLankan Airlines Procedure
recommends all landings to be below max landing weight in failure cases (Refer Sup. SOP)
Autoland (CAT 3 DUAL) [outer engine out] (CAT 3 SINGLE) [inner engine out] is available
on one engine out condition (as shown on ECAM).
Maximum use should be made of the autopilot to reduce crew workload. In manual flight
an engine out landing is essentially conventional. Good trimming is beneficial in keeping
the indication centered. Consider the use of manual thrust when the autopilot is off, as it is
easier to anticipate and coordinate rudder and trim input as and when the thrust varies.

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The approach should be carried out in CONF 3 as directed by ECAM. Do not select the
landing gear down too early, the power requirement for level flight at hot / high altitude
airports and / or high weight will be large.
Rudder trim may be reset to zero on short finals at 500‟, to make the landing run easier,
by giving symmetrical forces about the zero rudder position.
F. One Engine out Go-around.
The go-around is essentially the same as on 4 engines, the pitch target is now 12.50. Apply
rudder to compensate for the increase in thrust and keep the β target centered. FMA will
(when ALT pb pressed). As this is a go-around, the target speed is the memorized
approached speed or the speed at engagement of go-around, becoming green dot at
acceleration altitude.
G. β Target
target (blue) replaces the side slip indicator on the PFD when there is engine power
asymmetry and CONF 1,2 or 3 is set [ see FCOM 1.27.20(flight Controls – Normal law)].
When the β target is centered, total drag is minimized even though there is a small
amount of side slip.
surfaces, and airframe drag produced by a slight side slip. Centering the β target
procedures less total drag than centering a traditional ball as rudder deflection, aileron
Makes correct decision to continue the take-off.

Ensure minimum deviation from runaway centerline.
Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and β target centered.
Accurately follows flight director and ensures correct FCU selections.
Maintains speed, V2+5kt / -0kt during second segment.
Adheres to engine-out vertical profile maintaining acceleration altitude +200 ft / - 0 ft.
Follows EOSID, emergency turn procedures, ATC instructions or required heading + / - 100
Respects task sharing.

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 Common Errors
Over rotation to high pitch attitude on take off.

β target not fully centered.
ECAM non-revisable actions carried out without proper crew confirmation.
SID, EOSID or ATC instructions not accurately followed.
Lack of task sharing discipline during manual flight (FCU actions).
Not rotating to the correct pitch attitude on go-around.
6.1.3 Asymmetric Flight on Fly-By-Wire
To recognize engine failure / or fire warning.

 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.31.40 (Sideslip Index)

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MAIN
Theory of asymmetric flight.

SECONDARY

Engine Failure
PF should maintain centerline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD yaw bar (if
available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5 nose up and centralize blue target (see below for
explanatory note) with rudder. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor speed trend arrow (minimum
speed V2) until SRS has stabilized. The change over from yellow sideslip index to blue target may
not occur instantaneously: it is yellow as long as N1 is less than 80%.

Airspeed.
Asymmetric thrust moment from the engine(s), plus lateral and directional control
(sideslip and bank angle).
Airspeed is relevant because the aerodynamic power of the flight control surface varies: where the
asymmetric thrust moment from the engines is relatively consultant with airspeed. Therefore,
handling problems with asymmetric control only occur at low speed.
The asymmetric thrust moment varies according to engine regime: the moment is greater at high
thrust than at low thrust. Thus, handling problems with asymmetric flight are greater at high
thrust – i.e. the minimum control speeds are higher with TOGA than with a Flex thrust.
The efficiency of the control surfaces varies with airspeed: therefore larger control inputs are
needed to counter roll or sideslip at low IAS. Control deflections are limited, and when the controls
reach their stops, there is nothing to stop the sideslip or roll increasing, unless either the engine
thrust is reduced or the speed is increased.
Usually the rudder stops are reached first, and the minimum control speed (VMCA) is defined by
full rudder, 50 of bank towards the live engine, and straight flight. If flight is continued below this
speed the sideslip will increase and the limits of lateral control may also be reached.

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Crew Technique
On an Airbus FBW aircraft, the result of a failure, without pilot reaction, is a semi-stabilized
condition.
- As the aircraft yaws in response to the engine failure, the roll order seeks
to reduce roll rate zero.
angle and sideslip.
This is a natural consequence of the normal functioning of the control laws and does not depend
on any extra sensor of engine failure. Crew action on rudder pedals and stick is required to bring
the aircraft to a steady heading.
If only lateral control is used, the aircraft can be stabilized on a steady heading using the aircraft
weight vector to counter the thrust moment; but large bank angles are needed, which produces
larger sideslip angles. This is not recommended; therefore some rudder must be used.
This means, simply applying sufficient rudder to centralize the sideslip indicator (the ball on old
instruments) together with lateral control to hold the wings level. It applies to FBW aircraft when
in clean and config Full configurations, and at low asymmetric thrust levels, using the sideslip
index on the PFD (yellow display). This is not the most efficient technique from a climb
performance point of view.
Beta Target is available in all take-off configurations when significant asymmetric thrust exists.
It calculates the sideslip required for ailerons neutral, in straight flight.

It shifts the sideslip index by a small amount, so that this condition is achieved when the
index (blue) is centered by applying rudder.
When it is centered, the aircraft is close to the zero aileron position (best drag position)
The amount of sideslip required varies with speed; thus the amount of shift that is applied to the
index also varies with speed.
If the rudder stop is reached before the beta target is satisfied, the speed is too low; therefore the
speed must be increased until it is possible to centre the index.
The A340 has minimum control speeds (VMC) which limit the minimum operational speeds (V2 and
V REF), at weight, which are within the operational range.
The engine failure compensation implemented in the flight control laws of the Airbus FBW aircraft
eliminates the immediate risk of a loss of lateral / directional control while retaining all the
conventional cues (bank angle and sideslip with which flight crews are familiar ) to detect the
failure.

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SPEED AWARENESS;
VLS displayed on the PFD is in all flight phases, limited by a value equal to or slightly greater than
VMC.
During one engine inoperative operations at lightweights, speed excursions below VLS should be
avoided.
The recommended speed for flap retraction during take-off (“F speed) is limited (on the low speed
side) to VMC+5.
During a one engine inoperative take-off, “F provides a minimum speed at which the flap can be
retracted while providing adequate maneuvering capacity and margin relative to VMC.
The recommended speed with flaps extended during an approach (“F speed) provides a
comfortable margin (10-15kts) relative to MVC.
SIDESLIP AWARENESS;
In the current airworthiness Regulations (FAR and JAR) the minimum approach speed (VREF)
must not be lower than VMCL (“L” Landing configuration). If a Go-Around is performed, the full
power may safely be applied at a speed, at least, equal to the minimum control speed.
Therefore, when a one engine inoperative Go-Around is initiated at the minimum approach speed
(i.e. at low weights) large rudder inputs (close to full rudder) are to be expected since, by
definition, the aircraft will be flying at a speed close to its VMCL.
As a general rule the lower the speed the more rudder is required to zero the Beta target. The
need for more and more rudder to zero the Beta Target must be seen as an unmistakable sign
approaching the minimum control speed.
If at low weights or low speeds Beta Target cannot be zeroed even with full rudder the, only thing
to do is ACCELERATE.
A non-zeroed Beta Target with full rudder is an un-mistakable sign of flight close to or below
VMCL.
The calculation of the Beta Target is a trade off between drag produced by deflection of control
surface, and airframe drag produced by a slight sideslip. Centering the target produces less total
drag than centering a traditional ball, as rudder deflection, aileron deflection, spoiler deployment
and aircraft body angle are all taken into account.

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LATERAL CONTROL
On one engine inoperative flight at low speed, large bank angles will inevitably lead to large
sideslip angles.
Rapid roll entries will also generate large sideslip variations, which will require rudder inputs to
maintain Beta Target centered.
All of these statements are valid whatever the airspeed, but the effects are more pronounced at
low speeds close to the minimum control speeds.

Establishes correct pitch attitude at rotation with wings level and target centered.
 Common Errors
Over rotation to high pitch altitude.

Beta Target not fully centered.
Not rotating to correct pitch attitude on go-around.
6.2 DOUBLE FMGC FAILURE
To recognize, and correctly deal with, a double FMGC failure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.22 (Auto Flight)

FCOM 4.04.30 (How to use)
FCOM 4.06.20 (Abnormal Procedure)

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Briefing of the following key points:-
MAIN
Four functions of FMGCs (FM, FG, FE and FIDS)
Possibility of partial or total failure of FMGCs.
Systems lost with failure.
Back up navigation function.
SECONDARY
Loss of some characteristic speeds.

Loss of LANDING ELEV AUTO.
Each FMGC has four separate parts; Flight Management, Flight Guidance, Flight Envelop and
Fault Identification and Display Systems. Only the first three functions concern the flight crew
in flight.
The relevant functions of the parts of the FMGC are as follow:
A) Flight Management
Navigation
Flight Planning
Performance
B) Flight Guidance Controls
FD
AP
A / THR
C) Flight Envelope
VLS and VMAX computation.

Aft CG Monitoring.
Windshear detection

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Part or each FMGC may fail or the FMGC may fail completely. When there is a compete failure of
both FMGCs the following will be the main items lost and are detailed on ECAM:
AP 1+2
FD 1+2
A / THR
VLS & VMAX on PFD
FM functions on MCDU (including Landing elevation feed to CPCs)
The FPV will be available. To regain the blue track index it is necessary to switch off the FDs.
Turning of navaids will have to be done through he RMP.
NAV BACK UP mode is available on the MCDU (FCOM 4.04.40[How to Use- MCDU Back Up Nav]).
In this situation reset of the FMGECs may be attempted, consult QRH 2.25 (Reset of Computers)
Correct completion of required drills.

Demonstrates effective use of NAV BACK UP mode.
 Common Errors
Not selecting NAV BACK UP mode.

Not using FPV or deselecting FCs.
6.3.1 All Engine Generators Faults
To ensure continued safe flight following loss of all engine generators.
To carry out ECAM procedure strictly respecting task sharing requirements.
To perform a safe approach and landing using raw data information and degraded
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter1 (Systems remaining)

QRH chapter 2 (Fuel gravity feeding)
FCOM 03.02.24 (Elec emerg CONF)
Briefing note- ILS raw data approach
Briefing note- Use of FPV
MAIN
EFIS, ECAM, AUTO FLIGHT and FMGS availability following failure.

ECAM procedure (one ECAM DU lost) and status page APPR PROC consideration (RAT,
direct law)
Navigation aid tuning by RMP.
QRH use for approach and landing data.
SECONDARY
Communications (ATC, Cabin,…)

Raw data approach (reminder).
Direct law approach and landing (reminder)
Fuel gravity feeding consideration.
Cockpit lighting.
Use of APU generator in some specific cases.
When all engine driven generators have been given lost, the workload is immediately greatly
increased. It is important that task-sharing procedures are understood and adhered to.
Remember one of the golden rules; fly the aircraft.
Autopilot is not immediately available and CM1 must take control as only the following
equipment is available. It assumes the EMER GEN operates in High speed (Green HYD system
available):

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CM 1 PED (FD normally available)

CM 1 ND
Upper ECAM
CM 1 MCDU and FMGC 1
FCU
The FPV has to be selected in order to be displayed on the CM 1 PFD. It is important to

deselect the FDs so that the blue track index is indicated on the PFD, assisting heading / track
keeping.
Once a safe flight path is established and the aircraft is under control, the focus can shift to
Although the ECAM advices a landing as soon as possible, it would be unwise to attempt an
approach at a poorly equipped air field in marginal weather. Prolonged flight in this
nearest suitable airfield, once informed of your problem. This is a serious emergency and ATC
should be notified using appropriate phraseology (MAYDAY) so that greater separation
emergency electrical configuration with an all engine failure. Therefore, read the title of ECAM
failure. The ECAM drill may then be started. It is a lengthy and complicated procedure, as only
one display is available. Consider carefully the feasibility of starting the APU. If a simultaneous
engine generator failure has occurred, the probability of coupling will be low.
In ELEC EMER CONFIG only one fuel pump will be powered, until land recovery is pressed. If
prolonged flight is necessary, ensure that any fuel imbalance is dealt with [QRH 2.08(Fuel
Imbalance)]
When the gear is extended, the aircraft reverts to direct law, manual pitch trim must be used.
Prior to commencing the approach it is necessary to select the LAND RECOVERY pb on so that
additional equipments including ILS1, LGCIU1, BCSU1, WHC1 and SFCC1 are available.
 Completion Standards.
Maintains flight path in accordance with ATC clearance.

Perform ECAM actions accurately and without undue delay.
Makes sound decision to continue or divert according to circumstances.
Perform safe, accurate approach and landing, taking into account degraded systems
and flight control laws, within half scale deflection of localizer and glideslope. <O>.
Adhere strictly to task sharing requirements at all times and ensures good crew and
ATC communications.

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 Common Errors.
Confusion with all engine fail.

Lack to ask sharing discipline during ECAM procedure.
FD not selected OFF to regain blue track index when FMGS not available.
Early extension of landing gear.
Selecting LAND RECOVERY pb on, too late in the descent.
6.4 SMOKE
To demonstrate effective handling of smoke warnings with or without apparent smoke.

To correctly complete the ECAM actions if presented.
To correctly apply the QRH Smoke procedure.
To correctly apply the QRH Smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal procedure.
To practice the application of CRM and task sharing throughout.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC References:
QRH 1.03 SMOKE / AVNCS SMOKE
FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke / Avncs Smoke.
FCOM 3.02.26 Smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal.
FCOM Vol. 1 System Bus Equipment Lists.
FCOM 1.35.20 Oxygen.
FCOM 3.01.35 Limitations- Cockpit Oxygen System.
FCOM 1.23.20 Intercommunication system
FCOM 1.21.10 Air conditioning
FCOM 1.21.30 Ventilation
FCOM 1.21.40 Cargo
 Instructors Actions

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MAIN
The importance of donning oxygen with correct selections.

The application of each of the procedure actions.
The recognition of air conditioning smoke.
The isolation of electrical buses and remaining equipment.
Application to task sharing.
SECONDARY
Use of the full face oxygen mask.

Cabin communications.
Communications with oxygen masks on.
Smoke detector positions in the aircraft.
Avionics and cargo ventilation
increased use of electronics on aircraft and the consequent thirst for electrical power, modern
aircrafts are more than ever a target for fire on board. Recent accidents have indicated that
flight crew and aircraft systems can be completely overwhelmed very quickly. The flight crew
must act promptly and decisively to ensure the safety of the aircraft.
SMOKE / AVNCS SMOKE PROCEDURE
„This procedure is applicable in case of suspected smoke from the avionics compartment, air
conditioning, or cabin equipment. The flight crew should apply this procedure, if smoke is
detected with or without “AVIONICS VENT SMOKE” ECAM activation‟.
Initial actions
The initial procedure actions are designed to reduce smoke intensity, eliminate one of the
most common smoke causes and prevent pilots smoke inhalation. Pilots should have some
tactile indicators foe finding these push button in dense smoke.
Oxygen use and Communication
The use of headsets and avoiding the use of interphone by both pilots, will enable the PF to
receive ATC instructions clearly. Pilots should be familiar with the position of the 100% switch
and emergency knob on the full-face mask when donned. 100% oxygen must be used.
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The emergency knob should be used to clear smoke from the mask. Do not leave this function
on, as oxygen supply could be depleted quickly. Refer FCOM 3.01.35.
At this stage aggressive efforts must be made to determine the smoke source utilizing all crew.
Some degree of fault analysis may be required at this stage.
FCOM procedure gives some guidelines. In addition, the ECAM RCL list may be consulted; any
previous malfunctions may be an indicator. The initial location of the smoke is of primary
importance as shortly after the initial appearance of the smoke other smoke alarms will be
activated as the aircraft ventilation system will move the smoke quickly around the aircraft.
Crew Resources Management
It is important to maintain a good flow of information between pilots and from cabin crew;
however, the PF should not be discharged form the primary task. The Captain requires good
prioritization and management of tasks. If smoke is confirmed, do not hesitate to declare an
emergency, immediately descend and commence diversion to the nearest practicable airport.
If dense smoke is evident or reported the QRH procedure requires descent for the smoke
removal procedure and establishment of the Emergency Electrical Configuration as described
at the end of the procedure. CM 1 will become PF.
The next step in the procedure deals with air conditioning smoke if suspected. This should be
evident by smoke initially coming out of the ventilation outlets.
The note referring to cargo air isolation in the pervious procedure could also apply to the next
step where a commercial facility such as cabin lights or entertainment equipment may be
faulty.
Refer to FCOM 1.24.20 – Commercial Pb. This should be deactivated or selected “OFF” for any
cabin equipment smoke. The relevant faulty equipment can then be isolated by the CBs
located in the cockpit entry ceiling, or, the aft galley ceiling. Refer FCOM OEB. At the discretion
of the Captain the Commercial power could then be reinstated.

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The bus shedding procedure will shed the primary AC bus 1, then, if this dose not stops the
smoke AC bus 1 re-energies and AC 2 is shed. The auto pilot will remain engaged, ECAM SD
switching is required and before isolating AC bus 2 the CM 2 (if PF) will need to hand over
control to CM 1.
During pre study the trainee should review briefly the Bus Equipment List at the end of each
Vol. 1 section and assess the equipment lost with each AC bus. The flight control computers
are all DC powered, no attempt should be made to isolate any other business.
SMOKE REMOVAL
If the fire is confirmed to be extinguished, good smoke removal is obtained with pack flow „HI‟,
cruise thrust and Vent Extract overboard. However, if dense smoke, toxic fumes or if smoke
generation can not be stooped use the Smoke Removal procedure.
checklists as well as ECAM and information coming from the cabin. It is important to establish
the priority of removing dense smoke from the aircraft.
The smoke / Toxic Fumes Removal procedure will require prompt descent to 10,000 ft or MEA.
The emergency descent initiation technique should be applied as necessary. The LDG ELEV
selector may need to be sent to that altitude before this course of action is decided as it may
take several minutes to depressurize to 1 psi depending on the cabin altitude. Note the speed
limitation for cockpit windows open.
Demonstrates correct application of the procedure.

Takes action to ensure the aircraft flight path is safe throughout.
Demonstrate the correct use of the full face mask and oxygen
Maintains communication with ATC, the cabin and other crew member.
Knows the positions of system switches required
 Common Errors
Rushing the procedure.
Jumping or not completing steps of the procedure
Insufficient attention to Flight path and navigation requesting in errors.
Lack of crew communication and task sharing.

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6.5 FLIGHT CONTROL
6.5.1 Abnormal Flaps / Slats Configuration
To perform the correct procedure to configure the aircraft for approach and landing
To carry out actions required by ECAM / QRH procedure
To handle the aircraft smoothly during approach and landing complying with published
procedure for configurations and speeds.
To respect task sharing requirements throughout
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Landing with abnormal Slats / Flaps)

QRH chapter 2 (Approach Speeds and Landing distance)
FCOM 1.27.50 (Flaps and Slats)
FCOM 3.02.27 (slats and / or Flaps fault / locked)
FCOM 3.02.22 (Ground Clearance Diagram)
MAIN
Task sharing and crew coordination

Use selected speed
ECAM procedure and STS page “APPR. PROC”.
Approach speed and landing distance calculations.
Speed control for no flaps / no slats approach
Approach briefing and abnormal configuration procedure use.
SECONDARY
A / THR management
Pitch angle (tail-strike) at landing if no flaps.
Use of autobrake according to landing distance available.
Go around procedure briefing.
CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for VAPP calculation.

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The landing distance factors are available in QRH 2.41 along with approach speed increments.
Approach speed will be VLS as indicated on the PFD. The approach speed increments in QRH
2.40 should be used as information for wind correction in failure cases.
Use selected speed and the use of auto thrust is recommended for most cases.
Flaps / slats locked with the wing tip brake on when selecting a different flap setting –
do not recycle flap lever.
Flaps / slats fails to move with movement of the flap lever – recycle the flap lever.
If the fault cannot be cleared apply QRH 2.05 or 2.06 as appropriate.
QRH 2.05 needs a little amplification although the ECAM will say “FOR GO –AROUND – S / F
JAMMED PROCEDURE… APPLY”. The procedure must be applied form the start of the approach to
configure the aircraft.
When CONF 1 is selected slats lock (WTB on) between 0 and 1.
Take control of the aircraft speed- use selected speed for the rest of the approach.
Managed speed will aim for S speed which is the wrong speed at this stage, and may be
below VLS. At this stage select an appropriate speed depending on aircraft position and
intentions.
Follow ECAM and then when ready for CONF 2 select VFE NEXT – 5kt as shown on the
PFD. It is preferable to reduce speed and change configuration in non maneuvering flight.
Do not go below VLS- at high weights VLS may be greater than VFE NEXT in which case
decelerate to VLS, select the flap lever one step down and progressively select slower
speeds as the surfaces extend.
Repeat until landing configuration is reached.
No flap slats Landing
No flaps no slats landing is a fairly simple procedure, however more distance is required for
maneuvering. The flap handle should be placed into CONF 1 position as required by QRH in order
to engage the go-around modes in the event a go-around has to be performed. During approach
modes the aircraft pitch attitude will be almost normal.

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Therefore with correct aircraft handling a tail strike is les of a concern. Nevertheless long and high
flare should be avoided. Consider high-speed touchdown. Use of medium auto brake is
recommended.
Consider fuel available and the quantity that may be required if a diversion is necessary with flaps
and / or slats jammed. The autopilot may be available but monitor its operation closely as it is
only authorized for use in normal configuration, however, do not use the autopilot below 500 ft
AGL.
Correctly responds to failure ensuring a safe flight path and speed.

Performance ECAM actions and QRH procedures in a methodical manner.
Makes correct adjustments to VAPP and selects appropriate configuration.
Makes smooth and accurate approach and lands within the touchdown zone at the
correct speed (+10 / - 0 kt).
 Common Errors
Rushing procedure.
Starting approach before completing all procedures.
Selected speed not used immediately at failure recognition.
Wrong VAPP selection on MCDU.
Rough handling.
Use of managed speed on final approach.
Incorrect go around procedure.
6.5.2 Reconfiguration Laws – Recovery form approach to stall
To recognize the indications of an impending stall.

To take immediate and appropriate actions to recover to controlled flight.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.27.30 (Abnormal control laws)
FCOM 3.04.27 (Supplement Techniques – flight controls)

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MAIN
Stall possible only in Alternate and Direct laws (“Fly-by-wire” aircraft)

Speed scale symbols change (VSW) and aural warning.
Recovery technique according to altitude and configuration.
SECONDARY
Control of pitch.
Risk of secondary stall.
The conventional stall is only possible in alternate and direct control laws, because of the
protections provided in normal law. Alternate or direct laws will be indicated by ECAM and
the changes on the PFD: bank angle and pitch limitation replaced by amber X, low speed
protection indications change from alpha prot.to VSW. VSW is load factor dependant and
will increase with increase in pitch up rate or bank angle.
Also, an aural warning is produced on entering the stall regime. This aural warring is
produced by the FWC, not the flight envelope calculation. It is possible to experience “false
warnings” if pitch control is rough the recovery from the stall. VSW indications are always
correct as these are generated by the PRIM.
INDICATION…………………………………………………………………………..”STALL, STALL, STALL”

THRUST LEVERS …………………………………………………………………………. TOGA
At the same time:
PITCH ATTITUE …………………………………………………………………………….REDUCE

BANK ANGLE………………………………………………………………………………….ROLL WINGS LEVEL
SPD BRAKES…………………………………………………………………………………..CHEKC RETRACTED
If a danger of ground contract exists, reduce pitch attitude no more than necessary for air
speed to increase.
If below 20,000 ft, and in clean configuration, select CONF 1. Out of stall above VLS when
there is no threat of ground contact:

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LANDING GEAR……………………………………………………………………………..UP
Recover to normal speed and retract flaps as required.

Care must be exercised not to re-enter the stall regime and set off another waning. With
Takes immediate action at first indication of impending stall.

Employs correct recovery technique and ensures minimum altitude loss.
 Common Errors
Recovery not initiated immediately.

Insufficient pitch control at attitude.
Stall re-entry due to uncontrolled high pitch attitude.
Use of manual trim below VLS.
Clean up before acceleration above VLS.
6.6 FUEL JETTISON
To know the correct procedures and reasons for fuel jettison.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH 2.08A
FCOM 1.28.10 (Jettison)
FCOM 3.04.28 (Fuel Jettison)
FCOM 3.02.28 (Fuel Jettison Not Closed)
FCOM 4.03.20 (Pilot interface with FUEL PRED page)
FCTM 10.81 (Overweight landing)

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MAIN
Why the A340 is equipped with a fuel jettison system.

Guidance on when to jettison.
Procedure for fuel jettison.
SECONDARY
Considerations about fuel jettison.
The decision to jettison fuel is based on consideration of all conditions prevailing at the
time. As a guide, if a red indication. “LAND ASAP” is shown on the ECAM then do not delay
the landing to jettison fuel. If continued safe flight is a concern, an immediate landing is
preferable. Regardless, when runway length, weather conditions or runway state are such
that an overweight landing constitutes a risk, consideration should be given to the
jettisoning of fuel to below the weight limiting the landing length or below the GO Around
limiting weight in QRH 2.29.
The jettison procedure is detailed in QRH 2.09 and this should be consulted as a “read and
do” checklist if fuel jettison is required. Note that FCMC logic permits only a single-shot fuel
jettison operation.
If the crew inadvertently enter a final weight below ZFW, jettison will automatically stop
when inner tanks reach low level. Caution must be exercised, as jettison is possible, even
on the ground.
The rate of jettison is approximately 1000kg a minutes. There is no limit on the use of the
jettison system in terms of speed, flap setting, fire warning or altitude. However, 5000 to
6000ft AGL is required to allow jettisoned fuel to disperse in the atmosphere and it may be
advisable not to circle in descent while jettisoning. Fuel should be jettisoned away from
thunderstorm activity.
Every airport should have a published jettison area to which ATC will direct the aircraft for
the purpose of fuel jettison. It will assist ATC if they are advised of the required jettison
time.

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Correctly completes a jettison procedure.

Knows limitations on the use of the jettison system.
 Common Errors
Delaying approach to jettison when it is more appropriate to “LAND ASAP”.

No “JET GW” instead in the MCDU.
Jettison fuel in the wrong area or at too low an altitude.
6.7 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAIURE
To manually control the aircraft in abnormal flight control laws.

To carry out ECAM and QRH procedures respecting task sharing requirements.
To safety perform approach and landing in abnormal configuration.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH (landing with slats or flaps jammed).
QRH (approach Speeds and landing distances).
QRH 4 (in Flight Performance)
FCOM 1.29 (Hydraulic).
Briefing note – Abnormal Flaps / Slats configuration
MAIN
Control of flight path and navigation.

Importance of good crew communication and co-ordination as autopilot is
inoperative.
Coordination with ATC.
Correct prioritization of tasks.

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Use of selected speed.

Accurate following of FD and smooth control inputs.
SECONDARY
Flight Control system architecture (QRH 5.03)

QRH landing distance.
CONF FULL selected on MCDU RERF page for VAPP calculation with MCDU.
are lengthy, approach briefing necessary comprehensive and good crew co-ordination is
vital.
The golden rule of “FLY”, “NAVIGATION” and “COMMUNICATE” applies.
As there are usually many to fulfill, establish clear priorities. Bear in mind that if sufficient fuel
remains, taking time to plan and brief properly and time well spent. Remember that flight controls
will be in ALTERNATE law (PROT LOST).
In a HYD B + Y failure, there is no hydraulic power available to move the stabilizer. In effect, it is
frozen. Alternate law is active and auto trim is available, this is achieved by displacement of the
elevators which can be moved over the full range.
With HYD G +Y or G+Y failed, flight will continue on single elevator. With a G+B failure, use a
long runway as few retardation devices are serviceable (spoilers 4+6 and accumulator brake
pressure only)
There is no need to memorize the above points as ECAM will give sufficient information concerning
inoperative systems.
As with most abnormal procedures, approach speed will be VLS plus any increment required by
ECAM. Depending on flap and/or slat position and the particular combination of flight control
failures (caused by the hydraulic failures) there may be a 10kt (or more) increment required by
ECAM. The increased speed allows more control due to loss of elevators or horizontal stabilizer. It
will also be necessary to apply the LANDING DISTANCE procedures (QRH 2.41) which will be
required by ECAM.
In summery the STATUS page may appear complex but there are only 5 main considerations:-
1. Gear
2. Brakes
3. Flaps/Slats
4. VAPP Calculation
5. Landing Distance

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Maintains safe flight path.

Ensures strict application of task sharing requirements.
Ensures correct application of ECAM, QRH and FMGC procedures.
Handles the aircraft smoothly without major deviations from required trajectory (+ / - 200
ft +/ -0 kt).
Makes correct determination of VAPP and landing distance.
Performs accurate approach within standard limits for instrument approach.
Lands within the landing zone and uses correct braking technique.
Abnormal configuration approach procedure.
Specific approach and go around briefing.
Ensures any special requirements are communicated to ATC and cabin crew.
 Common Errors
No emergency declared to ATC.

Incorrect use of selected speed.
Incorrect prioritization of tasks.
Incomplete approach and go around briefing for abnormal configuration.
FD not followed precisely due to over controlling.
Confusion between VAPP / VREF / VLS for corrected speed.
Not using QRH or ECAM for gravity gear extension.
6.8 ECAM
6.8.1 Philosophy and Normal use.
To fully understand the philosophy and normal use of the ECAM.

To understand ECAM use for abnormal and emergency operations.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.31.30(ECAM Description)
FCOM 3.01.01(ABN and EMER PROCEDURES)

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MAIN
Warning levels and associated master lights

ECAM control panel.
Switching.
ECAM display philosophy.
MEMO display.
SECONDARY
Use of RCL and EMER CANG.

Flight phase and associated displays.
The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system monitors and displays all
information concerning aircraft systems and system failures. It is a system which, though
text and graphic displays, enables the crew to do most things from ensuring passenger
comfort by monitoring cabin temperature to dealing with multiple system failures without
the need for paper checklists.
Essentially the ECAM provides the following:
System indications – temperatures, pressures etc.
System monitoring – display of system failure, level 1 to 3 or advisory.
Memo= display use of systems by the crew. E.g. anti-ice and also take off and
landing memo.
Crew actions – in case of failures the E/WD indicates crew action necessary to deal
Status – the status page provides the crew with an operational summery of the
aircraft systems at any stage of the flight. If STS is not displayed on E/WD, when
CONF 1 is selected or when QNH (QFE) is set, the STATUS page is automatically
displayed.
Display of system failures and take off / landing memo is flight phase sensitive. Take off
and landing memo are only displayed at the appropriate time. Before announcing “no
blue”, ensure that the take-off or landing memo is displayed by reference to the memo title
i.e.

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Take Off or Landing
Some warnings and cautions are suppressed at critical phases of flight, however failures
critical to particular phase of flight will always be displayed. Note that these flight phases
are different from the flight phases used by the FMGS. On the SD some pages are phase
selected i.e. the WHEEL page is automatically displayed after engine start. The cruise page
is not selectable, but is continuously displayed from 1500ft after take off to landing gear
extension unless a warring / caution is displayed, or a system page has been manually
selected. (FCOM 1.31.20 [indicating / Recording Systems – indications on SD])
There are three levels of warring / caution – level 3 being the highest (FCOM 1.31.10
[indicating / Recording Systems – indications on SD])
Level 3 is associated with a master warring and is displayed in red on the E/WD.
Level 2 is associated with a master caution and is displayed in amber on the E/WD.
Level 1 is displayed in amber on the E/WD, however there is no master caution
In addition to the three levels of warring / caution, ECAM also differentiates between
A Independent Failures
A failure that dose not affect other systems. The system title is underlined on the
E/WD.
B Primary Failure
A failure that affects other systems and causes secondary failures. The failure title is
boxed on the E/WD.
C Secondary Failure
A failure that is caused by a primary failure and not unserviceability of that particular
system. Secondary failures are in amber preceded by an asterisk on the bottom right
hand side of the E/WD.
In the event of multiple failures there is a hierarchy which determines which failure
are displayed on the E/WD. i.e. level 3 takes priority over level 2. Furthermore there is
hierarchy within each of the levels to ensure that the most important failures are
displayed to the pilots first. Details of how failures are dealt with are given in the
following briefing note.

