G.R. No.
172299 April 22, 2008 In denying the motion, the RTC held that:
ALFREDO TAGLE, petitioner,
vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the
HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alfredo
Tagle (petitioner Alfredo) stemmed from the following Resolutions promulgated by the Court of
Appeals: (1) the 6 September 2005 Resolution1 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner Alfredo, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing the 4 April 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. P-71-20042;
(2) the 16 February 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion for Reconsideration; and
(3) the 11 April 2006 Resolution4 denying petitioner Alfredo’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration.5
Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 4 April 2005 Order6 of the RTC in LRC Case No.
P-71-2004, which denied petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. He prays that this
Court certify "for review with prayer for preliminary injunction to stop the writ of possession [of] the
property located at Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan and embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-143715 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan [subject
property] and after due hearing, let judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of the Honorable Regional Trial Court Branch 82, [City of Malolos, Bulacan,] and the Court of
Appeals as the law requires with costs."7
According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was constituted
as a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. He and his wife Arsenia
Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property to respondent Equitable PCI Bank
(respondent E-PCI) whether before or after the subject property was constituted as their Family
Home. It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the owner of the subject property, who
mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI. Josefino was religiously paying the installments on
his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half thereof. Josefino, however, passed away.
Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume Josefino’s outstanding mortgage obligation. Even
as petitioner Alfredo was already paying Josefino’s mortgage obligation in installments,
respondent E-PCI still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property. 8
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly registered
in the name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney
executed by petitioner Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses Josefino and Emma Tagle
with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property upon
default in payment by spouses Josefino and Emma, and upon the expiration of the period of
redemption, caused the consolidation and transfer of the title to the subject property in its name.
Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession
of the subject property, which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo,
however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the ground that the subject property is a
Family Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 9
On 4 April 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Stop Writ of Possession is hereby DENIED.
In the case at bar, the mortgage transaction happened on May 9, 1997 (Exhibit D), after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
With Article 155 in application, it is crystal clear that this instant case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code, as the case stemmed from the mortgage
transaction entered into between the [herein respondent E-PCI] and [herein petitioner Alfredo and
his spouse Arsenia] dating back in (sic) 1997. This fact will militate against the so-called exemption
by sheer force of exclusion embodied in said article. Hence, the law’s protective mantle cannot be
availed of by [petitioner Tagle and his spouse Arsenia].10
Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its
foregoing order. However, it was likewise denied by the RTC in another Order11 dated 21 June
2005.
Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo12 elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for
Certiorari [and Prohibition] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 90461, assailing and seeking the nullification and the setting aside of the denial of his Motion
to Stop Writ of Possession.
In a Resolution dated 6 September 2005, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the petition,
stating thus:
The instant petition is not accompanied by (i) the order denying petitioner’s motion to exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage; and (ii) a relevant and pertinent document, i.e., motion to exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage (Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED outright.13
In due time, petitioner Alfredo moved for the reconsideration of the afore-quoted Resolution.
On 16 February 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s
motion for reconsideration, decreeing that:
Petitioner [Alfredo] seeks reconsideration of Our resolution dated September 6, 2005 dismissing
the petition for not being accompanied by the order dated April 4, 2005 (denying his motion to
exempt from foreclosure mortgage) and motion to exempt from foreclosure of mortgage. Instead
of the aforesaid order and motion, however, petitioner submitted certified true copies of the order
dated June 21, 2005 (which was already attached to the petition) and motion to stop writ of
possession.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.14
Undaunted still, petitioner Alfredo once more filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court’s 16 February 2006 Resolution.
On 11 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the last of its Resolutions, denying, as
expected, petitioner Alfredo’s Second Motion for Reconsideration, stated in full below:
For consideration is petitioner’s [Alfredo’s] motion for reconsideration of Our February 16, 2006
resolution denying its (sic) motion for reconsideration of Our resolution dated September 6, 2005
dismissing the petition.
Appellant has not cured the formal defects of the petition noted in Our resolution dated September
6, 2005. And, more importantly, a second motion for reconsideration of a final order is not allowed
(Sec. 5, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Obando vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 673).
WHEREFORE, the subject motion for reconsideration is DENIED.15
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner Alfredo filed the instant petition designating it in both the caption and the body as one
for "certiorari" under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. He anchors the present petition on
the sole issue of "whether or not the subject property subject of the mortgage being a family home
is exempt from foreclosure of mortgage."16 He argues:
That from the records of the mortgage, the same was not constituted before or after the
constitution of the family home by the petitioner and as such the Honorable Court of Appeals has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the
proceedings complained of.17
He thus prays for this Court to issue a preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ
of possession of the subject property, and after due hearing, render a judgment annulling or
modifying the proceedings before the RTC and the Court of Appeals, with costs.18
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI counters that the petition at bar must be dismissed on the
following grounds:
First, petitioner Alfredo’s "Petition for Certiorari" with this Court failed to comply with the technical
requirements of the Rules of Court19 for petitions for certiorari in that (a) the present petition was
filed out of time considering that the 60-day period within which to file the same was reckoned
from receipt of the 11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s second Motion for
Reconsideration, instead of the 16 February 2006 Resolution denying his first Motion for
Reconsideration;20 (b) petitioner Alfredo did not allege in the present petition that the Court of
Appeals "acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"21 when it dismissed his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
90461 for failure to attach thereto certified true copies of the 4 April 2005 RTC Order denying his
Motion to Stop Writ of Possession, as well as the very motion subject of the assailed order; (c) the
present petition lacks the proper verification and is considered an unsigned pleading which
produces no effect whatsoever;22 and (d) the present petition requested for the issuance of an
injunction without stating the grounds therefor.23
Second, petitioner Alfredo’s second Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Court of Appeals is
prohibited by law,24 as a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is
clearly disallowed by Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
And third, granting arguendo that the petition at bar was properly filed by petitioner Alfredo with
this Court, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90461 for failure of petitioner Alfredo to submit the required documents.25
Respondent E-PCI then concludes that "the present Petition for Certiorari was filed not to question
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals but as a vain hope of appealing the Order dated April 4,
2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court x x x."26
In reply to the foregoing counter-arguments, petitioner Alfredo contends:
1. That Rule 52 Sec. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is not applicable to the present case
because what is applicable is a Second Motion for Reconsideration in the Supreme Court;
2. That the 60 day period within which petitioner [Alfredo] may file subject Petition for Certiorari
has been reckoned from April 11, 2006 denying the petitioner’s [Alfredo’s] Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Rules of Court does not distinguished (sic) whether the denial is first or
second;
xxxx
4. That the issue of whether or not the mortgage was executed before or after the constitution of
the Family Home is a necessary question in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; and
5. That the verification based on personal knowledge is proper because the Rules of Court did not
distinguish whether the facts is based on personal knowledge or an (sic) authentic records;27
For its substantive as well as procedural infirmities, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Given the above-stated arguments raised by both parties, the threshold question that must be
initially resolved is whether or not the present Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the reversal
of the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16 February 2006 and
11 April 2006.
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other purpose,
as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.29
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the writ
is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.30

