Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Editors
Pedro M. Arezes
University of Minho, Guimarães, Portugal
Rui B. Melo
Technical University of Lisbon, Cruz Quebrada—Dafundo, Portugal
All rights reserved. No part of this publication or the information contained herein may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
by photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written prior permission from the publisher.
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persons as a result of operation or use of this publication and/or the information contained herein.
Table of contents
Foreword xi
vi
vii
viii
ix
Foreword
This book is the fifth volume of the “Occupational Safety and Hygiene” series. It presents a selection or
112 articles submitted to SHO2017—International Symposium on Occupational Safety and Hygiene, the
13th edition, which is annually organised by the Portuguese Society of Occupational Safety and Hygiene
(SPOSHO). These articles were written by 395 authors from 12 different countries. Each manuscript
was peer reviewed by at least 2 of the 110 members of the International Scientific Committee of the
Symposium. These international experts cover all scientific fields of the event.
The editors would like to take this opportunity to thank the academic partners of the organisation of
SHO2017’s, namely, the School of Engineering of the University of Minho, the Faculty of Engineering
of the University of Porto, the Faculty of Human Kinetics of the University of Lisbon, the Polytechnic
University of Catalonia and the Technical University of Delft. We also would like to thank the scientific
sponsorship of more than 20 academic and professional institutions, the official support of the Portuguese
Authority for Working Conditions (ACT), as well as the valuable support of several companies and
institutions, including the media partners, which have contributed to the broad dissemination of the event.
Finally, the editors wish also to thank all the reviewers, listed below, which were involved in the process of
reviewing and editing the included papers. Without them, this book would not be possible.
To conclude, we hope that this book will be a valuable contribution to improving the results and
dissemination of research by academics involved in SHO2017. It is work done in different areas, showing
new research and methodologies, giving visibility to emerging issues and presenting new solutions in the
field of occupational safety and hygiene.
The Editors,
Pedro M. Arezes
J. Santos Baptista
Mónica P. Barroso
Paula Carneiro
Patrício Cordeiro
Nélson Costa
Rui B. Melo
A. Sérgio Miguel
Gonçalo Perestrelo
Reviewers involved in the process of reviewing and editing the papers included in this book
xi
xii
H. Vaz
Cleanport, S.A., Lobito, Angola
ABSTRACT: This paper reports a study of an environmental and occupational risk assessment of
two processes, regarding the transfer/discharge of hazardous ship waste (sludge and oily waters). Fol-
lowing the methodology suggested by the Spanish Standard UNE 150008:2008, a number of accident
scenarios (n = 7) were created and their respective risks evaluated, focusing on environmental matters.
The results pinpointed several aspects needing priority attention, mostly within procedures and equip-
ment. To improve the safety of those processes, the authors proposed a number of recommendations.
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND although with an emphasis on the latter case. The
processes studied were:
In the aftermath of major accidents like Seveso
1. the discharge of waste in the Port of Lobito,
or Chernobyl, specialists started to look for ways
from the ship to a truck-tanker;
to assess the risks in their industries. Interna-
2. the discharge of such waste into the company
tional Bodies provided complex methodologies
storage facilities.
like ARAMIS (Accidental Risk Assessment for
Industries in the framework of Seveso II) (Salvi The case described here focuses on one particu-
& Debray 2006), or FSA (Formal Safety Analysis) lar hazard: “spill of hazardous ship waste in the
established by the IMO (International Maritime soil and the sea water”.
Organisation) (Kontovas & Psaraftis 2009). Major The company studied is called Cleanport
accidents involving dangerous substances repre- (Lobito, Angola) and is specialized in industrial
sent a significant threat to humans and the envi- waste management, industrial cleaning and naval
ronment. Furthermore such accidents might cause maintenance.
massive economic losses and disrupt sustainable
growth (EU Directive Seveso-III 2012).
The application of some well-known methodol- 2 METHODOLOGY
ogies can be difficult due to their range being either
quite specific (narrow) or, too wide, requiring high The methodology applied in this study was selected
level knowledge of experts of different areas. That upon three factors: it is easy to understand, to apply
is why industries started to look for simpler and and provides all tools one needs to perform the risk
qualitative methods (Bahr 2006, p. 2795). analysis and assessment. Another plus is that the
The Spanish Standard UNE 150008:2008 pro- way the results are presented makes it understand-
vides a practical and easy to understand meth- able for any person who has only a notion of the
odology. It includes instructions for hazard subject matter.
identification and tools for risk evaluation. The standard UNE 150008:2008 is composed
Despite a large variety of studies on risks related of 5 main steps. It is recommended a multidiscipli-
to maritime transportation of hydrocarbons, less is nary team to take into account the several facets.