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failure are detailed in FCOM 1.31.05 (Indicating / Recording Systems – EIS General).
The ECAM control panel is described in FCOM 1.31.30(Indicating/Recording Systems –

ECAM Controls). However the operational use of the RCL and EMER CANC pb‟s
requires a little explanation. The EMER CANC pb may be used by the crew to cancel
any cautions or warnings that are spurious or intermittent, and are effectively
nuisance warnings. The RCL pb is used to either recover cancelled cautions
suppressed by the EMER CANC pb or to review cautions or warning which have been
cleared using the CLR pb.
Knowledge and correct use of the ECAM system.
 Common Errors
No deselection of manually selected system page.

Landing “no blue” call made before landing memo displayed.
Memo display not included in normal instrument scan.
To use ECAM procedure effective and correctly
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references :
QRH 0.00 (task sharing)

FCOM 1.24.10 & 20 (Electrical)

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MAIN
Task sharing
Identification of the failure
Co-coordinated ECAM actions and application of procedures.
SECONDARY
Advisory information
Flight phase inhibition
Priority of warnings
Abnormal ECAM configurations
OEBs application
When the ECAM displays a warning or caution it is of primary importance that task sharing
is respected and secondly, to remember not to rush. The first priority, as always, is to
ensure a safe flight path. Task sharing is important but ensure that monitoring and cross
checking procedures are maintained.
FCOM 3.02.01 (Abnormal and emergency Procedures – Introduction) details procedures for
the use of ECAM in the failure, however the key points are:
P-fly, navigate and communicate – in that order (golden rule).

PNF – To read aloud the ECAM failure.
PNF – deal with the failure on command of PF
Both pilots to identify failure and confirm by reference to SD, E/WD.
PNF to request clear, PF to confirm before CLR is pressed.
In addition, remember the following points:
In the case of multiple failures complete all required actions (blue) associated with the first
red or amber title. Request clearance to press CLR and then deal with next failure. The
second drill is then carried out until its red/amber title can be cleared, before starting on
the third etc. Don‟t leave the red or amber title on the E/WD when all action associated
with that failure have been completed. Clear each one as it is dealt with. When all
necessary actions are complete there will be no amber or red displayed on the lower part
of the E/WD.

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Read the ECAM carefully, as it is possible to misread drills particular the countdown for fire
bottle discharge,
Although the A340 overhead panels are uncluttered, misidentification of switches or pb‟s is
possible. When action on overhead panel pb switches is required by ECAM, identification of
the correct panel is aided by reference to the white writing on the side of each system
panel.
When carrying out system pb selection, verify on SD that the required action has occurred
e.g. switching off an hydraulic pump changes the indications on the SD.
Cross check by both pilots before movement of any controls like THR lever, engine master
switch, fire switch or IRs, any guarded p/b to prevent the crew from carrying out
inadvertent irreversible actions.
When reviewing secondary failures (FCOM 1.31.25 [indicating / Recording Systems – ECAM
Sequence]) follow the same discipline of request and confirmation before action on CLR
pb.
Certain procedures may be modified by OEB. When applicable, it has to be checked before
reading and analyzing status. The status page is then reviewed by both pilots. A green
overflow arrow indicates further pages of status messages. Status page can be recalled at
any time and is very useful as an aid for descent and approach planning. Don‟t be in too
much of a hurry to clear it.
Following certain failures, or after failures, the STATUS page may contain an excess of
information. In order to extract the information essential for landing the aircraft safely use
the following guide:
CONFIG - flap / slat setting, approach speed increment, landing distance factor and
control law for landing.
GEAR - when to lower gear and whether normal or gravity extension.
BRAKES - normal, alternate or alternate without anti-skid (1000 psi max brake
pressure, accumulator provides pressure)
(NOTE: If a reverser is inoperative on status page, do not select that reverser on LDG; as
the reverser will not deploy but reverse idle is selected. This is higher than
modulated idle and will procedure increased forward thrust)
When dealing with failures ECAM display the same principles discussed above are valid but
discipline use of the ECAM control panel is even more important.

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There is no automatic display of SD associated with the failure – conformation of the

failure reviewing secondary failures.
STATUS page is only displayed when STS pb is pressed and held. In order to view page
two or three of status messages the STS pb must be released for less than 2 seconds and
then pressed and held again.
Dealing with failures when in mono ECAM display requires discipline and practice. In the case of
single ECAM display or when there is a failure of the DMC ECAM channel, the engine parameters
may be monitored through the Engine stand-by page. This is displayed on the ND by selection on
the EFIS control panel. Remember that, except in EMER ELEC CONF it may be possible to transfer
the SD to the PNF‟s ND.
ECAM advisory mode (FCOM1.31.20 [indicating / Recording Systems – Indications on SD])

requires the crew to monitor a parameter and dose not necessarily require action. FCOM 3.02.80
{Abnormal and Emergency Procedures – Miscellaneous) contains recommended in the event of
certain advisory conditions.
OEBs (FCOM Vol 3) are issued by Airbus and contain information which may have implications for
crew actions in the event of system failures. The most important OEBs are reproduced in the QRH.
Depending on the software status of the particular aircraft, there may be an OEB reminder
function within the ECAM system. This OEB reminder function will replace the actions required by
ECAM, associated with a system failure, with a message directing the crew to consult a relevant
OEB.
If time permits consider consulting FCOM Vol 3 after ECAM actions have been completed. It may
contain additional notes or information not displayed on ECAM (electrical failure). However do not
prolong the flight for the purpose of consulting this volume.
Applies correct crew co-ordination and task sharing at all times.

Performs ECAM procedure correctly, accurately without undue delay.
 Common Errors
PF distracted from primary duties.

Clear action without crosscheck.
Non application of STATUS approach procedure.
SATTUS page(s) reviews at the wrong time.
During mono ECAM procedure, SD pages and STS page not reviewed.
Green overflow arrow ignored.

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6.9 NAVIGATION
6.9.1 IRS / ADR Failures
To recognize and successfully deal with multiple IRS or ADR failure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Dual ADR failure).
FCOM 1.34.10 (ADIRS)
FCOM 3.02.34 (Navigation)
MAIN
Use of IRS in ATT mode.

Flight control laws.
Use of standby instruments.
Separate ADR and IRS parts of ADIRS.
SECONDARY
NIL
Each ADIRS has two parts (ADR and IRS) which may fail independently of each other.
Single ADR or IRS failures are simply dealt with any only require action on the switching

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crewmember on the affected side can recover attitude, airspeed and altitude information
comes from the same source. It is therefore essential that both pilots cross-check attitude
and air data with the standby instruments.
A Triple IRS or ADR failure is very unlikely. Triple failures will not be displayed on ECAM.
Only two double failures will be displayed (i.e. ADR 1+2 FAULT and ADR 2+3 FAULT).
Following ECAM actions would give conflicting instructions. Follow the procedure for ADR
1+2+3 failure contained in QRH chapter 2). This is one of the few cases where the crew
will not follow the EACM.
procedure and inoperative systems. In this unlikely eventually, standby instruments are the
only attitude, speed and heading reference.

Recognize triple ADR failure and uses QRH for drill
 Common Errors
Fails to recognize triple ADR or IRS failure.

To be aware of approach and landing capabilities

To understand effects on autopilot, FD, approach mode and flight controls.
 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 3.02.34 (RA 1 + 2 fault procedure)
Briefing Note – ILS raw data approach.
MAIN
Effects of failure / gear position on auto-pilot, FD, approach mode and flight
controls.
Raw data approach.
Loss of CAT 2 / CAT 3 capabilities
Loss of AUTO CALL OUT and LDG MEMO.
SECONDARY
Flight controls logic.

Use of TRK / FPA.
It should be noted that APP mode push button is inhibited and the flight director will not
be able to capture and track the glide slope (FCOM 1.22.30 [Auto Flight – Flight
Guidance]). However be careful of following flight director commands close to the ground
as it will command excessive roll rates. Interception of the localizer may be done using
LOC and the approach can be flown in LOC mode down to 400ft.
The approach and landing are only to CAT 1 limits, bearing in mind that the aircraft will
 Common Standards

Makes smooth, accurate approach and landing limits.

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 Common Errors
Use of LOC Mode in short final (below 400ft)
6.10 POWER PLANT
6.10.1 Engine Failure in Cruse
trajectory.
To perform the correct descent procedure dependent on circumstances.
 Schedule
Briefing duration – 15 mts.
Briefing the following key points.
MAIN

Subsequent approach planning
SECONDARY
A/P engagement mode, A/THR disconnection.

ETOPS (Fixed Speed Strategy) Mountainous area consideration.
Task Sharing, Decision making and Communication.

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These are the Obstacle, Standard and ETOPS / fixed speed strategies. Unless a specific
procedure had been established before dispatch (ETOPS, mountainous areas) the
Before descent:
Set MCT on the remaining engine and disconnect A/THR.
Start ECAM actions.
Select green dot speed on the FCU and pull.
Set a lower attitude in the altitude window and pull for “OPEN DES”
Select a heading on the FCU to turn off the airway, if required, and pull.
Advise ATC.
below.
thrust fixed at MCT, the speed is controlled by elevator.
descent will be lower than other strategies. Carefully consider the aircraft‟s position during
the drift down, as obstacles may still present a problem. At the end of drift down, if clear
of obstacles, return to normal LRC speed, set on FCU and engage A/THR.
The descent should be performed at Match .82/300 kts. When in the descent, establish
from the QRH cruise flight level for level off. Inform ATC and set in the FCU altitude
window.
On reaching the new altitude, set speed according to the QRH, and select A/THR on.
Continue flight to destination, or as appropriate.

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Overview
Generally, there is sufficient time to check all actions before rushing in to them. However
at high flight levels, close to limiting weights, if an engine fails speed will decay very
quickly requiring prompt crew response. The ECAM only register the engine failure when
„engine core speed is below idle‟.
After the ECAM actions are commended the “THR LEVER………… IDLE” and the „L + R INR
TK……..SPLIT‟ will remain blue on the ECAM. This is a normal ECAM with this condition.
The FMGS PROG page will show the EO MAX REC altitude. Once descent is started the
PERF page shows time to descend, and distance taken. In the QRH there are tables
containing similar details of engine out ceiling, time to descent, distance taken and fuel
used. There is also a graph to calculate gross ceiling. Tables are available for long range
cruise performance, and in-flight check of fuel consumed and time to destination.
The control of task sharing is responsibility of the Captain. Good prioritization is required
as well as other CRM and communications skills.
The diversion airfield will probably not be a SriLankan destination so brief thoroughly and
do not allow the operation to be rushed especially below MSA.
Configuration for manoevuring on final,

Go around climb limiting weight and fuel jettison,
One engine taxi with sloping taxiways, strong and or wet conditions may make it

Respects task sharing and ECAM procedure requirements.
Establishes correct parameters from QRH.
Follows flight director accurately and ensures correct FCU selections.
Maintain good situational awareness.

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 Common Errors
A/THR not disconnected.

Incorrect strategy.
Rushed actions.
6.10.2 Two Engine out Operations
To correctly determine strategy and performance following a second engine

failure.
To complete an approach and landing on two engines.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC References:
QRH 4.04 (In Flight Performance)

FCOM 3.02.10 (ABN and EMER procedures)
FCOM 3.07 (Two Engine Out Operations)
FCOM 4.04.30 (MCDU Pages and Description)
Briefing Note – Fuel Jettison
MAIN
Standard strategy
Performance considerations
SECONDARY
Inoperative systems depending on particular combinations of engine

failures.

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Should a second engine fall in flight there is only one strategy to follow. This is
similar to the obstacle strategy used following a first engine failure. Set the live
engine thrust levers to MCT and disconnect A/THR. Descent will be at green dot
speed with the remaining engines at MCT. Once level at level off altitude the
airplane will accelerate to long range cruise speed. Descent to destination will be
at .81/300/250 kts, idle thrust. (FCOM 4.04.30-Hot to Use).
The ECAM will show all inoperative systems. Any additional drills caused by particular
combinations of engine failures will be detailed by ECAM.
The two engine ceiling, at height weights, are low (FCOM 3.07.20-Two Engine Out
Operations), and terrain clearance may be a concern. When beginning the drift down,
check MSA along intended route and take action if appropriate.
The descent to a lower altitude may require consideration of the affects of adverse
weather ahead. If sever icing conditions are encountered, ice may build up on non heated
parts of the airframe, and the ceiling may be reduced by a up to a further 7000 ft.
The MCDU PROG page will display predictions of EO MAX ALT and descent path based on
two engines out. Additionally on the PERF page, the EO CLR prompt will be displayed.
The F-PLN page will show predictions for fuel, time etc for two engines out, with the
remainder of the cruise phase flown at the lower of CRZ FL or EO MAX ALT. These
predictions remain as long as the EO CLR prompt is not pushed.
Monitor fuel imbalance and take appropriate actions when necessary.
The two major problems associated with a second engine failure are performance
degradation and difficult handling depending on which two engines have failed.
When planning the approach, consider whether fuel jettison is appropriate (see briefing
note – Fuel Jettison). Study the procedure and pattern to be flown for two engine
inoperative
landing, and possible go around, as shown in FCOM 3.02.10 (ABN and EMER – Operating
Techniques). The landing will be in CONF 3, with a commit altitude of 500 ft AGL. Below
this altitude the airplane is committed to a landing. The commit altitude is set at 500 ft to
allow some loss of altitude if a go around has to be flown.
If the two outer engines have failed, due to green hydraulic failure it will be impossible to
retract gear. Go-around performance on two engines and with the gear extended will be
very limited. Do not attempt a go-around after gear extension. Except at very
lightweights, with the gear extended it will be impossible to maintain level flight.
If both inboard engines have failed, be careful in controlling the airplane, as any thrust
changes must be made symmetrically or directional difficulties may be encountered.

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If both engines on the same side have failed, directional control may be difficult,
particularly in the event of a go around. If a go-around is necessary in this configuration it
may not be possible to satisfy target requirements. If this is the case, once obstacle
clearance is assured accelerate to a speed at which beta target can be satisfied (VMCL-2).
Correctly carries out standard strategy in case of second engine failure.

Uses FMGS and/or QRH to determine correct EO MAX ALT.
Completes safe approach and landing on two engines.
 Common Errors
Over controlling due to asymmetry.

Poor situational awareness.

To perform correct engine reflight procedure.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC References:


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MAIN

Engine relight in flight procedure (wind milling and starter assisted).
SECONDARY
Before attempting a relight in flight, gather all relevant information to decide

whether a relight should be attempted. Consider engine damage, icing or volcanic
or volcanic ash encounter and their effects on successful relight. Check for
satisfactory indications of N1/N2 and oil quantity. Further, is there an appropriate
time to relight, when workload is low? It is recommended to attempt a re-light
prior to ECAM “status” actions.
Refer to QRH 2.27 for ENG RELIGHT (in flight) drill. Auto start is recommended
and FADEC will determine whether an assisted start or a wind milling starter valve.
The relight envelop will need to be consulted to determine if the cross feed valve is
required open to provide air to the starter. If starter air is required the other
engine thrust will need to be increased above idle to provide sufficient air pressure.
If an engine has failed in the cruise, the estimated fuel on board and time to
destination is now calculated on single engine performance. The EO CLR prompt
should not be used if a real engine out has been detected. If the EO CLR prompt is
pushed, these predictions revert to two engine predictions and are meaningless, if
a successful relight is not achieved.
Uses all available information to make a sound decision an engine relight in

flight.
Ensures correct task sharing and good crew communications

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6.10.4 All engine Flame Out
To establish a safe flight path.

To recognize the indication of a dual engine failure
To carry out correct procedure
 Schedule
Briefing duration : 20- minutes
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 1 (All engine flame out)

QRH chapter 2 (engine relight in flight)
FCOM 1.70.(Ignition and starting)
MAIN

Choice of optimum speed
ECAM actions (APU use, relight parameters…)
Situational awareness
SECONDARY
Aircraft status: systems, F/CTL Law…

Minimum RAT speed
Related consequences (pressurization, forced landing, ditching..)

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Following all engine failure, flight deck indications change drastically as generators
drop off line, the RAT is deployed and ECAM prioritizes checklists.
Control of the aircraft must be taken immediately by CM1, and a safe flight path
established. It is important at this stage to correctly identify the failures as it can
be easily confused with all engine generators fault. ECAM will prioritize checklists
so to avoid confusion read ECAM carefully to correctly identify the failure. It is vital
to establish good crew communication and to apply efficient task-sharing.
Establish communications with ATC, stating nature of emergency and intentions.

VHF2 (VHF3) and ATC2 are not supplied to VHF 1 is the only means of
communicating the emergency to air traffic control. This can be easily seen by
looking at the ATC and VHF2 windows, which will be blank.
The ECAM actions can be commenced, with attention to optimum relight speed. If
there I no relight within 30 sec ECAM will order the engine master switches to be
placed off for 30 sec and then on again. This is to permit ventilation of the
Combustion chamber. Start the APU once the APU is available for attempting
engine start and below FL 200 optimum speed is green dot.
Maximum gliding range is achieved at green dot speed although this will not be
displayed on the PFD if the APU generator is not available. Think ahead and plan
the approach. Depending on the airplane‟s position, a forced landing or a ditching
may be required if the relight is unsuccessful. Find the relevant QRH page and
review the procedure.
The list of affected systems is long and flight controls will be much degraded. If
the relight attempts are successful, consider the options of immediate landing
versus continuing the flight. If the engines failed simultaneously, was there a
common cause?
At all times, maintain correct speed and situational awareness.


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 Common Errors

Engine relight not monitored (stopwatch / parameters).
6.10.5 Thrust Lever Disagree / Fault
To understand the consequences and differences related to thrust lever

malfunctions.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.70 (Thrust control)

FCOM 3.02.70 (Abnormal procedure)
MAIN
Differences between “Disagree” and “Fault” and related thrust control

consequences.
Specific approach procedure when autolanding not possible.

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SECONDARY
Caution relating to thrust lever Fault during take-off (on ground, between
V1 and VR: warning inhibited)
A Disagree
This failure occurs when the two validated thrust lever angle signals are not in
agreement. Should the failure occur on take-off, TOGA or FLEX thrust is
maintained until thrust reduction, after which maximum available thrust is MCT.
If the failure occurs when the thrust lever is between idle and MCT, FADEC will
automatically select the larger thrust lever angle, limited to MCT. On the ground,
thrust is limited to idle.
manage thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will reduce to idle
thrust. Consider a CONF 3 approach, as this is effectively a single engine approach.
Note that reverse thrust is available for landing.
B. Fault
If this fault develops, it indicates that a non-valid signal has been received from 1
or 2 thrust lever angle sensor of that engine.
The fault on the ground freezes thrust to idle, and furthermore commands the
reversers to stow.
manage thrust between idle and the larger thrust lever angle position. A/THR
should be engaged before slat retraction.
When the gear is lowered for approach the affected engine will be at idle thrust. It
will be necessary to make the approach with CONF 3, as the affected engine
reduces to idle power when landing gear is down locked, or at slat extension. This
is now shown on ECAM.
Note that reverse thrust is NOT available for landing.

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Maintains safe trajectory in all flight phases.

Ensures application of ECAM procedures, including specific approach
requirements.
 Common Errors
Different reason for “Disagree” and “Fault” not clearly understood. Specific
procedure not applied for approach.
6.10.6 Engine Abnormal Start
To carry out the correct ECAM or QRH actions in the event of an abnormal
start (auto or manual).
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
FCOM 1.70.80 (Ignition and starting)
FCOM 3.02.70 (Power Plant)
Briefing Notes – Engine start auto / manual
MAIN
Autostart fault ECAM procedures.

Engine starter limitations
Tailpipe fire.

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SECONDARY
It is important to have a thorough knowledge of limitations and procedure, particularly

when performing a manual start.
In general, the auto start function will protect the engine, but in manual start it is the
Following shut down for any reason, maintenance action may be required, or dry crank
before another start attempt.

 Common Errors


 Schedule

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 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 2 (Eng Tailpipe Fire)
MAIN

QRH use.
SECONDARY
The Most likely sources of information concerning an engine tailpipe fire are the
ground crew or cabin staff. The procedure for dealing with a tailpipe fire is
contained in QRH chapter 2. It is important to establish which engine is on fire
and react accordingly. Establishing good communications between the cockpit and
ground crew or cabin staff to establish which engine is on fire, and consider
opening the cockpit window to confirm. The engine must be cranked which
enables the engine to be ventilated to remove fuel vapors after the unsuccessful
start attempt.
If the burning has not stopped, consider the use of external fire extinguishers (Note
that they can cause severe corrosive damage and should only be considered after
the procedure has been completed).

Adheres strictly to task sharing requirements at all times and ensures good crew

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 Common Errors
Does not know where to find the appropriate procedures.

6.11 EMERGENCY DESCENT

To carry out the correct actions to achieve a safe descent at the maximum
appropriate rate.
 Schedule
 Equipment
DOC references:
QRH chapter 1 (emergency descent)

MAIN

Actions on FCU should be checked on FMA to ensure correct engagement of
the desire mode.
Where structural damage is suspected maintain current IAS
ECAM / check-list actions.
Control and monitoring of descent and level-off.

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 Trainee’s actions
The procedures for an emergency descent are detailed on ECAM, in the QRH and in
FCOM 3.02.80 (ABN and EMER procedures – EMER DESCENT).
The use of autopilot and autothrust is recommended for all emergency descents.
The modes used will depend on whether structural damage is assumed or a high
speed descent is required. The following are the two ways in which to use the
autopilot and autothrust depending on which type of descent is required. As per
standard ECAM procedures PF files the aircraft and PNF carried out ECAM drill.
However before initiating descent the crew must don oxygen masks and establish
crew communications.
a) 1st loop:

Check FMA reads IDLE / OP DES / HDG
b) 2nd loop:

Push sped / mach pb (target speed for descent is current IAS)
If NO DAMAGE suspected (HIGH SPEED DESCENT)
Increase speed to MMO /VMO
NOTE: At high flight levels, the speedbrake should be extended slowly while
monitoring VLS, so that angle of attack protection does not become active
thereby causing speedbrake retraction. Use caution when using speedbrake
if structural damage exists.
2000ft before selected altitude, speed brakes to be retracted.

10,000 ft or below consider removing oxygen masks and reset oxygen mask box
flaps to enable the Headsets microphones use.
Request purser to the cockpit and establish the condition of PAX and cabin.

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Dons oxygen mask within 5 seconds and crew communications established

immediately.
Initiates descent without delay using correct techniques, according to
circumstances.
Remember to reset the boom set microphone after removing the oxygen
mask.
 Common Errors

Headset not used.
Lack of ATC communication / transponder code.
Incorrect level-off technique

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BASE TRAINING
Page 1
CHAPTER - 07
BASE TRAINING

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BASE TRAINING
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7.1 Policy Procedures
7.1.1 Training Objective ……………………………………………………………………………………….. ……… 3

7.1.2 Schedule……………………………………………………………….…………………………………………….. 3
7.1.3 Equipment…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 3
7.1.4 Instructor‟s Actions…………………………………………………………..………………………………….. 3
7.1.5 Trainee‟s Actions …………..…………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
7.1.6 Completion Standards …………..……………………………………………………………………………… 15
7.1.7 Common Errors …………….……………………………………………………………………………………… 15
7.2 a) Circuit Profile for base and FFS Training……………………………………………………………… 16

b) Circuit……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17

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7.1.1 Training Objective
To manoeuvre the A320/A330/A340 safely on the ground.

To safely fly A320/A330/A340 manual visual circuit using the correct configurations
and speed.
To land the A320/A3330/A340 safely using the correct technique.
To observe an aircraft walk around inspection.
7.1.2 Schedule
Briefing duration : 30 mts.
7.1.3 Equipment
DOC references : FCOM 1.22.30 P41 SRS

FCOM 4.05.70 P29 VISUAL APPROACH
4.05.80 P1 GO AROUND
SOP VISUAL APPROACH & LANDING
FCOM 3.04.27 P1-5 FLIGHT CONTROLS
7.1.4 Instructor’s Actions
MAIN
Cockpit Preparation and Engine Start

Taxi technique and before Take-off procedures.
Lookout and communications.
Checklists.
Circuits profiles.
FMA
Touch and go procedure.
Emergencies
Instructor take-over
Landing Technique
SECONDARY
Seating position
Thrust setting
FPV use.

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7.1.5 Trainee’s Actions
Training Flight Policy
General
Training flights must be conducted in accordance with SriLankan training regulations

published in the Flight Operations Policy Manual and the Flight Crew Admin Manual.
Training flights however, will be conducted under the direct authority of the Chief Pilot
(Training/Safety & Standards)
In the above case the Operations Control will be responsible for the organization,
documentation and co-ordination of the flight training.
Where such training is undertaken, flight instructors will observe the SriLankan Regulations
regarding the conduct of the flight training.
Training in Colombo
The flight patterns will be based on rectangular, 1,500 ft circuits within 2.5 nm of the
runway centerline. Upwind and downwind legs may be extended at instructor request for
training points review, subject to any ATC amendments. They will form the basis for FMGS
initializing as well as integrating ATC future requirements.
In general, over flight of all surrounding densely populated areas should be avoided.
Crew Reporting Procedure
Trainees reporting time to Operations Control Centre, will be arranged for 01;30 mts
before scheduled departure time where they will meet their instructor for briefing. The
briefing is mandatory and specific to the conduct of the flight and the touch and go
procedure.
Whenever a technical delay is known or expected, Operations Control will advise all
concerned of the delay and the revised reporting time.
Crew Scheduling
The average duration of circuit is 10 minutes. Experienced pilots should not need more
than 2 circuits. Cadets should perform more than 4 consecutive circuits and not more than
a total of 06 circuits with a go-around.
Maximum flight duration is 01 Hr per Trainee.
Note : Refer FCOM Chapter 5 for full details.

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Carriage of Passengers
The carriage of passengers is forbidden.
Objectives
Base Training is intended to confirm the “transfer of knowledge” from the Full Flight
Simulator to the aircraft additionally, it affords the trainee the opportunity to experience
the “real” aircraft characteristics particularly during ground operations and in-flight
manoeuvring using predominantly visual references, especially those characteristic
pertinent to the take-off and landing.
Seating Policy
Trainees will occupy their respective operating seats. The instructor will then occupy the
appropriate non-flying pilot‟s seat.
Safety Pilot
The safety pilot shall be responsible for monitoring the actioning of checklists, in particular
the landing checklist prior to a touch and go and the receipt of ATC clearances.
The Safety Pilot will secure the cabin and arm the L1 and R1 doors on pushback. He will be
responsible for disarming the doors after shutdown.
The safety pilot will as far as possible assist with lookout for other air traffic and
obstructions during taxiing.
The safety pilot should be:
- an experienced First Officer, qualified on type for at least 06 months.
Flight Training Proficiency
As a general rule, all the items in the training syllabus should be completed and repeated if
necessary until proficiency is achieved. A trainee who does not meet the required
standard after completing the published syllabus will have his training record reviewed by
the Chief Pilot (Training/ Safety and Standards). Appropriate remedial training to
satisfactory standard, using other training devices, may be required before more Base
Training is authorized. A repeat failure to meet required standards will be addressed by
the Chief Pilot (Training / Safety and Standards)

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Unauthrorized Manoeuvres
No unauthorized maneuvers which might jeopardize the safety of flight will be allowed. In
addition, no demonstrations of the flight envelope protection systems will be intentionally
carried out unless expressly authorized by the Chief Pilot Training.
Engine Failure Simulation
No engine shutdown is allowed for training purpose.
Engine failure will not be simulated in SriLankan aircraft. It will be simulated by setting the
thrust lever to the forward idle stop (having first checked the correct functioning of the
other engines).
Engine failure on take-off or touch and go should only be simulated after the gear has
been selected up and, during go around, only after a steady climb attitude has been
achieved at or above Vref and above 400 ft AGL.
Check-lists
Full check-lists will be performed except for touch and go landing.
Accelerate/ Stop
No acceleration /stop training will be conducted in the aircraft. The decision to reject a
takeoff during a Base Training flight is made exclusively by the instructor who will
immediately take control of the aircraft.
A briefing in this regarding will be made prior to flight and reinforced during the take-off
briefing.
Touch and Go Landings
Touch and Go Landings are utilized to reduce the amount of training time wasted taxiing
the aircraft back to the holding point and awaiting take-off clearance. In order to maintain
high level of safety they must be conducted in properly disciplined manner.
Radio Communications/ External Lookout
The instructor is responsible for all radio communications and maintaining a visual lookout
for conflicting air traffic. The trainees (including the observer in the jump seat) should be
encouraged to back up the instructor in this regard and to immediately inform him of any
potential conflict.

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Flight Plan flight identification shall be the aircraft‟s registration, and the aircraft‟s call-sign
shall be; SriLankan. (plus the last 3 letters of the registration)
Recording and Administration
If the general assessment is „pass‟, the form comments must be annotated:
If the general assessment is „fail‟ appropriate comments and a recommendation for

remedial training must be made. A fail must be reported ASAP to Chief Pilot (Training/
Safety and Standards) and as appropriate.
Flight Training Procedures
Fuel Management
For normal Flight Training sessions, 30.0 (A330/A340) tonnes shall be the normal fuel load
for flights not requiring positioning. The overriding factor in determining the final amount
is the maximum fuel required for the next commercial operation, taking into account the
burn-off during the training flight.
Fuel balance and quantities must be monitored regularly.
FMGS Use
The FMGS should be initialized in the Secondary for the intended flight either by data base
company route. Managed lateral navigation may be used for the circuit but it is normally
more appropriate to use HDG or TRK mode and Rose display. Nevertheless, the fact that
the approach and runway will remain displayed is of considerable assistance for positioning
the aircraft on final approach.
Aircraft Walk around Inspection
The walk around inspection will be demonstrated before or after the flight as time permits.
FCOM 03.03.05 refers. The instructor should emphasize the inspection aspects of the
landing gear. Refer to FCTM „Landing Gear‟. The instructor performs a walk around prior
to the base training flight.
Cockpit Preparation and Engine Start
The trainee crew will occupy the left or right seat for cockpit preparation with the
instructor supervising from the other operating pilot‟s seat.

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Taxi Recommendation
Little, if any power above idle thrust will be required to get the aircraft moving at training
weights. Thrust should be used symmetrically. Avoid high thrust setting at low ground
speeds due to the risk of ingestion (FOD), jet blast of other aircraft and airport equipment.
Taxi at a safe and appropriate speed for existing conditions.
Exercise care to keep the nose gear on the centerline when taxiing. Brakes may be
checked once the aircraft is moving and thereafter the normal maximum taxi speed should
be 25 KTS in a straight line, 10 KTS for a sharp turn. Do not “ride” the brakes, as 25 KTS
is exceeded, apply brakes smoothly and decelerate to 10 KTS, release the brakes and allow
the aircraft to accelerate again.
Nosewheel steering is also fly by wire. The inputs of the nosewheel steering tillers are
additive (just like the sidestick). Care is needed to steer the aircraft smoothly with small
tiller inputs. For straight taxiways rudder pedal steering may be smoother. Sharp turns
particularly need care, as the rate of response of the nosewheel to tiller input is not linear.
Enter large angle or narrow radius turn at a low speed (10 kts MAX) with idle thrust and
brakes released. Use outboard engine power to maintain speed only, not to tighten the
turn. Do not use differential brakes to assist the turn.
The height above the taxiway tend to give a slower-than-actual speed sensation. Monitor
ND ground speed display to help assess taxi speed.
Maintain as a wide radius of turn as possible to avoid tire scrubbing.
Important:
A340
The long wheel base may cause problems with taxiway alignment in turns. The nosewheel
is 4m behind pilot‟s seat. The main gear is an additionally 25.5m behind the nose gear.
The center of the turn is always in line with main gear. This means the pilot is always
outside the centerline during the turns and MUST overshoot the desired centerline before
starting the turns.
It is recommended 180° turns on the runway without turning pads be avoided. If a 180° is
required refer to FCOM procedure.

