Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 – 8 August 2003
Final Version
Prepared by
Ronny Lardner
Chartered Occupational Psychologist
The Keil Centre
5 South Lauder Road
Edinburgh EH9 2LJ
United Kingdom
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
Table of Contents
1 Executive summary.......................................................................3
2 Overview.......................................................................................4
3 Introduction...................................................................................4
4 Safety culture theory.....................................................................5
4.1 Safety culture & climate definitions..............................................................6
4.2 Model of safety culture.................................................................................7
4.3 Influence of national and organisational culture..........................................8
4.4 Safety sub-cultures....................................................................................10
5 Safety culture and health and safety outcomes..........................10
5.1.1 Organisational accidents....................................................................11
5.1.2 Individual occupational accidents.......................................................11
6 Defining a positive safety culture................................................13
6.1 Features associated with a positive safety culture....................................14
7 Assessing safety culture.............................................................15
7.1 Tips and good practice..............................................................................16
7.2 Quantitative methods (questionnaires)......................................................18
7.3 Qualitative methods...................................................................................19
7.3.1 Interviews, focus groups and workshops...........................................19
7.3.2 Observation & ethnographic methods................................................20
7.4 Triangulated methods................................................................................21
7.4.1 Loughborough safety climate toolkit...................................................21
7.4.2 Safety Culture Maturity® model.........................................................21
7.5 Summary of safety culture assessment techniques..................................23
8 Links to behavioural safety and teamworking.............................24
8.1 Safety culture and behavioural safety.......................................................24
8.2 Safety culture and teamworking................................................................24
9 General conclusions and discussion...........................................26
10 Key references............................................................................27
11 Appendix 1: Relationship between safety climate and accident
rates..................................................................................................30
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PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003
1 Executive summary
This safety culture application guide is designed to inform readers in the European
process industries about safety culture theory, the features associated with a positive
safety culture, and the link between a positive safety culture and health and safety
performance. The guide also describes the main methods used to assess safety
culture, and the relationship between safety culture, behavioural safety and
teamworking. Key references are provided.
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2 Overview
This document is a guide to safety culture. The guide was prepared as part of the
activities of the EU-funded PRISM project, which concerns human and organisational
factors which affect health and safety in the European process industries. Within the
PRISM project, Focus Group 1 is concerned with 3 topics: safety culture, team-
working and behavioural safety.
This safety culture guide provides managers and safety specialists with an overview of
safety culture theory, validity, measurement techniques and its relationship with
behavioural safety and team-working. One of the needs identified earlier in the PRISM
project by industry members of Focus Group 1 was the need to demonstrate how the
topics of safety culture, team working and behavioural safety are integrated.
Section 3: An introduction
3 Introduction
The process industries increasingly recognise the importance of the cultural aspects of
safety management. This is due in part to the findings from investigations into major
disasters in process industries (e.g. Flixborough and Piper Alpha) and other industries
such as nuclear power (e.g. Three Mile Island and Chernobyl), marine transportation
(Exxon Valdez and Zeebrugge) and passenger rail transportation (Ladbroke Grove
and Clapham Junction). All these investigations concluded that systems broke down
catastrophically, despite the use of complex engineering and technical safeguards.
These disasters were not primarily caused by engineering failures, but by the action or
inaction of the people running the system. “The causes in each case were
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malpractices that had corrupted large parts of the socio-technical system”. (Lee, 1998
p217).
A major focus over the past 150 years has been on developing the technical aspects
of engineering systems to improve safety, and these efforts have been very
successful. This success is demonstrated by the low accident rates in the majority of
safety-critical industries, however many believe that a plateau has now been reached.
The effectiveness of engineering and procedural solutions has highlighted the key role
of human behaviour in the causation of the residual accidents. Some safety experts
estimate that 80-90% of all industrial accidents are attributable to "human factors"
causes (see Hoyos, 1995).
It is now widely accepted that an effective way to further reduce accident rates is to
address the social and organisational factors which influence safety performance. In
parallel with the wider recognition of the importance of behavioural and psychological
aspects of safety, the concept of organisational safety culture has come to the fore.
Safety culture has been described as the most important theoretical development in
health and safety research in the last decade (Pidgeon, 1991). The importance of
safety culture is illustrated by the fact that although airlines across the world fly similar
types of aircraft, with crews who are trained to similar standards, the risk to
passengers varies by a factor of 42 across the world’s air carriers. Since these
organizations have very similar technology, systems and structures, some argue that
the difference in performance is largely due to systematic differences in the behaviour
of their employees, in other words their safety culture (Reason, 1998).