The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority31 or
want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either
in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.32
"Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority;33 or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer
(to do) is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.34
While that of "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.35
In the present case, there is no question that the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 is already a disposition
on the merits. Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the Resolutions dated 16 February 2006 and
11 April 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature
of a final disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 by the appellate court, and which, under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, are appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.36
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders.37 They were not interlocutory because the
proceedings were terminated; and left nothing more to be done by the appellate court. There were
no remaining issues to be resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the proper remedy
available to petitioner Alfredo then was to file before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
and not a special civil action for certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for certiorari
is wanting, that is, there must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review
on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to
resort to a petition for certiorari.
Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to
an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.38
In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.39 Moreover,
petitioner Alfredo failed to show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule
as to make available to him a petition for certiorari in lieu of making an appeal.
Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason why the issue raised in his petition for certiorari
could not have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari. He simply argued that the appellate
court gravely abuse its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 and not finding that the subject property covered by the Writ
of Possession was a Family Home, hence, exempt from execution or forced sale. He did not give
a single explanation as to why the errors committed by the Court of Appeals cannot possibly be
cured by ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.40 Time and again
this Court has reminded members of the bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal41 where the latter remedy is available; especially
if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.42
To be sure, once again, we take this opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for Review on
Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari) and a Petition for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original
action for Certiorari), under Rules 45 and 65, respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal
Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,43 summarizes the distinctions between these
two remedies, to wit:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
‘When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by
a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently,
an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble
through the original civil action of certiorari.’
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised
for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the
basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction,
but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power
of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action
that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a
petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private
respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment
or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely
filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available
under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an ordinary
appeal by certiorari, already a sufficient justification for dismissing the instant petition. But even if
his present petition is given due course, we still find it bereft of merit.
When the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, it did so on
the ground that petitioner Alfredo failed to attach certified true copies of the following: (1) the 4
April 2005 Order of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-71-2004 denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession; and (2) petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession submitted
to the RTC. Suitably, therefore, the proper issue which petitioner Alfredo should raise before this
Court in his instant Petition for Certiorari should be whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to attach thereto
the pertinent documents.
In dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, the appellate court relied on Sec. 1, Rule 65,
in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 1 of Rule 6544 reads:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
(Emphasis supplied.)
And Sec. 3 of Rule 4645 provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition
shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner and
shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished
by the proper clerk of court or by his duly-authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the
court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other
requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of
all documents attached to the original.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The afore-quoted provisions are plain and unmistakable. Failure to comply with the requirement
that the petition be accompanied by a duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution or ruling being challenged is sufficient ground for the dismissal of said petition.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for
non-compliance with Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of substantial justice,46 this Court has, before,47 treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for
review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;48 (2) when errors of judgment are
averred; 49 and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.50
But these exceptions are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. x x x.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of petitioner Alfredo in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90461 by virtue of a Resolution dated 6 September 2005. Petitioner Alfredo’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated 16 February 2006. Petitioner Alfredo thus had 15 days from receipt of the 16 February 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to file a petition for review. The reckoning date
from which the 15-day period to appeal shall be computed is the date of receipt by petitioner
Alfredo of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and not of its 11 April 2006
Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo’s second motion for reconsideration, since the second
paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for
reconsideration shall not be allowed. And since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed,
then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner Alfredo made a critical mistake in waiting for the Court of Appeals to resolve his second
motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.
Another elementary rule of procedure is that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. For this reason, petitioner Alfredo’s failure to file this
petition within 15 days from receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying his first Motion for Reconsideration, rendered the same final and executory, and deprived
us of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal thereof.

The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances
to justify the same. Try as we might, however, we fail to find the existence of such exceptional
circumstances in this case, and neither did petitioner Alfredo endeavour to prove the existence of
any. In fact, there is total lack of effort on petitioner Alfredo’s part to at least explain his inability to
comply with the clear requisites of the Revised Rules of Court.

Worth noting is the observation of respondent E-PCI that, essentially, petitioner Alfredo is using
the present Petition for Certiorari, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the 4 April 2005 Order
of the RTC, and not to assail the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. This he cannot validly
do for it is an apparent disregard of the proper exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court. We
cannot overlook the ruling of the Court of Appeals and proceed right away to a review of the RTC
order, absent any error of judgment or jurisdiction committed by the former.