found in the literature with regard to ship’s sludge The first step is the “hazard identification”. This
and oily waters (ship waste) (eg: Ronza et al. 2006, step is essential because everything will revolve
Zuin et al 2009). around those identified hazards. The second step
The objective of this work was to carry out a risk is the “accident scenario design” where accident
assessment of two processes, regarding the transfer/ scenarios are created. The third step is called “fre-
discharge of hazardous ship waste. The assessment quency/probability estimation”. For each accident
covered both occupational and environmental risks, scenario, it is necessary to estimate its probability
Accident Scenario #5
Quantity (Q) The tear in the wall is likely located 1.5 meters from the floor. Assuming 4
that the deposit is almost full, with a level height of 14 meters and
storing around 3 millions of liters, the release will correspond to the
remaining 12.5 meters of residue, which is equivalent to 2 million
and 678 thousand liters (2678 m3)
Residue average density (it depends on the quantity of water) = 0.90 kg/dm3
Q = 2.678 m3 × 0,90 kg/dm3 = ∼2410 ton > 500 ton (very high quantity)
Dangerousness Inflammable, toxic, toxic for water species 3
Extent of release Very extensive area—given the quantity of residue spilled, it is very likely 4
that it could occur underground water and sea water contamination,
since the installation is located near the coast
Acute Losses exceeding 50% of all species and biomass that were in contact 3
with the residue, only a long term recovery is possible
Natural 4 + 2 × 3 + 4 + 3 = 17 4 Serious
Human 4 + 2 × 3 + 4 + 4 = 18 5 Critical
Socioeconomic 4 + 2 × 3 + 4 + 3 = 17 4 Serious
Risk Classification
Environmental risk classification—final score (scenario #5)
or frequency of occurrence. In this study, the esti- they expanded their activity to naval maintenance,
mation of frequency was based on the company’s as well as industrial cleanings and industrial waste
accident historical data. management. Their liquid waste storage capacity is
The forth step is “risk assessment”. This step over 7400 m3 of which 6000 m3 are reserved for oily
can be divided into two phases: “severity of the waste from ships and industrial machinery (two high
outcome” (or consequences) and “environmental capacity deposits, approximately 3000 m3 each).
risk estimation”. The severity of the outcome is The first process analysed was the discharge
estimated for three dimensions (or environments): of ship waste in the Port of Lobito. This waste is
human, natural environment and socioeconomic. discharged to a truck-tanker parked in the dock,
For that, it uses four variables, three of which are using the ship’s pump and high pressure hoses. At
common to all three dimensions. The common var- each end, there is an emergency stop button for the
iables are: the quantity of spilled/released/burned pump. This process requires one chief of opera-
residue, the dangerousness of the residue and the tions and 2 field workers. The workers are respon-
extent of release (i.e., affected area). The forth sible for the preparation and connections (hoses
variable is specific for each environment. For the and gaskets), as well as verifying the level of resi-
human dimension, it evaluates the affected popu- due in the truck-tanker. The chief of operations,
lation, whereas natural environment is assessed in addition to supervision, is responsible for the
in terms of damage caused to natural species and equipment inspection before and after the pump
alike. Finally, the socioeconomic environment is starts.
evaluated through monetary and capital losses. The second process takes place at the company’s
The standard UNE 150008:2008 provides tables facility where the land deposits are located. The pro-
with criteria and scores for all the variables used cedures are very similar to each other (i.e., from ship
in the assessment process. Some of these variables to truck-tanker and from this to land deposit). The
are rated 1–4 (being 4 the worst case), while oth- amount of residue handled in both processes may
ers are rated 1–5 (being 5 the worst case). At the vary from 5 m3 to 30 m3 (maximum capacity of tank-
end, after combining all variables, one will obtain ers), and pumps that can have a flow over 100 m3 per
the final level of risk, for which the highest level is hour. For instance, in one of the scenarios analysed
“very high risk” (scored 21–25). In this approach the estimated amount of spilled residue exceeded
the final assessment returns three risk results, one 2000 m3, which indicates a major spill event.
for each dimension (human, natural environment
and socioeconomic). As in any other methodol-
ogy, the last step (5th) refers to “recommenda- 3.2 Results and discussion
tions” where analysts should suggest measures for
As mentioned before, the main hazard analysed
improvement.
was the spill of dangerous residues, i.e., oily
The methodology is partially demonstrated in
ship waste. The 7 accidental scenarios created
Tables 1 and 2.
involved hoses and deposit ruptures, incorrect
connections, insufficient inspections and valve
malfunctions.
3 RISK ASSESSMENT
The first scenario (Acc Scenario #1) considers
a rupture in a high pressure hose during the dis-
3.1 Description of case study
charge from the ship to the truck-tanker. This task
This application case-study was carried out in the is illustrated in Figure 1.
company Cleanport, located in Lobito (Angola). This kind of accident has already occurred in
Being a fairly new company (3 years of activity), it the company and it was due to the hose degrada-
was created to help complying with the MARPOL tion. Since this work is performed outdoors, next
(marine pollution convention) in Angola, which to the sea, in a tropical country (extreme humidity,
was neglected. Their activity started in Port of radiation, high temperature), the equipment suf-
Lobito but after performing 100 services to ships, fers a fast ageing and degradation.
Even though the company has in place an Inter- environment, it provided the authors a good insight
nal Emergency Plan, it should also have an External on the risks existing in the processes scrutinised.
Emergency Plan established with the local authori- Moreover, it also allowed identifying measures to
ties (fire department, hospitals, etc.). prevent or mitigate potential consequences of the
To finish, it was recommended providing some accidents mapped in the 7 scenarios considered.
kind of information and training to workers on the This method can be used in various industries.
hazards. This way, they would be aware of what A more thorough analysis can be achieved with
could go wrong and be prepared if something more resources, e.g., time, personal, knowledge of
happens. the processes, etc.
The innovative aspects in this work are twofold:
3.4 Comments on the standard
• the methodology itself, which is not yet well dis-
In the course of the study, it was felt that the risk seminated in the specialty literature,
matrix proposed by standard UNE 150008:2008, • the country where it took place (Angola), show-
to estimate the environmental risk, does not pro- ing genuine efforts towards safer workplaces and
mote a conservative attitude toward the protection environments in developing countries.
of the environment, contrary to what one should
expect.