To an extent, safety culture has been a victim of its own success, because the explosion
of interest in safety culture has led to a range of conceptualisations, nearly one for each
research team working in the area. A recent review of the research literature identified
16 separate safety culture definitions (Guldenmund, 2000). The issue is further
confused by the related concept of safety climate. It appears that those who introduced
the term safety culture ignored the earlier concept of safety climate described by
Zohar (1980). Once the concept of safety culture became popular in the early 1990’s
the question of its relationship with safety climate arose. Over the last decade several
attempts have been made to distinguish between the two terms (see Cox and Flin,
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1998), but safety climate is still often used interchangeably with safety culture. The
following section presents the most accepted definition of safety culture and a model
that explains the relationship between safety culture and safety climate.
Safety climate also consists of attitudes and perceptions but does not contain values,
competencies and behaviour. It differs from safety culture since it is specific to one
time and location. It can be used as an indicator of the underlying safety culture.
These definitions indicate that safety climate is a sub-set of safety culture, which is a
broader, more enduring organisational feature.
Safety culture influences workers’ (or group of workers) view of the world (i.e. what is
important and how they interpret new information), and is relatively stable over time. It
can be likened to the personality of the organisation. Safety culture transcends the
organisational members that share the culture, is passed on to new members, and
endures. In essence, safety culture is independent of people who are currently part of
the organisation. The culture will exist after all these people have left. New members
of the organisation informally ‘learn’ the safety culture, through observation, social
feedback and trial and error.
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Safety climate is more transitory and can be likened to a person’s mood, which
changes in response to external events (Cox & Flin, 1998). Unfortunately, many
researchers use the terms interchangeably, which has caused much of the confusion.
In addition, questionnaires claiming to measure safety culture have very similar
dimensions and statements as those claiming to measure safety climate (Cox & Flin
1998). As will be discussed below safety climate can be assessed via questionnaire,
while safety culture arguably requires more qualitative measurement techniques.
Guldenmund (2000) proposed that safety culture consists of three levels, similar to the
layers of an onion (see Figure 1). The core consists of ‘basic assumptions’ that are
implicit, taken for granted, unconscious and shared by the entire organisation. These
assumptions are not specific to safety, but are more general. For example, if written
rules are regarded as critical then safety rules will also be considered as critical. The
next layer is labelled ‘espoused values’ which in practice refers to the attitudes of
organisational members. These attitudes are specific to safety, as opposed to general
organisational factors. There are four broad groups of attitudes, namely attitudes
towards hardware (e.g. plant design), management systems (e.g. safety systems),
people (e.g. senior management) and behaviour (e.g. risk taking). The outer layer
consists of artefacts or the outward expression of the safety culture. These would
include equipment (e.g. personal protective equipment), behaviours, (e.g. using
appropriate safety equipment or managers conducting safety tours), physical signs
(e.g. posting number of days since last accident publicly) and safety performance
(number of incidents).
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Safety culture
Basic Assumptions
(Taken for granted/ Safety climate
unconscious)
Espoused values
(Attitudes about:
•Hardware Artefacts
•Systems (Visible signs)
•People
•Behaviour)
This model distinguishes between safety climate and safety culture, with safety
climate consisting of the two outer layers of safety culture. Safety climate is a subset
of safety culture and consists of espoused values and artefacts, which are specific to
safety. These aspects can be measured quantitatively (e.g. via structured
questionnaires) and are less stable. Basic assumptions, the inner-most element of
safety culture, are more readily assessed by qualitative, non-numerical methods, as
basic assumptions are by definition subconscious, taken-for-granted and therefore
can only be inferred. Schein (1990) advocates ethnographic methods to measure
organisational safety culture, to get at these basic assumptions. For example, via
safety culture discussions with a large number of rail transport staff, it became
apparent to an external facilitator that they held three different, subconscious
definitions of safety: (1) train safety, (2) passenger safety and (3) staff safety. A very
high priority was afforded to train and passenger safety, whereas staff safety was
implicitly regarded as less important, and attracted less effort and resources. When
this aspect of their safety culture was pointed out to the organisation, it was
acknowledged that these implicit definitions did exist, and did influence how safety
was managed, but had not previously been explicitly recognised. It is difficult to
envisage how purely quantitative methods could have unearthed these types of
subtleties in an organisation’s safety culture. It required qualitative methods and an
external observer to notice.