All told, a perusal of the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals fail to illustrate any
reversible error, much less, a showing of any iota of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court, to warrant the exercise by this Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case at bar. Considering the allegations, issues and
arguments adduced and our disquisition above, without need of further delving deeper into the
facts and issues raised by petitioner Alfredo in this Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction, we hereby dismiss the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised
Rules of Court, as well as his failure to sufficiently show that the challenged Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16 February 2006
and 11 April 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With
costs against petitioner Alfredo Tagle.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment
in absentia and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel
within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 4,
2007 Resolution4 and the September 4, 2007 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R. No. 144332 and
promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 687 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines," as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case No.
2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s counsel informed the trial court
that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The
RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel
Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as
amended, they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum period.
Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren13 and issued warrants
of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the
promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty
imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. On the basis of
the evidence on record, accused Efren S. Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charge against him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence of the accused Ila
and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal.
Let the complete records of this case be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court
via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s September
8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied by
this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s
September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July
26, 2006 Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation25 of the
September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari28
with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for
lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in its September 4, 2007
Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the charge against him
passed the requisite conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner was valid
despite the absence of the petitioner and regardless of petitioner’s intention to be present at the
promulgation of the Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted
petitioner Almuete in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars further proceedings and that
to do so would constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-promulgation is in order, the
denial being based on an inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative Order No. 16-93).32
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly convicted by the RTC because
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on
circumstantial and hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck
containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his earlier acquittal by the CA was proper,35 and
that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without violating the principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment against him since it was
made in his absence.37 He insists that he had a valid reason for not attending the promulgation
of the judgment as he was suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and
thus, was advised to rest.38 He also claims that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for Repromulgation
was not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of the judgment should be made to allow him to avail
of his right to appeal.40
Respondent’s Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues and arguments raised by
petitioner may no longer be entertained as these have been addressed in People v. Court of
Appeals,41 which is already the "law of the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation
of judgment in absentia is allowed under Section 643 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Repromulgation of the September 8,
1998 Decision is proper as the same is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioner’s right has prescribed,46 as the
same should have been filed within 15 days from the time he or his counsel received a copy of
the September 8, 1998 Decision instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction, respondent recommends that the
penalty be modified by reducing the same to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY SUPREME COURT OR
COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in criminal cases after
their judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, attention is invited to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases, differs
from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where promulgation is
effected by filing the signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies
thereof to be served upon the parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was
reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in relation to section 17 of
Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and
10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that
"the certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court
under section 9 of rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the
execution of the judgment against him," it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the
defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had already been notified
thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9
and 10 of Rule 51)," and that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is
merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the court of first
instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for "promulgation" of the
judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an
unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security
problems where the convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and
the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court. Upon receipt of the
certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial court
should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may
be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement
and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the
bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the
corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the
execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts
for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC
in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which was
reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision must likewise fail as this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of
Appeals.50 As this Court has explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation
because petitioner’s absence was unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained finality. In fact, an
Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February 15, 2005.
Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision, we rule in the
negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by the CA as it was
made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for
Certiorari is not allowed because "the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error."54
Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.
Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused, respondents herein, guilty of the
crime charged based on the evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and
305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn
the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on its merits,
and for the nullification of the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of
their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error, from the
decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal of the petitioners in due course
was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the
findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty
imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether
assigned or unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ
of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the
trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging
that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them
being merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors
of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the appellate court to have dismissed
the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and
its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete
of the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere
of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review
perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are
correctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting
respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain
jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case
to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory
authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case,
the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation
of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus,
respondent Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court’s decision.55
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision has long prescribed.
Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to an appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the penalty
imposed by the RTC in its September 8, 1998 Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case
is an offshoot of G.R. No. 144332 which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority,
or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceed[s] the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis
supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article
310 which is two degrees higher than those specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous
considering that the penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed
under any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c)
if the property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is present in the
instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article
309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds
₱22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods57 should be
imposed in its maximum period58 plus an additional one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000
pesos in excess of ₱22,000.00 or three more years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum
penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor
to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than that
prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest court
of the land, rendered it."60 However, this Court has suspended the application of this rule based
on certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of
the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following:
(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner. If his
penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would
be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range
of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of
which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend
our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own Rules or
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice."62 Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such
as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s
"primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed notwithstanding the
finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel Barro (Joel) were
charged with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin
filed their notice of appeal. Joel failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial
court’s Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In the Court’s
Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and Florin was found without merit.
However, the Court noted that as regards Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside
the range"66 of the penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the
penalty imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already become final and executory.
The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees
lower is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail,
hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should,
therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight years which is within the medium period (6 years
1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in imposing
the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the range of said
penalty. The records show that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed
on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that
penalty imposed on the accused can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by
law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the
duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa. While the trial was
pending, petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during the promulgation of judgment in 1997,
petitioner was absent. Two years later, or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for
reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision. The same was denied for having been filed out of
time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was denied. Hence,
petitioner brought the case before this Court. In its Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court
ruled that petitioner’s trial in absentia was proper; that she was not denied due process; and that
the denial by the trial court of her motion for reconsideration was proper as the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period. However, the Court noted that the penalty imposed by the trial
court (which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as maximum) on petitioner was erroneous.
As computed by the Court, considering that the amount defrauded is only ₱68,700.00, the proper
minimum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium
period"69 while the proper maximum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10
years, 8 months and 21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period."70 Hence,
notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision, the Court modified the penalty imposed,
as the same was outside the range prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also modified the penalty imposed
on the petitioner notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision based on the observation
that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range
prescribed by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of the trial court that
must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional
one day on the maximum period of arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it
is outside the range of said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month and
one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will place it within the range of
prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years, four months and one day
of prision correccional is also incorrect as it is outside the range of the penalty imposable in this
case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law as it is within the Court’s duty and inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty imposed against
petitioner to be in accordance with the law and nothing else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in
order to be favorable to the petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying the penalty imposed,
it is not reopening the case; neither is it saying that there was error in judgment. In the same
manner, in this case, we are not reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:

x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to Gatward, the penalty
inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it was never authorized by law as a valid
punishment. The penalties which consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty
are self-contradictory in terms and unknown in penal law. Without intending to sound sardonic or
facetious, it was akin to imposing the indivisible penalties of public censure, or perpetual absolute
or special disqualification, or death in their minimum or maximum periods.

This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting a penalty higher or
lower than the one imposable under the law but with both penalties being legally recognized and
authorized as valid punishments. An erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment.
But a judgment which ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which
is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void, since the error
goes into the very essence of the penalty and does not merely arise from the misapplication
thereof. Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final and executory.1âwphi1

Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case was reopened in
order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him. There is here no reopening of the case, as in
fact the judgment is being affirmed but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to
make it conformable to law, pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has
not been changed since what was decreed by the trial court and is now being likewise affirmed by
this Court is the same penalty of reclusion perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the
lower court in an elemental form which is non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as the
penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused, neither has it been increased
so as to be prejudicial to him.

Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the imposition upon him of the
corrected duration, inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be
serving a void sentence with an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial
legislation and unequal protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an inadvertence which
could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment and the penalty meted therein, but also of
the sentence he may actually have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore,
the remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him against the risk of
another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of imprisonment.74

Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor General prayed for the
modification of the imposable penalty.75

Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
favorable modification of the penalty should likewise apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed
to appeal.77

