1. What is Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvidicatora?

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. (ERDONCILLO vs. SPOUSES
BENOLIRAO, G.R. No. 118328. October 8, 1998).

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the
proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

2. What is a Sugar Quedan? Is it a negotiable instrument?

A quedan is a document certifying to the amount of sugar a planter has to his credit at a sugar mill. The instrument
may be traded among merchants who then, armed with the quedan, may claim the corresponding amount of the
commodity from the mill.

3. What is the relation/difference between Sec. 14 of PD 1529 and the acquisitive prescription of the New Civil
Code

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art.
420-422 of the New Civil Code.

It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the
State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is converted into
patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive
act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.

Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was classified
as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.

Applying to the case at bar:

Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was
presented.

Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
 evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. (Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, August 6, 2017)

4. Read G.R. NO. 154953 June 26, 2008 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154953 : June 26, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering
Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to
6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of People's Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.6 All adjoining owners
and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands
(petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default against the whole world
except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial
court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file
his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial
court reinstated the Order of General Default.

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony
Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent's Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case;
Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth;
and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.

The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful,
adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death,
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio
executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato).
Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial
Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero Dimayuga
(Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to Respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity
and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts
showed that respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June
1945, which possession converted the land to private property.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and
decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in
Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square
meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied
with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of
Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional
witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Evangelista's testimony.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed
not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were
practically neighbors. On Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the
land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle
when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy's death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the
events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome
was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to
cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness' testimony.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact
that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the
following:

1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; andcralawlibrary

2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.13

The Issues

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; andcralawlibrary

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Respondent Failed to Prove

that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part
of the public domain.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State.14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.15

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(CENRO), Batangas City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925."
The second certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional
Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC
No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated
the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained
the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as
the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116
square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of
land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects;
andcralawlibrary

4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; andcralawlibrary

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to
the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated
therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; andcralawlibrary

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication21 of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar22
in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified copies
or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by
adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within
the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not,
by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima
facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not
constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's representative,
identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents
of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents of the certifications
are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29
Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct
any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The
DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable
and disposable on 31 December 1985.

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan
states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan
merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does
not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's classification.31 However, respondent should have at least
presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II,
testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of
Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions
of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the
Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the
other certifications submitted by Respondent.

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious

Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced.
Petitioner alleges that Evangelista's statement that the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was
open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than
factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its
predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was
declared alienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only
worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy's land.
The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of Kabesang Puroy's possession of
the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically
neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:

In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that
people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or
events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the
reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.33

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not
know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a
small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's
testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio,
not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the
fact of respondent's acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of
their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible
explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were
allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

Land Application by a Corporation

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public
domain in this case.

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the
public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring
agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were
citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino
citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution
continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x x

[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of
alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided
parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots
from one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who
already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him.
An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in
the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional
intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical
benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme
acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in
favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited
private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its
owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could
acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144
hectares.39

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for
the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period,
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
The Court ruled:

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. x x x.40 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private
property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997
from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent
acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of
title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for
at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been
converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the
latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.

Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973
Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private
property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land
registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law
because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of
the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period.
Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for
the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:

Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of
time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been
filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable
and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply
for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for
the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a
private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already
become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the
land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658
and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo, pp. 63-70. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
Cosico and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.

3 Id. at 56-61. Penned by Judge Flordelis Ozaeta Navarro.

4 Records, p. 78.

5 Id. at 81.

6 Id. at 66.

7 Id. at 69.

8 Id. at 99.

9 Id. at 101.

10 Id. at 111.

11 Also referred to as Forting.

12 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

13 Id. at 173-174.

14 Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 585.

15 Id.

16 Records, p. 143. Signed by CENR Officer Pancrasio M. Alcantara.

17 Id. at 91. Signed by Wilfredo M. Riña.

18 Delineation of Regulatory Functions and Authorities.

19 Revised Regulations on the Delineation of Functions and Delineation of Authorities.

20 On 2 June 1998, DAO No. 98-24 was issued, adopting a DENR Manual of Approvals delegating authorities and
delineating functions in the DENR Central and Field Offices. DAO No. 98-24 superseded DAO Nos. 38 and 38-A
and all inconsistent orders and circulars involving delegated authority. DAO No. 98-24 is silent on the authority to
issue certificates of land classification status, whether for areas below 50 hectares or for lands covering over 50
hectares. The CENRO certification in this case was issued prior to the adoption of the DENR Manual of Approvals.

21 Salic v. Comelec, 469 Phil. 775 (2004).

22 Article 410, Civil Code.

23 Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, 220 Phil. 356 (1985).

24 Delfin v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, 17 March 2006, 485 SCRA 38.

25 Ambayec v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162780, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 537.

26 Supra note 23.

27 Id.

28 Id.

29 People v. Patamama, 321 Phil. 193 (1995).

30 Rollo, p. 152.

31 Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).

32 Rollo, p. 67.

33 Id. at 68.

34 Ganila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 435.

35 433 Phil. 506 (2002).