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Take-off
a) Standard Take-off
The SOP power application to TOGA or FLEX is made and the aircraft is kept
straight by the use of the rudder. Set EPR or N1 using the blue “TLA Symbols”.
Refer SOP (take off).
At 100 KTS the deflection angle of the nosewheel by the rudder pedals is reduced
hence in strong crosswinds more rudder input may be required to prevent the
aircraft turning into wind.
The down elevator input may be gently removed by 100 KTS , rotation at VR is
made smoothly, using a continuous pitch rate of 3°/ second to a pitch attitude of
12.5° (10° in the event of engine failure).
b) Crosswind Take-off
Into the wind aileron preset is minimal. Moreover, any spoiler extension on the
“into the wind” wing is detrimental to the VMCA. It is equivalent to approximately
10° loss of rudder efficiency.
The lateral input is to be limited to the amount needed to maintain the wings level.
The flight control cross should not be „outside‟ the center pitch square on the PFD.
In all cases, the wings should be level during the rotation.
Initial Climb
When positive climb is confirmed by the increase of the radio altimeters height and positive
vertical speed, start the landing gear retraction.
The aircraft climbs away following the FD commands, care should be taken to restrict
control inputs to those necessary to change or correct the flight path only i.e. avoid over
controlling, remember there is no feedback to the stick input. At thrust reduction altitude
“LEVER CLB” will flash on the upper left portion (A/THR) on the PFD. Move the thrust
levers to the CLB detent (two “clicks” from TOGA or one “click” from FLEX). Do not do this
too slowly or there is a danger that the A/THR may disconnect. The auto thrust is then
active.
If the acceleration altitude coincide with the thrust reduction altitude, then the speed
target will change to the ECON climb IAS or the climb phase preset speed. If acceleration
altitude is higher the same speed changes will occur when it is reached.
Retract the flaps on schedule at F and S speed.

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When the final configuration for the exercise has been achieved (normally flap 1 for circuit
training) activate approach and ensure that managed speed is active. Managed speed will
not activate if the FD‟s have been turned off.
After the first take-off on an extended upwind leg the auto pilot should be engaged and
the full after Take-off Checklist completed. The aircraft should then be prepared for
approach and the full Approach Checklist completed.
Circuit Handling
Remember that in pitch the sidestick is demanding „g‟ and that in roll it is demanding roll
rate; take care not to over control.
The aircraft may be flown downwind using managed lateral guidance, if an appropriate
FMGS flight plan had been inserted, but is probably more usual to use TRK mode. In any
event return to HDG or TRK mode prior to ILS localizer interception. Use of managed
speed is normal procedure as well as use of autothrust. Angle of bank should be limited to
that commanded by the FD, where no FD is being used limit bank angle to 30 degrees.
The standard timing of 45 seconds (+/-wind) may be used from abeam the upwind end of
the runway prior to turning base leg. Flap 2 is selected at this point followed by gear
down, and a descent commenced.
Use of FD for visual approaches is not recommended. It is therefore mandatory to switch

both FD‟s off either on the downwind leg or just prior to commencing the descent. The
most useful display is the raw FPV symbol to assist in setting the aircraft up on the correct
approach path and to avoid gross errors.
Touch and Go Procedure
The following technique is to be used:
Prior to EVERY touch and go, the instructor will confirm with the trainee that:
The spoilers will not be armed (“NO SPOILERS”)

Reverse thrust will not be used (“NO REVERSE”)
Brakes (auto or manual) will not be used (“NO BRAKES”)
The trainee will:
Lower the nosewheel to the runway after main gear touchdown (which also allows
pitch trim reset).
Track the runway centerline using rudder pedal inputs only.
Advance the thrust levers to approximately 2” (5 cm forward). When the instructor
call to “Stand Them Up” (to prevent engines reducing to ground idle).

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The instructor will:
Move the flap handle to the position two detent and confirm the flaps are moving
up.
Reset the rudder trim if necessary.
Select the „bird‟ off as necessary.
Monitor the forward movement of the pitch trim.
Place one hand behind the thrust levers ensuring they are advanced approximately
2” (5 cm).
When the pitch is in the green band, call “GO”
The Trainee will:
Advance the thrust levers to the TOGA detent.

Maintain the runway centerline.
The instructor will:
Monitor engine acceleration.

Check FMA annunciation (when appropriate).
Check TOGA thrust obtained and call “THRUST SET”.
Call “ROTATE” at Vapp.
Maintain his hand on the thrust levers to ensure no inadvertent reduction of power,
until requested to raise the gear, or unwanted stop
The Trainee will:
Rotate the aircraft to the pitch attitude commanded by the SRS or 12.5° if no FD is
available.
Call gear up when instructor calls “Positive Climb”.
The trainee will move the thrust levers to the CL detent (the FMA will read CLB SRS
GA TRK)
Flap 1 may be selected at acceleration altitude when F speed is reached or at „ALT capture‟
when F speed is reached, whichever occurs first. Approach may be activated at this stage,
or as soon as the required flap angle for the circuit, if other than flap 1, is selected.
Emergency
If the instructor wishes to abandon the touch and go, he will call “STOP” simultaneously
taking control of the aircraft and bring it to a halt using maximum braking and reverse.
Once the aircraft has stopped he will call for any appropriate ECAM actions.

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The decision to discontinue a Touch and Go, or Take-off, must only be taken by the
instructor and only if it is certain that the aircraft cannot fly safely. Remember there is no
V1 on touch and go. Vapp will substitute for V1.
The trainee may never call “STOP”
Note : The take-off configuration warning may sound if the application of TOGA is
made while the flaps or pitch trim are resetting but still outside the take-off
range.
Next Exercise
The instructor will inform the trainee of the next exercise to be performed during the
downwind leg, and he will confirm the trainee‟s understanding of this exercise. During
each approach, the instructor will remind the trainee whether a full stop, a touch and go
“or” go around will be performed.
Instructor Take-over
a) In Flight
On the A320/A330/A340 there is no intermediate step for corrections between

voice recommendations (oral guidance) and total take-over by pressing the push-
button on the sidestick.
This is the reason why the instructor must remind the trainees that they must not
be concerned if the instructor takes over. Because of the nature of the “fly by
wire” system, additive control inputs by the instructor may be of negative value for
instruction purposes and can generate confusion in the handling of the trajectory.
This should be emphasized and reviewed to the trainees during the preflight
briefing.
If take-over becomes necessary during the flight, the instructor will clearly call “I
HAVE CONTROL” and press the sidestick priority push-button. The trainee will
acknowledge by calling “YOU HAVE CONTROL”. Release the sidestick and observe
the red arrow on the sidestick priority panel on the glareshield. The instructor will
keep his sidestick priority push-button depressed as long as the green light of the
priority panel is illuminated on the glareshield. On A-330/340, If both sidesticks are
deflected at the same time “PRIORITY LEFT/ RIGHT” (as appropriate) will sound,
“DUAL INPUT” will sound after 3 secs. Both pilot inputs are algebraically added.
The addition is limited to single stick maximum deflection.
CAUTION - However, there may be cases where it is necessary to apply

back stick without warning in case of a very late flare, it must
be emphasized that a take-over is a very rare occurrence.

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b) On the Ground
it should be emphasized that the nosewheel steering tiller should NOT be used at
high speeds (GS > 30 KT) because of the danger of over controlling. Steering
inputs from both tillers are additive, and corrective inputs by the instructor can be
confusing and potentially dangerous. Should a take-over be necessary, the
instructor will immediately call out “I HAVE CONTROL”, and if necessary, be
prepared to use rudder and differential braking to regain control or bring the
aircraft to a stop.
Automatic Landings
For training and evaluation purposes, instructors may carry out practice automatic landings
provided the weather and the ILS meet CAT I criteria or better. The instructor should be
prepared to take manual control immediately if the flight path or roll-out deviate.
Trainees should be reminded of all the conditions and limitations required during a briefing
prior to conducting an automatic landing.
Note : See FCOM 3.01.22 (Auto Flight Limitations) and 4.05.70 (FMGS Procedures)
for information on the use of the Automatic Landing System.
Final Approach and Landing
ILS guidance may be used if available, however trainees are required to demonstrate their
ability to fly a visual approach without ILS or VASI guidance. As it has already been
stated, the FDs are not to be used for visual approaches. The FPV symbol is the most
useful aid to establish the correct approach path. Autothrust is normally used, again
however, trainees must demonstrate their ability to fly the approach using both manual
and automatic thrust.
The speed trend arrow is particularly useful for achieving timely and correct thrust
response. Care should be exercised to avoid descent through the correct approach path
with idle thrust. Late recognition of this situation without prompt thrust increase may be
lead to considerable speed decay and altitude loss. Endeavour to have the aircraft
“stabilized” by 1000 FT, on the correct approach path at Vapp (or GS mini) with the
appropriate thrust applied. If stabilization is not achieved a go around is to be actioned.
Avoid any tendency to “duck under” in the latter stages of the approach. One dot fly up at
50‟ is 14‟ below the ideal glide path, 2 dots is 28‟. When the aircraft‟s glideslope antenna is
at 50‟ the main gear is at 32 FT AGL (330/340) & 27 ft (320).
In any event, avoid destabilization of the approach in the last 100 ft give the best chance
of achieving a good touch-down at the required position. There is no „Speed‟ „Speed‟ low
energy warning or Alpha Floor Protection below 100 ft AGL.

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Flare and Landing
a) Standard Landings
The pilot‟s view from the cockpit during approach and landing is particularly good.
The cockpit cut off angle gives a superb view of the runway close to the aircraft.
Students must make sure that they look well ahead during the flare and landing to
enhance their ability to judge the position of the aircraft relative to the ground.
At 40 ft (330/340) & 30‟ (320), select the thrust to idle and commence a gentle
progressive flare allowing the aircraft to touch down without prolonged float.
The three steps landing;(A330/A340) back main gear wheels, front main gear
wheels then nosewheel, release the sidestick at the first touch in order to allow an
appreciable nose down of the aircraft until – 2.5°. the approach pitch is about
3.5°, the pitch after flare is about 6°, this indicates the small amount of flare
required at training weights. Do not attempt to “hold the aircraft off” as
considerable float may be followed by a hard touchdown.
b) Crosswind Landings
For landing, the decrab technique is preferred. The structural loads are less critical
in case of an imperfect decrab than they are in case of lateral component on the
gear at touch down (since the tires can smoothen the remaining skid effect). Refer
to FCOM 3.03.22.
Allow the aircraft to point into wind, push it straight with gentle use of rudder
during the flare. If the decrab is gentle, little if any, use of into wind aileron will be
required. For rapid decrab using large or fast rudder inputs, the aircraft will roll
conventionally and sidestick will be required.
Remember the sidestick demands roll rate in flare law, once the wings are level,
center the sidestick.
Caution:
Avoid flaring high with a prolonged “hold off”. Tail strike will occur if the pitch
attitude exceeds 10° (340) & 11.5°(330/320) with the oleos compressed. Similarly
the wing tip will scrape the ground at roll attitudes approaching 10°. It should also
be remembered that there is a pitch up tendency with ground spoiler extension.
Refer to FCOM 3.03.22 (Ground Clearance Diagram). If any doubt exists as to the
safety of the flare or landing an immediate go around should be executed.

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Go around
An all engine go around is a requirement of the base training syllabus. This should
be performed in accordance with FCOM 3.02.23. The high thrust to weight ratio at
most training all up weights can produce spectacular, if not alarming, rates of
climb. The trainee should be prepared to select climb thrust quickly and positively,
lower the nose to level at the cleared altitude. The FD‟s will initially be off, „bird off‟
should be called to display the F/D‟s basic “HDG/VS” mode.
7.1.6 Completion Standards
Complies with SOP‟s and normal checklist.

Maintains good awareness of obstacle clearance and taxies at a safe speed for the
conditions using modulated braking rather than constant pressure.
Applies take-off thrust according to the published procedure.
Maintain runway center-line during take-off and touch and go.
Correctly positions the side-stick during the take-off roll without spoiler extension
and gets airborne with wings level.
Calls for the appropriate changes to configuration and FCU.
Maintains accurate track and altitude.
Establishes the correct speed, configuration and descent rate on base.
Stabilized on final at 500 ft at Vapp or GS MINI, on the correct approach path with
thrust set.
Executes a safe landing within the touchdown zone on center-line.
7.1.7 Common Errors
Taxies too fast or with inappropriate braking.

Incorrect thrust setting technique.
Allows himself to get „behind‟ the aircraft.
Incorrect base technique or does not allow for wind.
Fails to track the center line on approach and landing.
Over controlling.
Maintains good awareness of obstacle clearance and taxies at a safe speed for the
conditions

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7.2 a)

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MN/TR/05
Chapter 08
September 2010
LINE TRAINING
Page 1
CHAPTER - 08
LINE TRAINING

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8 LINE TRAINING
8.1 Line Training General ………………………………………………………………………….……………….. 3
8.1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
8.1.2 Use of the Syllabus Form ……………………………………………………………………………………… 3

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8.1 LINE TRAINING GENERAL
8.1.1 Introduction
The line training syllabus presented has been developed form the Airbus Industries
recommended listing of line training subjects. Additional subjects have been included to:
Provide additional operational acknowledge of SriLankan optioned equipment.

Cover items not included in the Regular Transition Course.
Take into account topics taught during line training on the A320/A330/A340.
Provide operational knowledge / experience of topics deemed appropriate.
The briefings are in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural
order.
8.1.2 Use of the Syllabus Form
The Line Training Syllabus Form is incorporated in the FTCM for trainee and Instruction
preparation. The form will also be included in the Training file for each trainee.
Each briefing topic will be signed and dated by the instructor after a briefing. The briefing
may be given again by a different instructor on a different sector as many as 6 times. When
the instructor is satisfied that the FTCM Completion Standards have been achieved and that
the Trainee has a good knowledge of the particular publication information, a horizontal line
is drawn through the remaining signature boxes. This will indicate to the next instructor
which topics remain and more importantly which areas the Trainee has been assessed as
competent.
The instructor completing the last training flight before the final Line Check must ensure that
all items have been annotated before recommending for final Line Check.

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LINE TRAINING RECORD

TRAINEE’S STAFF NO
SECTOR NO: DATE FROM /TO PF PNF TOTAL PF SECTORS INSTRUCTOR’S NAME
1 2 3 4
PRE FLIGHT PREPARATION
COCKPIT PREPARATION
T/O TECHNIQUE
CLIMB AND CRUISE
ENROUTE PROCEDURE
DESCENT PLANNING AND APPROACH
LANDING TECHNIQUE
USE OF REVERSE & BRAKES
R/T PROCEDURE & KNOWLEDGE
NORMAL PROCEDURES
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
CRM
ETOPS PROCEDURE
Comments:
ETOPS SECTOR YES NO
READY FOR FINAL ROUTE CHECK YES NO
Instructor’s Trainee’s Name &

Signature :……………………………………………………………………………. Signature:…………………………………………………………..
GRADINGS: 4 - Very Good 3 - Good 2 - Acceptable 1 – Unacceptable

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LINE TRAINING PROGRESS RECORD CAPT
NAME : F/O
S/NO :
BRIEFING TOPICS
PRELIGHT
FLIGHT PREPARATION
FUEL CALCULATION
USE OF RTOW
REJECTED TAKE OFF
CLIMB AND CRUISE
OPTIMUM FLIGHT LEVEL AND STEP CLIMB
CRUISE MANAGEMENT AND FUEL ECONOMY
FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
WEATHER RADAR/GPWS
DESCENT AND APPROACH
HOLD / DIVERSION FUEL CALCULATION
VISUAL APPROACH
NON PRECISION APPROACH
DECELERATED / STABILISED APPROACH
LANDING
LANDING TECHNIQUE
CROSSWIND LANDING TECHNIQUE
USE OF REVERSERS/ BRAKES/ AUTOBRAKE
GO-AROUND
DIVERSION AND CHANGE OF ALTERNATE

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NAME : F/O
S/NO :
BRIEFING TOPICS
AFTER LANDING AND PARKING

AFTER LANDING PROCEDURES
PARKING AND SHUTDOWN
NAVIGATION, AUTO FLIGHT AND AVIONICS
USE OF FMS
USE OF FPV
RNP, RVSM AND GPS
ABNORMALS AND EMERGENCIES
DUAL FMS FAILURE
ENG FAIL IN CRUISE / DIVERSION
ALL ENGINES FLAME OUT
ACTIONS WITH BOMB ON BOARD
DITCHING/FORCED LANDING BRIEFING
MISCELLANEOUS ABNORMAL / EMERGENCIES
PERFORMANCE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARY TECHNIQUES
CAT II
CONTAMINATED RUNWAYS
FLIGHT IN TURBULENCE
PERFORMANCE WITH GEAR DOWN
FLIGHT WITH UNRELIABLE SPEED
A/C TRIMMING/EFFECT OF WRONG ZFW CG
AIRCRAFT REFUELLING

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NAME : F/O
S/NO :
BRIEFING TOPICS
DOCUMENTATION
MEL STUDY
OEB AND FCOM BULLETIN ANALYSIS
AIRCRAFT LIBRARY
LOAD SHEETS AND TRIM SHEETS
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
REVIEW A/C EQUIPMENT (ON GROUND
DURING TURNAROUND)
NOTE : THE INSTRUCTOR IS TO INDICATE THE DATE OF COMPLETION OF THE

APPROPRIATE BRIEFING ITEMS WITH THE SIGNATURE.

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MN/TR/05
Chapter 09
August 2010
ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS
Page 1
CHAPTER - 09

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9 ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS

9.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
9.1.1 general …………………………………………………………………………..................................... 4
9.1.2 A brief history…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
9.1.3 Economic aspects………………………………………………………………………………………….….... 4
9.2 General Concepts………………………………………………..………………………………………………. 5

9.2.1 Category II / III………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
9.2.2 Decision Height and Alert Height ……………………………………………………………………….... 5
9.2.3 Runway Visual Range……………………………………………………………………………………..…… 7
9.2.4 Fail passive autoland system…………………………………………………………………………..……. 8
9.2.5 Fail operation autoland system……………………………………………………………………………… 8
9.2.6 Minimum Break-off Height…………………………………………………………………………………... 8
9.2.7 Concept of minima…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
9.3 Aircraft Requirements……………………………………………………………….……………………… 10

9.3.1 General…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
9.3.2 Aircraft Equipment……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
9.3.3 Automatic Landing Certification…………………………………………………………………………... 11
9.3.4 Category II / III certification……………………………………………………………………………….. 14
9.3.4.1 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 14
9.4 Airfield Requirements……………………………………………………………………………………….. 15

9.4.1 General ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
9.4.2 Runway characteristics……………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
9.4.3 Visual aids – Runway marks………………………………………………………………………………… 16
9.4.4 Visual aids – Runway lights…………………………………………………………………………………. 17
9.4.5 Visual aids – Approach light system…………………………………………………………………….. 21
9.4.6 Obstacle clearance area……………………………………………………………………………………... 22
9.4.7 ILS facility…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22
9.4.8 Runway Visual Range…………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
9.4.9 Airfield maintenance…………………………………………………………………………………………… 25
9.4.10 ATC procedures. ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 26
9.5 Operational Approval…………………………………………………………………………………………. 27

9.5.1 Required Aircraft Equipment……………………………………………………………………………..... 27
9.5.2 Maintenance Requirements…………………………………………………………………………………. 27
9.5.3 Operating Procedures………………………………………………………………………………………... 28
9.5.4 Flight Crew Training…………………………………………………………………………………………… 28
9.5.5 Aerodrome Requirement…………………………………………………………………………………….. 28

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9.6 Low Visibility Takeoff……………………………………………………………………………………….. 30

9.6.1 General…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 30
9.6.2 LVTO with RVR between 400m and 150m……………………………………………………………..31
9.7 Simulator All Weather Operations briefing…………............................................... 31

9.7.1 Training Objective……………………………………………………………………………………………... 31
9.7.2 Schedule…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 31
9.7.3 Equipment ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 31
9.7.4 Instructor’s Action…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32
9.7.5 Trainee’s Action……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32
9.7.6 Flight Preparation…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 33
9.7.7 Approach Preparation……………………………………………………………………………………….. 34
9.7.8 CAT II or CAT III Crew Briefing…………………………………………………………………………… 36

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9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 General
Landing in low visibility is perhaps one of the most ―exciting‖ ways to operate an aircraft but
certainly it is the most demanding.
In category III, pilots see the runway lights only few seconds (about 5 seconds) before
touchdown, therefore there is no margin for error.
The basis for Category II /III operations, such as aircraft certification or airline operational
demonstration, ensures a high level of safety. Moreover, approach success rate in actual in-line
services is now nearly 100%.
9.1.2 A Brief History
On January 9th 1969, a Caravelle becomes the first aircraft in the history of civil aviation to land in
actual Category IIIA conditions during a commercial flight. The approval was a direct result of
successful flight tests made since 1969 during which an automatic landing system was tested
(Toulouse: first automatic landing without visibility). Since then, many aircraft were granted
approval for Category IIIA, such as the Tridents, the B747 (1971) or the Concorde (1975). In
1974, the A300 was certified for Category IIIB, followed by the A310 (1983) and the A300 – 600
(1984).
9.1.3 Economic Aspects
Category II/III equipment represent a significant cost for Airlines. However, it is the only way to
keep in-line services with minimum diversions due to weather constraint check. The authority will
approve the landing values of RVR and DH.
Recurrent training and checking
An operator must ensure that, in conjunction with the normal training and checking of pilot
proficiency, a pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with the particular
category of operation for which he is authorized to demonstrate.
The required number of approaches to be conducted during such recurrent training is to be

minimum of two, one of which is to be a missed approach.

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9.2 General Concepts
The definition of AWO depends on the Regulatory Authority. AWO minima for SriLankan
operations is approved by the GDCA and published in the FOM. The definitions taken from ICAO,
FAA or JAA documents are represented as follows.
9.2.1 Category II/III
ICAO FAA JAA

CAT II DH 100ft< DH <200ft 100ft< DH <200ft 100ft< DH <200ft
RVR 350m<RVR 350m<RVR<800m 350m<RVR
CAT IIIA DH No DH or No DH or DH<200ft(2)
DH<100ft(2) DH<100ft(2)
RVR 200ft<RVR 200ft<RVR 200ft<RVR(1)
CAT IIIB DH No DH or DH<50ft(2) No DH or DH<50ft No DH or DH<50ft
RVR 50m<RVR<200m 50m<RVR<200m 75m<RVR(1)
CAT IIIC DH No DH No DH
RVR No RVR Limitation No RVR Limitation
150m for aircraft complaint with JAR AWO 321(B) (3) is proposed by JAR OPS 1 NPA – 10.
DH>50ft if fail passive.
9.2.2. Decision Height and Alert Height
In CAT II/III regulations, two different heights are defined.
The Decision Height (DH)
Decision height is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be
initiated unless adequate reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach
path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing safety.
There are no significant differences in DH definitions. The runway elevation means the elevation
of the highest point in the touchdown zone. The DH recognition must be by meas of height
measures by radio-altimeter.

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DETERMINATION OF THE DH FOR CATEGORY II:
DETERMINATION OF THE DH FOR CATEGORY III:

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Visual references at DH
CAT II Center / approach or edge lights must be seen continuously to establish lateral
position and cross-track velocity.
CAT IIIA 3 Centre line lights or Runway markings.
CAT IIIB 1 Center line light or Runway markings.
The Alert Height (AH)
It is defined for CAT III operations with a fail-operational landing system.
It is the height below which the manufacturer has evaluated that no system failures affecting the
integrity of the autoland system would occur (other than those mentioned and annunciated by the
auto land warning).
Above AH, a go-around must be initiated if a failure affects the fail-operational landing system.
Below AH, the approach must be continued (except if Autoland warning is triggered)
The AH evaluated during aircraft certification: 200ft for A330/A340

The AH evaluated during aircraft certification: 100ft for A320
9.2.3 Runway Visual Range.
RVR is the range over which a pilot of an aircraft on the centerline of the runway can see the
runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centerline.
CAT II/III operations require rapidly updated and reliable reports of the visibility condition.
For CAT II operations the TDZ measurement is mandatory (and controlling)

For CAT III operations the TDZ and MID measurements are mandatory. (and controlling).
Theory of RVR minima determination
The basic principles for the establishment of RVR minima are the scale of visual reference required
by a pilot or below DH, and depend on the task that he has to carry out.
The degree to which his vision is obscured depends on the nature of the meteorological
phenomena, which creates the low visibility conditions.
Refer AOC.

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Additional information on pilot’s eye position
The pilots must realize the importance of eye position during low visibility approaches and landing.
A too-low seat adjustment may greatly reduce the visual segment. When the eye reference
position is lower than intended, the already short visual segment is further reduced by the cut-off
angle of the glare shield or nose.
All Airbus Aircraft are equipped with an eye position-indicating device. The optimum eye position
is obtained when the pilots sees the red indicator ball covering the white ball.
Use all Landing Lights
Use of landing lights at night in low visibility can be detrimental to the acquisition of visual
references.
Reflected lights from water droplets or snow may actually reduce visibility. Landing lights would
therefore not normally be used in CAT III weather conditions.
9.2.4 Fail – Passive Autoland System
An automatic landing system is fail-operational if, in the event of a failure, there is no significant
out-trim condition or deviation of flight path or altitude but the landing is not completed
automatically.
Fail-passive capability is announced by the display of CAT3 SINGLE on the PFD.
9.2.5 Fail Operation Autoland System
An automatic landing system is fail-operational if, in the event of a failure below alert height, the
approach, the flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic system.
Fail-operational capability is announced by the display of CAT3 DUAL on the PFD.
9.2.6 Minimum Break-off Height.
The minimum Approach Break-off Height (MABH) is the lowest height above the ground,
measured by radio-altimeter at which, such that if a missed approach is initiated without external
reference.
In normal operation, the aircraft does not touch the ground during the procedure.

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With an engine failure during a missed approach, it can be demonstrated that taking this failure
into account, an accident is extremely improbable.
A320/A330/A340 was certified without MABH (as will future Airbus aircraft).
9.2.7 Concept of Minima
This term could refer to different concepts
Airfield Operating Minima
Airfield operating minima is established in accordance with the airport and published on approach
charts. Each individual Sate after evaluating SriLankan Airline’s ―request for approval‖ issues a
letter of approach. This letter is then forwarded to JEPPENSSEN, that in turn publishes Approach
Charts valid for the specific Category and Minima.
Operator’s Minima
Operator’s minima is the lowest minima that an operator is allowed to use, following approval
from its regulatory authority.
Crew Minima
Crew minima is the lowest minima that the crew is authorized to operate, depending on the crew
qualification.
SriLankan Airlines trains and authorizes its crew operate in CAT II (A320) and CAT IIIA (A330 /
A340) weather conditions.
SriLankan Airlines A330 /A340 flight crew are proficient to CAT III B minima once they are trained
as per the syllabus laid out in this manual FCTM and meet the currency requirements for
proficiency as laid out in the AOC.
SriLankan Airlines A320 flight crew are proficient to CAT II minima once they are trained as per
the syllabus laid out in this manual and meet the currency requirements for proficiency as laid out
in this AOC.
* Crew competency is certified by the flight operations department
By marking a tick ()to category III (CAT II – A- 320) authorized – yes section of the
category II (CAT II- A- 320) certificate (on the reverse side of the crew member
certificate) and.
There after maintain currency by completing and automatic approach and landing once
every 45 days.
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Aircraft Minima
Aircraft minima is the lowest minima which have been demonstrated during aircraft
certification. These minima are indicated in the AFM
All SriLankan Airlines Airbus Aircrafts are certified and maintained so as to be able to operate up
to and including CAT IIIB (JAR) minima weather conditions.
The Auto-Land Capability of the Aircraft is maintained as current by completing successful

Automatic Approach & Landing once in every 28 calendar days.
9.3 AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
9.3.1 General
An operator cannot perform CAT II / III approaches or auto landing unless:
The aircraft type is approved for the type of operation.
The operator has received from the national authorities, operational approval to perform these
types of operations.
The aircraft capability to perform these operations is a necessary pre-requisition to obtain this
operational approval (refer to AFM)
The airworthiness requirements for CAT II/III approach and auto landing applied to the Airbus
family are in compliance with the following:
JAR AWO section 1 (autoland), section 2 (CAT II) and section 3 (CAT III) or its previous
regulations applicable at the time of certification.
Definition of a successful approach
An approach is considered to be successful if:
* from 500ft.
- speed is maintained within +5kt disregarding rapid fluctuations
due to turbulence
- no relevant system failure occurs.
* from 300ft to DH
- no excessive deviation occurs
- no centralized warning gives a go – around order.

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9.3.2 Aircraft Equipment
In order to perform a CAT II/III approach and automatic landing as explained above, the
equipment listed in the QRH is required to be operative.
If one of these equipments / systems is listed in the MEL with associated dispatch conditions, the
MEL must clearly indicate that CAT II / III operations are not authorized.
9.3.3. Automatic Landing Function
Requirements
The automatic landing function of the AFS provides automatic control of the aircraft during
approach, landing and rollout.
This is a mandatory function for all CAT III operation, but it may also be used in weather
conditions better than CAT III weather conditions.
Touchdown Performance
Regulations require that:
A simulation by statistical analysis is performed to demonstrate that the exceedance of any limits
as defined for the average and limit risk is improbable.
Flight tests be performed to confirm the results obtained by simulation (1—is typical number of
tests performed for a new, non-derived aircraft)
Rollout performance
Automatic rollout is only necessary for specific CAT III operations. The automatic rollout
performance is demonstrated with the same method as touchdown performance, but is measured
only by one parameter, i.e. maximum lateral deviation of the aircraft from the runway centerline.
When automatic ground roll control or head-up ground roll guidance is being used, the probability
that the aircraft will deviate more than 8.2m from the runway centerline is less than 5%.
Additionally, when the operation is predicted on the provision of fail-operational ground roll
control, the probability must be less than 10-6 that the outboard landing gear will deviate to point
more than 21.3m from the runway centerline while the speed is greater than 40 knots.

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Automatic landing distance
The landing distance using autoland have been established for the aircraft type. When they
exceed the comparable values for the required manual landing distance (actual distance X 1.67),
they are shown in the approved flight manual.
Calculation of the automatic landing distance:
The required automatic landing distance is, the distance of the airborne phase plus the distance of
the ground phase, multiplied by the factor 1.15.
D = (Da + Dg) X 1.15
Dg is the distance of the ground phase. This distance uses the same method as for a manual
landing assuming a mean standard deviation touchdown (demonstrated over more than one
thousand simulated automatic landings)
Configurations and Conditions to be considered:
The compliance demonstration for the automatic landing system must take into account all
essential variables influencing the performance.
A typical example for the set of variables for Airbus aircraft is:
Flap setting.
Aircraft weight and center of gravity
Engine status (engine out)
Wind characteristics
Auto thrust speed control mode.
Runway characteristics.