In the safety culture model shown in Figure 1, basic assumptions influence espoused
values, which in turn determine artefacts (see Figure 2). This poses the question what
influences basic assumptions? Theoretically, basic assumptions are influenced by the
national and organisational cultures, although there is limited research evidence to
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support this proposition. Although the basic assumptions do not have to be specific to
safety, organisations that have strong safety cultures will have basic assumptions
about the priority of safety, which are shared by organisational members. If
organisations do not possess these basic assumptions, this would be an indicator of a
poor safety culture.
Figure 2: Relationship between national and organisational culture and safety culture
National
Culture
Safety culture
Basic Espoused
Artefacts
Assumptions values
Organisational
Culture
However, Fleming, Rundmo, Mearns, Flin and Gordon (1995) measured safety
climate on a number of offshore installations in the UK and Norwegian sectors of
the North Sea. They found greater differences within their sample of UK
installations and within their sample of Norwegian installations, than they found
when all UK and all Norwegian installations were compared. In other words in
this study, there was more variation in safety climate within a nation's offshore
safety climate than between the UK and Norwegian nations. This indicates that
installation safety climate differences are more significant than national cultural
differences.
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In summary, there is limited evidence to support the notion that national culture
does influence safety culture, however differences within countries may be larger
than between countries. Also, the influence of national or regional culture does
not preclude establishing a local site safety culture which differs markedly from
other similar local sites. A strong safety culture can over-ride national or regional
culture, if this safety culture is actively and consistently promoted.
There is a lot of debate about the existence and impact of safety sub-cultures within
an organisation. Despite the fact that there is limited research evidence supporting
the existence of subcultures (although Mearns et al, 2001 provide some evidence),
from a theoretical perspective safety sub-cultures will be present. As safety culture is
shared by a group of workers, this group may be an organisation but it could be an
occupational group, site or level of seniority Guldenmund (2000). It is likely that both
safety sub-cultures and a wider safety culture can co-exist, but that the organisational
safety culture will be more general or at a higher level of abstraction. Further research
is required to investigate the relationship between safety sub-cultures and the safety
culture of the entire organisation.
1
Comparatively rare, but often catastrophic, events that occur within complex modern technologies such as nuclear,
petrochemical, and chemical plants, transport etc. Often involve multiple causes and actual or potential fatalities (after
Reason, 1997)
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Fortunately organisational accidents do not occur frequently, and therefore only limited
research has been conducted to investigate the link between safety culture and
organisational accidents. The evidence that links safety culture with organisational
accidents comes from investigations into major disasters. As previously mentioned,
many recent investigations into major disasters have a remarkable similarity in that
they identify deficiencies in the safety culture as the underlying cause of the disasters.
The failings of the organisational safety culture that contributed to the disasters are
listed below for a sample of major disasters.
The safety culture concept originated from the investigation into the Chernobyl nuclear
disaster and it is clear that safety culture inadequacies have contributed to other
disasters. While these high profile incidents have focused attention on safety culture
there is a need for more scientific evidence of the importance of safety culture. The
following section reviews the research concerning the relationship between individual
occupational accidents and safety culture.
Two main sources of evidence provide support for the validity of safety culture, namely
(1) analysis of occupational accidents and (2) questionnaire studies. If safety culture
influences occupational accident rates then it should be possible to identify safety
culture factors that contributed to the cause of accidents. A review of 142
occupational accidents in two different sectors (steel industry and medicine) revealed
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All of these studies take the individual as their unit of analysis and therefore have
examined how individual attitudes are linked to individual accident involvement. The
extent to which this indicates anything about organisational factors is questionable.
There is a need to use the organisation as the unit of analysis rather than individuals.
A study conducted by Simard and Marchand, (1994) randomly selected 258 plants
from 20 manufacturing industries from Quebec, Canada. One hundred of the 258
agreed to participate in the study. The plants were split into high and low accident
plants on the basis of their accident rate relative to their industry average. Data were
collected through a battery of 13 questionnaires completed by senior managers,
middle managers, worker representatives and first line supervisors. They found that
the development of the safety management system and supervisor safety leadership
differentiate between high and low accident organisations. While this is an interesting
study, frontline workers were not surveyed, thus limiting the conclusions which can be
drawn.