36 Id.

37 Id. at 557-559.
 38 230 Phil. 590 (1986).

39 Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides: "No private corporation or association may acquire,
lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual
acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty four hectares, or by lease in excess of one
thousand and twenty four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing,
not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association."

40 230 Phil. 590, 602 and 605 (1986).

41 G.R. No. 88233, 4 October 1991, 202 SCRA 493.

42 Approved on 13 November 2002. An earlier law, Republic Act No. 6940, had extended the period up to 31
December 2000 under the same conditions.

43 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

5. Read G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.

Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means
of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may
acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal
which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another
case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest
upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the
constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be
made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment
simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing
the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not
be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of
appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only
had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being
prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all
register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee
was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which
had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision
of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending
before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the
Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important,
is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its
constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear
and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be
brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many,
with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court,
because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very
unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court
to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a
permanent offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal
result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of
the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide
that question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind
of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and
utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the
public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public
domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds
corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural
lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the
Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.

As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See
Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral
nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government
(13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be
included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture,
but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of
Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only
whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the
test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were
classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural
lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands.
It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when
they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.

Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been
in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have
used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs.
Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a
word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been
employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918
E, 581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal
meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such
citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for,
under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a
particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural
or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands
for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said
statute and under the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874,
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution
and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely
stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under
section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes
could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is
used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land"
includes land for residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not
the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to
include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short,
sharp and crystal-clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the
term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more
of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as
agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character
of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other
words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a
person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief
Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon
who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary
of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of
both administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have
always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But
this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly
to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons
who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute
will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public
and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same
in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the
property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of
Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for
such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind
that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential
lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially
is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to
private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant
disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public
domain shall have become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later
changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these
changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the
meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The
wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The
words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and
mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the
same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it
is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private,
and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the
first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is
merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible
confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not,
in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative
spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was
embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute
the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign
authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate
Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the
privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land
Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.)
And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our
lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in
Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs
of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not
completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we
shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence
are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.)
Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego,
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who
are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And,
indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly
passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to
the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized
in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same
are in force but not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of
any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine
Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the
same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this
section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated
within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of
the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature,
to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In
other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands
terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so:
Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event
of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being
transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands
or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference
being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This,
undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in
prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative
construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new
Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We
are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land
that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the
instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in
the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its
origin might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or
take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction
between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The
prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation
and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found
necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But
clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion
that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it
is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely
into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however,
that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since
their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future
generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in
this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of
causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most
important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to
be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who
expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they
may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial
moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to
affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to
inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for
racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success,
saving our people from a looming catastrophe.

On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The
case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen
of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that
"the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions
of the Constitution."

On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands
appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two
assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as
follows:

The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who, according to
his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos — who, while
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the
Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee,
but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.

As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is,
six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court
was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in
February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the
office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after
being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for
decision on July 3, 1946.

After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal
question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming
majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore
the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided
once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be
alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the
appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not
necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which
appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four
printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in
which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the question.

The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated
on the constitutional question for several days.

On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question
was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds
of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.

While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10,
1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the
rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to
whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.

Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its
conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all.
Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?

Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court
should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24,
1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest
tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.

After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and
and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr.
Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in
a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section
2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be
promulgated.

Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of
casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members
of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion,
and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final
result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.

But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by
the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of
the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12,
1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:

TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)

"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or
any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national,
may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in
section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those
who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284,
series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the
Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.

"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the
Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens
are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the
Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."

ROMAN OZAETA

Secretary of Justice

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:

Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is transferred,
assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, the
registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed
by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that
he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5,
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.

The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and
tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:

In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed
a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter
specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice
Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation
was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be
asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court
by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to
withdraw is considered denied.

Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of
seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once
on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present
at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4.
Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of
Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority to
agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for
withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.

Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to
withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices
voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules, the
petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr.
Justice Padilla.

Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were
granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the
same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present.
The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice
Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month
afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5.
Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence,
was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he
changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for
reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice
Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in
the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the
vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on
grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.

The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings
and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote
on the question.

Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became
moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter,
wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important
constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did
not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision.

If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this
Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago,
the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution,
aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great
majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.

The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The
uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to
what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public
morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already
knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with
which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of
Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most
cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new
one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the
darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria,
irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of
Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese,
Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the
greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the
hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.

Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to
defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First
came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown
immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their
sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment.
Taking advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience,
resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its
tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and
bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to
acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other means of moral
intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of
many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their
property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious
purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and
under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the
situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only
against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.

Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the
fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be
disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted
to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war,
said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a
means of insuring racial safety and survival.

When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and
our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the
Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like
the one now before us.

One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it
"shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and
branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article
XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino
citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our
people until, by constitutional amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by
hereditary succession — the only exception allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire
any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional
Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating
thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style — the
drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite
by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.

The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized.
If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of
alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may
create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which
we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the
Throne," we quote the following:

It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock
example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The
1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it
was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next
legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had
completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had
bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading
citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the
grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.

But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had
bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it
was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as
it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in
his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall
rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A
weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may
be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial
diffidence on state occasions.