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The wind characteristics - longitudinal and lateral component, nominal windshear and turbulence.
The runway characteristics - elevation, slope, length, ambient temperature and status (dry or wet)
Autoland is generally approved only up to 2500ft runway elevation, unless a runway higher than
that is included in the flight tests-the-so-called high-altitude autoland approval.
Definition of a successful landing
An automatic landing is considered to be successful if:

- no system failure occurs
- no flare failure occurs
- no decrab / failure occurs
- Mainwheel touchdown occurs between 150m (500ft) and 750m (2500ft) from
runway threshold, assuming a normal GS antenna location.
- Nosewheel touchdown occurs within 8m (27ft) of runway centerline.
- Touchdown vertical speed dose not exceed 360ft / min.
- Bank angle at touchdown dose not exceed 7 degrees.
- Pitch angle dose not exceed to maximum value for a safe tail clearance.
- Rollout lateral deviation does not exceed 8m (27ft)
- No rollout failure occurs.
9.3.4. Category II/III (Airbus Aircraft CAT II/III Certification Status)
This table details the specific results of CAT II and CAT III airworthiness certification. It is
assumed that the aircraft has a basic airworthiness approval for IFR operations.
Note: When making an approach using an autothrust system, the approach speed may be
selected manually or automatically.
The position of the aircraft is such that, between 90m (300ft) and DH the deviation with
regard to the reference ILS beam, do not exceed the values of the Glide Path or localizer
deviation for the excess deviation alerts.

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CAT II/III Certification Status.
Category Min.DH MABH AH Min RVR Remarks

CAT 2, CAT 3
No RVR SINGLE or CAT 3
CAT II 100ft
Specified DUAL capability
Displayed.
CAT 3 SINGLE,
CAT II Fail No RVR or CAT 3 DUAL
50ft
Passive Specified capability
Displayed.
CAT IIIB Fail CAT 3 DUAL
No RVR
Operational 200ft capability
Specified
with DH Displayed.
CAT IIIB Fail CAT 3 DUAL
Operational 200ft 75m capability
without DH Displayed.
MABH not specified

For specific Automatic Flight Control System Limitations, refer to FCOM.
For SriLankan Airlines the approval minima for CAT II will be DH 100ft and RVR 350m
(all fleets)
For SriLankan Airlines the approval minima for CAT III B will be DH 0ft and RVR 125 m
(A 330 & A 340 only)
Refer to AOC for latest minima
AUTOLAND IN CAT I OR BETTER WEATHER CONDITIONS
9.3.4.1. GENERAL
Crew are required to perform automatic landings in CAT I or better weather conditions for training
purposes or to record data for an operational demonstration or for crew competency purposes.
How ever auto landing in CAT I, or better weather condition, is possible on CAT I ground
installation or when ILS sensitive areas are not protected, if the following precaution are taken.
- The airline has checked that the beam quality and the effect of the terrain
profile before the runway have no advice effect on autopilot guidance. In
particular, the effect of terrain discontinuities within 300 meters before the
runway threshold must be evaluated.

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- The crew is aware that the LOC or GS beam fluctuations, independent of the
aircraft system, may occur and the PF is prepared to immediately disconnect
the autopilot and to take the appropriate action, should unsatisfactory
guidance occur.
- At least CAT II capability is displayed on the FMA and CAT II/III procedures
are being used.
- Visual references are obtained at A DH appropriate for the CAT I approach

being flown, or a Go-around is performed.
- When the crew does not intend to perform an autoland, they should
disconnect the autopilot at , or above, 80ft. this altitude being considered as a
minimum to take over and feel comfortable. Nevertheless, for safety reasons
the, the AP can be disconnected at any time.
9.4 Airfield Requirements
9.4.1 General
An operator shall not use in airfield for CAT II or III operations unless it is approved for such
operations by the state in which the airfield is located.
Airfield requirements are contained in the ICAO document ―All-Weather Operations Manual‖ which
refers standards and recommendations from ICAO.
Additional requirements or variants may be found in national regulations.
9.4.2. Runway Characteristics
Runway Length
There is no specific requirement concerning runway length for an aerodrome to be CAT II or

III approved. The runway length is only an operational limitation.
Runway Width
The runway width should be normally not less than 45m.
Runway Slope
For CAT II or III, disregarding normal standards, it is recommended that the first and the last
quarter of the runway length, the slope does not exceed 0.8%.

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To permit the use of the automatic landing system, ICAO also recommends that slope changes
must be avoided or, when it is not possible, kept to a maximum of 2% per 30m (i.e. minimum
radius of curvature of 1500m) within the area located just before the threshold (60m wide,
200m long)
This limitation is due to the fact that automatic landing system user radio altimeter, and a
rapid slope change could disturb the landing.
During airworthiness certification, it must be demonstrated that the automatic landing system
works on a particular runway profile (see aircraft requirements)
Objects on Runway Strips
It is recommended that for runways intended for use for CAT II or CAT III approaches, no
fixed object (other than frangible visual aids) be installed on a runway strip within 60m of the
centerline. During landing, no mobile objects are permitted in the same area.
Taxi – Holding Position
A taxi-holding position is established at each intersection of taxiway and the runway. The
distance between the holding position and the centerline of the runway is not less than 90m (if
the runway elevation exceeds 700m)
9.4.3. Visual Aids- Runway Marks
Runway Centerline Marks
For CAT II or III operations, the centerline marks, must have a width not less than 0.90m (or
not less than 0.45m for CAT I).
Touchdown Zone Marks
Touchdown zone marks are required for all precision approaches, unless the authority declares
that they are unnecessary.
They are painted in the touchdown zone (the zone beginning at the threshold and extending
to a distance of 900m)

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Taxiway Marks
Taxiway marks are not a specific CAT II or III requirements, but experience has shown that
they are an effective means of guiding aircraft in low visibility conditions during the day.
Taxi – Holding Position Markings
The taxi-holding positions must be for the closest marks to the runway. Either CAT II or CAT
III is written on the surface when the area exceeds 60m width. CAT II or CAT III signs are
also placed on either edge of the taxiway at the holding position and the sign CAT II must be
accompanied with flashing lights. These markings or signs are an efficient means to avoid
aircraft intruding into the obstacle free zone or in the critical / sensitive area.
9.4.4. Visual Aids-Runway Lights
Runway lights on runways intended for use by CAT II or CAT III operations consist of high
intensity threshold lights, runway touchdown zone lights, runway edge lights and runway
centerline lights.
Runway Edge Lights
Runway edge lights are placed along the full length of the runway in two parallel rows equidistant
from the centerline, with a distance of no more than 3m to the runway edge. These lights are
uniformly spaced at intervals of no more than 60m and may be omitted at the intersections. The
lights are fixed lights showing variable white.
Threshold Lights
Threshold Lights are placed in a row, at right angles to the runway axis, outside the runway, with
a distance of no more than 3m to the threshold.
The lights are fixed unidirectional lights showing green, uniformly spaced at intervals of no more
than 3m.
Runway End Lights
Runway end lights are placed in a row, at right angles to the runway axis, outside the runway,
with a distance of no more than 3m to the runway; the lights are fixed unidirectional lights
showing red, with a minimum number of 6 lights. ICAO also recommends spacing between the
lights of no more than 6m for runways intended to be used for CAT III approaches.

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Runway Centerline Lights
Runway centerline lights are specific requirement for CAT II or CAT III approaches. They are
located along the centerline of the runway, with a longitudinal spacing of approximately.
7.5m,15m or 30m for CAT II See Jeppesen Diagram on page 20

7.5m or 15m for CAT III Runway Lighting
These lights are fixed lights showing:
Variable white from the threshold to the point 900m from the runway end.
Alternate RED and variable WHITE from the point 900m to the point 300m from the runway end
(pairs of red lights followed by pairs of variable white light if the spacing is only 7.5m)
RED from the point 300m to the runway end.
Touchdown Zone Lights
Runway touchdown zone lights are a specific requirement for CAT II or CAT III approaches. They
extend from the threshold to a longitudinal distance of 900m (full touchdown zone) but do not
extend beyond the mid- point if runway length is less than 1800m.
Pairs of barrette containing at lest three lights from the pattern. The lights inside each barrette are
fixed unidirectional lights showing variable white, spaced at an interval of no more than 1.5m.
Each barrette must be not less than 3m and no more than 4.5m in length. The lateral spacing (or
gauge) between the lights is not less than 18m and no more than 22.5m with a preference of
18m. the longitudinal spacing between pairs of barrettes is 60m or 30m, but it is recommended to
have spacing of 30m for low minima.
Taxiway Edge Lights
Taxiway edge lights are not a specific CAT II or CAT III requirement, but provide efficient visual
aid during low-visibility operations. The lights are fixed lights showing blue.
Taxiway Centerline Lights
Taxiway centerline lights have to be installed on airfield intended for use by operations with an
RVR of 400m or less (400m is the mean value for CAT II approach). The lateral spacing between
lights must not exceed 15m, but a spacing equal to, or less than, 7.5m must indicate the proximity
of a curve.

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The lights are fixed lights green, but from the beginning of the taxiway to the perimeter of the
TLS critical areas / sensitive area or the lower edge of the inner transitional surface, the lights are
alternately showing green and yellow.
Stop Bars
Stop bars are placed at each taxi-holding position when the runway is intended for use at an RVR
less than 400m and are specially required for all CAT II approaches. The lights of the stop bars
are an efficient means to avoid aircraft intrusion into the obstacle-free zone (OFZ) or into the
critical / sensitive area during approaches in very low visibility conditions.

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Runway lights / Approach light system:

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9.4.5 Visual Aids – Approach Lights System
The approach light system is mandatory fro CAT II operations, and only optional for CAT III
operations. It consider of a row of lights on the extended centerline of the runway, extending over
a distance of 300m from the threshold (over 900m fro CAT I). In addition, the system has two
sides of rows of lights, extending 270m from the threshold, and two crossbars, one at 150m and
one at 300m from the threshold.
Sequenced strobe lighting is concerned to be incompatible with CAT II and III operations. When
installed for other operations, it should be switched off when CAT II/III approaches are in
progress.
Extended Centerline Lights
The light forming the centerline are, placed at longitudinal intervals of 30m, with the first one
located 30m from the threshold.
These lights consist of barrettes showing variable white. Each barrette is at least 4m in length.
When a barrette is composed of point sources, the lights are uniformly spaced at intervals of no
more than 1.5m.
Side Row Lights
The lights forming the side rows are placed each side of the centerline, at a longitudinal spacing
equal to that of the extended centerline lights (30m), with the first ones located 30m from the
threshold. The lateral spacing (or gauge) between the lights is not less than 18m and no more
than 22.5m, with a preference for 18m.
In any case, the lateral spacing shall be equal to that of the touchdown zone lights. These lights
consist of barrettes showing red. The length of a side row barrette and the longitudinal spacing of
its light shall be equal to those of the touchdown lights barrettes.
Crossbar Lights
The crossbar provided at 150 m from the threshold fills in the gap between the centerline and the
side row lights. The crossbar provided at 300m is extended on both sides of the centerline lights
to a distance of 15m from the centerline.
The lights forming the two crossbars are fixed lights showing variable white.

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9.4.6 Obstacles Clearance Area.
Introduction
Due to the very low visibility in CAT II, CAT III operations, each airfield must meet stringent
criteria concerning obstacles clearance to avoid any aircraft on approach, landing or go-around,
touching obstacles on the ground. The basis of those criteria is fully included in ICAO Annex 14
and PANS OPS Doc 8168 and in other national documents. In CAT II and III operations, two
important concepts are often mentioned I regulations.
The Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ).

The Obstacle Clearance Height (OCH)
Definitions
Provided below are, the definitions of the OCH and OFZ as defined in ICAO.
OCA/OCH: the lowest altitude (OCA), or alternatively the lowest height above the elevation of
the relevant runway threshold or above the aerodrome elevation as applicable (OCH), used in
establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle clearance criteria.
When an operator establishes his operating aerodrome minima, he must take into account the
OCH only for CAT II. The minimum DH for CAT II is always equal or higher than any OCH
mentioned in the aerodrome chart. This OCH is a function of the category of aircraft (A to E).
OFZ : The airspace above the inner approach surface, inner transitional surfaces, and
balked landing surfaces and that portion of the strip bounded by these surfaces, which is not
penetrated by any fixed obstacle other than a low-mass and frangible mounted and required for
air transportation purposes.
9.4.7 ILS Facility
Description
At present time all CAT II/III approaches are based on ILS facilities. The ILS installation must
conform to the appropriate specification contained in ICAO Annex 10, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapters
2 and 3, and be designed and operated in accordance with the guidance material contained in
attachments C to part 1 of Annex 10.
There are three categories of ILS performance that provide guidance down to a higher or equal
to:
60m (200ft) for CAT I,

15M (50tf) for CAT II,
runway surface and along the runway for CAT III.

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Normally, a CAT II ILS facility is required for the performance of CAT II approaches, and a CAT III
ILS facility for the performance of CAT III approaches. However, under a specific special
agreement it may be possible to use a category II ILS facility for the performance of CAT IIIA or
CAT III with the highest minima (i.e. CAT III A or CAT III with DH not less than 50ft). A special
agreement from the authority must be obtained.
ILS Protection
In CAT II/III approaches, the ILS beams must be protected from unacceptable disturbance.
For this purpose, two kinds of protection area are defined:
The critical area

The sensitive area
The ILS critical is an area of defined dimensions about the localizer and glide path antennas where
vehicles, including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS operations. The critical area is protected
because the presence of vehicles and/or aircraft inside the boundaries will cause unacceptable
disturbance to the ILS signal-in-space.
The ILS sensitive area is an area extending beyond the critical area where the parking and/or
movement of vehicles, including aircraft, is controlled to prevent the possibility of unacceptable
interference to the ILS signal during ILS operations. The sensitive area is protection against
interference caused by large moving objects outside the critical area but still normally within the
airfield boundary.
The dimensions of the critical area are contained in ICAO Annex 10, but there is no specification
for the dimensions of the sensitive area.
Some states do not define the sensitive area but increase the critical area.
The ILS beam is also protected by longitudinal separation between aircraft on landing or take-off.
ILS protection is mandatory when low visibility procedures are in force.
9.4.8 Runway Visual Range
RVR Measurement
The RVR measurement are provided by a system of calibrated transmissometer and take account
of the effects of ambient background, light and the intensity of runway lights.
The system includes one or more transmissometer(s); it provides the value of the opaqueness of
the atmosphere on a reference distance through the ratio between the transmitted light flux and
the received light flux.
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Location of the Transmissometers
The RVR measurements are basically provided for three parts of the runway.
The touch-down-zone (TDZ)

The mid runway portion (MID)
The roll-out portion or stop-end
The required number of measurements depends on the type of operations.
Transmissometers should be placed at each zone in which they are intended to provide an RVR
measurement. The location is supervised by the technical services of the airport authority’ it must
be close enough to the runway to provide an acceptable value, but at the same time must be a
non-hazardous obstacles for the aircraft.
Generally, each transmissometer is at a distance of between 110m and 150m from the runway
centerline. Moreover, to be representative of the vision of a pilot on the runway; the
transmissometer is installed at a height of between 5m and 10m above the ground.
RVR Measurements Reports
ICAO recommends that RVR reports be given with 50m increments when the RVR is less than
800m and 25m increments when the RVR is less than 150m. in any case, any change of the RVR
value must be known by the ATC as soon as possible and in less than 15 seconds.
During operations, the pilot must know the RVR value related to the touchdown. Generally it is
not necessary to give the other values (MID, stop-end) unless these values are lower than the
TDZ reports or there is special mention in the ATC procedures.
In Category II and Category III operations, the minima are expressed in terms of DH and RVR. It
is relatively simple to establish the DH. But it is more difficult to establish the RVR to be
associated with that DH in order to ensure the required visual reference (three-light segment).
Theory of RVR minima determination
The basic principle for the establishment of RVR minima are the scale of visual reference required
by a pilot at and below DH depends on the task that he has to carry out and that the degree to
which his vision is obscured depends on the nature of the meteorological phenomena which
creates the low visibility conditions.
“… the task that he has to carry out…”

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Research using flight simulators and flight tests have shown that:
1. Most pilots require visual contact to be established about three seconds above DH
though it has been observed that this reduces to about one second when a fail-
operational automatic landing system is being used;
2. to establish lateral position and cross-track velocity, most pilots require to be able to
see not less than a three-light segment of the centerline of the approach lights, or
runway centerline, or runway edge lights;
3. to maintain a lateral level, most pilots require to be able to see a lateral element of the
ground pattern, i.e. an approach lighting cross-bar, the landing threshold, or a barrette
of the touchdown zone lighting;
4. To make an accurate adjustment to the flight path in the vertical plane, such as a flare,
using purely visual cues, most pilots require to be able to see a point on the ground
which has a low or zero rate of apparent movement relative to the aircraft.
Minimum visual segments at DH have been established for each category. Typical values are 60m
for CAT III and 90m for CAT II automatic landing and 225m for CAT II with manual landing.
Note1: the visual segment is the runway segment that a pilot can see from his Position
“…nature of the meteorological phenomena…”
With regard to fog structure, data gathered in the United Kingdom over a twenty-year period have
shown that in deep stable fog there is a 90% probability that the SVR from eye heights greater
than 15ft above the ground will be less than the RVR. There is some evidence in pilots’ reports
that other low visibility conditions (heavy rain, blowing snow, dust, etc.) could produce a
relationship similar to that observed in fog.
So, to convert required SVR into required RVR, the model established in the UK for deep stable
fog can be used. Refer to the following graph providing SVR/RVR ratio as a function of eye
height. On 90% of occasions, the SVR is expected to be this proportion of RVR or more.
9.4.9 Airfield Maintenance
Introduction
A system of maintenance for visual aids must be established at an airfield to ensure both lighting
and marking system reliability. A system of maintenance for ILS installations must also be
established with regular and flight checks as mentioned in the ICAO annex 10.

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Lighting system condition
To preserve the pattern of lighting system, it is also recommended to ensure that two
unserviceable lights are never adjacent (except in the same crossbar or barrette where two
adjacent unserviceable lights are permitted).
5% In the approach lighting system from the threshold to 450m before the threshold
5% In the runway centerline lights
5% In the runway threshold lights
5% In the runway edge lights
10% In the touchdown zone lights
In the approach lighting system form the point 450m before the threshold and
15%
beyond
25% In the runway end lights
To check the pattern of the lighting system, aerodrome maintenance services can either use a
photograph of the complete system, taken at night or use automatic lighting system reports.
ILS Maintenance
ILS installations must be ground and flight checked at regular intervals in accordance with the
requirements of ICAO Annex 10. Moreover, users must be advised as soon as possible, and
comply with ATC procedures, in case of any degradations in ILS performance.
9.4.10 ATC Procedures
General
CAT II and CAT III operations require special procedures for the ATC and all services on the
aerodrome (maintenance, security). They are often referred to under the generic name of Low
Visibility procedure. Each aerodrome authority develops its own procedures with the ICAO ―All
Weather Document‖ as a possible aid. It is very difficult to provide in this paragraph a complete
view of all those procedures.
Mainly, the procedures to be established are:
For ATC to be quickly informed of all degradations in ILS performance and advise the crew.
For ATC to be quickly informed of all degradations in visual aids and advise the crew.
For the protection of the OFZ by the control of ground movements.

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For the protection of the ILS critical area and the ILS sensitive area by control of ground
movements and adequate separation between two aircraft on approach or one aircraft on
approach and another taking-off.
For metrological services.
For maintenance
For security.
ATC Clearance
Clearance to carry out a CAT II/III approach must be requested from ATC, who will activate the
Low Visibility Procedures, i.e. prepare the airfield and assure appropriate aircraft separation. Such
an approach may not be undertaken until the clearance has been received. It is also
recommended that ATC be informed when an automatic landing is intended to be performed, to
ensure, whenever possible, the same protection even in CAT I or better conditions.
9.5 Operational Approval
9.5.1 Required Aircraft Equipment
The CAT II/III capabilities is available provided the equipment listed in the relevant AFM list of
equipment are operative.
If the aircraft is dispatched with equipment inoperative, the MEL may preclude CAT II or CAT III
operations as appropriate.
9.5.2 Maintenance Requirements
On all Airbus aircraft, CAT II/III capabilities are inherent functions of the basic design standard.
Therefore, the Airbus Industrie Maintenance program covers related tasks. There is no special
recommendation for scheduled maintenance tasks to assure CAT II/III capabilities.
A program for unscheduled maintenance is established based on the Airbus Maintenance Manual
to advise corrective actions/procedures necessary after an autoland failure or associated
component failure.
A reliability program for the required equipment has been established to monitor the system
operational status.
The aircraft status is primarily governed by status messages displayed on ECAM STATUS page and
FMA display of capability. However, crew entry in the Technical Log-book will take precedence.

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A log entry will b e made if (CAT III DUAL) capacity is not available. A downgrading/upgrading
procedure has been established and is used.
9.5.3 Operating Procedures
All CAT II and CAT III approaches are required to be autoland. The recommended procedure is to
engage both APs and to disconnect APs at taxi speed on the runway. However, depending on
aircraft status or special airport conditions:
In CAT II conditions with RVR equal to, or greater that 350m, the AP may be disconnected at 80ft.
In CAT IIIA conditions with RVR equal to, or greater than 200m, the AP may be disconnected at
touchdown.
CAT II SINGLE may be performed with 50ft DH and RVR>200m if one AP is inoperative.
9.5.4 Flight Crew Training
The program consists of:
Ground courses (VACBI)

Simulator session of 2 hours, plus one hour evaluation for CAT II/III.
Refer to FOM for Training, Checking, Qualifications & Recency
For CAT II/III approaches:
Refer AOC part C for Crew qualification.
The recurrent training for CAT II/III operations has been integrated in the standard recurrent
training and checking for Captain and F/O.
A simulator check consisting of at least three automatic approaches will be conducted every six
months, one of which includes a go-around, one of which will be to a full stop landing and one will
involve a system failure.
In a period of thirty-six months all failure cases will be covered.
9.5.5 Aerodrome Requirements
General
CAT II/III operations are envisaged for a number of airports which fully comply with CAT II/III
standards, and are approved for such operations by the airport national Authorities.

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Runway Characteristics
Required runway length – if this distance is greater than the normal required runway length, it will
be verified to comply with automatic landing distance given in the AFM. Runway width is not to
be less than 45m for CAT II/III operations.
Obstacle Clearance
For CAT II approach the selected DH must not be lower than the published OCH.
RVR Measurements
Touchdown or mid-runway RVR measurement must be available for CAT III B operations. Rollout
RVR is advisory.
Automatic Landings in CAT I or better Weather Conditions
For training, automatic landings can be performed on runways promulgated for CAT II/III
operation without enforcing Low Visibility Procedures provided that:
Criteria to qualify crews for automatic landings in CAT I or better weather conditions have been
established.
Crews must be especially vigilant for flight path deviations close to the ground. Such deviations
may be caused by electronic interference, for example, by cable TV.
CAT II Automatic Approach
The DH is determined as the higher of:
The published OCH.

The minimum DH applicable to the flight crew,
100ft.
The minimum RVR is a function of the DH and is indicated in the table below.
DH RVR
100-120FT 350M
120-140FT 400M
140FT AND ABOVE 450M
Touchdown transmissometer must indicate a RVR above the listed minimum.

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CAT III Automatic Approach and Landing
For CAT III Operations, the general minima are:
DH 50ft
RVR 200m (Touchdown) and 100m (mid-point)
NOTE: Refer for AOC for authorized values
Touchdown transmissometer must indicate a RVR above listed minimum.

The visual segment associated with DH = 50ft and RVR 200m has been evaluated to be 120m.
Procedures recommend the use of both APs, but if one is inoperative, CAT III SINGLE can be
performed with the same minima.
If rollout cannot be used or is inoperative, CAT III A automatic approach and landings can still be
conducted provided that the AP is disconnected at touchdown.
For CAT III B operations, the general minima are:
DH NO DH
RVR 125m (Touchdown) and 100m (mid-point)
9.6 Low Visibility Take-Off
9.6.1 General
Take –off with RVR less than 500 m is considered as LVTO.
The minimum RVR at Take-off is quite independent of the aircraft type and aircraft equipment
except for very low RVR.
The take-off minima is mainly determined by the airport installation (runway lighting system, RVR
measurement system).
When weather conditions are lower than the CAT I landing minima, a takeoff Alternate is normally
required:
Within one hour at one engine inoperative speed.

Specific information is published in the Supplementary Sop’s.

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9.6.2 LVTO Take-Off Minima between 500 and 200m
The minimum RVR in this range of value is a function of the aircraft category and of the runway
equipment.
A320/A330/A340 are in category C.
SriLankan DGCA allows the following minima’s

Facilities RVR
Runway edge lights, runway centre line lights,
centerline markings, and TDZ, mid and roll-out 200m
RVR with readout to at least 175m.
Runway edge light, runway centerline lights,
center line markings, TDZ, and roll-out RVR 350m
with readout down to at least 300m.
Runway edge lights and either center line lights
500m
or centerline markings
Note: The requested RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be
replaced by pilot assessment.
9.7 Simulator All Weather Operations Briefing
9.7.1 Training Objective
To practice low visibility take-offs.

To practice low visibility approach and landing procedures.
To demonstrate and practice downgradings & malfunctions.
To practice low altitude go around with and without malfunctions.
To consolidate the AWO VACBI training with practical illustration of low visibility landing
conditions.
To reach the level of proficiency to pass a AWO evaluation for licence rating purpose.
To demonstrate competence to operate aircraft in Low Visibility Operations.
9.7.2 Schedule
Briefing duration: Ground school – AWO General – 2.00 hrs.

Simulator – AWO Procedures – 1.00 hr
9.7.3 Equipment
VACBI: Low Visibility Operations
DOC references : FCOM 3.01.22 (Limitations)

FCOM 3.03.22 (Landing geometry)
FCOM 4.05.70 (ILS approach)
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FCOM 4.02.30 (Flight guidance principles)

FCOM 3.03.18 (Sops)
QRH 5.04
9.7.4 Instructor’s Actions
MAIN
General Concepts
Aircraft Requirements
Low Visibility Take-off
ECAM alerted downgradings malfunctions and procedures.
Non-ECAM downgradings malfunctions and procedures.
Visibility criteria for take-off and landing.
Go-around procedures with malfunctions.
AWO take-off and landing malfunctions.
AWO take-off and landing briefing.
SECONDARY
Operational Approval.
Aircraft, crew and airport requirements.
Flight Crew Training Programme.
9.7.5 Trainee’s Actions
Description of syllabus items to be covered
The procedures and the operational instructions should cover normal and abnormal situations,
which can be encountered in actual operations.
For quick reference, we provide a list of items to be covered.
Checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in
flight.
Effects on minima caused by changes in the status of the ground installations and airborne
equipment.
Procedures for approach, flare rollout and missed approach.
Procedures to be followed in the event of failures, warnings and other abnormal situations.
The minimum visual reference required.
The importance of correct seating and eye position.

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Action which may be necessary arising from a deterioration of the visual reference.
Allocation of crew duties and co-ordination, to allow the pilot in command to devote himself
mainly to supervision and decision-making.
The requirement for all height calls below 200ft to be based on the RA and for one pilot to
continue to monitor the aircraft instruments until the landing is completed.
The requirement for the localizer sensitive area to be protected.
The use of information relating to wind velocity, windshear, turbulence, runway contamination and
the use of multiple RVR assessments.
Procedures to be used for practice approaches and landing on runways at which the full CAT II or
CAT III airfield procedures are not in force.
Operating limitations resulting from airworthiness certification.
Information on the maximum deviation allowed from the ILS glide path and/or localizer.
9.7.6 Flight Preparation
In addition to normal flight preparation, the following planning and preparation must be
performed.
Review NOTAMS to make sure that the destination airport still meets visual or non-visual CAT II or
CAT III requirements.
Aircraft status
Check that required equipment for CAT II or CAT III approach is operative. The required
equipment is given in the FCOM and AFM.
A320/A330/A340 CAT II/III OPERATING MINIMA
Category Min. DH MABH AH Min RVR Remarks

CAT 2, CAT 3 SINGLE or
RVR
CAT II 100ft CAT 3 DUAL capability
300m
displayed
CAT 3 SINGLE , or CAT
CAT III A RVR
50ft 3 DUAL capability
Fail Passive 200m
displayed
FAT III B
RVR CAT 3 DUAL capability
Fail Operational 15ft 200ft
125m displayed
with DH
FAT III B
CAT 3 DUAL capability
Fail Operational 200ft RVR TBD
displayed
with DH

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For specific Automatic Flight Control System limitations, refer to FCOM.
Crew Qualification
Crew qualification and currency must be reviewed (both Capt and F/O must be qualified and
current)
Weather information
Check that the weather forecast at destination is within company and crew operating minima. If
the forecast is below CAT I minima, verify that alternate weather forecasts are appropriate to the
available approach means and at least equal or better than CAT I minima.
Fuel planning
Additional extra fuel should be considered for possible approach delays.
Low Visibility Take-off
In addition to the normal take-off briefing items the following must be included. In particular:
Taxi route must be known by both pilots and a procedure established to read and follow the taxi
chart. Use of Ground Radar Control.
Yaw bar use will direct the pilot to regain and maintain the runway center line.
Use of TOGA thrust.
Anti-icing requirements.
9.7.7 Approach Preparation
Aircraft Status
Check on ECAM STATUS page that the required landing capability is available.
Although it is not required to check equipment, which is not monitored by the system, if any of
this equipment is seen inoperative (flag), the landing capability will be reduced.
Weather
Check weather conditions at destination and alternates.
The selected alternate must have weather conditions equal to or better than CAT I.

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Approach ban
The following additional provisions apply:
Policy regarding approach ban point may differ from county to country. The final approach
segment may not be continued beyond the OM or equivalent DME distance, or 1,000 ft. AGL if
the reported RVR is below the published minima for TDZ and MID transmissometers. After OM or
equivalent, if RVR becomes lower than the minima, the approach may be continued.
The JAR states the following:
The commander shall satisfy himself that the status of the aircraft and of the relevant airborne
systems is appropriate for the specific operation to be conducted.
The commander must satisfy himself that, according to the information available to him, the
weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway intended to be used should not
prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.
That is, the aircraft may not leave the holding pattern for approach when any element of the
visibility is expected to be below the required amount. If the aircraft leaves the hold for an
approach and prior to the approach ban point the visibility subsequently reduce below the
minimum, a missed approach must be conducted.
ATC Calls
Clearance to carry out a CAT II/III approach must be requested from ATC, who will check the
status of the ILS, lighting and protect the sensitive areas from incursion by aircraft or vehicles.
Such an approach may not be undertaken until the clearance has been received.
Before the outer-marker, RVR values from TDZ, MID (and rollout when available), must be
transmitted.
Seat position
The correct seat adjustment is essential in order to take full advantage of the visibility over the
nose. The seat is correctly adjusted when the pilot’s eyes are in line with the red and white balls
located above the glare shield.
Use of landing lights
At night in low visibility conditions, landing lights can be detrimental to the acquisition of visual
references.
Reflected light from water droplets or snow may actually reduce visibility.