Of all possible interactions between frequency ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
and severity, 40% represent “low risk”, 28% “mod-
erate risk”, 16% “medium risk”, 12% “high risk” The authors are grateful to Cleanport SA for open-
and only 4% return “very high risk”. In the authors’ ing their doors and participating in this assessment.
opinion this aspect should be taken into account Study made under UNIDEMI (ref. PEst-OE/EME
before suggesting “light” or no measures for an /UI0667/2014).
apparent “low risk” or “moderate risk”, as if “noth-
ing too serious might result from such scenario”.
REFERENCES
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS Bahr, N. J. 2006. System safety engineering and risk
assessment. International Encyclopaedia of Ergo-
Even though this methodology estimates an environ- nomics and Human Factors. Vol. 3: 2794–2797. Boca
mental risk in a way that is not conservative for the Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
ABSTRACT: The existence of methodologies for priority and control the risk in different areas sup-
port the realization of safety and security process practice. However, endeavors to create tools and
methodology to rank the ergonomic risk activities are mostly devoted on product design. Motivated by
such scarcity, the goal of this study is attempted to develop a modified FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis) as means to access the criticality of ergonomic risk in operations. An improved model to the
ranking ergonomic risk by using Risk Priority Number (RPN) is proposed and applied in a case study,
in the attempt to help decision makers to debate the problems occurred.
Table 5. Action plan. performance of the activities. Once the activity takes
place 100% of time, without any pause, full time;
What to do How to do it − The package of the product should be substi-
tuted by another one less flexible.
Rearrange the layout Projecting new filling
project, where the equipment. An action plan that involved the responsible and
filling, sealing and Acquiring new paper seam future controls was created then. (Table 5).
belt are placed side by system, with compatible The high leadership of the company assured the
side, eliminating the height to be placed next implementation and the extension of ELSS project
displacement of loads, to the scale. all over the company through the standardization
body rotation and Insert a semi-automated belt
weight management. of the system and definition of an operational sys-
at the output of the filling
system
tem. Due to the success of the method four more
Replacing the plastic Projecting new design of four-hour-events were conducted and the proce-
packaging for packing packing paper more resist- dure of ergonomic management was installed.
paper (less polluting ant and test the material.
and more resilient). Implement recycled packing 3 CONCLUSIONS
paper, and inform customer
about the change.
Isolate the packing area Building brick and mortar
In general, the process of generating a plan of step
from the cooking area. walls to separate the areas by step implementation, aligned to the reality of
Insert seats next to the Placing semi-sitting seats next the organization, may result significant gains and
job posts. to the job post so they can may positively feedback the efforts to change on
be used as an alternative the ergonomic management.
relay posture. Then, it is possible to join FMEA and Ergo-
Inserting pauses for Hiring a specialized company nomics in an integrated way on the solution of
stretching (labor gym). to implement the program. problems. This proposition was validated inside
Function rotation with Carrying out ELSS project to the scope of this study, once, through FMEA the
the pallet position at make the process viable. improvement process go beyond the results of risk
every 2 hours. assessment and can also represent priority classi-
Provide safety shoes with Buying bi-density shoes to fications. In this study, could be noticed that the
bi-density soles. replace the existing model.
problems were analysed in a structured way, pre-
Place an anti-fatigue mat Acquiring the product and
opposite the workplace place them on the job posts.
senting a hybrid model that could meet the current
methodologies of management around the world.
10
Deambulation Displacement with The employees 9.37% waste in the 2 2 3 12 The layout is distrib-
20 kg bags on the receive a training time of the proc- uted so that there
filing, sealing and course on how ess and Fatigue is displacement
belt areas. to handle heavy of lower limbs of the employee
materials with Overload in efforts 3 3 2 18 with unnecessary
efficiency. There on upper limbs load. There was no
are procedures and spine attention to this
to prevent indi- item in the design
vidual lifting of process
loads heavier
than 30 kg.
Displacement Inexistent. 7.14% waste in 2 1 3 6
without any load the time of the
between the belt process.
and filling area. Fatigue of lower 2 2 3 12
limbs
Horizontal Displacement Inexistent. Effort overload 3 3 3 27 As the previous one.
Distance filling-sealing and by rotating
sealing-belt trans- with load the
porting 20 kg lumbar spine.
loads.
Vertical Efforts on the Inexistent. Overload in 3 3 3 27 The leveling of the
Distance displacement of flexor efforts room was not
bags through the on shoulder taken into con-
areas with differ- and spine. sideration at the
ent levels conception.
Quality The plastic pack Inexistent. 12.5% waste in 2 2 3 12 As a matter of
is difficult to the time of design, the packag-
handle. the process. ing used is plastic,
and the quality
of operational
handling was not
tested.
(Continued )
11
Positioning The plastic bag is There is a good Inadequate specific 2 1 2 4 There was a concern
stored in an inap- positioning of site at the input about the proper
propriate place the load on the of the process. place, since the bar
(suspended on the side protections ensures the proper
frame of the fill- of the filling positioning of the
ing equipment) device. pack.
The hammer is The worker can Body inclination in 2 2 2 8 The hammer was not
an area that is place it his way. the area of dif- predicted to take
difficult to be ficult access part in the proc-
reached. ess, and then there
was no conception
on the plan for its
location.