We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal
technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had
fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In
our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe
sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.

We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the
prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public officials
have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in
charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts
so that any and all violations which may have taken place should be corrected.

We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen,
could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the
appealed decision, which we affirm.

HILADO, J., concurring:

Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of
appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant
the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating
were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The
resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which
it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the
withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have
concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the
court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court.
Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be
denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits.

After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that
I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead
and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and
independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once
the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and
confidence in each department must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that
confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the
people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this
Court.

I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was
issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14,
which was already amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban
lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the
serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the
constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty,
peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in
advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree from
public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other governmental
departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue.

I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented,
namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of
residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not covered by
the decision.

With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief
Justice, I have signed said decision.

BRIONES, M., conforme:

Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y
compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones,
particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario.

I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones
este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por
una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa — impaciencia que solo
puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime
tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha
demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.

A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido
demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica
contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias.
En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no
tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la
densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde
el 24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones
judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta
Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a
paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los
abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene
redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas
sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.

Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con
tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del
apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto
informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador
General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten
acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion
constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte,
entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.

Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia,

pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los
miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion
4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez
que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y
promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la
discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion
a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que
pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la
sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical
de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero
otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes
publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente;
que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion
constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y
positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota
era eso — la interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la
Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.

Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que
la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un
cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la
circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues
de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su
texto se copia integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de
transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo
Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e
inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados
residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en
ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario
de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo
Departamento — la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos
— y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o
documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de
terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura
fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no
esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en
elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es precisamente el objeto del presente
asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la
jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de
nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor
inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.

A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida
insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser
adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales,
comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su
mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la
apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is
now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He
aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:

In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No. 14 by
expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor
General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties
and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.1

Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los
tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la
administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno
constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania
americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y
autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el
ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en
las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en
la Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto
cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era tradicionalmente
absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria
estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian
absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley
Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del
Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la
Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le
nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza!

No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y
dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y
en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares, ya de
caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca
de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima
naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de
propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega
solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada
circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que
determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone
terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse
en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna
facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con
la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto
integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:

SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. — When
the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any party in interest
does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the
judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the
register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in
interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in
case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken or memorandum to be made.

Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de

laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular
num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron
susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos
ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num.
1289; ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la
apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la
prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de
dicha circularnum. 14:

. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless and /or until otherwise specifically
directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial,
so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones
esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion
pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara
naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el
cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado
con el poder judicial,maxime si esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede
imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada
con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En casos
recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional,
prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que hacer constar que
con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de
verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por
desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar
su excepcion sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu
independencia.

Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por
dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion
delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion
constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General
es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no
ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de
los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:

Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief. After that
brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una
delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre
unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el
Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente
demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino — ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo,
parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.

Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener
queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca,
llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra mañera. ¿ Podemos
soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi,
esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en
virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad
de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de
Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica
disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el
Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o
interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.

El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las
disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese
trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que
entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14.
Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el
registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los
extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno
publico. ¿ Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier
otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes,
consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados
para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva
tambien debe descartarse totalmente.

Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que
puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contra
Gaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora
pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque
cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los
casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe
decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao
practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otra
manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro
modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente
caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros
asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de
parsimonia, lentitud.

¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon
de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber ineludible,
imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo
debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros
residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion
de lugar, podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian
donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de
que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8 contra 3);
la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya
cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya
para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia.
Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema
naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de
vigia, de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.

No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de
suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal
cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao
arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema
de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade
disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano
solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta
concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este
articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo
ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la
determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.

Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para
resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del
Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una
sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas
veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que
mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones
de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una
sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla:
nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas:
hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual
y coordinado del gobierno.

Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir
queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no
solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros."
Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su
conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin
consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.

Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion
queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56,
seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar
enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y
para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia
de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas
deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun
Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la
votacion, no obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir,
5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde esta, pues,
la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?

Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como
ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del
Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba
presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta
la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo?
¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la
cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada,
es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.

II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas
observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en
este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea
Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.

Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel
articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:

SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es
lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.

Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como
untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de
quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del
estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to
diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.

Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico,
y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.

La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado
y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que
el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela
frase "public agricultural land."

La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine
bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold,
subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba y
esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."

No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende
terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres.
Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural"
aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?
Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta
jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia
firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados
Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales,
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir, que se
aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra
jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.

Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado
— y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda
parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? ¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna
definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa definicion? ¿O es que
se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o
"private", segun que se trate de terrenopublico o privado?

Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun
significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo
texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a
terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma
Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion,
esto es, aplicar la definicion de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra
manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade
miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.

Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor
de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela
Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero indudablemente no era inferiora
ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos
versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr.
Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos
prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado
comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o
dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon
Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la
Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon.
NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes
Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.