A recent study conducted in the UK offshore oil and gas industry by Mearns, Whitaker,
Flin, Gordon and O’Connor (2000) compared differences between 13 offshore
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The above indicates that there have been numerous studies demonstrating the link
between self-report accident rates and safety attitudes. Taken together there is
convincing evidence for the validity of the safety culture concept. Having said that,
there is also a need for research that uses qualitative research techniques to
investigate the relationship between basic assumptions and safety performance.
Furthermore, only one study investigated health and none of the studies examined the
relationship between safety culture and health outcomes. There is also a need for
intervention studies to demonstrate a causative link between safety culture and health
and safety outcomes. Finally, evidence of links between a strong safety culture and
other aspects of organisational performance (e.g. productivity, quality, environmental
performance) is sought by industry.
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1. Hardware:
Good plant design, working conditions and housekeeping
Perception of low risk due to confidence in engineered systems
2. Management systems:
Confidence in safety rules, procedures and measures
Satisfaction with training
Safety prioritised over profits and production
Good organisational learning
Good job communication
3. People:
High levels of employee participation in safety
Trust in workforce to manage risk
High levels of management safety concern, involvement and commitment
4. Behaviour:
Acceptance of personal responsibility for safety
Frequent informal safety communication
Willingness to speak up about safety
A cautious approach to risk
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There are a variety of methods that can be used to assess safety climate, and identify
the main issues that need to be addressed. It is important to note that the very act of
assessing the safety climate can have an impact on the culture. When people
participate in the process they will wonder what is happening and how it is going to
change their working environment. Frontline workers are likely to look for signs that
indicate that management are doing this because they are truly interested in their
safety, as opposed to some ulterior motive. The assessment method chosen can
either reinforce the negative aspects of the current culture or be the beginning of the
improvement process (Carroll, 1998). The assessment process should be consistent
with the positive culture that is desired, for example one which gains a high degree of
employee involvement.
The potential assessment methods can be divided into three main types:
One difference between these methods is the degree of confidentiality and security
they offer to the participants. Another difference is the degree of structure they
impose and the ease of analysing the output. Irrespective of the specific assessment
method used there are a number of tips and good practice guidelines, which are
outlined below, followed by a description of the three main types of assessment
methods.
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The following tips relate to the five main stages involved in assessing safety culture or
climate:
It is critical that senior management understand the assessment process and that they
are committed to making it work. The importance of senior management involvement
and commitment cannot be understated, because if the assessment process goes
ahead without this, then it is not only likely to fail, but may actually damage the safety
culture. In practice management commitment can be tested and secured by holding a
senior management workshop before any announcement about the assessment
process commences. The majority of the senior management team should attend this
workshop, which outlines the various assessment options, the potential problems and
the type of results that will be obtained. Managers need to consider how they would
respond if the results are negative and specifically if they are negative about
management. They also need to consider public reaction to negative results, as it will
be difficult to control them once they have been shared with the workforce. It must be
emphasised to management that, if they think they may want to suppress the results if
they are negative, then the assessment should not go ahead. Conducting a survey
and not sharing the results with the workforce is likely to increase distrust and ‘prove’
to frontline staff that managers are not really committed to safety.
Once managers are signed on, then frontline workers need to be involved. The most
suitable ways for involvement will depend on the method of assessment, number of
workers and the organisational structure. With a large workforce, a workforce steering
committee containing a representative sample of workers from each occupation and
location is often effective. If the workforce is smaller or group sessions are being
used, then involvement can be achieved by giving everyone an opportunity to
participate actively in the assessment process. It is important to provide workers with
an opportunity to ask questions and make suggestions. Irrespective of how frontline
workers are involved, it is important they are involved before assessment, and
included in interpreting findings and specifying interventions.
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Each assessment process has its own set of specific guidelines, but there are a
number of generic issues to be considered. Obtaining a representative sample is
critical. It is important that the sample is representative of all occupational groups,
levels of seniority, departments, locations and contractor staff. If a self-completion
questionnaire is being distributed to the entire workforce then a high response rate
(over 70%) is desirable. If only 40% of the workforce respond then it is likely that
those who made the effort to complete the survey have different attitudes than those
who did not complete the survey. Lee (1998) achieved a high response rate by
distributing questionnaires at weekly departmental meetings, and providing people
with time during the meeting to complete the questionnaire. In addition, the company
prepared a short video with a message from a senior manager outlining their
commitment to the process and how the data would be used. Returning the
questionnaires for analysis was also made easy by providing special post boxes for
preaddressed envelopes.