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the September 4, 2007
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition,
for reasons stated above, the September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the
penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y
Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164153 June 13, 2011
JOHN ANTHONY B. ESPIRITU, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact for Westmont
Investment Corporation, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Golden Era
Holdings, Inc., and Exchange Equity Corporation, Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL N. TANKIANSEE and JUANITA U. TAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause,
are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Where a party’s petition for certiorari and subsequent appeal seek to achieve one and
the same purpose, there is forum shopping which is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
certiorari petition.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s
February 27, 2004 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76518 which affirmed the February 4,2 February
17,3 and February 26,4 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46 in Civil Case
No. 02-103160, and the June 22, 2004 Resolution5 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On March 25, 2002, John Anthony B. Espiritu, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Westmont
Investment Corporation, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Golden Era Holdings,
Inc., and Exchange Equity Corporation (Espiritu Group) and Tony Tan Caktiong and William Tan
Untiong (Tan Group) filed a Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management
and Control6 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against United Overseas Bank Limited, United
Overseas Bank Philippines, Manta Ray Holdings, Inc., Wee Cho Chaw, Wee Ee Cheong, Samuel
Poon Hon Thang, Ong Sea Eng, Chua Ten Hui, Wang Lian Khee and Marianne Malate-Guerrero
(UOBP Group). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103160 and raffled to Branch 46.
On June 27, 2002, Manuel N. Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan, joined by Farmix Fertilizer Corp.,
and Pearlbank Securities, Inc. (intervenors), filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Petition-In-Intervention.7
On July 26, 2002, the UOBP Group filed their Answer Ad Cautelam with Counterclaim against
intervenors, and Cross-claim against the Espiritu and Tan Groups.
On September 16, 2002, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed their Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam
Answer to the cross-claim of the UOBP Group.
On October 4, 2002, the intervenors filed a Motion for Production, Inspection and Copying of
Documents against the UOBP Group.
On October 14, 2002, the intervenors filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of
John Anthony B. Espiritu, Tony Tan Caktiong and Chua Teng Hui. A similar notice was sent to
Wee Cho Yaw. All the aforementioned parties opposed the taking of their depositions via separate
Motions for Protective Order and/or Objection to Resort to Discoveries on the ground that resort
to discovery procedure was already time-barred.
In an Order dated October 29, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for production of documents
and notice to take depositions because, as modes of discovery, the same were filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
Subsequently, the intervenors filed a Motion for Clarification. On November 25, 2002, the trial
court reversed its previous ruling and granted the intervenors’ motion for production of documents
and notice to take depositions. Thereafter, the Espiritu, Tan and UOBP Groups sought
reconsideration of this order. However, on December 18, 2002, the trial court denied the same
and maintained that resort to discovery is permissible under the premises.
Following suit, the Espiritu and Tan Groups attempted to resort to discovery procedure. On
January 31, 2003, they filed a Notice to Take Depositions Upon Oral Examination of Manuel
Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan.8
Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
On February 4, 2003, the trial court issued the first questioned order which, among others,
disallowed the taking of the depositions of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan.9 It held that
the taking of the subject depositions is time-barred. Meanwhile, in view of the November 25 and
December 18, 2002 Orders of the trial court allowing the deposition-taking of John Anthony B.
Espiritu and Tony Tan Caktiong, on February 7, 2003, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed a Motion
for the Issuance of Protective Orders.10 On February 17, 2003, the trial court issued the second
questioned order which denied the said motion.11 Upon motion, on February 26, 2003, the trial
court issued the third questioned order which modified the February 17, 2003 Order by canceling
the deposition of John Anthony B. Espiritu until further notice and resetting the deposition of Tony
Tan Caktiong to a later date.12
On April 14, 2003, the Espiritu and Tan Groups filed a petition for certiorari13 before the Court of
Appeals challenging the validity of the February 4, 17, and 26, 2003 Orders for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition
for certiorari. It ruled that the Espiritu and Tan Groups failed to adduce evidence to establish that
they filed the notice of deposition within the period provided under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies. Moreover, the failure of a party to avail
himself of modes of discovery does not operate to deprive him of the right to present his case
because evidentiary matters may be presented before the court through pleadings and testimonies
of the parties.
From this adverse decision, only the Espiritu Group (petitioners) appealed to this Court.
Meanwhile, while this case was pending resolution before the appellate court or on February 2,
2004, the trial court rendered a Decision14 in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From
this judgment, petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of
appeal.15 This case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 and is pending resolution before
the appellate court. For its part, petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation filed an Ex Abundanti
Ad Cautelam Notice Of Appeal16 and a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.17 On December
15, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the Court of Appeals to elevate the complete
records of CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 to this Court.
Issues
1. Whether the disallowance of the deposition-taking of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan
(Tankiansee Group) is contrary to the mandate of liberality in the availment and interpretation of
the Rules on Discovery.18
2. Whether petitioners were deprived due process when they were denied resort to the modes of
discovery.19
3. Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.20

Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend that, in disallowing the deposition of Manuel N. Tankiansee and Juanita U.
Tan, the trial court violated the liberality in the availment and interpretation of the Rules on
Discovery. Moreover, the trial court failed to consider that the allowance of the deposition would
not prejudice any party because, at the time the notices of deposition were served, no party had
yet actually availed himself of and/or conducted any discovery proceeding. They emphasize that
the testimonies of the intended deponents are crucial to establish their just claims in the main
case.
Petitioners further argue that the Tankiansee Group was allowed to avail itself of the modes of
discovery despite the fact that the latter filed their pleadings beyond the period allowed under the
Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. They claim that the trial court erroneously
counted the 15-day period. In truth, both petitioners and the Tankiansee Group availed themselves
of the modes of discovery beyond the 15-day period. In effect, the trial court denied petitioners the
very same right it granted the Tankiansee Group.
Petitioners also note that after the submission of the respective pre-trial briefs in the main case,
the trial court rendered judgment without conducting hearings. Hence, they were denied the right
to fully present their case because they were unable to make use of the testimonies of the intended
deponents. Petitioners plead that it is not yet too late to rectify this injustice by allowing the subject
depositions because the aforesaid summary judgment has been challenged in the meantime in
various proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents claim that petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. On February 2, 2004, the trial
court rendered a summary judgment in the main case, i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160. Petitioners,
except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, thereafter filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner
Westmont Investment Corporation chose to file an ex abundanti ad cautelam notice of appeal and
a petition for certiorari and mandamus. All three cases seek to annul the February 2, 2004 Decision
of the trial court.
According to respondents, the present recourse has the same objective, that is, to reopen the trial
court’s February 2, 2004 Decision which is pending review before the Court of Appeals.
Considering that petitioners have a commonality of interest, the splitting of the causes of action
on the same cause is tantamount to forum shopping.
Moreover, respondents argue that the notices of deposition filed by petitioners are time-barred.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies provides that a
party can only avail himself of any of the modes of discovery not later than 15 days from the joinder
of issues. According to the respondents, the joinder of issues occurred on September 29, 2002
after the lapse of the period for the filing of the last responsive pleading of the parties to this case.
However, petitioners filed their notices of deposition only on January 31, 2003. Hence, the trial
court did not err in denying their resort to modes of discovery.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners’ appeal before the Court of Appeals is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and the
certiorari petition, subject matter of this case, constitutes forum shopping.
As stated earlier, while this case was pending review before the Court of Appeals or on February
2, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From
this judgment, petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of
appeal. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 and is now pending resolution before
the appellate court. For its part, petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation filed an Ex Abundanti
Ad Cautelam Notice Of Appeal and a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
With these developments, the instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners’ appeal
before the appellate court is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and (2) the certiorari petition,
subject matter of this case, constitutes forum shopping. This is in consonance with our ruling in
Ley Construction & Development Corporation v. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation.21
In Ley Construction & Development Corporation, petitioner filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent. Subsequently, petitioner served notices to take
the depositions of several individuals. Initially, the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioner
to take the subject depositions. However, it later issued another order canceling all the depositions
set for hearing in order not to delay the prompt disposition of the case. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the trial court’s order canceling the
deposition-taking which allegedly deprived it of its due process right to discovery. While this
certiorari petition was pending before the appellate court, the trial court issued a resolution in the
main case which dismissed the complaint for specific performance and damages. Subsequently,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the certiorari petition. On appeal to this Court by petitioner from
the dismissal of its certiorari petition, we ruled that –
Second, the Petition for Certiorari was superseded by the filing, before the Court of Appeals, of a
subsequent appeal docketed as CA-GR CV No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the two
Orders. In this light, there was no more reason for the CA to resolve the Petition for Certiorari.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available
only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." A petition for certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special
civil action for certiorari. As the Court has held, these two remedies are "mutually exclusive."
In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate
remedy because it assails not only the Resolution but also the two Orders.
It has been held that "what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies." The Court is satisfied
that the denial of the Petition for Certiorari by the Court of Appeals will not result in a failure of
justice, for petitioner’s rights are adequately and, in fact, more appropriately addressed in the
appeal.
Third, petitioner’s submission that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect is in fact an
admission that the two actions are one and the same. Thus, in arguing that the reversal of the two
interlocutory Orders "would likely result in the setting aside of the dismissal of petitioner’s amended
complaint," petitioner effectively contends that its Petition for Certiorari, like the appeal, seeks to
set aside the Resolution and the two Orders.
Such argument unwittingly discloses a recourse to forum shopping, which has been held as "the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Clearly, by its own submission,
petitioner seeks to accomplish the same thing in its Petition for Certiorari and in its appeal: both
assail the two interlocutory Orders and both seek to set aside the RTC Resolution.
Hence, even assuming that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect because it would
lead to the reversal of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint, it would still be denied on the
ground of forum shopping.22
In the same vein, petitioners’ certiorari petition, questioning the three interlocutory orders which
denied their resort to discovery procedure, has been superseded by the filing of their subsequent
appeal before the Court of Appeals (i.e., CA-G.R. CV No. 83161). As explained above, a certiorari
petition may only be availed of if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."23 We find that petitioners’ appeal from the February 2, 2004
Decision of the trial court in the main case is the appropriate and adequate remedy in this case as
it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory orders and the decision in the main case.

