FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her

husband, JOSE TAGACAY,

Facts:

 1962 – respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the CFI Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot
which she had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant
 Petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots which he had acquired them from Domingo
Melad (Melad) in 1941 and 1943.
 The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refiled in 1967.
 Respondent presented a deed of sale (1943) purportedly signed by Melad and duly notarized which conveyed the said
properties to her for P80.
- She (respondent) said that the amount was earned by her mother as a worker at the Tabacalera factory.
- She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Melad with whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945.
- She moved out of the farm only when in 1946, petitioner asked permission to cultivate the land and stay therein
- She agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the harvest to her which he did in 1958.
- The deliveries stopped so she consulted the municipal judge. The judge advised her to file a complaint against petitioner
- Respondent’s mother was her only witness to corroborate this testimony
 Petitioner testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Melad’s niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken
into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own.
- Petitioner and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Melad with the cultivation of
the farm
- Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave the petitioner the farm and in 1943, another private
instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the
grantor and would bury him upon his death.
- Petitioner presented three other witnesses to corroborate this testimony and to prove that petitioner since his marriage to
Isidra, he had been living in the land and remained in possession thereof after Melad’s death in 1945
- Two other witnesses declared that the respondent and her mother did not live in the land of Melad
 TC based its decision mainly on the issue of possession and ruled in favor of petitioner as the evidence of respondent are
unpersuasive and unconvincing.
 CA reversed. It stated that the petitioner’s two private instruments were null and void because they were donations and must
be effected through a public instrument

Issue: Whether Domingo intended to donate the properties to petitioner? – Yes but they were onerous donations

Ratio:

 The conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take
care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the
Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument.
 Petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the condition imposed by the
donor.
 Melad died when he was almost one hundred years old, which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by
himself and so provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that
there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous donation.
 The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the services for
which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights,
hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has
been adduced to support her contention that the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.
 The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly
paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious
circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying
for the lands.
 The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname,
before that instrument was signed and in fact even after she got married.
 Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the
disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did
have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another
lot belonging to her step-brother.
 In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her
actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
- Garchitorena v. Almeda - Ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095;
Fidelity and Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient
delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons
- Fidelity and Deposit co v. Wilson - The ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift,
by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition
 In case of symbolic delivery through the deed of sale (public instrument), the vendor shall have had such control over the
thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made.
 When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of
the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient.
 It is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession of the litigated properties. Even if the respective
claims of the parties were both to be discarded as being inherently weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the
petitioner (f the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the defendant, for the latter
being in possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove a better right.