Tip 5: Take actions quickly, which are directly linked to the results
Once the safety climate has been measured then interventions to improve the safety
culture will be required. Assessment alone is not enough. If people give their
perspectives on safety they expect action to be taken. The people in the best position
to identify suitable interventions are often those at the sharp end, i.e. frontline staff.
The specification of interventions should be a joint effort between senior management
who control resources, and frontline staff who have to make any interventions work in
practice. A lack of timely action is likely to be judged as a lack of management
commitment to safety and therefore make things worse not better. Too much analysis
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of results can often lead to delay, it is therefore better to take some immediate actions.
It is also critical to explicitly link actions to the results of the safety climate
measurement, to demonstrate that actions are being taken. This process should be
consistent with the positive culture that is desired, i.e. it should be participative and
based on mutual trust.
Additional tips and insights on safety climate assessment can be gained from a
published evaluation of users of the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Health and
Safety Climate Survey Tool (HSE, 2002).
Safety climate surveys are the most commonly used method to obtain information
about safety culture. Safety climate questionnaires measure ‘safety attitudes’ with
positive attitudes to safety being considered to be the most important aspect of a
‘good’ safety culture (Cox & Cox, 1991; Donald & Canter, 1994; Lee, 1995, Mearns et
al (1997). Questionnaire studies involve employees indicating the extent to which they
agree or disagree with a range of statements about safety e.g. ‘senior management
demonstrate their commitment to safety’. Although there are a large number of safety
climate questionnaires containing different statements to measure safety climate, a
number of common factors have emerged. A recent review (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor &
Bryden, 2000) has identified the following six common themes:
The majority of safety climate questionnaires are commercial products sold by health
and safety consultancies or academic institutions. There are some exceptions, such
as the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Climate Survey Tool (HSE, 1997) and
Loughbrough University’s freely-available downloadable offshore safety climate
assessment toolkit - Loughborough University, (undated).
.
The safety climate questionnaire tools currently in use are arguably deficient in a
number of respects. Firstly, the six common concepts identified in the Flin et al (2000)
review did not include trust or the perceived effectiveness of preventive measures, yet
these are key components of safety culture. Secondly, while some studies (e.g.
Mearns et al, 1997) have included measures of perceived risk, none have investigated
other issues surrounding risk such as norms for dealing with risk or risk acceptance,
yet these are key components of safety culture from a theoretical perspective.
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(a) it can be difficult to turn results into actions to improve safety, and
(b) it is often necessary to hold further workshops or interviews with staff to clarify the
significance of the results.
Interviews and workshops have been used less frequently to assess safety culture,
and validated techniques are not widely available. Organisations that have used these
techniques have tended to develop them in-house. The assessment process should
follow the five tips outlined above, in addition to the following considerations. Since
there are few commercially available tools, it may be necessary to develop an
assessment process.
Facilitation
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Explain what information will be collected, who will see it and how it is
going to be used
Do not request personal details of individuals and only use first names.
Use a suitable room where you are unlikely to be interrupted or over
heard.
Analysis
(a) the lack of a validated structure means that important issues may be missed
(b) participants may be unwilling to be open and honest if confidence and trust are low
(c) it is not easy to make comparisons between sites or over time.
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themselves. This was quite different from what the visiting safety specialist would have
expected to find on a site with a strong line management commitment to health and
safety. The significance of sending the local health and safety advisor was not noticed
by site employees, as this was “how they did things round here”, and was to them an
invisible part of their basic assumptions about how safety should be managed.
The two main strengths of observation & ethnographic methods are that:
(a) the lack of a validated structure may mean that important issues are missed
(b) an experienced external observer is required, who is sensitive to differences in
safety culture
(b) observations over an extended period of time may be required, to ensure
conclusions are not drawn on the basis of isolated, atypical incidents
(c) it is not easy to make comparisons between sites or over time.
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literature (see Lardner, Fleming and Joyner, 2001). A site’s overall level of
maturity is determined on the basis of the maturity level for each of the ten
elements. Safety sub-cultures are also defined and examined. It is unlikely that
an organisation will be at the same level on each of the ten safety culture
elements of the SCM®.