No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un
articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos
publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en
una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion
en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la
Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no
diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta
intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin — la establecida
en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la
palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e
industriales.

A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different
intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute
should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may
vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)

Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno
particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La
suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que
en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente
sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje
popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones
especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de
matices e idiotismos?

Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en la
definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel
Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster
que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class;
agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular.
Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately
owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna
definicion;da por definida la palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.

Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken
of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for
such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . The criterion is notmere
susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode
que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique
alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen
encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial
se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por
cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes
estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera
dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota
cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.

Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de
losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras, concretas y
definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es
agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria?
Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se
considera comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero
¿resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro
de una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que
es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos son agricolas por
naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaña mas pedregosa y
el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur.
Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una
correctare solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber:

. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay
dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por
su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado
Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y
el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La
Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.

La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes
preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la
tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor
de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde
propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster
¿que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada
enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean
corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?

Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque
el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas
logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en
el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — criterio mas frime, mas
seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes",
parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185).

Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo
determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous, corporaciones o
asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley." Si
seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e
industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida
por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser
dueños de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a
terrenos residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la
tesis sustentada por elapelante.

Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde
la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo
"agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se añadio la palabra calificativa
agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser
poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e
industriales, limitandose el precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.

La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso
equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion
no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que
la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en
nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien
residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el
articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay,
despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno
no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en que el
uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular.

En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque
los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en
algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero
es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar — una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes,
lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las
cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi
paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para
de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto
constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo
mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no
ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.

Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion
delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin
cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria
para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna
importancia. Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural"
empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo.

III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la
motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz
en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y
permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia.
Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este
efectolo sigiuente:

When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be
accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which
framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be
valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this
source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)

¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema
capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y ¿como era
tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la
Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?

Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante

entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era
evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes
generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un
significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y
representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que
constanen el diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto
constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula
que desempeñaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental,
conspicuo representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:

. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro
patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son
inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de
posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones
Asamblea Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).

Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y
privada.

El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la
Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:

La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueños de
propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para
mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag.
593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la
Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice
el Comite:

Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion
filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y
para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)

La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente.
Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el
preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas
resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:

The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall enbody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y
recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth,
sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd asegurar firmemente las
basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela
mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales
cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida?

Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos
debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones
demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos
roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas — centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas,
avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales.
China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y
militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de
Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli una especie
de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra
existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con
Manchuko.

Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y
otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion el error de
susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.

Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se

haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras
cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.

Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo
rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple:
(a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la
propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener
elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how)
superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales
comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se
trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como
para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola,
sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?

Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que,
noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se les
concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco en el mismo
plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada
reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.

The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the
legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is
to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so
read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words
used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal
interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)

IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre
terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el
caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es
majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las
soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.

Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel
pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden
disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional
mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en
una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.

El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman
gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la
disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres
cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.

En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo
interpretamos en nuestra decision.

Se confirma la sentencia.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is whether private
residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands
suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of the three classes.

But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the
Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion — which is at once
absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a
mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never be
private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber
and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only
to public agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that
all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely proclaims ownership by
the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the
Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands
theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that
lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the
Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before
the Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in
Cariño vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native
who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral.
However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or
mineral lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in
sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?

SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations,
or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law.

SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals,
corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law,
and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that
private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held
applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be
neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only,
and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.

In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and the term
"agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to
agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said
provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty would have been
comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore
significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can
ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and
said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On
the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed
to remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be
necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of
expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or
ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms
"private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be
private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of
Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe
that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3
and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be
expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as
private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private
timber or mineral land.

Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto,
Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII,
explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat
confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section
"is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists."

Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer
inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de
misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por
Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, señores.
Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como
siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la
reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble
Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes
ahorao existentes despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el
procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya
presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion
que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho
precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos
limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de
propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado
desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon
de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se
extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta
pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes
que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia
ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por
otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por nuetro
pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para
solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.

Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez demostrado
ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este
laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura
puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que
todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los
opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este
el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces
presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer
que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que
fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a
ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que
ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o medidas
imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces
en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por
desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto
porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido
fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la
justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.

Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra
revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la
Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion,
va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando
este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo,
cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion.

Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo autorizar a
la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.

Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo con exito
porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan un issue de esta
disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten
las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo
mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la
que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no
comunistas. ¿Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros
pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"

Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla a los votos
de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque
prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes
propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer
de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la
luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio
haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a
propiedad.

Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso
agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)

I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands,
private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President,
extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If
the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed
discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I
do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already
yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)

Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does
not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms
"private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5, if consistency is to be
attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect
that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly
mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the
preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must
have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development
and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the
explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of
Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give
reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the
Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.

The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not
controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held
that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after
a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the
definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for
the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the
only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land"
as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
(Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)

The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the
Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any
previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines
with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent
and is strongly implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition
contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured
under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public
domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since
they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they
become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to
foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional
objective. In the case before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally
acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.