Movements Repetitive tasks. There are pauses Physiological over- 2 3 2 12
for lunch (60 m) load with the risk
and two (15 m) of muscle fatigue
pauses for cof- in upper and
fee and personal lower limbs
needs.
Humidity High Relative There are evalua- Unnecessary effort 2 2 8 The shed has no
Humidity (72%). tions of occu- with the upper separation between
pational hygiene limbs to perform the rooms, which
that do not hammer in an makes that the
consider risks attempt to decon- humidity of the
since the legisla- gest the product kitchen facility be
tion refers to the in the filling transferred to the
minimum met nozzle with the packaging area,
by the company possibility of building up the
(40%). damaging the product by group-
equipment. ing wet particles.
Pauses Absence of There are pauses Physiological over- 2 2 8 There is not staff
necessary for lunch (60 m) load with the risk enough to ensure
pauses. and two pauses of muscle fatigue the pause at the
(15 m) coffee and in upper and current demand
personal needs. lower limbs. of the production
Movements Repetitive tasks. There are pauses Physiological 2 2 12 procedures
for lunch (60 m) overload with the
and two (15 m) risk of muscle
pauses for cof- fatigue in upper
fee and personal and lower limbs
needs.
Statics Long lasting Inexistent. Physiological 2 3 12 For the current
standing overload with the layout and need
posture risk of muscle to travel, it can
fatigue in lower not work with the
limbs. rotating position.
12
D.M.B. Costa
FEUP—Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
M.V.T. Rabello
UFRJ—Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
E.B.F. Galante
IME—Military Institute of Engineering, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
C.V. Morgado
UFRJ—Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
ABSTRACT: This work presents a risk assessment of a road transport company that delivers fuel to
distribution stations and seaports by tanker trucks in Brazil. Road transportation of dangerous goods
is a critical activity due to the occupational exposure of workers to these products as well as potential
consequences following accidents, which may include personal injury, property damage, fuel spills, among
others. Considering the need of including environmental aspects in the occupational health and safety
assessment towards a more integrated evaluation, the Methodology of Integrated Evaluation of Risks
(MIAR) was applied in the product transportation, identified through a risk matrix as the most critical
activity developed by the company. An evaluation of legal compliance to national standards was also
performed for the verification of gaps in performed activities, revealing 73 items requiring corrective
actions.
13
14
of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – NR 6, sion factor for road transport using diesel as fuel
(ii) occupational health control program—NR 7, was considered equivalent to 74.10 kg de CO2/GJ
(iii) safety in workplace facilities—NR 8, (iv) elec- (IPCC 2006). Following these steps, a risk evalu-
tric systems—NR 10, (v) ergonomics—NR 17, ation accordingly to MIAR was performed and
(vi) fire prevention systems and (vii) work at summarized in Table 2.
heights—NR 35. All 7 stages of the workflow were evaluated and
A priority sequence was established for the further associated to 16 hazard categories or sce-
actions with the implementation of GUT Priority narios. From these 16 categories, 62.5% were clas-
Matrix, leading to 18 recommendations to achieve sified as minor, 25% as medium and 12.5% as high.
their legal compliance. Among corrective actions Product transportation to customer/receiver can
identified, 8 are related to work at heights and be considered as the most critical activity since the
the most critical aspect was the ergonomics risks associated risk categories concentrated the highest
involved in the activities performed by drivers. classification.
In terms of ergonomics, it was evidenced that Considering this result, preventive measures for
bottom loading system may be prioritized to minimizing traffic accidents and transportation risks
avoid the need of climbing in the truck. For work were delimited focusing on causes identified in lit-
at heights, definition of working procedures, risk erature. The main causes of accidents involving dan-
analysis of tasks and inspection at workplaces are gerous goods have been assigned as drivers’ errors
some of the measures necessary to fulfill the legal (44.3%), others (23.61%), vehicle failure (21.83%)
compliances. and road conditions (3.71%) (Ferreira 2003).
Considering this aspect, the main preventive
measures for the process is the reduction of driv-
4.2 MIAR Implementation
ers’ errors by intensification of training as well as
The first phase of the study consisted in the sys- better compliance with safety regulations, such as
tematic and organized collection of the exist- Law 13.103/2015, which provides specifications for
ing information related to OHS in the company, the exercise of professional drivers. Furthermore,
followed by a survey of existing hazards in the organizational factors may be improved such as
transportation process. For the evaluation of the monitoring of working hours, resting hours,
atmospheric emissions, carbon dioxide (CO2) emis- and establishment of psychological monitoring.
15
16
I. Castro
Polytechnic Institute of Cávado and Ave, Barcelos, Portugal
D.G. Ramos
School of Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of Cávado and Ave, Barcelos, Portugal
Algoritmi Centre, University of Minho, Guimarães, Portugal
ABSTRACT: Understanding the perceptions of employees on the risk management system is very
important, but there is still a lack of full understanding of how the workers characterize the risk. This
study aimed, through the consultation of workers, understanding the perception of risk by these and thus
improve the risk management system. A questionnaire addressed to 201 employees of a metalworking
industry has been prepared. The results of the questionnaire showed that it is necessary a higher involve-
ment of the workers in the process of management of occupational hazards and accidents at work and
the corresponding communication. Since the organization is preparing the process of certification of the
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management system, according to ISO/DIS 45001, it was impor-
tant in this study to analyse, discuss and understand the perception of workers of OHS risk.