Moreover, petitioners’ appeal and certiorari petition effectively seek to annul the February 2, 2004
Decision of the trial court. In their pending appeal before the appellate court, petitioners argued,
among others, that they were unduly deprived of their right to avail of modes of discovery,
specifically, the deposition taking subject matter of this case.24 This is one of their arguments in
their appeal which prays for the annulment of the February 2, 2004 Decision on due process
grounds.25 On the other hand, petitioners argued in their certiorari petition that the disallowance
of the taking of the subject depositions deprived them of the opportunity to bring to fore crucial
evidence determinative of this case. According to petitioners, this brought about the erroneous
February 2, 2004 Decision issued by the trial court.26 In fine, the appeal and certiorari petition
raise similar arguments and effectively seek to achieve the same purpose of annulling the

February 2, 2004 Decision which petitioners perceive to be in gross error. Thus, as in Ley
Construction & Development Corporation, the certiorari petition must perforce be dismissed on
the ground of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 27, 2004 Decision and June 22, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76518 are AFFIRMED.

The records of CA-G.R. CV No. 83161 are RETURNED to the Court of Appeals which is
ORDERED to resolve the aforesaid case with reasonable dispatch.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011
Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of
the action1 and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is
the CA Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario
and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as
summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:
The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974
located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of
said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of
Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof.
In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the
premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right
to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.5
On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said
complaint contains, among others, the following significant allegations:
3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao,
Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the
plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control
and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial
purposes.
xxxx
7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by
tolerance.
8. But [plaintiffs’] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002,
plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of
the property.
xxxx
10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to
fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to
vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said
demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject
property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.7
Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:
3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect
that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same"
and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and
the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the
part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the
allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has
used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant
has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to
purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare,
protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere
in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its
avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements,
including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation "shall accrue to the
CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease"
(Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2" hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;
xxxx
5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint,
the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of
Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2"
and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true
and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the defendant foundation
is lawful, being a lessee thereof;
xxxx
8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant
refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES
the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to
the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant;
xxxx
As and by way of –
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:
12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.
The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991,
the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an
integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs,
nevertheless, the ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of
Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing
sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified
in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code
that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex
"3"), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the
vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever,
to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of
Agreement (Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the
subject property;9
After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on
October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of
Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a
case against petitioners for "Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107,
[Presidential Decree No.] 1529" docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition
to the said Motion.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondent’s Motion. In the
said Order, the MTCC held that:
The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of
the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual
relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.
affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The Gerry Roxas
Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor.
Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and
continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and
pursuant to law.
The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the
plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.
Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does
not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied
the signatories to the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs
signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable
without any specifications.
When the parties’ pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual
allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there
is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case
is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court,
Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of
the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the
same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for
someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same
never happened. Plaintiff[s] have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is
only by tolerance.
xxxx
Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in
accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant
corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over
twenty-two long years.
That the defendant’s possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered
into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the
latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19,
1981, long before the defendant foundation’s occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162
SCRA 823 (1988), Buyer’s immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed
corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the
defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the
pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this
instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9, 2004 affirming
the MTCC Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision13
dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution15 dated November 15, 2005.
Issues
Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising
the following issues:
I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in
interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,
II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute judicial admissions.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991,
without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the
respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.
Petitioners thus conclude that respondent’s possession of subject property is only by tolerance.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x
"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense
with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice
necessary to be observed and complied with."17 Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint
are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him."18 "The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."19
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject
property without their consent and authority and that respondent’s use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.
Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.
In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held
that "what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought."
This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in
forcible entry vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right
to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of
the defendant's right to continue in possession.23
"The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ shall include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another,
who has had prior possession, therefrom."24 "The foundation of the action is really the forcible
exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."25
"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies
the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."26 The employment of
force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners’ allegation that respondent took full control
and possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.1avvphi1
"‘Stealth,’ on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery
and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"27 while
strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject
property.28 The CA found that based on the petitioners’ allegations in their complaint,
"respondent’s entry on the land of the petitioners was by stealth x x x."29 However, stealth as
defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of
the respondent into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by
petitioners’ allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant
foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff’s nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the
Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right,
who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation
using their property."30 To this Court’s mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.
Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry,
and not for unlawful detainer.
"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the defendant’s possession of the property is
illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover
possession.32
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the
subject property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are
true, it hence follows that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore,
the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry – that is "the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."34 Thus, and as correctly found
by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent’s possession was
illegal at the inception.35
Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in
petitioners’ Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court
finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not
the instant suit for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year
period from the time of dispossession.
Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of
subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one
year from the time of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when
petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid
cause of action against the respondent.
In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed
said order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution
dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012
RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner,
vs. Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1
dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution2 dated 15 July
2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.
The Factual Antecedents
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa
Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa
Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City
Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:
1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon,
situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area
of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.
2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing
an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original
Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to
Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to
occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the
same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15,
1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz,
Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor
for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and
occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving
the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy
the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the
defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot
No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court is
of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled
to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive
portion of said decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED,
with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC,
by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its
Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.4 It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when
he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by
the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with
respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their
execution.5 The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,6 resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents
was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.7
Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed
real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to
this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the
nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner
against respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property
was not by mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of
ownership.8
The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to respondents
as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action
to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.9 The appellate court rejected his
contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession
thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense
of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale
in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents’ unregistered deed.10 In dismissing his
appeal, the CA concluded that respondents’ possession was "not ... anchored on mere tolerance
nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the complaint for
ejectment must fail."11 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision
of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.12
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal ownership
of petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right to possession.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF
THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.13
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the
parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered
owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties?
The Court's Ruling We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature
of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A
resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to
possession in this unlawful detainer case.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal,
or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful
detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper
inferior court."14 In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled
to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not
possession de jure.15
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication
of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.16
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties
as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed
properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date.
Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed
properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that,
having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has
the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession.17 Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title
holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof.
However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the
disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of
the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the
property for more than 30 years up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,18 which has facts and legal issues identical to
those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the
respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as
actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of
Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to
possession of the disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive
of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has
a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of
title in the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world
unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory
and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of
the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser
for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral
attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. 19
The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel20
and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,21 wherein we consistently held the
age-old rule "that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."22
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful
detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept
of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances,
petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding.
Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,23 which reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the
owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment
cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.
The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of
ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment
case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by mere
tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such
lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by
mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject
properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact,
petitioner has not established when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful
– a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
In Canlas v. Tubil,24 we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint
for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which
has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from
the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient
to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts
and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession of
the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the concept of
ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the
disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years
from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens
system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without
bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any
action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect
of registration of respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals 25 :
(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect
of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held
in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is
the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration
as to him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v.
Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead
of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner’s father
to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know
of the transaction.
We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-
12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him
was an "act of fraud" 26 on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack
against the Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer
case.1âwphi1
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral
attack.27 Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.28 It is a well-established
doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged,
or diminished in a collateral proceeding.29 Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case
wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a
collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession
in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity
of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity,
an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.1âwphi1 The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal
Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner – are AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169594 July 20, 2011
BIENVENIDO BARRIENTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO RAPAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April
29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68482, and the Resolution2 dated
September 1, 2005 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:
On April 15, 1988, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square meter parcel of land located at
No. 2 Misamis St., Luzviminda Village, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, from one Antonio
Natavio via a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The said parcel of land was said to
be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4136. Thereafter, respondent constructed a semi-concrete house on
the lot and took actual possession of the property by himself and through his caretaker, Benjamin
Tamayo.
Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed petitioner Bienvenido Barrientos and his family to stay on
the subject property as caretakers on the condition that petitioner shall vacate the premises when
respondent would need the property. However, when respondent demanded petitioner to vacate
the subject property, the last of which was made on July 14, 1997, petitioner refused to leave the
lot. The parties later underwent barangay conciliations, but to no avail.
Thus, on April 13, 1998, respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
19889.
On February 21, 2000, after submission of the parties' respective position papers, the trial court
rendered a Decision3 in favor of the respondent, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff
entitled to the prayer sought and hereby orders defendant to:
1. vacate and all persons claiming under him that house structure located at No. 2 Misamis Street,
Luzviminda Village, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City;
2. pay plaintiff the sum of ₱3,000.00 per month, as compensation for the use of said house
structure beginning July 14, 1997 until he vacated the place; and
3. pay plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fee plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the Decision of the MeTC and resolved in
favor of petitioner, reasoning that respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the
property in question.5 The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the decision of the lower court is reversed and
set aside. The court finds no basis to award any counterclaim.6
Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the CA assigning the following errors committed
by the RTC, to wit:
1. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the petitioner has not shown any
prior lawful possession of the property in question.
2. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the respondent and his family who
were merely invited to live in the house out of Christian charity and human compassion, has
possessory rights over the same lot and house.
3. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in injecting the issue of ownership over the lot.
4. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding that the petitioner has propositioned
himself as an awardee-grantee of the property in question.7
On April 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision8 reversing the decision of the RTC and
reinstating the decision of the MeTC, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the extant Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 92-Quezon City is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila, Branch 39-Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.9
In ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA touched upon the issue of ownership since both claimed
ownership over the disputed property. The CA found that both parties presented weak evidence
of ownership. Hence, the CA determined who between the parties was first in possession and
concluded that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,10 but it was denied in the Resolution11 dated
September 1, 2005.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
WHETHER THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE INITIALLY RESOLVED FOR THE PURPOSE
OF DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION.
II
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE A TRANSFER OF
POSSESSORY RIGHT CAN PREVAIL OVER THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
AND THE LATTER'S ACTUAL POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY.12
Petitioner maintains that he has a better right over the subject property as against the respondent.
Petitioner insists that even assuming arguendo that the subject property was registered in the
name of the Rapal family and occupied by him as caretaker, this only bolsters his claim that he
has been in actual occupation of the property. Moreover, petitioner contends that since
respondent's claim of ownership was derived from a void title, he did not have a better right to
possess the property as opposed to by the petitioner who actually occupied the same.
Petitioner points out that he was even awarded a Certificate of Project Qualification by the Office
of the President through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. Petitioner
argues that since the property in controversy is a government property, it is the government
through the National Government Center (NGC) that can award the same to qualified beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9207, or the National Government Center Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003, which it in fact did when he was given a Certificate of Project Qualification.
On his part, respondent argues that the CA did not commit any reversible error by ruling in his
favor, considering that the CA initially looked into the issue of ownership only for the purpose of
determining who between the parties has a better right to possess the subject property. In addition,
petitioner failed to substantiate that he has a better right to possess the subject property.
The petition is without merit.
Ejectment cases – forcible entry and unlawful detainer – are summary proceedings designed to
provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.13 In
an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue
of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to
determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property.14
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent were claiming ownership over the subject
property. Hence, the CA correctly touched upon the issue of ownership only to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the subject property.
True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and respondent presented weak evidence of ownership.
Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over the subject property on the strength of
a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. The subject
land, however, was said to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which this Court has declared null and void in the case
of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals15 as such,
respondent could not derive any right therefrom.
Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a better right to possess the
property on the fact the he is in actual possession of the property and that he was awarded a
Certificate of Project Qualification by the Office of the President through the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council. However, although petitioner claimed ownership over the
subject lot, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence therefor, or even sufficient reason on the
manner by which he acquired ownership.
Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but just and proper for the CA to have reminded the
courts a quo to have settled the case by restricting their resolution to the basic issue of possession.
From the various evidence submitted by the respondent, it can be clearly inferred that respondent
is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. As aptly found by the CA:
To recall, in its (sic) Answer, respondent (defendant herein) alleged:
4. That defendant also DENIES the allegations in paragraphs 6 and 7 of complaint, the truth of
the matter being that defendant is the exclusive occupant of said lot since 1989 and that he built
thereon a residential house from his own resources as a consequence of which he has been
registered as the qualified beneficiary of the property as is (sic) indicated in the Beneficiary
Evaluation and Qualification Form issued by the National Government Center – Housing Project
on August 18, 1997, copy attached as ANNEX "C" hereof. (Answer, p. 2; Records, p. 167)
(Emphasis supplied)
Going over Annex "C" (records, p. 24) or the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form which
bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1, Our attention was caught by the words "CARETAKER" written on
the top of the entry BIENVENIDO/GLORIA BARRIENTOS.
We also find, appended to petitioner's Reply to Answer with Special Defense and Counterclaim
(records p. 50), a Census Survey Certificate that bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1 with a notation
"Registered to Rapal family."
xxxx
But considering Our preceeding (sic) findings and the fact that the Beneficiary Evaluation and
Qualification Form submitted by the respondent himself bears no indication that it was tampered,
We are inclined to believe the version maintained by the petitioner. The mark "CARETAKER"
purports what it explicitly states; that is, Bienvenido C. Barrientos was only a caretaker of the
subject lot.
Consequently, and taking into consideration the great number of affidavits and evidence in favor
of the petitioner, We find that the petitioner was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.16
Thus, based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be deduced that petitioner's
occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted by
respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact in his Beneficiary
Evaluation and Qualification Form. Moreover, all other supporting evidence, such as the Census
Survey Certificate17 and construction material receipts,18 bolster the fact that respondent was in