The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No.
2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or
industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only
be valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of
"public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of the
Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public
residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a
limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership prior to the
approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial, Legislative
and Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral
and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our
position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain,
our view is that private residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of
Article XIII. Let us particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading
case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July
15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lots
forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is
clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941,
expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding
transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural
lands is applicable."

This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of
Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department
quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land"
in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial
or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch
of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code
which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.

There is no conflict between the two opinions.

Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural lands
while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is
not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article
XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain
are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not
agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural
lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included
within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in
favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions
formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic
of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National
Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire
directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other
improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless
authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true
that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any
persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial
determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the
opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous
transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any
opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our
Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained
in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.

I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be
blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its
provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not
express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens,
as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either
by its amendment or by Congressional action.

There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of
the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright.
In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a
court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such
question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a
court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only
possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there
might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's
brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be
exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.

In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to
teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present,
seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros
was absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the
withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and
the motion denied under the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to
observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later
deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for
excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who
originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the
circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of
residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its
constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A.
Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice
issued while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for
wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and
the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the
functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.

In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to
issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take
advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the
Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in
question is objectionable, the same can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect
prohibiting the registration of transfers of private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in
this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the
only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and
notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as
hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision
holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the
appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the
constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words,
the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to
annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept
the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our
indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest
implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in,
the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in
introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority.
Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this
Court to pass upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs.
Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case,
I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the
country, there will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the
constitutional prohibition.

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties
having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to
give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to
know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.

There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It
must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on
constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p.
101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other
Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be
erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent
Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the
registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several
probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or
creditors of the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in
a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice.
It is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that
in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately
touched or improperly considered.

It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject
to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such
conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by
the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was
approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese
authorities had shown distaste for such transfers.

The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting
politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and
vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:

(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the
time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the
approval of the Constitution;7

(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United
Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United
States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the
United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the
Commonwealth Government?

The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for
withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am
convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood — not
including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a
restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by
legislation amplifying it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and
highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for
residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included
in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion
that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot
be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10
Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But
the opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in
the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the
Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified
into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those
belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which was neither
timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The
susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of
such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would
hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet
the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the
public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide
or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is
contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common
or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874.
Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations
described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural
land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section
24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may
acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or
residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any
permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however, That
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold
agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that
belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a
real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at
the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey,
or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of
this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or
other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:

Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation,
or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That any
person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes
under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes
referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 121 of the Act provides:

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with
regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who
may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
used for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither
timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from
acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the
Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to
alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and
improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under
the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person
irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all
the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from
acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy
of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private agricultural lands,
constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919 to 1935.
There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which
would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease
lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can
it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase
private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or
residence purposes were not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason
for believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the
intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private
ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings
of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from
the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or
intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory
prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of
private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately
owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of
private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the
effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however,
included among the excluded, because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land
grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25
June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution,
and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal
by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act
No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the
Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it.

The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of
Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.

There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant
— whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had
never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not
apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat —

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos
baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain,
or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .

is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it
violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs.
Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited
case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is
exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not
be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it
must avoid offending against the constitutional provision referred to above.

Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case,
despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be
exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional
questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do
not express their opinion on a consitutional question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of
the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government
may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is
only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course,
the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from and be made by this
Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is
that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple
that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and
especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its
opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is
unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of
the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the
Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be
justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that
eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the
constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the
course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment
to the Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted
the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional
provision in question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom,
foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive possession
of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out
by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment
or repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment.

In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and
consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth,
the judgment under review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as
we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise
it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and
could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed
what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in
search of the ideal result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor
General gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:

5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section?
Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of
constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors.

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect to
the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent
meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead
to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)

Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or
logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the
exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the
common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with
the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary
gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)

Marshall , Ch. J., says:

The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words in
their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed.,
23).

Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction
where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read
into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade
the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty
to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)

There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation
of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the
same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.

That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the
sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is
another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to
aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The
express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind.

Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what
lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines
this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class;
agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the
word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to
mean agricultural lands. They are either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings,
communities are divided into residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the
ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its
improvement as agricultural land.

If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will
dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be
assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee
on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the
incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:

SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned
by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold
lands in the Philippine Islands.

In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven
embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural
development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural
resources:

SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.

But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n
General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with
President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned
by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)

The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in
the phraseology.

It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the
Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without
regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the
word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose
was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not
partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby
eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended.

In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's
decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the
premises.

According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the
provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and
avoid uncertainties."

If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and
obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid
uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the
result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which
would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.

But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as
"merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of
construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided
by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation
and reflection and after consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and
connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it,
did not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be
scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not
operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is
against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed
themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated,
leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men,
whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the
ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it,
must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said."
(Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)

When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the
prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other
lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the
members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to
specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.

If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral
land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only
be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable
and profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops
is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending
circumstances.

The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home
building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial
lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional
Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and
agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."