17
% Answers
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
No
2.1 Case study Questions n Yes No opinion
18
4 CONCLUSIONS
19
REFERENCES
APPENDIX: Questionnaire
Alexopoulos, E. C., Kavadi, Z., Bakoyannis, G. and Papan-
tonopoulos, S. (2009). “Subjective Risk Assessment CONSULTATION TO WORKERS IN TERMS
and Perception in the Greek and English Bakery Indus- OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
tries”. Journal of Environmental and Public Health SYSTEM (OHS)
Volume 2009. Hindawi Publishing Corporation. General Information
Arocena, P. & Núñez, I. (2009). The effect of occupational Name, gender, age, education, number of years
safety legislation in preventing accidents at work: tra- working in this firm, function/activity, number of
ditional versus advanced manufacturing industries. work accidents.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Pol-
icy, 27(1), 159–174. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec. 1. General
org/a/pio/envirc/v27y2009i1p159–174.html. 1.1. Do you consider that the company fulfils
EU-OSHA (2013). European Agency for Safety and its obligations in terms of OHS?
Health at Work. Priorities for occupational safety and 1.2. Do you consider that the company has ade-
health research in Europe: 2013–2020. ISBN 978-92-
quate OHS conditions?
9240-068-2. Luxembourg.
EU-OSHA (2016). Agência Europeia para a Segurança e 2. Occupational risks
Saúde no Trabalho. Bons níveis de SST são um bom 2.1. Do you receive information about the risks to
negócio. Consulted in April 2016, available at https:// which you are exposed in your workplace?
osha.europa.eu/pt/themes/good-osh-is-good-for- 2.2. Do you receive information about the pre-
business. ventive measures to eliminate risks in your
ISO/DIS 45001 (2016). Occupational health and safety workplace?
management systems—Requirements with guidance 3. Emergency
for use. 3.1. Do you have some kind of knowledge of
ISO Guide 73 (2009). Risk Management. Vocabulary.
firefighting?
OIT—Organização Internacional do Trabalho (2011).
Sistema de Gestão da Segurança e Saúde no Trabalho: 3.2. Can you properly handle a fire
um instrumento para uma melhoria contínua. ISBN extinguisher?
978-92-2-224740-0. Torino. 3.3. Do you have basic knowledge in first aid?
Ramos, D. G. (2013). “Análise Custo-Benefício em 4. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Avaliação de Risco Ocupacional”. PhD Thesis is 4.1. Do you have available adequate PPE to pre-
Industrial and Management Systems. University of vent the risks inherent to your job function?
Minho. 4.2. When you use PPE, do you know against
Ramos, D., Arezes, P.M. & Afonso, P. (2015). Analy- what kind of risk you are being protected?
sis of the Return on Preventive Measures in Mus-
4.3. Do PPE present good condition?
culoskeletal Disorders through the Benefit-Cost
Ratio: a Case Study in a Hospital. International 4.4. Are PPE adjustable and comfortable?
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics. DOI: 10.1016/j. 4.5. Are they compatible with other PPE?
ergon.2015.11.003. 4.6. Are they available in sufficient number?
Ramos, D. & Costa, A. (2016). Occupational Health and 5. Equipment and Machinery
Safety Management System: a case study in a waste 5.1. Equipment and machines have adequate
company. Arezes et al. (eds), Occupational Safety and security conditions?
20
21
T. Zlatar
Research Laboratory on Prevention of Occupational and Environmental Risks (PROA/LABIOMEP),
University of Porto, Portugal
B. Barkokébas Jr
University of Pernambuco, Pernambuco, Brazil
L. Martins
Federal University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
M. Brito
Centre of Mathematics of the University of Porto CMUP, Portugal
ABSTRACT: In the fresh food industry the working activities are conducted in environmental tem-
peratures from 0ºC to 10ºC, while in the frozen food industry usually are at temperatures below −20ºC
which influences the variations in core and skin body temperatures and affects the working performance,
health and safety of the employees. The aim of this work is to contribute with a study on the influence of
cold thermal environment on core and skin body temperatures in packing workers from the frozen food
industry. By using the core body pill sensor and 8 skin temperature sensors a study was conducted on 4
workers during 11 days. The lowest recorded temperature was for hand 14.09ºC, mean skin temperature
had variations of 1.10 to 3.20ºC along the working period and the mean body temperature on two occa-
sions decreased below 35ºC. The core temperature was found to increase. The mean body temperature
showed small changes along the time.
23
24
25
Temp. - temperature
4 DISCUSSION
26
27
28
E.B.F. Galante
IME—Instituto Militar de Engenharia, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
ABSTRACT: The Brazilian legislation 6.514/1977 provides guidance on how to manage health and
safety aspects in the work environment. Under such legislation, this work aims to identify and map haz-
ardous activities and substances within a case study, which is an industrial cleaning company that works
on cleaning and dyeing clothes. The methodology divides the work in two main sections: the first address-
ing risk mapping and the second presenting and applying the Hazard Matrix (HM) risk assessment tool
to this case study. The work concludes that the most critical hazards is the chemical storage room (with
29.3% of the hazards of the whole case study), followed closely by thermo-presses (25.9%), while the
most severe hazards to be dealt with are associated with fire and explosion (which stands for 17.3% of the
hazards) and noises (14.3%).