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Landing lights would therefore not normally be used in CAT II/III weather conditions.
Airfield facilities
Check the latest NOTAMS or ATC advice.
9.7.8 CAT II or CAT III Crew Briefing :
The briefing should include the normal items as any IFR arrival and in addition the following
subjects should be covered prior to the first approach: (Ref. SOP)
Check destination RVR’s and alternate weather CAT I and fuel requirements.
Confirm that the crew is CAT II or CAT III qualified.
Check status, airfield facilities i.e. ILS, approach and runway Lighting, RVR measuring equipment.
Check aircraft systems status and any en-route deficiencies.
Review and set applicable minima for CAT II/III, DH, and downgraded approach CAT 1, (DA) on
stand-by altimeter.
Review go-around procedure (heights, routing, aids, ALTN F-PLN and fuel).
Review distribution of tasks and procedures in case of malfunction.
Review procedures for downgrading CAT III  CAT II  CAT I
Review Approach Ban, ATC calls required and LVP runway exits and taxi-route.
Check seat position and aircraft/flight deck lighting.
Review use of Autobrakes.
Review use of APU.
APPROACH PROCEDURES
Task sharing CAT II/III
CAPT and F/O task sharing for precision approach is clearly defined in the SOP, FCOM 4.05.70 and
in the SOP’s.
The workload is distributed in such a way that the PF primary tasks are supervising and decision
making, and the PNF primary task is monitoring operation of the automatic system. In all cases
FOM/SOP procedure must be observed.
In summary the tasks are shared as follows:
During approach
CAPT:
Has hands on controls and thrust levers throughout the approach, landing and go-around.
Makes FCU selections (if any).

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Takes manual control in the event of AP disconnection.

Monitors flight instruments.
Approach DH
Starts to look for visual references, progressively increasing external scanning as DH is

approached.
At or before DH (if decision is to continue)
Calls ―LANDING‖
Scans mostly head-up to monitor the flight path and flare (in CAT II/III A) or the track (in CAT III
B) by visual references.
Monitors thrust reduction at ―RETARD‖ call-out; sets thrust levers to idle.
Selects and controls reverse thrust.
Disengage autopilot and auto brakes when taxi speed is reached.
F/O:
Monitors flight instruments head-down throughout approach, go-around, or landing until rollout is
completed.
Calls any deviation or failure warning.
Calls barometric heights as required, and monitors auto call-out or calls radio heights including
―100 above‖.
Monitors FMA and calls mode changes.
At DH (identified by aural and visual warning)
If decision is not announced by CMi, calls ―MINIMUM‖

If no response from CM1, initiates a go-around.
If decision is to go around
CAPT:
Calls ―GO AROUND-FLAPS‖

Initiates go-around by setting thrust lever to TOGA.
Monitors rotation in PFD.
Checks positive climb (V/S and RA).
Commands configuration changes.
F/O:
Standard Operating Procedures

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VISUAL REFERENCES
It should be stressed that the DH is the lower limit of the decision zone during which, in limiting
conditions, the CAPT will be assessing the visual references.
CAPT should come to this zone prepared for a go around but with no pre-established judgment.
CAPT. should make a decision according to the quality of the approach and the way the visual
reference develop as DH is approached.
CAT II Operations
The conditions required at DH to continue the approach are that the visual reference should be
adequate to monitor the continued approach and landing, and the flight path should be
acceptable. If both of these conditions are not satisfied, it is mandatory to initiate a go around.
The visual references required at DH in CAT II operations to continue the approach may be any of
the following:
A segment of the approach light system.

The runway threshold.
The touchdown zone.
CAT III Operations
The conditions required at DH are that there should be visual references, which confirm that the
aircraft is over the touchdown zone. Go around is mandatory if the visual references do not
confirm this.
LOSS OF VISUAL REFERENCES
Operations with DH-before touchdown
If the decision to continue has been made and the visual references subsequently become
insufficient (for the appropriate category), or the flight path deviates unacceptably, a go-around
must be initiated (a go around initiated below the MABH, whether auto or manual, may result in
ground contact).
Note : If the touchdown occurs after G/A is engaged the AP remains engaged in that
mode, and ATHR remains in TOGA.
Operation with DH- after touchdown
If the visual references are lost after touchdown, a go around should not be attempted.
The rollout should be continued with AP in ROLLOUT mode down to taxi speed.

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FLIGHT PARAMETERS DEVIATION CALLS
PARAMETERS ID DEVIATION EXCEEDS CALL REQUIRED

IAS +10kt ―SPEED‖
- 5 kt
RATE OF DESCENT -1000 ft / min ―SINK RATE‖
PITCH ATTITUDE 100 nose up ―PITCH‖
00 nose down
BANK ANGLE 70 ―BANK‖
LOCALIZER EXCESS ¼ DOT (PFD) ―LOCALIZER‖
GLIDE SLOPE DEVIATION 1 DOT (PFD) ―GLIDE SLOPE‖
WARNING
These calls would normally be made by the PNF and acknowledge by the PF. However, any crew
member that sees a deviation outside the above limits should make the appropriate call.
FAILURE AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS
Refer to FCOM 4.05.70 (―Table of required equipment for CAT III approach and landing‖ and
―Failures and associated actions during CAT II/III approach‖)
In general there are three possible responses to the failure of any systems, instrument or element
during the approach.
CONTINUE the approach to the planned minima.

REVERT to higher minima and proceed to a new DH/DA (above 1000ft).
GO-AROUND and reassess the capability.
The nature of the point of its occurrence will determine which response is appropriate.
As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1000ft AGL the approach may be continued reverting to
a higher DH/DA , providing the appropriate conditions are met (refer to below 1000ft and down to
AH when in CAT III DUAL) the occurrence of any failure implies a go around, and a reassessment
the system capability. Another approach may then be undertaken to the appropriate minima for
the given aircraft status.
It has been considered that below 1000ft, not enough time is available for the crew to perform the
necessary switching, to check system configuration and limitations and brief for minima.
In CAT II DUAL, in general, a single failure (for example one AP failure or one engine failure)
below DH dose not necessitate a go-around.
But a go-around is required if the autoland warning is triggered.

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Abnormal Procedures
The required procedures following failures during CAT II or CAT III approached are provided in
the FCOM. These procedures have been established and approved during the aircraft CAT II/CAT
III certification.
It has been found that a simplification of the AFM abnormal procedures was desirable for actual
operation. Therefore, these simplified abnormal procedures, which are necessarily more
conservative, are published in the FCOM 4.05.70.
The abnormal procedures can be classified into two groups.
Failures leading to a downgrading of capability as displayed on FMA and ECAM with an associated
specific audio warning (triple check).
Failure, which do not trigger a downgrading of capability but are, signaled by other effects (Flag,
ECAM warning, amber caution and associated audio warnings).
It should be noted that some failures might trigger ECAM warnings, cautions and a downgrading
of capability.
The FCOM describes what should be the crew responses to failures in function to the height.
Above 1000ft:
Downgrading conditions
Refer to FCOM 4.05.70
(a) Downgrading from CAT III or CAT II is permitted only if:
ECAM actions are completed.

RVR is at least equal to CAT II minima.
Briefing is amended to include CAT II procedure and DH.
Decision to downgrade is completed above 1000ft AGL.
(b) Downgrading from CAT II or CAT I performed only if:
ECAM actions are completed.

At least one FD is available.
RVR is at least equal to CAT I procedure and DH.
The decision to downgrade is completed above 1000ft AGL.

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Note : Switching from one AP to another above 1000ft AGL is permitted.
Below 1000ft and above DH:
(For CAT II or CAT III SINGLE) or above AH (fro CAT III DUAL).
GO AROUND must be performed in case of:
ALPHA FLOOR activation.

Loss of AP (cavalry charge)
Downgrading of capability (clic, clic, clic)
Amber cautions (single chime).
Engine failure.
Note: when the aircraft reaches 700ft RA with APPR with APPR mode (LOC and G/S) armed or
engaged, the ILS frequency and course are frozen in the receiver.
This function (ILS tune inhibit) is available when at least one AP/ FD is engaged. Any attempt to
change ILS frequency or CRS through the MCDU or RMP dose not affect the receiver. (FCOM
4.05.70)
At 30ft RA
LAND must be displayed on FMA and runway course must be checked. If runway course is
incorrect or LAND dose not appear, a go-around must be performed.
LAND is displayed if LOC and GS track modes are active and at least one RA is available. These
conditions need to be obtained later than 350 ft AGL to allow a satisfactory automatic landing.
Depending on terrain profile before the runway LAND mode may appear at lower height. This can
be acceptable provided it has been demonstrated that automatic landing is satisfactory.
At 200ft and below
Any AUTOLAND light flashing requires an immediate go-around (FCOM 4.05.70). if visual
references are sufficient and a manual landing is possible, the PF may decide to land manually.
Monitor Transmitter / receiver failure.
Note: below 200ft (radio altimeter,) the FMGS freezes the landing capability until LAND mode is
disengaged or both autopilots are off.
Therefore a failure occurring below 200ft dose not change the category of the system.

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At Flare Height (40ft)
If FLARE dose not come up on FMA, a go around must be performed; however if visual references
are sufficient and a manual landing is possible, the PF may decide to complete the landing.
After touchdown
In case of anti-skid or nose wheel steering failure, disconnect AP and take manual control. If
automatic rollout control is not satisfactory, disconnect the AP immediately.
Completion Standards
Demonstrates correct handling of AFS.

Makes correct use of SOP and standard calls.
Demonstrate correct handling during take-off.
Correctly identifies malfunctions.
Demonstrates correct decision making during malfunctions.
Demonstrates correct downgrade procedure.
Demonstrates correct decision to go around.
Demonstrates correct go around procedure.
Common Errors
CM1 delays decision making at low altitude after a CM2 call-out.

CM2 tendency to look outside while approaching minima.
Inadequate knowledge of failure indications.
Not configuring and stabilizing the approach by 1500ft.

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FFS
LOW VISIBILITY AND CAT II TRAINING
(1 SESSION OF 2:00 HR PER CREW)
M REF - +
AIRLINE OPERATIONAL MINIMUM:
LOW VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF: RVR: DH:
INIT T/O
130 FT  1 COCKPIT PREPARED BY INSTRUCTOR – LOW VISIBILITY OPS T/O BRIEFINGS
125 M Engine running, fuel freeze
 2 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES-FOLLOW YAR BAR
 3 HOLDING – CAT II BRIEFING
170 FT  4 APPROACH – 2 AP
400 M REVIEW VISUAL SEGMENT
FREEZE AT 150 FT – REVIEW VISUAL SEGMENT – RELEASE
130 FT FREEZE AT 100 FT – REVIEW VISUAL SEGMENT – RELEASE
300 M AUTOLAND
INIT T/O FUEL FREEZE
130 FT
200 M 5 TAKE-OFF
170 FT  6 APPROACH ABOVE 1000 FT
REVIEW LOSS OF ILS TRANSMITTER
REVIEW LOSS OF RECEIVERS
REVIEW LOSS OF RADIO ALTIMETERS
REVIEW LOSS OF STAND BY HORIZON
130 FT REVIEW OF INSTRUMENT FAILURES
400 M 7 AUTOLAND
150 FT  8 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES – ENGINE FAILURE ABOVE 100 KT/BEFORE V1
125 FT REJECTED TAKE-OFF-Restore
9 TAKE-OFF-RADAR VECTORS DOWNWIND
 10 APPROACH 2 AP-DH 100 FT
LOSS OF LOC TRANSMITTER AT 200FT-AUTOLAND WARNING –GO-AROUND-
Restore
150 FT  11 APPROACH 2 AP-DH 100FT -1 ATHR ONLY
0M REMAINING ATHR FAILS 500FT
GO AROUND- Restore ATHR
150 FT  12 APPROACH – 2 AP-DH 100FT-ENGINE FAILURE BELOW 100FT
300 M LAND
159 FT  13 APPROACH -2 AP-DH 100FT-CHECK ATT WARNING AT 300FT(or both R/A failure)
300 M MANUAL GO-AROUND (USING STDBY HORIZON)
150 FT  14 APPROACH-2 AP-DH 100FT
300 M CM 1 INCAPACITATION ABOVE DH-GO AROUND
150 FT  15 APPROACH-2 AP – DH 100FT
300 M ENGINE FAIL AT 400FT
GO AROUND –CLEAN UP
0 FT  16 RELIGHT-APPROACH -2AP – DH 100FT
0 FT LOC BEAM DEVIATION- GO AROUND
150 FT  17 APPROACH-1 AP- DH 100FT
300 M AUTO PILOT DISCONNECT AT 80 FT – MANUAL LANDING

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FFS
LOW VISIBILITY AND CAT II EVALUATION
PF PNF
- + - +
M REF
INIT T/O
150 FT  1 COCKPIT PREPARED BY INSTRUCTOR
RVR 125 ENGINE RUNNING, FUEL FREEZE
 2 TAKE-OFF-RADAR VECTORS – CAT II BRIEFING
 3 APPROACH – 2 AP-DH 100 FT- NO VISUAL CONTACT

GO AROUND-RADAR VECTORS- DOWNWIND
150 FT  4 APPROACH – 2 AP-DH 100 FT

300 M AUTOLAND
 5 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES
 6 APPROACH -2 AP – DH 200 FT
ENG FAIL ABOVE 200 FT
GO AROUND
130 FT  7 APPROACH – 2 AP- DH 100FT – 1 ATHR ONLY

RVR 350 REMAINING ATHR FAIL AT 500 FT
AUTOLAND
Pilot’s Certificate Competency filled and signed ……………………………..

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FFS
LOW VISIBILITY AND CAT III TRAINING
CAPTAIN
M REF
 COCKPIT PREPARED BY INSTRUCTOR

ENGINE RUNNING, FUEL FREEZE
INIT T/O - +
 1 LOW VISIBILITY OPS T/O BRIEFING
125 M  2 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES-FOLLOW YAW BAR
 3 HOLDING-CAT III BRIEFING
4 APPROACH CAT III DUAL
REVIEW VISUAL SEGMENT
150 FT DH 100 FT- FREEZE AT 100 FT-RVR 300 M
80 FT DH 50 FT- FREEZE AT 50 FT – RVR 200 M
30 FT DH 20 FT – FREEZE AT 20 FT- RVR 125
AUTOLAND
125 M 5 TAKE-OFF
60 FT  6 APPROACH ABOVE 1000 FT
125M REVIEW LOSS OF ILS TRANSMITTER
REVIEW LOSS OF RECEIVERS
REVIEW LOSS OF RADIO ALTIMETERS
REVIEW LOSS OF STAND BY HORIZON
REVIEW OF INSTRUMENT FAILURES
0/125 7 AUTOLAND
0/0  8 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES (*)
0/0 ENGINE FAILURE ABOVE 200 KT BEFORE V1 (*)
REJECTED TAKE-OFF (*)
125 M  9 TAKE-OFF(*)
60FT  10 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL DH 20 FT (*)
LOSS OF LOC TRANSMITTER AT 200FT-AUTOLAND WARNING(*) –GO-AROUND-
Restore (*)
60FT  11 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL DH 20 FT (*)
125 M CHECK AT WARNING AT 100 FT(*)
GO AROUND USING STANDBY HORIZON (*)
60 FT  12 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL-ILS PERFORMANCE: CAT II (*)
125 M ENG FAIL AT 200 FT-GO-AROUND-CLEANUP(*)
0/0  13 APPROACH CAT 3 SINGLE DH 50 FT
0/0 AUTOPILOT DISCONNECT AT 50 FT-GO-AROUND
125 M  14 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL-CAPT INCAPACITATION-F/O GO-AROUND
(ITEM NOT REQUIRED IN CASE OF 2 CAPTAIN CREW)
60 FT  15 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL DH 50 FT (*)
125 M ATHR 1 FAIL AT 300 FT-GO-AROUND-RESTORE(*)
60 FT  16 APPROACH CAT 3 DUAL DH 20 FT- ENG FAIL BELOW 50 FT (*)
AUTOLAND(*)
(*) ITEMS TO BE PREPARED IN CASE OF 2 CAPTAIN CREW

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FFS
LOW VISIBILITY + CAT III EVALUATION
PF PNF
- + - +
M REF
INIT T/O FUEL FREEZE

 1 COCKPIT PREPARED BY INSTRUCTOR
ENGINE RUNNING
60 FT  2 TAKE-OFF-HOLDING/RADAR VECTORS – CAT III BRIEFING

125 M
0/0  3 APPROACH – CAT 3 DUAL-DH 50 FT- NO VISUAL CONTACT
0/0 GO AROUND-RADAR VECTORS
60 FT  4 APPROACH – CAT 3 DUAL-NO DH

125 M AUTOLAND
125 M  5 TAKE-OFF-FOG PATCHES

125 M ENGINE FAIL BETWEEN V1 AND VR- Restore after clean up
0/0  6 APPROACH –CAT 3 SINGLE – DH 50 FT

LOC BEAM DEVIATION
GO AROUND- Restore
60 FT  7 APPROACH – CAT3 DUAL- DH 50FT

125 M VISUAL CONTACT-AUTOLAND
ROLL OUT FAULT
Pilot’s Certificate Competency filled and signed ……………………………..

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CHAPTER - 10
MISCELLANEOUS

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10 MISCELLANEOUS
10.1 Windshear Weather ……………………………………………………………. ……………………………. 3
10.1.(a) Thunderstorms ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

10.1.(b) The Microburst as a Windshear threat ……………………………………………………………..…….. 6
10.1.1 Measured Microburst …………………………………………………….………………………….…………… 9
10.2 Lessons Learned from Windshear Encounters …………………………………………………. 11
10.2.1 Encounter during Take-off-On Runway ……………………………………………………………………. 12

10.2.2 Encounter during Take-off-After Lift off …………………………………………………………………… 14
10.2.3 Encounter on Approach …………………………………………………………………………………………. 17
10.3 Windshear effects on Airplanes and Systems…………………………………………………… 18
10.3.1 Windshear Effects on Airplanes ……………………………………………………………….…………..…. 18

10.3.2 Windshear Effects on Systems ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22
10.4 Model of Flight Crew Actions …………………………………………………………………………….. 23
10.4.1 Crew Actions ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23

(a) Avoidance …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
(b) Precautions – Takeoff ………………………………………………………………………………… 24
(c) Precautions – Approach and Landing …………………………………………………………… 24
.
10.4.2 Follow Established Standard Operating Techniques ………………………………………………….. 25
(a) Crew Awareness ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 26
(b) Crew Co-ordination ……………………………………………………………………………………. 27
10.4.3 Windshear Recovery Technique ……………………………………………………………………………… 28

(a) Encounter During Take-off – On Runway …………………………………………………… 28
(b) In-Flight Recovery Maneuver ……………………………………………………………………. 29
10.4.4 Summery of Crew Actions for Operation in Windshear/Down Burst condition………………. 29

(a) Precautions for Expected Windshear …………………………………………………………. 29
(b) Recovery Technique At Take-off ………………………………………………………………. 30
(c) Recovery Technique At Landing ……………………………………………………………….. 31
10.5 Microburst Windshear probability Guidelines ………………………………………………… 32

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GENERAL
It is not long ago that windshear has been identified as the case of many accidents which were
previously attributed to pilot error in poor weather conditions. The fact is that windshear can place
the crew in a situation, which exceeds the maximum performance capacity of an aircraft.
The objective of this chapter is to bring about an awareness of the causes and effects of
windshear. AVOIDANCE is emphasized as the best defense against the hazards of low level
windshear. However, precautions and techniques for improving chances of surviving in an
inadvertent windshear encounter is also discussed.
The following will be covered:

1. Windshear whether, particular Microburst, and clues which may indicate its presence.
2. Effects of windshear on Airplanes.
3. Windhsear recognition from the Cockpit and avoidance.
4. Precautions to take when windshaer is suspected.
5. Recovery techniques to be use in inadvertent windshear encounter.
10.1 WINDSHEAR WEATHER
In this section, several terms will be used to discuss low altitude wind variations. These terms are
defined as follows:
Windshear - Any rapid change in wind direction or velocity causing airspeed changes
greater than 15 knots or vertical speed changes greater than 500ft per
minute.
Increasing Headwind Shear

- Windshear in which headwind increases, causing an airspeed increase.
Decreasing Headwind Shear

- Windshear in which Headwind decrease, causing an airspeed loss
Decreasing Tailwind Shear

- Windshear in which Tailwind decreases, causing an airspeed increase.
Increasing Tailwind Shear

- Windshaer in which Tailwind increases, causing an airspeed loss.
All the above situations may be accompanied by x-wind effects when ever the wind directions are
not exactly in line with the runway axis. Therefore in addition to speed changes, there will
normally be drift changes which complicate the approach profile. Funnel effects must also be
anticipate whenever a runway lies in the vicinity of high ground or mountain ranges.

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In order to avoid windshear encounters, pilots must learn to recognize conditions producing
windshear. Two out of every three events were related to convective storms. For this reason, the
primary focus is directed toward windshear associated with convective weather conditions:
Thunderstorms and in particular the most hazarders form of windshaer, the Microburst.
Examination of airplane Accident and incident reports from 1959 – 1983 identified 51 windshear –
related events. These events are summarized in the table below.
Weather System No of Windshaer Events

Convective storms 33
Frontals 7
Strong surface winds 2
Unstable (turbulence) air 2
Strong winds on top of temperature inversion 1
Sea Breeze front 0
Mountain wave 0
Unknown 6
Total 51
10.1(a) The Thunderstorm:
There are basic types of thunderstorms: airmass and frontal.
Airmass thunderstorms appeared to be randomly distributed air and develop from localized
heating at the earth’s surface. The heated air rises and cools to from cumulus clouds. As the
cumulus stage continues to develop, precipitation forms in higher portions of the cloud and falls.
Precipitation signals the beginning of the mature stage and presence of downdraft. After
approximately an hour, the heated up draft creating the thunderstorm is cut off by rainfall. Heat is
removed, convection stops and the thunderstorm dissipates. Many thunderstorms produce an
associated cold air gust front as a result of the down flow and out rush of rain-cooled air. These
gust fronts are usually very turbulent and can create a serious threat to airplane during take-off
and approach.

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Frontal thunderstorms are usually associated with weather systems like fronts, covering winds,
and troughs aloft. Frontal thunderstorms form in squall lines, last several hours, generate heavy
rain and possibly hail, and produce strong gusty winds and possibly tornadoes. The principal
distinction in formation of these more severe thunderstorms is the present of large horizontal wind
changes (speed and direction) at different altitudes in the thunderstorm. This causes the
thunderstorm to be lifted vertically. Precipitation falls away from the heated up draft permits a
much longer storm development period. Resulting airflow within the storm accelerate to much
higher vertical velocities which ultimately result in higher horizontal wind velocities at the surface.
The downward moving column of air, downdraft, or a typical thunderstorm is fairly large, about 1
to 5 miles in diameter. Resultant outflow may produce large changes in wind speed, presenting a
potential hazard to aeroplanes.
Regardless of whether a thunderstorm contains windshear, the possibility of heavy rain, extreme
turbulence, and tornadoes make it critical that pilots avoid thunderstorms.
The highest threat areas are in the tropics, but due to lower frequency of air traffic, fewer
accidents have been reported or attributed to windshears.
Examination of the world-wide windshear- associated accidents and incidents shows that a greater
number of accidents results from the combination of high convective activity and high air traffic
density. Many windshaer-associated accidents and incidents have probably occurred world-wide
but have not been recorded as such.
A close examination of the United States, for example, shows a co-relation between areas of high
thunderstorm activity and the number of accidents.

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Severe Frontal Thunderstorm Anatomy
10.1(b) The Microburst as a Windshaer Threat
Identification of concentrated, more powerful downdrafts- known as microburst – has resulted

from the investigation of windshear accidents from meteorological research. Microburst can occur
in any convective weather conditions such as thunderstorm, rain showers and virga (Rain which
evaporates before reaching the ground).
Observations suggest that approximately five per cent of all thunderstorms produce a microburst.
Downdrafts associated with microburst are typically only a few hundred to 3,000 feet across.
When the downdraft reaches the ground, it spreads out horizontally and many form one or more
horizontal vortex rings around the downdraft. The outflow region is typically 6,000 to 12,000 feet
across, the horizontal vortices may extend to over 2,000 feet AGL.
Symmetric microburst. An airplane transiting the microburst from left to right would
experience almost equal headwinds and tailwinds.

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Microburst outflows are not always symmetric. Therefore, significant airspeed increases may not
occur upon entering the outflow, or may be much less than the subsequent airspeed loss
experienced when exiting the microburst.
More than one microburst can occur in the same weather system. Pilots are therefore cautioned to
be alert for additional microburst if one has already been encountered or observed.
If several microburst are present, a series of horizontal vortices can form near ground due to
several microburst being embedded in one another. Conditions associated with these vortices
may produce very powerful updrafts and roll forces in addition to downdrafts.
Asymmetric microburst. An airplane transiting the microburst from left to right would
experience a small headwind followed by a large tailwind.

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In a typical microburst, wind speeds intensify for about 5 minutes after it initially contact the
ground.
An airplane penetrating it during the initial stage may not experience a significant widshear, but
an airplane following may experience an airspeed change two to three times greater. Microbursts
typically dissipate within 10 to 20 minutes after ground contact.
Evolution of a microburst winds intensify for about 5 minutes after ground contact and
typically dissipate about 10 to 20 min after ground contact.

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10.1.1. Measured Microburst
Doppler radar wind measurements indicate that the wind change a pilot might expect when flying
through the average microburst at its point of peak intensity is about 45 knots. However,
microburst wind speed difference of almost 100 knots have been measured. In fact, a severe
event at Andres Air Force Base (Camp Spring, Maryland) on August 1st 1983 indicted headwind /
tailwind differential velocities of nearly 200 knots.
IT IS VITAL TO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME MICROBURTS CANNOT BE SUCESSFULLY ESCAPED

WITH ANY KNOWN TECHNIQUES. Note that even windshears which were within the performance
capability of the airplane have been caused accidents.
Microburst frequency versus intensity. Accidents have occurred in windhsear within

performance capability of airplane. Some windshears cannot be escaped successfully.

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Microburst can be associated with both heavy rain, as in thunderstorm conditions, and much
lighter precipitation associated with convection clouds. Microburst have been occurred in relatively
dry conditions of light rain virga (precipitation that evaporates before reaching the earth’s
surface). The formation of a dry microburst is illustrated below.
In this example, air below a cloud base (up to approximately 15,000 feet AGL) is very dry.
Precipitation from higher connective clouds falls into low humidity air and evaporates. This
evaporative cooling causes the air to plunge downward. As the evaporative cooling process
continues, the downdraft accelerates. Pilots are therefore cautioned not to fly beneath convective
clouds producing virga conditions.
Dry microburst formation. Evaporation of rain below cloud base (virga) causes intense
cooling of rain air and subsequent cold air plunge. No rain is detected at ground level.

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10.2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTERS:
Analysis of past windshear accidents and incidents has taught valuable lessons regarding
windhsear recognition and flight path control. Engineering studies and flight simulator evaluations
have been conducted as well to gather additional information. The resulting lessons learned from
a basis for the recommended precautions and techniques in this document.
The Primary Lesson Learned is that the best defense against widshear is to avoid it
altogether.
This is specially important because shears will exist which are beyond the capacity of any pilot or
airplane. In most windshear accidents, clues such as LLWAS alerts, weather reports, visual sings,
were present, and if noticed flight crew would have avoided the presence of windshear threat. In
all instances, however, these clues were either not recognized or not acted upon.
Other lessons were also learned regarding windshear recognition and pilot technique should the
avoidance process fail. These lessons are summarized as follows:

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Windshear Recognition:
1. Recognition of windshear encounter is difficult and is usually complicated by marginal

weather.
2. Time available for recognition and recovery is short (as little as seconds).
3. Flight crew co-ordination is essential for prompt windshear recondition and recovery.
Pilot Technique:
1. Flight path must be controlled with PTCH ATTITUDE.
In reaching theses conclusions, three types of windshear encounters which have resulted
in an accident or incident were examined: an encounter during take-off on the runway, an
encounter during take-off after lift-off, and an encounter during approach.
10.2.1 Encounter during Take off – On Runway
Analysis of a typical accident where an increasing tailwind shear was encountered

during takeoff ground roll showed that initial indications appeared normal. Due to
the increasing tailwind shear however, the airplane did not reach VR until nearing
the end of the runway. As the airplane lifted off, the tailwind continued increasing,
preventing any further airspeed increase. The airplane contacted an obstacle off
the departure end of the runway.
In this accident, less-than-normal airspeed due to windshear encounter resulted in

reduced lift at normal take-off attitude. In turn, the result was inability to lift-off
soon enough to clear obstacles.
Windshear encounter during take-off runway.
(1) Take-off initially appeared normal.

(2) Airspeed build-up slowed due to windshear.
(3) Airplane reached VR near end of runway, lifted off but failed to climb.
(4) Airplane contacted obstacle off departure end of runway.

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An additional factor is the difficulty of recognizing deteriorating airplane performance. Timely

recognition of a windshear encounter on the runway may be difficult since the only indication may
be a slower than normal airspeed increase. On the A320 / A330 / A340, windshear warning is only
available after lift off. Crew will recognize a tailwind shear when the speed trend decreases and
from the wind indication displayed on the ND (above 100kts). The presence of gusts may mask
abnormal airspeed built-up. Time available to respond effectively to a windhsear may be as little
as 5 seconds, callout is essential in routine operations to develop habit patterns required to ensure
timely recognition of degrading performance.
If reduced thrust take-off procedure in use, application of full thrust will provide additional
performance.
If there is insufficient runway left to accelerate to normal take-off speed, and inadequate runway
to stop, lift-off and safe climb may require rotation at speeds less than normal rotation speed
(VR). In this case, additional pitch attitude may be required to achieve sufficient lift. In traditional
training, crews are frequently cautioned not to rotate at speeds less than VR to avoid high pitch
attitudes that could result in aft body contact. In a windshear encounter, rotation toward normal
take-off pitch attitude (12.50) at lower than normal airspeed may be required to lift off in the
remaining runway. This may result in aft body contact. TO DEAL WITH AN INADVERTENT
WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER, THE PILOT MUST BE PREPARED TO APPLY TECHNIQUES, WHICH
DIFFER FROM THOSE ORDINARILY USED.

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Pitch attitude effects on lift-off. Increased pitch attitude generated lift required for
lift-off.
10.2.2 Encounter During Takeoff - After lift off
In a typical accident studies, the airplane encountered an increasing tailwind shear shortly after
lifting off the runway. For the first 5 seconds after lift-off the takeoff appeared normal, but the
airplane crashed off the end of the runway about 20 seconds after lift-off.
Windshear encounter during takeoff after liftoff.
(1) Take off initially appeared normal.

(2) Windshear encountered just after lift-off.
(3) Airspeed decrease resulted in pitch attitude reduction.
(4) Aircraft crashed off departure end of runway 20 sec after lift-off.

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In many events involving after lift-off windshear encounter, early trends in airspeed, pitch
attitude, vertical speed and altitude appeared normal. In the example, the airplane encountered
windshear before stabilized climb was established which cause difficulty in detecting on set of
shear. As the airspeed decrease, pitch attitude was reduced to regain airspeed. By reducing pitch
attitude, available performance capability was not utilized and the airplane lost altitude. As terrain
became a factor recovery to, initial pitch attitude was initiated. Corrective action, however, was
too late to prevent ground contact since the downward flight path was well established.
Reducing pitch attitude to regain lost airspeed, or allowing attitude to decrease in response to loss
airspeed, is the result of usual training emphasize on airspeed control. Successful recovery from
an inadvertent windshear encounter requires maintaining or increasing pitch attitude and
accepting lower than usual airspeed. Unusual and unexpected sidestick movements may be
required to counter natural airplane pitching tendencies due to airspeed and lift loss.
Windshear effects on flight path Microburst reduces airspeed and lift at normal
attitude which results in pitch down tendency to regain airspeed.
to counter the loss of airspeed and lift resulting from windshear, pitch attitude must not be
allowed to fall below the normal range. Only by properly controlling pitch attitude and accepting
reduced airspeed can flight path degradation be prevented. Once the airplane begins to deviate
from the intended flight path and high descent rates develop, it takes additional time and altitude
to change flight path direction.