As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of
public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it
should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which
declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the
background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions
of the enactments which came up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the
classification of public lands.

In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and
manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural — can find their
way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for
posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private
persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The
majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands
allows the conveyance of private forests and mines.

In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view.
Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of
segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United
States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the
State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources may be used without waste.
Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation
of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's
natural resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural
resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United
States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.

It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an
organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members
were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the
Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades
of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline
governing the administration, exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out
by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.

It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels
of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered
itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies,
ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither
forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often
inevitable in a law or constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not
say that agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that
for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the
class of agricultural lands.

On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court
is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question
of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether
a private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the
position where it found itself with reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to
call public residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private
non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which
of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands,
and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different standards
of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective.
When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or
agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.

The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special
considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but
to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct
connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its
meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or
are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice
Story and Professor Cooley:

"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a
constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice
Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one
connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection
in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists
or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been
more common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and
subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in
some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to
measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of
Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed
too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to
adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National
Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be
sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent
appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)

As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the
Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical
import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity
and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the
Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the construction of a constitution words must be
given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which
the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution
speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase
having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not
necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from
the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical
sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal
and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the
quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are
familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for
buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of
members of the Constitutional Assembly.

The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments
expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of
the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were
relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can
be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If
anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute
nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution
the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute
convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true
when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn,
and calculated for permanent endurance."

The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the
principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other
natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court
wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is
hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal
form of expression." It is an expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not
mean all men, and every one knows we don't.

The decision says:

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and
a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that
are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly
agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public
agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution."

If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is
that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge
from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case
which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and
agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted
that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And
these are lands of the public domain.

The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is
entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private
lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or
private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural
resources either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may
have been one factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the
prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics.

From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we
cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded
was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as
agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private lands was
not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the
construction placed by the law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as
the majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be
consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the
government in a judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in
theory and in practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal,
which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of the head of his
department.

The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino
citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in
favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied
upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from
falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the
majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they public
or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be
owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.

Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII.
Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or
under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in
the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature,
whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry
such prohibition. For if the Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the
provisions of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.

The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small
jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no
similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the
ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not
barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of
his friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to
Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire
maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's
economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for communal
living and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to
some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The
importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single
foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the
political complexion or scene of the nation.

This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural
lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may
freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole
towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses,
playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural."
Arguments like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at
liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience
or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or
consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to
make citations of authorities presumptuous.

Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we
should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if
and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the
transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to
regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to
specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries,
vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude
foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original
draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave
to the political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by
foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did
that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the
Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr. Justice
Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional
legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such
prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be
given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also
because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays
 special emphasis on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141)
had been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one
of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional
Convention?

Footnotes

1 En vista de la circular num. 128 del Departamento de Justicia fechada el 12 de Agosto, 1947, la cual
enmienda la circular num. 14 en el sentido de autorizar el registro de la venta de terrenos urbanos a extranjeros, y
en vista del hecho de que el Procurador General se ha unido a la mocion para la retirada de la apelacion, ya no
existe ninguna controversia entre las partes y la cuestion es ahora academica. Por esta razon, la Corte ya no tiene
jurisdiccion sobre el caso (Traduccion; las cursivas son nuestras).

2 Vease regla 64, seccion 3, incisos c y d, Reglamento de los Tribunales.

3 Vease el asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192); vease tambien el asunto de Mabanag contra Lopez
Vito (78 Phil., 1).

4 El Congreso puede determinar por ley la extencion del terreno privado agricola que los individuos,
corporaciones, o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto alos derechos existentes antes de la
promulgacion de dicha ley.

5 Vease los siguientes asuntos: Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, 10 Jur. Fil., 178; Montano contra Gobierno
Insular, 12 Jur. Fil., 592; Santiago contra Gobierno Insular, 12 Jur. Fil., 615; Ibañez de Aldecoa contra Gobierno
Insular, 13 Jur. Fil., 163; Ramos contra Director de Terrenos, 39 Jur. Fil., 184; y Jocson contra Director de Montes,
39 Jur. Fil., 569; Ankron contra Gobierno de Filipinas, 40 Jur. Fil., 10.

6 Osorio y Gallardo.

7 Cf. Buchanan vs. Worley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16.

6. G.R. No. 194199 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, vs BODEGA GLASSWARE.

THIRD DIVISION

March 22, 2017

G.R. No. 194199

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR.,

Petitioner
 vs

BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, Respondent

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

The Case

This is a verified petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Province of
Camarines Sur (petitioner) challenging the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 31, 2010
(assailed Decision) and its Resolution3 dated October 12, 2010 (assailed Resolution). The assailed Decision affirmed
the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 26 (RTC Naga City), which in turn, reversed the ruling5
of the Municipal Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 2 (MTC Naga City) in the action for ejectment filed by the petitioner
against respondent Bodega Glassware (Bodega).