This paper describes a study that carried out a quali- This part of the paper is divided in two main sec-
tative risk mapping, under the guidance of Brazilian tions: one addressing risk mapping and a second
29
30
Hazards
Chemicals Ergonomic
Sector Physical Hazards Hazards Biohazards Hazards Accident hazards
A Not identified Not identified Not identified Monotony and Electricity, Fires and
repetitiveness explosions, poor
layout
B Noise Chemicals, Not identified Not identified Electricity, Fires and
several explosions, falls.
C Heat Not identified Not identified Monotony and repe- Burnings, falls, electric-
titiveness, requirement ity, fire and explosion,
of odd body hand cuts.
positions
D Noise Chemicals, Not identified Illumination Chemical burns, Fires
several and explosions,
poor layout
E Heat and noise Chemicals, Not identified Not identified Electricity, Fires and
several explosions, poor
layout, unprotected
machinery
F Noise Chemicals, Contaminated Monotony and Fire and explosions
several Air repetitiveness
G Noise Chemicals, Not identified Monotony and repe- Fire and explosions
several titiveness, requirement
of odd body
positions
D sector in characterized by its significant noise (handling chemicals) and ergonomic hazards. This
levels generated by gas compressor. The chemi- last hazard is due to demand for improper posture
cal hazards relate to storage area and handling during machine operations coupled with repeati-
of chemicals. The poor illumination causes one tivity and monotony of such tasks. In the office
to determine an ergonomic hazard in the area. rooms there are also ergonomic risks due to the
Accident possible causes are chemical burns, poor employee’s position in her job and biohazard is
layout (which compromises any evacuation proce- originated from lack of control in cleaning the air
dure) and the possibility of fire and explosion due condition system. Accident hazards are mainly fire
to activity of the gas compressor and electricity and explosion in blasting machine and electricity
due to the presence of scattered wireless and cable due to the presence of scattered wireless and cable
ducts. ducts.
In the sector E the main physical hazards Usually, the next phase of risk mapping would
risks are noise from the operation of washing be to plot these risks in a blueprint and make it
machines, and heat due to the presence of two known by everyone within the facility. This phase
boilers and poor ventilation in the area. The is not disclosed in this paper to avoid disclose the
chemical hazard is characterized by handling case study recognizable features.
miscellaneous chemicals. Accident risks are elec-
tricity, the inadequacy of the control cabinet, and
this, easy access to all people circulating on the 5.2 Risk prioritization
spot; risk of fire and explosion due to the activity According to Haddad et al. (2012), this meth-
of the boilers and the presence of large amounts odology helps to understand and set priorities
of combustible material (clothing); poor lay- between several risks in complex systems. The
out allowing the presence of clothing furniture technique is recommended when managing risks
containers blocking the way as well as incorrect and is particularly efficient to highlight the criti-
distance between equipment’s. The last potential cality of the hazards and sectors within a case
cause of an accident is unprotected machinery study. The HM consists of identifying and classi-
and equipment. fying hazards related to every activity within each
The physical hazards within both sectors F and sector of a company. This classification takes into
G arise from the noise generated by the dyeing account to two aspects: kind of danger (physical,
activity, which also causes both chemical hazards chemical, biological, ergonomics and accident,
31
100.0
25.9
29.3
14.7
10.8
7.0
2.6
9.7
%
Code Meaning
100,0
2781
195
720
816
408
300
270
machinery explosion Burnings Electricity cuts layout Falls FS
72
0 No hazard exposure
3 Exposure to hazard considered low.
2,4
66
No control required
0
6
0
0
6
0
0
6 Exposure to hazard considered
Hand Poor
189
medium.
6,8
3
0
0
6
6
0
0
Control recommended
9 Exposure to hazard considered
120
4,3
medium.
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
Control required, urgently.
12,2
339
for example) and their severity. The severity
3
3
3
6
9
3
3
parameters are determined using the values from
in Table 3.
The methodology for the calculation of the
10,1
282
Hazard Matrix (HM) in this case study follows
0
0
9
6
0
0
0
what has been proposed by Haddad (Haddad et al.
17,3
Accident hazards
480
for each sector (Si) making a line (from 1 to y),
3
3
3
9
6
9
9
followed by a column that stands for the number
of workers on that sector (Wi). As for the other
columns, they take all the hazards (Hj) identified
in all the sectors, drawing column from 1 to x. The
2,6
72
intensity level (or frequencies according to HM
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
methodology) of hazards is calculated for each
sector (fs1) and for each hazard (fH1), using equa-
Illumination labour
tions 1 and 2.
156
5,6
3
0
3
0
0
3
3
x
fsi ∑W * R
j =1
i i, j , Where
W 1≤ i y (1)
1,8
fHj ∑W * R , Where
W 1≤ j x (2) 51
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
i i, j
Ergonomic
i =1
Hazards
posture
Table 4.
3
0
6
0
0
3
3
1,1
7.0%.
0
3
0
9
6
0
3
20
17
10
3
G
A
C
B
E
F
comparison.
32
REFERENCES
33
ABSTRACT: Driving performance may be affected differently according to Blood Alcohol Concentra-
tion (BAC) levels. We conducted a short review in accordance with PRISMA statement guidelines follow-
ing a search strategy which includes the combinations of keywords: alcohol; driver errors; driving influence;
Acute protracted error; Acute tolerance; Ascending and descending blood alcohol Concentrations; Cognitive
performance on 25 search engines and 34 scientific publishers. Nine studies met inclusion criteria; the
studies were analyzed regarding the type of experiment and procedures including a total of 230 partici-
pants who drove under BAC influence. Results of the studies agreed to be in the descending phase of the
BAC curve that more driving errors are recorded, with loss of motor skills and cognitive impairments
mainly due to the effect of acute tolerance, which affects the perception of the drivers about the risks of
driving by minimizing the BAC effects.