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Maintaining V2 may result in Descending flight path
Controlled pitch Attitude to enable positive climb-out.
Pitch control effects on flight path. Control of pitch attitude and acceptance of reduced
airspeed results in improved flight path.
In the windshear encounter cited earlier, available airplane performance capacity may not have
been used because of two factors: lack of timely recognition and inappropriate or inadequate
response.
Rapidly deteriorating climb performance may not be apparent to the crew unless all appropriate
vertical flight path instruments are closely monitored.
Only 5 to 15 seconds may be available to recognize and respond to a windshear encounter. It is

therefore of great importance that a windshear encounter be recognized as soon as possible.
Timely recognition of windshear requires effective crew co-ordination and appropriate callouts by
the pilot flying.
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Timely available to respond to windshear encounter. Take off initially appeared

normal. Additional time is required to arrest descent. Result only 5 to 15 seconds may
be available for recognition and recovery.
10.2.3 Encounter on Approach
Analysis of a typical windshear encounter on approach provided evidence of an increasing

downdraft and tailwind along the approach flight path. The airplane lost airspeed, dropped below
the target glidepath, and contacted the ground short of the runway threshold. Reduced airspeed,
as the airplane encountered the windshear, resulted in decreased lift. This loss of lift increased the
descent rate.
The normal nose-down pitch response of the airplane to low airspeed caused additional altitude
loss. Pitch attitude increase and recovery initiation were not used soon enough to prevent ground
contact.
Lack of timely and appropriate response – affected by weather conditions, inadequate crew co-
ordination and limited recognition time- was a significant factor in delaying recovery initiation.
Gradual thrust increase during approach may have masked the initial decreasing airspeed trend.
Poor weather conditions caused increased workload and complicated the approach. Transition
from instruments to exterior visual references may have detracted from instruments scan.
Inadequate crew co-ordination may have resulted in failure to be aware of flight path degradation.
A stabilized approach with clearly defined callouts are essential for recognition of unacceptable
flight trends and the need to initiate, prompt actions.

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Windshear encounter during approach.
(1) Approach initially appeared normal.

(2) Increasing downdraft and tailwind encountered at transition.
(3) Airspeed decrease combined with reduced visual cues resulted
in pitch attitude reduction.
(4) Airplane crashed short of approach end of runway.
10.3 WINDSHEAR EFFECTS ON AIRPLANES AND SYSTEMS
10.3.1 Windshear Effects on Airplanes
Headwind / Tailwind Shear Response
The various components of windshear have unique effects on airplane performance. In

addition, the magnitude of the shear depends on the flight path through the microburst.
An increasing headwind (or decreasing tailwind) shear increases indicated airspeed and
thus increases performance. The airplane will tend to pitch up to regain trim airspeed. An
additional consideration is that this type of shear may reduce normal declaration during
flare, which could cause overrun.
Any rapid or large airspeed increase, particularly near convective weather conditions,
should be viewed as a possible indication of a forthcoming airspeed decrease. Thus a large
airspeed increase may be a reason to discontinue the approach.

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However, since microburst are often asymmetric and the headwind may not always be present,
headwind shears must not be relied upon to provide early indications of subsequent tailwind
shears. Be prepared!
In contrast to shears, which increase airspeed, an increasing tailwind (or decreasing headwind)
shear will decrease indicated airspeed and performance capability. Due to airspeed loss, the
airplane may tens to pitch down to regain trim speed.
 Vertical Windshear Response
Vertical winds exist in every microburst and increase in intensity with altitude. Such winds
usually reach peak intensity at heights greater than 500ft above the ground. Downdrafts with
speed greater than 3,000 feet per minute can exist in the center of a strong microburst. The
severity of the downdraft the airplane encounters depends on both the latitude and lateral
proximity to the center of the microburst.
Perhaps more critical than downdrafts, short duration reversals in vertical winds can exist due
to horizontal vortices associated with microburst.
Encounter with microburst horizontal vortices. Rapid updraft downdraft variation

due to horizontal vortices can cause uncommanded pitch changes.
On the A320 / A330 / A340 – IF speed fails below Alpha Floor (in normal Law)
automatic TOGA thrust will be activated as well as the High Angle of attack
Protection (a PROT)

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An airplane flying through horizontal vortices as shown on the pervious page experiences
alternating updrafts and downdrafts causing pitch changes WITHOUT pilot input. These vertical
winds result in airframe shudder at speed well above normal.
Vertical winds, like those associates with horizontal vortices, were considered in development of
the recovery procedure. The most significant impact of rapidly changing vertical winds is to
increase pilot workload during the recovery, the higher workload results from attention to
momentary and uncommanded pitch attitude changes from rapid changes in vertical wind.
 Crosswind Shear Response.
A crosswind shear tends to cause the airplane to roll and / or yaw. Large crosswind shears
may require large or rapid sidestick input. These shears may result in significantly increased
workload and distraction. In addition, if an aircraft encounters a horizontal vortex, severe roll
forces may require up to full sidestick input to counteract the roll and maintain aircraft control.
 Turbulence Effects
Turbulence may be quite intense in weather conditions associated with windshear.
Effects of turbulence can mask changing airspeed trends and delay recognition of severe
windshear.
 Rain Effects
Accident investigations and the study of windshear have shown that some forms of windshear
are accompanied by high rates of rainfall. NASA research is underway to determine if high
rainfall rates contribute to a loss of airplane performance. The results available to date are
inconclusive. However, because rain may serve as a warning of windshear, areas of heavy
rain should be avoided. High rates of rainfall also cause significant increases in cockpit noise
levels, making crew co-ordination and pilot concentration more difficult.
 Basic Aerodynamics
The pilot has direct control over airplane pitch attitude, which in turn acts to change flight
path. The angle-of-attack will change with pitch attitude resulting in a modified flight path
angle. These three factors are related as follows:
Pitch Attitude = Angle of Attack + Flight Path Angle

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 Airplane Performance
Transport category airplanes have considerable climb capability at speeds below normal
reference values. As seen in the figure below for typical takeoff climb performance, a rate-of-
climb of 1500 FPM is possible even at Alpha Prot/Max.
 Airplane Stability
As mentioned earlier, typical longitudinal stability characteristics tend to pitch the airplane up
with increasing airspeed and down with decreasing airspeed. Thrust changes in response to
these airspeed variations may also affect stability. In airplanes with underwing-mounted
engines, there is an additional tendency to pitch up as thrust increases, and pitch down as
thrust decreases. This tendency may become more pronounced at low speeds.
 Stalls and Stall Warning In ALT Law
Airplane stall occurs when further increases in angle-of-attack produce no further increase in
lift. In order to prevent inadvertent entry into this flight region, stick input are over ridden to
maintain V a max. In addition, having clean, smooth wing leading edges will help prevent both
early onset of stall buffet as well as roll off tendency prior to stall.
Typical take off rate of climb capability. Significant climb capability exists even at speed
corresponding to alpha max condition.

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10.3.2 Windshear Effects on Systems
 Altimeters
During callouts and instrument scan in a windshear, radio and/or barometric altimeters must
be monitored carefully. Since radio altitude is subject to terrain contours, the indicator may
show a climb or descent due to falling or rising terrain, respectively. The barometric altimeter
may also provide distorted indications due to pressure variations within the microburst.
 Vertical Speed Indicators
The vertical speed indicator (VSI) should not be solely relied upon to provide accurate vertical
speed information. Due to instrument lags, indications may be several seconds behind actual
airplane rate of climb/descent and, in some situations, may indicate a climb after the airplane
has started descending (figure below). Vertical speed indicators driven by an Intertial
Reference Unit (IRU) show significant improvement over other type instruments but still have
some lag.
In addition, gust-induced pitot static pressure variations within the microburst may introduce
further VSI inaccuracies. Due to such lags and errors, all vertical flight path instruments
should be crosschecked to verify climb/descent trends.
VSI error during take-off windshear encounter VSI may lag actual flight path changes.

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10.4 MODEL OF FLIGHT CREW ACTION
Due to the serious threat imposed by infrequent windshear encounters, an orderly set of actions is
necessary to increase flight crew awareness of weather conditions that produce windshear.
Additionally, certain operating practices have been developed that improve the chances of
surviving a windshear encounter. In past windshear accidents, same of these actions were
frequently missing, thereby reducing crew effectiveness in dealing with the situation.
The model of flight crew actions must be incorporated into day-to-day operations to ensure such
actions are available and easily recalled when needed.
Evaluate the Weather
No Any Signs of
Windshear?
Yes Avoid Known Windshear
Is it Safe to No
continue?
Yes
Consider Precautions
Follow Standard Operating Techniques
Windshear Recovery Technique
Report the Encounter
10.4.1 Crew Action
Crew actions are divided into three areas: Avoidance, Precautions, and Recovery.
(a) Avoidance
Windshear which exceed the performance capabilities of commercial transport airplanes have
been observed below 1000 feet. The flight crew should search for any clues to the windshear
along the intended flight path.

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Carefully assess all available information such as pilot reports of turbulence, low-level windshear
alerts, and weather reports, including thunderstorm and VIRGA activity. Avoid areas of known
sever windshear. Server windshear produces airspeed changes greater than 15 knots. If severe
windshear is indicated, delay takeoff or do not continue an approach until conditions improve.
Use all available means on the flight deck that might be an alert for the presence of windshear,
including visual clues, pilot reports, windshear warning system, and flight instruments.
(b) Precautions - Takeoff
If windshear conditions are suspected, TOGA Thrust should be used for takeoff. If practical, use
the longest suitable runway provided it is clear of know windshear.
Use the takeoff CONF that gives the best performance, taking into account the runway length
available.
Use the flight director for takeoff and initial climb.
Be alert for airspeed fluctuations during take off and initial climb.
Know the all-engine initial climb pitch attitude. Rotate at the normal pitch rate to (12.50) for all
takeoffs when engine failure is not a factor.
Maintain proper climb attitude until terrain and obstruction clearance is assured. Smooth steady
control of pitch attitude is essential.
Crew co-ordination and awareness are very important. Develop an awareness of the normal
values of airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, and airspeed built-up. Closely monitor vertical flight
path instruments such as vertical speed and altimeters. The pilot not flying should be especially
aware of vertical flight path indications and call out any deviations from normal.
Above 500 feet AGL, pitch attitude adjustments are acceptable to assist in controlling airspeed
provided terrain clearance is no longer an immediate concern.
On the fly by wire A/C, follows the SRS closely for effective windshear recovery.
(c) Precautions – Approach and Landing
In a potential windshear environment, a stabilized approach should be established no lower than

1000 feet AGL to improve windshear recognition capability.
The autothrust should be used. Managed speed should be engaged (min ground speed function
available). However, if selected approach speed is used, add wind correction based on the mean
of headwind component and gust value up to a max of 15 kts. Land with CONF 3. Use the most
suitable runway that avoids the area of suspected windshear and is compatible with crosswind and
tailwind limitations.
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A longer runway provides the greatest margin for increased ground roll due to unanticipated winds
and possible high ground speed at touchdown. A precision approach and other aids to glide path
monitoring (VASI, etc) are also desirable, as they can enhance windshear recognition by providing
timely, accurate flight path deviation information.
If autothrust is not engaged, avoid large thrust reductions in response to sudden airspeed
increase as these may be followed by airspeed decrease. In suspected windshear conditions,
crosscheck flight director commands using vertical flight path instrument displays. These
instruments are the primary references for vertical flight path control.
Crew co-ordination and awareness is very important, particularly at night or in marginal weather
conditions, to ensure early recognition of a deteriorating flight path. Closely monitor the vertical
flight path instruments, such as vertical speed, altimeters and glideslope displacement. The pilot
not flying should call out any deviation from normal.
Use of the autopilot and autothrust for the approach will enable better monitoring.
10.4.2 Follow established Standard Operating Techniques
In an effort to aid crews with the early recognition of a windshear encounter, a series of
recommendations were formulated under the general heading of Standard Operating Techniques
(SOTs).
The SOTs fall into two general headings of crew awareness and crew co-ordination.
The need for emphasis on SOT’s came from recognition that in most takeoff windshear accidents,
the airplane pitch attitude was reduced below the attitude that would maintain level flight. This
was done when the airplane was already descending toward the ground and indicates lack of
flight pitch awareness on the part of the crews involved. This lack of awareness was also
observed during piloted simulator studies of windshear encounters.
Traditional training programs and routine flying may not have reinforced proper flight path control
and concern for altitude loss. However, flight pitch control should be the primary focus when
dealing with windshear. TECHNIQUES SUCH AS STRICT ADHERENCE TO AIRSPEED MUST BE
MODIFIED IN FAVOUR OF MAINTAINING FLIGHT PATH BY CONTROLLING PITCH ATTITUDE.
The SOTs that follow emphasis flight path and pitch attitude for operations near the ground.
Following SOTs result in better crew performance during day-to-day operations, as well as during
windshear encounter.
In both takeoff and approach landing, crew awareness and co-ordination are vital for timely
windshear recognition, particularly at night or in marginal weather conditions.

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(a) Crew Awareness
It is important for crews to remain alert for any change in conditions, remembering that can be
quick to form and to dissipate. The shears that proved to be most deadly are those which caught
crews by surprise.
Crews should be aware of normal vertical flight path indications so that windshear induced
deviations are more readily recognized. On takeoff, this would include attitude, climb rate, and
airspeed build-up. On approach, airspeed, attitude, descent rate, and Thrust N1 indications
provide valuable information. Awareness of these indications assures that flight path degradation
is recognized as soon as possible.
During takeoff and approach, be alert for airspeed fluctuations. Such fluctuations may be the first
indication of windshear. Sidestick forces significantly different from those expected during a
normal takeoff or go-around may result if airspeed is below target or airspeed build-up is slow
during rotation and lift-off. Vertical flight path displays should be used to crosscheck flight
director commands.
During takeoff while at relatively low altitude (below 1000ft), the SOPs require awareness and use
of normal climb out pitch attitude and less emphasis on strict airspeed control.
Know the all-engine initial climb pitch attitude. Rotate at the normal rotation rate to this attitude
for all takeoffs. Minimize pitch attitude reductions in response to low airspeed until terrain and
obstruction clearance is assured.
On approach, avoid large thrust reductions in response to sudden airspeed increases as an

airspeed decrease may follow. Closely monitor vertical flight path instruments, such as vertical
speed, altimeters and glideslope displacement. In addition, comparison of groundspeed airspeed
indications can provide additional information for timely windshear recognition. When potential
windshear exists, achieve a stabilized approach no later than 1000 ft AGL.
High workload and distractions in the approach phase, particularly in marginal weather, may divert
attention away form instruments that provide early recognition of flight path deterioration.
Additionally, gradual thrust increase on approach may mask a decreasing airspeed trend. The
absence of throttle movement and low engine noise feed back associated with thrust changes
would require the crew members to include N1 indications in their instrument scan.
Crews should be prepared to execute the recommended recovery procedure immediately if

deviations from target conditions in excess of the following occur:
Takeoff / Approach
1. 15 knots indicated airspeed
2. 500 FPM vertical speed
3. 50 pitch attitude

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Approach
1. + 1 dot glide slope displacement
2. Unusual thrust indications for a significant period of time.
These values should be considered as guidelines only. Exact criteria cannot be established. In
certain instances where significant rates of change occur, it may be necessary to initiate recovery
before any of the above criteria are exceeded. Other situations may exist where brief excursions,
particularly in airspeed, resulting from known or anticipated local wind effects may not be an
indication of significant hazard. The pilot flying (PF) is responsible for assessing the situation and
using sound judgment to determine the safest course of action.
(b) Crew Co-ordination
The PF should focus attention on flying the airplane. In a windshear encounter,

appropriate action should be taken in response to callouts.
The PNF should focus attention on airspeed, vertical speed, altitude, pitch attitude, glide
path deviation and thrust. If any significant deviations from normal indications are
detected, the PNF should immediately call out the deviation. Callouts in the cockpit should
be standardized and easy to understand to ensure timely recognition.
Example:
“Vertical speed 1200 down – airspeed 115 decreasing – glideslope one dot low”.
Standard Operating Techniques Summary
Takeoff
Know normal attitudes, climb rates, airspeed build-up

Know/use all-engine initial attitude.
Make continuous rotation at normal rate.
Crosscheck flight director commands.
Minimize pitch attitude reductions.
Monitor vertical flight path instruments, call deviations (PNF).
Know recovery decision guidelines.
Approach
Know normal attitudes, descent rates, airspeeds, N1 indications.

Crosscheck flight director commands.
Avoid large thrust reduction if in manual thrust control
Monitor vertical flight path instruments, call out deviations (PNF)
Know recovery decision guidelines.
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10.4.3 Windshear Recovery Technique
The primary recovery technique objective is to keep the airplane flying as log as possible in hope
of exiting the shear. A wide variety of techniques were considered to establish the one best
meeting this objective. The best results were achieved by pitching toward an initial target attitude
while using necessary thrust. Several factors were considered in developing this technique.
Studies show windshear encounters occur infrequently and that only a few seconds are available
to initiate a successful recovery. Additionally, during high stress situations pilot instrument scan
typically becomes very limited-in extreme cases, to only one instrument. Lastly, recovery skills
will not be exercised on a day-to-day basis. These factors dictated that the recovery technique
must not only be effective, but simple, easily recalled, and have general applicability.
Extensive analysis and pilot evaluations were conducted. Although a range of recovery attitudes
(including 150 and the range of all-engine initial climb attitudes) provides good recovery capability
for a wide variety of windshears, 12.50 was chosen as the initial target pitch attitude for takeoff
and 150 for approach.
While other more complex techniques may make slightly better use of airplane performance, these
techniques do not meet simplicity and ease of recall requirements. Evaluations showed that the
recommended technique provides a simple, effective means of recovering form a windshear
encounter. A detailed discussion of the recommended recovery techniques follows:
(a) Encounter During Takeoff –On Runway
Aural windshear annunciation when windshear is detected by the FMGS is only from Lift-off
to 1300’AGL. Therefore during the T/O roll, crew should be aware of windshear condition
with reference to change in speed trend as well as wind indication displayed on ND (above
100kts).
Prior to V1, if windshear conditions are uncounted, there may not be sufficient runway
remaining to stop when V1 is reached. A rejected take off should only be attempted if the
crew deems that there is sufficient runway left to stop the aircraft.
At VR, rotate at a normal rate toward a 12.5 degree pitch attitude initially. Then follow SRS
indications which may include the use of full aft stick if necessary.
If windshear should be encountered near the normal rotation speed and the airspeed
suddenly decrease, advance thrust levers to TOGA and ensure maximum thrust is
available. There may not be sufficient runway left to accelerate to normal takeoff speed. If
there is sufficient runway left to stop, initiate a normal rotation by 2000 feet before the
end of the runway even if airspeed is low. Higher than normal attitudes may be required to
lift off in the remaining runway.

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(b) In-Flight Recovery Maneuver
The following action should be taken when preventive action is not successful, or
whenever flight path deviations become unacceptable below 1000 feet above the ground
on takeoff or landing. The flight crew must make the determination of unacceptable flight
path deviations using all available information.
This determination is subjective and based on the pilots’ judgment of the situation.
As a guideline, unacceptable flight path deviations may be indicated by uncontrolled

changes from normal steady flight conditions in excess of:
- 15 knots indicated airspeed.

- 500 feet per minute vertical speed.
- 5 degree pitch attitude.
- 1 dot displacement from the glideslope
- Large power deviation as indicated on N1 indications.
Whenever flight path deviations become unacceptable below 1000 feet above the ground,
or when the “Windshear” warning occurs, perform a normal GO-AROUND except that there
is no change in the aircraft in the aircraft’s configuration.
10.4.4. Summery of crew actions for Operation in windshear / down Burst

Conditions.
(A) Precautions for Expected Windshear
1. Before TAKEOFF
- DELAY TAKEOFF until conditions improve.
- ASSESS CONDITIONS for a SAFE TAKEOFF by:
- Observing the weather & checking the weather records.
- SELECT the MOST FAVOURABLE RUNWAY (considering location of the likely

windshear)
- USE the WEATHER RADAR before the takeoff run, to ensure a flight path clear
of any potential problem areas.
- SELECT TOGA thrust.
- CLOSELY MONITORING AIRSPEED and TREND during the takeoff run for early
detection or sings of windshear.
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2. During APPROACH
- DIVERT to another airport or DELAY LANDING until conditions are more

favorable.
- ASSESS CONDITION for a SAFE LANDING by:

i. Using observations and experience
ii. Checking weather conditions
- USE the WEATHER RADAR
- SELECT the MOST FAVORABLE RUNWAY, in conjunction with the most

appropriate runway approach aid.
- SELECT FLAPS 3
- USE MANAGED SPEED IN APPROACH PHASE>
- CHECK both FD’s ENGAGED IN ILS , FPA or V/S

- ENGAGE AUTOPILOT, for more accurate approach and early information of
beam deviation when ILS available.
NOTE: Using the GS mini function associated with managed speed, the system will carry
speed in strong wind condition.
If downburst is expected, increase VAPP displayed on the MCDU up to maximum of VLS + 15kt.
(B) Recovery Technique at Takeoff
1. Before V1
- The TO should be rejected only if significant airspeed variations occur below

indicated V1 and the pilot decides that there is sufficient runway remaining to
stop the airplane.
- If VR speed is not attained, rotate to above normal target pitch attitude by

2000ft from the end of the runway.
- Tail strike may occur in this case.
2. After V1
- Announce “WINDSHEAR TOGA”

- THRUST LEVERS : TOGA
- ROTATE NORMALLY
- FOLLOW SRS ORDERS

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3. During Initial Climb
- SET or MAINTAIN TOGA
- IF ENGAGED, AUTO PILOT MAY BE USED, but be aware that automatic

disengagement may occur if a >a port.
- FOLLOW SRS ORDERS (including use of full back stick if necessary)
NOTE: If SRS not available, initially use pitch attitude up to 12.5 but this pitch attitude can
be increased by using up to full back stick if necessary to minimize loss of height.
- DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION (gear, flaps) UNTIL OUT OF SHEAR
- CLOSELY MONITOR THE FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED (PNF is to call out
significant deviations)
- RECOVER SMOOTHLY TO A NORMAL CLIMB WHEN OUT OF SHEAR.
(C) Recovery Technique at Landing
- THRUST LEVERS: TOGA
- IF ENGAGED, AUTO PILOT MAY BE USED, but be aware that automatic

disengagement may occur if a>a port.
- FOLLOWS SRS ORDERS.
NOTE: If FD not available, initially use pitch attitude up to 150 but this pitch attitude can
be increased by using up to full stick if necessary to minimize loss of height.
- DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION
- CLOSELY MONITOR THE FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED
- RECOVER TO A SMOOTH NORMAL CLIMB when out of shear

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10.5. MICROBURST WINDSHEAR PROBABILITY GUIDELINES
Observation Probability of
Windshear
Presence of convective weather near intended flight path.
- With localized strong winds

(Tower reports or observed blowing dust, rings of dust,
Tornado-like features, etc.)………………………………………………………………… HIGH
- With heavy precipitation

(Observed or radar indications of contour, red or
attenuation shadow)……………………………………………………………………………. HIGH
- With rain shower…………………………………………………………………………………. MEDIUM
- With lightning ……………………………………………………………………………………….. MEDIUM
- With VIRGA ………………………………………………………………………………………… MEDIUM
- With moderate or greater turbulence (reported or radar

indications)…………………………………………………………………………………………… MEDIUM
- With temperature / dew point spread between 30 and 50 degrees

Fahrenheit……………………………………………………………………………………………. MEDIUM
- ONBOARD WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT

(Reported or observed)………………………………………………………………………….. HIGH
PIREP OF AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
- 15 knots or greater ……………………………………………………………………………… HIGH
- Less than 15 knots………………………………………………………………………………… MEDIUM
LL WAS ALERT / WIND VELOCITY CHANGE:
- 20 knots or greater ………………………………………………………………………………… HIGH
- Less than 20 knots…………………………………………………………………………….. MEDIUM
FOREST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER ……………………………………………………………… LOW

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CAUTION:
Currently no quantitative means exist for determining the presence or intensity of microburst
windshear. Pilots are urged to exercise caution in determining a course of action. Use of the table
should not replace sound judgment in making avoidance decisions.
NOTE: these guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity (within 3 miles of the
point of takeoff or landing along the intended flight path and below 1000 feet AGL).
The clues should be considered cumulative. If more than one is observed the
probability weighing should be increased, the hazard increases with proximately to
the connective weather. Weather assessment should be made continuously.
HIGH: critical attention needs to be given. A decision to avoid (e.g. DELAY OR DIVERT) is
appropriate.
MINIMUM: Consideration should be given to avoiding. Exercise precautions.
LOW: a decision to avoid is generally not indicated.

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MN/TR/05
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Page 1
CHAPTER - 11
TAKE-OFF SAFETY

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11 TAKE OFF SAFETY
11.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………........ 4
11.2 Objectives ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
11.3 (a) Successful versus unsuccessful Go/No Go Decision …………………………………. 4

(b) 'Successful' Go/No Go Decision …………………………………………………………………. 5
11.4 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents ……………………………….……………………………. 5
11.5 Statistics …………………………………………………………………….………………………………………. 6
11.6 Lessons Learned ……………………………………………………………..…………………………………. 8
11.7 Decisions and Procedures - What every pilot should know………………………………. 10
11.8 The Take-off Rules - The Source of the Data …………………………………………………. 10
11.8.1 The "FAR" Take-off Field Length……………………………………………………………………………… 12

11.8.2 Vi Speed Defined …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
11.8.3 Balanced Field Defined …………………………………………………………………………………………… 15
11.9 Transition to the stopping configuration ………………………………………………………….. 15
11.9.1 Flight Test Transitions ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

11.9.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time ……………………..………………………………………….…. 18
11.10 Comparing the 'Stop' and 'Go' Margins ……………………………… ………………….…………. 18
11.10.1 The 'Stop' Margins ……………………………………………………….………………………………………. 18

11.10.2 The "Go" Option …………………………………………………….………………….………………………. 19
11.11 Operational Take-off Calculations ………………………………….……………………………….. 22
11.11.1 The Field Length Limit Weight ……………………………………………….……………………………. 22

11.11.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit Weight ………………………………………………..………………. 23

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11.12 Factors that Affect Take-off and RTO Performance …………………………………………. 24

11.12.1 Runway Surface Condition ……………….…………………………………………………..……………… 24
11.12.2 Hydroplaning …………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
11.12.3 The Final Stop …………………………………………………………………………………………… 26
11.12.4 Atmospheric Conditions ………………………………………………………………………….… ……… 26
11.12.5 Airplane Configuration ………………………………………………………………………………… 27
11.12.6 Flaps ………………………………………………………………………….............................. 27
11.12.7 Engine Bleed Air …………………………………………………………..…………………………………… 28
11.12.8 Missing or Inoperative Equipment ………………………………..…………………………..………… 28
11.12.9 Wheels, Tires and Brakes ………………………………………………………………………….………. 29
11.12.10 Worn Brake …………………………………………………………..………………………………………… 32
11.12.11 Residual Brake Energy ………………………………………………..……………………………… 32
11.12.12 Speed Brake Effect On Wheel Braking ……………………………………………..………………… 32
11.12.13 Carbon and Steel Brakes Differences ………………………………................................... 34
11.12.14 High Brake Energy RTO's ………………………………………..……………………………………….. 35
11.12.15 Reverse Thrust Effects …………………………………………..……………………………………..…. 36
11.12.16 Runway Parameters ……………………………………………..…………………………………………. 37
11.12.17 Take-offs Using Reduced Thrust …………………………………………………………………….. 38
11.12.18 The Take-off Data The Pilot Sees ………………………………………………………………………. 39
11.13 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins ……………………….……………….………………………. 39
11.13.1 Runway Surface Condition …………...……………………….…………………………………………… 39

11.13.2 Flap Selection …………………………………………………………………………………………… 40
11.13.3 Runway Lineup …………………………………………………….…………………………................... 41
11.13.4 Setting Take-off Thrust …………………………………………………………………………………….. 41
11.13.5 Manual Braking Techniques …………………………………….……………………………………….… 42
11.13.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking Techniques …………………………………………………………….… 43
11.13.7 RTO Auto brakes ……………………………………………………………………………………………..… 43
11.13.8 The Vi Call …………………………………………………………….…………………………………………. 43
11.13.9 Crew Preparedness …………………………………………………………………………………………… 44
11.14 Crew Resource Management ……………………………………………………………………………… 44
11.14.1 CRM and RTO ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 45

11.14.2 The Take-off Briefing …………………………………………………………………………………. 45
11.14.3 Callouts ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 46
11.14.4 The Use of All Crew Members ………………………….……………………………………………….… 46
11.14.5 Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………….................. 46

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11.1 INTRODUCTION:
The goal of Take-off Safety training is to reduce the number of RTO related accidents by
improving the pilot’s decision-making and associated procedural accomplishment through
increased knowledge and awareness of the factors affecting the successful outcome of the
“Go/No Go” decision.
This Pilot Guide is extracted from FAA’s Take-off Safety Training Aid and is not specific to
any airplane type. It may contain procedures different from Company standard and shall be
considered as advisory and informational only.
11.2 OBJECTIVES:
The objective of the Pilot Guide to Take-off Safety is to summarize and communicate key
RTO related information relevant to flight crews. It is intended to be provided to pilots
during training and to be retained for future use.
11.3 (a) “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/No Decision:
Any Go / No Go decision can be considered “successful” if it does not result in injury

or airplane damage.
However, just because it was “successful” by this definition, it does not mean the
action was the “best” tat could have been taken. Available data indicates that over
75%of all RTO’s are initiated at speeds of 80 knots or less. These RTO’s almost
never result in an accident. Inherently, low speed RTO’s are safer and less
demanding than high speed RTO’s. At the other extreme, about 2% of the RTO’s
are initiated at speeds above 120 knots. Overrun accidents and incidents that occur
principally stem from these high-speed events.
What should all these statistics tell a pilot? First, RTO’s are not a very common
event. Second, and more important, the infrequency of RTO events may lead to
complacency about maintaining sharp decision-making skills and procedural
effectiveness. In spite of the equipment reliability, every pilot must be prepared to
make the correct Go/No Go decision on every take-off just in case.

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11.3 (b) “Successful” Go/No Decision:
There is more to a “good” Go/No Go decision than the fact that it may not have
resulted in any apparent injury or aircraft damage.
Some situations came very close to ending differently. By contrast, the large number
or take-offs that are successfully continued with indications of airplane system
problems such as caution lights that illuminate at high speed or tires that fail near V1,
are rarely reported.
They may result in diversions and delays but the landings are normally uneventful,
and can be completed using standard procedures.
This should not be construed as a blanket recommendation to “Go, no matter what”.

The goal of this training aid is to eliminate RTO accidents by reducing the number of
improper decisions that are made, and to ensure that the correct procedures are
accomplished when an RTO is necessary. It is recognized that the kind of situations
that occur in line operations are not always the simple problem that the pilot was
exposed to in training. Inevitably, the resolution of some situations will only be
possible through the good Judgment and discretion of the pilot.
11.4 RTO OVERRUN ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS:
The one-in-one-thousand RTO's that became accidents or serious incidents are the ones
that we must strive to prevent. As shown In Figure I, at the end of 1990, records show 46 in
service RTO overrun, accidents for the western built jet transport fleet.
These 46 accidents caused more than 400 fatalities. An additional 28 serious incidents have
been identified which likely would have been accidents If the runway overrun areas had
been less forgiving.

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74 RTO overrun accidents / incidents

1959 – 1990
11.5 STATISTICS:
Studies of the previously mentioned 74 accidents/incidents have revealed some

interesting statistics, as shown in Figure 2:
Fifty-eight percent were initiated at speeds In excess of Vi.

Approximately one-third were reported as having occurred on runways that
were wet or contaminated with snow or Ice.
An additionally, a vital fact was that where a 'Go' decision was made, there was not a
case where the airplane was incapable of continuing the take-off.