The Facts

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 22.6 On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated
around 600 square meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a
Deed of Donation Inter Vivas (Deed of Donation).7 The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause
which states:

That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in
connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.8

CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied with the conditions stated
in the deed. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated
property.9 Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing
on September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession of the property on
September 1, 1995.10

Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega
regarding the building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer requested Bodega to show proof of
ownership or any other legal document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof.
Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property.11

On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega dated October 4, 2007.12 In this letter, petitioner stated
that Bodega's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner.13 As it now intended to use the
property for its developmental projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its
peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand.14

Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its donation through a
Deed of Revocation of Donation15 (Deed of Revocation) dated October 14, 2007. It asserted that CASTEA violated the
conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic revocation
clause in the Deed of Donation, petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation.16 It appears from
the record that CASTEA never challenged this revocation.

On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. It
prayed that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner its peaceful possession. Petitioner
also prayed for the payment of ₱15,000 a month from October 2007 until Bodega vacates the land.17

In a Decision18 dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to
vacate the property and to pay ₱l 5,000 a month as reasonable compensation.19 The dispositive portion of this
Decision states:

Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered, plaintiff having established by preponderance of evidence its
cause of action against the defendant, the latter is ordered:

1) To immediately vacate and surrender to plaintiff, Province of Camarines Sur, the peaceful possession of the
portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22 registered in the name of the plaintiff with an area of
Six Hundred (600) square meters subject of the lease contract executed by CASTEA in favor of the herein defendant
dated 7 September 1995 where the defendants (sic) building is constructed, and,

2) [T]o pay plaintiff the amount of Php15,000.00 a month from date of judicial demand until it vacates the subject
properties as reasonable compensation for the use of the same.

Defendant's counterclaim is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against defendant.20

Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it in a Decision21 dated May 13, 2009. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE premises considered, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside and a new
one entered DISMISSING the above case for failure of the plaintiff to present evidence to sustain its cause of
action[. ]22

The petitioner then went up on appeal to the CA which rendered the now assailed Decision. The CA disposed of
the appeal thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May 13, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City is hereby AFFIRMED.23

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that
Bodega vacate the property. The CA explained that Bodega's possession of the property is based on its Contract of
Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA, in turn, claims ownership of the property by virtue of the Deed of Donation. According
to. the CA, while petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic
revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA. The CA
theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to ascertain if the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the
donation revoked. In support of its argument, the CA cited the ruling of this Court in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Court of Appeals.24

The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. According to it, Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code
applies in this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation
was violated. As the Contract of Lease was entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this
date to file the action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more than 12 years later. Further, the CA
added that even the revocation of thedonation was done beyond the 10-year prescriptive period. The CA also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.25

Petitioner filed this verified petition for review on certiorari challenging the assailed Decision. It argues that the CA
wrongly applied the doctrine in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. It asserts that the assailed Decision in fact
categorically stated that in donations containing an automatic revocation clause, judicial intervention is not necessary
for the purpose of effectively revoking the donation. Such a revocation is valid subject to judicial intervention only when
its propriety is challenged in court.26

In its comment, Bodega anchors its right of possession on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. It insists that the
Contract of Lease is valid because CASTEA is the owner of the property. The automatic revocation clause did not
immediately revoke the donation in the absence of a judicial declaration. It also agrees with the CA that the petitioner's
action has already prescribe d.27

The Issues

The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to the actual physical possession
of the property. The resolution of this issue requires us to look into the basis of their claims of possession. Essential to
this is the determination of the effect of the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation. We note, however,
that an action for unlawful detainer pertains only to the issue of possession de facto or actual possession. Thus, while
we may rule on the basis of the parties' claims of possession-which, in the case of the petitioner, involves an assertion
of ownership--this determination is only provisional and done solely to settle the question of possession.

The Ruling of the Court

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. These actions are
summary proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular remedy for a very specific issue. Actions for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of actual possession.28 In these actions, courts are asked to
ascertain which between the parties has the right to the possession de facto or physical possession of the property in
question.29 Its purpose is to restore the aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully establishes his or her
right to possess the property. The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully recover the
property through lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its current occupant.30
Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary proceeding and is an expeditious means to recover
possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of
ascertaining who has the better right of possession.31 Any ruling involving ownership is not final and binding. It is
merely provisional and does not bar an action between the same parties regarding the title of the property.32

An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a
situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully.33 This possession only
became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere
tolerance.34
 An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's
right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.35

When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the opposing party
occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established.36
Further, the party seeking possession must identify the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present
evidence establishing it.

In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for
occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated
Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property. Petitioner
demanded that Bodega vacate the property in November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based
on mere tolerance.

Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on its
position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as provided in the automatic
revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.

We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of ascertaining who between
petitioner and Bodega has the right to possess the property.

This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in the case of De Luna v.
Abrigo37 promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the three
categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous. A donation is
simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is remuneratory when the donor "gives something to reward past
or future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less
than the value of the donation."38 A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or future services
equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x. "39 This Court found that the donation in De Luna was
onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We then went on to explain that an
onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts and not by the law on donations. It is within this context that this
Court found an automatic revocation clause as valid.

We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties "to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy."40 In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of them the right to
rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The jurisprudence
on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
 Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the Philippines v. De las Angeles41 and Angeles v.
Calasanz42 where we held that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without
need of any judicial declaration.