35
36
37
38
39
40
J.E.M. França
Departamento de Engenharia Civil, UFF, Niterói, Brazil
E.B.F. Galante
IME—Instituto Militar de Engenharia, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
D.M.B. Costa
FEUP—Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
ABSTRACT: This paper presents a case study that applies a Hazard and Operability Study (HazOp)
into a part of an industrial wastewater treatment plant under construction. The aim of this study is to
identify hazardous situations and operational risks before the occurrence of these scenarios, prior to the
plant start-up. HazOp is a structured and systematic qualitative examination of a process plant opera-
tion, based on guidewords and nodes, that identifies and assess hazardous and risks. Two risk scenarios
were identified and analysed by HazOp methodology, resulting in technical recommendations for the
management of these risks. These recommendations target safety in plant operations and, since they
are suggested prior to the beginning of plant operation, its implementation demands few resources and
presents high cost-effectiveness.
41
Source: (Galante et al. 2014). Source: Adapted from Mil STD 882-E (USDoD, 2012).
42
43
of operation, and ensure that the hose and con- “high level” deviation, it was suggested to enable an
nections are correctly grounded in the same earth automation interlock between LIT of TQE-E02-
equipotential of the tank trunk and the transfer- 005 and the transference pump, shutting down this
ence pump. Moreover, due ethanol viscosity and pump when the tank level reaches HH (High High)
its transference in pressure, static electricity build parameters.
up on the walls of the hose are a concern once a Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate the pos-
spark source can potentially starts afire. Taking sibility of having a backup automated system, not
pump, trunk tank, hose and connections by the having LIT as a reference, which also shut down
same earth equipotential, the risk of ignition from the transference pump when detects high ethanol
static electricity is greatly reduced. levels. For “low level” deviations, it was identified
The less pressure deviation had presented a seri- that, during normal operation of ethanol dosing,
ous risk, having as consequence the mechanical for the wastewater treatment process, if the LIT
tank truck implosion, caused by a failure in the top fail during the transmission of low level signals, the
vents of this tank. This implosion happens due an metering pumps will send continuously ethanol to
lower pressure (vacuum) inside of the tank, break- the process, till no more product is available inside
ing the mechanical structure of the tank and caus- the tank.
ing an ethanol spill that contaminates personal and These metering pumps are responsible for etha-
environment, as well as fire or explosion, due its nol dosing in the process and by design, cannot run
flammability. Recommendations for this scenario without fluids. If these pumps run dry it may cause
were similar to the less flow deviation, however serious cavitation damages, which can be mitigated
including procedures to ensure the all top vents of enabling an automation interlock between LIT of
the truck tank are in perfect condition and without TQE-E02-005 and the metering pumps, that when
obstruction before the operations stars, and also LIT reaches LL (Low Low) levels, all the metering
guarantee that all personal involved in this opera- pumps will be shutted down instantly.
tion has been trained to identify top vents failures An overall recommendation is to observe all
and obstructions. operational procedures, check materials and ver-
For ethanol storage operations in tank TQE- ify equipment integrity to ensure that all situa-
E02-005, two possible deviations were identified: tions that can cause a loss of ethanol containing
high level and low level. As defined in the P&ID, are controlled and identified. Safety must be the
the ethanol tank will have two LIT (Level Indica- prime concern in all actions during the operations
tor Transmitter), as redundancy. Although this of transference of ethanol from the transportation
redundancy control, LIT can fail, and this might truck to the storage tank and ethanol storage into
lead to leakage of ethanol. As recommendation for the tank TQE-E02-005.
44
Table 6. HazOp table: transference of ethanol from the transportation truck to the storage tank.
Guide
Parameter word Deviation Cause Consequences Freq. Sev. Risk Recommendations
Ethanol flow transference None No flow Unplanned Locking of Delay in the E 4 L - Prevent the inadvertent closing of manual valves.
between truck and tank manual valves operations - In case of loss of containment, follow procedures
to avoid ethanol spreading.
Ethanol flow transference None No flow Fail in the hose integ- Ethanol spill, D 1 S - Remove or eliminate explosion ignition sources
between truck and tank rity or accidental causing con- during operation.
disconnection of any tamination, fire - Ensure that the hose and connections are cor-
quick coupler or explosion rectly grounded in the same earth equipotential of
the tank trunk and the transference pump.
- Ensure that the hose and connections are in per-
fect condition and operation.
- Evaluate the possibility of substitution of etha-
nol as a carbon source for other less dangerous
product.
Ethanol flow transference None No flow Pump fail Delay in the B 4 M - Ensure that the pump, its accessories and connec-
45
between truck and tank operations tions are in perfect condition and operation.
- Evaluate the possibility of having a backup pump
for this process.
Ethanol flow transference Less Less flow Partial fail in the hose Ethanol spill, D 2 M - Remove or eliminate explosion ignition sources
between truck and tank causing con- during all steps of operation.
tamination, fire - Ensure that the hose and connections are in per-
or explosion fect condition and operation.
- Ensure that the hose and connections are cor-
rectly grounded in the same earth equipotential of
the tank trunk and the transference pump.