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Figure 2
Major factors in previous RTO accidents
Reasons why the 74 “unsuccessful” RTO’s were initiated are of interest. As shown in Figure
3, approximately one-fourth were initiated because of engine failures or engine indication
warnings. The remaining seventy-six percent were initiated for a variety of reasons which
included tire failures, procedural error, malfunction indication or lights, noses and vibrations,
directional control difficulties and unbalanced loading situations where the airplane failed to
rotate.
Some of the events contained multiple factors such as an RTO on a contaminated runway
following an engine failure at a speed in excess of V1. The fact that the majority of the
accidents and incidents occurred on airplanes that had full thrust available should figure
heavily in future Go/No Go training.

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Figure 3
Reasons for initiating the RTO

(74 accident / incident events)
11.6 LESSONS LEARNED:
Several lessons can be learned from these RTO accidents. First, the crew must always be
prepared: to make the Go/No Go decision prior to the airplane reaching V1 speed. As will be
shown in subsequent sections, there may not be enough runway left to successfully stop the
airplane if the reject is initiated after V1. Second, In order to eliminate unnecessary RTO's,
the crew must be prepared to act as a well-coordinated team. A good summarizing
statement of these lessons is, as speed approaches V1 the successful completion of
an RTO becomes increasingly more difficult.
A fourth and final lesson learned from the past 30 years of RTO history is Illustrated in
Figure 4. Analysis of the available data suggests that of the 74 RTO accidents and incidents,
approximately 80% were potentially avoidable through appropriate operational practices.
These potentially avoidable accidents can be divided into three categories. Roughly 9% of
the RTO accidents of the past were caused by loading errors and others by incorrect
preflight procedures. About 16% of the accidents amid incidents could be attributed to
incorrect pilot techniques or procedures in the stopping effort. Delayed application of the
brakes, failure to deploy the speed brakes, and the failure to make a maximum effort stop
until late In the RTO were the chief characteristics of this category.

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Figure 4
80% of the RTO accidents were avoidable
Review of the data from the 74 RTO accident and incidents suggests that in approximately
55% of the event, the airplane was capable of continuing the take-off and either landing at
the departure airport or diverting to an alternate. In other words, the decision to reject the
take-off appears to have been "improper". It is not possible, however, to predict with total
certainty what would have happened in every event if the take-off had been continued.
Nor is it possible for the analyst of the accident data to visualize the events leading up to a
particular accident “through the eyes of the crew” including all the other factors that were
vying for their attention at the moment when the "proper" decision could have been made.
It is not very difficult to imagine a set of circumstances where the only logical thing for the
pilot to do is to reject the take-off. Encountering a large flock of birds at rotation speed,
which then produces loss of thrust on both engines of a two-engine airplane, is a clear
example.
11.7 DECISIONS AND PROCEDURES - WHAT EVERY PILOT SHOULD KNOW:
There are many things that may ultimately affect the outcome of a Go/No Go decision. The
goal of the Take-off Safety Training Aid is to reduce the number of RTO related accidents
and incidents by improving the pilot's decision making and associated procedure
accomplishment through increased knowledge and awareness of the related factors.
This section discusses the rules that define take-off performance limit weights and the
margins that exist when the actual take-off weight of the airplane is less than the limit
weight. The effects of runway surface condition, atmospheric conditions, and airplane
configuration variables on Go/No Go performance are discussed, as well as what the pilot
can do to make the best use of any excess available runway.

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11.8 THE TAKE-OFF RULES - THE SOURCE OF THE DATA:
It is important that all pilots understand the take-off field length/weight limit rules and the
margins these rules provide. The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’S) have continually
been refined so that the details of the rules that are applied to one airplane model may
differ from another. However, these differences are minor and have no effect on the basic
actions required of the flight crew during the take-off.
11.8.1 The "FAR" Take-off Field Length
The "FAR" Take-off Field Length determined from the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual
(AFM), considers the most limiting of each of the following three criteria:
1) All-engine go Distance:
115% of the actual distance required to accelerate, lift off and reach a point 35 feet
above the runway with all engines operating (Figure 5).
2) Engine-Out Accelerate-Go Distance: The distance required to accelerate with all

engines operating, have one engine fall at VEF, at least one second before V1,
continue the take-off, lift off and reach a point 35 feet above the runway surface at
V2 speed (Figure 6).
3) Engine-Out Accelerate-Stop Distance: The distance required to accelerate with all

engines operating, have an engine fall at VEF, at least one second before V1,
recognize the failure, reconfigure for stopping and bring the airplane to a stop
using maximum wheel braking with the speedbrakes extended. Reverse thrust is
not used to determine the FAR accelerate-stop distance (Figure 7).

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The FAR criteria provide accountability for wind, runway slope, clearway and stop way.
FAA approved take-off data are based on the performance demonstrated on a smooth, dry
runway. Separate advisory data for wet or contaminated runway conditions are published
in the manufacturer's operational documents. These documents are used by many
operators to derive wet or contaminated runway take-off adjustment.
Other criteria define the performance weight limits for take-off climb, obstacle clearance,
tire speeds and maximum brake energy capability.
Any of these criteria can be the limiting factor which determines the maximum dispatch
weight. However, the field Length Limit Weight and the amount of runway remaining at V1
will be the primary focus of our discussion here since they more directly relate to
preventing RTO overruns.
11.8.2 VI Speed Defined:
The certified accelerate-stop distance calculation is based on an engine failure at least one
second prior to V1. This standard time allowance has been established to allow the line
pilot to recognize an engine failure and begin the subsequent sequence of stopping
actions.
In an operational Field Length Limited context, the correct definition of V1 consists of two
separate concepts:
First, with respect to the "No Go" criteria, V1 is the maximum speed at which
the rejected take-off manoeuvre can be initiated and the airplane
stopped within the remaining field length under the conditions and
procedures defined In the FAR's. It is the latest point in the take-off roll
where a stop can be initiated.

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Second, with respect to the "Go" criteria, V1 is also the earliest point from which an engine
out take-off can be continued and the airplane attain a height of 35 feet at the end of the
runway. This aspect of Vi is discussed in a later section.
The Go/No Go decision must be made before reaching V1. A "No Go" decision after
passing V1 will not leave sufficient runway remaining to stop if the take-off weight is equal
to the Field Length Limit Weight. When the airplane actual weight is less than the Field
Length Limit Weight, it is possible to calculate the actual maximum speed from which the
take-off could be successfully rejected. It is therefore a recommended that pilots consider
V1 to be a limit speed: Do not attempt an RTO once the airplane has passed V1 unless the
pilot has reason to conclude the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly. This
recommendation should prevail no matter what runway length appears to
remain after V1.
 The time interval between VEF and V1 is the longer of the flight test demonstrated time or one
second. Therefore, in determining the scheduled accelerate-stop performance, one second is
the minimum time that will exist between the engine failure and the first pilot stopping action.
11.8.3 Balanced Field Defined:
The previous two sections established the general relationship between the take-off
performance regulations and V1 speed. This section provides a closer examination of how the
choice of V1 actually affects the take-off performance in specific situations.
Since it is generally easier to change the weight of an airplane than it is to change the length
of a runway, the discussion here will consider the effect of V1 on the allowable take-off weight
from a fixed runway length.
The Continued Take-off:
After an engine failure during the take-off roll, the airplane must continue to accelerate on
the remaining engine(s), lift off and reach V2 speed at 35 feet. The later in the take-off roll
that the engine fails, the heavier the airplane can be and still gain enough speed to meet
this requirement.
For the engine failure occurring approximately one second prior to V1, the relationship of
the allowable engine-out go take-off weight to V1 would be as shown by the "Continued
Take-off” line in Figure 8. The higher the V1, the heavier the take-off weight allowed.

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The Rejected Take-off:
On the stop side of the equation, the V1/weight trade has the opposite trend. The
lower the V1, or the earlier in the take-off roll the stop is initiated, the heavier the
airplane can be, as indicated by the "Rejected Take-off line in Figure 8.
The point at which the "Continued and Rejected Take-off lines intersect is of special
interest. It defines what is called a "Balanced Field Limit" take-off. The name
"Balanced Field" refers to the fact that the accelerate-go performance required is
exactly equal to (or "balances"0 the accelerate-stop performance required.
From Figure 8 it can also be seen that at the "Balanced Field" point, the allowable
Field Limit Take-off Weight for the given runway is the maximum. The resulting
unique value of V1 is referred to as the "Balanced Field Limit V1 Speed" and the
associated take-off weight is called the "Balanced Field Weight Limit". This is the
speed that is typically given to flight crews in handbooks or charts, by the onboard
computer systems, or by dispatch.

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11.9 TRANSITION TO THE STOPPING CONFIGURATION:
In establishing the certified accelerate-stop distance, the time required to reconfigure the
airplane from the "Go" to the "Stop" mode is referred to as the "transition" segment. This
action and the associated time of accomplishment include applying maximum braking,
simultaneously moving the thrust levers to idle and raising the speed brakes. The transition
time demonstrated by flight test pilots during the accelerate-stop testing is used to derive
the transition segment times used in the AFM calculations.
11.9.1 Flight Test Transitions:

During certification testing, the airplane is accelerated to a pre-selected
speed, one engine is "failed" by selecting fuel cut-off, and the pilot flying
rejects the take-off. In human factors circles, this is defined as a "simple
task" because the test pilot knows in advance that an RTO will be
performed.
An average of the recorded data from at least six of these RTO's is then
used to determine the "demonstrated" transition times.
The total flight test "demonstrated" transition time, initial brake application
to speed brakes up, is typically one second or less. The certification
regulations require that additional time delays, sometimes referred to as
"pads", be included in the calculation of certified take-off distances.
11.9.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition Times:

Although the line pilot must be prepared for an RTO during every take-off, it
is fairly likely that the event or failure prompting the Go/No Go decision will
be much less clear-cut than an outright engine failure. It may therefore be
unrealistic to expect the average line pilot to perform the transition in as
little as one second in an operational environment. Human factors literature
describes the line pilot's job as a "complex task" since the pilot does not
know when an RTO will occur. In consideration of this "complex task", the
flight test transition times are increased to calculate the certified accelerate-
stop distances specified in the AFM. These additional time increments are
not intended to allow extra time for making the "No Go" decision after
passing V1. There purpose is to allow sufficient time (and distance) for "the
average pilot" to transition from the take-off mode to the stopping mode.
The first adjustment is made to the time required to recognize the need to
stop. During the RTO certification flight-testing, the pilot knows that the
engine will be failed, therefore, his reaction is predictably quick.
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To account for this, an engine failure recognition time of at least one second
has been set as a standard for all jet transport certifications since the late
1960's. V1 is therefore, at least one second after the engine failure. During
this recognition time segment, the airplane continues to accelerate with the
operating engine(s) continuing to provide full forward thrust. The "failed"
engine has begun to spool down, but it is still providing some forward
thrust, adding to the airplane's acceleration.
Over the years, the details of establishing the transition time segments after
V1 have varied slightly but the overall concept and the resulting transition
distances have remained essentially the same. For early jet transport
models, an additional one-second was added to both the fight test
demonstrated throttles-to-idle time and the speed brakes-up time, as
illustrated In Figure 9. The net result is that the flight test demonstrated
recognition and transition time of approximately one second has been
increased for the purpose of calculating the AFM transition distance.
Figure 9
Early method of establishing AFM transition time
In more recent certification programs, the AFM calculation procedure was slightly different.
An allowance equal to the distance traveled during two seconds at the speed brakes-up
speed was added to the actual total transition time demonstrated in the flight test to apply
brakes, bring the thrust levers to idle and deploy the speed brakes, as shown in Figure 9.
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To ensure "consistent and repeatable results", retardation forces resulting from brake
application and speed brake deployment are not applied during this two-second allowance
time, i.e. no deceleration credit is taken. This two-second distance allowance simplifies the
transition distance calculation and accomplishes the same goal as the individual one
second "pads" used for older models.
Regardless of the method used, the accelerate - stop distance calculated for every take-off
from the AFM is typical 400 to 600 feet longer than the flight test accelerate - stop
distance.
These differences between the past and present methodology are not significant in so far
as the operational accelerate-stop distance is concerned. The key point is that
time/distance "pads" used in the AFM transition distance calculation are not
intended to allow extra time to make the "No Go" decision. Rather, the "pads"
provide an allowance that assures the pilot has adequate distance to get the airplane into
the full stopping configuration.
Regardless of the airplane model, the transition, or reconfiguring of the airplane for a
rejected take-off, demands quick action by the crew to simultaneously initiate maximum
braking, retard the thrust levers to idle and then quickly raise the speed brakes.
Figure 10
More recent method of establishing AFM transition time

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11.10 COMPARING THE "STOP" AND "GO" MARGINS:
When performing a take-off at a Field Length Limit Weight determined from the
AFM, the pilot is assured that the airplane performance will, at the minimum,
conform to the requirements of the FAR's if the assumptions of the calculations are
met. This means that following an engine failure at VEF, the take-off can be rejected
at V1 and the airplane stopped at the end of the runway, or if the take-off is
continued, a minimum height of 35 feet will be reached over the end of the
runway.
11.10.1 The "Stop" Margins:
It has been shown that at a Field Length Limit Weight condition, an RTO
initiated at V1 will result in the airplane coming to a stop at the end of the
runway.
This accelerate-stop distance calculation specifies a smooth, dry runway, an

engine failure RTO at V1, and the completion of the transition within the time
allotted in the AFM. If any of these basic assumptions are not satisfied, the
actual accelerate-stop distance may exceed the AFM calculated distance, and an
overrun will result. The most significant factor in these assumptions is the
Initiation of the RTO no later than V1, yet as was noted previously, in
approximately 58% of the RTO accidents the stop was initiated after V1. At
heavy weights near V1, the airplane is typically traveling at 200 to 300 feet per
second, and accelerating at 3 to 6 knots per second.
Figure 11
Overrun Speed for an RTO initiated after V1

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This means that a delay of only a second or two in initiating the RTO will require several
hundred feet of additional runway to successfully complete the stop. If the take-off was at
a Field Limit Weight, and there is no excess runway available, the airplane will reach the
end of the runway at a significant speed, as shown in Figure 11.
The horizontal axis of Figure 11 is the incremental speed in knots above V1 at which a
maximum effort stop is initiated. The vertical axis shows the minimum speed in knots at
which the airplane would cross the end of the runway, assuming the pilot used all of the
transition time allowed in the AFM to reconfigure the airplane to the stop configuration,
and that a maximum stopping effort was maintained. The data in Figure 11 assumes an
engine failure not less than one second prior to V1 and does not include the use of reverse
thrust. Therefore, if the pilot performs the transition more quickly than the AFM allotted
time, and/or uses reverse thrust, the line labeled "MAXIMUM EFFORT STOP" would be
shifted slightly to the right. However, based on the RTO accidents of the past, the shaded
area above the line shows what is more likely to occur if a high speed RTO is initiated at or
just after V1 This is especially true if the RTO was due to something other than an engine
failure, or if the stopping capability of the airplane is otherwise degraded by runway
surface contamination, tire failures, or poor technique. The data in Figure 11 are typical of
large, heavy jet transport and would be rotated slightly to the right for the same airplane
at a lighter weight.
In the final analysis, although the certified accelerate-stop distance calculations provide
sufficient runway for a properly performed RTO on a dry runway, the available margins are
fairly small. Most importantly, there are no margins to account for initiation of the RTO
after V1 or extenuating circumstances such as runway contamination.
11.10.2 The "Go" Option:
FAR rules also prescribe minimum performance standards for the "Go"
situation. With an engine failed at the most critical point along the take-off
path, the FAR "Go" criteria requires that the airplane be able to continue to
accelerate, rotate, lift off and reach V2 speed at a point 35 feet above the
end of the runway. The airplane must remain controllable throughout this
manoeuvre and must meet certain minimum climb requirements. These
handling characteristic and climb requirements are demonstrated many
times throughout the certification flight test program. While a great deal of
attention is focused on the engine failure case, it is Important to keep in
mind, that in nearly three-quarters of all RTO accident cases, full take-off
power was available. It is likely that each crew member has had a good deal
of practice in engine Inoperative take-offs in prior simulator or airplane
training. However, it may have been done at relatively light training
weights. As a result, the crew may conclude that large control inputs and
rapid response typical of conditions near minimum control speeds (V1) are
always required in order to maintain directional control.
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However, at the speeds associated with a typical Field Length Limit Weight,
the control input requirements are noticeably less than they are at lighter
weights.
Also, at light gross weights, the airplane's rate of climb capability with one engine
inoperative could nearly equal the all engine climb performance at typical in service
weights, leading the crew to expect higher performance than the airplane will have
if the actual airplane weight is at or near the take-off Climb Limit Weight. Engine-
out rate of climb and acceleration capability at a Climb Limit Weight may appear to
be substantially less than the crew anticipates or is familiar with.
The minimum second segment climb gradients required in the regulations vary
from 2.4% to 3.0% depending on the number of engines installed. These minimum
climb gradients translate into climb rate of only 350-500 feet per minute at actual
climb limit weights and their associated V2 speeds, as shown in Figure 12. The
take-off weight computations performed prior to take-off are required to account
for all obstacles in the take-off flight path. All that is required to achieve the
anticipated flight path is adherence by the flight crew to the planned headings and
speeds per their pre-departure briefing.

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Consider a one-engine-inoperative case where the engine failure occurs earlier than the
minimum time before V1 specified in the rules. Because engine - out acceleration is less
than all-engine acceleration, additional distance is needed to accelerate to VR and, as a
consequence, the liftoff point will be moved further down the runway. The altitude (or
"screen height") achieved at the end of the runway is somewhat reduced depending on
how much more than one second before V1 the engine failure occurs. On a field length
limit runway, the height at the end of the runway may be less than the 35 ft specified in
the regulations.
Figure 13 graphically summarizes this discussion of "Go" margins. First, let VEF be the
speed at which the Airplane Flight Manual calculation assumes the engine to fail, (a
minimum of one second before reaching V1).
The horizontal axis of Figure 13 shows the number of knots prior to VEF that the engine
actually fails instead of the time, and the vertical axis gives the "screen height" achieved at
the end of the runway. A typical range of acceleration for jet transports is 3 to 6 knots per
second, so the shaded area shows the range in screen height that might occur if the
engine actually failed "one second early", or approximately two second early", or
approximately two seconds prior to V1. In other words, a "Go" decision made with the
engine failure occurring two seconds prior to V1 will result in a screen height of 15 to 30
feet for a Field Length Limit Weight take-off.
Figure 13 – Effect of engine failure before VEF on screen height

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Figure 13 also shows that the "Go" performance margins are strongly influenced by the
numbers of engines. This is again the result of the larger proportion of thrust loss when
one engine falls on the two-engine airplane compared to a three or four-engine airplane.
On two-engine airplane, there are still margins but they are not as large, a fact that an
operator of several airplane types must be sure to emphasize in training and transition
programs.
It should also be kept in mind that the 15 to 30 foot screen heights in the preceding
discussion were based on the complete loss of thrust from one engine. If all engines are
operating, as was the case in most of the RTO accident cases, the height over the end of
the Field Length Limit runway will be approximately 150 feet and speed will be V2 +10 to
25 knots, depending on airplane type. This is due to the higher acceleration and climb
gradient provided when all engines are operating and because the required all-engine
take-off distance is multiplied by 115%. If the "failed" engine is developing partial power,
the performance is somewhere in between, but definitely above the required engine-out
limits.
11.11 OPERATIONAL TAKE-OFF CALCULATIONS:
As we have seen, the certification flight-testing, in accordance with the appropriate

government regulations, determines the relationship between the take-off gross weight
and the required runway length which is published in the AFM.
By using the data in the AFM it is then possible to determine, for a given combination of
ambient conditions and airplane weight, the required runway length which will comply with
the regulations. Operational take-off calculations, however, have an additional and
obviously different limitation. The length of the runway is the limit Field length and it is
fixed, not variable.
11.11.1 The Field Length Limit Weight:
Instead of solving for the required runway length, the first step in an operational take-off
calculation is to determine the maximum airplane weight which meets the rules for the
fixed runway length available. In other words, the limit weight is at which the airplane:
1. Will achieve 35 ft altitude with all engines operation and a margin of 15% of
the actual distance used remaining;
2. Will achieve 35 ft altitude with the critical engine failed prior to V1;
3. Will stop with an engine failed prior to V1 and the reject Initiated at V1;

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......... all within the existing runway length available.
The result of this calculation is three allowable weights. These three weights may or may
not be the same, but the lowest of the three becomes the Field Length Limit Weight for
that take-off. The possible combinations of airport pressure altitude, temperature, wind,
runway slope, clearway and stop way are endless. Regardless of airplane type, they can
easily combine to make any one of the three previously discussed take-off field length
limits apply. Flight crews have no convenient method to determine which of the three
criteria is limiting for a particular take-off, and from a practical point of view, it really
doesn't matter. The slight differences that may exist are rarely significant. Most RTO
overrun accidents have occurred on runways where the airplane was not at a limit take-off
weight. That is, the accidents occurred on runways that were longer than required for the
actual take-off weight. Combining this historical evidence with the demanding nature of
high speed rejected take-off, it would seem prudent that the crew should always assume
the take-off is limited by the accelerate-stop criteria when the take-off weight is Field
Length Limited.
11.11.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit Weight:
Returning to the operational take-off calculation, the second step is to then

compare the actual airplane weight to the Field Length Limit Weight. There are only
two possible outcomes of this check.
1. The actual airplane weight could equal or exceed the Field Length Limit
Weight, or
2. The actual airplane weight is less than the Field Length Limit Weight.
The first case is relatively straightforward; the airplane weight cannot be greater
than the limit weight and must be reduced. The result is a take-off at a Field
Length Limit Weight as we have just discussed. The second case, which is typical of
most jet transport operations, is worthy of further consideration.
By far, the most likely take-off scenario for the line pilot is the case where the
actual airplane weight is less then any limit weight, especially the Field Length Limit
Weight. It also is possibly the most easily misunderstood area of take-off
performance since the fact that the airplane is not at a limit weight is about all the
flight crew can determine from the data usually available on the flight deck.
Currently, few operators provide any information that will let the crew determine
how much excess runway is available; what it means in terms of the Vi speed they
are using; or how to best maximize the potential safety margins represented by the
excess runway.

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11.12 FACTORS THAT AFFECT TAKE-OFF AND RTO PERFORMANCE:
Both the continued and the rejected take-off performance are directly affected by
atmospheric conditions, airplane configuration, runway characteristics, engine thrust
available, and by human performance factors. Changes in these variables can have a
significant impact on a successful Go/No decision. In many instances, the flight crew has a
degree of direct control over these changes.
11.12.1 Runway Surface Condition:
The condition of the runway surface can have a significant effect on take-off
performance, since it can affect both the acceleration and deceleration capability of
the airplane. The entire length of the runway may not have the same stopping
potential due to a variety of factors. Obviously, a 10,000 feet runway with the first
7.000 feet bare and dry, but the last 3,000 feet a sheet of ice, does not present a
very good situation for a high speed RTO. On the other hand, there are also
specially constructed runways with a grooved or Porous Friction Coat (PFC) surface,
which can offer improved braking under adverse conditions. The crews cannot
control the weather like they can the airplane's configuration or thrust. Therefore,
to maximize both the "Go" and "Stop" margins, they must rely on judiciously
applying their company's wet or contaminated runway policies as well as their own
understanding of how the performance of their airplane may be affected by a
particular runway surface condition.
The certification testing is performed on smooth, un-grooved, dry runway.

Therefore, any contamination which reduces the available friction between the tire
and the runway surface will increase the required stopping distance for an RTO.
Runway contaminants such as slush or standing water can also affect the continued
take-off performance due to "displacement and impingement drag" associated with
the spray from the tires striking the airplane. Some manufacturers provide advisory
data for adjustment of take-off weight and/or V1 when the runway is wet or
contaminated. Many operators use this data to provide flight crews with a method
of determining the limit weights for slippery runways.
11.12.2 Hydroplaning:
As a tire rolls on wet runway, its forward motion tends to displace water from the
tread contact area. While this isn't any problem at low speeds, at high speeds this
displacement action can generate water pressures sufficient to lift and separate
part of the tire contact area from the runway surface. The resulting tire-to-ground
friction can be very low at high speeds but fortunately improves as speed
decreases.

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Dynamic hydroplaning is the term used to describe the reduction of tire tread contact area
due to induced water pressure. At high speeds on runways with significant water, the
forward motion of the wheel generates a wedge of high pressure water at the leading
edge of the contact area, as shown in Figure 14A. As the tread contact area is reduced,
the available braking friction is also reduced. In the extreme case, total dynamic
hydroplaning can occur where the tire to runway contact area vanishes, the tire lifts off the
runway and rides on the wedge of water like a water-ski. When it does occur, such as
during an extremely heavy rainstorm, it virtually eliminates any tire braking or cornering
capability, at high speeds.

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Another form of hydroplaning can occur where there is some tread contact with the
runway surface but the wheel is either locked or rotating slowly (compared to the actual
airplane speed). The friction produced by the skidding tire causes the tread material to
become extremely hot. As indicated in Figure 14B, the resulting heat generates steam in
the contact area which tends to provide additional upward pressure on the tire. The hot
steam also starts reversing the vulcanizing process used in manufacturing the rubber tread
material. The affected surface tread rubber becomes irregular in appearance, somewhat
gummy in nature, and usually has a light gray colour. This "reverted" rubber hydroplaning
results in very low friction levels, approximately equal to icy runway friction when the
temperature is near the melting point.
In the last several years, many runways throughout the world have been grooved, thereby
greatly improving the potential wet runway friction capability. As a result, the number of
hydroplaning incidents has decreased considerably.
11.12.3. The Final Stop :
A review of overrun accidents indicates that, In many cases, the stopping capability
available was not used to the maximum during the initial and mid-portion of the
stop manoeuvre, because there appeared to be "plenty of runway available". In
some cases, less than full reverse thrust was used and the brakes were released for
a period of time, letting the airplane roll on the portion of the runway that would
have produced good braking action. When the airplane moved onto the final
portion of runway; the crew discovered that the presence of moisture on the top of
rubber deposits in the touchdown and turnoff areas resulted in very poor braking
capability, and the airplane could not be stopped on the runway. When an RTO is
initiated on wet or slippery runways, it is especially important to use full stopping
capability until the airplane is completely stopped.
11.12.4 Atmospheric Conditions:
In general, the lift the wings generate and thrust the engines produce are directly
related to the airplane's, speed through the air and the density of that air.
The flight crew should anticipate that the airplane's take-off performance will be
affected by wind speed and direction as well as the atmospheric conditions which
determine air density. Properly accounting for last minute changes in these factors
is crucial to a successful Go/No Go decision.

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The effect of the wind speed and directions on take-off distance is very straight
forward. At any given airspeed, a 10-knot headwind component lowers the ground
speed by 10 knots. Since V1, rotation, and lift off speeds are at lower ground
speeds, the required take-off distance is reduced. The opposite occurs if the wind
has a 10-knot tailwind component, producing a 10-knot increase in the ground
speed. The required runway length is increased, especially the distance required to
stop the airplane from V1. Typical take-off data supplied to the flight crew by their
operations department will either provide take-off weight adjustments to be applied
to a zero wind limit weight or separate columns of limit weights for specific values
of wind component. In either case, it is the responsibility of the flight crew to verify
that last minute changes in the tower reported winds are included in their take-off
planning.
The effect of air density on take-off performance is also straight forward in so far
as the crew is normally provided the latest meteorological information prior to take-
off. However, it is the responsibility of the crew to verify the correct pressure
altitude and temperature values used in determining the final take-off limit weight
and thrust setting.
11.12.5 Airplane Configuration:
The planned configuration of the airplane at the time of take-off must be taken into
consideration by the flight crew during their take-off planning. This should include
the usual things like flap selection, and engine bleed configurations, as well as the
unusual things like inoperative equipment covered by the Minimum Equipment List
(MEL) or missing items as covered by the Configuration Deviation List (CDL).
11.12.6 Flaps:
The airplane's take-off field length performance is affected by flap setting in a fairly
obvious way. For a given runway length and airplane weight, the take-off speeds
are reduced by selecting a greater flap setting. This is because the lift required for
flight is produced at a lower V2 speed with the greater flap deflection. Since the
airplane will reach the associated lower V1 speed earlier in the take-off roll, there
will be more runway remaining for a possible stop manoeuvre. On the "Go" side of
the decision increase the airplane drag and the resulting lower climb performance
may limit the allowable take-off weight. However, the take-off analysis used by the
flight crew will advise them if climb or obstacle clearance is a limiting factor with a
greater flap setting.

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11.12.7 Engine Bleed Air:
Whenever bleed air is extracted from an engine and the value of the thrust setting
parameter is appropriately reduced, the amount of thrust the engine generates is
reduced. Therefore; the use of engine bleed air for air conditioning pressurization
reduces the airplane's potential take-off performance for a given set of runway
length, temperature and altitude conditions.
When required, using engine and/or wing anti-ice further decreases the
performance on some airplane models. This "lost" thrust may be recoverable via
increased take-off EPR or N1 limits as indicated in the airplane-operating manual. It
depends on engine type, airplane model, and the specific atmosphere conditions.
11.12.8 Missing or Inoperative Equipment:
Inoperative or missing equipment can sometimes affect the airplane's acceleration

or deceleration capability. Items, which are allowed to be missing per the certified
Configuration Deviation List (CDL), such as access panels and aerodynamic seals,
can cause airplane drag to increase. The resulting decrements to the take-off limit
weights are, when appropriate, published in the CDL. With these decrements
applied, the airplane's take-off performance will be within the required distances
and climb rates. Inoperative equipment or deactivated system, as permitted under
the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) can also affect the "Stop" performance.
For instance, on some airplane models, an Inoperative in-fight wheel braking

system may require the landing gear to be left extended during a large portion of
the climb out to allow the wheels to stop rotating. The "Go" perform calculations
for dispatch must be made in accordance with certified "Landing Gear Down" Flight
Manual Data. The resulting new limit take-off weight may be much less than the
original limit in order to meet obstacle clearance requirements, and there would be
some excess runway available for a rejected take-off.
An MEL item that would not affect the "Go" performance margins but would
definitely degrade the "Stop" margins is an inoperative anti-skid system. In this
instance, not only is the limit weight reduced by the amount determined from the
AFM data, but the flight crew may also be required to use a different rejected take-
off procedure in which the throttles are retarded first, the speed brakes deployed
second, and then the brakes are applied in a judicious manner to avoid locking the
wheels and failing the tires. The associated decrement in the Field Length Limit
Weights is usually substantial. Other MEL items such as a deactivated brake may
impact both the continued take-off and RTO performance through degraded
braking capability and loss of in-flight braking of the spinning tire.
The flight crew should bear in mind that the performance of the airplane with these
types of CDL or MEL items in the airplane's maintenance log at dispatch will be
within the certified limits.