In University of the Philippines, this Court held that a party to a contract with an automatic rescission clause, who
believes that there has been a breach warranting rescission, may consider the contract rescinded without previous
court action. Speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we said:

x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and
wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the other's
breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final
judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to minimize its
own damages x x x.43

We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial rescission in court in case of abuse or
error by the rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the issue becomes necessary.

Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna that:

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.44

While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations with an automatic revocation clause, we
extended this doctrine to apply to donations inter vivas in general in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. We
explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the general provisions on obligations and contracts
shall govern donations inter vivas in all matters not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Title III has no explicit
provisions for instances where a donation has an automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law
regarding automatic rescission of contracts as well as the jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory application. We
then reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a donation has an automatic revocation clause, the
occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider the
donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary
when the other party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation.
Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is
not in itself the revocatory act. "45 We also explained in this case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions arising
from an automatic revocation clause in donations, the general provisions on prescription under the Civil Code apply.
Article 764-which provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the donation in case of breach of
a condition-governs an instance where the deed of donation does not contain an automatic revocation clause.46

We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas.47 We
once again held that if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a
condition and the donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts back to the
donor without need of any judicial declaration. It is only when the donee denies the rescission or challenges its
propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper. This was also the import
of our ruling in Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata.48

In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause. The clause states:
 That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in
connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.49

The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its
offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its
charter and bylaws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above
shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph
states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x."50 We read the final clause of this
provision as an automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA
leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions.

Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the
conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of
Revocation. The records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly
considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and
immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner should have first
filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders
nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.

Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property donated
effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the prope1ty, petitioner sources its right of
possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with
CASTEA.1âwphi1 CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of
Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as
an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner
of the property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out.51 None exists in this case.
Bodega finds no basis for its continued possession of the property.

As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit against Bodega has
not prescribed.

First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on the prescription of actions for the
revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic revocation clause.52 This is
necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern cases
where a breach of a condition automatically, and without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.

Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an action for
reconveyance of the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10 years.
This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of
repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to
formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the
propriety of the revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the revocation.
Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the
revocation, no court action is necessary.

Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession. The petitioner's action for
ejectment is anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject
another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to
vacate.53 This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. The records show that
the petitioner served its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or
around four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.

We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner.

Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the property"54 and
attorney's fees and costs. More specifically, recoverable damages are "those which the plaintiff could have sustained
as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property."55

In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of Pl5,000 monthly as damages. Petitioner argued that considering
that the Contract of Lease between CASTEA and Bodega shows that the monthly rent for the property is ₱30,000, the
amount of ₱l5,000 which it prays for is fair and reasonable.56 We agree with the petitioner's position. The amount of
rent in the Contract of Lease is evidence of the fair rental value of the property. That the petitioner asked for half of this
amount as damages is reasonable given the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010
which AFFIRMED the Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the MTC Naga City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 12-26.

2 Id. at 28-41 , penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Just ices Romeo F. Barza, and
Manuel M. Barrios, concurring.

3 Id. at 62-63.

4 Id. at 82-88.

5 Id. at 109- 111.

6 Id. at 29.

7 Id. at 29; 107-108.

8 Id. at 107.

9 Id. at 30-31.

10 Id. at 3 1.

11 Id. at 16-17

12 Id. at 3 1.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Rollo, pp. 11 2- 11 3.

16 Id. at 11 2.

17 Id. at 31-32.

18 Supra note 5.

19 Rollo, p. 111.

20 Id.

21 Supra note 4.

22 Rollo, p. 88.

23 Id. at 40.

24 G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991 , 198 SCRA 300; Rollo, pp. 37-39.
25 Rollo, p. 63.

26 Id. at 18-19.

27 Id at 3 16-322

28 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755, 766.

29 University Physicians Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100424, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 86, 89.

30 Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461.

31 Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 20 12, 663 SCRA 350, 358.

32 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 18.

33 Macasaet v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 15439 1-92, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 625.

34 Republic v. luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007, 5 13 SCRA 140, 152-153.

35 Suarez v. Emboy, Jr., G .R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014, 7 18 SCRA 677, 692.

36 Quijano v. Amante, G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 20 14, 737 SCRA 552, 564-565.

37 G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150.

38 Id. at 155.

39 Id. at 156. Citation omitted.

40 Id. at 156- 157.

41 G.R. No. L-28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102.

42 G.R. No. L-42283, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 323.

43 University of the Philippines v. De los Angeles, supra note 41 at 107. Citations omitted.
 44 De Luna v. Abrigo, supra note 37 at 158

45 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 308-309.

46 Id. at 306.

47 G.R. No. 15263ovember 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 458.

48 G.R. No. 148433 September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 163.

49 Rollo, p. 107.

50 Id.

51 Ballesteros v. Abion, G .R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 23, 33.

52 Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata, G.R. No. 148433, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA
163, 18 1-1 82; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 199 1, 198 SCRA
300, 306-307.

53 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1147; RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 1.

54 Herrera v. Bollos, G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002, 374 SCRA l07, 11 2.

55 Dumo v. Espinas, G.R. No. 14 1962, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 53, 70.

56 Rollo, p. 133.