Ethanol pressure transfer- Less Less pressure Failure in the top vents Mechanical tank D 1 S - Ensure that all top vents of the truck tank are
ence between truck and of the truck tank, implosion, in perfect conditions and without obstructions
tank causing internal causing etha- before transference operation begins.
vacuum nol contamina- - Ensure that all personal involved in this operation
tion, fire or has been trained to identify top vents failures and
explosion obstructions.
- Ensure that the hose and connections are cor-
rectly grounded in the same earth equipotential of
the tank trunk and the transference pump.
2/20/2017 9:21:13 AM
Table 7. HazOp table: ethanol storage into the tank TQE-E02-005.
Guide Devia-
Parameter word tion Cause Consequences Freq. Sev. Risk Recommendations
Ethanol level High High LIT fail during Ethanol spill, D 1 S - Enable automation interlock
in the tank level ethanol load- causing con- between LIT (level indicator) of
TQE-E02- ing to the tamination, fire TQE-E02-005 and the transfer-
005 tank or explosion ence pump.
- Evaluate the possibility of having
a backup automated system that
shut down the transference pump
when detected high ethanol level.
Ethanol level Low Low LIT fail during Damages in the D 2 M - Enable automation interlock
in the tank level normal opera- metering pumps between LIT of TQE-E02-005
TQE-E02- tion of the of the ethanol and the metering pumps.
005 tank dosing process - Evaluate the possibility of having
an automated system that shut
down the metering pumps when
detected low ethanol level.
5 CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES
Crawley, F., Preston, M. & Tyler, B., 2000. HAZOP:
A HazOp analysis presents some operational recom- Guide to best practice. Guidelines to best practice for the
mendation to avoid economic and safety loss in the process and chemical industries., Institution of Chemi-
experimental works. However, besides the consid- cal Engineers (Great Britain), European Process Safety
eration of economic order, aspects concerning the Centre. United Kingdom: The Cromwell Press.
safety of a process are becoming more important Dunjó, J.; Fthenakis, V. M.; Darbra, R. M.; Vílchez, J.
by an increasing knowledge of the environmental A.; Arnaldos, J. Conducting HAZOPs in continuous
problems and life quality in a scenario of sustain- chemical processes: Part I. Process Safety and Environ-
able world growth. Safety assessment at workplaces mental Protection. Elsevier, v. 89, p. 214–223, 2011.
Galante, E., Costa, D.M.B. da & Nóbrega, M. Risk
involves operation risks as well as all other kinds of
Assessment Methodology: Quantitative HazOp. Jour-
tasks and hazardous activities, which, in this paper, nal of Safety Engineering, p. 8, 2014.
include the operations of a wastewater treatment Ghasemzadeh, K.; Morrone, P.; Iulianelli, A.; Liguori,
unit that is under construction, but its operational S.; Basile, A. H2 production in silica membrane reac-
risk were already identified, resulting in recommen- tor via methanol steam reforming: Modeling and
dations that will easily implemented. For instance, HAZOP analysis. International Journal of Hydro-
the recommendation of an automated system that gen Energy. Elsevier, v. 38, p. 10315–10326, 2013.
shut down the metering pumps when detected low Isimite, J. & Rubini, P. A dynamic HAZOP case study
ethanol level, for “low level” deviations, will demand using the Texas City refinery explosion. Journal of
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Elsevier, v.
a simple installation of new two sensors, one trans-
40, p. 496–501, 2016.
mitter and few connecting wire in each metering Kotek, L. & Tabas, M. HAZOP study with qualitative
pump; a simple and not complex installation that risk analysis for prioritization of corrective and pre-
can im-prove operational safety, and can be easily ventive actions. Procedia Engineering. Elsevier, v. 42,
done be-cause was identified by a HazOp study dur- p. 808–815, 2012.
ing the construction phase. Although this particular National Center for Biotechnology Information. PubChem
HazOp attends a Wastewater Treatment Unit, this Compound Database; CID = 702, https://pubchem.ncbi.
study can be performed for any industrial plant, in nlm.nih.gov/compound/702 (accessed Nov. 6, 2016).
any phase of this life cycle: project, construction, Reis, G. F. “Assessment of operational risk and safety of
the work in a sewage treatment plant” (in Portuguese).
operation, expansion and decommissioning. How-
Postgraduation, UFRJ, Escola Politécnica—Rio de
ever, as evidenced, if HazOp is performed in the Janeiro, 2016.
project or construction phases, the safety recom- USDoD (US Department of Defence), 2012. MIL STD
mendations can be implemented quickly, economi- 882-E—Standard Practice for System Safety, Wash-
cally and effectively. ington, USA: USA.
46
ABSTRACT: The safety management competence plays a crucial role when managing safety in organi-
sations. Developing managers’ safety competence is one way of achieving better safety performance. The
aim of this study is to construct a Safety Management Competence Development (SMCD) framework
based on previous studies and empirical results in a Finnish case organisation. The framework consists of
definition of safety management competence requirements, self-assessment of the competence, definition
of development needs, and implementation of competence development activities. Assessing and develop-
ing managers’ safety competence provide them with knowledge of their responsibilities and expectations,
company-wide safety procedures and targets, as well as tools for promoting safety. The SMCD framework
provides the means for systematically improve managers’ safety competence as an integral part of general
competence development in organisations. Moreover, the assessment and development activities influence
managers’ perceptions of and attitudes toward safety and encourages their commitment to safety.
47
48
49