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However, it would be prudent for the flight crew to accept final responsibility to
assure that the items are accounted for in the dispatch process, and to insure that
they, as a crew, are prepared to properly execute any revised procedures.
11.12.9 Wheel, Tires and Brakes:
The airplane's wheels, tires, and brakes are another area that should be considered
in light of the significant part they play in determining the results of a Go/No Go
decision.
One design feature which involves all three components is the wheel fuse plug. All
jet transport wheels used for braking incorporate thermal fuse plugs. The function
of the fuse plug is to prevent tire or wheel bursts by melting if the heat transferred
to the wheels from the brakes become excessive. Melting temperatures of fuse
plugs are selected so that with excessive brake heat, the inflation gas (usually
nitrogen) is released before the structural integrity of the tire or wheel is seriously
impaired.
Both certification limitations and operational recommendations to avoid melting

fuse plugs are provided to operators by the manufacturer. While fuse plugs provide
protection from excessive brake heat, it is also important to recognize that fuse
plugs cannot protect against all types of heat induced tire failures. The location of
the fuse plug in the wheel is selected to ensure proper response to brake heat.
This location in combination with the inherent low thermal conductivity of tire
rubber means that the fuse plugs cannot prevent tire failures from the rapid
internal heat buildup associated with taxiing on an under Inflated tire.
This type of heat buildup can cause a breakdown of the rubber compound, ply
separation, and/or rupture of the piles. This damage might not cause immediate
tire failure and because it is internal, it may not be obvious by visual Inspection.
However, the weakened tire is more prone to failure on subsequent flight. Long taxi
distances especially at high speeds and heavy take-off weights can aggravate this
problem and result in a blown tire. While under Inflation is a maintenance issue,
flight crews can at least minimize the possibility of tire failures due to overheating
by using low taxi speeds and minimizing taxi braking whenever possible.
Correct tire inflation and fuse plug protection are significant, but will never prevent
all tire failures. Foreign objects in parking areas, taxiways and runways can cause
severe cuts in tires. The abrasion associated with sustained locked or skidding
wheels, which can be caused by various antiskid or brake problems can grind
through the tire cords until the tire is severely weakened or a brake problems can
grind through the tire cords until the tire is severely weakened or a blow-out
occurs. Occasionally, wheel cracks develop which deflate a tire and generate an
overloaded condition in the adjacent tire on the same axle.

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Some of these problems are Inevitable. However, It cannot be overstressed that

proper maintenance and thorough walk around inspections are key factors in
preventing tire failures during the take-off roll.
Tire failures may be difficult to identify from the flight deck and the related Go/No
Go decision is therefore, not a simple task. A tire burst may be loud enough to be
confused with an engine compressor stall, may just be a loud noise, or may not be
heard. A tire failure may not be felt at all, may cause the airplane to pull to one
side, or can cause the entire airplane to shake and shudder to the extent that
instruments may become difficult to read. Vibration arising out of failure of a nose
wheel tire potentially presents another complication. During take-off rotation,
vibration may actually increase at nose wheel liftoff due to the loss of the
dampening effect of having the wheel in contact with the runway. A pilot must be
cautious not to inappropriately conclude, under such circumstances, that another
problem exists.
Although continuing a take-off with a failed tire will generally have no significant
adverse results, there may be additional complications as a result of tire failure.
Failed tires do not in themselves usually create directional control can occur,
however, as a result of heavy pieces of tire material being thrown at very high
velocities and causing damage to the exposed structure of the airplane and/or the
loss of hydraulic systems.
On airplanes with aft mounted engines, the possibility of pieces of the failed tire
being thrown into an engine must also be considered. An airplane's climb gradient
and obstacle clearance performance with all engines operating and the landing gear
down exceeds the minimum certified engine-out levels that are used to determine
the take-off performance limits. Therefore, leaving the gear down after a suspected
tire failure will not jeopardize the aircraft if all engines are operating. However, it
the perceived tire failure is accompanied by an indication of thrust loss, or if an
engine problem should develop later in the take-off sequence, the airplane's climb
gradient and/or obstacle clearance capability may be significantly reduced if the
landing gear is not retracted.
If a tire failure is suspected at fairly low speeds, it should be treated the same, as
any other rejectable failure and the take-off should be rejected promptly. When
rejecting the take-off with a blown tire, the crew should anticipate that additional
tires may fall during the stop attempt and that directional control may be difficult.
They should also be prepared for the possible loss of hydraulic systems, which may
cause speed brake or thrust reverser problems. Since the stopping capability of the
airplane may be significantly compromised, the crew should not relax from a
maximum effort RTO until the airplane is stopped on the pavement.

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Rejecting a take-off from high speeds with a failed tire is a much riskier proposition,
especially if the weight is near the Field Limit Weight. The chances of an overrun
are increased simply due to the loss of braking force from one wheel. II additional
tires should fail during the stop attempt, the available braking force is even further
reduced. In this case, it is generally better to continue the take-off, a' can be seen
in Figure 15. The subsequent landing may take advantage of a lower weight and
speed if it is possible to dump fuel.
Also, the crew will be better prepared for possible vibration and/or control
problems. Most important, however, is the fact that the entire runway will be
available for the stop manoeuvre instead of perhaps, as little as 40% of it. As can
be seen from this discussion, it is not a straight forward issue to define when a
take-off should be continued or rejected after a suspected tire failure. It is fairly
obvious however, that an RTO initiated at high speed with a suspected tire failure
Is not a preferred situation.

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11.12.10 Worn Brake:
Virtually all brakes in use today have wear indicator pins to show the degree of
wear and when the brake must be removed from the airplane. In most cases, as
the brake wears, the pin moves closer to a reference point, so that when the end of
the pin is flush with the reference (with full pressure applied), the brake is "worn
out". As of late 1991, tests have been completed which show that brakes at the
allowable wear limit can meet AFM brake energy levels. As a result, "wear pin
length" is not significant to the flight crew unless the pin indicates that the brake is
worn out and should be removed from service. There are no changes to flight crew
or dispatch procedures based on brake wear pin length.
11.12.11 Residual Brake Energy:
After a brake application, the energy which the brake has absorbed is released as
heat and until this heat is dissipated, the amount of additional energy which the
brake can absorb without failure is reduced. Therefore, take-off planning must
consider the effects of residual brake energy (or brake temperature) if the previous
landing involved significant braking and/or the airplane turnaround is relatively
short. There are two primary sources of information on this subject. The brake
temperature limitations and/or cooling charts in the airplane-operating manual
provide recommended information on temperature limitations and/or cooling times
and the procedures necessary to dissipate various amount of brake energy.
11.12.12 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking:
The reason speedbrakes are so critical is their pronounced effect on wing lift.
Depending on flap setting, the net wing lift can be reduced, eliminated or reversed
to a down load by raising the vertical load on the wheels which in turn can greatly
increase braking capability.
Speedbrakes must be deployed early in the stop to maximize the braking capability.
Failure to raise the speedbrakes during an RTO or raising them late will significantly
increase the stopping distance beyond the value shown in the AFM.
Figure 16 and 17 summarize the effect of speedbrakes during an RTO. For a typical
mid-sized two-engine transport, at a take-off weight of 225,000 Ibs, the total load
on the main wheels at brake release would be approximately 193,000 Ibs.
As the airplane accelerates along the runway, wing lift will decrease the load on the
gear, and by the time the airplane approaches V1 speed, (137 knots for this
example), the main gear load will have decreased by nearly 63,000 Ibs. The data in
Figure 17 graphically depicts how the forces acting on the airplane vary with
airspeed from a few knots before the RTO is initiated until the airplane is stopped.
When the pilot begins the RTO by applying the brakes and closing the thrust levers
the braking force rises quickly to a value in excess of 70,000 Ibs. The nearly
vertical line made by the braking force curve in Figure 17 also shows that the
airplane began to decelerate almost immediately, with virtually no further increase
in speed.

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One common misconception among pilots is that the quick use of thrust reversers
will offset any delay or even the complete lack of speedbrake deployment during an
RTO. This is simply not true. On a dry runway, delaying the deployment of the
speedbrakes by only 5 seconds during the RTO will add over 300 ft to the stop
distance of a typical mid-sized two-engine jet transport, including the effects of
engine-out reverse thrust. As a worst case Illustration, if reverse thrust was not
deployed at all, the stopping distance would be increased by more than 700 ft.
although the exact figures of this example will vary with different flap settings and
from one airplane model to another, the general effect will be the same, namely
that speedbrakes have a very pronounced effect on stopping performance.

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11.12.13 Carbon and Steel Brakes Differences:

Recent emphasis on the apparent tendency for carbon brakes to wear out in
proportion to the total number of brake applications, as opposed to steel brakes
which wear out in proportion to energy absorbed by the brakes, has generated
interest in other operational differences between the two types of brakes. While the
emphasis on wear difference is necessary, since the economics of brake
maintenance is so significant, for most other operational aspects the two brakes
can be considered, the type of brake involved does not matter since each brake
installation is certified to its particular take-off energy capability.
This means that either carbon or steel brakes, even fully worn, will be able to
perform the maximum certified RTO condition applicable to that installation in a
satisfactory manner.

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A RTO from at or near the brake energy limits can also mean that after stopping on
the runway, the brakes may not be capable of stopping the airplane again, even
from low taxi speeds. This is especially true for steel brakes due to the increased
chance of structural failure. Therefore it is important that the crew consider the
probable condition of the airplane wheels, brakes, and tires after completing a high
speed RTO before attempting to move the airplane from the runway.
11.12.15 High Brake Energy RTO's:
Brake rotor and stator temperatures associated with RTO's which involve brake
energies at or near certified maximum values, reach approximately 2000 °F for
steel brakes, and 2500 °F for most carbon brakes. These high temperatures may,
in some situation. Ignite certain items in the wheel, tire, and brake assembly. While
considerable design efforts made to preclude fires whenever possible, the
regulations recognize the rarity of such high-energy situations and allow brake fires
after a maximum energy condition, provided that any fires that may occur are
confined to the wheels, tires and brakes, and which would not result in progressive
engulfment of the remaining airplane during the time of passenger and crew
evacuation.
It is Important then, for flight crews to understand the nature of possible fires and
the airplane take-off parameters that could involve these very high brake energies.
There are two primary combustibles in the assembly, namely the tire, and brake
grease. Brake hydraulic fluid will also bum if there is a hydraulic leak directed at a
very hot brake disk. Tire fires usually bum fairly slowly for the first several minutes
when started by brake heat. Grease fires are even less active, typically involving a
small, unsteady, flickering flame, sometimes with considerable smoke.
The probability of a crew experiencing a brake fire at the conclusion of an RTO is

very low, considering brake design factors, the dispatch parameters, and service
history.
In terms of practical guidelines for flight crews, take-offs at or near VMBE, are
normally encountered at high altitude airports at very hot temperatures. An RTO
from close to V1 speed under these conditions will require the brakes to absorb a
significant amount of energy during the stop.
In cases where extremely high brake energy might be encountered, the possibility
of a brake fire should therefore be considered by the flight crew during the pre-
takeoff briefing. If a high speed RTO is subsequently performed the tower should
immediately be advised that the airplane is still on the runway, that high a brake
energy stop was made, and that emergency equipment is requested to observe the
tires and brakes for possible fires.

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11.12.16 Reverse Thrust Effects:
The rejected take-off certification testing under FAA rules does not include the use
of reverse thrust. An additional stopping margin is produced by using maximum
reverse thrust.
Some pilots are of the opinion that idle reverse is "equally or even more" effective
than full or maximum reverse thrust for today's high bypass ration engines. This is
simply not true. The more EPR or N1 that is applied in reverse, the more stopping
force the reverse thrust generates. The data shown in Figure 18 is typical for all
high bypass engines.
On wet or slippery runways, the wheel brakes are not capable of generating as high
a retarding force as they are on dry surface. Therefore, the retarding force of the
reversers generates a large percentage of the total airplane deceleration.

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11.12.17 Runway Parameters:
Runway characteristics which affect take-off performance Include length, slope,

clearway and/or stop way. The effect of runway length is straightforward, however.
slope, clearway, and stop way deserve some discussion.
A single value of runway slope is typically chosen by the operator to perform take-
off analysis calculations. This single value is usually taken from information
published by the navigation chart services or the airport authorities. On closer
inspection however, many runways are seen to have distinct differences in slope
along the length of the runway. The single published value may have been
determined by a variety of methods, ranging from a simple mathematical average
of the threshold elevations, to some weighted average methods proposed by ICAO
in an advisory publication.
As a simple example, consider a runway, which has only one slope discontinuity.
The first two-thirds of the runway has an uphill slope of +2% and the last third has
a downhill slope of-2%. The equivalent single slope for this runway, as determined
from the ICAO Circular methods, could vary from +1.3% to - 0.3%. When the take-
off analysis is made for this runway, the limit weights will be the same as would be
determined for an actual single slope runway. However, as the airplane
commences a take-off on the 2% up slope runway, it will accelerate.
More slowly than it would on any of the equivalent single slope runways, which will
result in its achieving V1 speed further along the runway than was planned. If no
event occurs which would precipitate and RTO, the final acceleration to VR and
liftoff will be higher than planned and the overall performance will probably come
out close to what was scheduled.
On the other hand, if an event worthy of an RTO should occur just prior to the
airplane reaching VI, most, if not all of the stop manoeuvre will have to be carried
out on a 2% downhill slope surface instead of the equivalent single slope value,
and the RTO will have been initiated with less runway remaining than was assumed
in determining the limit weight for that take-off. There is little weight for that take-
off. There is little the crew can do in this type of situation, other than in the vein of
situational awareness, emphasize in their briefing that an RTO near V1 for anything
other than a catastrophic event is not advisable.
A clearway is an area at least 500 feet wide centered about the extended centerline
of the runway with a slope equal to or less than 1.25%. This area is called the
clearway plane. No obstructions, except threshold lights, can protrude above this
clearway plane. The acceleration to V2 and 35 feet is completed over the clear way,
the use of clearway to increase take-off weight "unbalances the runway" and
results in a lower V1 speed. The maximum clear way used to calculate take-off
performance is restricted by the regulations to one-half the demonstrated distance
from lift off to 35ft.

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A stop way is an area at least as wide as the runway and centered about the
extended centerline. It must be capable of supporting the weight of the airplane
without causing damage. Use of stop way also "unbalances the runway" resulting in
a higher take-off weight and increased V1 speed. An RTO instituted at this V1 will
come to a stop on the stop way. For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed
out that not all stop ways will qualify as clearways, nor will a clearway necessarily
qualify as a stop way. The specified criteria for each must be met independently
before it can be used for take-off performance calculations. The use of clearway
and/or stop way does not necessarily offer any additional margin for RTO stopping.
In both cases, the take-off performance is "unbalanced" by adjusting V1 speed to
plan that the stop will be completed by the end of the paved surface.
11.12.17 Take-offs Using Reduced Thrust:
There are two methods of performing a reduced thrust take-off. The first is to use
a fixed derate of the engine to a lower thrust rating. For example, a JT9D-7F
engine operated at a JT9D-7 rating or a CFM56-3C-1 engine operated at 20,000 Ibs
of thrust (-B1 rating] instead of the full 23,500 Ibs rating. When a fixed derate is
used, the engine EGT and RTM limits are reduced and the crew are not to exceed
the reduced limit in normal operation.
As a result of the lower limit thrust with a fixed derate, the minimum control speeds
Vmcg and Vmca are also reduced. Since the choice of derate thrust levels is usually
restricted to one or two preselected values, it is rare that the take-off performance
at the length limit levels.
The second way of reducing take-off thrust is to use the Flexible Temperature
Method. The fundamental difference between fixed derates and the Flexible
Temperature Method is that the operating limits of the engine are not reduced
when using Flexible Temperature Method reduced thrust. The flight crew may
increase the thrust to the full engine rating at any time during the take-off if it is
deemed appropriate. As a result, the Vmcg and Vmca speeds are not reduced below
the full rating values when using the Flexible Temperature Method.
Fixed derates and the Flexible Temperature Method also differ in terms of the
performance margins that are inherent to their use. As was previously mentioned,
at limit weights, take-off performed using a fixed derate take-off thrust will conform
to the minimum performance levels of the regulations, just as a limit weight take-
off would when using full rated take-off thrust. The associated V1 speed provides
the standard certification "margins" of 35-foot screen height or a stop at the end of
the runway in the event of an engine failure.
When using the Flexible Temperature Method, additional "margins" are created in
both the "Go" and "Stop" cases. As the name implies, the technique used to
calculate the performance with the Flexible Temperature Method is to assume that
the temperature is higher than it actually is, and to calculate take-off thrust and
speeds at the higher temperature.
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The primary reason that the use of the Flexible Temperature Method results In
performance margins is that the true airspeed of the airplane is lower than would
be the case if the actual, temperature were equal to the assumed temperature.
11.12.18 The Take-off Data the Pilot Sees:
Typical take-off data table (sometimes referred to as runway analysis or gross

weight tables) shows the limit take-off weight for a specific runway over a range of
ambient temperatures. There may also be corrections for wind, pressure altitude,
bleed configurations, and runway surface conditions. Each table usually shows the
limit weights for only one flap setting. Some airlines show the take-off speeds and
the take-off thrust EPR or N1 setting along with the limit weights. The tables can
display limit weights for Field Length, Climb, Obstacle Clearance, Tire Speed and
Brake Energy, and tell which factor is limiting for each wind and temperature.
This tabular display of the take-off data has become the standard tool for using the
assumed temperature method to reduce the take-off power setting and thereby
improve engine life.
This take-off data is some of the most important data used on any flight. It is
essential that flight crews know their actual take-off weight and that they use the
proper take-off speeds. It is equally important that the flight crew be aware of their
proximity to the limit weights for that take-offs ambient conditions. These limit
weights and speeds are more than just numbers. They represent the maximum
certified take-off performance of the airplane. If the actual take-off weight is equal
to or near the runway limit weight, the crew should note that fact and be extra
alert that a reject from near or at V1 will require prompt application of the full
stopping capability of the airplane to assure stopping on the runway.
11.13 INCREASING THE RTO SAFETY MARGINS:
There are a number of choices and techniques the crew can make and practice that will increase
the RTO margins for take-off. Some involve airline policy and require the publication of additional
data (such as multiple flap setting take-off weight and speed data) and some are just good
personal technique.
11.13.1 Runway Surface Condition:
The crew cannot control the weather like they can the airplane's configuration or thrust.
Therefore, to maximize both the "Go" and "Stop" margins, they must rely on judiciously
applying their company's wet or contaminated runway policies as well as their own
understanding of how the performance of their airplane may be affected by a particular
runway surface condition.
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11.13.2 Flap Selection:
Often the RTO safety margin can be increased by selection of an alternative take-of flap
setting. Consider for example, the effect of take-off flap selection on the performance limit
weights of a typical large two-engine airplane, as shown in Figure 19.
8,700 ft Runway Flap Setting

Sea Level 370 C 1 5 15 20
Runway limit weight, 358,000 374,200 389,000 393,600
lb (kg) (162,494) (169,705) (176,417) (178,503)
Climb / Obstacle 414,100 407,300 393,600 383,000
Limit weight, lb (kg) (187,800) (184,717) (178,503) (173,696)
Figure 19
Typical Large Two-Engine Jet Transport

Take-off Performance
If a flight requires the absolute maximum take-off weight, the above weight limits would dictate
choosing Flaps 15 since 389,000 pounds is the highest weight allowed. Flaps 20 is Climb/ Obstacle
limited to a lower weight and Flaps 1 and 5 are Runway limited to lower weights. If the actual
take-off weight desired is equal to the maximum limit weight, there is no flap selection option. The
take-off will need to use Flaps 15.
More typical, however, the airplane's actual take-off weight is well below the maximum. There are
then two viable ways to improve RTO stopping distance margin: either by flap selection or by
reduced V1 techniques.
If the flight's actual take-off weight was 374,200 pounds, investigating the above table indicates
Flaps 5, Flaps 15, or Flaps 20 are all acceptable. Flaps 5 is runway limited so it offers no additional
RTO margin. However, Flaps 15 and Flaps 20 both offer an opportunity for additional stopping
distance margin. These additional stopping margins have been calculated for the above example
and are shown in Figure 20.
Thus, if there are no other constraints such as obstacles or critical noise abatement procedures
that would prevent the selection of a greater flap setting, the crew could give themselves 1000
feet of extra stopping distance in case an RTO was required on this take-off.
FLAP SETTING 5 15 20
STOPPING MARGIN ZERO 850 FT 1000 FT

Figure 20
Effect of Flap selection on RTO stopping margins

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11.13.3 Runway Lineup:
Positioning the aircraft on the runway in preparation for take-off is an important element in
maximizing the amount of pavement available for a possible to RTO manoeuvre. Correction to the
available runway length can be made to the take-off analysis on those runways where it is not
possible to position the airplane at the beginning of the published distance.
Correct runway lineup technique should always be practiced regardless of whether or not there is
excess runway available. Even if an allowance has been made, it is up to the crew operating the
flight to align the airplane on the runway using the shortest possible distance than taken into
account by their company, then there is that much extra margin for the take-off.
11.13.4 Setting Take-off Thrust:
At take-off thrust settings, gas turbine (jet) engines operate at very high RPM. It typically takes
several seconds for the engines to spool up from a low idle or taxi thrust to take-off power after
the thrust levers are advanced. During this time, the aircraft is not accelerating at full potential
because the engines are not yet developing full power. The demonstrated take-off distance is
achieved when the take-off thrust is set prior to releasing the brakes, but this technique is often
not practical in line operations due to expedited take-off clearances, engine FOD hazards, and
passenger comfort.
As a result, most take-offs are performed as "rolling take-offs", with the thrust being set as the
airplane begins the take-off roll. However, this technique must be accomplished promptly to’ avoid
compromising the take-off performance. A delayed application of take-off thrust will increase the
time and distance to reach V1 speed, consequently less runway will be left to stop the airplane
should an RTO be necessary. The thrust should be set promptly according to the airframe
manufacturer's recommendations. The non-flying pilot monitors the engines for any abnormalities.
The engine Instruments should be monitored closely for any abnormal indications. Company
operations manuals or training manuals contain correct procedures for setting take-off thrust.
Observing these procedures assures efficient engine acceleration and, as a consequence, proper
aircraft acceleration throughout the entire take-off roll.

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11.13.5 Manual Braking Techniques:
Proper braking technique in an RTO is to apply full brake pedal force ("stand on it") and maintain
full brake pedal force until the airplane comes to a complete stop.
The pilot's foot position relative to the rudder pedal can also have an effect on the achievement of
full brake pressure. It was noted that foot position during the take-off roll tends to be an
individual preference. Some pilots prefer to have their feet "up on the pedals" to be ready to apply
full brakes if required. Pilots who prefer this technique also noted that their toes are "curled back"
to avoid unwanted brake applications when applying rudder. The other technique is to rest the
heels on the floor during the take-off roll, and then raise them to be on the pedal to apply full
braking. No problems were noted with either technique.
In an RTO stop manoeuvre, the feet should be up on the rudder pedals and steady, heavy
pressure applied until the airplane is completely stopped. Pilots should develop a habit of
adjusting their seat and the rudder pedals prior to leaving the gate. The ability to apply maximum
brake pedal force as well as full rudder should be checked by both pilots.
The Importance of maintaining maximum braking and full reverse thrust during an RTO until the
airplane "rocks to a stop" cannot be over stressed. During a reject from V1 the goal is safety, not
passenger comfort.
The amount of distance required to decelerate from a given speed at the high weights associated
with take-off is significantly greater than from the same speed at a typical landing weight. If the
pilot tries to judge the amount of runway remaining against the current .speed of the airplane, the
visual perception that the airplane will stop on the runway ("we've got it made"), will prompt a
decrease in the stopping effort. It is precisely at this point in the RTO that the difference between
a successful Go/No Go decision and an accident can occur. The brakes may be nearing their
energy absorption limits and the airplane may be entering a portion of the runway contaminated
with rubber deposits, which can be very slick if wet. In several of the RTO accidents and incidents
of the past, there was excess runway available to complete the stop, but the premature relaxation
of the stopping effort contributed to an overrun.
An additional consideration in completing a successful RTO is that the pilot should assess the
condition of the airplane after it comes to a stop. If there is evidence of a fire or other significant
hazard to the passengers, an evacuation on the runway is definitely preferable to "clearing the
active". Every second counts in an actual emergency evacuation.

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September 2010
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11.13.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking Techniques:
Antiskid inoperative dispatches represent a special case for brake application techniques.
In this situation the pilot executing the RTO should apply steady moderate pedal pressure
consistent, in his judgment, with runway conditions, airplane dispatch weight and the available
runway length. Full brake pressure should not be applied with the antiskid system inoperative due
to the risk of tire failure. To minimize the possibility of skidding a tire, which leads to a blow out,
the speedbrakes should be deployed before brakes are applied. This provides the highest possible
wheel loads to keep the wheels rotating with the forward motion of the airplane.
11.13.7 RTO Autobrakes:
For the A340, A330, A320 automatic braking is initiated by the ground spoiler extension
command. In addition for MAX mode the nose landing gear compressed signal is required.
Consequently in the event of an acceleration stop, if the deceleration is initiated with the speed
below 72 kt, the automatic braking will not be operative because the ground spoilers will not be
extended. RTO Autobrakes, therefore, achieve the same airplane stopping performance as a
proper, manual application of full foot pedal braking. No time delays are built in to the RTO
autobrakes such as are used in some landing autobrake settings.
The use of "autobrakes" eliminates any delay in brake application and assures that maximum
effort braking is applied promptly.
When the "autobrakes" are ARMED for take-off, the pilot not flying must monitor the system and
advise the pilot flying if a DISARM condition occurs. The pilot flying should also monitor the
deceleration of the airplane for acceptability and be prepared to apply manual braking if required
or, the pilot performing the reject procedure should apply maximum manual braking during the
RTO. In this later case arming the "autobrake" function only serves as a backup if for some reason
manual braking is not applied.
11.13.8 The V1 Call:
One important factor in avoiding RTO overrun accident is for the crew to recognize reaching V1
when the airplane does, in fact, reach V1 —not after. The airplane's stopping performance cannot
match that specified in the Airplane Flight Manual if the assumptions used to derive that
performance are violated - knowingly or inadvertently. Operationally, careful attention to
procedures and teamwork are required to match the human performance recognized by the AFM.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot flying the airplane to include airspeed in his
Instrument scan during the take-off ground roll. Hence he is always aware of the approximate
speed. The pilot not flying monitors airspeed in more detail and calls-out "Vee-One" as a
confirmation of reaching this critical point in the acceleration.
MN/TR/05
Chapter 11
September 2010
TAKE-OFF SAFETY
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The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1 unless the V1 call is made in a timely, crisp, and
audible manner.
A frequently cited factor in RTO accidents that occurred when the First Officer was flying is lack of
any airspeed calls by the Captain during the take-off.
11.13.9 Crew Preparedness:
Important crew factors directly related to eliminating RTO overrun accidents and incidents are:
► Brief those physical conditions, which might affect an RTO that are unique to each specific
take-off.
► Both pilots must be sure to position the seat and rudder pedals so that maximum brake
pressure can be applied.
► Both pilots should maintain situational awareness of the proximity to V1.
► Use standard callouts during the take-off.
► Transition quickly to stopping configuration.
► Don't change your mind. If you have begun an RTO, stop. If you have reached V1, go,
unless the pilot has reason to conclude that the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly.
► Use maximum effort brake application.
► Assure deployment of speedbrakes.
► Use maximum reverse thrust allowable.
The accident records frequently show that slow or incomplete crew action was the cause of, or
contributed to, an RTO overrun event. The crew must be prepared to make the Go/ No Go
decision on every take-off.
If a "No Go" decision is made, the crew must quickly use all of the stopping capability available.
Too often, the records show uncertainty in the decision process and a lack of completeness in the
procedures. Be ready to decide and be ready to act.
11.14 CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a term that can mean many things. In this context it is
simply intended to encompass the factors associated with having the crew members work
effectively together to make optimal Go/No Go decisions and effectively accomplish related
procedures.

MN/TR/05
Chapter 11
September 2010
TAKE-OFF SAFETY
Page 45
11.14.1 CRM and the RTO:
Effective CRM can improve crew performance and in particular, decision-making during take-off.
Often, Go/No Go decisions must be made "instantaneously" and as a result, the significance of
CRM is not readily apparent. However, the fact that a critical decision must be made and
implemented using rapidly changing, often Incomplete information in a dynamic environment in
which the time available decreases as the criticality of the decision increases, is reason for
effective CRM. Some aspects of CRM are especially important with respect to the Go/No Go
decision.
11.14.2 The Take-Off Briefing:
Crew members must know what is expected of them and from others.
For optimum crew effectiveness, they should share a common perception - a mental image - of
what is happening and what is planned. This common perception involves a number of CRM
areas: communications, situational awareness, workload distribution, cross-checking and
monitoring. A variety of means are used to achieve this common perception. This begins with
airline standard operating procedures (SOP's) that clearly define captain and first officer as well as
pilot flying and pilot not flying responsibilities and duties. Training reinforces the crew's knowledge
and skill, while standardization insures acceptable, consistent performance, across all fleets and
cultures within an airline.
The take-off briefing is another means of improving the crew's awareness, knowledge, and team
effectiveness; especially when special circumstances or conditions exist. The briefing is not
necessarily a one-way process. In fact, asking for clarification or confirmation is an excellent way
to insure mutual understanding .when required. These briefings can improve team effectiveness
and understanding of the Go/No Go decision planning and communications to be used.
A review of actions for a blown tire, high-speed configuration warning, or transfer of control are
examples of what might be appropriate for before take-off (or before engine start) review. Such a
briefing should address items that could affect this take-off, such as runway contamination,
hazardous terrain or special departure procedures.
The briefing should not be a meaningless repetition of known facts, but rather a tool for improving
team performance, that addresses the specific factors appropriate to that take-off.

MN/TR/05
Chapter 11
September 2010
TAKE-OFF SAFETY
Page 46
11.14.3 Callouts:
Meaningful communications, however brief, regarding a non-normal situation during take-off and
RTO can often mean the difference between success and disaster. For this reason,
communications must be precise, effective, and efficient. Standard callouts contribute to improved
situational awareness. These callouts, couples with all crew members being aware of airspeed,
maximize the opportunity for a common understanding of what actions are proper in the event of
a non-normal situation. The crew member noting a problem should communicate clearly and
precisely without inferring things that may not be true. For example, the loss of fuel flow
indication alone does not necessarily mean an engine failure. Use of standard terms and
phraseology to describe the situation is essential. The pilot tasked to make the RTO decision
should clearly announce this decision, whether it be to continue or reject.
11.14.4 The Use of All Crew Members:
It's Important to understand that all crew members on the flight deck play an important role in
the Go/No Go Decision and RTO manoeuvre. Company policies shape these roles, however, how
the team is organized for each take-off can make a difference in team performance. Knowing your
own capabilities and that of the other crew members is part of situational awareness and should
be used in planning for a given take-off. Although it's "the first officer's leg", it might not be an
effective plan to task an inexperienced first officer with a marginal weather take-off when weight
is also limited by field length. Consider the possibility of an RTO when assigning take-off duties.
11.14.5 Summary:
Each airline approaches CRM in a slightly different manner, but the goal of effective Teamwork
remains the same. This material is an example of the type of CRM information that could be used
to promote a common perception of RTO problems and actions.


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MN/TR/05

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL Issue No : 00

The miscellaneous section provides information related to adverse operating conditions.

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 This issue will be annotated by REV 00.

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Date of Issue Issue No. Details

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

01. ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL

02. GENERAL INFORMATION

03. NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS

04. ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS –A320

05. ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS –A330

06. ABNORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS –A340

07. BASE TRAINING

08. LINE TRAINING

09. ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS

11. TAKE-OFF SAFETY

Revision No. 00 Revision Date

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Revision No. 00 Revision Date

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

Revision No. 00 Revision Date

1 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE MANUAL

1.1 INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

1.2 SYSTEM OF ISSUANCE AMENDMENTS AND REVISION ………………………………………………. 14

2.1 Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

2.2 Operational Philosophy……………………………………………………………………………………… 3

2.3 Training Objectives ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4

2.4 Abnormal & Emergency Checklist Philosophy …………………………………………………. 4

2.5 Flight Management …………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

2.6 Operations Golden Rules ………………………………………………………………..………………… 6

2.7 Guidelines for Situations beyond the Scope of Emergency

3. NORMAL OPERATION BRIEFINGS

3.1 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

3.2 Exterior Inspection………………………………….…………………………………………………………. 13

Revision No. 00 Revision Date

3.3 Cockpit Preparation……………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

3.4 Take-Off Briefing …………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 18

3.5 Engine Start – Auto or Manual ………………………………….………………………………………. 20