The three main strengths of the Safety Culture Maturity® model technique are:
(a) it is possible to compare results from different sites, teams, or at different
points in time
(b) it provides a rich picture of the cultural issues and
(c) the participants suggest solutions to the issues they identify.
A further description of the development of this method and an industrial case study by
Lardner, Fleming and Joyner (2001) is available.
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Assessment methods
Criteria Quantitative Qualitative Triangulated
methods
Cost Purchase of Time to develop External assistance
instrument/ interview schedule Workforce and
development of External assistance management time
instrument Workforce time
Staff time to complete Time to analyse
questionnaire results and identify
Analysing results actions
Meeting with staff to
identify interventions
Utility of Produces a large Produces a large Qualitative data can
results amount of numerical amount of written be difficult to analyse
data data and interpret
Results may be Data can be difficult Can help with focus
difficult to link to to analyse and on solutions
interventions interpret
Strengths Efficient way of High face validity – High face validity –
collecting data about appears relevant appears relevant
employee’s Interventions can be Can compare and
perceptions and directly linked to contrast different
attitudes to safety interviews types of data
Can allow Some employee Can lead to higher
benchmarking and involvement confidence in results
comparison between
sites
Limitation Limited employee Confidentiality can be External assistance
s involvement a problem may be required
Employees often do Results can be Time-consuming
not see the link biased if level of trust Lack of comparable
between the survey is low norm data for
and interventions Relatively time qualitative data
Hard to know exact consuming
meaning of results Difficult to compare
results across sites
or over time
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Research evidence (Komaki, 2000) suggests that behavioural safety programmes can
enhance the safety climate of an organisation. They provide an opportunity for
management to demonstrate their visible commitment to health and safety, involve
employees, and provide an opportunity to learn about the behavioural causes of
accidents, and preventative measures. For example, one behavioural safety study
(Cooper and Phillips, 1994) measured site safety climate before and after a
behavioural safety programme was implemented. Over a one-year period, significant
positive changes in the plant’s safety climate occurred, suggesting the programme’s
impact extended beyond its initial focus on behaviour.
Other research (Fleming & Lardner, 2000) suggests that behavioural safety
programmes need to be matched to the maturity of an organisation’s existing safety
culture. This suggests a two-way relationship between behavioural safety programmes
and safety culture. The existing level of maturity determines the type of behavioural
safety programme which is appropriate and is likely to succeed, and this behavioural
safety programme will in turn enhance the maturity of the organisation’s safety culture.
There is very little research that has investigated the relationship between safety
culture and team working. One study in Australia (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000) tested
the extent to which a socio-technical systems theory applied to safety climate. Socio-
technical systems theory advocates a teamworking approach to organisational design
as this facilitates variance (e.g. process upsets, occupational accidents) being
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Safety Safety
Knowledge Compliance
Organisational Safety
Climate Climate
Safety Safety
Motivation Participation
Additional insights into the relationship between safety culture, teamworking and
behavioural safety are provided by a case study completed during the PRISM project
(Labudde et al, 2003). This case study of DuPont’s Nomex plant in the Asturias region
of Spain demonstrated how it is possible to design and construct the work and safety
culture you desire, despite the fact that this may run counter to the prevailing local
industrial safety culture. DuPont was able to capitalise on the fact that the Nomex
plant was a greenfield site, therefore all employees were selected and hired to be
compatible with the desired work and safety culture.
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10 Key references
ACSNI (1993) Human factors study group Third report: Organising for safety.
London: HMSO
Brown. R. L. & Holmes, H. (1986). The use of factor-analytic procedure for
assessing the validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident
Analysis and Prevention, 18, pp 289-297
Cox, S. & Cox, T. (1996). Safety, systems and people. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann.
Cox, S. & Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man of straw?
Work and Stress, 12, 189-201
Donald, I. & Canter, D. (1994). Employee attitudes and safety in the chemical
industry. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 7, 203-
208.
Fleming, M., Rundmo, T., Mearns, K,. Flin, R. and Gordon, R. (1995, December)
Risk perception and safety a comparative study of UK and Norwegian
offshore workers. Paper presented at the work and well-being
conference, Nottingham.
Flin, R. (1998) Safety Culture: Identifying and measuring the common features.
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