prior possession of the property before petitioner entered the same by mere tolerance of the
respondent.
Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, since
petitioner's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.19
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one
who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the
parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are
intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands
purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical
or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in
nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with
finality.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 29, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 1, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No.
68482, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194880 June 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both
represented by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs.
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein
with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are
registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito
Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject
matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with
an area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent
(80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent
(20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.2 Petitioners are being represented in this case by the
Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and
disposal of government assets.3 Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
(Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the
meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,4 petitioners
leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center
Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31
December 2002.5 Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted
TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.6
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to
respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although
these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them contained common provisions on
the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration
date of TRCFI’s main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of
respondent:8
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable] months
commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive
option.9
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed "to return or
surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of
the sublease contract or any renewal or extension thereof."10
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting
of several commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the
other open spaces on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the
Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions
previously performed by TRCFI.13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the
sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent
expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and
proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even date, it
also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject
property under the new rental rate and renewal period.15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had already
been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.16 It further explained that the
proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither
could the proposed rental payments be accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the
letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect
to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC –
through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel – notified PDAF of the
former’s decision not to renew the contract of lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s
decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q.
Flores likewise notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The
Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and
to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25
June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew
the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements
with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over
the subject property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred
the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to
occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to completely
vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the
OSG through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property.26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate
within 15 days.27 When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the
property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair rental
value of the subject property and petitioners’ lost income – a loss arising from the refusal of
respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and
sublease agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the
fair rental value of the subject property was ₱ 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar
owed petitioners a total of ₱ 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be
ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income
owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after proper
proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons,
natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully
surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs
damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (₱ 630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use
and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount
of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 10,364,000.00) per
month from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely
vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of petitioners
in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract
existed between them.31 In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was
more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent
had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed
respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’ Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied
the Motion for Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its Answer35
to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed
a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the
RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a
petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the
outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an
exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,40 which was subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the
certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari
Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint
for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.43 The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the
filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract
and the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
I the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues that
merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly,
petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision
was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a
certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by
petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing
an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition under Rule
65.46 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.47 This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law."49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.50 The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the
RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful
detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary
Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and
granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged
with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for
the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules
on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the
MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The
prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.53 The RTC should
have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited
pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for
Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of Appeals57 to justify a
certiorari review by the RTC owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases,
there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited
pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure – conditions that are not availing in
the case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-
Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-
lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the
Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary
tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary
period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day
period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered
his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed
a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant
in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner,
moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a
petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The
RTC, however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper
disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless
allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708)
is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling.
When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from
judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief
from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the
Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are
juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of
Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form
of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him
through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from
judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the
rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC
of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged
therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx 58 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in
the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC.
In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance
involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party
appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was
not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed
the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the
appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition
for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party
was deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding.
Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic
that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals
from interlocutory orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived
to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress."
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a
petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught "between Scylla and Charybdis"
in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary
circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective
of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules.’ (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit
petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays
and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the
MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely,
a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the
extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the
Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case
and negate the rationale of the said Rules.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are
not comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause
of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special
civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit
pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject
of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog
are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot
claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary
judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify
respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s
adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy
for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer.
Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary
ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on
account of respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by
filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would
constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to
liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings,
lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax
the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected
parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition – whether the Complaint filed
by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an
accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of
the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If,
as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on
03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the
one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning
period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then
petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and,
hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold possession may – by virtue of any express or implied
contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an action in the municipal trial
court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with
damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only
after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon
the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the
premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in
the case of buildings.61
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,62 the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an
unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding
is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court.
The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the
case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the latter’s enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.63
"On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than
one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana."64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for
unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property
from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration
of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject
property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It
was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to
turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer
suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period
should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is
not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last
demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an
action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s
last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful."66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last
demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint – filed on 25
February 1997 – from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier
demand letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property
located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house
and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C
without paying any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because their
possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the
property; and that one year had elapsed from respondent’s demand given on "July 3, 1995" when
the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and
that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for
to vacate sent to them. the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.

Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful SO ORDERED.
detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason
being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let
the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25,
1997 was well within the one year reglementary period.69 (Emphasis supplied.)

From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003),
respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any
express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally
occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners –
petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the
final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and
without any contract between them, respondent is "necessarily bound by an implied promise" that
it "will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them."70 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have
vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in
which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint
was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.

The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008,
which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit.
Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar
and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to
Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied
promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary
action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.

In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders
of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an
ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original
demand.71 If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original
demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first
demand.72 However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of
fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings
for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008
Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule
45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.

The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the
expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has
paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or
sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that
almost a decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of
the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to
speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime property
of the government located in the country’s business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011,
filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the
Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan
G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012
FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO,
LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA,
BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON,
AIDA CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING,
JOSE ESCASINAS, GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA,
EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA,
NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO
NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO,
FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR
SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares
Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of
Appeals’ decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City,
Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77, by
dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s complaint for ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto
Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo
Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon,
Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas,
Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera, Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño,
Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon Macairan,
Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo Pacate,
Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos, Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio
Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay
San Dionisio, Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioner’s cause of action
was not for unlawful detainer but for recovery of possession. The appellate court affirmed this
decision in its resolution of August 22, 2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters, located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing
leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered
with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period upon mutual
agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or occupants. The
LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the
LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement
from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the
LESSEE any and all damages that may be recovered from the occupants.5 (Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease contract was
executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the petitioner
demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay a
monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an
ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the Parañaque City MeTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then
brought the dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to
File Action on March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint, incorporating
the proceedings before the barangay before the summons and copies of the complaint were
served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that as lessee of the
subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the land. He
alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less
any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered
owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed to vacate the
property without legal justification. He prayed that the court order the respondents; (1) to vacate
the premises; (2) to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999 until they vacate
the premises; and (3) to pay him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of
suit.13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of the
land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract between
the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The respondents also
presented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in their
favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and
for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing
of a baseless and malicious suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were submitted, the
MeTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 of January 27, 2003, the MeTC
held that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that their occupation was merely
by the owner’s tolerance. It further noted that the respondents could no longer raise the issue of
ownership, as this issue had already been settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the
annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before the RTC, Branch 260, of Parañaque City, which
ruled that the registered owner’s title was genuine and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is
not divested of jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents’ assertion of ownership of
the property. On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate the premises and
to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the date of
filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs
of suit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that no legal basis
exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by tolerance, "where the possession of
the defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be no
tolerance."16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision17 on October 8,
2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment was proper. The petitioner, as lessee,
had the right to file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land by mere tolerance
and their possession became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to vacate on April 28, 1999.
The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or
within one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar,
etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a case for unlawful detainer was
appropriate.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that
the respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It
defined tolerance not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another
occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or
neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the
property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was not alleged and there could
be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents’ allegation that they had been in possession of
the land before the petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having been
in possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an
ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the only
issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a property. The
petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a
possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the
land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC,
Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
amended complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises before us the following
issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED
ON RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
III WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE
MERITS TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action
may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of
the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of
an express or implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s possession became
illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to
heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the
court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and
the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in support of his
unlawful detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and
registered in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the
aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less
any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered
owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff
referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the
defendants to vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx hereto
attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to
vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the requirements for unlawful
detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was originally legal and
his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the
start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the
property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes
the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by the
petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not
be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had taken place
at an earlier unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents occupied the
premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint nor any supporting
evidence on record, however, shows when the respondents entered the property or who had
granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s definition and
characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on
the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give
to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of
neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the
land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even
though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." Further
expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts
which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the
possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question
reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics
supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must have been present
at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful
detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s
possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s allegation that the entry
to the subject property was unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when a complaint is
silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty
Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant immediately occupied the
subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance." The Court
expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they did not contain anything substantiating
the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of the property by the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that its cause of action is for
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that plaintiff’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from
the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation of the premises has not
been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly
ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — an action that had already
prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of
one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual entry into the
land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack of knowledge of
the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation that there had been
tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant of
permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but
ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally wanting as
to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical possession of
the premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up to the present. For sure,
the petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of their
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their having
been in possession of the property at one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity
of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint
which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy
the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As
the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish
its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as
an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription
period from the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry.
Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that
right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.
If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then
the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one
year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics
supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the respondents of possession
over a property that they have held for at least eight years before the case was filed in 1999, by
means of a summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the word "tolerance" without
sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.
There was no change in the
respondents’ theory during
the appeal that would amount
to a deprivation of the petitioner’s
right to due process.
The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC the fact that
their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the
title to the property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true owner of the property
in question; (3) the petitioner’s lease contract was not legally enforceable; (4) the petitioner was
not the real party-in-interest; (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical possession
of the property; and (6) the respondents’ right of possession was based on the "Deed of
Assignment of Real Property" executed by Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance
merely on appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes a change of theory, which is
disallowed on appeal.38
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer
cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be
unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in connection with the
new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair play.39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not applicable to the
present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the petitioner’s failure to allege and
prove the essential requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v. Spouses
Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on
the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required to properly
allege and prove when the respondents entered the property and that it was the petitioner or his
predecessors, not any other persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and
occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the
case but the petitioner’s contradictory statements in his amended complaint which he even
reiterated in his other pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always
questioned the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the
respondents negated the possibility of their possession of the property under the petitioner and
his lessor’s tolerance when the respondents alleged to have occupied the premises even before
the lessor acquired the property in 1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed property, as when
he became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property described in TCT No. 52594, the
property had already been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore,
DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the property from where they are being
ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main
thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession and that the same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession
regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor
herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical possession of the property where DEFENDANTS
have already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got
his fake title to the property.42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their possession was based
on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of the estate of Domingo de Ocampo,
shows that they considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their transactions
on the property, and could not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the respondents before
the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court.43 At best, he belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum44 before this
Court that his lessor had tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of the lot, without addressing the
respondents’ allegation that they had occupied the lot in 1970, before the petitioner’s lessor
became the owner of the property in 1991, and without providing any other details. His pleadings
continued to insist on the existence of tolerance without providing the factual basis for this
conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the
petitioner of due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the case based on the issue
of tolerance.
The Court cannot treat an ejectment
case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile
the case serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment case and
decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable
and their differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be treated as
an accion publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also
applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we
rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be
filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana
is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is
concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real property; in accion
publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real property. Third,
an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion
publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical
possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible
entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the
issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are
summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide
for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to
properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance
of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might
take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.49 An ejectment case
cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or
ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals51 describes
in detail how these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect
the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the
parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of
a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the
property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual
security and disturbing to social order.1âwphi1 Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be
the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually
in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right.
[italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file ejectment cases instead of
plenary actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings cases which the rules intend
to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle
complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious and would no
longer serve the purpose for which they were created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting
congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of system would
assist the courts in protecting and preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision dated March
14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80116. SO ORDERED.